Case Digests in Admin Law Part 1 5

MARIANO MARCOS STATE UNIVERSITY
College of Law
Administrative Law ; A.Y. 2017-2018
Table of Contents
Case Page
Case Title
No. No.
1. De Villa vs City of Bacolod, 189 SCRA 736 1
2. Jalandoni vs Drilon, 327 SCRA 107 2
3. Federation of Free Workers vs Inciong 161 SCRA 295 4
4. Ople vs Torres 293 SCRA 141 6
5. Echegaray vs Sec of Justice 297 SCRA 754 8
6. Republic vs CA 200 SCRA 226 10
7. KMU vs Garcia 239 SCRA 386 12
8. Boei-Takeda vs Dela Serna 117 SCRA 329 13
9. Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777 14
10. PASEI vs Torres 212 SCRA 298 15
11. Yaokasin vs Comm of Customs 180 SCRA 591 17
12. Lina vs Carino 221 SCRA 515 18
13. Sec of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160 19
14. Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483 21
15. Realty Exchange Venture vs Sendino 233 SCRA 665 23
16. Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262 24
17. Republic vs Sandiganbayan 173 SCRA 72 26
18. Republic vs Saludares GR#111174; March 9, 2000 28
19. Cana vs Gebusion 329 SCRA 132 31
20. Skyworld vs SEC 211 SCRA 565 33
21. Carpio vs Exec Sec 206 SCRA 290 34
22. Uy vs COA 3628 SCRA 607 36
23. SEC vs Recto GR # 129521; Sept 7, 1999 37
24. Naguiat vs NLRC 269 SCRA 564 38
25. Mark Roche vs NLRC GR # 123825; August 31, 1999 40
26. Gonzales vs NLRC GR#125735; Aug 26, 1999 42
27. UP Board of Regents vs CA 313 SCRA 404 44
28. Mabuhay Textile vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437 46
29. Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners 28 SCRA 345 48
30. Teotico vs Agda Jr 197 SCRA 675 50
31. Lopez vs City of Manila GR # 127139; Feb 19, 1999 52
COMPILED BY: CID | LLAGUNO | LUCERO | PANED | PETILLA

College of Law
Case Title: De Villa vs City of Bacolod

GR No. / Date: 189 SCRA 736 / September 20, 1990
Topic: President's Control over Executive Departments/Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Doctrine
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter, or modify, nullify, or set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter
Facts
On September 12, 1990, petitioner Dir. Gen. De Villa of the Integrated National Police (INP),
relieved respondent Lt. Col. Ploteña as Bacolod City Station Commander and assigned him to te
Provincial headquarters in Bacolod City.
The City of Bacolod filed with the RTC a complaint for declaratory relief or preliminary mandatory
injunction to declare the relief was illegal and invalid. The RTC declared that Ploteña was summarily
replaced without observance of due process, violation of EO 1027 and the constitution requiring as an
essential condition for relief a prior recommendation and consultation of local chief executives, in the
instant case, the City Mayor of Bacolod.
Not satisfied with the RTC ruling, the herein respondent elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not the Director General or the chief of the INP has the power of direction and
operation supervision over police units from the INP
Held
The Chief of the INP exercises direct control over the INP police units.
EO 1027 did not remove direct supervision and control over police units of the INP from the Chief
of the INP, what is given to local chief executive are at most operational supervision. Administrative
supervision and control is not the same as general or operational supervision and direction. In the case
at bar, the participation of the local chief executive is amendatory but the power to relieve or reassign a
city INP station commander is lodged with the INP Director.
The contention that Ploteñas’ replacement, transfer or reassignment may only be done upon
approval of the local chief executive, defies organizational interests, a deadlock may ensue an
intransigent local chief executive that would be in a position to nullify the power of administrative
supervision and control vested by law in the PC Chief/INP Director General.
The petition is granted and the decision of RTC was reversed and set aside.
DIGESTED BY: ACADEMIA, GRACE 1

College of Law
Case Title: Jalandoni vs Drilon

GR No. / Date: 327 SCRA 107 , March 2, 2000
Doctrine
Power of Control and Supervision
The revised administrative code so provides that supervision shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, direct performance of
duty; restrain the commission of acts, modify, review or affirm the acts and decision of the subordinate
units.
Facts:
On July 15, 1992, Jaime Ledesma filed a complaint for violation of the RPC and the Anti-graft and
corrupt practices against the petitioner with the PCGG. Private respondents published a full-page
advertisement in five major daily newspapers. These ads contained allegations naming petitioner who
was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts.
Exactly a year after, petitioner Jalandoni filed a complaint for the crime of libel before the
Provincial Prosecutor. On November 8, 1993, a memorandum issued by the provincial prosecutor
recommending the indictment of Coyiuto jr. who was then the chairman of OPMC Oriental Petroleum and
Mineral Corporation, thereafter the information for libel before the RTC of Makati was filed. All
respondents in the aforementioned cases appealed to the Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon who then
ordered the immediately withdrawal of information filed in court against respondent Coyiuto jr.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice may challenge, alter, nullify or modify the acts and
decisions of the Provincial Prosecutor
Held:
Yes he may.
It is a well-settled rule that the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions or
decisions of provincial or city prosecutor or the Chief prosecutor upon petition by the proper party. The
revised administrative code empowers the Secretary of Justice to have a direct control and supervisions
over said prosecutors. He may affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings as he may deem fit.
PD No. 911 empowers the Secretary of justice to authorize and direct the investigating fiscal
concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case when he,

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the Secretary of Justice, finds no prima facie case exist. The secretary can also authorize or direct the
filing of an information in court.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives
the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor and the
Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated
in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code: Scncm
"(1) Supervision and Control. -- Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing
the relationship of particular agencies, the word control shall encompass supervision and
control as defined in this paragraph."

College of Law
Case Title: Federation of Free Workers vs Inciong

GR No. / Date: 161 SCRA 295 , May 11, 1988
Doctrine
Doctrine of qualified political agency. In the absence of a constitutional provision or a statute to the
contrary, the official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed the acts of the President himself unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter.
Facts
Petitioner Federation of Free Workers is a labor organization registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment. It is the certified collective bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of
the herein private respondent, the Allied Sugar Centrals Company, a registered partnership.
On April 21, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the
private sector to pay their employees an across-the-board increase of P60.00 in their existing monthly
emergency allowance as provided for in an earlier law, Presidential Decree No. 525. The increase was to
take effect on May 1, 1977. The Decree also authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue the appropriate
rules necessary to implement the provisions of the said law, including such regulations to govern the
procedure through which financially distressed employers may be exempted from the requirements of the
same.
On September 27, 1977 or more than 100 days after the said rules took effect, the private
respondent filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the P60.00
increase mandated under Presidential Decree No. 1123. In support of the application, the private
respondent stressed, inter alia, that it had suffered substantial losses from its operations during the fiscal
years 1974-1975 and 1975-1976.
Sometime thereafter, the respondent Chairman of the Wage Commission submitted her report to
the Secretary of Labor recommending the approval of the said application. On November 21, 1977, the
herein respondent Acting Secretary of Labor Amado Inciong wrote to the private respondent informing it
that its application was approved for a period of one year, effective May 1, 1977. The letter of approval
recited therein that the same is final and unappealable.
On March 3, 1978, the private respondent filed another application for exemption, this time for the
year 1978. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of Labor dated May 31, 1978, the petitioner opposed
the application and reiterated its objection to the exemption granted to the firm for 1977 on the grounds
that the exemption granted to the private respondent is discriminatory and that the firm is not in unsound
financial condition.
On June 5, 1978, Chairman Fidelino overruled the opposition and motion for reconsideration
which stressed that the private respondent does not appear to be in distressed financial condition as
observed by a financial analyst of the Commission. Thus, on June 9, 1 978, Acting Secretary Inciong
issued an order approving the second application for exemption covering 1978, for a period of one year
effective May 1 thereof. The approval also recited therein that the same is final and unappealable.
The petitioner argues that the herein public respondents-Acting Secretary Inciong and Chairman
Fidelino committed a grave abuse of their discretion, amounting to loss of jurisdiction, in effecting the
DIGESTED BY: ANNANG, MARILYN 4

