Critically assess whether Russia is best understood as a ‘revanchist’, ‘defensive’, or

‘aggressive isolationist’ power, or something else? Explain with examples.

Introduction
The study of Russian foreign policy has long intrigued those seeking an understanding of the
inner workings of the political elite. The difficulty of such a task is exemplified by Winston
Churchill's (1948) description of Russia as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery, inside an
enigma." Defining Russia’s power type is a complex undertaking with many interlocking and
overarching dynamics that cannot be reduced to a single concept.
Russia has long advocated for a multipolar world order free of Western dominance. Given
this, their actions at home and abroad in the twenty-first century have unmistakably been
revisionist in nature, attempting to change global governance to better suit their needs (Götz
& Merlen, 2018; Tsygankov A. P., 2021; Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2017).

This essay will examine various perspectives from which Russia and its activities can be
viewed in order to determine what kind of power Russia is. Revanchism, defensiveness, and
aggressive isolationism will be addressed first, followed by an alternate explanation section.
The essay will conclude by illustrating that there is no one-size-fits-all definition of Russian
power; rather, it is a hybrid revisionist power with characteristics of many distinct, yet
interconnected, types of power.

Russian Revanchism
Revanchism is a foreign policy of revenge or retaking territory (Collins, n.d.). President Putin,
his political elite, and much of the Russian public regret the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
ending its grand sphere of influence (Jenkins, 2017; Wilson, 2016). This loss of influence is
devastating for a country seeking great power status (Götz, 2016; Miskimmon & O'Loughlin,
2017). Currently, Russia uses various forms of coercion, including military intervention and
regime change, to maintain influence in their near abroad (Balachandran, 2022; Charap et
al, 2021; Das Kundu, 2007). Thus, Russia's foreign policy may appear more aggressive as it
seeks to strengthen this influence and exact revenge on the West for encroachment (Götz &
Merlen, 2018; Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2017; Jenkins, 2017).

Ukraine and Georgia significantly contribute to this argument. With two strategic FSU states
drifting ever Westward, Russia had to act (Tsygankov A. , 2015). Support for separatist
movements and military incursions has led to Russian recognition of breakaway regions in
these countries as independent states (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Tsygankov A. , 2015). These
pro-Russian territories prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO.
However, by accepting EU and NATO deals, Ukraine would have violated the Russian-
imposed neutrality clause, preventing NATO membership (Lutsevych & Wallace, 2021).
Moreover, the Russian Navy would have lost its Black Sea Fleet port in Crimea, essential for
winter operations (Katchanovski, 2016; Tsygankov A. , 2015). Consequently, annexing
Crimea likely sought to preserve Ukrainian neutrality and warm-water port access. Finally, as
Russia exports a significant amount of energy through Ukraine (Cecire, 2023; Tsygankov
A. , 2015), territorial control over these would likely increase energy leverage over Europe
and strengthen regional influence through coercion.

The West has not helped itself, however. By encouraging independence and reducing
reliance on Russia in FSU states, they have made themselves and those it seeks to
welcome into alliances a bigger target by ignoring more than 30 years of Russian concerns
(Götz & Merlen, 2018; Maitra, 2021; Tsygankov A. , 2015; Lutsevych & Wallace, 2021). In
this light, Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine could be interpreted as retaliation against
the West, which Russia perceives has infringed on and removed their historic sphere of
influence, as well as belittled and excluded them from major international institutions (Fusiek,
2022; Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2017). Russia is therefore attempting to demonstrate its
status as a great power and demand greater recognition.

However, this argument is not without issues. If reclaiming Soviet era landmasses was the
sole priority, there are other, less Westernised nations to annex territory from. In fact, Russia
has refused pleas from its recognised independent regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, South
Ossetia, Abkhazia) to join the Russian Federation (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Katchanovski,
2016; Tsygankov A. , 2015). This suggests that Russia's priority is to provide semi-legitimate
support for ongoing separatist movements to potentially overthrow democratic governments
and turn them into Russian puppet states that they can exert control over, therefore
reclaiming a sphere of influence.

