Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Original research article

Policy mixes against oil dependence: Resource nationalism, layering and T

contradictions in Ecuador’s energy transition
⁎
Guillaume Fontainea,b, , José Luis Fuentesc, Iván Narváeza
a
Department of Public Affairs, FLACSO, Ecuador
b
University of São Paulo, Brazil
c
Universidad de Las Américas, Ecuador

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Most recent research on energy policy is interested in how policy mixes —the combination of instruments to
Energy transition attend a policy problem— can explain policy outcomes. This policy design framework is utilized here to explain
Policy instruments and avoid possible implementation gaps in oil-rich countries engaged in the low-carbon energy transition.
Process tracing Ecuador is used as an typical case for a ten-year policy which headed at a post-oil era after three decades of oil
Institutional change
dependence but failed eventually. A causal mechanism linking the adoption of policy aims with the im-
Latin America
plementation gap is tested against a typology of expected empirical observations based on policy instruments.
The main findings indicate how the adoption of contradictory policy aims produces institutional change by
layering, which helps actors resisting the policy change to influence the incumbent, eventually undermining the
political interplays and the policy outcome.

1. Introduction: policy mixes and causal mechanisms in the low-
carbon energy transition
Recent research on energy policy underlines the importance of
“policy mixes” —the combination of instruments to attend a policy
problem— in the energy transition [1]. This approach advocates for a
“conscious policy design” [2] by underlining the complementarity of
programs —such as energy efficiency, technological change, circular
economy, etc.— that share a common final goal [3,4]. Not only does it
call scholars´ and practitioners´ attention on how instruments con-
stituency is key to fulfill the energy policy objectives [5,6], but it also
pinpoints the institutional effects of policy instruments on consistency
and coherence [7].
This shift from resource endowment to decision-making brings out
new elements to the political economy of energy transition in oil and
gas producing countries, hence providing for a renewed explanation of
policy outcomes and implementation gaps. To reverse the path de-
pendence of oil-endowment and “escape the resource curse” [8], gov-
ernments have been advised to cancel or to postpone natural resource
exploitation until domestic institutions are strong enough to deal with
boom and bust cycles [9]. Yet expecting governments to make such a
decision might be a vain wish since institutional change is a wicked
problem for natural resource endowed countries: existing institutions
can help or constrain governments to control for exogenous factors such
as oil price shocks, but these factors affect existing institutions [10].
Such endogeneity has dramatic implications for policy design and fails
to reverse long-lasting effects of path dependence, for instance when
institutional change is implemented by “layering” [11,12]. Institutional
change by layering, as opposed to drift, displacement and replacement,
is a process by which new aims and means are added to the existing
ones, hence creating an overcrowded institutional system increasing the
risk of incoherent policies (for a full taxonomy, see [13]).
In most Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) oil and gas producing
countries, energy policy is driven by the will to secure State control
over natural resources, in order to maximize the government-take in
rents and to finance development. These are the core attributes of
“resource nationalism” [14–16], which is the dominant regional pat-
tern. Even though governments would rather implement liberal policies
in Colombia, Peru, and Trinity and Tobago to attract foreign direct
investments and increase their proven reserves, they make intensive use
of natural resource rents to finance development. In Mexico, the pet-
roleum sector has been controlled by the State since the 1938 Con-
stitution and the creation of PEMEX (Petróleos de México). This mono-
poly was only partially reversed in 2015, by the opening of the
upstream to private investments. During the past two decades, resource
nationalism has even included the nationalization and expropriation of
foreign assets in Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. In Brazil, it
has provided protection to local national oil companies combined with

⁎
Corresponding author at: Department of Public Affairs, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Quito, Ecuador.
E-mail address: gfontaine@flacso.edu.ec (G. Fontaine).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.08.013
Received 20 November 2017; Received in revised form 15 August 2018; Accepted 21 August 2018
2214-6296/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
G. Fontaine et al.
the controlled intervention of private actors. [17,18].
Regardless of the degree of State control over the petroleum sector,
almost all of these countries fall far behind the low-carbon energy
transition (see Appendix Table B4), the exception being Brazil, where
the first important program of biofuels was launched in the 1960′s, at a
time when this country′s energy sector was in crisis [19]. Renewables
energy sources (RES) hardly reach 18% of total primary energy supply
(TPES) in Peru, and even remain below 10% everywhere else. They are
below 20% of total energy production (TEP) in all but one country
(Colombia), where they reach 23%. These performances contrast with
Chile’s, a net oil and gas importer like Brazil and Argentina, where RES
reach 27% of TPES and 75% of TEP [20].
Why would the energy transition be hindered by resource nation-
alism? This paper argues that the attributes of resource nationalism
—resources nationalization, rent-seeking and state-driven develop-
ment— are contradictory with the ultimate goals of the energy transi-
tion because they do not allow to reverse the path dependence of re-
source endowment. A necessary but non-sufficient condition to achieve
these goals is for a government to renounce progressively using oil and
gas rents for development.
Ecuador is a typical case of resource nationalism hindering the en-
ergy transition because of a lack of consistency between the aims and
means of the policy. Immediately after his election in 2006, President
Correa announced his will to achieve post-oil transition, a major chal-
lenge considering this country’s economy had been driven by oil rents
for over three decades. The new energy policy would consider massive
investments in hydropower infrastructures, the construction of a new
petrochemical complex to export refined products rather than crude oil,
and a ban on the exploitation of the Ishpingo, Tiputini and Tambococha
oilfields (ITT), also known as “The Yasuni-ITT Initiative” [21]. Yet after
ten years the results of this policy look deceptive. In 2013 the gov-
ernment gave up the Yasuni-ITT Initiative and had the National As-
sembly declare ITT of national interest, in order to push forward the oil
extraction from the Amazon. The ambitious call for a structural change
in the energy mix ended in an incremental raise of hydropower in TEP,
and the pattern of energy consumption remained unchanged.
To assess this lack of consistency and explain how it produced an
implementation gap, the research design was based on a critical rea-
listic approach of process tracing, combining dualism and trans-factu-
alism [22]. This means a causal explanation of a policy outcome exists
(dualism) and this explanation can be found in detected but non-di-
rectly observable phenomenons (trans-factualism). Such a critical rea-
listic approach had two implications for the research. Theoretically, the
causal mechanism —hereby defined as “a system of interlocking parts”
(A–C) transmitting causal forces from a trigger (T) to an outcome (O)
[23]— consists in a pattern of interplays between institutions and ac-
tors that can explain implementation gaps in certain contexts, rather
than a law-like theory of implementation gaps. Methodologically the
constitutive parts of the causal mechanism are not intervening variables
but entities engaging in activities. Hence the causal mechanism relies
on a deterministic inference and it does not provide a predictive model.
Policy instruments were utilized as expected empirical observations (or
fingerprints) of the causal mechanism, following a Bayesian logic as
explained in Section 3.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the analytical framework of the research. It includes a dis-
cussion about the relationship between policy design and im-
plementation gaps. Then it proceeds with the theorization of a causal
mechanism of implementation gap in the energy transition. Section 3
explains the method used to support the hypothesis. It includes a de-
scription of the expected empirical observations based on the energy
policy mix. Then it explains the rationale of the Bayesian formalization
based on hoop tests. Section 4 presents the research results and analyzes
them for each part of the causal mechanism. It describes the collected
evidence, then proceeds with the Bayesian formalization and point-by-
point comparison with the hypothesis. Section 5 draws some
57
Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68
conclusions on policy mixes in energy transition and further research on
the low-carbon energy transition in oil-rich countries.
2. A policy design framework
2.1. Policy design and implementation gap
Research on implementation gaps started with Aaron Wildavsky′s
interest in explaining failures in the policy process and the differences
between what was expected by a government and policy outcomes and
outputs. His work with Jeffrey Pressman focused on decisions effec-
tiveness, in particular during the implementation phase, although later
on Wildavsky would also write on policy evaluation. In their study of a
failed economic development project in Oakland, California, Pressman
and Wildavsky underlined the complexity of collective action in the gap
between policy formulation and implementation [24]. After this
ground-breaking study, research on implementation would feed into an
impressive body of literature focusing on decision course, unexpected
policy outcomes and implementation gaps (for a state of the art, see
[25–27]).
This research made at least three fundamental contributions to
policy analysis. First, it showed that a government deals with multi-
layered processes, since multiple stakeholders are involved at different
levels in local and national agencies, State and social organizations, as
well as private and public companies. Second, it brought about a central
argument of the pluralist theory regarding the diversity of perspectives
and objectives, underlining the incidence of community power in a
Project’s cost and the control of social content by the central adminis-
tration. Third, the Oakland case showed that not all actors assign the
same importance, necessity or urgency to a policy program, when they
can choose among competing offers, and not everyone expects to ben-
efit likewise from this program.
The role of implementation structures in top-down and bottom-up
policy styles [28,29] became key to disentangle the complex relation-
ship between policy design and implementation gaps [30]. This fra-
mework provided a middle-range theory of policy change, according to
which the scope of the collective action and a decision′s degree of ab-
straction define three levels of policy aims and means [31,32]. At a
macro level, general preferences and principles adopted by a govern-
ment may be assimilated to long-term goals to be fulfilled by the
overarching institutional design and the governance mode. At a meso
level, specific ideas and principles define medium-term goals which
lead to combine specific instruments in a policy mix. At a micro level,
technical objectives and preferences defined by the administration
allow for the adjustment or calibration of these policy instruments to
short-term variations in context.
This theory combines the institutional approach of policy para-
digms1 [33] with a taxonomy of policy instruments based on the State’s
resources of nodality, authority, treasure and organization [34]. Nod-
ality instruments can be assimilated to the use of information by a
government, either as a detector (to inform a decision) or as an effector
(to inform on a decision) [35]. Authority includes formal rules ex-
pressed in the political Constitution, laws and regulations. Treasure
instruments are financing sources and public spending related to the
policy at stake. Organization refers to State and non-State agencies
involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of this policy
[34,36].
1
In his comparative study of the neoliberal turn of UK and French economic
policies, Peter Hall [40] states that a policy paradigm change, coined as “third-
order change”, consists in adopting a new definition of the policy problem
which frames the agenda-setting, the formulation and the implementation.
Unlike first- and second-order changes (referring to changes in aims and
means), third-order change are not the product of social learning but rather of
the multiplication of policy failures in the former paradigm (or normal policy).
G. Fontaine et al. Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

