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Postpositivist Political Theory

Joscha Wullweber

The Encyclopedia of Political Thought

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UCHENNA OHANU

Post st ruct ural Research in Int ernat ional Polit ical Economy
Joscha Wullweber

Post -posit ivist met at heory and research in Int ernat ional Rela-t ions: A comparison of neo-gramscian, …
Aram Ziai
 P
Postpositivist Political
Theory
Joscha Wullweber
Introduction
D
There is no such thing as a coherent, unified
postpositivist political theory. Postpositivist
TE
political theory is rather an umbrella descrip-
tion, which is loosely used to group together
a  variety of different theories and approaches
EC
that critically engage with different forms of
essentialism in the political and social sciences –
assumptions reflected in conventional, tradi-
tional, and especially positivist thoughts. Among
R
other paradigms, the term postpositivism
encompasses poststructuralism, most feminist
R
theories, critical theory (in the sense imposed
by  the Frankfurt School), critical realism, the
O
interpretative tradition, and neo-Gramscian
approaches, notwithstanding the tendency, on
C
the part of many scholars representing these
N
currents of thought, to reject the label of
postpositivism.
U
The term postpositivism is often used inter-
changeably with terms such as poststructuralism
or postfoundationalism. Although no clear-cut
theoretical framework exists, it is possible to
find a common ground among the differing
The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
0002106217.INDD 1
FS
O
O
approaches and to highlight a number of salient
points that link them together. In one way or
PR
another, all these theories challenge the explicit –
and very often the implicit – assumptions
inherent in such theories as rational choice,
game theory, (post)behaviorism, (neo)realism,
or (neo)liberalism (see, for example, Friedman
1953; Krasner 1996; Katzenstein, Keohane, &
Krasner 1998; Gilpin 2001; Mueller 2003;
Shapiro 2005; Sobel 2006; Frieden, Lake, &
Schultz 2009). They reject uncritical objectivism
and the possibility of prediction in social and
political sciences. They contest the conception
of social sciences as natural sciences. And they
dispute the Weberian claim that science should
be neutral and value-free (Weber 1949). In fact,
they strongly question the notion that science
can be viewed at all as a neutral venture.
According to postpositivist approaches, science
simultaneously shapes and is shaped by society,
and every theory is biased and partisan (Shapiro
1981). Following this line of reasoning, there is
no logical distinction between the political and
the social (or the economic, or the cultural). As
a result, all spheres of society, including science,
are inherently political (but not necessarily
always politicized). Traditional political science
approaches are accused of being complicit with
existing unequal power relations, and even of
supporting prevailing states of power. The
3/4/2014 8:39:17 AM
 2 postpositivist political theory
notion of power and the analysis of power rela-
tions are, accordingly, pivotal to postpositivist
theory.
Engaging with postpositivism requires crit-
ical engagement with positivism, which is not
a clear-cut concept either (for an introduction
to the debate, see Smith, Booth, & Zalewski
1996; Steinmetz 2005). Halfpenny (1982) dis-
tinguishes 12 different forms of positivism,
and Giedymin (1975) indicates that there are
about 64 possible positivist mutations.
Following Blaikie (2007: 110–11), it is pos-
sible to identify some rules that are largely
accepted as constituting positivism in the
English-speaking world after World War II:
phenomenalism (the uniqueness of pure
experience as the only reliable basis for
scientific knowledge, not contaminated by
any theoretical notions; a theoretically unme-
diated access to empirical facts); nominalism
(metaphysical claims are not scientifically
legitimate; abstract concepts must also be
derived from experience); atomism (reality
TE
consists of discrete and independent events,
which constitute the ultimate, fundamental
elements of the world); universalism (order
EC
and regularities in reality are considered to be
valid across time and space); and a strict sep-
aration between fact and values. This is often
combined with a theoretical monism: “[A]ll
R
theoretical or generalizing sciences [should]
make use of the same method, whether they
R
are natural sciences or social sciences”
(Popper 1957: 130). Despite the fact that post-
O
positivism constitutes a clear break with these
rules of positivism, the approach is neverthe-
C
less not antipositivist or antifoundationalist
(Giedymin 1975; Bevir 2009). In fact, because
N
a political analysis consists of developing
U
plausible explanations, there is no such thing
as an antipositivist political analysis, as will be
demonstrated below. The “post” in postposi-
tivism rather indicates a degree of continuity
with positivism.
