Republic of the Philippines

UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW

University Town, Catarman, Northern Samar

CASE DIGESTS - 3 in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Submitted by:
MELINA M. GORGONIA
JD 1 – D

Submitted to:
ATTY. MICHAEL P. PECAYO
Course Lecturer

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 2

2. Romualdez v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. 152259 3

3. Estrada v Desierto GR No. 167710-15 4

4. Legarda v De Castro PET Case No. 003 6

5. Soliven v Makasiar GR No. 8287 7

6. Dominador Aytona v Andres Castillo et. al. L-19313 8

7. Roxas v Lopez 17 Scra 756 9

8. Sarmiento v Mison 150 SCRA 549 10

9. Carpio v Executive Secretary GR No. 96409 11

10. Kilusang Bayan v Dominguez 205 SCRA 92 12

11. Prof. Randolf David v Gloria Macapagal Arroyo GR No. 171396 13

12. Villena v Secretary of the Interiof 67 Phil 451 15

13. SPS Constatino et al. v Hon. Cuisa et al. GR No. 106064 16

14. Pimentel v Executive Secretary 396 Phil 623 18

15. Neri v Senate Committee on Public Accountability GR No 180643 20

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 Marcos vs. Manglapus
177 SCRA 668, September 15, 1989, CORTES, J.

FACTS:
Only around three years after President Aquino succeeded Marcos, the latter
expressed his desire to die in the Philippines on his deathbed. But, contemplating the severe
ramifications of his return to the country at a time when the government's stability is under
danger from all sides and the economy is just starting to climb and move forward, President
Aquino has decided to ban his and his family's return. The Marcoses are now attempting to
halt the enforcement of President Aquino's order, citing their constitutionally granted right to
domicile and travel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Cortes held that it would not be
accurate to state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is
head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers in here in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Although the Constitution
imposes limitations of the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what
is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.” Corollary, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. More
particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace.
The President is also tasked with “ensuring domestic tranquility.” The demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. There exists factual basis for the President’s decision. The Court cannot “pretend the
country is not besieged from within”. The catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses may
prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel’s back. With these before
her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return. Thus, the instant petition was dismissed.

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 Romualdez vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
vacate the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736 dated November
20, 2001 and March 1, 2002. Alfredo T. Romuladez was accused with a crime by
Sandiganbayan. A Motion to Dismiss is filed by Romualdez. Alfredo T. Romualdez interfered
in bad faith in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Company (BASECO), a private corporation with the majority of its stock owned by former
President Marcos, on or about July 16, 1975, and during the period from July 16 to July 29,
1975. For a sum of P5,000,000, NASSCO sold, transferred, and ceded to BASECO its
ownership, all of its titles, and interests in all facilities and equipment situated at the Engineer
Island Shops, including part of its machinery and equipment from Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte. The act is said to be a violation of RA 3019, Sec 5 (Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act, Prohibition on Certain Relatives).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Panganiban declared that the Court
has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity. Romualdez claim
that the term “intervene” is vague, but the Court says it can be easily understood through
simple statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute
will not render the law void for vagueness, if the meaning can be determined through the
judicial function of construction. Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in
their ordinary and usual meaning. The term “intervene” should therefore be understood in its
ordinary acceptation, which is “to come between.” Criminally liable is anyone covered in the
enumeration of Sec 5 of RA 3019. In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not
vague, and that in any event, the void for vagueness doctrine is not applicable to the case.
The petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed Resolutions. On the contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law
and jurisprudence. The Petition is dismissed and the questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan are affirmed.

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 Estrada vs. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, PUNO, J.