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approval of both applications for exemption sought by the private respondent. The Petition seeks the
annulment of the orders issued by the Acting Secretary relating to such approval.
Issue:
Whether or not the public respondents gravely abused their discretion in effecting the approval of
applications for exemption sought by the respondent.
Held:
The petition is devoid of merit. .
RATIO:
The Wage Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment are the administrative agencies
which are in a better position to assess the matter on account of their expertise in the same. In the
absence of any grave abuse of discretion on their part, and none has been shown in the instant Petition,
their recommendations will be respected by this Court.
Moreover, in the absence of a constitutional provision or a statute to the contrary, the official acts of a
Department Secretary are deemed the acts of the President himself unless disapproved or reprobated by
the latter. This is the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under the presidential type of government
which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in
force by our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to
act in person or the agencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.
Inasmuch as no grave abuse of discretion appears to have been committed by the herein public
respondents, the writ of certiorari sought by the petitioner cannot issue.

MARIANO MARCOS
MARIANO STATE
MARCOS UNIVERSITY
STATE UNIVERSITY
CollegeCollege
of Lawof Law
Administrative Law ; A.Y.
Administrative Law2017-2018
; A.Y. 2017-2018
Case Title: Ople vs Torres

GR No. / Date: 293 SCRA 141 , July 23, 1998
Topic: Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation
Doctrine
Administrative power
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Facts:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System,” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on December 12, 1996. Senator Blas F. Ople
filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on the ground that
the establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a legislative act
and that the issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative
powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. On this point, respondents counter-
argue that A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president
without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate.
Held:
A.O No. 308 is unconstitutional.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution
has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general,
and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation

and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement
of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power
over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance." and "embodies changes in administrative structure
and procedures designed to serve the
people."
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,
etc.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-
vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without
the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public
law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws."

MARIANO MARCOS
MARIANO STATE
MARCOS UNIVERSITY
STATE UNIVERSITY
CollegeCollege
of Lawof Law
; A.Y. 2017-2018
Case Title: Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice

GR No. / Date: 297 SCRA 754 , October 12, 1998
Topic: Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation
Facts:
Leo Echegaray is convicted for the crime of rape and sentenced with death penalty. The
Congress passed RA 8177 which changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection. Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules") and directed the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Echegaray filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice
and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner
under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules.
Issue:
Where or no there is undue delegation of legislative power in R.A. no. 8177 to the secretary of
justice and the director of bureau of corrections.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that there is no undue delegation of legislative power in R.A. 8177 to the
secretary of justice and the director of bureau of corrections.
R.A. No. 8177 provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that the death sentence
shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far
as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection
as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.” Further, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to
cause the instantaneous death of the convict.” The legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such
task." The Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice
and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general,
are capable of reasonable application.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest." The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
DIGESTED BY: BALTAZAR, MARJORIE 8

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the
task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by
itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate- and (b) fix a standard - the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

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Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. / Date: 200 SCRA 226 August 5, 1991
Doctrine: Requisites of a Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, filed on 25 October 1989 by the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines "acting through the
Sugar Regulatory Administration" (SRA) and the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) seeking the review of the
13 October 1989 Decision of the Court of Appeals (15th Division) in CAGR No. 17188.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit citing one of the reason as that Petitioner
(SRA) may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines since under Section
13 of Executive Order No. 18 dated 28 May 1986, which created it, it simply was to take over the
functions of the defunct PHILSUCOM; however, the latter was to remain a judicial entity for three more
years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits against it; hence it is PHILSUCOM, being a
party to the compromise agreement, which may properly contest the right of private respondents to
attomey's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the SRA has no authority to bring an action in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory
Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in
this case
Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took effect immediately, abolished
the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration
(SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President. However, under the third paragraph of Section 13
thereof, the PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a juridical entity for three (3) years for the purpose
of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to
dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the
functions for which it was established, under the supervision of the SRA.
Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but it does
not specifically include the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against
it, nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the power to "enter, make and execute routinary

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MARIANO STATE
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STATE UNIVERSITY
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contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons,
firms, public
or private, and the Government of the Philippines" and "[t]o do all such other things, transact such
other businesses and perform such functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the purposes of the Sugar Regulatory Administration."
The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit by or against it having been
withheld from SRA, it following that the latter cannot institute the instant petition and the petition in C.A.-
G.R. No. 17188 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
This conclusion does not, however, mean that the SRA cannot sued and be sued. This power can
be implied from its powers to make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or
incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms public or private, and the
Government of the Philippines and to do all such other things, transact such other businesses and
perform such other functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
purposes of the SRA and the powers of its governing board to enter into contracts, transactions, or
undertaking of whatever nature which are necessary or incidental to its functions and objectives with any
natural or juridical persons and with any foreign government institutions, private corporations, partnership
or private individuals.

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Case Title: Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Garcia

GR No. / Date: 239 SCRA 386 , December 23, 1994
Topic: Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
Doctrine
What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of such power would
constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it
directly.
Facts:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to
charge passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing,
among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial
buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be
replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range."
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of
the DOTC, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares, without first having
filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing.
The petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus
fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates
based on the order of the LTFRB.
Held:
Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public
Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing
regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19,
1987. Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life.
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and
LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public
service. Therefore, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata
non delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would
constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it
directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic
situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators.
DIGESTED BY: CID, CZARINA MAE 12

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Case Title: Boie-Takeda Chemicals Inc. v. Hon. Dionisio De La Serna

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 92174 / December 10, 1993
Topic: Validity of Administrative Rules and Regulations
Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 851, the Thirteenth Month Pay Law, defines “Basic Salary” as which shall
include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but may
not include cost of living allowances profit sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits
which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee. On the
other hand, the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law promulgated by
then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon included these salary-related benefits as part of the basic salary in
the computation of the 13th
Month pay. Both petitioners in this case were found by the labor officer not to have been including
the commissions earned by their employees in the computation of their 13th month pay. Petitioners
contended P.D.851, the 13th month pay is based solely on basic salary. As defined by the law itself and
clarified by the implementing and Supplementary Rules as well as by the Supreme Court in a long line of
decisions, remunerations which do not form part of the basic or regular salary of an employee, such as
commissions, should not be considered in the computation of the 13th month pay. This being the case,
the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then Secretary
Drilon providing for the inclusion of Commissions in the 13th month pay, were issued in excess of the
statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851.
Issue:
Whether or not the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued
by then Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of commissions in the 13th month pay were issued in
excess of the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851.
Held:
In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of
Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly
expanded the concept of “basic salary” as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing
rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
8
DIGESTED BY: DELARNA, STELLA MARIZ 13
College of Law
Case Title: RMBSD v. HDMF (PAG-IBIG)