Positivism is traditionally located within the
realm of epistemology, the theory of knowledge.
Accordingly, it addresses questions such as
“What can we know of the world ‘out there’?”
0002106217.INDD 2
and “How is knowledge about this world
acquired?” Ontology, on the other hand, which
is the theory of being, deals with such ques-
tions as “What is the world ultimately made
of?”; “What is the driving force of history?”;
and “What is out there to know about?” In
postpositivism, however, the traditional dis-
tinction between ontology and epistemology is
blurred. The question “How can we know?”
FS
simultaneously touches upon the question
“What is out there to know about?” and, last
but not least, “Whom does this ‘we’ refer to?”
O
As Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 3) note: “The
two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since
O
each of us was several, there was already quite a
crowd.” Framed in this manner, ontology and
PR
epistemology are inextricably intertwined. In
postpositivist political theory there is no
clear-cut difference between the two domains.
For this reason, and because positivist theories
and other conventional political theories have
D
been very fiercely attacked and challenged
from within the realm of ontology, questions of
ontology will be the primary focus of the
present entry.
In what follows, postpositivist theories are
approached from a variety of different angles.
The discussion proceeds from a problematiza-
tion of the notion of objectivity as well as from
the idea of an unmediated access to empirical
facts. An explanation of the difference between
form and existence is followed by a description
of an inclusive way to analyze reality. Methods
of induction and deduction are critically exam-
ined and related to the question of social foun-
dations of society. The entry then considers a
postfoundational approach to social structures
and to the concept of dislocation and outlines a
critique of the rational notion of the subject.
An alternative approach is presented, in which
the subject is located within dislocated social
structures, the notion of power is brought to
the fore, and prevailing accounts of reality are
discussed in connection with hegemonic truth
politics. The terms sedimentation and reactiva-
tion are introduced to explore the construction
of objectivity and truth, after which various
paradoxes within postpositivist theories are
3/4/2014 8:39:17 AM

described. Finally, by way of conclusion,
detailed consideration is given to the political
underpinnings of postpositivist approaches.
Universal Objectivity
The striving for universal explanations is a
paradigmatic feature of positivist political the-
ories. It is based on the assumption that
political science is driven by the need to find
the appropriate framework to “squeeze” the
real and true facts out of empirical data in
order to come as close as possible to social
objectivity. This is an attempt to deliver
schematic descriptions and classifications of
political events and developments that should
be based on criteria similar to those used in the
natural sciences.
From a postpositivist point of view, it is not
possible to offer an ultimate explanation or a
transcendental theory, that is, one that is his-
torically independent. According to this line
of reasoning, there is no ahistorical explanans
TE
such as a universal law or theory, and a vari-
able independent of society is impossible.
Postpositivists argue instead that every theory
EC
is embedded in a social context. They see the
production of theory, the collection of “brute
facts,” and intellectual reflection as always
embedded within a specific horizon of truth.
R
From this perspective theory is a historical
product: “Objective always means ‘humanly
R
objective,’ which can be held to correspond
exactly to ‘historically subjective’: in other
O
words, objective would mean ‘universal
subjective’” (Gramsci 1971: 445). It follows
C
that theoretical frameworks are constantly
changing and that, consequently, objectivity
N
also changes. The claim that objectivity can
exist independently from humanity has been
U
dismissed as a form of mysticism:
It might seem that there can exist an extra-
historical and extra-human objectivity. But
who is the judge of such objectivity? Who
is  able to put himself in this kind of
“standpoint if the cosmos in itself ” and
what could such a standpoint mean? It can
indeed be maintained that here we are
0002106217.INDD 3
postpositivist political theory 3
dealing with a hangover of the concept of
God. (Gramsci 1971: 445)
However, claiming – as postpositivist theory
does – that objectivity is historical and
embedded in a social context is very different
from denying the possibility of objectivity per
se, as would be the case in antipositivism.
