PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND V A L UA -

TIONS

Andréa LOPARIC and Newton C. A. DA COSTA

1. Introduction

A theory F is called inconsistent if among its theorems there are at

least two, one of which is the negation of the other. When this is not
the case; 6
. i s
formulas (or all closed formulas) of its language are also theorems of
sF. aI f there
i d is at least one formula (or closed formula) of the language
t F othat is not a theorem of F, then F is said to be nontrivial.
of
b A paraconsistent logic is a logic (a logical calculus o r simply a
e
calculus) which can be used in the systematization of inconsistent but
c o n theories. These 'paraconsistent' theories, therefore, may
nontrivial
s i s inconsistencies (contradictions), i.e., pairs of theorems such
contain
t eone
that n is the negation of the other, without being trivial. Obviously,
most
t . of the extant systems of logic, such as the systems o f classical
W
logic, are not paraconsistent( in relation to paraconsistent logic, its
applications,
e and its philosophy, see [I] and [31).
c Every logical system whatever has a two-valued semantics o f
valuations,
a which constitutes a generalization of the standard seman-
tics
l (cf. [81 and the next section o f this paper). Taking this fact into
account,
l we can define precisely the notion of paraconsistent logic; a
logic
F is paraconsistent if it can be the underlying logic o f theories
containing
t contradictory theorems which are both true. Such theories
we
r call paraconsistent.
i Similarly, we define the concept o f paracomplete logic : a logical
system
v is paracomplete if it can function as the underlying logic o f
theories
i in which there are (closed) formulas such that these formulas
and
a their negations are simultaneously false. We call such theories
paracomplete.
l
w As a consequence, paraconsistent theories d o n o t satisfy the
principle
h o f contradiction (o r o f non-contradiction), which can be
e
n
a
l
l
120 A . LOPARIC A ND N.C. DA COSTA

stated as follows : from two contradictory propositions, i.e., one o f

which is the negation o f the other, one must be false. Moreover,
paracomplete theories do not satisfy the principle o f the excluded
middle, formulated in the following form: fro m two contradictory
propositions, one must be true.
The objective o f the present paper is twofold: 1 ) t o develop a
propositional system o f logic at the same time paraconsistent and
paracomplete, which, in a certain sense, contains the classical propo-
sitional lo g ic ; 2 ) t o illustrate h o w the method o f valuations i s
convenient fo r the better understanding o f a logical system (some
applications o f the semantics o f valuations may be found in [2], [4],
[10] and [16]).
The system studied in this paper may be seen as a kind of logic of
vagueness (in the sense of [6] and perhaps also in the sense of [7]; it
also constitutes an alternative to the dialectical logic in the sense of
the logic DL of da Costa and Wolf (see [5] and [6]), which formalizes
some vie ws o f McG ill and Pa rry ([12]). Moreover, o u r system
presents some connections with the dialectical logic DK o f Routley
and Meyer (cfr. [13]). One of the consequences of these parallels is
that the main ideas o f dialectics seem to be really vague, not being
susceptible to unique characterization by a formal system.
Nonetheless, we do not intend here to explore the possible applica-
tions of our system, from the philosophical point of view or otherwise.
Our aim is merely a technical one : to emphasize the relevance of the
semantics of valuations, showing that with the help of such semantics
one can, in various cases, obtain decision methods which really
constitute a natural extension of the common two-valued truth-table
decision method o f the classical propositional calculus. I n fact, we
conjecture that any calculus that is decidable at all, is decidable by the
corresponding semantics o f valuations, i.e., more precisely, by the
device which we shall name 'valuation tableaux' (for these tableaux
see, for example, [4], [9], [10] and [ 1 1
]
).
2. The semantics o f valuations

