Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream

Author(s): SERGEY RADCHENKO

Source: Inner Asia , 2009, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2009), pp. 231-258
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23614962

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Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream

SERGEY RADCHENKO

University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

sergey. radchenko@nottingham. edu. cn

ABSTRACT

This article is an account of Soviet and Mongolian efforts to manipulate a natio

alist insurrection in Chinese Altai in 1944-45. For the Soviet leader Joseph Stali
this insurrection, led by a Kazakh nationalist, Osman Batyr, offered an excellen
opportunity to attend to Soviet security interests in Xinjiang. For the Prim
Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), Khorloogiin Choibalsan
Osman represented an important investment in the process of expanding th
MPR's regional influence and prestige. Choibalsan intended to co-opt Osman
an expanded Great Mongolia, which he hoped to build up at China's expense
winning the loyalty of the Kazakhs in Xinjiang and the Mongol banners of wha
is now Inner Mongolia. Stalin supported Choibalsan's vision for a time, until
reached a broader accommodation with China, ending Soviet support for an
Chinese nationalist movements and putting an end to Choibalsan's Gre
Mongolia Dream.

Keywords: Choibalsan, Osman, Sino-Mongolian border conflict, Yili reb

lion, Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945

INTRODUCTION

China's recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR)'s independence

on 6 January 1946 put an end to legal uncertainty, which had plagued Outer
Mongolia since Beijing relinquished political control there a quarter-century ear
lier.1 Although the Chinese leaders, nationalists and communists alike, would
later question the legitimacy of Mongolia's statehood and privately (or in Taibei's
case publicly) call upon its 'return' to China, 1945 was the final milestone on the
tortuous road to Mongolia's independence. It was also a turning-point for
Mongolia's great division: only a fraction of ethnic Mongols found themselves
within the borders of an independent homeland; the rest were lost to China. But
1945 was also a year of great opportunities: as World War II wound up, borders
were being redrawn in Europe as well as in Asia. Independent Outer Mongolia

Inner Asia 11 (2009): 231-258

© 2009 Global Oriental Ltd

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232 SERGEY RADCHENKO

within the borders we now easily recognise was

no means an inevitable or the only possible one
Indeed, the MPR's Prime Minister, marshal
time had a grander, a more ambitious vision fo
end he savoured the prospect of a homeland
Mongolia at China's expense.2 Choibalsan enc
alist insurrections in Xinjiang and among Mong
hope to see his plans realised, but for the app
leader Joseph Stalin who, for reasons of his o
reaching aspirations in 1943-45 before putting
seemed that Choibalsan might have his way aft
the rise and fall of Choibalsan's Great Mongolia
and intrigue, a murky plot that we have only n
record in Mongolia and Russia comes to light.
Readers familiar with the MPR's early post-w
discussion of the independence movement am
what is now the eastern part of China's Inner M
that movement - by far his biggest stake bey
not be Great Mongolia without the Inner Mong
demise of this movement is beyond the scope
focus rather on a little-known episode in th
Choibalsan's troubled relationship with a Kaza
the leadership of bandit-turned-revolutionary
legendary exploits in the Chinese Altai (Nor
studied in the context of the general anti-Ch
rebellion of 1944-45) - but, once again, this is
also not an account of Osman's insurrection or
state, although Osman's stately ambitions are im
their place within Choibalsan's pan-Mongolia
designs in the region.3
The article explores the parallels in Choiba
and his relationship with Stalin. In the first cas
the second a pawn: like a good actor, Choibalsan
ferent scripts, making sure all the while tha
would not be neglected. Choibalsan's regiona
broader Soviet strategy in the region. Stalin
vision, seeing in his dealings with Osman a ch
ence in Chinese border areas. This bufferisati
MPR as its chief effect, but the Soviet dictator
at the fringes of the Republic of China. How
strategy in favor of a broad compromise wit
(Chiang Kai-shek). Devoid of Soviet support,
matter Choibalsan's Great Mongolia dream, ha
Choibalsan and Osman were about the same

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 CHOIBALSAN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 233

decade at the time of the events described below. But they had very
backgrounds. Socialist historians once praised Choibalsan as the
Mongolia's revolution. In fact, Choibalsan was not so much the maker
olution as its survivor. Carefully navigating a bitter power struggle in
as prominent Mongolian politicians one after another fell victim to e
scheming and Soviet manipulation, he suddenly emerged from obscurit
It was then that Stalin, for reasons that are still unclear, advised p
Choibalsan to the position of a deputy prime minister. In the subsequ
Choibalsan accumulated power in his hands, unleashing a wave of terr
his political rivals, party officials, military elites, minority ethnic g
Buddhist lamas. By the early 1940s Choibalsan became, with Stalin'
Mongolia's own 'Stalin'.
Osman Batyr spent his life in rather different pursuits, and made qu
ferent impression. Admired by the Kazakhs and feared by the Chine
roamed the sparsely populated lands of northeast Xinjiang at the h
armed band of rebels, pillaging Chinese establishments in the name o
for his people. His men were few in number but skilled in guerilla
Demoralized Chinese troops in the Altai had to take Osman seriously.
his banditry he commanded the respect of local Kazakhs and, when the
ripe, could lead a rebellion against the Chinese. A rebel and a self-p
freedom-fighter, Osman expected that his pursuits would one day lead
ation of an independent kingdom of Altai, of which he would become a
Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi dreaded this scenario. Embroiled in a
struggle with Japan, the Chinese government could not exercise effect
of the remote Northwest. For many years, in fact, the Manchu go
Xinjiang Sheng Shicai ran his own business, unconcerned with the c
ernment's demands. For a time, Sheng flirted with the Soviet Union an
Soviet advisors and economic aid. During his 1938 trip to the Soviet
promised Stalin eternal loyalty and asked to become a member of
Communist Party (Ledovskii 1999: 191-2). Yet, when things turned ba
USSR in the war with Germany, Sheng Shicai hurried to rebuild bri
Jiang Jieshi and his ruling Nationalist Party (Guomindang). He bec
edly hostile toward his former Soviet comrades and initiated anti-Sovie
in the capital city Urumqi. As a result of Sheng's policies, trade with
Union plummeted, and the local population - mainly the Uyghurs
Kazakhs - found themselves in dire economic straits. No wonder Osm
Chinese agenda found eager followers in the Altai Mountains. No won
Shicai and Jiang Jieshi feared an uprising against Chinese rule.
Even so, Osman's insurrection would not have worried the Chines
ominous signs that he was receiving support from China's foes in the N
Russians. Was the rebellious Kazakh simply acting as a tool to advanc
imperial ambitions in Central Asia? Stalin's plans for Central Asia we
by the tsarist legacy. In the nineteenth century the Russian empire sw
the ancient khanates of Central Asia one by one and annexed vast territo

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234 SERGEY RADCHENKO

Far East at the Qing's expense. The falter

internal rebellion and foreign pressure, s
which only whetted the Russian empire's
lands. Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjian
China's northern frontier the tsars sought t
to serve Russia's strategic and commercial
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries w
the Chinese Northwest and by the Japanese
The Russian Revolution and the chaos of
the expansion of Russian influence in
Bolsheviks, driven by revolutionary idealis
with China but as soon as the Soviets cons
their internal enemies, the tsar's strategic p
closet and imperial exploits were renewed
assistance to neighbouring nations. In
Mongolia in pursuit of Baron Ungern's ant
sideshow to the Russian Civil War. Unger
Bolsheviks stayed in Mongolia, to China's
Beijing took Outer Mongolia to be a part o
tried time and again to re-establish cont
Mongols' quest for independence was a bi
Russian presence in Outer Mongolia was a
the Russian revolution.5
The Chinese did not harbour illusions. I
for Mongolia Na Yantu wrote in desperatio
into a buffer state. Once it takes Gansu its t
the gaze of a tiger and the appetite of a w
only slightly. Russians lost Manchuria irre
1905. But Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang, and
peoples, could be turned around to serve So
consolidated Soviet hold on Outer Mongolia
intents and purposes under Moscow's
Xinjiang, he worked with Sheng Shicai to
Shicai's betrayal was a rude awakening to
not think he could be manipulated. To comp
considered covert support of nationalist m
Uyghurs and the Kazakhs. One of the key p
was Osman Batyr.
Osman had been in contact with the Mo
Khovd aimag [province] of southwestern
troops chased his men out of the Altai. Th
deterrent to prevent the Chinese from cro
Osman, the Mongols fought back, although
frontation with the Chinese troops. The situ

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 CHOIB ALS AN' S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 235

hand by late 1943 - so much so that Choibalsan decided to write a protest note
the Chinese government. Before doing so he consulted with his Soviet comrade
On 27 December 1943 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Viaches
Molotov responded that Choibalsan should hold off his protest note and inst
come to Moscow at once for urgent consultations.