If there is no universal objectivity, neither
can there be any pure empirical facts. Lefort
FS
asserts that positivist political science
emerges from a desire to objectify, and it forgets
that no elements, no elementary structures,
O
no entities (classes or segments of classes), no
economic or technical determination, and no
O
dimension of social space exist until they have
been given a form. (Lefort 1988: 11)
PR
In postpositivism, a difference is introduced
between the social form of an object and its
pure existence; or, as formulated by Heidegger
(1982), between Sein und Dasein. The social
D
form of an object, in other words its meaning,
is dependent on a social, and hence discursive
context. Its existence, that is to say its pure sub-
stance, is outside of the discursive realm.
Outside of discourses “objects do not have
being; they have only existence” (Laclau &
Mouffe 1990: 104). Most postpositivist theories
side with realism against idealism in claiming
that objects have an existence outside the
human mind. However, nothing meaningful
follows from this existence. We never engage
with this pure existence of objects, but only
with its social form. There is no unmediated
access to the “real-concrete.” It follows that the
thing to be explained, the explanandum, is
always already a contextualized explanandum.
Rather than being able to analyze the existence
of objects, we can only examine their social
form. Nevertheless, the result of such an
approach is not relativism. In contrast to
relativism, which is just another name for anti-
positivism, a postpositivist approach stresses
that some explanations are indeed more plau-
sible than others (see below).
In epistemological terms, a positivist approach
assumes that knowledge is acquired by way of
investigation and testing. This is chiefly a
3/4/2014 8:39:17 AM
 4 postpositivist political theory
question of method and empirical facts. As an
empiricist-agnostic approach, positivism main-
tains that no claims can be made about the world
except in the form of observables and that
hypotheses must be formulated so as to be open
to falsification – that is, to the possibility to show
that the hypothesis is false. It considers any
claims or theories that are not falsifiable to be
unscientific (Popper 1968; King, Keohane, &
Verba 1994: 99–105). In positivism the method-
ology of reasoning is inductive. Induction
involves making careful observations, conduct-
ing experiments, rigorously analyzing the data
obtained, and thus producing new discoveries or
theories (Blaikie 2007: 59–79). Theory follows
observation.
Other theories, including (new) institution-
alism (March & Olsen 1989; Goodin 1996) and
constructivism (Onuf 1989; Searle 1995; Wendt
1999), reject the assumption of parsimony in
positivism – a guiding principle of political
analysis that refers to the reliance on models
with as few variables as possible, which never-
TE
theless explain as much as possible (Hay 2002:
31–7). Unlike models emphasizing parsimony,
these theories offer complex explanations
EC
based on rich and empirically saturated
analyses. This, however, is not the point of a
postpositivist approach. For, if both the explan-
ans and the explanandum are dependent on
R
their social context, as claimed by postpositiv-
ists, it is not merely the principle of parsimony,
R
but the method itself that must be problema-
tized. Accordingly, it is possible neither to
O
derive concrete cases from universal laws
(deduction) nor to conclude a universal expla-
C
nation from many individual cases (induction).
Both of these claims have been highly prob-
N
lematized: on the one hand, the claim that it is
U
possible at all to have a socially independent
variable; and, on the other hand, the claim that
the application of a theory does not impinge
upon the theoretical framework. It has been
proposed instead that theory and empirical
facts are prone to variation and mutation
(Wullweber & Scherrer 2010). What is more,
according to postpositivist theories, the line of
reasoning does not start with an objective
0002106217.INDD 4
empirical or theoretical problem, because no
problem can be objectively stated in the first
place. Instead, something must be problematized
in order for a problem to be constructed. We
are not pristine observers of objective problems
that are “out there,” waiting to be discovered.
Rather we actively – although perhaps not
consciously – construct scientific problems.
Moreover, deciding to focus on one specific
FS
problem implies leaving other issues unscru-
tinized. At the same time, the decision to
problematize one issue and not another is not a
O
pregiven. The terrain for making a decision is
undecidable (see below).