GR No. / Date: 333 SCRA 777 / June 19, 2000
Facts:
HDMF Board of trustees, pursuant to Sec 5 of RA no. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011,
series of 1995, amending and modifying the rules and Regulations implementing RA No. 7742. As
amended, sec 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund
coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefit superior to
those provided under the Pag-ibig Fund.
Petitioners filed with the responded an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage
because of its superior retirement plan and explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are
invalid.
On March 18 1996, the President and CEO of HDMF disapproved the petitioner’s application on
the ground that the requirement should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in
the use of the phrase “and/or”, and that the Rules Implementing RA no. 7742 did not amend nor repeal
Sec 19 of PD No. 1752 but merely implement the law. HDMF contends to exercise the rule-making
power under sec 13 of PD No. 1752. It had option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver
in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law.
The Court of Appeals DISMISSED the petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and
employees under Home Development Mutual Fund is MANDATORY in character as clearly worded in
sec 4 of PD No. 1752 as amended by RA No 7742.
Issue:
Whether or not HDMF exceeded its delegated power.
Held:
The Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed
Sec 19 of PD No. 1962. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Sec 19 are both invalid. The HDMF
cannot exercise the rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply.
The controversy leis in the legal signification of the words “and/or” and those are to be used
interchangeably.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is hereby reversed and set aside and the Home Dev’t
Mutual Fund is directed to refund the petitioner all sums of money it collected from the latter.
8
DIGESTED BY: DELARNA, STELLA MARIZ 14
College of Law
Case Title: PASEI v. Torres

GR No. / Date: 212 SCRA 298 , August 6, 1992
Facts:
As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed
in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.16, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong
Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of
1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and
to prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars that the assailed DOLE
and POEA Circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and that
the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
complied with.
Issue:
Whether or not the circulars are valid.
Held:
They are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the
Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts
shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their
adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as
amended.)
DIGESTED BY: FLOJO, JUAN PAOLO 15

College of Law
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not

inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the
rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
As held in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to

enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and
implemented.

College of Law
Case Title: Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs

GR No. / Date: 180 SCRA 591 , December 22, 1989
FACTS:
The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin,
which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the
Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo
to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue
of Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of Section 12 of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that a decision of a Collector of Customs in seizure
and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to automatic review by the Commissioner of
Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either
commissioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and executory.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that
these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however
published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the Official Gazette to
take effect.
RULING:
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative
order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said
issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is addressed only
to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As
held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all
concerned.”
Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress,
executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no
general applicability.
8
College of Law
Case Title: Lina v. Cariño

GR No. / Date: 180 SCRA 591 / December 22, 1989
Doctrine
A rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with the provisions of its enabling statute.
Facts:
This is a petition for Mandamus filed by petitioner Senator Lina, Jr., who disputes the legal
authority of respondent Cariño to issue DECS Order No. 30. It is entitled “Guidelines on Tuition and/or
other School Fees in Private Schools, Colleges and Universities for SY 1991-1992.” which allows private
schools to increase tuition and other school fees, subject to certain guidelines set out in said order.
Respondent Secretary contends its validity by citing PD 451; conversely, petitioner Lina contends that
Order No. 30 is invalid for being contrary to BP 232 and RA 6782.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Secretary had authority to issue DECS Order No. 30. (Was it within
the scope of the law?)
Held:
Yes. Sec. Carino has legal authority to issue DECS Order No. 30.
PD 451, promulgated on 1974, authorizes the Secretary of Education and Culture to fix the tuition
and other school fees charged by private schools. BP 232, passed on 1982 states that each private
school shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees, subject to rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. RA 6782 deals with government
assistance to students and teachers in private schools, not with the question of authority to fix tuition and
school fees.
Hence, Order No. 30 in seeking to fix tuition and other school fees is valid pursuant to PD 451; it
is not invalidated by BP 232 since the latter authorizes public schools to determine its tuition rate subject
to rules promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports; and it is not invalidated by RA
6782 since it confers authority to the State Assistance Council (SAC) to give government assistance to
students, and not the authority to fix tuition and other school fees.
R.A. NO. 6728 did authorize the SAC to issue rules and regulations but the rules and regulations
which may be promulgated by the SAC must relate to the authority granted by R.A. NO. 6728 to the
SAC. It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid. DECS Order No. 30 is valid.
8
DIGESTED BY: GARCIA, EILEEN JOY 18
College of Law
Case Title: Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

GR No. / Date: 322 SCRA 160 , January 18, 2000
Topic: Quasi-Judicial Power distinguished from Judicial Power
Doctrine
Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the
failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition
process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extraditee.
Facts:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
“Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country”. The Decree is founded on: The Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped. On November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.” The Philippine Senate ratified the said
Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez
to the United States. Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to
wiretapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez
requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The
DOJ secretary:
1. refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is
not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies;
2. denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Jimenez sued the DOJ Secretary (Franklin Drilon). The lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON Jimenez was deprived of due process.

College of Law
Held:
Yes.
Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to
the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the
extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective
extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages:
1. The provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request; and
2. The temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in
court.
Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative
agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since
such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of
a criminal investigation. The Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an
administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative
proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case
at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which
may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the
deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing
according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of
any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present
their side.
In view of the foregoing premises, the petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to
file his comment with supporting evidence.

College of Law
Case Title: Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 96681. December 2,1991
Topic: Investigation
Facts:
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to
“dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention. They did not attend work and
decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances.
As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then
investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the
service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission
on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case
and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño.
Issue:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such
as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
Held:
No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate
all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and
decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with
the trial. The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve
on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
DIGESTED BY: JACINTO, ALYSSA2 21

College of Law
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge.
DIGESTED BY: JACINTO, ALYSSA 22

College of Law
Case Title: Realty Exchange Venture Corporation vs. Sendino

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 109703. July 5, 1994
Topic: Adjudication/Delegation to a Division
Facts:
Respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with petitioner Realty Exchange
Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a lot located in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat for P307,800. Sendino paid
a total of P5000 as reservation fee. Six months thereafter Sendino paid 16K as downpayment. She was
however advised by REVI to change her co-maker. Sendino agreed, to which she asked for an extension
of one month or so. For alleged non-compliance with the appropriate documentary requirements, REVI
unilaterally rescinded the contract. Sendino sued for Specific Performance against REVI with the Office
of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. REVI argued that OAALA-HLURB
has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case becauseEO 90 which created the HLURB did not grant
such powers to it. Although such quasi-judicial function was exercised by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), HLURB’s predecessor.
Issues:
1. Whether the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding the absence of such grant of
power by EO 90.
2. Whether a decision can be rendered by OAALA- a subordinate office of the Board of