FACTS:
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo maintains she is the President, while petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada argues he is the President on leave. Although the contending personalities
are significant, the constitutional questions entwined in the parties' conflict are more
transcendental. The relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine-
style, is the central concern despite the fact that there are many critical difficulties. After the
people of EDSA urged him to step down, Petitioner Joseph Estrada declared that he would
leave the Malacaang Palace in order to facilitate a smooth transfer of power and begin the
process of healing the country, which had been riven by chaos as a result of his impeachment
trial. Nevertheless, he informed the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate in
a letter that he was temporarily unable to carry out his presidential responsibilities and that
Vice President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo should take over as Acting President.
Later, the Petitioner was accused of plunder and perjury by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The allegations against the petitioner were the subject of an investigation by a
special prosecutorial panel. As a result, the petitioner presented the Supreme Court with a
petition for prohibition. He claimed that because of his immunity from litigation, the
Ombudsman cannot bring a criminal complaint against him. He asserted that Respondent is
simply serving in an acting role and that he is still the President of the Philippines. Furthermore,
he asserted that he was not actually quitting since he was being investigated for an
impeachment trial, which is against the law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.
2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency.
3. Whether or not the Petitioner is immune from suit, and if so, up to what extent.

RULING
1. Yes, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Puno held that in a resignation,
there must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long
as the resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned from his position as
President of the Philippines. According to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final
days of the Petitioner in Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner made pronouncements
which was interpreted as intention of giving up the position such as when he proposed
a snap election where he would not be a candidate; non-defiance to the request of a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior agreement to the transfer of power with
conditions as to the state of the Petitioner and his family; and the issuance of a
statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the Presidency, for the
sake and peace and order. Hence, the resignation of the Petitioner was implied by his
actions to leave the Presidency.

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2. No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Puno declared that it is not within its
jurisdiction to review whether the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising
the Presidency for being political in nature, and addressed solely to Congress, as
provided in the Constitution. Even if the Petitioner can prove that he did not resign, the
Petitioner cannot successfully claim that he was merely on leave because Congress
recognized the Respondent as the de jure president, which cannot be reviewed by the
Court without violating the principle of separation of powers.

In this case, both Houses of Congress recognized the Respondent as the President
when they issued Resolutions to the said effect. Further, both Houses issued a
Resolution approving the selection and appoint of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as Vice-
President. Further, finally, both Houses started sending bills to be signed into law by
the Respondent. Hence, the Petitioner was not temporarily incapable to exercise the
Presidency because he resigned as President, and Houses of Congress already
recognized the legitimacy of the Respondent.

3. No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Puno held that presidential immunity
was granted only during the term of the President in order to prevent delay in actions
on important matters by the Chief Executive due to litigations that may be lodged
against him. The said immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.

In the present case, the Petitioner cannot claim that he cannot be sued before the
Ombudsman because he was immune from suit. In fact, the Petitioner cannot cite any
decision that the President has post-tenure immunity from liability. Further, the
Petitioner cannot claim that he is immune from suit because he was not convicted by
the Impeachment Court. To allow such situation will put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution, which were criminal in nature. Hence, the Petitioner is not immune from
suit. Hence, the petitions are dismissed.

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 Legarda vs. De Castro
P.E.T. CASE NO. 003, MARCH 31, 2005, QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) rejected the protester Noli L.'s application
and affirmed the jurisdiction over Loren B. Legarda's protest in a Resolution dated January
18, 2005. de Castro for its unequivocal denial. The Tribunal additionally instructed the involved
officials to take steps to protect the voting machines and electoral records that were the focus
of the complaint. On February 4, 2005, De Castro presented a motion for reconsideration
disputing the aforementioned resolution.
De Castro contends that when the accuracy of the number of votes is in question, the
ballots are the best source of evidence; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in
the certificates of canvass or election returns is a responsibility of the canvassing bodies; that
once the canvassing bodies have performed their duties, no alteration or correction of manifest
errors can be made; and that since the Tribunal's authority involves the use of judicial power
to determine the validity of the results, it is not within its power to do so. He further argues that
the manifest inaccuracies on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass cannot
be corrected by the Tribunal (COC). However, none of the parties have made the claim that
the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over issues relating to the SOVs and COCs' validity, authenticity,
or accuracy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Tribunal can re-canvass the ballots and can correct the manifest errors
in the SOVs and COCs.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Quisumbing finds no reason why the
Tribunal cannot perform this function. SC agrees that the ballots are the best and most
conclusive evidence in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of
each candidate is involved. Legarda merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is,
errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition of votes. The constitutional
function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in
the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct
manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There is no necessity, in the SC’s view, to amend the
PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional function. In the instant
protest, Legarda enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she
questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and
substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to De Castro’s title to his office.
Considering that the protest is sufficient in form and substance, the SC again stress
that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only
sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the Legarda the opportunity to prove her case
pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots,
nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest
errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, Castro’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