STALIN'S COUNSEL

Choibalsan left Ulaanbaatar shortly after the New Year. He travelled for a week,
first by car and then by train, past the endless Siberian taiga and snow plains o
central Russia, arriving in Moscow on 14 January 1944. The air buzzed wit
excitement over new Soviet advances in Western Ukraine and Belorussia.
German resistance was crumbling. In the north, Soviet forces broke the siege of
Leningrad in a sweeping offensive, recapturing the ancient city of Novgorod.
Foreign diplomats were discussing the deadlock in negotiations between the
Soviet and the exiled Polish governments over their fixture border and put for
ward diverse opinions about the latest rumours that the British had secretly met
the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in Spain, to discuss sepa
rate peace terms. In comparison with these momentous developments,
Choibalsan's arrival in Moscow went unnoticed. The New York Times devoted a
36-word article to the occasion on 17 January but did not reveal any reasons for
the mysterious visit of, alas, misspelled 'Marshal Shuibolsan' (New York Times
1944:4).
Choibalsan met with Molotov a week later, on 21 January. Molotov told
Choibalsan not to send a note of protest to the Chinese but instead to lure them
into attacking Mongolia and then retaliate with a greater force. 'Can you create
such a situation?' Molotov asked, and heard Choibalsan's reply: 'If you permit,
we can strike [the Chinese] with your help.' On the following day at 8:15 p.m.
Choibalsan, accompanied by the Soviet plenipotentiary in Mongolia Ivan Ivanov,
went to see Stalin at his Kremlin office.6 Molotov was there already. Choibalsan
spoke to Stalin briefly about the situation on Mongolia's border with China.
Stalin showed considerable interest in the organisation and numbers of the
Mongolian troops, and after he heard Choibalsan's explanations, asked bluntly:
'Are you afraid of China? Why don't you give them a good blow?' Ivanov com
mented: 'They are exercising self-restraint' (Bat-Ochir 1996:166-7).
Taken aback, Choibalsan defended his patience on the border. 'We don't have
a reason to be afraid of China, and to restrain ourselves. If the Chinese invade
again we can well give them an appropriate blow.' But this was only one part of
the solution. Osman was the other part. Choibalsan recalled how Kazakhs had
struggled against Chinese rule in Altai since 1939, and how many of their leaders
were killed and captured - now only Osman remained. True, Kazakh rebels
resorted to out-and-out banditry, but did Osman participate in the raids? -
Choibalsan said he did not know. Of course, he knew. He later admitted that

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 236 SERGEY RADCHENKO

much to Osman's face (Shagdarsuren 2000: 1

overlook Osman's questionable pursuits, as
[Osman] is used to cleanse Altai of the Chin
ties there will find freedom.' A moment later
'other nationalities': 'I think that the Mongols
(Bat-Ochir 1996:167).
Stalin could live with free Mongols in the A
pendent Kazakh state there. Stalin thought
him rely on Soviet support, and his supposed
would have no fall-back position, unlike cos
Osman, like other nationalist leaders in Xi
would inadvertently serve Soviet interests in
Chinese and the Japanese. It did not matter
Ideology was immaterial to Stalin's strategi
bility than an asset because ideological affin
pawn mlers that the Soviet commitment wou
erous, than would otherwise be the case. O
friendly warlord than as a comrade-in-arm
capitalism.
Stalin preferred to act tacitly. He could not afford a direct intervention in
Xinjiang to defend Soviet economic and strategic interests, nor to get rid of
Sheng Shicai. The Soviet Union and China were parties to a non-aggression
treaty. For a time, Stalin relied on China to keep the Japanese tied down in a war,
a safe distance from the Soviet borders, for despite Japanese defeat in the battle of
Khalkhyn Gol in 1939, Stalin feared that Japan might yet strike against the USSR
in the Far East. He sent arms and military instructors to Jiang Jieshi to strengthen
China's resistance to the Japanese advance. Although this assistance decreased in
the early 1940s, not least because of the conclusion of a neutrality pact between
Japan and the USSR, and Soviet relations with China plunged to a new low,
Stalin played a careful game in China and refuted any suggestion of Soviet med
dling in the affairs of Xinjiang, making a surprised face every time Chinese
officials mentioned sightings of Soviet weapons, and even aircraft, on the side of
the rebels.
The task of helping Osman thus naturally fell to Choibalsan. But this is not to
say that the Mongolian prime minister was merely Stalin's puppet, an obedient
servant of Moscow's imperial ambitions. It is said that once Choibalsan's prede
cessor Peljidiin Genden quarreled with Stalin, accused him of being a 'tsar' and
even grabbed and broke Stalin's pipe. Choibalsan would never permit himself
anything like that, and did well, for he survived Stalin's purges, while Genden
ended up in the hands of NKVD executioners. But Choibalsan's survival did not
mean that he lost his Mongolian identity - far from it! He was skilled at hiding his
nationalist agenda behind a smokescreen of the unbreakable Soviet-Mongolian
friendship. But Choibalsan did have his separate agenda, for which he tried to
enlist Stalin, softly but consistently.

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 CHOIBALSAN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 237

Indeed, Mongolia's involvement with Osman was not a Moscow

ploy. Choibalsan's men were on the scene in Khovd aimag in the f
made contact with Osman and already supplied him with inst
weapons (Baabar 2006: 637). Although Soviet operatives were prob
of these contacts, there is no evidence that Stalin knew anything of O
Choibalsan raised this subject in Moscow during that conversation. In
was unhappy that Ivanov had paid inadequate attention to the probl
words, that he failed to keep Stalin informed. Osman was Choibals
He was not a Mongol, but if he won and the Chinese had to leave A
would fall into Mongolia's orbit of influence; and Altai could partic
form or another in the pan-Mongolian movement. This is what Choib
when he let it slip from his tongue: 'Mongols living there will also be
The fate of Mongols in the Altai concerned Choibalsan more than any
far-fetched strategic calculations.
Stalin did not have to be persuaded. It was in his interest to bac
Stalin and Choibalsan worked with different agenda, but not at cro
'Someone needs to help Osman', Stalin said. 'Why don't you help
don't have guns and bullets?' Here was Choibalsan's chance. He ex
he was waiting for Stalin's approval first; and then, he wanted the Sov
supply weapons, which he could pass over to Osman. The conversati
practicalities: how and when would the Soviets supply these weap
picked up the phone and called Deputy Head of the General Staff
Antonov and Commander of the Zabaikal'e Front Mikhail Kovalev
two generals arrived Stalin instructed them to provide Choibalsan wit
200 PPSh submachine guns, 6 machine guns, 30 hand machine
grenades, 400,000 bullets and 5 binoculars. All of this was to be t
covertly to Osman (Bat-Ochir 1996:167).
Before taking leave of Stalin, Choibalsan raised one more issue.
Mongols, he said, living in Western China - Ningxia, Gansu and Qin
banks of Qinghai Lake and in the Tsaidam basin. Choibalsan asked
permission to conduct 'intensive work' among these Mongols. Th
from Choibalsan's mouth, could only mean that he intended to sen
Western China to stir unrest among Mongols, and then ... pr
Choibalsan did not know what would happen then. Did his pan-Mon
extend to the ice-capped plateaux of Tibet? Did he have in mind a c
of Mongol states, or simply greater autonomy for Mongols in Wester
Whatever his motivation, Choibalan's timing was crucial. The W
uncertainty to Asia's political landscape. Who knew what gains cou
for Mongolia, if only Stalin could be prevailed upon to endorse C
vision? Stalin was realistically cautious. 'Right', he said. 'In any c
your work there. We could run out of time (hojimdoj medne).' He kne
end of the war would mean that he would have to build a new relat
China's Jiang Jieshi. Before that happened, Stalin, like Choibalsan
take as much of Asia as he could carry, and a little more. Choibalsan

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238 SERGEY RADCHENKO

aged. And only Molotov remained with Stalin

talked for nearly an hour. But then he, too,
leaving the old dictator to ponder his strategi
1996: 168).