Commissioners.
Held:
1. YES. The HLURB has quasi-judicial functions. Although such power was not granted by the law
creating the HLURB, it can be implied from the fact that HLURB is the sole regulatory board for
housing and land development. HLURB would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if
it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor, the HSRC, which included the power to settle
disputes concerning land use.
2. YES. The Board of Commissioners may delegate such function to the OAALA.The power
conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry
out its functions has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function. The board may adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business for
the effective accomplishment of its mandated functions.
DIGESTED BY: JACINTO, ALYSSA 23

College of Law
Case Title: Melendres vs COMELEC

GR No. / Date: 319 SCRA 262 , November 25, 1999
Topic: Administrative Interpretation of the Law
Doctrine
The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a

statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.
Facts:
Petitioner (herein private respondent Ruperto P. Concepcion) and private respondent (herein
petitioner Miguel Melendres, Jr.) were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. The petitioner was proclaimed as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman. Private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-seven (47)
precincts of said barangay.
After the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was
paid by the protestant therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37,
Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with this
requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and is
not jurisdictional.
On June 16, 1997, Concepcion filed this instant case for Certiorari and Prohibition, with a prayer for
a Temporary Restraining order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Respondent Melendres filed with the
Commission a Manifestation wherein he claimed that the contested issue of non-payment of filing fee
was now moot and academic as the same had been paid on June 6, 1997, ten days before this petition
was filed.
On the basis of the foregoing factual recital, respondent COMELEC rendered the challenged Order
nullifying the orders of the public respondent in SPR No. 16-97.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in its ruling
Held:
The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in its ruling.
Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a

statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. The rationale for
DIGESTED BY: LLAGUNO, MYKA JOSA 24

College of Law
this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society
and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it
also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
Contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability in the laws, especially
those involving specific terms having technical meanings. However, courts will not hesitate to set aside
such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or
when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary reader.
In the case at bar, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of
the COMELEC conforms to rather than conflicts with the governing statute and controlling case law on
the matter.
DIGESTED BY: LLAGUNO, MYKA JOSA 25

College of Law
Case Title: Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 84895. May 4, 1989
Topic: Power to Grant Immunities from Criminal and Civil Prosecutions
Facts:
Republic filed with SB a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages against Alfredo Romualdez, Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Jose Campos, Jr. and forty five
(45) other defendants including the above-named private respondents, seeking to recover from them ill-
gotten wealth resulting in their unjust enrichment during Marcos' rule.
Campos Jr., having been served with summons, filed with SB a 'Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss Complaint praying that he be removed as party from the complaint for he had voluntarily
surrendered or turned over any share in his name on any of the corporations referred to the government
and that he was entitled to the immunity granted by the PCGG.
Republic then filed with SB a 'Motion' seeking to drop Campos from the Complaint on the ground
that PCGG granted immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family, which immunity necessarily extends
to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. who is the son of said Mr. Jose Y. Campos.
The private respondents opposed petitioner's motion. The Sandiganbayan denied the motions to
drop and the subsequent Motions for Reconsiderations. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as party defendant in Civil Case
by virtue of the PCGG's grant of immunity in favor of his father Jose Y. Campos and the latter's family.
Held:
Rule 3 Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any
claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (11a)
The Solicitor General asserts that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in the
complaint through mistake or oversight and that pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court it has a right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any party.
The Solicitor General also maintains that Campos, Jr. was not an indispensable party since Article
1216 of the Civil Code allows the petitioner as solidary creditor to choose among the solidary debtors
against whom it win enforce collection.
DIGESTED BY: LUCERO, STEVE PAULO 26

College of Law
SC held that the Sandiganbayan's objections will hamper PCGG efforts in similar cases. By virtue of
the PCGG's resolution, Jose Campos, Jr. was given full immunity from both civil and criminal
prosecutions
in exchange for the "full cooperation from Jose Y Campos to this Commission, his voluntary surrender of
the properties and assets disclosed and declared by him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, his full, complete and truthful disclosures,
and his commitment to pay a sum of money as determined by the Philippine Government."
Campos, Jr. had already waived and surrendered to the Republic his registered equity interest in the
Marcos/Romualdez corporations involved in the civil case. Thus, as far as the petitioner is concerned, it
had already released Campos. Jr. from an criminal and civil liabilities in connection with his association
with the said corporations. Under the law, civil liabilities would include restitution and damages in favor of
the government.
It is immaterial whether or not Campos, Jr. was given specific or individual immunity from his liabilities as
regards the Marcos/Romualdez corporations. The grant of full immunity to Campos and his family covers
all of Campos, Jr.'s liabilities, criminal or civil, arising from association with the Marcoses including
transactions with the corporations involved in the said civil case.
Even from the viewpoint of procedure, the PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose
Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case.
DIGESTED BY: LUCERO, STEVE PAULO 27

MARIANO MARCOS
MARIANO STATE
MARCOS UNIVERSITY
STATE UNIVERSITY
CollegeCollege
of Lawof Law
; A.Y. 2017-2018
Case Title: Republic vs Saludares

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 111174. March 9, 2000
Topic: Power to Grant Immunities from Criminal and Civil Prosecutions
Facts:
On April 2, 1986, the PCGG issued a writ of sequestration of Lianga Bay Logging. The writ of
sequestration was based on the ground that the shares of stocks in LBLC owned by Peter A. Sabido
formed part of "illegally acquired wealth." On July 27, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines through the
PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against, among others, Peter A. Sabido.
On August 12, 1991, Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration before the Sandiganbayan.
On November 29, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. On December 11, 1991, PCGG
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Sandiganbayan praying for the nullification of the
order which lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC.
In the meantime, on February 11, 1993, private respondent Hung Ming Kuk filed a complaint5 for
sum of money against LBLC, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The PCGG was not impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk as party-
defendant nor was the sequestration case referred to the RTC's proceedings.
Thus, the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action6 for certiorari under Rule 65,
dated March 29, 1993, with the Supreme Court. This petition, docketed as G.R. No. 109314, was later on
consolidated with other similar cases.
Meantime, on February 15, 1993, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of
PCGG, dated December 11, 1991.
On February 17, 1993, the trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Hung
Ming Kuk. Thereafter, Hung Ming Kuk filed a motion to declare LBLC in default for failure to file
responsive pleadings pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC of Lianga, acting on
the motion of Hung Ming Kuk, issued an order dated March 4, 1993, declaring LBLC as in default.
Consequently, on March 19, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment by default.
On August 11, 1993, petitioner filed this special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
i) Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
ii) Whether or not the provisional remedy of attachment issued by the trial court in favor of the
private respondent is valid.
DIGESTED BY: PANED, JHEIA LINDHELLE 28

College of Law
Held:
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Lianga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
inasmuch as the same are under sequestration by the PCGG. Citing Baseco vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181
(1987), petitioner asserts that the sequestered assets have been placed under custodia legis of the
PCGG pending the final determination by the Sandiganbayan that said assets are in fact ill-gotten.
Hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction to order the attachment of said sequestered properties.
In the case at bar, the claim of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk is for a sum of money arising
from a debt incurred by LBLC. Under a contract, private respondent had extended cash advances and
supplied LBLC hardware materials, auto spare parts, and rendered services, for cutting and hauling logs.
The total claim amounts to P18,031,563.78. Following Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691 on March 25, 1994, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of
the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
We note that PCGG is not an owner but a conservator. It can exercise only powers of
administration over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. Even resort to the
provisional remedies should entail the least possible interference with business operations or activities so
that, in the event that the accusation that the business enterprise is "ill-gotten" be not proven, it may be
returned to its rightful owner as far as possible in the same condition as it was at the time of
sequestration.
The holding in Peña which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan in sequestration
cases cannot also be relied upon by petitioner in this case. We hold that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the complaint for payment of money allegedly averred by LBLC to private respondent.
ii) By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or
lost intentionally, or otherwise, pending the action. When a writ of attachment has been levied on real
property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien which nothing
can destroy but its dissolution. This well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration.
DIGESTED BY: PANED, JHEIA LINDHELLE