O
Postfoundational Ontology
PR
Postpositivist scholars sharply criticize the
notion of social foundation as a closed and fixed
structure of society. The basic assumption – and
in fact the very ontological core – of post-
D
positivist political theory maintains that there is
no ultimate ground for society. A common
assumption about postpositivist approaches is
that they categorically deny the existence of
social structures. This is not the case. In post-
positivist theories a different concept is used for
social structure, namely discourse. The phrase
social structure has not simply been renamed,
however. Unlike subjectivist or voluntaristic
theories such as behaviorism, postpositivism
goes along with more structuralist approaches,
for instance institutionalism or Marxism, in
their explanation that subjects are embedded in
social structures. Postpositivist approaches are
consequently not antifoundational. The post-
positivist concept of discourse refers to a more
or less stabilized horizon of action and truth.
Every society requires foundations. Without
stabile social structures, society would not
be  possible. However, foundations are not
permanent. Instead, societies are based on
unstable and contingent foundations (Butler
1992). Such postfoundational approaches argue
that society’s foundations are subject to
variation and transformation. They deny the
existence of ultimate foundations but not of
social foundations per se (Marchart 2007).
3/4/2014 8:39:18 AM

In their criticism of structuralist theories,
postpositivist approaches argue that every
social foundation is subject to change. In other
words, to a certain degree they are always dislo-
cated. The concept of dislocation refers to a
destabilization of structures, and hence to dis-
courses. It is a permanent phenomenon, and a
continuous disruption of existing social struc-
tures (Lacan 2005). The result of this postulated
dislocation is that a social structure is not able
to offer the means for its own transformation.
In other words, “with dislocation there is no
telos which governs change” (Laclau 1990: 42).
There is no Hegelian rationality of the world that
ultimately leads to the sublation (Aufhebung) of
all social contradictions.
In postpositivist theory the concept of dislo-
cation is constitutive and, as an ontological con-
cept, it frames the impossibility of a full and
complete structuration of the social. It intro-
duces temporality, possibility, and freedom, all
at the same time. In other words, it refers to the
historicity and contingency of events and social
TE
processes. However, in order to engage in a dis-
pute over the notion of foundations, founda-
tions must exist in the first place. A structure – that
EC
is, a set of discourses – has to be there in order to
become dislocated:
the dislocation of a structure does not mean
R
that everything becomes possible or that all
symbolic frameworks disappear, since no dis-
R
location could take place in that psychotic
universe. … The situation of dislocation is
O
that of a lack which involves a structural ref-
erence. (Laclau 1990: 43)
C
The concept of dislocation implies a relative
structuration.
N
It is evident now that the term discourse is
U
not just about language. It comprises all forms
of (relatively) stabilized social actions. These
stabilized and sedimented actions constitute
the framework within which other actions
become possible and meaningful. Hence
discourse is another word for a spatially and
temporally sedimented horizon of truth. In
this sense, it refers to the whole social
constitution of a specific society. Within this
0002106217.INDD 5
postpositivist political theory 5
framework some discourses or organizations
of discourses are more stable – more sedi-
mented – than others (see below).
De-Centered Subject
Rational choice theory formulates the strongest
claim about a rational subject. Actions of
subjects are conceptualized as instrumental,
FS
utility maximizing, and, of course, rational –
conceptualized on the basis of a set of given
interests and preferences. Such a concept of the
O
subject relies on a stylized model of political
behavior. Even though rational choice theory is
O
often perceived as giving the subject free reign,
it is in fact superstructuralist. For it is based on
PR
the assumption that, in each and every moment,
there is always one best choice. Furthermore,
because subjects are conceived of as acting
rationally, they are always acting out precisely
this best choice. In consequence, subjects have
D
no choice at all. To be more precise: “They
have  … a nominal choice between rationality
and irrationality but, as rational choice actors,
always opt for the former” (Hay 2002: 53).
However, rational choice theory is not a
clear-cut positivist approach. Given the criteria
defined above, rational choice theory shares
with positivism the requirements of generating
universal laws, of value-free statements, of the-
oretical monism, of parsimony, and of atomism.
Still, the research process goes the other way
round. Rational choice theory follows the logic
of deduction: a theory or a postulated general
law is the starting point for political analysis.
