Review: KORNILOV REDIVIVUS: NEW DATA ON THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

Reviewed Work(s): Russia 1917: The Kornilov Affair by George Katkov; Russia and the
Allies 1917-1920. Vol. I: The Allies and the Russian Collapse, March 1917-March 1918 by
Michael Kettle
Review by: JOHN W. LONG
Source: Russian History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1984), pp. 101-110
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24652646
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 RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE, 11, No. 1 (Spring 1984), 101-10.

JOHN W. LONG (Lawrenceville, N.J., U.S.A.)

KORNILOV REDIVI VUS :

NEW DATA ON THE
PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

George Katkov. Russia 1917: The Komilov Affair

Longman. 1980. 210 pp. $25.00.
Michael Kettle. Russia and the Allies 1917-1920. Vol. I: The Allies and the
Russian Collapse, March 1917-March 1918. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1981. 287 pp. $27.50.

Of all the events of the Russian Revolution, few have engendered more
scholarly controversy than the alleged counterrevolutionary revolt of General
L. G. Komilov in September 1917. Thus, over the past sixty-five years, his
torians have advanced a multitude of interpretations of the Komilov move
ment characterizing the event as everything from an unfortunate misunder
standing to a full-fledged effort at counterrevolution. In general, in this welter
of conflicting opinion, unanimity has prevailed on only one point: namely,
on the great significance of the Kornilov episode in determining the ensuing
course of the Revolution. Thus, in virtually every case, historians of 1917 are
agreed that the events of early September were decisive in hastening the down
fall of the Provisional Government and assuring the success of the Bolsheviks.
According to its many chroniclers, the Kornilov affair was truly, in the apt
phrase of its apparent chief target, "the prelude to Bolshevism."
For the most part, the earliest accounts of the Kornilovshchina did little to
dispel the confusion surrounding the event. Produced by various direct or in
direct participants in the affair, these initial accounts were above^11 attempts
to provide self-justification, either personal or political, for their authors' own
involvement in the movement. Foremost among these personal treatments of.
the affair was that of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Alex
ander F. Kerensky, who early on published a heavily edited version of his
own testimony before the Extraordinary Commission of Investigation which
he himself had appointed to look into the Kornilov affair.1 This account,
which argued that the movement was basically a counterrevolutionary plot
on the part of a small clique of reactionary officers and civilian conservatives

1. Delo Kornilpva (Moscow: Zadruga, 1918), 194 pp. English translation: The Prel
ude to Bolshevism (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919), 312 pp.

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102 RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE

that was foiled only by the prompt counteraction of th

ment, was followed by several later versions in which K
upon but did not essentially alter his original interpreta
the Kerensky view, a competing version of the Kornilo
propounded by Deputy War Minister Boris V. Savinkov,
the formal liaison between Kerensky and Kornilov duri
period of the crisis.3 According to Savinkov, the whole
of a tragic juxtaposition of circumstances that drove a
mutually suspicious leaders at the very moment when the
have joined forces.
Notwithstanding Savinkov's conciliatory explanation, th
other participants in the affair tended to take up position
one or the other of the chief antagonists. Among these p
versions sympathetic to General Kornilov were advance
Lukomskii and A. I. Denikin, respectively the Supreme
of Staff and leading field subordinate, and by P. N. Mil
the liberal Kadet Party.4 On the other side, early suppor
especially from V. N. L'vov, whose untimely appearance
between the Prime Minister and Kornilov was instrume
the crisis; from V. B. Stankevich, military commissar on
and from the enigmatic but vaguely left-wing General
Finally, some excerpts from Kornilov's own testimony
dinary Commission of Investigation, in which he flatly d
of any plot, leaked out briefly in October 1917 but were
by the Kerensky government.6
Serious study of the Kornilov affair first began in the
1920s. Thus, at either end of the decade, Vera Vladimirov