In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid
writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when respondent Judge Saludares issued the
assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of
sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting. Said writ of the PCGG could not be
interfered with by the RTC of Lianga, because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG
had acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final
determination of the case or until its dissolution.
DIGESTED BY: PANED, JHEIA LINDHELLE

College of Law
Case Title: Caña vs. Gebusion

GR No. / Date: A.M. No. P-98-1284. March 30, 2000
Topic: Administrative and Judicial Proceeding Distinguished
Facts:
Petitioner (judge) filed a complaint against private respondent (Sheriff IV in the same court as
petitioner) for violation of the Civil Service Law, the Firearms Law, and the Omnibus Election Code. In
addition, respondent was also accused of carrying a revolver without a license and of threatening to kill
complainant for having filed the above charges. An investigation was conducted, and the respondent
was found guilty of several of the charges.
The Investigating Judge finds respondent guilty of all the charges against him except those of
grave threats, illegal possession of firearms, and violation of the election gun ban and recommends that
respondent be suspended for six (6) months without pay.[10] On the other hand, the Office of the Court
Administrator, although concurring in the factual findings of the Investigating Judge, recommends that
respondent be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be dismissed from service
Held:
The SC ruled that respondent should be dismissed from service.
The Court agree that the evidence is insufficient to prove that respondent really made threats against
complainant. The Court do not agree, however, that resolution of the administrative charges in this case
must be held in abeyance while charges of illegal possession of firearm without the requisite license are
still pending against him in court. A finding that respondent is administratively liable is not inconsistent
with the constitutional presumption of innocence. For one, the quantum of evidence required in
administrative cases is only substantial evidence, while in criminal cases proof beyond reasonable doubt
is required. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For another, the purpose of the administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public
office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of
crime.
Although respondent has shown remorse for his conduct and apologized and promised to
undergo rehabilitation for his alcoholism, he has time and again shown himself unable to overcome his
addiction to alcohol. His habits have affected his work and rendered him unfit for public service. Self-
restraint and civility are expected of civil service employees. Fighting with co-employees during office
hours reflects adversely on the image of the judiciary. It discourages respect for the court
Under no circumstance can such behavior be tolerated. Absence without leave for a prolonged
period of time constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service and justifies the
DIGESTED BY: PETILLA, MARIANNE SHEN 31

College of Law
dismissal of an employee and the forfeiture of benefits with prejudice to re-employment in the
government on the basis of the evidence in the records the Court is convinced that respondent, by
possessing a firearm without the necessary license, committed serious misconduct. As an officer of the
Court, respondent should set the example for obedience to the law, not lawless conduct. It is obvious
respondent does not appreciate the importance of his position in the judicial system and the immense
responsibility that goes with it.

College of Law
Case Title: SKYWORLD CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v SEC

GR No. / Date: 211 SCRA 565, July 17, 1992
Topic: DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND RECEIVE EVIDENCE
Facts:
Two petitions were filed against the petitioner SCOAI, one of them contesting the existence of the
petitioner as an entity, and the other, for a writ of preliminary injunction praying that the petitioner be
stopped from exercising the prerogatives of a condominium corporation.
The first petition was filed on August 8, 1986 by CBC before the SEC docketed as SEC No. 3035.
The second was filed on October 9, 1986 before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch V (Civil Case
No. 915-R) by the respondent Baguio Skyworld Condominium Corporation (BSCC) which was organized
at the instance of CBC and registered with the SEC on September 19, 1986.
A hearing was conducted on September 11, 1989 by the PED with Mr. Norberto Ruiz as the
hearing officer. The counsels of the two parties were present. On December 12, 1989, the PED issued a
resolution ordering the revocation of the certificate of registration of the SCOAI. The resolution was
prepared by Mr. Norberto Ruiz after studying the substantial evidence he received and the arguments of
the parties in the memoranda submitted by the parties to him. On the same date, the resolution was
presented by PED Director Elnora Adviento before the Commission en banc which approved the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Commission validly approved the alleged unauthorized resolution
or decision made by Mr. Norberto B. Ruiz on the revocation case.
Held:
The contentions are without merit. Pres. Decree No. 902-A vests on the Commission the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving, among others, disputes between the
corporation and the state regarding its legal right to exist, and the power to hear and decide on the
suspension or revocation of a certificate of registration of a corporation. In the consolidated cases, the
Commission empowered the PED to conduct the hearing and to decide on the revocation of a certificate
of registration. The task was assigned to Mr. Ruiz for and in behalf of the Commission. In judging the
merits of the case at the instance of the Commission, Mr. Ruiz acted only as a trier of the facts presented
to him and not as a prosecutor at the same time. The resolution arrived at was adopted by the
Commission, en banc as its own decision, upon its approval. The Court agrees with the analysis of the
respondent Commission that the petitioner was barred by estoppel by laches from repudiating the
jurisdiction of the hearing officer to whom it has submitted itself and before whom it presented evidence
by way of memorandum.
DIGESTED BY: RICARDO, FRANZESS AUDCHRIS 33

College of Law
Case Title: CARPIO vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR No. / Date: 206 SCRA 290, February 14, 1992
Topic: SUBDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Doctrine
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or alter ego principle means that the acts of the secretaries of
the Executive departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Facts:
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of
the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the
control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by
limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local
executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.
Issue:
Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA
6975.
Held:
No.
The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
“Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation
DIGESTED BY: RICARDO, FRANZESS ANN AUDCHRIS 34

College of Law
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination
and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and
public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part
subsidized by the national government.
DIGESTED BY: RICARDO, FRANZESS ANN AUDCHRIS 35

College of Law
Case Title: UY et al., vs COA

GR No. / Date: 3628 SCRA 607
Topic: PROCEEDINGS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES: NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Doctrine
Nature of Proceedings. Even if administrative agencies are not bound by technical rules they cannot
dispose with dues process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a
mere technicality, but is an indispensable requirement.
Facts:
Petitioners are permanent employees of the Provincial Engineering Office, Province of Agusan
del Sur, who were dismissed from the service by then Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. when the latter
assumed office, allegedly to scale down the operations of the said office. A petition for reinstatement was
filed by petitioners before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), docketed as MSPB Case No. 91-
1739, alleging that Governor Paredes was motivated by political vengeance when he dismissed them
and hired new employees to replace them. The MSPB rendered a decision holding that the reduction in
work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the
reinstatement of petitioners. Commission on Audit rendered a decision ruling that the back salaries of the
workers have become the personal liability of the Governor because the illegal dismissal was done in
bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of
back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has
been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission.
Held:
No, respondent COA is bereft of power to disallow the payment of petitioners' back wages. There
is a further impediment in the exercise of the audit power of the respondent COA. The MSPB decision of
January 29, 1993 became final and executory when the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur failed
to appeal within the reglementary period. Again, our undeviating jurisprudence is that final judgments
may no longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government. n the case at bar,
the action taken by COA in disallowing the further payment by the Provincial Government of Agusan del
Sur of backwages due the petitioners amended the final decision of the MSPB.
The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. [20] Payment of backwages
to illegally dismissed government employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.
DIGESTED BY: RIVERA, JENRIETTA CAMILLE 36