Hypotheses are deduced from theoretical
assumptions. These are then tested through
empirical observation. The data set either con-
firms or falsifies a hypothesis. Explanations of
concrete phenomena are derived from theory.
Furthermore, the strong claim of rationality
and the maximization of utility cannot be
shown empirically. Both assumptions are axi-
omatic metaphysical claims that are completely
incompatible with the claim of phenomenalism
and nominalism (Hay 2002: 31; Harré 1970).
Hence rational choice theory shares with posi-
tivism only some assumptions and strongly
3/4/2014 8:39:18 AM
 6 postpositivist political theory
departs from others. Interestingly, rational
choice theory is often perceived as being a pos-
itivist theory, perhaps because “contemporary
disciplinary practice equates science with posi-
tivism” (Wight 2006: 17).
It is not surprising that postpositivist theory
questions all these assumptions. To start with,
postpositivism denies a voluntaristic account
of the subject and the whole idea of an autono-
mously and rationally acting subject. It rejects
the idea that there is any freedom of action. On
the contrary, it views the subject as being caged
in social discourses. In consequence, “freedom”
does not arise from or in the subject. However,
postpositivism departs from a structuralist
account of the subject as well, for it does not
assume that subjects merely act out the reason
or the necessities of the structure; they do not
merely follow the corridor of action that is
given by the structure. Instead – as described
above – as the structure is dislocated, it fails to
completely determine the subject. As Derrida
(1992) argues, the structure is undecidable. It
TE
does not contain its own means of reconstruc-
tion. There is no freedom to act, only a necessity
to do so: “I am condemned to be free, not
EC
because I have no structural identity … but
because I have a failed structural identity. This
means that the subject is partially self-
determined” (Laclau 1990: 44).
R
The subject is embedded within the social
structure, but the structure itself is dislocated. As
R
a result, the fullness of the subject is disrupted as
well. The dislocated structure needs to be supple-
O
mented by decisions. The subject has to fill the
rift in the structure with decisions within an
C
undecidable terrain. However, even though the
decisions are not determined by the structure,
N
they take place within a social field that is stra-
tegic and selective (Jessop 2007). It is selective
U
because the social terrain facilitates some
decisions while making others more difficult. It
is strategic because the structure is constituted by
decisions that have formerly been made by
others. Paraphrasing Marx, one could say that
people make their own decisions, but they do not
make them as they please; they do not make them
within structures chosen by themselves, but within
0002106217.INDD 6
structures directly encountered, given, and trans-
mitted from past decisions. The more dislocated
the structure, the less constrained the decisions
are by it, and hence the more of a leeway for the
actions of the subjects there is. In this way sub-
jects change their identity by re-creating some
structural possibilities and by refusing to act on
others (Laclau 1990: 28–31).
FS
The Construction of Reality
If, as postpositivists claim, there is no universal
truth, how is it possible to explain that there are
O
indeed truth claims that are socially accepted? Is
this because these truth claims come closer to
O
objectivity than others? According to postposi-
tivist theory, the answer to this question is an
PR
unequivocal “no.” If there is no such thing as
transcendental objectivity, truth cannot arise by
way of closeness to something that does not
exist. Instead truth and objectivity must be
D
related with the notion of power. This is a
question of how objectivity and knowledge are
produced and legitimized within society. It is a
question of truth politics:
Each society has its regime of truth, its
“general politics” of truth: that is, the types of
discourse which it accepts and makes function
as true; the mechanisms and instances which
enable one to distinguish true and false state-
ments, the means by which each is sanctioned;
the techniques and procedures accorded value
in the acquisition of truth; the status of those
who are charged with saying what counts as
true. (Foucault 1984: 73)
To say that there is no general objectivity is the
same as saying that there is no transcendental
universality. However, there are truth claims that
are perceived as universal. According to post-
positivist theory, universality is not inherent in
the claim per se. Every universality is rather a
particularity that became hegemonic at a certain
point in time. In other words, the concrete con-
stitutes the abstract, the implication being that
each universality is a specific historical construct.