2. See The Catastrophe (New York: D. Appleton, 1927), 376 p

Liberty (New York: John Day, 1934), 406 pp.; and Russia and
(New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1965), 558 pp.
3. B. Savinkov, K delu Kornilova (Paris: Imprimerie "Union
"General Kornilov (Iz vospominanii)," Byloe (Leningrad), N
97.
4. See A. S. Lukomskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin: Otto K
translation: Memoirs of the Russian Revolution (London: Unw
Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, I-II (Paris: J. Povolozhky, 1921
Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, 3 vols. (Sofia: Rossiisko-Bolga
1921-24).
5. See V. N. L'vov, "Kerenskii-Kornilov," Posledniia novosti
Dec. 1920; V. B. Stankevich, Vospominaniia 1914-1917 gg. (Be
1920), 356 pp.; and A. I. Verkhovskii, Rossiia na Golgofe (P
1918) 141 pp.
6. See "Ob'iasnitel'nuiu zapisku Kornilova," Obshchee delo
1917.

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NEW DATA ON THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 103

produced pioneering Marxist accounts of the Korni'ovshchina

described the movement as counterrevolutionary but sharply d
gards its social class dynamics.7 Thus, while Vladimirova argue
tive role in the affair of reactionary generals and capitalists,
sisted on the primary importance of counterrevolutionary land
while, in a development possible only in the relaxed atmosphere
ties, a non-Marxist interpretation was offered by ex-tsarist Ge
tynov.8 Deeply antagonistic to Kornilov personally, Martynov
movement as simply the bungled attempt at a coup d'état perpe
inept, would-be Napoleon.
ror its part, Western scholarship on Kornilov was initiated in
ry Chamberlin's classic history of the Revolution first publishe
cording to Chamberlin, whose research was confined primaril
sources, the Kornilovshchina was an abortive counterrevolution
violence" on the part of "the military and- propertied classes.
Chamberlin, Western interest in Kornilov declined to such an e
next great history of the Revolution, published by E. H. Carr
missed the whole subject in a single sentence.10 Nor did the top
better during this time in Soviet scholarship. Thus, with the onset
increased political control over Soviet historiography resulted
tion of general works in which collectives of putative authori
more or less official guidelines on historical subjects.11 So far
was concerned, these guidelines derived largely from the contempo
of Lenin who had defined the Kornilovshchina as a counter
movement of reactionary generals and capitalists supported ov
bourgeois Kadets and de facto by Kerensky, the Allies and the "c
Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. The unity of thi
acy, argued Lenin, had been shattered only by internal intrigue
sequent prompt action of the Bolshevik-led popular masses.1-

7. Cf. Vera Vladimirova, Kontrrevoliutsiia v 1917 g. (Kornilovshch

Krasnaia nov', 1924), 126 pp. and O. N.Chaadaeva, Kornilovshchina (Mosc
Molodaia gvardiia, 1930).
8. E. I. Martynov, Kornilov (Popytka voennogo perevorota) (Leningrad
1927), 199 pp. This work is especially valuable for its citations from the
9. William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 2 vols (New Yo
1935), I, 192-222.
10. See E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, 3 vols. (N
millan, 1950), I, 92.
11. See, e.g., Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, M. Gorkii et al.,
Gospolitizdat, 1936), 297 pp. Also Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sov
(bol'sheviki): Kratkiikurs, J. Stalin et al., eds. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1
12. See V. 1. Lenin, "Proekt rezoliutsii o sovremennom politicheskom
(16) Sept. 1917 in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed. (Moscow: Gosp
XXXIV, 144-50.