A (logical) calculus (
of eformulas
i s aof na given language Y , and .4 is a collection of inference
o r d e r e d
p a i r <
A ,
. 4
› ,
i
n
w h
i c
 PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND VALUATI O NS 1 2 1

mies; A and M are supposed to be nonempty, and A is called the set

of axioms o f W. I n this paper, Y will a propositional language. In
general, we assume that 2' contains propositional variables (normally
a denumerable infinite se t o f such variables), parentheses and
connectives. Th e connectives are supposed t o have finite ranks
(although this point is not essential to our discussion). Usually, the
language contains connectives fo r implication (—>), conjunction (8 ),
disjunction ( V) and negation (7 ); there may also be intensional ones,
like the modal and deontic connectives. The concept o f formula is
introduced as usual. Capitan Roman letters will stand for formulas ;
sets of formulas will be denoted by capital Greek letters. The notion of
inference rule could be made precise, but this is not essential to our
objectives here. We recall only that a rule relates a new formula (the
conclusion) to a given set o f formulas (the premisses). Fo r a given
rule, the number of premisses is always finite and fixed.
In a calculus W, it is easy to define when a formula A is a syntactical
consequence o f a set ['o f formulas. When this is done, we write
f F
E
fact is symbolized as follows : 1,7 A . Th e symbol ' 1
A
expected
4 properties. We write simply i n s t e a d of '17', when there
is
'. no h doubt
a s about a lthel calculus
t weh aree considering.
I Definition 1. - Let W-<A, > be a calculus and e a function from
f set of formulas of the language L of (
the
eI i n t o evaluation
(two-valued) 1 0 , associated
1 1 .with W if we have:
'W 1) eI f A A , then s e(A)a 1 ;y
t( h a t
e1 2) I f all premisses of an application o f a rule belonging to .4'
i3assume the s value 1 under e, then the corresponding conclusion also
assumes the value 1 ;
a,
A 3) There exist at least one formula A such that e(A) = O.
i
s Let g be the set of evaluations o f a calculus W, e f , and 1' a set
sformulas of the language of W. We say that e satisfies f if, for every
aA E l
i- i) 1 f f H A, then, for every e Ef , if e satisfies 1', then e(A) 1 ;
d,
te ii) i s trivial if, and only if, g ( W is said to be trivial if, for
o( every formula A of its language, we have that H A).
bA
e)
a=
t-
hI
e.
sW
ie
sc
122 A . LOPARIC A ND N. C. DA COSTA

Let U t A l be a set of formulas o f a nontrivial calculus W. E is

called A-saturated i f E -- A and, fo r every B U IB H A . We
clearly have (see [8] and t91):
iii) I f i s A-saturated, then H B if, and only if, B
iv) I f F 4-- A, then there exists an A-saturated set E such that
E.

v) The characteristic function of an A-saturated set is an evalua-

tion.

An evaluation which is the characteristic function of an A-saturated

set is called a valuation. Let r be the set of all valuations associated
with W. Using ii, iii, iv, and v, we can easily show that:
vi) 6 ' = cl) if, and only if, r
The notion of semantical consequence, with respect to a non-trivial
calculus W, is introduced without difficulty. We say that A is a
semantical consequence of I if, for every valuation v which satisfies
v(A) = I (in which case we write F I A , or simply I" A ) . If = (13,
we say that A is valid in W (and we write A or A ) .
Any nontrivial calculus (logical system) has a two-valued seman-
tics, in the sense of the following theorem:
Theorem!. — f H A
i f , Proof. a n —d Follows from i-v above.
o n l y
The soundness and completeness o f the classical propositional
i f ,
calculus are special cases of the preceeding theorem. The same is true
A .
of several other calculi (see, for example, [41 and [ 1 4
A valuation v, such that v(A ) = 1 f o r every A belonging to a
collection F of formulas, is called a model of F.
A theory based on a calculus (
language t e i s o f a( n y
dr
g ,sA ) e, d tt is calledoa set fo f axioms fo r Ti. A model o f Ti is any
valuation
s fu co h vr of m( u l a
g
theses)
t shs u aof c hTi
t are the formulas that belong to Ti.
ti oh' isfaparaconsistent
t f if, and only if, there are theories, based on (6
vH t 2 models
having h v f o r ewhich v(A ) = 1, f o r some A
(A ,A ) (6
Similarly,
—
2
, is
It a r ha
p
cfe o mo p
lrn e t e
ie
A v
fe
E r
fyF
A
o
.
rE
W
 PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND VALUATI O NS 1 2 3

a model y such that, fo r some formula A , v(A) = v( TA) = 0, and

conversely.