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 Soliven vs. Makasiar
G.R. No. 82827, November 14, 1988, PER CURIAM

FACTS:
One of the petitioners in this case is Luis Beltran. He and other people were accused
of libel by Corzaon Aquino, the president at the time. A complaint-affidavit was submitted by
Cory herself against him and others. Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit, according to
Makasiar, as doing so would revoke her right to immunity from legal action. He based his
argument on the idea that a president is immune from lawsuits. But if a president filed a lawsuit,
she would be consenting to be sued back and would also be placing herself under the court's
authority. A president may also be charged with contempt if she fails to appear in court as a
witness for herself due to her duties as president.

ISSUE:
Whether such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that the privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by
any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal
case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there
is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.

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 Dominador Aytona vs. Andres Castillo et. al.
G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962, BENGZON, C.J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Dominador Aytona was named as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank
on December 29, 1961, by outgoing President Carlos Garcia. The corresponding oath was
taken by Aytona. President-elect Diosdado Macapagal took office at noon on the same day,
and the following day, he issued Administrative Order No. 2, which recalled, withdrew, and
annulled all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. The former President
Garcia made 350 late-night or last-minute appointments in total. Andres Castillo was named
as the Central Bank's interim governor by President Macapagal on January 1. Aytona filed a
case (quo warranto) against Castillo, arguing that since he had been legitimately appointed,
Castillo's subsequent appointment by the new President should be regarded as null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 “midnight” appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Bengzon held that after the
proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration
was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to
know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use
powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail
himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may
undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned
induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogative, the steps
taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness
and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make
the corresponding appointments. Hence, the court dismissed the action.

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 Roxas vs. Lopez
G.R. No. L-25716, July 28, 1966, CONCEPCION, C.J.

FACTS:
In the 1965 presidential elections, Fernando Lopez, the petitioner, and Gerardo Roxas,
the respondent, ran for vice president. With 3,531,550 votes, Lopez defeated the respondent,
who received 3,504,826, by a margin of 26,724 votes. Before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, Roxas appealed his defeat. RA 1793 established the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET).
A losing candidate would essentially have the option to challenge his defeat. Lopez
criticized the law and requested an injunction against Roxas and the PET from continuing the
lawsuit. Lopez claimed that because the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) was not
included in the constitution, it was unconstitutional. Additionally, any PET decision cannot be
legitimately appealed before the Supreme Court, and there may be a dispute whenever a PET
decision is appealed before the Supreme Court because the PET is made up of the Chief
Justice and the other 10 Supreme Court justices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Conception held that
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional. Pursuant to Article 8, Section 1 of the
constitution “the judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may
be established by law.” In this case, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the
Supreme Court. Such is within its power; the Constitution allowed Congress to determine
which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice
President. RA 1793did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution.
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in
the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but
“the” judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said
power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as
the power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members
of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental
law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Thus, the petition herein was dismissed and the writs therein prayed for was denied,
accordingly.

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 Sarmiento vs. Mison
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987, PADILLA, J.