The revanchist Russia argument hinges on the desire to recoup losses from the breakup of
the Soviet Union, including their sphere of influence, and to be seen as a great power by the
West. However, Russia has repeatedly refused to accept independent states ascension into
the Federation. Russia is less likely to absorb former satellites than to push them closer to
the West as it becomes more assertive abroad. Forcefully regaining Soviet territory
undermines Russia's goals.

Defensive Russia
According to Götz and Merleen (2018), external factors—particularly the West's allegedly
destabilising actions—significantly impact Russia's decisions. NATO and EU expansion into
Russia’s near abroad are therefore viewed with suspicion.
Additionally, Russia acts as a bastion of conservativism in a liberal world with Putin seeing
himself as the defender of the former, and chastising the latter. Though this is likely due to
liberalism challenging Putin’s autocratic rule over the Russian people (Götz & Merlen,
Russia and the question of world order, 2018; Fusiek, 2022). This also plays into calls to
form a “Russkiy Mir” (Hudson Institute, 2015) uniting all Russian people under
conservativism. These are all factors in considering Russia’s actions as defensive in nature.

After the Cold War, American politicians claimed NATO would not advance eastward, but
there is disagreement over whether any formal agreements were made (Fusiek, 2022;
Maitra, 2021). Russia is concerned about NATO's actions near its borders, as well as
Ukraine's and Georgia's membership bids (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Maitra, 2021). As a result,
it could be argued that Russia took defensive action by supporting secessionist movements,
annexing Crimea, and intervening in Ukraine and Georgia. These actions prevent them from
joining NATO and limit the perceived Western expansion into Russia's sphere of influence.
With this, Russia has effectively halted the advance of liberal democracy in the region and
defended itself against perceived Western threats.

Since the 1990s, Russian nationalists have advocated for the defence of all Eurasian
Russians (Tsygankov A. , 2015). In his 2022 Ukrainian invasion speech, Putin portrayed the
West as wanting to break up Russia. He uses World War II analogies to justify military action
in other sovereign countries as defending Russia and its people from evil (Fusiek, 2022).
This obligation also motivated Russia's 2008 intervention in Georgia, which it saw as
necessary to protect ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Tsygankov A. , 2015).
Through membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Russia also
intervened in Kazakhstan in 2022, helping to stabilise a domestic situation (Bohr, 2022).
In addition, looking to defend conservativism, Russia aligns with other authoritarian countries
and co-founds organisations, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, to establish itself as the head of a 'conservative pole' and advance
multipolarity (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Tsygankov A. P., 2021; Maitra, 2021).

While Russia may see their actions as defensive, for many reasons, the majority of the world
understands such actions as negating defensiveness. Russia prefers coercion over
cooperation. The invasion of Ukraine and other international law violations are offensive and
contradict Russia’s rhetoric of sovereignty and non-interference (Götz & Merlen, 2018).
According to these principles, Russia should not be able to prevent independent sovereign
nations from joining alliances. Nor should they demand that the West not expand into a
region where it currently has little influence. The claim that Putin is defending all Russians
appears to be a last-ditch effort to win over the public, who are unhappy with his decision to
invade Ukraine and beginning to doubt his methods (MacFarquhar, 2023; Gould-Davies,
2022). Finally, Russia has repeatedly ignored calls from Armenia, a CSTO member whose
support for Russian actions has waned in recent years, for assistance in their ongoing
conflict with Azerbaijan (Way, 2018; Ramani, 2022). This suggests that it is more interested
in defending regimes that support Putin's autocracy than ethnic Russians as a whole.