BATTLE IN THE MOUNTAINS

Mongolia. Khovd aimag. Bulgan sown. Alagtolgoi. Mid February 1

Choibalsan was expecting Osman's visit. Two white gers were set up as m
quarters on the occasion. These were large winter gers, each with eight
made of crossed narrow wooden planks, and covered with bright white felt
outside. One ger was to serve as a meeting place, the other as a dining hall,
Osman and his party. Osman arrived at the agreed time, with a dozen h
armed body guards. In his heavy winter coat with a thick fur collar, we
helmet-like Kazakh fur hat, and armed with a Mauser handgun in a wood
ster, black-bearded Osman had the authentic look of a man whom you wo
want to encounter as a traveller on this desolate plain. Choibalsan, too, d
for the occasion, exchanging his military uniform for a spacious nation
tightened on his waist with a traditional silk sash. Choibalsan, too, wore
fur hat, but with fur on the outside, in the Russian style (Shagdarsuren
137). Greeting his guests, Choibalsan invited them to the meeting.

FIGURE 1. Meeting between Marshal Khorlogiin Choibalsan and Osman Bat

February 1944. Taken from Shagdarsuren (2000).

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 CHOIBALSAN' S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 239

Osman entered the ger, with his deputy Suleiman. The Sov
inevitably represented by Ivanov and Kovalev who, however, barely
in the conversation. The two Kazakhs spoke with reserve but to the
had left their wives and children behind to devote their lives' efforts
the Chinese from Altai; for that aim they would struggle until death.
commended Osman on his accomplishments and apologised for hav
trusted him in the first place. 'Comrades, if your honest struggle reach
the Kazakh state can become like our state', Choibalsan said. He the
the Mongolian revolutionary gains, and praised the Soviet Union for it
help to liberation movements. Finally, Choibalsan declared that the
government had decided to go beyond 'moral' support of the Kazakh
and furnish them with military equipment for use in the rebellion
Chinese. Gratified by this development, Osman acknowledged Mong
Kazakhs' 'supporter'.
Osman was tense during the meeting, maybe because he did
Choibalsan and suspected a trap. The intensity of the conversation
bad headache, and he only relaxed somewhat when the conspirators
the dinner ger. Osman even permitted himself a friendly exch
Choibalsan about their national cultures and traditions. Choibalsan treated
Osman to a fat mutton rump, and Osman called on his men to sing for the hosts.
And they sang songs praising anti-Chinese struggle, the great history of the
Kazakh nation, and the epic exploits of their legendary leader, Osman the Hero
(Shagdarsuren 2000: 141-2). The occasion indeed appeared more like a confer
ence of two Asian khans than a covert meeting of communist operatives. Even so,
the Soviet presence on the scene guaranteed that Stalin's interests would not be
neglected.
The next day, Choibalsan delivered weapons to Osman, and had his men
trained in their operation. It took 105 camels to carry all of these weapons and
ammunition back to Osman's base (Bat-Ochir 1996: 171). As a special treat for
the Kazakhs, Choibalsan arranged for an air show. The head of Mongolia's air
force, Madras Zaisanov, personally flew a small Russian fighter plane over the
heads of the Kazakhs. For Osman and his party, seeing a man in the air was
already a dazzling experience. But this time the impression was particularly
strong because Zaisanov, a Mongolian officer, was actually a Kazakh, born in
Western Mongolia. This was a chance for Choibalsan to brag about Mongolia's
technological advancement, and about opportunities she offered not only to
Mongols but also for the Kazakhs. We shall probably never know whether
Choibalsan envisioned the Altai as a part of Mongolia, something like a repeti
tion of the Bayan-Ulgii aimag, a Kazakh-populated province in westernmost
Mongolia, set up in 1940 to accommodate national feelings of the Kazakhs. At
the very least he expected that Osman-ruled Altai would become his,
Choibalsan's, puppet state in Central Asia.
Soon thereafter, Choibalsan paid a return visit to Osman. The rebel's small
ger barely accommodated Choibalsan's party and the ever-present Ivanov. The

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 240 SERGEY RADCHENKO

Kazakhs and Mongols of lower rank ming

slaughtered a young sheep for the occasion
the marshal's approval, the sheep was boiled
bones in a feast. All the while Osman prais
again his appreciation for Mongolia's mil
After his meetings with Osman, on 6 M
telegram to Stalin. He said his meetings w
'delivered the presents'. At the same time
Osman could be trusted. 'In general, th
muutai), he wrote, concluding, though, th
and observe Osman's subsequent actions'
6 March was a Monday. On Saturday of
Xinjiang provincial troops near Qinghe, an
side of the Altai mountain range. The ens
Urumqi that Xinjiang had come under atta
and then again on 19 March the local Fore
reported to Chongqing (the wartime seat
Chinese troops had been bombed and machin
- he mentioned five P-5s (Soviet reconna
fighter with visible markings: 'a red star, a
cluded that 'the Russian aircraft attack is o
to surrender, or he will be driven out by
tion is very critical' (cited in Whiting 1958:
In Chongqing the news of military clas
sumed Soviet participation stirred confu
American ambassador in China, Clarence E
sent a telegram to the Secretary of State
had been putting down a Kazakh uprising
tions, leaving up to 30 dead. Two days later
Legislative Yuan Sun Fo, who said that th
Mongolian, not the Soviet, border, and t
Mongolian planes, which 'were of course
might bear a red star emblem'. Sun Fo pla
dent and thought that Sheng Shicai was d
761-2).
On 20 and 24 March the US Consul in Urumqi, Horace Smith, reported on his
meetings with Wu, who claimed that 400 Kazakh 'bandits' reinforced by 600
Mongol soldiers, Mongols and Kazakhs from Mongolia, and accompanied by 2
Soviet advisers - a force of some 2000 men - attacked the Chinese but, in Wu's
brave estimate, suffered 200 casualties as against 100 Chinese. Nevertheless, the
Chinese troops withdrew from the site of the battle, though Wu gave conflicting
explanations as to their subsequent whereabouts (FRUS 1967: 765-6). Wu's
report to the British supplied completely different figures: 'A Chinese force of
about 2000 made a strategic withdrawal [clearly a codename for retreat] after a

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 CHOIBALSAN' S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 241

successful ground engagement on March 16 in which they lost 47 an

in [.s'/c] killed.' The two so-called Soviet advisers, Wu specif
unknown to the Xinjiang government: before their guerilla activ
been geologists prospecting for tungsten. Now, Wu claimed, they
with the rebels 'in whose ranks the Chinese have an agent'.7
Murky stories multiplied by the day, and Ambassador Gauss teleg
about a rumour that the border conflict was a part of a larger
Communist understanding against Central Government" (FRUS
But the British had heard the rumour even before the outbreak of hosti
Altai. His Majesty's Consul-General in Kashgar, M.C. Gillett rep
patch on 17 February 1944 about Chaucer Wu's claims that t
government officials had visited the Soviet city of Alma-Ata; whi
Yu of the Ministry of War had told the British that 'mysterious
been seen crossing the Altai district en route for the communist cen
The Consul-General concluded sceptically that 'it is difficult to k
the Chinese expect us to believe these confidences. There is certai
able clumsiness in the attempts of the Chinese in Xinjiang to drive
the solidarity of the United Nations.'8
Commenting on this report from Kashgar one Foreign Office o
Hudson, wrote that the Chinese claim about the Soviet planes flying
to relieve the communists in Yan'an was nothing short of absurd, si
geographically it was much easier to reach Yan'an from Outer M
Suiyuan or Ningxia (Chinese provinces bordering Mongolia in the
continued Hudson,

if Russia is out to make trouble for the present administration in Xi

recent events strongly suggest [here Hudson was referring to the March
the border], what could be more natural than to use aircraft for maki
with the Kazakh and Torgot tribesmen who are Russia's best cards now th
Shicai had given them the slip? Xinjiang is a vast country in which the d
of land travel are still very great and the routes are few, but a few hour
would be enough for parachuting an agent (or arms) into the middle of th
I think we are likely to hear more of this kind of thing.9

