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  • Modele Rothschild Stiglitz

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    bombi sinzinkayo
    9 views10 pages
    1) The document describes a model of two groups (H and B) that receive different public goods levels (pH and pB) and income levels. 2) It defines the expected utility functions for individuals in each group, and shows that individuals will prefer the public good matching their own group if the difference in expected utilities between the goods is largest. 3) Equilibrium is found where no individual wants to switch groups, which occurs when receiving levels match individual probabilities (pi) of being in that group.

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    modele-rothschild-stiglitz

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    1) The document describes a model of two groups (H and B) that receive different public goods levels (pH and pB) and income levels. 2) It defines the expected utility functions for individuals in each group, and shows that individuals will prefer the public good matching their own group if the difference in expected utilities between the goods is largest. 3) Equilibrium is found where no individual wants to switch groups, which occurs when receiving levels match individual probabilities (pi) of being in that group.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    9 views10 pages

    Modele Rothschild Stiglitz

    Uploaded by

    bombi sinzinkayo
    1) The document describes a model of two groups (H and B) that receive different public goods levels (pH and pB) and income levels. 2) It defines the expected utility functions for individuals in each group, and shows that individuals will prefer the public good matching their own group if the difference in expected utilities between the goods is largest. 3) Equilibrium is found where no individual wants to switch groups, which occurs when receiving levels match individual probabilities (pi) of being in that group.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 10

    ● H

    pH

    ● B
    pB (1 − )

    p B < pH
    L

    j Cj = ( j
    , Ij) j

    Ij

    j
    ● CH = ( H
    = pH I H , I H = L)

    ● CB = ( B
    = pB I B , I B = L)

    Ij L
    j

    pH I H pB I B
    i

    ⇧i = �pi + (1 − pi )� i
    − �pi I i + (1 − pi ) × 0�
    = i
    − pi I i

    ⇧i = 0 ⇐⇒ i
    = pi I i

    E0

    wS wM
    i = H, B

    EU i = pi u(wM ) + (1 − pi )u(wS )

    dEU i = pi u′ (wM )dwM + (1 − pi )u′ (wS )dwS


    dwM 1 − pi u′ (wS )
    − =
    dwS pi u′ (wM )

    u(.)
    E0
    wS ≥ wM

    u′ (wS )
    u′ (wS ) ≤ u′ (wM ) ⇐⇒ ≤1
    u′ (wM )
    1 − pi
    ⇐⇒ T M S ≤
    pi

    ●
    Ii − i
    = (1 − pi )I i

    ●
    i
    = pI I i

    pi
    1−pi

    pH
    1−pH
    pB
    1−pB (wS , wM )
    E0 Ii = 0

    H B
    Ii = L
    H S

    wM = w0 − L − i
    + L = w0 − i
    = wS
    i

    TMS =
    pi
    1 − pi
    H
    H
    C
    H

    Cm = ( m
    , I m)

    ●
    m = ( pH +(1−
    )pB )I m

    ● Im

    pH + (1 − )pB
    −
    1 − ( pH + (1 − )pB )
    B
    < m
    < H

    H B

    I <L
    m

    C B′
    B
    H
    B B
    C H
    =( H
    ,I )
    H
    C =(
    B B
    ,I )
    B

    EU H (C H ) ≥ EU H (C B )
    EU B (C B ) ≥ EU B (C H )

    pH u(w0 − H
    − L + I H ) + (1 − pH )u(w0 − H
    ) ≥ pH u(w0 − B
    − L + I B ) + (1 − pH )u(w0 − B
    )
    pB u(w0 − B
    − L + I B ) + (1 − pB )u(w0 − B
    ) ≥ pB u(w0 − H
    − L + I H ) + (1 − pB )u(w0 − H
    )

    H B
    B′′
    C
    E0
    H B′′
    C C
    B H

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