Ukrainian War: Realism: conquest for power

The recent war in Ukraine has demonstrated how the Realist school of thought, in what we
considered to be a globalised and liberal world, is back in full throttle. This blog post will aim
to explain the Ukrainian crisis through a Realist perspective through analysing Russia’s
conquest for power and influence of Ukraine. Also, I will intend to highlight the human
nature of Putin in exacerbating the war in Ukraine.

Realism, an important International Relations theory, is central to deciphering the roots and
the present situation of the recent Ukrainian War. Dominant within the Realist paradigm, is
that states will seek to maximise their own security and power to ensure its survival (Dunne
and Schmidt, 2020: 132) and to reduce insecurity. In February 2022, the Putin led
government in Russia had launched a full fledged geopolitical war against Ukraine, taking no
regard for international law nor the sovereignty of Ukraine. The Ukrainian war can be
regarded as a hostage to Russian realist aggression. The fact that Putin has asserted
overarching dominance highlights the significance and importance of realism within the
contemporary world.

For Russia, the fear of Ukraine succumbing under the wing of the EU and NATO would result
in a direct threat to their “security interests” and thus their national security. So, using force
as reactionary measure ensures they are reaching their optimal power in order to control
their sphere of influence geopolitically (Götz and Staun, 2022: 3).

Perhaps one could agree with Götz and Staun (2022: 3) that there is a “sense of vulnerability
and fear” on behalf of Russia as they have always viewed the “West”, namely NATO as the
“enemy” historically as they are a major impediment to dominating the region.

Reach (2022) argues a valid truth and confirms the Realist agenda by arguing that the most
significant and long-term goal for Russia is to secure its “influence” within Ukraine rather
than solely keeping Ukraine out of NATO membership. Furthermore, this prevents the liberal
infiltration of the West out of Ukraine, as the threat of the EU and NATO became of top
concern for Moscow (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). This further clarifies the argument
in question and informs us that states are motivated out of self-interest and will increase
their power by adopting an imperialistic approach (Dunne and Schmidt, 2020).

Putin has clearly adopted an imperialistic approach in attempts to gain power. Flockhart and
Korosteleva (2022) believe that the Ukrainian War is a manifestation of Putin’s long term
desired aims of a “Russian-led Eurasian order” and that one should not be surprised by the
act of war by Russia. Flockhart and Korosteleva (2022) further allude to the “2007 Munich
Security Conference” where he had explicitly “outlined” his aims. This further demonstrates
the conquest for power and security.

The conquest for power and domination has led Mosow and its political elite to disregard the
legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, thus, has automatically given Moscow the signal to impose
itself on Ukraine. The general perception of Ukraine for Russia is that its “national [identity] is
artificial- and therefore fragile” (Mankoff: 2022). Putin reinforced his views on Ukraine before
the invasion declaring Ukraine as “inalienable” part of Russia. On these grounds this had
given Russia to “respond in order to ensure [its] security” (Flockhart and Korosteleva, 2022:
7)

The human nature of Putin is an, inextricably, integral factor in explaining the present
situation with Ukraine. For a long time, it seems that Ukraine has remained an “obsession” of
Putin especially if he were to lose it to the West (Kuzio, 2022: 158). Putin has repeatedly
asserted ownership over Ukraine and belligerently projects the fact that they will not allow
Ukraine to be pulled away from Russian influence (Kuzio, 2022: 158). Of course Putin’s
paranoia of losing Ukraine to the West amounted to mistrust thus resulting in war.
Subsequently, the invasion of Ukraine substantiates Putin’s “vision” in “expanding its sphere
of influence” (Flockhart, 2022: 9).

This portrayal of Putin closely resembles Morgenthau’ classical realist conception that
humans are “hardwired to pursue power over others” and thus results in them “continually
looking for opportunities to increase their own power” (Dunne and Schmidt: 2020: 136).
The pessimistic human nature is further demonstrated through Putin’s decisive actions to
achieve his nationalistic ambitions. The failure to reach an amicable outcome through the
G20 talks and the impression that Russia “has barely started its campaign in Ukraine” (The
Guardian, 2022). This further heightens the extent to which Realism is currently dominant
and confirms the realist observation that world politics is synonymous to a state of war
(Dunne and Schmidt; 2020).

The theme of hubris runs prominently throughout the Ukraine War and it should be
mentioned that the hubris of Putin for many commentators is a major cause of the Ukraine
War. Behr and Rosch (2013: 114) define hubris as the need to “prove oneself”, also equating
it to “arrogance”. Again, leveraging from the above point, Putin’s hubristic attitude stems
from his paranoia of losing Ukraine to the West. Further, Sonne et al (2022) claim that Putin’s
paranoia is fuelled by “biases and skewed information”, for example, failing to acknowledge
the “extent to which Ukraine has changed in the years since the Soviet collapse” (Mankoff,
2022). Still, Putin allowed his inaccuracy and misjudgement to allow him to take such
decisions which would prove to be detrimental for Ukraine.

The behaviour displayed by Putin reinforces Morgenthau’s observation that “human nature is
dominated by the drive to prove oneself” (Behr and Rosch, 2013: 114). This demonstrates
how human nature of Putin has been significant in the Ukraine War and still relevant when
explaining the causes of war.

Realism has made a definite comeback within international politics and this is seen through
the hostile actions of Russia in an attempt to unite Ukraine under the Russian wing as well as
preventing the West, and its liberal institutions, in absorbing itself within its sphere of
influence. The realist view of human nature strongly provides an explanation for the War in
Ukraine as we can see how pessimistic view of human nature is one which has a hunger for
power.

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