Hudson's assessment was remarkably close to reality, except tha

there was no place for Mongolia in his calculations. There was onl
menace; only Stalin looking after his dirty affairs in Xinjiang in the
of the Great Game.
In any case the British seem to have had more appreciation for
concerns than the Americans. US President Roosevelt was least
dramatise the situation in Xinjiang. He had been disappointed with J
performance in the war against Japan and wearied by his obsessi
Communist menace in Northwest China. Jiang's calls for US support
the Soviet encroachment in Xinjiang could not come at a worse tim
Roosevelt wrote to Jiang:

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 242 SERGEY RADCHENKO

The world would feel that proportion and perspec

incidents on the Outer Mongolia-Xinjiang bord
the great objective of achieving victory and d
aggression. I suggest, as a matter of practical st
dents be placed on ice until the conclusion of the
sovereignty.
(FRUS 1967: 772)

In other words, FDR, with his characteristic political realism, was not willing to
risk a promising wartime alliance with Soviet Russia to appease Jiang's feelings
in a border conflict in a location so remote and obscure that even Ambassador
Gauss could not at first find it on the Embassy's Chinese maps (FRUS 1967:
761).

THE YILI REBELLION

In the meantime, Osman retreated into the mountains to build up strength

Mongolian operatives were present at his encampment, and compiled reports fo
Choibalsan about Osman's words and actions. These reports ended up on
Ivanov's desk; he forwarded a summary to Viacheslav Molotov in Moscow on 3
October 1944. Ivanov's assessment was a mixed bag. He claimed that the
'national liberation movement in the Altai' - as he called Osman's rebellion -
'has made a great move forward'. As a part of that great movement, 'many thou
sands' of families packed up their gers and simply left the steppes for the
mountains; others escaped across the Soviet and Mongolian borders (3000 and
2000 families respectively). Another few thousand families actually moved int
Osman's camp, which as of 15 September 1944 counted 3177 nomadic Kazakh
households.

This was a modest force in comparison with the Chinese soldiers in the Altai,
who numbered up to 20,000. Osman's tactic was to lure the Chinese beyond the
town walls for a showdown in the open steppe. But the Chinese soldiers would
not give up their entrenched town positions, and Osman's efforts to capture town
were generally unsuccessful. In the summer months Osman's forces thrice laid
siege to a small town of Huhtohoi, and every time the siege was abandoned:
Osman feared that the Chinese defendants would inflict unacceptable losses to
his ranks. Huhtohoi only had two old cannons 'which, though [they] did not d
any harm to the rebels and probably cannot do [any harm], nevertheless have
strong moral effect'.10 Ivanov suspected that the Chinese intended to wait it out in
the towns until the Kazakhs were forced by the winter conditions to descend from
the mountains into the valleys.
In the meantime, Osman's best bet was classic guerilla warfare. In bands of
100-200 men the Kazakhs set traps along the roads from Urumqi and Central
China into Altai, surprising Chinese caravans. By the early autumn of 1944, they

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 CHOIB ALS AN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 243

could boast of modest results, to wit, 1100 Chinese dead and 18 captured. In a
tion to this, Ivanov reported that the rebels captured 111 rifles (only one for e
10 killed Chinese soldiers?!), 26 single shot Berdan rifles, and 1 hand mac
gun, as well as up to 1000 horses, 500 cows, 300 camels, more than 3000 s
and goats 'from the herds of the Chinese garrisons'.11 Ivanov had no prob
with Osman's tactics, considering that caravan robbery and theft of herds wen
line with the 'deeply-mercantile psychology of the rebels and ... personal i
ests of each of the participants in the raid'.12 Though Osman was fighting
Soviet weapons, he was not expected to embrace socialist principles; on the
trary, it did not matter that Osman was a bandit and a robber - as long, that
he served Moscow's purpose by stirring up the trouble in the Altai.
Ivanov also pointed to serious problems within Osman's camp. There we
constant frictions within the Kazakh community, among the various clans,
Osman was often forced to amend his plans to suit the desires of this or that
Moreover, as the trouble spread out throughout Xinjiang, more authoritat
leaders emerged at the political arena, whose stature was greater than Osm
But, concluded, Ivanov, if divisions within the rebel camp were overcome,
'he [Osman] will be able to create unbearable conditions for existence of
Chinese in the Altai, and force them to leave it'.13
In August 1944 Jiang Jieshi at last removed Sheng Shicai from his position
Xinjiang governor. But, contrary to the Chinese estimates and hopes, the n
alist movement in the province broadened rather than weakened. Stalin
opted for more direct Soviet participation rather than using Outer Mongolia
proxy for his far-reaching strategic designs. Osman was only one of Sta
pawns in the game; now he was moving other pieces across the board. There i
doubt, though, that the general uprising in Northern Xinjiang in late 1944—45
famous Yili Rebellion) was a product of disastrous Chinese policies, not So
meddling.
In 1944 prices across Xinjiang increased on average sevenfold. For example,
if a nomad Kazakh wanted to buy one kilogram of tea at markets in Altai, he
would have to sell one sheep, or nine kilos of butter, or 60 kilos of flour (Barmin
1999: 49). By July 1944, wrote the British Consul in Urumqi Geoffrey Turral,
'flour was unobtainable on the market'. Overall, 'the cost of living continued to
rise'. In August, the consul reported, 'the cost of living rocketed'.14 In the
summer of 1944 the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang announced the requisition of
10,000 horses from the population for military needs. That measure especially
hurt the nomadic herders (Barmin 1999: 53). By late summer/early autumn 1944
small groups of nomads formed guerilla units across all of Northern Xinjiang.
Besides the Kazakhs, the rebels included a dozen local nationalities - Uyghurs,
Mongols, and others. Even a group of Russians who had escaped across the
border into Xinjiang in the 1920s, fleeing the Reds, joined forces with the bur
geoning independence movement. This was a rather colourful agglomeration of
ethnic groups, who shared little among themselves except for their anti-Chinese
sentiments and, for most of the participants, commitment to the Islamic faith.

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 244 SERGEY RADCHENKO

Large-scale clashes with the Chinese bega

group attacked the Altai capital Sharasume.
Chinese captured and publicly executed 40 K
pacify the district, and the rebellion gathe
Uyghur rebels intensified guerilla warfare
Soviet border). The key figure here was a for
USSR at the time of collectivization) Alikh
Ture became the head of the revolutionary he
the rebels launched a general uprising in th
too disorganised to offer serious resistance -
rebels. Reporting on these developments to
Chinese Foreign Affairs delegate attribu
Russians'. He claimed that 'nö Kazakhs and
party', and that 'at the time of the outbreak t
there except some gendarmes but troops were
restore order quickly'. The Chinese official ch
revolt'.15
Was this wishful thinking or deliberate disinformation? Far from restoring
order quickly, the Chinese were pushed out completely; by March 1945 all three
northern districts of Xinjiang were in the hands of the rebels who had proclaimed
the establishment of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan, under the leadership of
Alikhan Ture. Osman continued to control Altai; Sharasume finally fell with the
help of Russian-led troops. Among those involved were former White officers
F.I. Leskin and I.G. Polinov, but also infiltrated NKVD agents. Soviet weapons
were furnished to the rebels directly from across the border. With the establish
ment of a rebel government the Soviet authorities eagerly established economic
ties with Northern Xinjiang, helping to alleviate a difficult economic situation in
the rebel-controlled territory. In the meantime, by the summer of 1945 the Yili
rebellion expanded southwards and the fate of Urumqi was now in jeopardy
(Barmin 1999: 58-63).