This is only possible by denying its particular
content. Such a process of construction does not
happen accidentally. Rather it has to be connected
3/4/2014 8:39:18 AM

to the question of power struggle. To put it the
other way around: the universal has no content
of its own, it is an empty universality: “The
universal is the symbol of the missing fullness”
(Laclau 1996: 26). Which particular content will
represent a universality cannot be derived from
the particularity itself. Filling the universality is a
hegemonic process between different particular-
ities, which compete in filling the empty univer-
sality. The relation between particularity and
universality can be conceptualized as a hege-
monic relation. It is a relation in which a
particular content is partially fixed as a univer-
sality, by way of power struggles. It follows that
the construction of universality is precarious,
incomplete, and contestable.
Husserl (1978) used the term sedimentation to
describe a social process in which the knowledge
of the creative moment of a particular scientific
insight becomes gradually lost, step by step. As
the insight is integrated into daily use, it is repro-
duced without being questioned. The original
creative moment becomes obscured and the
TE
knowledge of alternative explanations gets lost.
A scientific postulate initially in competition
with other approaches is thereby naturalized
EC
without any obvious alternatives. This is how
universalities and “disciplinary knowledge sys-
tems” (Ashley 1983: 493) are created. However,
as Husserl emphasizes, some traces of particu-
R
larity always remain. Accordingly, the opposite
route – the reactivation of the knowledge of
R
alternatives – is still possible. In political terms,
sedimentation and reactivation can be linked to
O
the domain of the social and the political. The
social realm of a society consists of sedimented –
C
and hence, for the most part, unquestioned –
social relations. In the process of reactivation,
N
some social relations become denaturalized and
U
thereby (re)politicized (Wullweber & Scherrer
2010). During and between these processes,
reality is produced, reproduced, and revised.
The Postpositivist Paradox
A postpositivist approach has far-reaching
implications for both the process of knowledge
production and the significance of analysis,
0002106217.INDD 7
postpositivist political theory 7
considering that there are no hard  facts and
timeless explanations. Explanations become
elastic, context-sensitive, and considerably
dependent on the person who conducts research.
However, although there is no possibility of
objectivity, postpositivists insist that it  is
still  possible to make plausible statements.
Therefore, as stated above, they are not
antipositivistic.
FS
In a postpositivist approach there is no
truth that is contextually independent: “There
are no formal rules that could guarantee a
O
correct choice as to which explanation should
be retained and which rejected. … any
O
substantive rules will depend on the specific
theoretical framework(s) within which inves-
PR
tigators work” (Jessop & Sum 2006: 308).
Something is perceived as being true because
it refers to the prevailing horizon of truth.
Accordingly, an explanation is seen as being
plausible once it becomes inscribed within this
D
hegemonic horizon. Although horizons of
truth are spatial and temporal, it follows that
every scientific explanation must be oriented
toward this prevailing horizon. Otherwise
it  is  no longer deemed scientific. Even a
postpositivist analysis cannot articulate its
explanations and lines of reasoning completely
outside this (potentially positivist!) horizon. A
relation to the hegemonic horizon of truth is
both a necessary and paradoxical condition.
The struggle for truth is waged on a hegemon-
ized terrain, which is therefore strategically
and selectively dominated by conventional
and potentially positivist theories. Although it
may be possible to reasonably break with some
prevailing assumptions – a very common
practice among postpositivist scholars – it is
not possible to call the whole system of
evidence into question at once. Still, a partial
breakdown of truth claims can lead to a dis-
placement of such a system. In the long run it
may shift the horizon of truth.
A further paradox exists in the realm of
postpositivist theorizing. In a general sense, a
theory is a formal abstraction of reality. The
abstraction is possible because we assume social
regularities within societies. In positivism, the
3/4/2014 8:39:18 AM
 8 postpositivist political theory
process of abstraction entails extracting the
essence from the concrete object. However,
postpositivist theory problematizes the whole
idea of social regularities and transcendental
laws. The theory is based on an ontological
system “in which the central signified, the
original or transcendental signified, is never
absolutely present outside a system of differ-
ences” (Derrida 1978: 280). It argues that there
are no regularities independent of their social
and historical contexts.