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 104 RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE

the movement, modified only to provide an incre

suppression, remained predominant in Soviet histo
decades.13
In the mid-1950s interest in the Kornilov affair abruptly resurfaced in the
form of a sharp exchange between two Western scholars. Thus, returning to
the original personality-oriented view of the affair, Abraham Ascher strongly
attacked General Kornilov as the perpetrator of a real counterrevolutionary
plot clearly intended to displace the ruling Provisional Government.! 4 jn re
sponse, Leonid I. Strakhovsky described the Kornilov "plot" as the deliberate
fabrication of Prime Minister Kerensky whom he accused of betraying Russia
into the hands of the Bolsheviks.15 On the heels of this exchange, Soviet
study of Kornilov was also revived as the result of the dual impact on histori
cal scholarship of de-Stalinization and the fortieth anniversary of the Revolu
tion.16 In the wake of these developments Soviet historians soon produced a
host of new studies of the Kornilovshchina which, though confined to the
elaboration of such selected themes as Allied assistance to Kornilov and the
leading role of the Bolsheviks in his defeat, nevertheless contributed to the
subject some useful documentary details.17

13. See, e.g., B. Volin, "Opasnost' ot kotoroi bol'sheviki izbavili narody Rossii letom
1917 goda (Kornilovshchina)," Istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 8 (1942), pp. 3-19 and N. Ia.
Ivanov, "Iz istorii razgroma kornilovshchinyIstoricheskie zapiski, 28 (1949), 3-38.
14. Abraham Ascher, 'The Kornilov Affair," Russian Review, 12 (Oct. 1953), 235
52. A similar argument was shortly advanced by Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the
Russian Revolution (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 116-57.
15. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "Was There a Kornilov Rebellion?" Slavonic and East
European Review, 33 (June 1955), 372-95. In his introduction, Strakhovsky states spe
cifically that his work was prompted by the studies of Ascher and Warth.
16. Of particular importance in the revival of Kornilov scholarship was the publica
tion by the Academy of Sciences of a multivolume documentary collection on the Revo
lution which included a volume wholly devoted to the Kornilovshchina. See Revoliu
tsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v avguste 1917g.: Razgrom kornilovskogo miatezha, D. A.
Chugaev et ai, eds. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959), 695 pp. A few years later an equally im
portant collection appeared in the West. See The Russian Provisional Government, 1917:
Documents, 3 vols. R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky, eds. (Stanford: Stanford Univ.
Press, 1961), III, 1527-1613.
17. See, e.g., A. E. Ioffe, "Otnoshenie Frantsii, Anglii i SShA k zagovoru Kornilova,"
Doklady i soobshcheniia Instituta istorii AN SSSR, vyp. 10 (1956), pp. 60-77; L. Brem
berg and I. Iakushev, Bol'sheviki-organizatory razgroma kornilovshchiny (Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1957), 110 pp.; V. M. Mironenko, 'Taktika bol'shevikov v period razgroma
kornilovshchiny (Iiul'-avgüst 1917 g.)," Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 2 (1957), pp. 49-64;
A. M. Sovokin, "Rukovodiashchaia roi' bol'shevistskoi partii v razgrome kornilovskogo
miatezha," in Velikii Oktiabr': Sbornik statei, L. M. Spirin et al., eds. (Moscow: Gospo
litizdat, 1958), pp. 156-79; and F. I. Vidiasov, "Kontrrevoliutsionnye zamysly inostran
nykh imperialistov i kornilovshchina," Voprosy istorii, No. 5 (1963), pp. 51-66. For a
useful summary of the new themes, see A. Ia. Grunt, Zagovor obrechennykh (razgrom
kornilovshchiny) (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1962), 76 pp.

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NEW DATA ON THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 105