However, in spite of persistent efforts to link governance modes

Public account of an implementation

with implementation styles through policy instruments [31,37], the

The energy mix is not affected by

persistent oil dependence (¬HO)
persistent oil dependence (HO)
determinants of an implementation style remain indeterminate in-

The energy mix is affected by

asmuch as different governance modes can coexist in different policies
designed by the same government. This rests on the fact that instru-

Policy outcome (O)

ments constituency is context-dependent [38,39], so a particular
change in a governance mode may have different effects from one
policy area to the other. Likewise, intents to measure and theorize
variations in the consistency and coherence of policy mixes have re-

gap (O)
mained inconclusive so far, essentially because the definition of con-
sistency and coherence is subjective, as the definition of policy failure is
(but see [41,11]). At best, a policy mix may provide for a major source

Actors resisting policy change in the energy

Actors resisting policy change in the energy

sector do not influence the incumbent (¬HC)
Actors influence on implementation style
of information on a government′s implementation style [42]. But it is
still a descriptive framework, insufficient to explain implementation

sector influence the incumbent (HC)

gaps. Explaining an implementation gap as a consequence of a policy
mix requires to build a causal mechanism through process tracing, as
explained in the following section.

Political interplays (C)

2.2. A causal mechanism of implementation gap

In order to build up the causal mechanism linking resource na-

tionalism to the low-carbon energy transition failure in contemporary

(C)
Ecuador, it is necessary to trace the process leading from policy aims to

institutional reform by layering (HB)

Government does not implement an

policy outcomes. Table 1 presents this causal mechanism, each part of

institutional reform by layering

which is related to a hypothesis. Every other hypotheses are treated as

Government implements an
one single alternate hypothesis (¬H). This Bayesian logic means only

Change in cross-sectorial
the hypothesis (H) can be confirmed. If it was to be disconfirmed, this
Institutional change (B)

hypothesis should be discarded or reformulated but the alternate hy-

pothesis would remain indeterminate [42,43].
coordination (B)
The theoretical causal mechanism works as follows. The agenda-
setting (T) triggers a process leading to an implementation gap (O)

(¬HB)
through the formulation of a policy (A), institutional change (B) and
political interplays (C). Confirming this mechanism would require to
observe explicit claims made by the government (T), change in the
Government does not formulate a new

energy policy area (A) and cross-sectorial coordination (B), influence on

Government formulates a new energy
policy based on resource nationalism

the incumbent by actors resisting policy change (C) and public account
energy policy based on resource
Formulation of new policy (A)

of an implementation gap (O). Theoretically these parts are causally

Change in sectorial policy (A)

related (H = T:A:B:C:O) and the hypothesized mechanism is the sum of

its part (H = HT + HA + HB + HC + HO). This means the confirmation
of the overall mechanism depends on the confirmation of its weakest
nationalism (¬HA)

part [23].
According to the research hypothesis, when a government aimed to
achieve energy transition and increase oil rents simultaneously (HT),
this would cause the formulation of a new energy policy based on re-
(HA)

source nationalism (HA). This would cause the implementation of an

A causal mechanism of implementation gap in energy transition.

institutional reform by layering (HB) which would have actors opposed

Government aims to achieve energy transition

Government does not aim to achieve energy

to policy change influencing the incumbent (HC). This would end in the
and increase oil rents simultaneously (HT)
Explicit claims made by incumbent (T)

energy mix being affected by persistent oil dependence (HO).

Conversely, the alternate hypothesis states that the government would
transition and increase oil rents

not aim at achieving energy transition and increasing oil rents si-
multaneously (¬HT). Neither would they formulate a new energy policy
based on resource nationalism (¬HA), nor would they implement an
simultaneously (¬HT)

institutional reform by layering (¬HB). Actors resisting policy change

Agenda-setting (T)

would not influence the incumbent (¬HC) and the energy mix would not
be affected by persistent oil dependence (¬HO).2
Alternate hypotheses
Operationali-zation

2
Again, since the absence of evidence is no evidence of absence, the alternate
Hypotheses
mechanism
Theoretical

hypothesis is not another hypothesis against which the hypothesis should be

Table 1

tested. It is only the sum of all possible other hypotheses that could disconfirm
the theoretical causal mechanism (for further discussion on Bayesian logic
applied to process tracing, see [44,45]).