Remark. - Sometimes, in order to d e

fi
respect to a given calculus = <A, M › , it may occur that some rules
of nhea v e t h to undergo
e r ecertain
l a trestrictions,
i o n which take into account the
1 where
cases - 4z13• (a s occursA i n modal lo g ic wit h th e ru le o f
w
necessitation i t in predicate
and h logic with the rule o f generalization).
However, Theorem I remains valid under convenient, clear adapta-
tions.
It seems worthwhile to observe that the semantics o f valuations
satisfies Tarski's conditions o f formal correctness and o f material
adequacy (see {141 and [151). I n particular, Ta rski's criterion F
remains valid. These aspects o f the semantics o f valuations would
become more evident if we were to consider predicate logic instead of
propositional logic (cf. [2]).
A large part of our results and comments apply to f i
with
r s ot r- without
o r d e ridentity,
l o andg i even
c , to higher-order logic ; o f course,
profound adaptations are required, since, in particular, we have to
analyse the behaviour of the quantifiers.

3. The system it

We introduce now a paraconsistent and paracomplete calculus, it,

with a very weak primitive negation, but where a kind o f classical
negation is definable. The language of it contains the set f-4, &, V, -
1 1primitive connectives, and an axiomatic basis for it is given by the
of
following postulates (where Ac! Def
= & A ) & (A v A ) :
.

1) A -)(B ->A )
2) (A -> B) ( ( A ( B ->C)) -) (A -4 C))
3) A , A --)B/B
4) (A & B) -) A
5) (A & B) -4 B
6) A -4 (B -) (A & B))
7) A -> (A V B)
8) B ( A v B)
124 A . LOPAR1C AND N. C. DA COSTA

9) (A -4C) ( ( B - - > C ) -4 ((A V B) C ) )

10) A? v (A & -
A)-V
11)
- T ( A & TA ) -) ((A & TA ) B )
1
12)
13)
(1 A - ( A
IvV( A(2
14)
vT
6 A )
Theorem
-A
0 2. - The following schemes are not valid in a ;
1
&
) 1) T T A -> A
A
B
- 2) cA -4 - - -
)13)
? 1 )- -
-( 4) - ((A
1 A & TA ) B
4
>
A5) 1 AA V TA
&
(&6) T (A V TA) B
(T7) A (A -•* TA) -> TA
A8 ) )TAVflA
V
&
) 9) (A B ) ( ( A -4 -
-10)
& 1 B(T) B --> >TA) -> (A -4B)
(111) T (A A -> )B) -› (TB -› TA)
A 12) T A -> (A ->B)
v)13) -
B 1 -
14)
)15)(A -
1
?16)(- A ( T A V TB) -> -
1
& >A( A(
(V
1
17) &
(18) A (A
&
-B ) ->B) T ( A & -
A ) A-
B
1
19)
-20) )(B -
&
1
>
1(B TA)
Theorem -B A
T
B
& 3. - The following schemes are provable in rt :
)T
1 &Ti) -
)A
?
(B TA
-V 1 ( A( T A & -
T2)
&
V BT3)
T
)> v ( AA V&(A ->f3)
1
(-T
T ) T4)
B - A(A )& )TA) v - -
T
->
A ) T5)
O - ( A((A
1 › && -
A
)(V
(
T
A
T6) ) )
A - A&)
nA BT7)
-
&
1 (A
) v -
-) A
•> ( )A BA V )
(T
4-& )( )
B1 A ( A
B
T
)V -
A
T
)1 A
)&
3
-)
1
(
 PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND VALUATI O NS 1 2 5