Finally, beginning in the mid-sixties, Kornilov historiogr

new stage of development characterized not only by an inc
phistication but even by a degree of convergence in Soviet an
To begin with, in 1965, Soviet scholarship on Kornilov rece
tematic treatment in the exhaustive monograph of N. Ia. Iv
only restated all the previous Soviet themes on the "counte
also introduced the idea of a "second Kornilovshchina" said to have material
ized on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution.18 More innovative were several
other Soviet studies which explored, with a wealth of new detail, the counter
revolutionary social origins of the Kornilovshchina}^ It was precisely this lat
ter development that closely paralleled one of the two trends in recent West
ern scholarship on Kornilov. This trend, an outgrowth of the ongoing Western
interest in social history, was first reflected in the study of James D. White,
who described the Kornilovites as a shaky amalgam of counterrevolutionary
industrialists, financiers, and landowners.20 In turn, White's analysis was then
refined and extended in the more detailed account of the Annaliste Marc Fer
ro. 21 According to Ferro, the Kornilov shchina was the product of a coalition
of counterrevolutionary conservatives and middle class liberals who tried and
failed to "use" Kerensky and the moderate left to establish a strong govern
ment and stem the rising tide of radicalism. Coincident with the work of the
social historians, the old personality approach to the Kornilov shchina was con
tinued in the new and more sophisticated account of Harvey Asher, who per
ceived a kind of joint responsibility for the affair rooted in the mutual dis
trust and intrigues of its rival protagonists.22 Finally, in an interpretation ef
fectively subsuming both of the recent trends in Kornilov historiography, Alex
ander Rabinowitch discerned the attempted formation of a conservative/left

18. N. la. Ivanov, Komilovshchina i ee razgrom (Leningrad: Izd. Leningradskogo

universiteta, 1965), 238 pp. The concept of a "second Komilovshchina " i:e., a renewed
threat from the counterrevolutionary right, was first outlined by Ivanov in an earlier
article. See "Iz istorii bor*by protiv 'vtoroi kornilovshchiny'," Voprosy istorii, No. 11
(1960), pp. 50-67.
19. See V. la. Laverychev, "Russkie monopolisty i zagovor Kornilova," Voprosy
istorii, No. 4 (1964), pp. 32-41; N. G. Durnova, "Maloizvestnye materialy po istorii
kornilovshchiny," ibid., No. 11 (1968), pp. 69-93; and M. I. Kapustin, Zagovor genera
lov: Iz istorii kornilovshchiny i ee razgrom (Moscow; Mysl', 1968), 266 pp.
20. James D. White, "The Komilov Affair-A Study in Counter-Revolution," Soviet
Studies, 20 (Oct. 1968), 187-205.
21. Marc Ferro, La Révolution de 1917: Octobre, naissance d'une société (Paris:
Aubier-Montaignes, 1976), pp. 62-97. English translation: October 1917: A Social His
tory of the Russian Revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 36-58.
22. Harvey Asher, 'The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation," Russian Review, 29
(July 1970), 286-300.

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106 RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE

liberal united front which, however, broke down in th

and machinations of its two leading personalities.23
To the foregoing extensive literature on the Kornilo
added two new studies: a detailed monograph by the dis
ary historian George Katkov and several chapters from
Michael Kettle's projected five-volume history of Allie
sia.24 Of these, Katkov's study, which features some i
materials as well as a painstaking analysis of existing co
represents a full-scale reinterpretation of the Kornilo
Kettle's treatment focuses almost exclusively on the r
the Kornilov movement. Curiously, the latter subje
historians have dwelt heavily, is virtually ignored by
dismisses its significance in a brief bibliographical aside
Readers of Katkov's earlier history of the Februar
familiar with his particular interpretive idiosyncracies
a heavy emphasis on the critical role in the Russian R
Germany and frequent, vaguely sinister, references to th
in the events of 1917 by Russian freemasonry. Both t
the same token, Katkov has also retained his earlier me
the close analysis of existing contemporary sources an
of any secondary materials. Given this approach, it is p
that Katkov's account stresses the role in the Kornilov
lationships and covert political maneuvering and thus
personality-oriented current of Kornilov historiograph
tive, Katkov's analysis reduces to an all but complete e
Kornilov, who emerges as the unwitting victim of polit
ability to comprehend, and a sharp, almost vindictive,
with whom Katkov apparently had some considerable, i
ful, personal contact.
In its essence (ten out of twelve chapters), Katkov's
meticulous step-by-step recapitulation of the Kornilov
a review of conditions in the Russian army following
archy and concluding with a summary of both the pe
sequences of the Kornilovshchina. More detailed than a

23. Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power

ton, 1976), pp. 94-150. A similar argument, with emphasis on
affair of the Kadet Party, had previously been advanced in Willia
in the Russian Revolution (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1
24. George Katkov, Russia 1917: The Komilov Affair (Lond
man, 1980) and Michael Kettle, Russia and the Allies 1917-1
Russian Collapse, March 1917-March 1918 (Minneapolis: Univ. o
pp. 36-105.