STALIN'S ABOUT-FACE

At the Yalta Conference of Allied powers in February 1945 Stalin made a

promise to Roosevelt to join the war against Japan two to three months after the
war with Germany was over. In return for this promise he secured Roosevelt's
agreement to substantial expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence in Asia:
Outer Mongolia, far from returning to the Chinese fold (as Jiang Jieshi had
hoped), would retain its status quo (Stalin understood this to mean actual inde
pendence). The Soviet Union would gain new territories in the Far East and
obtain concessions in China, including a base in Port Arthur and re-possession of
the Manchurian railroads. Jiang Jieshi was not involved in the negotiations but
his agreement was taken for granted. To make sure that the Generalissimo would

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 CHOIB ALS AN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 245

go along with the Yalta decisions, Stalin invited the Chinese to Moscow
in the summer of 1945. Jiang Jieshi sent his brother-in-law and the Pres
the Executive Yuan Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong).
Stalin's goal at the talks was to achieve a broad understanding with
which would guarantee substantial Soviet interests in Xinjiang, Outer M
and Manchuria. To this end, Stalin was in tum willing to make consider
cessions. In fact, in the summer of 1945 his policy with regard to Norther
suffered a sudden and complete reversal; and the project of puppetis
China through fostering relationships with local warlords and supporting
insurgencies was basically abandoned in favour of a broader compromi
Jiang Jieshi. The reasons for this reversal were crystal clear - Stalin
Western acquiescence to expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence
That meant in tum that Jiang Jieshi would be forced to accommodate
demands, which now appeared not as illicit Soviet meddling inspired by
imperialist ambitions, but as an agreed policy of the Allied Powers. Th
macy afforded to Stalin's gains in Asia by the Yalta agreement was we
abandoning Soviet support to the insurgents - like Alikhan Ture, Osman
that matter Mao Zedong.
On 2 July 1945 Stalin had his first substantive meeting with Song Ziw
clear stumbling bloc was Outer Mongolia: Song said that the Generali
would prefer not to mention the subject at all because the question of Mo
status could not be resolved at that time. Stalin disagreed sharply, and
Song an instalment of his decidedly brutal realpolitik:

Outer Mongolia occupies a specific geographic location, because of which

Japanese can always knock over the Soviet positions in the Far East. Even bef
the war the Japanese tried to break through to the Halkingol region, and if
Soviet Union did not have a legal right to protect the territory of Outer Mong
then all of the Far East would be in the danger of being lost for the Soviet Uni
and this would also be bad for China.

As an afterthought, Stalin added that the MPR did not wish to reunite wit

The Mongols are striving towards self-governing existence and national i

pendence. It is more profitable for China to axe off Outer Mongolia, and if it d
not do that, Outer Mongolia will be a factor, which will unite all the Mong
which will be unprofitable for China
(Ledovskii et al. 2000:73-4).

Stalin's statement to Song had several important points lurking between t

First, it was absolutely clear that the MPR was non-negotiable for secu
sons. The Soviet dictator did not mention ideological principles b
Marxism-Leninism was basically irrelevant to his overriding geopolit
cerns. It did not matter to Stalin so much whether Outer Mongolia was soc
not as whether the Soviet Union exercised effective control over its terri
therefore protected its vast Asian frontiers from the Japanese. Though it

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 246 SERGEY RADCHENKO

the brink of collapse at the moment, in Sta

before Japan would once again become a sec
ened to make Outer Mongolia a rallying point
Jieshi dragged his feet in recognizing the
Mongol nationalism was a potent force. But on
recognize Outer Mongolia - implied Stalin - t
tribes of Northern China would remain und
with Choibalsan's Mongolia.
Song refused to accept Stalin's demands a
quickly became the chief obstacle in the Sin
key reasons for Jiang's inability to recogni
One reason was that Chinese public opinion
that gave up Outer Mongolia, and Jiang Jiesh
move. Stalin retorted, though, that the prize
set the loss: 'if China will have an alliance wi
able to overthrow the government of Jiang J
the Chinese Communists in mind. This was a
support the CCP in the conflict with Jiang
(Ledovskii et al. 2000: 88).
Song's second reason for not recognising M
spur an independence movement in Tibet;
domino effect leading to disintegration of C
ment with a characteristic awareness of the intricacies of the nationalities
problem in China. He pointed out that whereas Tibet already had Chinese repre
sentatives, there were no such representatives in Mongolia. He offered a
counter-example: the granting of independence to Finland by the Bolshevik gov
ernment. Song rejected the parallel out of hand, and Stalin retorted that 'if China
maintains this point of view, nothing will come out of our talks' (Ledovskii et al.
2000: 87). Indeed, by the end of Stalin's third meeting with Song, on July 7, it
appeared that the Sino-Soviet talks would break down.
In early July 1945 Ivanov received an urgent cable from Molotov: it asked
Choibalsan to depart for Moscow immediately. On 3 July, in a Douglas plane fur
nished by the Soviet government for the occasion, Choibalsan flew to Moscow,
once again accompanied by Ivanov, landing at the downtown airport on 4 July.
His reception in Moscow was far more than anything he expected or experienced
up to that day. The airport was decorated with Soviet and Mongolian national
flags. Choibalsan was greeted by a guard of honour, and stood to performance of
the Soviet and Mongolian anthems. Molotov, military intelligence chief Fiodor
Kuznetsov and the head of the Ministry of State Security Vsevolod Merkulov
were among those present at the airport to welcome the stunned Marshal; all were
dressed in ceremonial attire. A couple of days later Choibalsan told Ivanov: 'It
has never been like that. I have never been so nervous. On the aerodrome I recog
nized comrade Molotov only when he came up to me. I could not control my
hands and my fingers were shaking when we passed by the honour guard.'16

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 CHOIBALSAN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 247

Stalin wanted to show to the world that Choibalsan was head of

state; above all, he wanted to impress Song Ziwen who was sti
achieve a treaty with Stalin, short of abandoning Chinese sove
Mongolia.
On his second day in Moscow, accompanied by a cohort of Soviet officials,
Choibalsan was taken on a tour of the Kremlin. The word 'Kremlin', a derivative
from Mongolian Herem [a stone wall, or a fortress], is a telling reminder of the
Mongol invasion of Russia in 1237. For the two-and-a-half centuries that fol
lowed, Russian princes travelled to the Golden Horde to obtain permission to mle
from the Mongol khans. Now the roles were reversed, and judging by
Choibalsan's reception in Moscow the khan was favourably disposed. 'In the
Kremlin', Choibalsan told Ivanov, 'I saw a completely different Stalin. He is all
shining, I could not take my eyes off the face of comrade Stalin and was once
again nervous and, probably, [my] answer[s] were completely off.'17
In his meeting with Choibalsan Stalin summarised the talks with Song Ziwen,
which had so far progressed little:

China still came here unwilling to recognize you. While this time our side is dis
cussing China's approval of Mongolia as a fully sovereign independent state, they
don't like that. In my opinion, the Chinese representatives will approve this ques
tion in the end. If our discussions reach results, I think China will issue a statement
about recognizing Mongolian independence. It is appropriate to hear your opin
ions on this score.
(Bat-Ochir 1996: 173-4)

Choibalsan, for his part, thanked Stalin profusely. Stalin produced a text, which
was read to Choibalsan - a draft declaration by China and the USSR about recog
nition of Outer Mongolia's independence (that is, still, in the absence of any sign
of Chinese agreement).18
It was all excellent news to Choibalsan. After all, he could never be certain
that Stalin would not sacrifice his country to China in return for some juicy
arrangement worked out among the Allies. But the MPR meant a lot to Stalin
strategically, too much to use it as a trading chip in negotiations with the Chinese.
He was willing to abandon the talks with Song if he did not agree to Outer
Mongolia's independence; yet something told Stalin that he would agree in the
end. First, Song probably realised that if a treaty were not signed, the Soviet
Union would enter the war against Japan anyhow and occupy Manchuria right
away, which would make the Chinese negotiating position even weaker. Second,
it was clear to Stalin that the Americans were not concerned about Outer
Mongolia and had no sympathy for Jiang's plight. Therefore, Song was more or
less cornered, and Stalin could confidently promise Choibalsan the taste of
independence.
After that meeting with Stalin, Ivanov took Choibalsan to a spacious dacha in
Zarech'e (specially assigned to the Mongolian delegation on 'comrade
Fedotov's' - i.e. probably Stalin's - recommendation).19 At the dacha Ivanov