18) -
IT9)( AA V - -
TIO) vK A 1 A& v -
1
TT Ti!( )AA- & )
T12)
TA A(A )&
1
T13)
( )( A (
T14)
-v- (A v 1 A )
1115)
T>( AA'?'?
&T16)
A( (A -> B) ( ( A ( B -+ -
T17)
) ( ( B ((Av - AT T
1 (AVBTA))) )-> - > -
-&A( A
1 -> v T( A A ) )
T18)
-v& 1 ( > -
T19)
-)1T (: (T(B & TB) & (A v TA)) ( ( A --> B) --3 (TB -) TA))
120) ( A( AAA'? ( A ->
1
A
T21) A) A'? - > (
&
V -
- A 2. )- - ) )
-T
Definition
1
VB Def
A A = -
1 T )
classical negation o f It).
A -)A- 1 - 1
(Theorem
)1A A(- >4.A-) ' - ' has all properties of the classical negation.
&
Proof.
V () A- In fact, we have in n:
T t- B ( AV A
and -
) V . B )
T
( -T - - A- - + A ( b y T17).
B
'Thus, B since A
postulates 1-9 above, together wit h th e schemes
-) -) ) (-B -4
(Ai -÷B) --A) and -
s • )
- A classical
the )
- A , propositional A , calculus (in which ' & ' , ' V' and a r e
-( n )s t iconnectives),
c toprimitive
the t u t e i t contains, in an obvious sense, that
ah A
calculus. ( n)
a e x)- A i o m a
(
t i c t
s 1
b r bB a 4. o Valuation
s isemantics and decision method for it
n y T g
s
oLetT
f10,11, A V„ be the set of functions from the set of formulas o f it into
o that, for every y N w e have:
1 such
r r )
6-1) v(A & B) 1 if, and only if, v(A) = 1 and v(B) = I ;
)2) * v(A B ) 1 if, and only if, v(A) = 1 o r v(B) 1 ;
,3) ( v(A ->B ) = 1 if, and only if, v(A) 0 or v(B) = 1;
4)
A If v (
--
1
) 1A)
=
B
v)
() T
A )
,
t
h
126 A . LOPARIC A ND N. C. DA COSTA

5) I f v(A §B) = v(T(A §B)), then v(A) v ( T A ) and

v(B) = v(TB ), for § ( — ) , A, V
6) v(T(A
} & TA)) * v(A & TA );
7) v(T(A
; v TA)) 'P v(A v

Theorem 5. — The set 1/

n is t h e
Proof. — I t is easy to demonstrate that y Ç if, and only if, there
s ea set t of formulas
o f EU {A
exists
v a
characteristic l u function. o
a t i
}
n s
, s u c h t h a t
a s s o cseveryi theorem of it is classically valid, it is easy
E Remark. — Since i
A asee t eevery d classical Nq luation belongs to Y/
to - that
w i
svaluations
7 a t uv for r ita such t e that, for some A, v(A)* v ( T A ) . But there a
,d- ;t valuations
also t h uh s ,v of tÇ hsuch e that,
r efor some formula A, v(A) = v (
.-a. eath isr case,
in ne w e say
d that A is n o t 'semantically well-behaved'.
.
vOtherwise,
1 A ); A is 'semantically well-behaved'. Ou r system a has an
interesting
i property
s : the semantical behaviour of any given formula A
can
i be expressed,t in a certain sense, b y a formula. Fo r example,
sA & At! means that A is true and we ll behaved, in this sense: fo r
every yE i f v(A & Ac!) = 1. then v(A) I and v(TA ) = O. In the
same way: A & TA means 'A is true but not well-behaved'. TA &
means that A is false and well-behaved ; finally, T A & v TA)
means that A is false and not well-behaved.
With the help o f w e can obtain a decision method f o r the
calculus a.
Let t A
that l A1, A2, , A
n ,
a) I f B is a subformula of A
c oA n2 s t i t u t
b)
i If A
e s,
i, i tsuchh ethat n , A, isf T Ao and
r Ak is T B ;
a •
s Fo
c) — r
o m eF j < i, A, 4 A
i •t -
•Ij ( A
s Definition •e q u 3.e— Suppose that A A
•§
i ,
n
tableaux 2, cB e for A
iby
t ,At )— ,f A
,from
, nn ,AI„ x iA 2 s;,
n , A
fn I o
,A a2 w , , = i {1
t ,2
- }, t,(I, I) = 1, and t,(1,2) = 0;
r)w I) RAO
, s,bi nh ,e t oq u { e0 n , c e .
l1
A Te e„ , h
h e
i}e
d a er n
i,n
o s te e
n
td e E
w h e r e
,Ih
b t 8
w
y o•
e
n
e
ft f C
=
h
n f ,
Io
a o
 PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND VALUATI O NS 1 2 7