FACTS:
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, two taxpayers and attorneys, filed this petition
for prohibition in an effort to prevent respondent Salvador Mison from carrying out the duties
of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and prevent Secretary of the
Department of Budget from making payments for Mison's wages and benefits on the grounds
that Mison's appointment to that position is in violation of the Constitution. On the other hand,
the respondents uphold the legality of Mison's appointment without the approval of the
Commission on Appointments. Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution of 1987 is the
relevant constitutional provision.
The Commission on Appointments also intervened in this case and emphasized the
third sentence of the aforementioned provision, contending that since a law is required to vest
the appointment of lower-ranking officers in the sole discretion of the President, this implies
that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranking officers must be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is the case, as to
lower-ranking officers, it follows that higher-ranking officers

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from
Commission on Appointment is valid.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Padilla held that under the 1987
Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that needed confirmation
from the Commission on Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President
shall appoint: Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or
consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution.
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the
President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those which
does not require approval from COA: All other Officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law; Those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone. Henceforth, the petition and petition in intervention
were dismissed.

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 Carpio vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992, PARAS, J.
FACTS:
The "Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department
of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes" (Republic Act No. 6975) was
enacted by the Congress. The Philippine police were transferred by this law from the Philippine
Armed Forces to the DILG. In his capacity as a lawyer and defender of the Constitution,
Antonio Carpio questioned the legitimacy of the law. It only affects the president's ability to
exercise control because it lessens his or her authority as commander in chief, he claimed.
Carpio also argued that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
by limiting its authority over the Philippine National Police (PNP) to "administrative control,"
meaning that "control" remained in the hands of the Department Secretary, who oversaw both
the NAPOLCOM and the PNP, and that the system of letting local executives choose local
police chiefs also reduces the president's authority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president renounced its Commander-in-Chief power over the PNP
and NAPOLCOM by virtue of RA 6975.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Paras held that the PNP and the
NAPOLCOM are not under the Commander-in-Chief Power of the President. They are under
the President’s control power and power of supervision. So, there is no abdication to speak
of. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a
corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Moreover,
the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG
is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP
being in large part subsidized by the national government.
The local chief executives choosing local police chiefs is also constitutional. Under the
law, the local chief executives in choosing local police chiefs are acting so as representatives
of the NAPOLCOM. The NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President. Hence, in no way
does the law undermine the President’s power if the local chief executives choose local police
chiefs. Hence, instant petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

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 Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez
205 SCRA 92, January 13, 1992, DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
The petitioners dispute the legality of the directive issued by the then-secretary of
agriculture, Hon. Carlos Dominguez issued an order directing the Department of Agriculture
to assume control of the petitioner, Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM), in accordance with the
Department's statutory authority to regulate and oversee businesses under Section 8 of P.D.
The dissolution of the Board of Directors, Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13 and Executive
Order No. 175 as amended; the transfer of all assets, properties, and records of the
KBMBPM's Management Committee; the formation of a Management Committee that will take
over the organization's management upon receiving the order. The exordium of said Order
unmistakably states that its foundation is the purported petition of the general membership of
the KBMBPM asking the Department for assistance in the removal of the Board of Directors
members who were not chosen by the cooperative's general membership and that the ongoing
financial and management audit by the Department of Agriculture auditors demonstrates that
the management of the KBMBPM is not running that cooperative. Additionally, it is stated there
that the Department issued the Order in the course of exercising its regulatory and oversight
authority under Section 8 of P.D. Executive Order No. 113's Section 4 and Public Law 115–
175, as modified.

ISSUE:
Whether of not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is unconstitutional.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Davide Jr. held that the Regulation
34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 provides the procedure for the removal of directors or
officers of cooperatives. A substantially identical provision was also found in Section 17, Article
III of the KBMPM’s by-laws. Moreover, under the same article are found the requirements for
the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly. Indubitably
them, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity toe be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot
be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. The Secretary of
Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are
authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors. He cannot take refuge under Section 8
of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This
section does not give him that right. An administrative officer has only such power as are
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers
should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.