58
G. Fontaine et al. Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

Table 2a
Typology of expected empirical observations.
Entities Agenda-setting (T) Policy formulation (A) Institutional change (B) Political interplays (C)

Nodality instruments Explicit claims in government′s
program (PT1)
Authority instruments Explicit claims by government in
constitutive regulation (PT2)
Treasure instruments Explicit claims by government in
development model (PT3)
Organization Explicit claims by government in
instruments State apparatus design (PT4)
Change in policy area planning
(PA1)
Change in policy area regulation
(PA2)
Change in policy area
budget allocation (PA3)
Change in policy area
administration (PA4)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination Influence on implementation style in
planning (PB1) incumbent′s statements (PC1)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination Influence on implementation style in
regulation (PB2) legislative process (PC2)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination Influence on implementation style in
budget allocation (PB3) budget execution (PC3)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination Influence on implementation style in
administration (PB4) community involvement (PC4)

3. Methodology
3.1. Expected empirical observations
The theorized causal mechanism was tested against a typology of
expected empirical observations, based on Hood′s four categories of
policy instruments described above. Each expected empirical observa-
tion refers to what kind of evidence is needed to confirm the hypothesis,
so if no evidence could be found or when evidence of the alternate
hypothesis would be found, the test would be negative and the result
would be disconfirming (see Tables 2a and 2b).
If HT was true, explicit claims made by the government should be
observable in the government′s program (PT1), in the constitutive
regulation (PT2), in the development model (PT3) and in the design of
the State apparatus (PT4). If HA was true, change in the policy area
should be observable in the sectorial planning (PA1), regulation (PA2),
budget allocation (PA3) and administration (PA4). If HB was true,
change in cross-sectorial coordination should be observable in planning
(PB1), regulation (PB2), budget allocation (PB3) and administration
(PB4). If HC was true, influence of actors resisting change should be
noticed in the incumbent′s statements (PC1), in the legislative process
(PC2), budget execution (PC3) and community involvement (PC4).
The policy outcome was tested against quantitative data on the
energy mix transformation during the period of reference (2007–2016).
If HO was true, public account of the implementation gap should be
observable in the comparative analysis of energy production by sources
(PO1), of energy consumption by sources (PO2), of energy consumption
by sectors (PO3) and of renewable energy production and production
(PO4). The comparison should be both cross-countries and longitudinal,
in order to explain a variation in the effectiveness of the energy policy.
3.2. Hoop tests design
Bayes theorem provided a formal way to evaluate the confirming or
disconfirming meaning of these empirical observations and to discuss
their quality as evidence. The typology of conventional causality tests is
based on their levels of certainty and uniqueness [46,47], sometimes
assimilated to necessity and sufficiency conditions [48]. Certainty is the
probability to find evidence if a theory is true p(e|h); uniqueness refers
to the probability to find this evidence if the theory is not true p(e|¬h).
The relationship between these attributes defines the confirming or
disconfirming value of a test.
Performing a “straw-in-the-wind” test means there is a low
Table 2b
Expected empirical observations on the outcome.
Entities Policy outcome (O)
Nodality instruments Comparative energy production by sources (PO1)
Nodality instruments Comparative energy consumption by sources (PO2)
Nodality instruments Comparative energy consumption by sectors (PO3)
Nodality instruments Comparative renewable energy production and
consumption (PO4)
probability to find evidence if a theory is true but still a high probability
to find this evidence even if the theory is not true. On the contrary, a
“doubly-decisive” test is both certain and unique, a “smoking-gun” test
is not certain but unique, and a “hoop” test is certain but not unique.
Using random values, in a “straw-in-the-wind” test [p(e|h) = 0.4] and
[p(e|¬h) = 0.3]; in a “doubly-decisive” test [p(e|h) = 0.9; p
(e|¬h) = 0.1]; in a “smoking-gun” test [p(e|h) = 0.4; p(e|¬h) = 0.1];
and in a “hoop” test [p(e|h) = 0.9; p(e|¬h) = 0.3].3
The confirming or disconfirming value of these tests can then be
measured by the difference between the prior confidence p(h) and the
posterior confidence p(h|e). The prior confidence depends on the result
of former empirical tests, so it can be calculated according to the
available information, either relying upon an experiment, a standard
linear regression or a qualitative appreciation. In absence of previous
experiments or statistical series, a random value of prior confidence
might be that of a flipping coin [p(h) = 0.5].
The posterior confidence depends on the result of each additional
test and it can be calculated with Bayes theorem as follows (adapted
from Bennett [44]).
In case of a positive test:
p(h|e) = [p(h)p(e|h)/[p(h)p(e|h) + p(¬h)p(e|¬h)]
In case of a negative test:
p(h|¬e) = [p(h)p(¬e|h)/p(h)p(¬e|h) + p(¬h)p(¬e|¬h)]
where h is the hypothesis, e is the evidence, ¬h is the alternate hy-
pothesis and ¬e is the absence of evidence.
Based on the random values used above, Table 3 presents the pos-
sible results of conventional tests, using Bayes theorem. Straw-in-the-
wind tests exhibit the lowest value as confirming (0.07) and dis-
confirming (−0.04) tests. Conversely, doubly-decisive tests show the
highest confirming (0.4) and disconfirming (−0.4) values. At an in-
termediate level, hoop-tests show a lower confirming value than
smoking-gun tests (0.25 vs 0.3) but a higher disconfirming value
(−0.38 vs −0.1).
Eventually, the replication of independent tests on each element of
the causal mechanism allowed to upgrade the theory when positive. All
other things being equal (that is, if each test ended positive) these va-
lues would increase significantly the prior confidence.
The tests on T, A, B and C were performed according to the same
procedure, based on the use of policy instruments as hoop tests, even if
some of them (like treasure4) might be treated as smoking-gun tests.
3
NB: Even if they are random, the values assigned to a test should be con-
sistent with the confirming or disconfirming process. First, a confirming tests
implies that posterior confidence > prior confidence, so the random values
cannot produce a negative result if the test is positive. Second, the posterior
confidence ranges from a minimum (in the case of a positive straw-in-the-wind
test) to a maximum (in the case of a positive doubly decisive test). Eventually
0.01 < p(e|h) < 0.99 but p(e|¬h) > 0.5 would mean e is irrelevant for the
theory.
4
There is a high probability to find a treasure instrument in any policy and
finding a treasure instrument in absence of a policy would be unexpected.