This assertion is already the first step out of
this paradox. For, although postpositivist
approaches agree that there are no trans-
cendental laws or objectivities per se, they
argue that every society has its own specific
spatial and temporal transcendental frame-
work. This framework is shaped by stabilized
and sedimented social relations. It is accord-
ingly possible to derive abstractions from
these sedimented relations as social forms. In
this  way postpositivist theory becomes a
quasi-transcendental ontology. However, it is a
TE
negative ontology, or an “ontology of lack”
(Laclau 1990), which is based on the assump-
tion of a profound social contingency and
EC
incompleteness of social structures. Therefore
the scientific process of abstraction does not
lead to a universal abstraction, but to an
abstraction that is determined, limited, specific,
R
and always contextually dependent. Furthe-
rmore, scientists themselves are embedded in a
R
social context. Hence, instead of there being
universal abstractions, there are at best plausible
O
abstractions, which are related to a certain
horizon of truth. In this sense, a determinate
C
abstraction is an empty universality, for it
remains tendential and the knowledge of its
N
particularity is maintained.
U
The Primacy of Politics
The aim of positivist science is to collect and
classify pure facts. From a positivist stand-
point, science is expected to derive general
laws and to develop theoretical models – or
vice versa – on the basis of such hard facts.
Mathematics and statistics are considered basic
0002106217.INDD 8
tools in the study of society. It is therefore
deemed necessary, according to positivist
reasoning, that science banish “all ‘meta-
physics,’ [and] all ‘personal feeling or class
bias’” (Ross 1990: 157, quoting Pearson).
Politics is expected to be kept out of science.
In this entry diverse points of critique were
delineated. The notion of objectivity was decon-
structed. It was demonstrated that, instead of
FS
one single version of objectivity, there are many
spatiotemporal specific objectivities, and that a
trace of particularity remains in every universal
O
(scientific) claim. The claim that stable social
foundations exist was scrutinized by showing
O
the spatial and historical traces – and hence the
contingency – of social foundations. The notion
PR
of a subject with fixed interests and preferences
was replaced by a concept of the subject
embedded in dislocated social relations. It was
further claimed that there are no “hard facts,”
but rather accounts of reality that are theoreti-
D
cally informed and culturally shaped, and
therefore discursively constructed (Torfing
2005). The subject is always already situated
within this world of meaningful objects and
practices.
Postpositivist scholars assert that a
fundamental critique of positivist science is not
just appropriate, but also essential – and indeed
of key importance. It is not the object of post-
positivist theory to refine positivist or conven-
tional theories. All of the above-mentioned
critique of ontology and epistemology targets
the very essence of positivist science: it aims at
bursting the “neutrality bubble” (Connolly
2006: 829). It profoundly shatters the idea that
science could be value-free in any way. It prob-
lematizes the “spectre of scientism, especially
its current positivist incarnation, which is evi-
dent in the paradigmatic status accorded to
causal laws” (Glynos & Howarth 2007: 3). It
holds that no methodology exists that is not
grounded on epistemological assumptions;
and that no epistemology exists that is not
based on an explicit or implicit ontology. Each
and every stage of application and abstraction
is located within a social context that is strategic
and selective. Inevitably, people are constrained
3/4/2014 8:39:18 AM

by certain ideologies in the form of hegemonic
discourses. Therefore the object of method-
ology is not to apply a neutral set of rules
and techniques. Science and research are prac-
tices that are themselves embedded within
spatial, historical, and ultimately also political
contexts.
The practice of science involves the
rearrangement of data, explanations, and the-
oretical assumptions. It strives to establish
relationships between and among various
factors. This process changes the form, in
other words the meaning of the factors. If the
process is successful, a certain meaning is
fixed and established by way of articulation
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985). If, as argued in post-
positivist theory, there is no one best option
or choice for interrelating elements, other
possibilities can always be found to establish
relationships. The researcher is required to
choose among different alternatives: “It would
almost be more correct to say, not that an
intuition was needed at every stage, but that a
TE
new decision was needed at every stage”
(Wittgenstein 1953: §186).
To decide on a specific explanation implies
EC
excluding alternative explanations. This exclu-
sion is not based on objective facts, but on
individual choice. This choice, again, depends
on a specific methodology, on a certain episte-
R
mology, on a particular ontology, and, last but
not least, on the social, political, and cultural
R
context in which the research is couched.