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 248 SERGEY RADCHENKO

went over the matters discussed in the Kremli

that the Marshal had understood everything co
draft declaration, Choibalsan said:

Yes, this is what we want, but we will not have frien

with the Chinese. These are very, very bad peopl
[us], burned and raided yurts, killed the arats [nom
do this with the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Alas
well the meaning of the declaration. We, as an indep
bill to the Chinese. We will tell the entire world how
nad nami), how they continue to torment the Mongo

Beyond assurances of eternal Soviet-Mongolian

Marxism-Leninism, there was one force compe
protection - apprehension of China, rooted in a
cultural differences. This was a factor that Song,
On Saturday, 7 July, Stalin hosted a reception
the guest of honour. Stalin greeted him warml
Song Ziwen and his men to join the reception
Choibalsan, apparently taking Stalin's joke seri
whole party of 23 people walked to the Hall of C
(Shirendev 1993:172). In the course of the dinne
toast:

At one time there were great disagreements among the Mongols about the ques
tion as to which country they should maintain friendship with, Japan or the Soviet
Union. Many Mongols, for example, [Inner Mongolian Prince] De Wang, spoke
for friendship with Japan. I raise my glass for those leaders of Mongolia, who
understood and correctly decided that Mongolia should maintain friendship with
the Soviet Union. These people now stand at the head of the independent
Mongolian People's Republic, and those who spoke for union with Japan are now
under the foot of Manchus and the Japanese. To the health of the leaders of
Mongolia, to her independence!21

By the time Stalin invited Choibalsan to watch a film, 'The Victory Parade', the
Mongolian leader already had a little too much after all the good toasts. That
night Choibalsan continued to celebrate with the rest of Mongolian delegation at
his residence. By the morning of 8 July, the Marshal could barely stand. In the car
en route to the airport he told his secretary: 'Hold me up when we greet the people
who see us off, let me do the duty in front of the guard of honour. I will try for my
part.' Molotov, though, was full of understanding: he shook Choibalsan's hand
and saw him off with the words: 'when you get on the plane, sleep well'. When
the plane landed in Ulaanbaatar the following morning, Choibalsan was already
'completely sober', prepared to open a new chapter in Mongolia's history, a
chapter that had already begun so well, but the Marshal was now expecting so
much more (Shagdarsuren 2000: 27-8).

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 CHOIB ALS AN' S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 249

On the same day Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi closed one chapter in his st
for China's territorial integrity. Ele cabled to Song Ziwen his agreem
abandon Mongolia if the Mongols confirmed by plebiscite their desire f
pendence. In return Jiang wanted the Soviet Union to guarantee Chinese
of Manchuria, put an end to the nationalist insurrection in Xinjiang an
providing support to the Chinese Communist Party. Later that day, Son
passed Jiang's telegram on to Stalin. Although Stalin said that he would
time to study the Chinese conditions, he indicated in the conversation t
least as far as Xinjiang and the CCP were concerned, the Soviet Union wo
make any trouble for Jiang.
Song, of course, diplomatically refrained from accusing the Soviet Un
stirring ethnic unrest in Xinjiang. Instead, he expressed his concern w
smuggling of weapons across the Soviet border into the province. Stalin
corrupt Chinese officials in Xinjiang for smuggling weapons. 'Nowada
Stalin said, 'one can get weapons anywhere.' 'But only not in Xinjiang', r
Song Ziwen. Still, Stalin denied any involvement. In fact, he questioned
with fake curiosity what the situation was like in Northern Xinjiang (of co
knew that better than Song because he had intelligence operatives placed
ranks of the rebels). Song explained that the rebellion temporarily con
northern districts, but that the Chinese government desired to return its terr
Stalin replied that:

[T]his is a fairly reasonable desire of the Chinese government and that from
point of view, the best means towards this [end] would be providing the natio
minorities of Xinjiang with certain political rights... [I]t is necessary to recogniz
that they have at least the minimum rights; otherwise, there will always be dist
bances in Xinjiang.
(Ledovskii et al. 2000:110)

The Soviet ruler did not raise the problem of the Guomindang nationalities
because he was particularly concerned with the plight of the Xinjiang min
It was his way, however, to disclaim all responsibility for the rebellio
Xinjiang by shifting the blame on to the misguided policies of the Ch
authorities. Indeed, as we have seen, much responsibility did rest wit
Chinese government, though Stalin had also tried to catch fish in the m
waters. But now he indicated that Jiang's plan to defeat the rebellion was '
able' - what better indication did Song need that Stalin would withdra
support from Xinjiang rebels?
The Sino-Soviet talks were adjourned temporarily because Stalin had to
Potsdam for a conference of the Allied powers. In August he and Song
were back at the negotiating table in Moscow. After overcoming disagre
concerning Outer Mongolian borders and Soviet rights in Manchuria a
Liaodong peninsula, the Soviet Union and China concluded their treaty of f
ship of alliance on 14 August 1945.

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 250 SERGEY RADCHENKO

THE END OF THE GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM

Even before any agreement with the Chinese had been reached, Stalin ordered
cease supply of Soviet weapons to Xinjiang rebels. After 10 June 1945 So
military aid to East Turkistan dried up (Ledovskii et al. 2000: 655). In the m
time, Xinjiang rebels continued their engagements with the government for
and by September 1945 the situation had become extremely tense. The Chi
suspected the USSR of continuing to aid the insurrection and appeale
Moscow to help resolve the conflict. As a result, on 14 September Beria a
Vyshinskii submitted to Stalin a draft resolution, which recommended c
mencement of talks between representatives of the East Turkistan Republic
the government authorities and called on the insurgents to refrain from furt
military activities. Grudgingly, the rebel forces ceased offensive operations on
September, and talks began in Urumqi on October (Barmin 1999: 9-101).
By September 1945 Osman had established firm control over the Altai d
trict. He obtained a mandate from the government of East Turkistan Republic
rule the district as a governor. But when instructions came in to stop offen
operations against the Chinese, Osman ignored them altogether. The earl
Soviet investment in the insurgency was now becoming the most difficult to
trol. Beria wrote to Molotov in October 1945 indicating his increasing conc
with Osman's activities in Altai. The letter read:

According to the information at hand, the leader of insurgents of the Altai district
Osman Batyr after the liberation of Altai has no intention to recognize the govern
ment of East Turkistan, created in Kulja [Yili] and considers the Altai to be an
independent state, and himself- the khan of the Altai. Osman Batyr claims that in
1944 during his meetings with Choibalsan, the latter promised to tum the Altai
into an independent state, and to appoint him the khan of the Altai, therefore,
Osman Batyr considers it necessary to carry out only Choibalsan's instructions.

Annoyed, Beria asked Molotov to instruct Choibalsan to tell Osman that, bec
of the peace negotiations under way in Urumqi, he had better comply with
ceasefire.22
It is very likely that Choibalsan promised Osman heaven and earth in their
meetings in February-March 1944, and possibly on the terms claimed by Osman.
The Marshal's own ambitions extended far beyond expelling the Chinese from
the Altai. Indeed, following his return from Moscow in July 1945 Choibalsan
began preparations for the 'liberation' of nearby Mongol banners (in present-day
Inner Monoglia), his ultimate intention being the province's unification with the
MPR at China's expense. It took some time before he realised that Stalin did not
support the idea following his agreement with Song in Moscow. Ivanov, in a
detailed political report to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in January 1946, claimed
that Choibalsan's initial hope was not only to extend Mongolia's borders to the
south, but also to the east, all the way to the Pacific Ocean, so that Mongolia
would become a naval power. Part of the problem, according to the Soviet