59
G. Fontaine et al.
Table 3
Typology of empirical tests using Bayes theorem.
Type of test p(h) p (¬h) p (e|h) p (¬e|h) p (e|¬h)
Straw in the wind 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.30
Hoop 0.50 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.30
Smoking gun 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.10
Doubly decisive 0.50 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.10
This conservative strategy avoids potential statistical bias due to tests
sequencing. The rationale is that if a policy exists there is a high
probability to find traces of this policy in the instruments of nodality,
authority, treasure and organization [p(e|h) = 0.9]; yet there is a high
probability to find these fingerprints in absence of such a policy [p
(e|¬h) = 0.3]. For instance, if a policy exists that aims at the low-
carbon energy transition, there is a high probability to find traces of this
aim in each policy instrument; but finding traces of this aim in one
instrument does not mean such a policy actually exists. In other words,
in a policy mix each instrument behaves as an Insufficient but Neces-
sary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition (INUS).
The tests on O were based on cross-countries comparison (Ecuador/
LAC; Ecuador/oil and gas LAC producing countries) and longitudinal
comparison (2006/1998; 2016/2007), using databases from the Latina
American Organization of Energy (OLADE) and the International
Energy Agency (IEA) [92,20]. Following the former procedure, these
expected observations were treated as hoop tests, so the cumulative
result would be consistent with the cumulative result on the other parts
of the mechanism.
The following section proceeds with the presentation of the evi-
dence found and a discussion of the tests results.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Evidence found and formalization
Table 4 presents a list of the evidence found by sources related to
each part of the hypothesis in Table 4.
The evidence from nodality instruments used as effectors included
the national plans of developments for 2007–20105, 2009–2013 and
2013–2017, the master plans of electrification for 2009–2020 and
2013–2022, the 2014 National Energy Agenda, and the incumbent′s
addresses about the Yasuni-ITT Initiative at the UN (in 2007) and the
National Assembly (in 2013). The evidence from nodality instruments
used as detectors came from 1998 to 2016 time series by the Latin
American Organization of Energy (OLADE) and the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA) databases.
The evidence from authority instruments consisted in the 2007
Constitutional Mandate on the electric sector and the 2008 political
Constitution, ordinary regulation including executive decrees and laws
on petroleum nationalization, hydrocarbons, water management and
electricity supply, the National Assembly assessments for the 1st and
2nd debates on the ITT declaration of national interest, and the Blocks
31 and 43 declaration of national interest by the National Assembly.
The evidence from treasure instruments consisted in the 2007 Plan
for a new energy matrix and the 2014 Strategy for a new productive
matrix, the new contractual regime for oil operations, the 2016
Catalogue of public investments by the Ministry of Strategic Sectors, the
2012 report on the Yasuni-ITT trust fund, Ministry of Finance Fiscal
balance reports (2011–2017) and the Central Bank of Ecuador’s na-
tional annual assessments (2007–2016).
The evidence from organization instruments consisted in official
documents describing the organic functions of the National Secretary of
Planning and Development (SENPLADES), the Ministry of Strategic
5
This plan was revised after the adoption of the 2008 political Constitution.
Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68
p (¬e|¬h) p (h|e) p (h|¬e) C1 = p (h|e) − p(h) C2 = p (h|¬e) − p(h)
0.70 0.57 0.46 0.07 −0.04
0.70 0.75 0.13 0.25 −0.38
0.90 0.80 0.40 0.30 −0.10
0.90 0.90 0.10 0.40 −0.40
Sectors, the Ministry of Renewables and Electricity, and decentralized
administration, assessments to the National Assembly for the ITT de-
claration of national interest, by the Ministry of Environment, the
Special Commission on Autonomous Governments, and press reports on
the General Attorney’s investigations about corruption by former
Minister of Strategic Sectors, Chinese loans-for-oil contracts and the
General Comptroller′s assessments on the public debt.
The prior confidence in each part of the mechanism was defined on
a conservative basis [p(h1) = 0.3], which means there is only a 30%
initial confidence in our hypothesis. Each test was then performed in-
dependently, so that the posterior degree of confidence found afterward
[p(h1|e) = n1] could be used as a prior for the following one [p
(h2) = n1] and so on and so forth. The posterior confidence (final re-
sult) for each entity of the causal mechanism is 0.97. This may still be
too low a probability to take a decision regarding the maintenance of
nuclear infrastructures, but is sufficient to draw conclusions on the
cause of the post-oil transition failure, beyond reasonable doubts.
Table 5 present a detailed account of the Bayesian formalization based
on the evidence found.
4.2. Aiming at financing energy transition with oil rents
Evidence of the government’s aims to achieve the low-carbon en-
ergy transition and increase oil rents were found through explicit claims
in the four types of policy instruments.
As for nodality instruments, the government′s program was pre-
sented in the National Development Plan for 2007–2010, announcing
major changes in the energy policy to “enter the post-oil era” while
securing access to affordable electricity by the poorest [49]. The gov-
ernment would finance this transition with two complementary
sources. On the one hand, they would increase the government-take in
oil rents by negotiating new contracts with foreign companies; on the
other hand, they would create new sources of income based on en-
vironmental services. These objectives were explained by the incum-
bent in his address at the United Nations, during the 2007 High Level
Dialogue on Climate Change [50]. President Correa thus presented the
“Yasuni-ITT Initiative” consisting in the non-exploitation of roughly
20% of the proven domestic oil reserves, partly located beneath the
Yasuni National Park. He asked for a 3.5 billion USD support by foreign
countries, international organizations and private partners for en-
vironmental services such as biodiversity conservation, carbon capture
and greenhouse gases depletion. This program was very popular
abroad, as shown by a considerable number of studies and academic
articles and press reports, until its termination in 2013 for a lack of
contributions.
Authority instruments indicate that these policy aims were part of
the constitutional process. The cornerstone of the State’s reform was the
election of a Constitutional Assembly in 2007 which would act as the
Congress for one year. This Assembly immediately ordered the electric
sector being modernized, in the context of the dramatic shutdowns
caused by a drought year [51]. Later on, the 2008 Constitution pro-
claimed the energy transition a major issue for the country [52], a few
months after the Nobel Peace Prize was granted to the International
Panel on Climate Change and former US State Secretary Al Gore for
their campaign against global warming. The energy transition was also
key to the reorganization of the economy, as the new Constitution
60
 G. Fontaine et al.

Table 4
Collected evidence for each expected observation.
Hypotheses Expected observation (fingerprints) Evidence found Sources Test results

Government aims to achieve energy transition and Explicit claims made by government in 2007 PNBV 2007 President Correa address to UN General Assembly [49,50] +
increase oil rents simultaneously (HT) official propaganda (PT1)
Explicit claims made by government in 2007 Constitutional mandate 2008 political Constitution [51,52,53] +
constitutive regulation (PT2)
Explicit claims made by government in 2007 Ecuador energy matrix 2015 Strategy for the change of productive matrix [54] +
development model (PT3)
Explicit claims made by government in SENPLADES organic functions [55,56] +
State apparatus (PT4)

Government formulates a new energy policy based Change in policy area in sectorial planning 2009 PNBV Master Plan of Electrification 2009-2020 [57,58] +
on resource nationalism (HA) (PA1)
Change in policy area in sectorial regulation Executive Decree on petroleum nationalization 2010 Law on hydrocarbons + regulation [59,60,61] +
(PA2)
Change in policy area in sectorial New contracts for oil operations [61,62,63] +
budget allocation (PA3)
Change in policy area in sectorial MREE organic functions Petroamazonas organic functions [64,65] +
administration (PA4)

Government implements an institutional reform by Change in cross-sectorial coordination 2013 PNBV 2014 National Energy Agenda Master Plan of Electrification 2013–2022 [66,67,68] +

61
layering (HB) planning (PB1)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination 2014 Law on water management 2015 Organic law on public service of electricity supply [69,70] +
regulation (PB2)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination Evolution of budget allocation Public investments in RES focus on hydropower [71] +
budget allocation (PB3)
Change in cross-sectorial coordination MICSE organic functions General Attorney assessments on corruption [72,73,74,75] +
administration (PB4)

Influence on the incumbent by actors resisting policy
change (HC)
Influence on implementation style in 2013 President Correa address to National Assembly [76,77] +
incumbent′s statements (PC1)
Influence on implementation style in National Assembly assessments for 1st and 2nd debates on ITT declaration of national interest ITT [78,79] +
legislative process (PC2) declaration of national interest by National Assembly
Influence on implementation style in budget Evolution of State′s budget General Comptroller assessments on external debt Presale contracts [80,81,82,83,84,85,86] +
execution (PC3) with China Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund annual report Ministry of Economic Policy assessment on ITT
Influence on implementation style in Local governments assessment on energy policy Ministry of Environment assessment on oil [87,88,89,90,91] +
community involvement (PC4) extraction in the Yasuni National Park

The energy mix is affected by persistent oil Comparative energy production by sources Carbon-fossil fuels in TEP [92] +
dependence (HO) (PO1)
Comparative energy consumption by Hydrocarbons in TPES [92] +
sources (PO2)
Comparative energy consumption by sectors Transportation in TPES [92] +
(PO3)
Comparative renewable energy production RES in TEP and TPES [20] +
and consumption (PO4)
Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68
G. Fontaine et al. Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

Table 5
Bayesian formalization on positive tests.
Empirical tests p(h) p (¬h) p (e|h) p (¬e|h) p (e|¬h) p (¬e|¬h) p (h|e) p (h|¬e) C1 = p(h|e)-pr(h)