2) .11(A
1 A2, • • • A n - 1 ) = {
, A1, Fo
2.1) r 1 i ,n , 1 j m , tri(i•j) = tn -t(i,j);
2 ,
2.2)
2 i a)n I f } A ,
o n e
n
, h i s Aa s
a
, : jn m , t
p
A r b) o n I)pf A
n s ni (=
o ti1ns, i, j )
o
_ n a a = 1
t snlo , = 1 ;
vi aA 1.fj A C) I
0
r) i n k ;_ a1m i -•.•j s Z m, t
Ç lA
b & tn(1,j)
2n ,k = I;
- 1d)
e ,A Im (tf nA, j )
.( A1 11 n l i =
n, sj m , t , (n , j) 1 i f , a n d o n ly i f , t
1
l A A
, ,n t 1
(k
(, e)
A J In
n a(inf kA, f j ) = 0
A e n
l)( (n iA ,s
o r
1
2 l-,= l Ida j 2, , 2 m} and, f o r j m . t
, l
)
J{, ,n A , )tn(n,j) n = tn(k,j);
A
• k
I(IA A
e j
fd 1( n , j ) t
2
• ,
f
2
l ,
2 )
o iA
o n
•, t
A
)
e
, , rfn
2 h
1 n ( k ,l j )
•, e
k
I
3
A ,• jy,)f; from o- r
n
•A )fi2,• •iaIj A : is = -
•n s,m
Ia • -fnAn_1): Ip{mA t ,
)• a
k
f
, }
, •dM , ,
n I
A ,
2( ,1 • • • A n ) = {

p
i
A ;A _to1 a
3
t A
, ,h
a
n ksrnfn .nm e,n
n
= 2 +Mn s); f o r j m , t
2
j) l),, =
n
d o
iA
)o ) m (ltd n k •
e
p
s
= = ,y• 1
r , (
l
e •=n ,
• j ) t
,
4
o
&
A
{5{ tji ,
e r
e
5
t I
,
M i r }
f
))p
-sII n)fA(.t1,m t k ,h
o nn
e
II
i
-
&
, = M
j
R
.
5 2
} . ) ;
r f , ( , _ R
fA :r
f1 ,; i no - I. lr s r , t
J t22 n1
A1 t A
a A
t
t
nn}j)In ,f, n
k 1
A
ii, ,o
,A
(
sk n
.
(
o (i, m
A o ,, jr(PdAm
p n
,
o
Let t TiAro 2
n (
t
,
rA +
,r + s t)
m )kq t
l have: m
A .n We i•
n
h = t
sA
R
},} 1,)n
ra br1
t2
, •
(A l;; ,je
lAkA ,
(n
=
,e - nn
•1 ,
t,
l e
p
ikvff a)s j
n
•
(
n ;
• ( i , m
a
()
, (- , f s
sia
o
A o n=kc•u•
A srr d1it.l•c)o
l)A _ )• ;
2 iA fo/1
,
AA
p n
j•hri f o
;(
, „vp
a A
) 1
m r
orit
2
,
• b rfkA
,•A
V -n•, j
h
-
• „-l• ,1
•e
t)a-t
P
• ,Ie Aj,n
,v t•n
A
128 A . L O P A R I C A N D N .C . D A C O S T A