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 CHOIBALSAN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 251

plenipotentiary, was that Choibalsan had only a faint idea about the
ditions among the Mongol banners, and that he was unpleasantly surp
he visited parts of Inner Mongolia after the beginning of Soviet-Mong
ation against the Japanese, to see so many Chinese living there.23
As a result, Choibalsan scaled back his appetites, but still hoped fo
of Hingan (in Western Manchuria) and Inner Mongolia to the
People's Republic - this would increase the population of the count
million - a substantial increase from a population of under one million
in the MPR. 'This would be a country', commented Ivanov, 'with a f
nomic organism. The country would have its own bread, agricultur
cattle, relatively developed petty industry and enormous natural ri
had been untouched by the human hand.'24 Therefore, Choibalsan w
to hear about the Sino-Soviet agreement to recognise Outer Mongoli
current borders, which 'broke off for a certain time the flight of a d
Great Mongolia and brought about disappointment... '25
Around the time of this report Stalin voiced his thoughts abou
Mongolia in quite a different context. Jiang Jieshi's son, Jiang Jinggu
the Soviet Union in December 1945 to discuss with Stalin Guomind
culties with the CCP. Referring to clashes between the CCP and the G
forces in Inner Mongolia, Jiang told Stalin that 'in Mongolia there w
tles between the Chinese [Communist?] forces and the forces of
Central government, and the Chinese communists conducted propag
effect that because independence of Outer Mongolia had been procl
will strive for independence of Inner Mongolia'. Stalin replied that 'th
and ... the Soviet government cannot be held responsible for the ac
Chinese communists ... It is unhappy with their behaviour. The Chi
nists had not asked it for advice' (Ledovskii et al. 2000: 331).
It was Choibalsan who had been asking Stalin for advice. After a
was held and the Guomindang government recognised Mongolia's
ence, the Marshal travelled to Moscow to sign a new treaty of mutu
the USSR (the previous arrangement - a protocol, not a treaty - sig
was about to expire). In a meeting with Stalin on 22 February 1946
proposed to conduct propaganda work among the Mongol banners in
Inner Mongolia to prepare them for eventual independence.26 Ap
Choibalsan gave up for the time being the thought of outright annexa
Mongol banners but, no doubt, creation of independent Inner Mong
first step in the direction of her eventual reunification with the
People's Republic.
Stalin's response was somewhat ambiguous:

Com. Stalin: Creation of an independent state in Hingan and Inner Mong

require a new war with China. Does one need it now!
Choibalsan: Can we carry out propaganda work there?
Com. Stalin: You can, quietly.27

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252 SERGEY RADCHENKO

Was Stalin for or against cessation of Hin

Evidence suggests that he was against th
Soviet treaty. He also realised that too m
could cause him complications with th
instructions to Choibalsan - 'you can, quie
avoiding saying 'no' outright (this would
Choibalsan). On the other hand, with the
tense, Stalin could never be sure whether
hold up. In this case, he could always revert
tion of China, and if Choibalsan paved the g
long as he did not do so in obvious ways.
Developments in Inner Mongolia in this cr
of this article. Suffice it to say here that fro
of Great Mongolia in 1944-45, Choibalsan
hope in 1946-47; the prospect of the pan-M
by the day. In yet another staggering rever
Altai, not only failed to abide by Soviet or
joined ranks with the Guomindang in late
the Mongolian People's Republic. Indeed, i
again on the Sino-Mongolian border in Alt
time, the Chinese forces acted with Osman'
On 1 June 1947 Choibalsan left Ulaanbaata
in Moscow. It was not an official visit, and
time without any plans for meeting with
Zarech'e the Marshal proceeded north, to
Riga (in Latvia), spent some time on the B
the Black Sea. It was there that Stalin's ai
Choibalsan and invited him to visit Stalin
Ritsa. Choibalsan obliged, and proceeded to
There, on the night of 27 August, he had hi
Stalin wondered: 'What is happening wit
happened to Osman?' To this Choibalsan re

Though the border conflict is simmering low

Baitag Bogd [Baitoushan] has run continuously
But because Osman sold himself and betray
trated into the areas where he was.

(Bat-Ochir, 1996:181

On the following evening, Stalin continued

The closest friend of independent MPR is th

the beautiful words of any capitalist country.
For example, if we take the MPR and China, th
Mongolia. It is a state with full rights that can
But China has in reality lost the quality of an in

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 CHOIB ALS AN' S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 253

eyes of the Americans. Therefore, independent Mongolia can be infringed upon

by both the Chinese and the Americans. They must be firmly opposed. If you need
help, we are ready to help. We have such a treaty between us. We will fully imple
ment our duty under the treaty.
(Bat-Ochir 1996:182-3)

What exactly, though, did Stalin have in mind? Was he encouraging Choib
to act with greater resolve in the border dispute, as he had in January 1944? M
points were left unclear; so Choibalsan raised some of these issues once a
when a month later, on 30 September 1947, he met with Molotov in Moscow.
Choibalsan explained that the Chinese were conducting border raids into
MPR and asked Molotov's advice about how to deal with the intruders.
Molotov's response was clear and unequivocal:
The Mongols must protect their border, but not go any further and not interfere in
other matters. The Chinese attacks should be beaten back, the Chinese forces
should be thrown out of the Mongolian territory, if they cross into it, but the
Mongols themselves should not cross the border.

Molotov proposed that Choibalsan put someone in charge of the border troops
'who would use his brain but would not become arrogant'. In response to
Choibalsan's inquiry about the Mongol planes with Soviet markings stationed
along the border (possibly the same planes that had been involved in the bombing
raids on Altai in 1944), Molotov said that 'Soviet markings must be removed.'28
The situation was completely reversed from early 1944. Then, Stalin and
Molotov encouraged Choibalsan to act decisively. Now, Molotov urged caution,
and it was Choibalsan, perhaps emboldened by Stalin's references to Soviet pro
tection, who argued for more resolute action in the border region. He told the
Soviet Foreign Minister that 'the Chinese stand at the border, conduct frequent
raids, kill peaceful citizens and take away the cattle'. But Molotov warned once
again that Mongol soldiers were under no circumstances to cross the border, and
gave a good reason why:
The Americans are standing behind the Chinese backs. If there are Mongolian sol
diers in the Chinese territory the Americans will raise noise. This is not terrible,
but undesirable ... The Chinese could kill or capture Mongols on their territory
and then they will scream that we cross the border. This is undesirable.29

Thus, tensions in Soviet-American relations made Moscow act with considerable

circumspection in order not to offer Washington any further opportunities to
accuse the Soviet Union of imperialist ambitions in China.
Faced with new realities, Choibalsan proposed another scenario to Molotov,
one which could avoid the 'undesirable' results but also remove Osman from the
picture in Altai.

Choibalsan says that Osman has influence among his bandits and that it seems to
him, to Choibalsan, that it would be better to kill Osman, because he sold himself
to the Chinese. Molotov remarks that we will not have regrets about Osman.30

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 254 SERGEY RADCHENKO

The Soviet Foreign Minister also allowed

Osman's gang' - that is to say, to send in
rather than engage Osman's forces in direct
covert activities, and even kill Osman, Ch
situation was quite different than in 1944.
with Stalin full of dreams about Great Mon
an instrument of Mongolian influence in
more, and Osman had become at best a
Mongolia's southwestern frontier.

CONCLUSION

The border conflict between China and Mongolia did not outlast the cru
Guomindang regime. The establishment of the People's Republic of Ch
October 1949 changed the situation. In theory at least, the Chinese an
Mongolian communists were class brothers on the same side of histor
reality was of course much more complicated, not least because Choibal
not believe that the Chinese - nationalists or communists - had abandone
hope of Mongolia's eventual return to China. We know from the historical
that the subject was frequently raised in the Chinese communist leader
with the Soviets - at least until 1956. (These probes were consistently rebuf
Radchenko 2008: 341-66.) In any case, the establishment of the PRC put
to all hopes for independence for the Inner Mongolian banners. Osman'
ment for a Kazakh state in the Altai likewise succumbed to the ruthless fo
history.
On 7 July 1950 China's second-in-command Liu Shaoqi received in Beijing
the first Mongolian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Bayaryn
Jargalsaikhan. Suddenly Liu turned the conversation to Osman:

There was Osman's gang on our border in Xinjiang. When the Chinese side
started to beat it, it would run away into Mongolia; when it was beaten from the
Mongolian side, it would go to China. He is a serious bandit. If we join forces
from both sides we will be able to liquidate him easily. There are gangs still oper
ating at some points of our border. Time will pass and everything will be OK.31

In the end, the PRC did not require Mongolia's assistance. In February 1951 the
Chinese tracked and arrested Osman at his makeshift camp in Qinghai province,
far to the south of Altai. He was tried in Urumqi and accused of banditry. Found
guilty of all charges, Osman was executed in April 1951 (Benson & Svanberg
1998: 86-7). It was a fitting closure to a remarkable story of intrigue and betrayal,
of rise and fall of unlikely alliances, triumph and tragedy of nationalist insurrec
tions, of great power manipulation and unrealised dreams of lesser nations upon
the remote and little-known yet important and ever-coveted expanse of Inner
Asia.