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NEW DATA ON THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 107

account, Katkov's treatment is based on two kinds of evide

these, as indicated above, consists of existing contemporary
to rigorous analysis, both textual and circumstantial. From
dence, of which he proved himself a master in his study of
olution, Katkov produces some especially insightful charac
only of the affair's principals-Kornilov, Kerensky, Savink
also of such critical, but elusive, secondary figures as A. F
Filonenko, and V. S. Zavoiko. Equally valuable are Katkov's
sons of the multiple versions of the affair produced by seve
tagonists, most notably Kerensky and L'vov. In addition to
Katkov has also brought forth some new pieces of evidence
fact, have been available to previous, but less diligent, resear
documentation, by far the most valuable is the full text o
made by Kornilov for the Extraodrinary Commission of Inv
September 1917. Located in Columbia University's Bakhme
document, together with the previously published text of
tary interrogation on 24 September (7 October), is printed i
appendix and makes a vital addition to existing documenta
lov affair. Other new evidence adduced by Katkov include
rary reports of the Kadet leaders N. M. Kishkin and F. F.
from the Bakhmeteff Archive, and a very suggestive letter o
from the diplomat-politician V. A. Maklakov to P. N. Miliuk
which is not identified.

As indicated, Katkov's treatment of the Kornilovshchina results in a thor

oughgoing indictment of Kerensky and a nearly complete vindication of Gen
eral Kornilov. This conclusion rests essentially on several points of interpreta
tion: first, that Kornilov's disposition of reliable troops on the approaches to
Petrograd, which began as early as 6-7 (19-20) August, was directed solely
against the Germans and the Bolsheviks, was accomplished with the full knowl
edge of the Provisional Government, and was therefore in no way part of any
military plot to overthrow the existing regime; second, that the famous con
versation of 24 August (6 September) between Kornilov and the crackbrained
intermediary V. N. L'vov, which effectively precipitated the crisis, was en
tirely innocent on the part of the Supreme Commander, who sincerely be
lieved that his interlocutor was an authorized agent of the Kerensky govern
ment; and third, and most important, that the report of his conversation with
Kornilov that L'vov then conveyed to Kerensky was a tissue of obvious lies
which the prime minister deliberately used to "invent" a counterrevolution
ary plot in order to avoid introducing promised military reforms (notably the
reintroduction of the death penalty) that would have caused a break with the
Petrograd Soviet and the probable loss of his position.
Without essaying the same kind of painstaking review of the evidence un
dertaken by Katkov, it is difficult to take issue with his conclusion which

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108 RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE

seems likely to become the standard interpretation of

Nevertheless, there remain in Katkov's account several
least one relatively unexplored avenue of inquiry that l
research. Among the former are certain obvious chrono
that can scarcely be accidental in so meticulous a recon
Katkov. These discrepancies involve Kornilov's pre-crisis
early August and to the Moscow State Conference, 12-
both instances Katkov asserts that the general arrived a
respective destinations on the same day. This contenti
controverted by Kornilov's own deposition (Katkov's ch
dicates that on both occasions he stayed at least two d
the matter is actually critical because it is precisely on
cent Soviet and Western social historians have asserted
his supporters were meeting (and perhaps plotting) wi
conservative and right-wing counterrevolutionaries.
In turn, the latter point raises the most significant sh
his failure to deal in detail with the questions raised in r
of the Kornilovshchina. To be sure, Katkov is too good
this area altogether. Thus, much of his chapter 11, rat
titled "Later Reconstructions, Legends and Rumours,"
on émigré literature in the 1930s, deals with the subjec
over, among Katkov's new evidence, the letter from M
(pp. 142-43) directly supports the fact of counterrevol
tween certain "public men" (including Miliukov) and rep
lov. All of this, however, Katkov passes over lightly, al
it contradicts his view that the Kornilovshchina was n
personal "invention" of Kerensky. Accordingly, in spit
Katkov's study has not sufficiently explored the social
the affair so fruitfully initiated by recent Kornilov sch
Western.
For its part, Michael Kettle's account of the Kornilovsh
ly inferior to that of Katkov, also makes a modest, if n
contribution to the history of the movement. Concept
study consists of the restatement of the theses of var
studies (e.g., Katkov's on the February Revolution) int
excerpts from official British sources and somewhat les
several private collections. Most notable among the lat
the peripatetic Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson, th
armored car squadron have long been the basis for Sov
collusion with Kornilov.
It is precisely his lengthy citations from the British sources that give Ket
tle's account of the Kornilovshchina its somewhat inadvertent value. Thus,
contrary to Katkov's assertion, the British documents show clearly that Great

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NEW DATA ON THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 109

Britain did take a hand in the Kornilov affair, albeit a hesitant

tory one. Hence, from the outset, the British military, in particu
liaison officer at Stavka, Major-General Sir Charles Barter (and
gree Locker-Lampson), did everything in its power to assist Ko
other hand, the political authorities, though not unsympathetic to
Commander, adopted a decidedly cautious attitude, ordered Ba
out of politics, and entrusted decision-making to Ambassador
Buchanan who, in the end, refused to become involved in the K
broglio. Of course, none of this is entirely new.25 Still, Kettl
far more detailed than any previous treatment and does disclos
cant particulars on the subject. Thus, for example, Locker-Lam
heralded participation in the affair is revealed as more opéra bouf
counterrevolution with nothing whatever in the way of seriou
By the same token, General Barter's almost daily reports from
considerable light on developments at headquarters, in particu
tensive contacts between the Kornilovites and various counter
elements. On the other hand, Kettle's conclusion that both Ke
Kornilov shared responsibility for a failed coup d'état that som
"compromised" Great Britain is neither original nor entirely c
his sources. Indeed, it is unfortunate that his refusal even to co
ject has deprived us of the interpretation that might have been gi
sources by Katkov to whom most of Kettle's documentation wa
able.

Regrettably, Kettle's handling of the Kornilov episode is char

the rest of his study. Thus, the considerable value of his docum
the British sources is largely vitiated by defective organization
analysis. For example, despite its announced subject, the book
exclusively with British rather than Allied intervention and,
quently loses its way in lengthy, unintegrated digressions on s
the various schemes put forward by different Russian and Briti
private entrepreneurs to take over Russian financial institution
and early 1918. More serious is Kettle's continued lack of fresh
indeed, once he reaches the post-October period already docum
the British sources in the excellent study of R. H. Ullman, redu
to virtual superfluity. In fact, unless these serious problems of
and analysis can be redressed, the author and his publisher mig
vised to reconsider the publication of the project's remaining v

25. See Norman E. Saul, "British Involvement in the Kornilov Affair

tain Social Science Journal, 10 (Jan. 1973), 43-50. Also Kenneth 1. Da
Kornilov's Abortive Coup," Topic, 27 (Spring 1974), 5-17.

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110 RUSSIAN HISTORY/HISTOIRE RUSSE

In far different measure, both Katkov and Kettle ha

significant new data to the existing store of informat
fair. In neither case, however, have all the questions r
been fully resolved. The ambiguity of its documentary
tinuing great significance in the history of the Russia
that the debate over the Kornilovshchina, so often res
will yet again be revivified.

Rider College

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