FACULTY OF DEFENSE STUDIES AND MANAGEMENT

BACHELOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES (2ZP44)

SEMESTER MARCH 2023 - SEPTEMBER 2023

DSS 3403
PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

NON-WESTERN THOERY OF WAR: MAO TZE DONG HAVE ESTABLISHED A

THEORY OF “THREE STAGES OF INSURGENCY”. HOW THIS THEORY HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO MAO’S SUCCESS

NO. NAME MATRIC ID

1 MUHAMAD AZNAN BIN KAMARUDDIN 2210582
2 HENDRY LEAGGA ANAK MATHEW 2210576
3 FREDYNO BIN ASOI@ASRI 2210585
4 MOHD RASZIWAN BIN ABDUL RASID 2210565

PREPARED FOR: ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DR COLONEL ABDUL LATIF BIN

HARUN (RETIRED)

SUBMISSION DATE: 23rd NOVEMBER 2022

 INTRODUCTION

THE THREE THEORY MAO TZE DUNG’S STAGES OF THE INSURGENCY

HOW THE THEORY CONTRIBUTED TO MAO’S SUCCESS?

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF CONTENT

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INTRODUCTION.

In article Also Known as: Mao Tse-Tung written by Stuart Reynolds Schram, Mao
Zedong also spelled Mao Tse-tung, who was a Chinese communist revolutionary and the
founding father of the People's Republic of China. He was born on December 26, 1893, and
died on September 9, 1976.Mao Zedong played a significant role in the Chinese Communist
Party and led the party to victory in the Chinese Civil War against the Nationalist Party. He
established the People's Republic of China in 1949 and served as the Chairman of the
Communist Party of China until his death.

During his time in power, Mao implemented various policies and campaigns that had
profound and far-reaching effects on China. Some of his notable initiatives include the Great
Leap Forward, an economic and social campaign aimed at rapidly industrializing China, and
the Cultural Revolution, a political movement aimed at reasserting communist ideology and
removing perceived capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society.

Mao Zedong's leadership was characterized by his authoritarian style and the cult of
personality that surrounded him. His policies had mixed results, with some successes and
significant failures. The Great Leap Forward, for example, led to widespread famine and
economic setbacks, resulting in millions of deaths. The Cultural Revolution caused social
upheaval and political persecution, disrupting China's education system, economy, and
society.

While Mao Zedong is revered by many as a founding father of modern China and a
symbol of Chinese communism, his legacy remains highly debated. His leadership and
policies have been subject to both criticism and praise, and his impact on China and the world
is still a topic of discussion among historians, scholars, and political observers (Julia Lovell,
2019).

Mao Zedong's theory of insurgency, known as "Maoist guerrilla warfare" or

"protracted people's war," was a key component of his revolutionary strategy. It involved
protracted resistance, mobilizing the masses, utilizing guerrilla tactics, establishing base
areas, and emphasizing unity and discipline. This theory played a crucial role in the success
of the Chinese Communist Party in their struggle against the Nationalist Party, leading to the

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establishment of the People's Republic of China. Finally, Mao’s the three theory stages of
insurgency are strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive.

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THE THREE THEORY MAO TZE DUNG’S STAGES OF THE INSURGENCY.

The first stage of insurgency is the strategic defensive. During this stage, the insurgent
forces focus on establishing and consolidating base areas as the foundation of their
operations. These base areas serve as safe havens where the insurgents can regroup, recruit
new members, and train their forces. They also provide a logistical infrastructure for
sustaining the insurgency. According to Samuel B. Griffith (2000), The primary objective in
this stage is to avoid direct confrontations with the enemy's main forces, which are often
superior in terms of firepower and resources. Instead, the insurgents employ tactics such as
hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and harassment to weaken the enemy and protect their own
forces. By maintaining a defensive posture, the insurgents conserve their strength and build
up their capabilities for future stages.

The second stage is the strategic stalemate. In this stage, the insurgents aim to prolong
the conflict and engage in a war of attrition against the enemy. They understand that they
may not have the immediate military strength to defeat the enemy decisively. Therefore, the
goal is to create a situation where the enemy becomes exhausted, both in terms of resources
and morale. Lenin (2002) explains that the insurgents continue to employ guerrilla tactics,
conducting ambushes, raids, and sabotage operations to disrupt the enemy's control and
spread their own influence. By constantly harassing the enemy and avoiding direct
engagements, the insurgents force the enemy to commit significant resources to counter the
insurgency. This drains the enemy's physical and mental strength, while the insurgents seek
to preserve their own. Over time, the insurgents strive to shift the balance of power in their
favor, gradually eroding the enemy's control and gaining popular support.