PT1 0.30 0.70 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.56 0.06 0.26
PT2 0.56 0.44 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.79 0.16 0.23
PT3 0.79 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.92 0.36 0.13
PT4 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.97 0.62 0.05
PA1 0.30 0.70 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.56 0.06 0.26
PA2 0.56 0.44 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.79 0.16 0.23
PA3 0.79 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.92 0.36 0.13
PA4 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.97 0.62 0.05
PB1 0.30 0.70 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.56 0.06 0.26
PB2 0.56 0.44 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.79 0.16 0.23
PB3 0.79 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.92 0.36 0.13
PB4 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.97 0.62 0.05
PC1 0.30 0.70 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.56 0.06 0.26
PC2 0.56 0.44 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.79 0.16 0.23
PC3 0.79 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.92 0.36 0.13
PC4 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.97 0.62 0.05
PO1 0.30 0.70 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.56 0.06 0.26
PO2 0.56 0.44 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.79 0.16 0.23
PO3 0.79 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.92 0.36 0.13
PO4 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.97 0.62 0.05

called for a policy paradigm shift from economic development to
human development [53].
Likewise, treasure instruments reflected these policy aims through
the 2007 Plan for a new energy mix, which would later be rephrased in
the 2014 Strategy for a new productive matrix [54]. These are two
moments when the government claimed their will to develop knowl-
edge and high technology sectors in order to reverse the path of oil
dependence. On the one hand these programs created subsidies aimed
at enhancing the energy efficiency in the residential sector and clean
energy in transportation. On the other hand they aimed at investing
massively in petrochemical plants, hydropower production plants and
electricity transportation to convert Ecuador into a refined oil exporter
and increase electricity interconnections with neighboring countries
Colombia and Peru.
As for organization instruments, the government aimed at a enfor-
cing the presidential regime and modernizing the administrative system
to increase the State’s capacity to restore national sovereignty.6 The
SENPLADES was created by merging the National Council of Moder-
nization and the National Secretary of the Millennium Development
Goals [55,56]. This agency, which was directly accountable to the in-
cumbent, embodied the renewed importance of multi-annual planning
and epitomized the governance mode that would rely on a highly
hierarchical and centralized civil service. Aside from playing an im-
portant role in the elaboration of the 2008 Constitution, the SENPLA-
DES took the lead in the Yasuni-ITT Initiative.
The adoption of policy aims based on the post-oil energy transition
and rent-seeking were the direct cause of the formulation of a new
energy policy, as described in the following sub-section.
4.3. Formulating a new energy policy based on resource nationalism
Evidence of the formulation of a new policy based on resource na-
tionalism were found through change in the policy area in all four kinds
of instruments.
As for nodality instruments, the National Development Plan for
2009–2013 confirmed the will to change the economic model towards a
post-oil era [57]. Again, environmental services and oil-rents seeking
6
The National Congress became National Assembly and lost power with the
incumbent’s ability to declare its termination. Other structural reforms reck-
oned civic participation and political accountability, through the creation of the
4th and 5th estates (the National Electoral Council and the Council of
Participation and Control).
were seen as complementary means to achieve the energy transition
and the collective well-being, through the government′s encompassing
project called the “Civic Revolution” (“Revolución Ciudadana”), a poli-
tical project consistent with similar statist programs from Venezuela
and Bolivia. Symbolically entitled “National plan for the good life”
(“Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir”), the second development plan was still
impregnated with the spirit of the Constitutional Assembly, full of hu-
manist generosity and voluntarism. Hence the energy transition was
above all the responsibility of an emancipatory State, in charge of
protecting human rights and “the nature’s rights” as stated by the
Constitution. This plan was completed by a Master plan of electrifica-
tion for 2009–2020 [58] which responded to the Constitutional Man-
date mentioned above and to the incumbent’s orientations through the
SENPLADES. Taken together, these instruments embodied resource
nationalism, based on State control over the energy sector and ex-
tractive industries, rent-seeking and redistribution.
These orientations were supported by authority instruments. As of
2009 the government declared the nationalization of 99% of the ex-
traordinary profits made by transnational companies after the 2000s oil
price shock. The concept of extraordinary profits referred to the dif-
ference between current prices and original reference prices from the
late 1990’s (when most contracts were signed) [59]. This nationalist
shift was a prelude to the new Law on hydrocarbons, and further reg-
ulation on the national oil company Petroecuador and its subsidiary
Petroamazonas. The 2010 reform of the Law on hydrocarbons con-
firmed the nationalist policy by ordering the termination of all contracts
for oil exploration and exploitation before new ones were signed
[60,61]. The main change produced by the law was to substitute service
contracts to participation contracts. In participation contracts, the State
would confer private operators a temporary license and a property right
on production. According to service contracts, the State would no
longer grant property on the resource; instead, foreign operators would
be contracted in exchange for a service fee.
The 2010 law on hydrocarbons also created new treasure instru-
ments increasing the government-take in oil rents. It granted the State
with control over 40% of the incremental production and settled roy-
alties on gross production to minima of 12.5% (if production < 30,000
barrels/day) and 18.5% (if production > 60,000 barrels/day), plus
conventional taxes on the companies’ profits [61,62]. These were very
favorable conditions for the Ecuadorian State, at a time of sky-rocketed
oil prices on international markets. In 2008 the Western Texas Inter-
mediate (WTI), reference for the Ecuadorian crude oil, reached a 100
USD/barrel tipping point and it would remain at an average 87 USD/