College of Law
Case Title: SEC vs RECTO

GR No. / Date: GR No. 129521; September 7, 1999
Topic: POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENA AND CITE FOR CONTEMPT
Doctrine
The power to issue Subpoena and Cite for Contempt.
Facts:
The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals setting side the
order of the SEC declaring respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying a TRO issued to respondents
to desist from holding a stockholders’ meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation.
The Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten days from notice.
Thereafter, the respondents filed their comment. In the main, respondents submit that contempt is
criminal in character and their exoneration from a charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal from,
which an appeal would not lie.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in finding respondents guilty of contempt.
Held:
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they
are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do
the thing required. In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the
the dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie
from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt.
In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the dignity and
power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of
dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt. While the SEC is vested with the power to
punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The
courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for
contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
DIGESTED BY: RIVERA, JENRIETTA CAMILLE 37

MARIANO MARCOS
MARIANO STATE
MARCOS UNIVERSITY
STATE UNIVERSITY
CollegeCollege
of Lawof Law
; A.Y. 2017-2018
Case Title: Naguiat vs NLRC

GR No. / Date: 269 SCRA 564 , March 13, 1997
Topic: Form and Promulgation of Quasi-Judicial Determination
Facts:
Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services ("AAFES")
for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while
Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat
Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation. Individual respondents were previously
employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers.
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which Clark Air Base was not
spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the services of individual respondents were officially terminated
on November 26, 1991. The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local
president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be
awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given
P500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted said amount in
December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual respondents herein refused to accept theirs.
Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual respondents, through the
National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined,
filed a complaint[5] against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name and style Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area
Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as
President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out. Said complaint was later
amended to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI with
Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party respondent.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to
pay them P1, 200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration," setting aside the earlier
agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of service.
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its Resolution, the NLRC modified the
decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to the private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the appealed resolution;
Held:
No, NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that individual respondents were entitled to
separation pay.
DIGESTED BY: SANTOS, N ICCOLO 38

Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial dictum that findings of
fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality;
and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is
clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.[13]
Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the instant case if only to determine whether
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in granting the
clamor of private respondents that their separation pay should be based on the amount of $240.00,
allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi drivers of petitioners. In their amended complaint
before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga, herein private respondents set forth
in detail the work schedule and financial arrangement they had with their employer. Therefrom they
inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not
bother to refute nor offer any evidence to controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the labor
arbiter adopted such facts in his decision. Petitioners did not even appeal from the decision of the labor
arbiter nor manifest any error in his findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in estoppel for not
having questioned such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private respondents, like
petitioners, are bound by the factual findings of Respondent Commission.
Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to great financial losses
brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which made the roads practically impassable to their
taxicabs. Likewise well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order to sustain
retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant exemption from payment of separation
pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence.[14] The records, however, are devoid of such
evidence. The labor arbiter; as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners stopped their taxi
business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was not due
to any great financial loss because petitioners' taxi business was earning profitably at the time of its
closure. With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted, Article 283 of the Labor
Code provides: "x x x In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1 ) whole
year."
DIGESTED BY: SANTOS, N ICCOLO 39

College of Law
Case Title: MARK ROCHE INTERNATIONAL vs. NLRC

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 123825. August 31, 1999
Doctrine: REQUISITES OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; TESTS TO
DETERMINE AMOUNT OF DUE PROCESS
Facts:
Petitioners Eduardo Dayot and Susan Dayot were President and Vice President, respectively, of their co-
petitioner Mark Roche International (MRI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, engaged in the garments business. Private respondents were employed as sewers of MRI
with lengths of service varying from three (3) to nine (9) years.
On different dates private respondents filed separate complaints for underpayment of wages and non-
payment of overtime pay against petitioners MRI, Eduardo Dayot and Susan Dayot. They likewise
asserted that sometime in 1992 they were unable to avail of their SSS benefits, e.g., salary loan,
sickness benefits and maternity benefits because, as they found out, the company did not remit their
contributions to the SSS.
On 11 October 1992 private respondents sought the assistance of a labor organization which helped
them organize the Mark Roche Workers Union (MRWU).
On 14 October 1992 they registered the union with the Department of Labor and Employment - National
Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) and on the same date filed a Petition for Certification Election before the
Med-Arbitration Board.
On 27 October 1992 petitioners received a notice of hearing of the petition. Apparently irked by the idea
of a union within the company, petitioners ordered private respondents to withdraw the petition and
further threatened them that should they insist in the organization of a union they would be dismissed.
Unfazed, private respondents refused. As expected, on 29 October 1992 they were discharged from
work.
On 30 October 1992 private respondents amended their earlier complaints to include as additional
causes of action their illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, non-payment of 13th month pay,
underpayment for legal holidays, and for damages.
On 3 March 1993 the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision declaring as illegal the constructive dismissal
of private respondents. Petitioners were thus ordered to immediately reinstate private respondents as
sewers and to pay each of them his (a) back wages, (b) proportionate share in the 13th month pay, and,
(c) wage differentials
On appeal the NLRC affirmed the reinstatement of private respondents and the payment of back wages,
salary differentials and proportionate 13th month pay but set aside the award of service incentive leave
DIGESTED BY: SANTOS, NICCOLO 40

College of Law
pay on the ground that private respondents were not entitled thereto as they were piece-rate workers.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondents
reinstatement with payment of back wages.
Held:
No, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
The award of reinstatement and back wages belongs to an illegally dismissed employee by direct
provision of law and cannot be defeated by mere allegations of inconvenience, inconceivability or
implausibility. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back wages from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Back wages are
granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal
dismissal.[5] Petitioners are however given the alternative of paying separation pay to illegally dismissed
employees where reinstatement is no longer possible.
DIGESTED BY: SANTOS, NICCOLO 41