Lemma 1. — Fo r every / i i , A2, • • • , A

that, n for 1 i n , v(A
i ) t h e r e i the
s set a asafollows:
Proof. — Construct
) v= t e 1
n 7 1) I f A e A
( i, , 2) .l I,jf A) 0 .As u c h
i, a) A A2 is, B & C and B o r C e a ;
,• A b) A is B VC and A, B e a ;
2A c) A is B --)C and A ea and B 0 a ;
,n d) A i s T(B & TB) and B & e a ;
,} e) , A is T M v TB) and B v e a ;
A t f) hA is T T B and B e a and T B e a ;
R e g) A n is —
1A 1, (1C3 i f and only if TC Oa, for § e & , v )
Now,te §ithCis )not , difficult to show that the complement o f a, with
e a B n
respect to the set of all formulas of Tr, is A-saturated relative to every
formula A i 0A of the form B & TB & & TB). Thus, its characteristic
function ef a y belongs to I / a n d , b y construction, f o r any A
A
t a, a
e I iaAn , ,
2
, Lemma fn d 2. — Fo r every y Y t h e r e is a j e J (A „ A2, • • • , An),
such
, ,dthat,
B for j ) v(A , ).
a o c
A Proof. — B y induction on n.
„ nn a
1 Proof. dl i — H
,I andA oy 2,f A , if , and only if , fo r every j A
j)Y2= 1 n Ii .i af ,
(, a f n
On l n , dother hand,
the A we can easily stipulate a canonical wa y o f
associating,
A d
n o y, n l to any formula A, a at-sequence A
iiA,
) yis, it A.o t
i f„ 2fn,
,)r iTherefore,
A a is
, decidable A by our tableaux, based on the valuation
nsemantics.
: ( l s u c h
=( , i ,
t A ih y a t
Example : The graphic below presents the tableau for the schematic
, , i
a-sequence ' A , T A , A V TA, T ( A V TA), A & & TA),
b j f
v TA) & TA)' and shows the validity o f the scheme'
y ) T
— = B
T h
and
1 0' K(A & TA)'.
e o
( : ,
r e
A
m a
V n
1
T d
.
A
N
)
o
T
w
(
,
A
 PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND VALUATI O NS 129

A - AV - - A&1A - v -> - &

I IA 1 1 1
1 0A 1 ( o o ( 1 1(
0 1 1 A O o A 1 1A
1 1 v O & O 1
0 0 o - 1 o 1 1
I
A
Using valuation-tableaux
) we can prove an interesting result: TE is
not a finite many-valued logic. The proof runs as follows:

Lemma 3. - L e t A
propositional I variable ' p ' and, f o r 1 < i n , A
a)
i ,.1(A,, = A AT h e n ,
2 2- I) = 1, t
2n
,1 E
n , i ,n ,- I, t
(A ni A , i 2I „, ) t
n( i n, n 2 n
=
Proof. - B y induction on n.
)- b( i ,; e
0
c=3 tCorollary. 2 ) n) h -e a) -
fI= 712 Ioc ) - b) p p , for k 0
r,1 s= e; q u e k , the
m formula
> 1obtained
, by putting n occurrences o f
2d n,O c ) e
n ( w h e r ebefore 'p').
,f w
2 n. o h ' T
Proof - Take the rt-sequence 'p, -
,rLemma ,e p , r r
1 1 3 ,3, tk+n,-F1(
, k+- m + 1, 2(k -I- m + 1) - 3) = 0 and tki-m+1 (k + 1,
t2n f
e1 + km + o r , p '
2(k p 1), - 3) = 1; thus, by Lemma 1, there is some y E7Ç such
.2
n Ak V(11, i s
that m
(1,by l0 n ,
4 pthe Theorem ' 6, 1 k P-> -
,;t1 „, im k
• p
+ )
n (ic
, P m; + o
i, 2 (k
n + m + i) - 2) = 1 and tn+,,,,+1 ( k + 1, 2 (k +
bn
2 s1
t= B
m + h1) - e2) = y0; therefore, by lemma 1, there is some v e 1 s u c h
)(that
n 0 t; tvn ( h e r
o
-f,by a hTheorem
-h na n 6, -d ,
o2
3 d e„Theoremy7. - 7t has not a finite characteristic matrix ; thus, J
b
1
)rn v +m
kL
+ . n many-valued
ep m m
1a
= -,a finite
( t 7i s n o t
logic.
j2
0 , Proof
3
p ) - In ,any finite matrix there is some k al 0 and some m > 1
n)such
a p
1 that, for every value x o f the matrix, Tk(x) T k -F , „(x ). Since
,=
n A
) -) A is n-valid, in any adequate matrix for it, and for every value y,
a
tIn
d 1
,na ,
d
f(n vh (
id
o -e
r,,1 n
fkc
o
e )
p
r=
v (
-
0
130 A . LOPARIC A ND N.C. DA COSTA