62
G. Fontaine et al.
barrel until 2014 [63]. Two years after the termination of the contract
with Occidental Petroleum, another major company, the Brazilian
Petrobras, left the country while new operators were coming in from
China, Venezuela and Chile.
As for organization instruments, the Ministry of Energy and Mines
split in two independent agencies: one of hydrocarbons and mining, and
one of renewable energy and electricity. Future bids and contracts
oversight were entrusted to the new Regulatory Agency for
Hydrocarbons Control (ARCH) and the Secretary of Hydrocarbons.
Further, the government made the Navy responsible for the moder-
nization of Petroecuador from November 2007 to March 2010. The
national oil company was challenged by its subsidiary, Petroamazonas,
which had inherited Occidental Petroleum and Petrobras utilities in
blocks 15 and 31, connected to the ITT oil fields. As Petroamazonas was
taking charge of the upstream in 21 blocks (18 of which were located in
the Amazon and 3 on the Pacific offshore), Petroecuador would over-
sight contracts and oil trade operations [64,65].
The formulation of this new energy policy, based on resource na-
tionalism, was the direct cause of the institutional change described
below.
4.4. Adapting cross sectorial institutions by layering
Evidence of the government implementing an institutional reform
by layering were found through change in cross-sectorial coordination
in all four kinds of instruments.
Regarding nodality instruments, the National Development Plan for
2013–2017 came out in the wake of the third election of President
Correa, whose party also won a two-third majority in the National
Assembly [66]. At that moment, the government could not possibly
anticipate the mid-2014 bust of oil markets (when the WTI fell below
50 USD/barrel), but they knew the energy transition would require
massive capital inflows. Calling for more cross-sectorial coordination to
achieve the objectives of the “good life”, the third Plan valued the role
of national secretaries and coordinating ministries directly accountable
to the incumbent, in enacting sectorial planning. As the SENPLADES,
these agencies were granted a special authority on policy areas. In that
context, the Ministry of Strategic Sectors presented the 2014 National
Energy Plan, which stressed out the urgency to conclude the building of
the eight hydropower plants already foreseen in the Master plan of
electrification for 2009–2020, and the Petrochemical complex on the
Pacific coast [67,68]. This indicated a swift turn in the energy policy
emphasizing the necessity to increase energy supply rather than energy
efficiency or eliminating subsidies on gasoline and LNG.
Regarding authority instruments, the adoption of the Law on water
management in 2014 put an end to a six-year conflict with local or-
ganizations about mining, hydropower plants and land use [69]. Water
governance stood at a crossroad of multiple policy areas regarding
mining, environmental protection, hydropower production and in-
digenous rights protection. To solve this complex problem, the reform
aimed at securing the State′s control over water management and
guaranteeing water supply to future mega-projects for hydropower and
mining. It made possible the adoption of the Organic law on electricity,
in 2015, another key instrument for cross-sectorial coordination [70].
Although it stated the management of the sector was the State's ex-
clusive responsibility, this law allowed the Ministry of Electricity and
Renewable Energy to conclude public-private partnerships. As in the
petroleum sector, service contracts would be negotiated separately. The
trade and supply of electricity would be conceded to local public
companies, but most construction projects would be provided by for-
eign companies.
Regarding treasure instruments, the change in cross-sectorial co-
ordination can be traced in the State budget allocation (see Appendix
Table A1) [71]. From 2007 to 2016, electricity and water supply in-
creased from 1.15% to 2.76% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), oil
and mining decreased from 11.7% to 9.96%, but the petrochemical
63
Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68
sector decreased from 1.82% to 0.9%. This means the diversification
energy policy was only partly effective. Meanwhile, the government′s
budget increased from 10.93% to 14.9% of the GDP and exports de-
creased from 31.93% to 28.39%. The evolution of public spending is a
clear evidence of the government′s efforts to enhance the energy tran-
sition through investments in renewables. Yet public spending would
become a structural source of deficit if they were not quickly adjusted
to the negative oil prices variations.
Likewise, the change in cross-sectorial coordination can be traced in
organization instruments. Initially the independence of the two agen-
cies in charge of the energy policy brought out coordination problems,
since neither Ministry exerted full control over their policy area
[72,73]. Not only the energy policy was designed and implemented by
different actors, but the decisions related to renewable and non-re-
newable sources were taken separately. These deficiencies could put the
energy transition at risk, hence the necessity of a coordinating agency
to oversight their results. Eventually both ministries would lose most of
their autonomy with the creation of the Ministry of Strategic Sectors
[74]. Acting under the direct authority of the incumbent, the Ministry
was accountable for the objectives of the National Development Plan,
including the Yasuni-ITT Initiative and the construction of hydropower
and petrochemical plants. He would also take the lead in the negotia-
tion of loans-for-oil with the Chinese government and infrastructure
projects with the Brazilian company Odebrecht (see below) [75].
This institutional change by layering affected the political interplay
by increasing the influence on the incumbent by actors opposed to the
policy change, as will be explained further on.
4.5. Influencing the incumbent to give in policy change
Evidence of influence on the incumbent by actors resisting change
in the energy sector were found in all four kinds of instruments defining
the policy implementation style.
Regarding nodality instruments, shortly before the 2014 National
Energy Agenda was adopted, President Correa asked the National
Assembly to declare the ITT of national interest, hence opening the way
to new bids for oil activities in the Amazon [76]. In his address, the
incumbent made a balance of the six-year campaign of fundraising for
the Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund, which had hardly raised 6.5 million USD
[77]. After blaming Northern countries and international organizations
for their lack of support, he declared the Ecuadorian people had nothing
to feel guilty about if they were to exploit their own natural resources.
The challenge was to secure the “National plan for good life” by all
means, including the extraction of the heavy crude oil from ITT. The
two ordinary debates following this address granted the government
with the opportunity to explain all the advantages and to minimize the
disadvantages of oil extraction in the Amazon. They also provided clear
evidence of the government giving up the aim to enter a post-oil era.
As for authority instruments, on October 22, 2013 the National
Assembly issued the declaration of national interest for blocks 31 and
43 —which roughly included all the ITT reserves, except for a small
fraction located beneath the so-called “intangible area” from the
Yasuni. Beyond this particular moment, the fast-track process by which
this decision was made indicates how influential the oil industry was,
and how much preparation had been necessary to prevent any potential
conflict raised by a politically sensible issue. According to the 2008
Constitution, extractive activities in protected areas were prohibited, so
ITT could not actually be operated even if their reserves had been
certified more than a decade before. The only ways to proceed was to
declare them of national interest, based on a national referendum or a
two-third majority vote by the National Assembly. Since the govern-
ment′s party Alianza País had won these two thirds in the 2013 elec-
tions, the risk of political opposition was minimum. The technical re-
ports prepared for the debates by a Special Permanent Commission on
Biodiversity and Natural Resources show a striking convergence of all
sectorial agencies to support the government′s demand, including those
G. Fontaine et al.
by the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Economic Policy and
the Special Commission on Local Governments [78,79].
The incidence of the oil sector on the implementation style can also
be observed on treasure instruments, which gives an idea of how im-
portant oil incomes remained for the State and kept on driving the
economy. At that moment, the energy transition was already threatened
by the deterioration of the State′s budget. On the one hand the incomes
were shrinking (with oil prices below 50 USD/barrel), on the other
hand the need for public spending kept growing to conclude the con-
struction of the eight hydropower plants and the petrochemical plant
on the Pacific shore. Not only the evolution of the State′s budget in-
dicated that oil persistently outweighed any other income, but it con-
firmed the tendency to feeding the structural deficit by pre-sale oil
contracts (see Appendix Table A2) [80–86]. From 2007 to 2016 total oil
incomes (including current and capital) fell from 35.63% to 12.23% of
the State′s budget, but pre-sales increased from 2.51% to 9.05% of the
budget (even reaching a historical tipping point at 11.43% in 2015,
above 4.2 billion USD). This means public spending had become a cause
of structural debt that could only be guaranteed by selling oil below
conventional market prices. Not only this policy was in clear contra-
diction with the initial commitment of increasing oil rents to finance
the energy transition, but it seriously hindered any intent by the
forthcoming administration to achieve these objectives and enter the
post-oil era.
Regarding organization instruments, the influence of the petroleum
sector on the implementation style can be traced in local governments´
reports on the energy policy during the legislative debates on the ITT
declaration of national interest [87,88]. They indicate that oil remains a
major source of jobs and development for the Amazon communities,
with transfers from the State′s budget reaching up to 16% of oil rents
[89]. Besides, when the government started looking for alternative
ways to increase foreign direct investments, a policy window opened
for the Ministry of Strategic Sectors. Acting under the direct authority
of the incumbent and the Vice-President, he would negotiate the
funding and building of the already mentioned infrastructure projects,
mostly with the Brazilian company Odebrecht and the Chinese gov-
ernment. The modalities of these agreements lacked so much of trans-
parency that an investigation was ordered by the General Comptroller
in 2017, in the wake of the corruption scandal originated by Odebrecht
in Brazil. According to preliminary results of this investigation pub-
lished by the press, the loans-for-oil with China ended in the overall
public debt exceeding the 40% of the GDP threshold authorized by the
Constitution [90]. Further, in December 2017, former Minister of
Strategic Sectors Jorge Glas was sentenced to a six-year jail period, for
his involvement in illicit association with Odebrecht [91].
Eventually the influence of actors resisting policy change on the
energy transition is directly responsible of the implementation gap of
the energy transition described in the following sub-section.
4.6. Depending on oil
Evidence of the energy mix being affected by persistent oil depen-
dence were found through the cross-countries and longitudinal com-
parison of energy mixes in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
They indicate that, even though Ecuador might register a slight im-
provement in renewable energy production compared with the former
decade, it underperformed LAC during the 2007–2016 period.
The energy mix indicates that Ecuador is still heavily dependent on
oil, compared with the regional average (see Appendix Table B1) [92].
From 1998 to 2006, the volume of carbon-fossil fuels had increased by
40% and hydropower by 36.9% in Ecuador, compared with 17.5% and
18.36% in LAC. From 2007 to 2016 carbon-fossil fuels increased by 8%
and hydropower by 75.2% in Ecuador, compared with 5.92% and
5.39% in LAC. Yet this was far from sufficient to reverse oil depen-
dence: as for 2016, carbon-fossil fuels still reached 92.17% of TEP and
hydropower 4.51%, compared with 44.05% and 3.29% in LAC.
64
Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68
Likewise, the variation of TPES by sources indicates a persistent
dependence on hydrocarbons (see Appendix Table B2) [92]. From 1998
to 2006, the volume of hydrocarbons had increased by 32.7% and
electricity by 64.28% in Ecuador, compared with 6.81% and 35% in
LAC. From 2007 to 2016 hydrocarbons still increased by 31.91% and
electricity by 59.37% in Ecuador, compared with 19.96% and 26.65%
in LAC. Consequently, as for 2016 hydrocarbons reached 79.74% of
TPES and electricity 18.12% in Ecuador, compared with 66.82% and
23.95% in LAC. This proves that the 2007–2016 administration actually
underperformed the former ones and LAC.
The variation of TPES by sectors indicates that the country′s oil
dependence is due to the increasing importance of transportation in the
energy balance (see Appendix Table B3) [92]. From 1998 to 2006, the
volume of transportation had increased by 18.43% and the volume of
the industrial sector by 11.07%, while the residential sector had de-
creased by 2.5%. From 2007 to 2016, the volume of transportation
increased by 51.07%, the industrial sector by 3.55% and the residential
by 9.26%. Again, this indicates a counter-performance for energy
transition during the 2007–2016 administration.
Finally the variation of renewable energy sources among the nine
oil and gas exporting LAC countries provides further evidence of the
implementation gap of energy transition (see Appendix Table B4) [92].
As for 2016 Ecuador ranked 4th for net oil and gas trade balance (with
14.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe)), 8th for TPES (with 15.1
Mtoe) and 7th for TEP (with 30.3 Mtoe) among these countries.
Ecuador ranked 5th for the share of renewables in TPES (13%), in
electricity production (53%) and in TEP (7%). These figure indicate
that the country has not outperformed other oil and gas exporting
countries, in spite of a decade of so-called energy mix transformation.
Taken together, all the indicators from Ecuador’s energy balance
provide strong evidence confirming an implementation gap of energy
transition. Not only the energy policy during the 2007–2016 govern-
ment did not prove more efficient than before, but it was actually less
efficient than the regional average and most other oil and gas exporting
countries.
5. Conclusions
The findings of the present research are threefold and have theo-
retical, methodological and practical implications beyond Latin
America and the Ecuadorian case. This case selection was justified as
being typical of the structural contradiction faced by oil and gas ex-
porting countries when willing to initiate a low-carbon energy transi-
tion. On the one hand it illustrates the difficulty for these countries to
renounce increasing the government-take when oil prices are high. On
the other hand it shows that, relying on international contributions to
ease the burden created by such sacrifice is at best a wager. The
Ecuadorian case also shows how institutional layering allows influential
actors to resist policy change and have a decisive role in the im-
plementation gap of major reforms.
Theoretically, the research built on a causal mechanism of im-
plementation gap, hence contributing to the current discussion about
instruments mixes and policy design for the energy transition.
According to the hypothesis that was confirmed, the adoption of policy
aims triggered a process leading to a policy outcome, through policy
formulation, institutional change and political interplays. The research
did not aim at building nor testing a predictive theory on a deep within-
case study. Instead, it contended that a pattern of interactions between
actors and institutions exists, based on a middle-range theory of in-
stitutional friction in policy change. Assuming that a policy mix plays a
determinant role in the policy outcomes, the analytical framework in-
tended to explain an implementation gap in the low-carbon transition
for oil-rich countries by the formulation of an energy policy based on
resource nationalism (defined by the combination of State-led devel-
opment, increasing oil-rents and State control over the petroleum
sector). First, the policy aims explicitly claimed by a government were
G. Fontaine et al. Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

