CIVIL LAW 1/ Atty.

Al Jumrani
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2022 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAM QUESTIONS PART 1

1. Noel is the son of spouses Marie and Benedict. Benedict has passed away. For Noel’s 7 th birthday, his
paternal grandparents offered to organize and pay for his birthday party. In coordination with Marie, the
grandparents booked the party venue, signed the contracts with the caterer and the entertainers, finalized
the guest list, and paid all amounts due. Marie promised to them to bring Noel to the party. A week before
the scheduled birthday party, Marie decided that she would not bring Noel to the party, and that she would
instead take him on an out-of-town trip on the day of the party. Marie could not forget that her parents-in-
law initially opposed Benedict’s marriage to her because she was a former burlesque dancer. Marie did not
notify the grandparents of her plan to skip the birthday party. During the party, the grandparents kept trying
to get in touch with her but she ignored all their calls. The grandparents and the guests who went to the
party were very dismayed that Noel was not present. When the grandparents asked Marie why she did not
bring Noel to the party, she simply replied, “I am his mother, and I decide where he goes!” To which, Noel’s
grandmother retorted, “Anak mo lang s’ya! Hindi mo s’ya pag-aari!” The grandparents seek your advice on
whether there is legal basis to hold Marie liable for the damages that they have suffered as a result of her
acts.
What is your advice? Explain briefly. (5 points)
Yes, there is legal basis to hold Marie liable for damages.
Under the Civil Code, there is an abuse of right when a right, although legal, is exercised in a malicious,
wanton and unjust manner. When the act is contrary to law or morals, an action for damages is proper.
In this case, Marie may have the right to decide for her son, Noel, including whether to attend the birthday
party. However, Marie had already promised to bring Noel to the party which his paternal grandparents
organized and paid for. Instead of bringing Noel as promised, she took Noel on an out of town trip impelled
by her grudge against her parents in law for initially opposing their son's marriage to her.
Thus, Marie abused her right and should be liable for damages to the grandparents.
2. Razna and Junsi got married in 2015 and were blessed with two children, Zarah and Mica. In 2020,
because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the entire family had to spend 24 hours together every day in their
small house. Razna observed that although Junsi continued to work from home to support the family, he
began to exhibit paranoia, and constantly kept making sure that they always washed their hands and
rubbed them with alcohol ten times before eating. Junsi also always wore a face mask, face shield and
hazmat in the house, except when he was alone in the room. Junsi began sleeping separately from Razna
and their children. He believed that other people who wanted to meet him in person were actively trying
to harm him by exposing him to the virus. In early 2022, Razna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Junsi on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code,
citing his atypical behavior. She presented the testimony of a doctor, who proved that Junsi was suffering
from psychotic paranoia due to intense stress, which accounted for his belief in things that are not real.
Should Razna’s petition be granted? Explain briefly. (5 points)
No, Razna's petition should not be granted.