Every analysis can be conducted in a different
O
manner, which is not the same as saying that
every analysis is plausible. To phrase it differ-
C
ently: because there is no objectivity, which is
the same as saying that there is no universal
N
law, the moment of undecidability cannot be
U
overcome or skipped (Derrida 1992). The sub-
ject has to fill this structural void. It follows
that both the context within which the decision
has to be made and the subject who has to
come to a decision have a highly significant
role in the research process. Moreover, there is
no fundamental and unambiguous difference
between fact and value. Similarly, it is not
possible to completely differentiate between
0002106217.INDD 9
postpositivist political theory 9
science and daily practice, or between science
and nonscience. Science is only one among
many forms of knowledge (Habermas 1972;
Latour & Woolgar 1979; Haraway 1989).
Each decision, each rearrangement of
established relations has an impact on the overall
horizon of truth – an impact that is sometimes
stronger and sometimes weaker. Every horizon
of truth is social and political. Shifting and dis-
FS
placing this horizon becomes a political act. In
accordance with the postpositivist perspective,
science is essentially politics: the politics of
O
ontology, the politics of epistemology, and the
politics of methodology. Postpositivism interro-
O
gates the historical limitations of our knowledge;
it asks about that which is knowable at a certain
PR
point in time, and how power relations construct
certain objects as knowable while simulta-
neously presenting others as nonknowable and
unthinkable (Butler 1993). Postpositivism
insists on being explicit about the underlying
D
theoretical assumptions and the analytical
choices and strategies that are made. This
implies being conscious about one’s own role as
a researcher.
In contrast to problem-solving approaches,
postpositivist approaches are problem-driven
(Cox 1981; Howarth 2005). While problem-
solving theories aim at solving problems within
social structures that are taken for granted, a
problem-driven approach includes in its analysis
the structural conditions that gave rise to a
certain problématique. And things do not stop
here: a problem-driven approach involves criti-
cizing prevailing social conditions, revealing
underlying power relations, and developing the
means to challenge these conditions and rela-
tions. A normative element is inscribed in such
approaches. The role of political theory and of
political analysis is a politicized process itself.
A postpositivist approach is concerned first
and foremost with questioning existing power
relations. What is more, such an approach
opens the ontological possibility of democratic
politics. If there is no telos, if there is no neutral
Archimedean vantage point from which right
and wrong can be judged, this void, this consti-
tutive lack within the social structure has to be
3/4/2014 8:39:18 AM
 10 postpositivist political theory
filled by political practice. However, every
universal claim is unstable in the long run,
because it is itself permeated by its own par-
ticularity: “Incompletion and provisionality
belong to the essence of democracy” (Laclau
1996: 16). In that sense, one of the main tasks
of postpositivist theories is to democratize the
political and social sciences.
SEE ALSO: Biopower/Biopolitics;
Constructivism; Contingency; Critical Theory;
Derrida, Jacques (1930–2004); Epistemology;
Essentialism; Foundationalism; Hegemony;
Positivism; Postmodernism
Acknowledgments
For very useful criticism and comments
I am indebted to Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Loren
Samlowski, the participants to the workshops
on postpositivism in economic thought in
Erfurt, Germany in January 2013, the editors
of The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, and
TE
the anonymous reviewer. As always, ultimate
responsibility rests with the author.
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Abstract
There is no such thing as a coherent, unified postpositivist political theory. Postpositivist political

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theory is rather an umbrella description, which is loosely used to group together a variety of different
theories and approaches that critically engage with different forms of essentialism in the political
and social sciences – assumptions reflected in conventional, traditional, and especially positivist

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thoughts. Among other paradigms, the term postpositivism encompasses poststructuralism, most
feminist theories, critical theory (in the sense imposed by the Frankfurt School), critical realism, the

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interpretative tradition, and neo-Gramscian approaches, notwithstanding the tendency, on the part
of many scholars representing these currents of thought, to reject the label of postpositivism.

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Keywords: contingency, essentialism, foundationalism, political theory, positivism, postmodernism
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