compared with their consecutive decisions and acts. Then these deci-
sions and acts were related to the institutional change implied by the
new energy policy. Eventually the political interplays were in-
corporated in the overall policy process.
From a methodological standpoint, the research design combined
process tracing with comparative policy analysis in a within-case study,
grounded in a critical realistic methodology. The first step was to build
up a typology of expected empirical observations, based on a parsi-
monious taxonomy of policy instruments which was applied to each
entity of the causal mechanism, including the trigger. The second step
consisted in designing a series of hoop tests for each entity of the causal
process, based on a Bayesian formalization. The main result is a ty-
pology of expected empirical observations that could be used for a
comparative purpose in further research. Additionally, the study ad-
vanced towards a systematic evaluation of the confirming or dis-
confirming meaning of the evidence found. Process tracing does not
allow to cope with equifinality but it treats INUS complexes in a way
that allows to increase prior confidence in a single causal hypothesis.
Hence resource nationalism is not a necessary condition of im-
plementation gap for the energy transition, but it is a sufficient one.
Practically the research focused on oil-rich countries committed to
overcome the natural resource curse, in search of a pattern of policy
change. The lessons drawn from the Ecuadorian case have three general
implications for policy design. First and foremost, a good idea is not
enough to design a good policy. This means the adoption of policy aims
from different agendas makes the policy formulation more difficult,
including inconsistency in the definition of the policy mix. Second,
ambiguity in the policy formulation leads to institutional layering,
unless the reform proceeds with a radical structural change by dis-
placement or substitution. This means the inconsistency in a policy mix
has a decisive effect on the institutional change, as it multiplies rules
and processes, hence producing more institutional friction. Third, in-
stitutional layering leads to contradictions in the implementation style.
It makes it easier for actors resisting the policy change to influence its
outcomes, especially in hard times, when oil prices decline and the
government has to cope with the low elasticity of public spending.
Institutional friction precludes policy change by producing in-
determination and ambiguity in the incumbent′s leadership. Eventually
this puts the energy transition at risk, when a State′s incomes are
shrinking and massive investments command more public spending.
Acknowledgements
This article is a partial product of an on-going research funded by
FLACSO Ecuador, through the IP973 grant. The authors wish to thank
Lorna Greening for suggesting the original idea and for her careful
reading of the initial draft. They also thank the anonymous reviewers
and the editors of ERSS for engaging in the never ending discussion
about policy design for the energy transition. Any error or mis-
interpretation remains the authors’ sole responsibility.

Appendix A

Table A1
Budget allocation (2007–2016).
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador 2018. https://contenido.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNotas/Catalogo/CuentasNacionales/Anuales/Dolares/IndiceCtasNac.
htm.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

6
Goods and services (106 constant 2007 USD)
GDP 51,007.00 54,250.00 54,557.00 56,481.00 60,925.00 64,362.00 67,546.00 70,105.00 70,174.00 69,068.00
Government 5574.00 6,191.00 6,910.00 7,213.00 7,840.00 8,712.00 9,609.00 10,252.00 10,471.00 10,293.00
%GDP 10.93 11.41 12.67 12.77 12.87 13.54 14.23 14.62 14.92 14.90
Exports 16,287.00 16,773.00 15,970.00 15,932.00 16,835.00 17,756.00 18,210.00 19,342.00 19,218.00 19,610.00
%GDP 31.93 30.92 29.27 28.21 27.63 27.59 26.96 27.59 27.39 28.39

Goods and services (% annual variation)

GDP 2.20 6.40 0.60 3.50 7.90 5.60 4.90 3.80 0.10 −1.60
Government 5.70 11.10 11.60 4.40 8.70 11.10 10.30 6.70 2.10 −1.70
Exports 0.00 3.00 −4.80 −0.20 5.70 5.50 2.60 6.20 −0.60 2.00

GDP / industry (106 constant 2007 USD)