College of Law
Case Title: GONZALES vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 125735. August 26, 1999
Topic: REQUISITES OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; TESTS TO
DETERMINE AMOUNT OF DUE PROCESS
Doctrine
Basic requirements of due process.
Facts:
Lorlene Gonzales has been a schoolteacher in the Elementary Department of private respondent
Ateneo de Davao University since 1974. In 1991 Fr. Oscar Millar, Ateneo Grade School Headmaster,
sent a letter informing of the complaints of two (2) parents for alleged use of corporal punishment on her
students. Petitioner claimed that she was not informed of the identity of the parents who allegedly
complained of the corporal punishment she purportedly inflicted in school-year 1990-1991. She likewise
claimed that she was not confronted about it by private respondent ATENEO in 1991 and that it was only
two (2) years after the complaints were made that she discovered, through her students and their
parents, that ATENEO was soliciting complainants to lodge written complaints against her.
On 31 March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar Millar demanding that she be formally informed
of the complaint and be duly investigated. On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the composition of
an investigative committee organized by Fr. Oscar Millar to look into the alleged use of corporal
punishment by petitioner in disciplining her students.
Petitioner refused to take part in the investigation unless the rules of procedure laid down by the
Committee be revised, contending that the same were violative of her right to due process. Petitioner
specifically objected to the provision which forbids her counsel to participate in the investigation.
Issue:
Whether procedural due process was accorded to the petitioner in the investigation prior to her
dismissal
Held:
No. Procedural due process was not accorded to the petitioner in the investigation prior to her
dismissal.
Upon being notified of her termination, she has the right to demand compliance with the basic
requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and substantial
due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself either personally
and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and
confront face to face the witnesses against her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be
based on established facts and on a sound legal foundation. It is precisely to demand compliance with
these requirements that petitioner at the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the
rules laid down by the Investigative Committee.
The adamant refusal of the Committee to accede to this demand resulted in her failure to confront
and cross-examine her accusers. This is a serious violation of petitioner's statutory and constitutional
DIGESTED BY: URNOS, ERLIN JERMAE 42

College of Law
right to due process that ultimately vitiated the investigation. The dismissal of complainant is declared
illegal for lack of factual basis.

College of Law
Case Title: UP Board of Readents vs CA

Topic: Requisites of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
Facts:
Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and
finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.
After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed
plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists
gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.
UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she
expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean
Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach
the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against
her.
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private

respondent's doctorate degree.
The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree
recommended by the University Council.
She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was
denied by President
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification and without affording her procedural due process.
Issue:
Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive
due process.
Rulin:
No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.
Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

College of Law
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
party who
has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied
due process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submitted.
She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her
case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance
of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

MARIANO MARCOS
MARIANO STATE
MARCOS UNIVERSITY
STATE UNIVERSITY
CollegeCollege
of Lawof Law
; A.Y. 2017-2018
Case Title: MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN

GR No. / Date: 141 SCRA 437, February 28, 1986
Topic: Trial-type Proceedings; exception
Facts:
Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabuhay) is a corporation engaged in the garments
and textile import business for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government requirements for
engaging in this type of business are the export quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments
and Textile Export Board. The Board granted export quota allocations for 1983to the petitioner. The
petitioner received a letter from the Board informing it that its 1983 export quota allocations were
revoked. Furthermore, its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from engaging in
business activities involving garment and textile exports. The Bureau of Customs conducted an
investigation pursuant to the above initial findings. The petitioner moved to reconsider the revocation of
its export quota allocations and the disqualification of its officers from the export business. Commissioner
of Customs responded through a letter-comment addressed to the Board.
Petitioner filed an action for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining
order against the Board. The trial court issued a restraining order directing the Board and its officials to
desist and to stop from implementing the decision revoking the petitioner's export quota allocations and
from disqualifying its principal stockholder and officers from engaging in the textile and garment export
business. The Board moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and among others
directed the Board to issue to the petitioner within two days from service of the writ. The Board appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The appellate court modified the trial court's decision. It
affirmed all the findings of fact of the court and held that the petitioner was denied due process by the
Board when it cancelled the export quota allocations. However, the appellate court ordered the Board to
give the petitioner and its officers due hearing to determine whether or not any of its rules and
regulations had been violated as to warrant the imposition of any penalty against them. Until such
hearings were held, the petitioner's export quota allocations were to remain cancelled and its officers
suspended. This modification is now the subject of this petition. The petitioner contended that the
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered a new hearing to be conducted
unnecessarily since even without controverting evidence, the evidence on record relied upon by the
Board failed miserably to measure up to the requisite of "substantial evidence."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct.
Held:
No. The court ruled that the contention has no merit. Executive Order No. 823 provides, among
others: The GTEB shall have the following powers and functions: h. In case of violations of its rules and
DIGESTED BY: VENTURA, FHAREN 46

regulations, cancel or suspend quota allocations, export authorizations and licenses for the operation of
bonded garment manufacturing warehouses. (Sec. 2[h] Exec. Order No. 823 amended Sec. 3[h] of Exec.
Order No. 537). Likewise, under its Rules and Regulations, said Executive Order provides: Rules and
Regulations: Section III. Penalties.- Any act or misrepresentation or violation of these Rules and
Regulations shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient ground for the imposition of a fine of not more
than ten per cent (10%) of the gross FOB value of the goods exported or for a total or partial forfeiture of
the offender's Export Quota, Export Authorization and Export License and permit or temporary
disqualification from enjoying the privilege to export under all Agreements on textiles, without prejudice to
any liabilities under other applicable laws. (Sec. III, Part 111, Rules and Regulations). It is clear from the
above provisions that the respondent Board is the body charged with the function of granting export
quota allocations, issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses and revoking or cancelling the same.
Correspondingly, it is also authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether or not violations have
been committed by the grantee. The Board acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon the initial
findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the questioned order but once the basis for its action proved
non-existent, it refused to lift its erroneous and unfounded order.
However, since the Board has reason to believe that the petitioner might have violated its rules
and regulations in connection with the importation of materials for the petitioner's garment industry then it
has the discretion to conduct a proper hearing to determine the petitioner's culpability or non-culpability.
It does not have to rely on the findings of other agencies to discharge this function.
In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export
quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as
alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these
privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property
rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner
with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by
the petitioner and their families.

College of Law
Case Title: Pascual VS. Board of Medical Examiners

GR No. / Date: 28 SCRA 345, MAY 26, 1969
Topic: Right Against Self Incrimination
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner.
Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to
be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the
witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for
failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue:
Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a
criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of
property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects
as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be
used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will."

College of Law
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference
accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens.

College of Law
Case Title: Teotico vs. Agda Jr

Topic: Applicability of Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Facts:
Democrito Agda Sr. was appointed on June 16, 1984, as Chief, Fiber Industry Development
Authority by Cesar C. Lanuza, former Administrator of FIDA and was designated Acting Regional
Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. On November 13, 1987, three months before the local elections,
which was held on January 18, 1987, Agda was reassigned by former FIDA Administrator Lanuza to the
FIDA main office and designated Epitacio E. Lanuza, Jr. as officer-in-charge (OIC) of FIDA Region 1. On
December 15, 1987, Agda requested the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to stay the implementation of
Special Order No. 219. On January 7, 1988, Teotico implemented said Special Order 219, despite the
fact that Agda requested the Civil Service Commission to stop the implementation of the said Special
Order 219. On January 12, 1988, Agda requested Teotico to defer the implementation of said Special
Order No. 219. Teotico again implemented Special Order 219, requiring petitioner to submit his
accomplishment report. Agda requested Teotico to defer the implementation of said special order,
considering that the same has not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Agriculture. On December 11,
1987, former FIDA Administrator designated Wilfredo G. Siguritan as officer-in-charge of FIDA Region 1
Onn March 9, 1988, FIDA Region 1 administrator Siguritan requested the Agda through Teotico to
require Agda to turn over to him the keys of the vault in FIDA Region 1 and on March 14, 1988, Teotico
implemented Special Order No. 219, requiring Agda to turn over said keys to OIC Seguritan. On March
16, 1988, Agda requested the Secretary of Agriculture to defer the implementation of said special order
pending resolution of said office. On March 23, 1988, Teotico implemented Special Order 219 by
instituting administrative charges against Agdape for insubordination prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. On April 4, 1988, Teotico placed Agda under preventive suspension, effective April 6, 1988.
Agda requested respondent Teotico to give him twenty (20) days from April 11, 1988, within which to
submit his explanation to the formal administrative charges. Teotico granted him an extension of only five
days from receipt of memorandum. Agda sent a letter to the Commission on Elections, inquiring if
Special Order No. 219, series of 1987, of Administrator Lanuza was referred and submitted to it for
approval three days before its implementation. The Commission, informed private respondent that
records of the Department do not show that aforesaid Special Order was submitted or referred to this
Commission for approval. Agda filed with the court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with
preliminary injunction and restraining order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC.
The court granted said petition and ordered to immediately reinstate Democrito O. Agda, Sr., from his
previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, with full back wages and allowances
mandated by law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Agda was appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I.