The third and final stage is the strategic offensive. In this stage, the insurgents
transition from guerrilla warfare to larger-scale conventional operations. Having weakened
the enemy and built up their own capabilities, the insurgents are now ready to take the
offensive. The focus shifts from avoiding direct confrontations to actively seeking and
engaging the enemy's main forces. The insurgent forces launch a decisive campaign aimed at
defeating the enemy's main forces, capturing cities and key strategic locations, and ultimately
seizing power. Samuel (2000) claimed this stage requires careful planning, coordination, and
execution of military operations. The insurgents leverage their popular support, use the
element of surprise, and exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy's forces. Lenin (2002) stated,

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by conducting successful offensives, the insurgents aim to establish a new political order and
consolidate their control over the territory.

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HOW THE THEORY CONTRIBUTED TO MAO’S SUCCESS?.
Strategic Defensive (1927-1937)

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was compelled to flee to the countryside in
the wake of the failed urban uprisings and its break from the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)
in 1927, this stage got underway. Mao concentrated his efforts at this time on strengthening
the party's support among the peasants and establishing a rural revolutionary foundation. He
placed a strong emphasis on the agricultural revolution, land redistribution, and the creation
of bases like to the Soviet Union. The main goal was to establish a safe and secure rural base
from which the party could increase its power and develop an army.

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was compelled to flee to the countryside in
the wake of the failed urban uprisings and its break from the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)
in 1927, this stage got underway. Mao concentrated his efforts at this time on strengthening
the party's support among the peasants and establishing a rural revolutionary foundation. He
placed a strong emphasis on the agricultural revolution, land redistribution, and the creation
of bases like to the Soviet Union. The main goal was to establish a safe and secure rural base
from which the party could increase its power and develop an army.

Finally, Mao's army will try to defend and maintain the base area from government
attacks. Mao believed that such a move was essential to the success of the rebellion, as it
allowed the rebels to maintain their safe haven and continue to build their strength. Because
of his emphasis on gaining popular support, Mao was able to mobilize and incorporate the
Chinese peasantry into the revolution.

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Strategic Stalemate (1937-1945)

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), which saw the CCP team up with the
Nationalist government to thwart the Japanese invasion, also occurred during this phase. Mao
understood that the Nationalist troops had been weakened by the Japanese occupation, which
had allowed the CCP to gain power. The CCP grew its military might during this time, in
addition to continuing to construct and solidify its base regions. Mao's approach of waging a
protracted people's war, using guerilla tactics, and earning the support of the rural populace
worked well in thwarting Japanese soldiers and undermining the Nationalist government.

During the strategic stalemate stage, Mao realized the importance of shifting from
guerilla warfare to a more mobile approach. With this development, Communist troops were
able to widen their operations, engage in protracted warfare, and put more pressure on the
opposition. The use of hit-and-run techniques by communist soldiers, which allowed them to
conduct strikes against opposition forces and infrastructure while avoiding direct battle, is
critical at this stage. These techniques are intended to make the opponent less successful at
dominating the region by disturbing their operations and reducing their influence over it
(Johnson, R. B., 2012).

Franceschini, I., & Sorace, C (2022) said that during strategic stalemates, Mao
emphasised the value of mobility and flexibility. Communist forces were difficult to detect
and target due to their avoidance of fixed positions and constant movement. Because of their
mobility, they can choose advantageous battlefields and exploit flaws in enemy deployments.
Mao also pushed for encircling and isolating opposing forces. The Communist troops might
weaken and demoralize opponent units by encircling them and cutting off their supply routes.
This technique imposed pressure on the adversary, interrupted their communication and
supplies, and made it difficult for them to maintain their activities over time.

Gin, C. M. (2016) said that the strategic stalemate stage also included the
consolidation and growth of Communist troops and influence. The following aspects entail
consolidating and strengthening the base regions developed during the strategic defense
stage. This base location provided a safe haven for Communist forces, allowing them to
reorganize, relax, and replenish supplies. They also serve as administrative centers for the
local populace, offering government and social services. As communist troops gained

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strength, their influence spread beyond the base areas. They intended to infiltrate and garner
support in other places, eventually expanding their power and influence over additional land.
This extension aided the revolution's general momentum and placed pressure on the enemy.

The strategic stalemate allowed Mao to concentrate on recruiting and training new
forces. Communist forces increased their numbers by including local insurgents, volunteers,
and other potential allies. A training program was established to improve the skills and
capacity of warriors, thereby strengthening the Communist army. As the Communist forces
grew stronger, their influence grew beyond the base area. Based on a Youtube video by in
His Joyful Service (2017), they intended to infiltrate and gain support elsewhere, eventually
increasing their power and influence over new territories. This growth helped the general
momentum of the revolution and put more pressure on the enemy.