Oil and mining 5970.00 5970.00 5,950.00 5,957.00 6,125.00 6,283.00 6,463.00 6,889.00 6,746.00 6,877.00
%GDP 11.70 11.00 10.91 10.55 10.05 9.76 9.57 9.83 9.61 9.96
Petrochemical 926.00 1,007.00 1,049.00 897.00 995.00 1,089.00 812.00 536.00 501.00 623.00
%GDP 1.82 1.86 1.92 1.59 1.63 1.69 1.20 0.76 0.71 0.90
Electricity and water supply 585.00 761.00 685.00 921.00 1,171.00 1,381.00 1,541.00 1,642.00 1,790.00 1,907.00
%GDP 1.15 1.40 1.26 1.63 1.92 2.15 2.28 2.34 2.55 2.76

GDP/industry (% annual variation)

Oil and mining −7.50 0.00 −0.30 0.10 2.80 2.60 2.90 6.60 −2.10 1.90
Petrochemical −2.90 8.70 4.20 −14.50 10.90 9.40 −25.40 −34.00 −6.50 24.30
Electricity and water supply 17.10 30.00 −10.00 34.50 27.10 17.90 11.50 6.50 9.00 6.50

Bold characters describe the general GDP values.

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G. Fontaine et al. Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

Table A2
State’s budget (2007–2016).
Source: Ministry of Finance 2018. http://www.finanzas.gob.ec/biblioteca/.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Incomes (106 current USD)

Total 21,408.00 26,117.00 29,086.00 33,992.00 38,361.00 37,100.00 34,334.00
Total oil incomes 7,628.14 11,118.86 10,642.65 11,864.84 11,954.22 9,298.11 4,199.49
%Incomes 35.63 42.57 36.59 34.90 31.16 25.06 12.23
Total presales 538.00 1,528.91 353.18 2,287.81 3,155.14 4,239.05 3,107.59
%Incomes 2.51 5.85 1.21 6.73 8.22 11.43 9.05
Currenta 13,856.00 15,869.00 19,071.00 21,456.00 22,982.00 23,161.00 18,554.00
Taxes on oil activities 38.00 140.00 109.00 94.00 77.00 74.00 85.00
Sales of oil and refined products 62.00 20.00 17.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGE 298.00 535.00 574.00 228.00 42.00 0.00 0.00
EP 3,285.00 3,933.00 4,586.00 5,330.00 6,240.00 4,622.00 445.00
Total current oil incomes 3,683.00 4,628.00 5,286.00 5,654.00 6,359.00 4,696.00 530.00
%Incomes 17.20 17.72 18.17 16.63 16.58 12.66 1.54
Capitalb 3,989.00 5,563.00 5,485.00 4,544.00 3,348.00 6,698.00 2,138.00
Transfers and donations from oil sector 3,407.14 4,961.95 5,003.47 3,923.03 2,440.08 363.06 561.89
Presale 538.00 528.91 353.18 587.81 1,355.14 2,404.05 1,482.59
Total capital oil incomes 3,945.14 5,490.86 5,356.65 4,510.84 3,795.22 2,767.11 2,044.49
%Incomes 18.43 21.02 18.42 13.27 9.89 7.46 5.95
Financement 3,562.00 4,685.00 4,529.00 7,991.00 12,030.00 8,240.00 13,642.00
Public financement 2,888.00 2,939.00 3,847.00 5,297.00 9,342.00 5,809.00 10,635.00
Presale of oil 0.00 1,000.00 0.00 1,700.00 1,800.00 1,835.00 1,625.00
Total financement 2,888.00 3,939.00 3,847.00 6,997.00 11,142.00 7,644.00 12,260.00
%Incomes 13.49 15.08 13.23 20.58 29.05 20.60 35.71

Outcomes (106 current USD)

Total 20,894.00 24,749.00 27,580.00 33,890.00 37,735.00 37,300.00 34,067.00
Sectorial Natural Resources 966.00 1,326.00 1,214.00 1,755.00 1,714.00 1,692.00 1,457.00
%Outcomes 4.62 5.36 4.40 5.18 4.54 4.54 4.28
Final balance 514.00 1,368.00 1,505.00 102.00 629.00 −200.00 268.00

Bold characters describe the general GDP values.

a
From 2015: “Permanent incomes”.
b
From 2015: “Non-permanent incomes”.

Appendix B

Table B1
Comparative production trends (%).
Source: OLADE, Energy Information System for Latin America and the Caribbean (SIELAC), 2018. http://sielac.olade.org/consultas/sistema-numerico.aspx?ss=2.
Ecuador LAC

Carbon-fossil fuels Hydropower Carbon-fossil fuels Hydropower

Participation in production 2016 (%) 92.17 4.51 44.05 3.29

Variation of volume (2006/1998) (%) 39.99 36.89 +17.15 +18.36
Variation of volume (2016/2007) (%) 8.01 +75.2 +5.92 +5.39
Variation of participation (2006/1998) (%) 1.03 −0.03 −0.16 +0.02
Variation of participation (2016/2007) (%) −1.75 +1.15 −0.48 −0.06

Table B2
Comparative data on consumption trends (%).
Source: OLADE, Energy Information System for Latin America and the Caribbean (SIELAC), 2018. http://sielac.olade.org/consultas/sistema-numerico.aspx?ss=2.
Ecuador LAC

Hydrocarbons Electricity Hydrocarbons Electricity

Participation in 79.74 18.12 66.82 23.95

consumption 2016
Variation of volume +32.69 +64.28 +6.81 +35.01
(2006/1998)
Variation of volume +31.91 +59.37 +19.96 +26.65
(2016/2007)
Variation of −2.23 +2.5 −5.18 +3.41
participation
(2006/1998)
Variation of −1.63 +2.64 −0.21 +1.19
participation
(2016/2007)

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G. Fontaine et al. Energy Research & Social Science 47 (2019) 56–68

Table B3
Sectorial consumption.
Source: OLADE, Energy Information System for Latin America and the Caribbean (SIELAC), 2018. http://sielac.olade.org/consultas/sistema-numerico.aspx?ss=2.
Transportation Industry Residential Others

Participation in consumption 54.55 14.83 13.5 17.57

2016 (%)
Variation of volume (2006/ 18.43 11.07 −2.51 409.16
1998) (%)
Variation of volume (2016/ 51.07 3.55 9.26 10.57
2007) (%)
Variation of participation −4.85 −3.46 −5.15 13.46
(2006/1998) (%)
Variation of participation 8.41 −3.47 −2.21 −2.73
(2016/2007) (%)

Table B4
Comparative renewable energy sources (RES).
Source: IEA Atlas of Energy (2018). http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/-1076250891.
Countries Total primary Total energy Share of renewables in Share of renewables Share of renewables Net oil & gas Oil trade Natural gas
energy supply production total primary energy in electricity in total energy trade balance balance trade balance
(Mtoe) (Mtoe) supply (%) production (%) production (%) (Mtoe) (Mtoe) (Mtoe)

Argentina 86 73.8 8 28 10 −12.4 −3 −9.4

Bolivia 8.3 21 16 31 6 12.6 −0.5 13.1
Brazil 298 279.4 40 74 43 −8.1 7.2 −15.3
Colombia 33.8 124.7 23 68 6 38.3 38 0.3
Ecuador 15.1 30.3 13 53 7 14.6 14.6 0
Mexico 187.4 191.8 8 15 8 6.8 36.9 30.1
Peru 24.6 25.5 20 53 18 0.6 −4.2 4.8
Trinity and 19.4 37.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.1 2.5 14.6
Tobago
Venezuela 59.4 182.7 12 64 4 121.3 121.6 −0.3
Chile 36.1 12.9 27 44 75 −18.4 −15.8 −3.1

Bold characters describe the general GDP values.

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