College of Law
2. Whether or not Agda failed to exhaust administrative remedy as mandated by P. D. 807.
Held:
1. No. Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but as CHIEF FIBER
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, he was not appointed to any specific station. He was merely designated as
Acting Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I and II.
Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be tranferred or assigned to any other
place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more effectively.
Temporary appointments or appointments in an acting capacity are terminable at the pleasure of
the appointing authority. Agda can neither claim a vested right to the station to which he was assigned
nor to security of tenure thereat. Accordingly, private respondent could be re-assigned to any place and
Special Order No. 219 dated 13 November 1987 reassigning private respondent at the Office of the
Administrator of the FIDA "in the interest of the service" was in order. Although denominated as
"reassignment", it was in fact a mere detail in that office.
2. Yes. Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows
transfer, detail and re-assignment. If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification
therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the
Commission, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate
jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify the
Special Order in question with the Civil Service Commission. It does not, however, appear to that he
exerted genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof. What appears to be clear
is that he used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandum of Teotico of 7
January 1988 and the routing slip request of 11 March 1988 for the key to the safety vault.
Furthermore, even in the cases of transfer or detail within the probihited period prior to an
election, an aggrieved party is provided an appropriate administrative remedy. Again Agda made no
attempt to avail of this remedy. In his Urgent Petition to Stay Implementation and Nullify Special Order
No. 219, nothing is mentioned about a violation of the ban on transfer or detail. The reason seems too
obvious. Until he filed the Amended Petition before the court below he did not consider his re-assignment
per Special Order No. 219 as a violation of the ban on transfer or detail during the three-month period
before the election.
Not having yet fully exhausted the existing adequate administrative remedy which he already took
advantage of, Agda cannot be permitted to abandon it at his chosen time and leisure and invoke the
jurisdiction of regular courts.

MARIANO
MARIANO
MARCOS
MARCOS
STATE
STATE
UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY
CollegeCollege
of Lawof Law
Administrative
Administrative
Law ; A.Y.
Law2017-2018
; A.Y. 2017-2018
Case Title: LOPEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA

GR No. / Date: G.R. No. 127139 , February 19, 1999
Topic: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Facts:
Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
the conduct of the general revision of real property.
The revision of real property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of
Manila. Upon receipt of Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 from the Bureau of Local Government Finance
relating to the failure of most of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including the City of
Manila, to conduct the general revision of real property and after obtaining the necessary funds from the
City Council, the City Assessor began the process of general revision based on the updated fair market
values of the real properties.
The City Assessor’s Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City
Council for its appropriate action. The council then enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894 which was
approved. With the implementation of the ordinance, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was
increase hence he filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance
No. 7894 for being “unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.”
Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter, reducing by fifty percent (50%) the assessment
levels (depending on the use of property, e.g., residential, commercial) for the computation of tax
due. The new ordinance amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74, paragraph (A) of
Manila Ordinance No. 7794. Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the
controversy proceeded.
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with in the
instant case
Held:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be dispensed with the instant
case.
As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative
board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The
reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake
or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the
courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly,
but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.

“One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers which enjoins upon the
judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily within the competence of
other department. x x x
There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial
action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question
raised is purely legal, (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is
small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is
private land; and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted).
In the court’s opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of the exceptions
above-mentioned.

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MARIANO MARCOS STATE UNIVERSITY

COMPILED BY: CID | LLAGUNO | LUCERO | PANED | PETILLA

Case Title: De Villa vs City of Bacolod

DIGESTED BY: ACADEMIA, GRACE 1

Case Title: Jalandoni vs Drilon

Power of Control and Supervision

DIGESTED BY: ACADEMIA, GRACE 2

DIGESTED BY: ACADEMIA, GRACE 3

Case Title: Federation of Free Workers vs Inciong

DIGESTED BY: ANNANG, MARILYN 4

The petition is devoid of merit. .

DIGESTED BY: ANNANG, MARILYN 5

Case Title: Ople vs Torres

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

A.O No. 308 is unconstitutional.

DIGESTED BY: ANNANG, MARILYN 6

DIGESTED BY: ANNANG, MARILYN 7

Case Title: Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice

DIGESTED BY: BALTAZAR, MARJORIE 8

DIGESTED BY: BALTAZAR, MARJORIE 9

Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

DIGESTED BY: BALTAZAR, MARJORIE 10

DIGESTED BY: BALTAZAR, MARJORIE 11

Case Title: Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Garcia

DIGESTED BY: CID, CZARINA MAE 12

Case Title: Boie-Takeda Chemicals Inc. v. Hon. Dionisio De La Serna

Case Title: RMBSD v. HDMF (PAG-IBIG)

Whether or not HDMF exceeded its delegated power.

Case Title: PASEI v. Torres

Whether or not the circulars are valid.

DIGESTED BY: FLOJO, JUAN PAOLO 15

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not

As held in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to

DIGESTED BY: FLOJO, JUAN PAOLO 16

Case Title: Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs

Case Title: Lina v. Cariño

Case Title: Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

WON Jimenez was deprived of due process.

DIGESTED BY: GARCIA, EILEEN JOY 19

DIGESTED BY: GARCIA, EILEEN JOY 20

Case Title: Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights

DIGESTED BY: JACINTO, ALYSSA2 21

DIGESTED BY: JACINTO, ALYSSA 22

Case Title: Realty Exchange Venture Corporation vs. Sendino

2. Whether a decision can be rendered by OAALA- a subordinate office of the Board of

DIGESTED BY: JACINTO, ALYSSA 23

Case Title: Melendres vs COMELEC

The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a

Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a

DIGESTED BY: LLAGUNO, MYKA JOSA 24

DIGESTED BY: LLAGUNO, MYKA JOSA 25

Case Title: Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

DIGESTED BY: LUCERO, STEVE PAULO 26

DIGESTED BY: LUCERO, STEVE PAULO 27

Case Title: Republic vs Saludares

DIGESTED BY: PANED, JHEIA LINDHELLE 28

DIGESTED BY: PANED, JHEIA LINDHELLE

DIGESTED BY: PANED, JHEIA LINDHELLE

Case Title: Caña vs. Gebusion

Whether or not respondent should be dismissed from service

DIGESTED BY: PETILLA, MARIANNE SHEN 31

DIGESTED BY: PETILLA, MARIANNE SHEN 32

Case Title: SKYWORLD CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v SEC