According to Summers, H. J. (1979), similar concepts and methods have been used in
the past in similar circumstances, such as the Vietnam War (1955–1975), which is analogous
to Mao's strategy. Maoist-inspired strategies were used by the Viet Cong, a communist
guerilla force in South Vietnam. To defeat the better-equipped American and South
Vietnamese forces, they used ambushes, hit-and-run strategies, and local support. The
Vietnam War showed the potential of insurgency and the ability of a determined guerrilla
force to confront and ultimately overcome a superior conventional army.

As said by Greentree, T (2016), it was also utilised in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–
1989), when Afghan opposition organisations generally known as the Mujahideen deployed
guerrilla warfare strategies very similar to those advocated by Mao. In order to repel the
Soviet invasion, they used ambushes, hit-and-run tactics, and a decentralised command
system. The final retreat of Soviet forces was greatly aided by the Mujahideen's capacity to
maintain a lengthy struggle, hang on to isolated and mountainous areas, and weaken Soviet
control.

Mao's theory of strategic stalemate led to his victory by moving to mobile warfare,
encircling and isolating opposing forces, and consolidating and increasing their influence.

These tactics and techniques allowed the Communist forces to weaken their opponents,
strengthen their own strength, and ultimately tilt the balance of power in their favor.

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Ultimately, this stage set the stage for a successful strategic offensive, which led to the
Communist victory in 1949.

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Strategic Offensive (to end the conflict) (1945–1949)

According to Staudenmaier (1977), with the end of World War II and Japan's
capitulation in 1945, the stage was prepared for the last drive to triumph. The CCP and the
Nationalist government resumed open combat during this time. Mao's armies began a series
of military offensives known as the "Liberation War," attempting to capture control of
important towns and provinces. The China Communist Party used a combination of
conventional and guerilla warfare methods, bolstering peasant support and capitalizing on the
Nationalists' weaknesses, including corruption and lack of public support. The China
Communist Party won substantial military successes and earned extensive popular support,
resulting in the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

Thomas (2014) said during this period, the CCP conducted a series of significant
military offensives known as the "Liberation War" in order to regain control of important
towns and provinces. The Huai-Hai Campaign, the Liaoshen Campaign, and the Pingjin
Campaign were among the most important. These offensives attempted to weaken and
ultimately destroy Nationalist troops, push them out of strategically key areas, and increase
the CCP's territorial authority.

As said by Coon (1977), the CCP used a mix of conventional and guerilla combat
techniques. While the Nationalists possessed a larger and better-equipped conventional force,
the CCP capitalised on its skills in guerilla warfare and rural mobilisation. Mao's emphasis on
"people's war" meant that CCP soldiers blended in with the local populace, acquired their
sympathy, and utilised hit-and-run guerilla tactics to harass and degrade Nationalist troops.

During this time, the Nationalist government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, faced
numerous severe problems. The Nationalists' legitimacy had been damaged by widespread
corruption, incompetence, and a loss of public support. The CCP exploited these flaws by
portraying itself as a more disciplined, efficient, and responsive alternative. It earned
popularity by resolving peasants' land concerns, advocating social changes, and providing
basic services and security in regions under its control.

Land reform was a crucial component of the CCP's policy during the strategic
offensive stage. Mao's concept of agricultural revolution and land redistribution resonated

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with China's rural populace, which represented the majority. The CCP gained widespread
support from rural areas by transferring land from landowners to peasants. This support not
only supplied the party with a social basis, but also secured a continual supply of recruits for
its armed units (Castelli et al, 2020).

Bingham K (2008) said that the Nationalist troops saw a quick fall and collapse
during the strategic offensive stage. The CCP's military triumphs, along with the Nationalists'
weakening due to corruption, internal splits, and lack of popular support, resulted in a
succession of decisive wins for the CCP. As more Nationalist troops and officials defected or
surrendered to the CCP, the Nationalists' strength and morale deteriorated, eventually
contributing to their withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949.

By the end of the strategic offensive stage, the CCP had consolidated authority over
the majority of mainland China, and on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the People's
Republic of China formally formed. The Final Stage heralded the effective fulfilment of
Mao's insurgency theory, with the CCP defeating Nationalist troops and drastically changing
China's political environment.

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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the theory which have been established by Mao Tze Dung which are
the three stages of insurgency have contributed a lot towards his success to gain
independence for China.

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