An Aggressively Isolationist Russia

According to this theory, Russia is aware of its international decline. Putin needed an
adversary to manifest conflict against to justify constraining foreign influence (Götz & Merlen,
2018). It is unsurprising that the West has become the country's primary target, given its
history of ideological conflict and the rise of anti-liberal sentiments. Aggressive geopolitical
tactics used to deflect attention away from a weak domestic position are examples of this
strategy. This stokes nationalism, further alienating the Russian people (Götz & Merlen,
2018; Fusiek, 2022).

Tsygankov (2015) claims Russia only isolates itself when its sphere of influence and
interests are threatened. Hence, the isolationist argument, like the defensive one, relies on
the EU and NATO spreading liberal democracy along Russia's border (Götz & Merlen,
2018). Russian nationalism rose following the Euromaidan protests over Ukraine's EU
associateship, leading to the annexation of Crimea (Götz, 2016). Putin fears democratisation
in the FSU will undermine his authoritarian rule, having lost much of the Soviet Union's
"borderland" to the West. Thus, annexing Crimea and supporting Donbas separatists were
calculated to maintain a 'buffer zone', insulating it from the West. The precedent was support
for Georgian secessionist movements in 2008. Putin's approval ratings rose ~20% following
the annexation, suggesting he uses nationalism to stay popular (Götz, 2016).

Putin rallies Russians around positive Soviet memories with patriotic, state-centric rhetoric
(Fusiek, 2022). However, such positive memories are used in conjunction with victimisation.
The latter uses defeatist language to persuade the Russian diaspora that a liberal
democratic government would fail them (Fusiek, 2022; Collins , n.d.). Putin elicits a "united
Soviet" mindset to convince ethnic Russians that they would be better off under the Russian
Federation rather than as minorities elsewhere (Tsygankov A. , 2015). He evokes victory
and suffering from World War II to build community through shared history. Soviet triumphs
are contrasted with betrayal and humiliation. This argument partially draws on Lenin's
concept of revolutionary defeatism, which states that being opposed to the prevailing political
situation entails a preference for the defeat of the governing structure, in this case, the liberal
international order (LIO) (Draper, 1998). Putin uses this to argue that Russians are losing out
just for being Russian and that the only way to succeed is to fight liberalism and change
global governance. Hence, supporting Russian independence and Western isolation (Fusiek,
2022; Lutsevych & Wallace, 2021).

Many indicators suggest Russia is not isolating from liberal democracy, however. They
remain members of international organisations supporting the LIO. They also founded or co-
founded regional and international cooperation organisations. The CSTO, BRICS, Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation, and Eurasian Economic Union are examples. While mostly
strengthening ties with autocratic allies, some of these include democracies. This indicates
Russia may be less willing to cut ties with the ideological ‘West’ than it claims.

The aggressive isolationist theory relies on Putin using the West and liberalism as enemies
to promote nationalism, praising a shared ethnically Russian history. Victimisation and
humiliation are used in equal measure to positivity. This rhetoric is designed to inspire
patriotic sentiments and fight democratisation at home and abroad. However, Russia's
continued participation in international institutions and the creation of new ones suggest they
are not ready to give up international cooperation, on their terms. The fear of democratic
spillover and a colour revolution overthrowing Putin drives this mindset (Götz & Merlen,
2018; Tsygankov A. , 2015). Western sanctions and counter-disinformation campaigns
restrict and isolate Russia, regardless of their intentions, and help Putin justify his stance
(Krastev, 2022; Wagnsson & Hellman, 2018; Gould-Davies, 2022).

Alternate Explanations
Of course, there are other ways to describe Russia's actions besides those mentioned
above. The following section will consider opportunism and hybrid revisionism as
mechanisms to understand Russian behaviour, policies, and rhetoric.