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 Prof. Randolf David vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS:
President Arroyo signed PP 1017, which was put into effect by G.O., on February 24,
2006, the day the country of the Philippines commemorated the 20th anniversary of the EDSA
People Power. Declaring a national emergency is option no. 5. When presenting the factual
foundations for PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 respondents claimed that a conspiracy between some
military officers, leftist NPA rebels, and some members of the political opposition in a scheme
to depose or assassinate President Arroyo was the primary cause of the executive issuances.
They viewed the plot to assassinate or remove the President and seize power as a clear and
present danger.
David and Llamas, petitioners, were detained without warrants on their way to EDSA
on February 24, 2006. Around 1:00 A.M., a warrantless search of the Daily Tribune's
headquarters took place because it was thought to be anti-Arroyo. at 25 February 2006.
Several publications-ready items were taken from the premises. The law enforcers, a
combined team of PNP and AFP officers, cited Presidential Proclamation 1017, issued by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress unlawful violence, as the justification
for the warrantless arrests, the warrantless search, and the warrantless seizure.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to
PP 1017, valid?
2. Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

RULING:
1. No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez held that the
warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were not
valid. Searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by
a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and Neither of the
provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s
warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation
that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their
erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently,
the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency

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 of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and
even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez held that the
warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant
to PP 1017 was not valid. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays
down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search
of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And
Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. Thus, the petitions are partly granted.

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 Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior
G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939, LAUREL, J.

FACTS:
This is an initial action of prohibition with a request for a preliminary injunction against
the Secretary of the Interior to stop him and his representatives from carrying out the planned
investigation of the petitioner, mayor Jose D. Villena, until this issue is resolved by this court.
The petition for a preliminary injunction was rejected, but the respondent was obliged to
respond. On the Secretary of the Interior's request, the Department of Justice's Division of
Investigation looked into the actions of Villena, the mayor of Makati, Rizal. As a consequence,
Villena was found to have engaged in bribery, extortion, intentional abuse of power, and illegal
practice of law. The President of the Philippines verbally agreed to the respondent's
recommendation to suspend Villena. The Secretary then removed Villena from her position.
Villena requested a preliminary injunction against the Secretary in order to stop the
investigation from being conducted by the Secretary and his agents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction to suspend and order
investigation over Villena.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Laurel held that the Secretary of
Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the power to
order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was
given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted
in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive
supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions.
This supervision covers the power to order investigation because supervision “implies
authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render power real and effective.
”However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not
provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to
suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the
provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded
the Secretary of Interior. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the
acts of the department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of
the President.” The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the
heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the
President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the
departments are assistants and agents of the President. Therefore, the petition was
dismissed.

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 SPS Constatino et al. v Hon. Cuisa et al.
G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005, TINGA, J.

FACTS:
This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus challenges the validity of the
contracts in question, which were signed in accordance with the 1992 Philippine
Comprehensive Financing Program. It wants to prevent respondents from putting those
contracts into action in any other debt relief agreements. Additionally, it requests that the Court
issue a directive ordering the Secretary of Justice to file criminal and administrative charges
against respondents for actions that violate or contradict the terms of Art. Constitution Article
XII.
Plaintiffs are taxpayers in the lawsuit. Respondents were members of the Philippine
Debt Negotiating Team, who, in accordance with the Philippine Comprehensive Financing
Program of 1992, negotiated debt reduction agreements on behalf of the Republic with its
foreign commercial bank debtors (the Program). The Program's goal is to decrease the burden
on Filipino taxpayers through managing the nation's foreign debt issue. Parts of the country's
prior loans were cancelled through either a debt repurchase or a bond conversion. While the
bond conversion scheme extinguished public debts by obtaining a new loan through the
issuance of sovereign bonds, the proceeds of which were then used to terminate the original
loan, the buyback approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts.
The constitutionality of the debt-relief arrangements is contested by the petitioners.
They allege, among other things, that the repurchase and bond conversion plans are neither
"loans"191 nor "guarantees" envisaged therein, and that the debt-relief arrangements go
beyond the President's authority to borrow money abroad under Article VII, Section 20 of the
Constitution. Foreign loans may be arranged under RA 245 in the form of, among other things,
bonds. Contrarily, RA 240 expressly grants the President the authority to preterminate debts
without additional action from Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the buyback and bond conversion schemes beyond the foreign
borrowing powers of the President?