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 CHOIB ALS AN' S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 255

Declassification of archival record in Mongolia and Russia allows a d

examination of little-known episodes in contemporary Mongolian hist
story of Mongolia's uneasy relationship with the Kazakh nationalist ins
in the Altai can yield itself to different interpretations. The one offer
gives more credit to Mongolia and to Choibalsan than is afforded by t
nents of the theory of the MPR's complete subservience to the USSR. C
- the Soviet pawn - comes across as a kingmaker in his own right, playin
plex geopolitical game in tune with, but not at the behest of, his Soviet
Choibalsan looked to Stalin for protection and support but his core
uniting the Mongol tribes and extending Mongolia's borders at China's
was not a Soviet-inspired ploy. It was rather a consequence of Choibals
nationalist sentiments, which ran much deeper than his commitment to
Leninism or to his Soviet ally.
One could perhaps object to this interpretation. In fact, the record als
how much Choibalsan depended on Stalin's support. Unlike Osman, wh
simply ignore instructions from Moscow, whether conveyed directly or
Choibalsan, the Mongolian leader could not say 'no' to Stalin. So Cho
Great Mongolia dream had to be scaled back and, indeed, abandoned al
once Stalin decided that his interests lay elsewhere. But Choibalsan's n
ambitions must be distinguished from his political realism. The road
Mongol unity lay through Moscow. The road to Mongolia's national sur
lay through Moscow. For that matter, Choibalsan was in a situation si
Kim II Sung's: the North Korean dictator also sought Stalin's support for
unification - and got it. Choibalsan did not. No one would question Kim
nationalist credentials; perhaps, one should also reappraise Choibalsan's
Mongolia's modem history.
Some conclusions can be drawn also with regard to Stalin's strategy
tics in the region in the mid to late 1940s. Stalin's key interest was secur
means to this end could and did evolve over time. At one stage (i.e. in 194
1945) Stalin pursued a policy highly disadvantageous to China's terri
integrity. I have called it 'bufferisation' of China. Relying on nationalist
tions to undermine the Guomindang authority in Xinjiang and in areas ad
the MPR frontier, Stalin provided support to various Osman-type ch
either directly or through Mongolia. The latter method was of course p
for reasons of conspiracy, although as we have seen, neither the Chinese
Western observers in the region believed that Mongolia's participation
thing but a veil for Soviet territorial expansion.
In mid 1945 Stalin changed his strategy. He believed that US acquies
his post-war gains in China and the Far East (registered in the Yalta ag
was worth much more than his investments in the nationalist insurre
Xinjiang. Soviet support for the East Turkistan Republic (and Osman)
doned in favour of a general compromise with the Guomindang
about-face shows how much he valued the notion of post-war great po
promise if Washington was willing in tum to recognize his 'legitimate

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 256 SERGEY RADCHENKO

interests. The compromise did not last; and

policy changed once again. But this change
Stalin's support for the Chinese Communist
the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 dealt the
dream.

NOTES

I am grateful to Uradyn Bulag, Stephen Harmon, Jim Hershberg, Odd Ame Westad and
David Wolff for useful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank two anony
mous reviewers who recommended this article for publication in Inner Asia. I would not
get far in my research but for insights and all-round help on the part of Elizaveta Guseva of
the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF). Finally, I am grateful to
my wife, Onon Perenlei Radchenko, who stoically endures my academic excesses and
always finds good words for encouragement.
1 All Chinese names (even where used in quotations) have been converted to pinyin for
the sake of consistency. The Library of Congress system has been used for Russian
transliteration. Mongolian transliterations do not come under any system.
2 One should note here that the term 'Mongol peoples', which permits a rather loose inter
pretation, does not include the Buryats or the Tuvans long lost to Russia. I did not invent
the term 'Great Mongolia' for the purposes of this article - it was used in some of the pri
mary sources relied upon below.
3 It is important to keep in mind that Osman Batyr was an ethnic Kazakh, not a Mongol -
a fact that, as this article demonstrates, did not prevent Choibalsan from seeing a role for
him within the pan-Mongolian movement. References to Great Mongolian and pan
Mongolian are mutually substitutable here and elsewhere in the article.
4 Of course, there were other setbacks to Russia's expansion in East Asia before the revo
lution, not least Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, 1904-05.
5 It is important to note that Russian troops had been present in Outer Mongolia even
before the Russian revolution, and in 1907 Russia and Japan agreed that the territory
would belong to the Russian sphere of influence.
6 The time of the meeting was recorded in Stalin's meetings diary.
7 Telegram from the Government of India, External Affairs Department to the Secretary
of State for India (28 March 1944), UK National Archives, F0371/41591.
8 Kashgar Weekly Letter No. 574/H/5/L-43 (17 February 1944), UK National Archives,
F0371/41592.

9 G.F. Hudson's comments to Kashgar Weekly Letter No. 574/H/5/L-43 (17 February
1944), UK National Archives, F0371/41592.
10 Report from Ivan Ivanov to Viacheslav Molotov (3 October 1944), Arkhiv Vneshnei
Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF): fond 06, opis 6, papka 51, delo 528, list 10.
11 Ibid., list 11.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 12.
14 News Summary, Urumchi, for the month of July 1944 (2 August 1944), UK National
Archives, F0371/41593.
15 Situation in Sinkiang (30 November 1944), UK National Archives, F0371/41593.

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 CHOIBALSAN'S GREAT MONGOLIA DREAM 257

16 Memorandum of conversation between Ivan Ivanov and Khorloogiin C

July 1945), AVPRF: fond 06, opis 7, papka 38, delo 560, list 8.
17 Ibid.
18 Memorandum of conversation between Ivan Ivanov and Khorloogiin Choibalsan (5
July 1945), AVPRF: fond 06, opis 7, papka 38, delo 560, listy 7-8.
19 Plan vstrechi, prebyvani'ia i provodov Prem'er Ministra MNR Marshala Choibalsana
(3 July 1945), AVPRF: fond 06, opis 7, papka 38, delo 560, list 1.
20 Memorandum of conversation between Ivan Ivanov and Khorloogiin Choibalsan (5
July 1945), AVPRF: fond 06, opis 7, papka 38, delo 560, list 7.
21 Obed u tovarishcha I.V. Stalina v chest' Choibalsana (7 July 1945), AVPRF: fond 07,
opis 6, papka 38, delo 560, list 10.
22 Report from Lavrentii Beria to Viacheslav Molotov (15 October 1945),
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF): fond 9401, opis 2, delo 104, listy
62-63.
23 Report from Ivan Ivanov to S.A. Lozovskii (12 January 1946), AVPRF: fond 0111, opis
26, papka 190, delo 3, list 54.
24 Ibid., list 58.
25 Ibid., listy 58-59.
26 Memorandum of conversation between Joseph Stalin and Khorloogiin Choibalsan (22
February 1946), Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'noi i Politicheskoi Istorii
(RGASPI), fond: 558, opis 11, delo 352, list 88.
27 Ibid.
28 Memorandum of conversation between Viacheslav Molotov and Khorloogiin
Choibalsan (30 September 1947), AVPRF: fond 06, opis 9, papka 2, delo 23, listy 3-5.
29 /¿/¿„list3.
30 Ibid., list 5.
31 Memorandum of conversation between Bayaryn Jargalsaikhan and Liu Shaoqi (7 July
1950), AVPRF: fond 0111, opis 32, papka 215, delo 5, listy 3^1.

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