Opportunism
Russia is highly opportunistic, seizing any opportunity to gain relative benefit regardless of
whether its actions are right or wrong (Collins, n.d.). Russia likely understands that it cannot
match Western military power and therefore exploits openness and vulnerabilities in Europe
and the Euro-Atlantic community to exacerbate divisions. The use of ‘active measures’ to
sow dissent is an opportunistic way of countering perceived Western threats without physical
confrontation (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Jenkins, 2017). Additionally, forming separate alliances
and conducting intra-regional trade in roubles, allows Putin to build a network of partners
and bypass certain global governance structures in the face of tightening sanctions (Fusiek,
2022; Ramani, 2022).
Despite some willingness to cooperate with the West, the Iranian Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action being one of them (Fusiek, 2022), Russia still refuses to effectively communicate
over Ukraine. Russia likely only engages with the West when an opportunity to increase its
legitimacy appears. However, opportunities for reproachment with the West are likely not
taken due to the Russian belief that there are no ‘win-win’ situations, and they would be seen
as the loser (Nattrass, 2022). Ultimately, they are trying to save face with the Russian public.

Hybrid Revisionism
According to Putin and Lavrov, a unipolar world is unsustainable. In 2017, Lavrov spoke to
the UN about creating a polycentric world (Götz & Merlen, 2018). Therefore, Russia's
policies and actions are highly likely aimed at establishing a new multipolar world order, with
itself as a major pole. Russia combines ideas from various power types in order to alter the
post-Cold War order. As a result, hybrid revisionism may best explain Russia's power type.

The annexation of Crimea, interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and separatist support are
examples of hybridisation. Russia invades, annexes, and foments secession to punish the
West and democratising FSU states (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Fusiek, 2022). This defends
Russia against NATO and liberalism, preventing democratic spillover and potential revolution
(Götz & Merlen, 2018; Fusiek, 2022). All the while, Russia pseudo-gains territory by
declaring pro-Russian regions independent. Putin uses defeatist rhetoric to stir nationalism
and turn the population against liberal democracy to justify his actions to all Russians for
their benefit (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Fusiek, 2022; Krastev, 2022). He then uses these factors
to unite Russians under a conservative community, isolating them from the West (Hudson
Institute, 2015; Fusiek, 2022). This is combined with opportunistic alliances with autocratic
regimes to avoid sanctions, and the use of "active measures" to divide the Euro-Atlantic
community to avoid direct confrontation (Götz & Merlen, 2018; Jenkins, 2017).

So, what is seen as a purely revanchist move—annexing Crimea—has defensive tones. It

also allows the use of Western reactions in defeatist misinformation to propagate an
isolationist mindset. All of this occurs while Russia seized the opportunity to keep the Black
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol (Tsygankov A. , 2015). Therefore, calculated hybrid revisionist
mechanisms are used to further Russia’s aims.
Conclusion
Many aspects must be reflected upon when one defines a country’s power type.
Consideration must be given to not only one’s own perspective, but also the perspective of
the country in question.
A vast and complicated history of revolution and upheaval clouds our comprehension of
Russia's activities (Lutsevych & Wallace, 2021). This essay has presented that there is no
singular definition that can be applied to Russia’s power, but that it is a hybrid of many types.

There are arguments for and against revanchism, defensiveness, and aggressive isolation.
The West views Crimea's annexation as a purely revanchist move to regain influence, and
strike back at the West for perceived injustices. Russia, on the other hand, sees the same
action as defending its territory and conservative values against advancing liberalism.
Russia, in alliance with other autocratic regimes, seeks to reduce reliance on Western
nations and establish itself as the leader of a new conservative pole in a multipolar world
order. They will, however, most likely cooperate with the West when it suits their needs.

Revanchism, defensiveness, and aggressive isolationism undeniably form a large portion of

what makes up a hybrid revisionist Russia. However, defeatism can be seen in Putin's
rhetoric on unifying the Russian people, reinforcing the belief that liberalisation will be the
Federation's downfall. Russia also seizes opportunities to exploit cracks between Western
states and alliances, meddle in elections, and support right-wing political parties to
undermine the LIO without directly causing conflict.

Ultimately, Russia blends elements from many types of power to achieve its aim of creating
a new multipolar world with itself as a major pole. Therefore, Russia should be considered a
hybrid revisionist power.

Word count: 2733

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