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Judge Tinga held that the language of the
Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee
foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions
as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. The only restriction the
Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the
loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this case, the bond conversion scheme
is authorized by RA 245, and the buyback scheme by RA 240. The buyback scheme is neither
a guarantee nor a loan—so petitioners argue—but it is a necessarily implied power which
springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power. The President is not empowered to
borrow money from foreign banks and govts on credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of
authority to implement the payment despite appropriation therefor. It is inescapable from the

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standpoint of reason and necessity that the authority to contract foreign loans and guarantees
without restrictions on payment or manner thereof coupled with the availability of the
corresponding appropriations, must include the power to effect payments or to make payments
unavailing by either restructuring the loans or even refusing to make any payment altogether.
The court declared that petitioners have not sufficiently established any basis for it to declare
the acts of respondents as unconstitutional. Thus, the petition was dismissed.

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 Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. NO. 158088, July 6, 2005, PUNO, J.

FACTS:
The Conditional Cash Transfer Program was implemented by the government's
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as a way to combat poverty (CCT).
The National Statistical Coordination Board (NCSB) classifies the poorest provinces as priority
target areas. Eligible households chosen from these areas are given health assistance of
P500.00/month, or P6,000.00/year, and educational assistance of P300.00/month for 10
months, or a total of P3,000.00/year, for each child, with a cap of three children per family
(assuming that they qualify based on the conditions set by the DSWD). The administrative
order that DSWD issued explained the procedures for putting the CCT into effect. The
establishment of an inter-agency network with the Department of Social and Welfare (DSWD),
the Department of Health (DOH), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), and other
Local Government Units is one of its requirements (LGUs). In fact, a memorandum of
understanding outlining the responsibilities of each party in carrying out the CCT was signed
by the DSWD and the LGUs. Congress provided funding for the CCT through the yearly
General Appropriations Act to ensure its success (GAA). It received 298 million pesos in 2009,
5 billion pesos in 2010, and a whopping 10 billion pesos in 2011.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of the CCT by the DSWD can be considered a
"recentralization" which is a violation of local autonomy.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Puno declared that the
implementation of the CCT by the DSWD cannot be considered a "recentralization" which is
a violation of local autonomy. The power to implement programs funded by the national
government is reserved in the Local Government Code. Section 17of the Local Government
Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services. This is in line with the state policy of making Local Governments self-reliant
communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals. While such provision
charges the LGUs to take the responsibilities devolved from national agencies, the same
section provides an exception regarding nationally funded projects, facilities, programs, and
services. The import of this express reservation under Section 17 (c) is that unless the LGU
has been designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual GAA. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the delivery of these basic services is done within the jurisdiction
of these LGUs. The purpose of local autonomy is to break the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of the LGUs. Local autonomy is not designed to create mini-states
imperium et imperio. The nature of the relationship between the national government and the
LGUs is that of integration and coordination. The national government has not completely
relinquished its authority over local governments. to enable the country to develop as a whole,
the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and

18
Congress. To yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit as to
preclude any and all involvement by the national government in programs implemented in the
local level would be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would
amount to a decentralization of power, which is beyond the constitutional concept of
autonomy. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

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 Neri v Senate Committee on Public Accountability
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Senate Committees submitted a move for reconsideration of the court's
decision from March 25, 2008, in which Romulo Neri was found in contempt of court for
refusing to respond to three specific questions about the contentious ZTE-NBN deal.
According to the Court, the three questions' elicited conversations are protected by the
presidential communications privilege, making the respondents' contempt order invalid.
Respondents now claim that the data obtained from the three questions is required for them
to carry out their legislative duties.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the
three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Leonardo-De Castro recognizes
respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However,
the Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is
validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose
of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of
mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance.
The jurisprudential test laid down by the Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that
the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege. The presumption in favor of
Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to
overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited
by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft
legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the
exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate
bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said
information sought by the three (3) questions. The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3)
questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy
endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the
President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform.
The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or
wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as
the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

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