we should have a distinguished value f o r —) (y , y ) ; thus both

v
i
Universidade
k Estadual de Campinas A n d ré a LOPAR1C
P Newton C. A. DA COSTA
Universidade
- Estadual de Campinas
Caixa
- Postal 1170
-131.000 Campinas SP Brasil
Telex
l (019) 1150
k
REFERENCES
-
F Arruda, A. 1., 'A survey of paraconsistent logic', in Mathematical Logic in Latin
[1]
r America, edited by A. I. Arruda, R. Chuaqui and N. C. A. da Costa. North.
n Holland. 1980, pp. 1-41.
[2] Arruda, A. I. and N. C. A. da Costa, 'Une semantique pour le calcul
p Acad. Sc. Paris, 284 (1977), 279-282.
'[3] Da Costa, N. C. A., 'The philosophical import of paraconsistent logic', The Journal
a of Non Classical Logic, 1(1982), 1-19.
n
[4] Da Costa, N. C. A. and Alves, E. H., 'Une sémantique pour le calcul C
ld Acad. Sc. Paris, 283 (1976), 729-731.
[5]
'' , DaC Costa.
R . N. C. A. and R. G. Wolf , 'Studies i n paraconsistent logic 1: t he
dialectical principle of the unity of opposites', Philosophia, 9 (1980), 189-217.
-[6] Da Costa, N. C. A. and R. G. Wolf, 'Studies in paraconsistent logic 11: quantifiers
l and the unity of opposites', to appear.
[7]
k Korner, S., The Philosophy of Mathematics, Hutchinson, 1960.
[8] - Kotas, I. and N. C. A. da Costa, 'Some problems on logical matrices and valoriza-
tions', in Proceedings o f the Third Braz ilian Conference on Mathematical
F Logic, edited by A . E. Arruda, N. C. A. d a Costa and A . M. Sette, Soc.
m Brasileira de LOgica, 1980, pp. 131-146.
[9] P Loparié, A., 'Une étude sémantique de quelques calculs propositionnels'.
[10] — Loparié, A., 'The method of valuations in modal logic', in Mathematical Logic:
Proceedings of the First Brazilian Conference, edited by A. I. Arruda, N. C. A.
>
da Costa and R. Chuaqui, Marcel Dekker, 1978, pp. 141-157.
[11] - LopariC, A. and Alves, E. H.. 'The semantics of the system C,, of da Costa', in
1 Proceedings of the Third Brazilian Conference on Mathematical Logic, edited
k by A. E. Arruda, N. C. A. da Costa and A. M. Sette, Soc. Brasilieira de LOgica,
1980, pp. 161-172.
P
[12] Mc Gill, V. J. and W. T. Barry, 'The unity of opposites: a dialectical principle'.
• Science and Society, 12 (1948), 418-444.
1131 w Routley, R. and R. K. Meyer, 'Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consis-
o tency of the world', Studies in Soviet Thought, 16 (1978), 1-25.
[14] u Tars k i, A., 'The Concept of truth in formalized languages', in Logic, Semantics,
Metamathematics, by A. Tarski, Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 152-278.
l
d
b
e
v
a
l
i
d
 PARACONSISTENCY, PARACOMPLETENESS, A ND VALUATI O NS 1 3 1

[15] Tarski, A., The semantic conception of truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 4 (1944), 13-47.
[16] W4icicki, R., Theory of Propositional Calculi, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1981.