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According to law and jurisprudence, for psychological incapacity to be a ground for nullity of marriage, it
must be of such character that it is grave, incurable and must have juridical antecedence. It must also render
the concerned spouse utterly incapable of comprehending and performing essential marital obligations.
In this case, Junzi's condition may be considered erratic or atypical. But it does not relate to his marital
obligations. In fact, despite of his mental state, he is still able to work from home to support his family.
Hence, the petition should be denied.
3. Before they married in 2000, Nonoy and Daday signed a marriage settlement wherein they agreed that
their property relations as husband and wife would be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. While
the marriage was subsisting, they acquired a parcel of land using conjugal funds. The Register of Deeds issued
a transfer certificate of title over the said land in the name of “Nonoy, married to Daday”. Nonoy sold the
parcel of land to Barby without Daday’s consent. Daday was not aware of the sale and did not sign the
contract of sale. A year after Nonoy and Barby signed the contract of sale, Daday died. When the children of
Nonoy and Daday learned about the sale to Barby, they questioned its validity since Daday had not
consented to the sale. Nonoy’s position is that Daday’s consent was not required because the property was
registered in his name.
Is the sale to Barby valid? Explain briefly. (5 points)
No, the sale to Barby is invalid.
Under the Family Code, in a conjugal partnership of gains, all property acquired during the marriage, whether
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, shall be presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Furthermore, the phrase "married to" in the certificate of title indicates the civil status
of the registered owner. When the property is conjugal, any disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse (or authority of the court) shall be void.
In this case, the title to the land indicates that the owner is married. Moreover, the property was acquired
using conjugal funds. The sale should have been with Daday's written consent.
Hence, there being no written consent from Daday, Nonoy's sale of the parcel of land to Barby is void
4. [This item has two questions.] In 2013, Agaton, then 70 years old, executed a will wherein he bequeathed
his entire estate to his acknowledged illegitimate son Karl. Agaton entrusted the original copy of the 2013
will to Karl. In 2014, Karl joined a group of mercenaries to fight in Crimea alongside the Russians. After
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Karl did not return to the Philippines and was never heard of. Five years later,
in 2019, Agaton executed a codicil which provided the following: “Because of the death of Karl, I revoke my
2013 will. I hereby recognize Gian as my other illegitimate son, and hereby bequeath to him my entire
estate.” Agaton died in 2020. During the probate of Agaton’s 2019 codicil, Karl appeared in court, presented
the 2013 will, contested the validity of its revocation, opposed the probate of the 2019 codicil, and sought
the probate of the 2013 will. Both the 2013 will and 2019 codicil were immaculate as to form.
(a) Did the 2019 codicil revoke the 2013 will? Explain briefly.
Yes, the 2019 codicil revoked the 2013 will.
As a rule, the revocation of a will must be based on a true cause and if the revocation is based on a false or
illegal cause, the revocation shall be null and void. Moreover, as a rule, a person may be presumed dead
after an absence of four years if he or she is a member of the armed forces who has taken part in war.
In this case, Agaton revoked the will due to his belief that Karl was already dead because he had been absent
for more than five years since participating in the war in Crimea. Agaton's belief that Karl was already dead
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is valid and legal. Karl's subsequent reappearance did not make Agaton's cause for revoking the will false or
illegal.
Hence, the 2019 will should prevail over the 2013 will
(b) Distribute the estate of Agaton. Explain briefly.
The estate should be divided equally between Karl and Gian.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition or omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs. If there are no devisees and legacies, full intestacy shall apply.
In this case, Karl is a compulsory heir in the direct line, being an illegitimate child of Agaton. Gian's institution
as voluntary heir to the entire estate shall be annulled and the estate will be distributed by intestacy. Here,
Karl and Gian are the only compulsory heirs.
Hence, Agaton's entire estate (free portion and legitime) shall be divided equally between Karl and Gian.
5. Joey was the legitimate son of Ron and May. Joey died intestate and was survived by his wife Kathy and
their two legitimate children, Luis and Clarisse. Several months after Joey died, Ron also died intestate. Ron
was survived by his wife May, daughter Mercy (full-sibling of Joey), and the children of Joey (Luis and
Clarisse).
Distribute the estate of Ron. Explain briefly. (5 points)
Ron's estate shall be divided among his wife May, Mercy and Joey's children Luis and Clarisse.
Under the Civil Code, by intestacy, the compulsory heirs are the wife and the legitimate children. In case of
predecease of any of the compulsory heirs, the children of said heirs shall be raised and shall inherit by way
of representation. The wife of a deceased compulsory heir cannot represent.
In this case, Ron was survived by his wife May and his daughter Mercy. His son Joey had predeceased Ron
but is survived by his two children Luis and Clarisee. Luis and Clarisse shall equally divide what Joey would
have received.
Hence, Ron's estate shall be divided by three: one portion for May, another portion for Mercy and the last
portion to Luis and Clarisse per stirpes.
6. [This item has two questions.] Jungkook, who owns a building, leases the same to Gel with the following
terms: (i) the lease is for a period of ten years; (ii) the yearly rental is Php 1,200,000.00 payable within the
first ten days of the current year; and (iii) in case of breach of any of the provisions of the lease, Gel is liable
to pay Jungkook five monthly rentals and attorney’s fees. Five years into the lease, Gel sends a notice to
terminate the lease and offers to pay five monthly rentals. Despite Jungkook’s objections, Gel vacates the
premises. Jungkook sues Gel for the rentals due for the remaining five years of the lease. Gel takes the
position that her liability should only be limited to five monthly rentals and attorney’s fees.
(a) Is there a penalty clause in the lease agreement? Explain briefly
Yes, there is a penalty clause in the lease agreement.
Under the Civil Code, a penalty is a stipulation for damages in case of breach of the contract. It may be
claimed by the creditor without need of proof of actual and other damages.
In this case, Jungkook and Gel stipulated in their contract that in case of breach of any provision of the lease,
Gel is liable to pay Jungkook five monthly rentals and attorney's fees. Thus, a penalty clause was agreed by
the parties.
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(b) As between Jungkook and Gel, who is correct? Explain briefly. (5 points
Gel is correct
Under the law, when a contract is breached, the creditor is entitled to sue for performance or rescission,
with damages in either case. The damages may be that which may be proved or that which may be agreed
upon by the parties as penalty or liquidated damages.
In this case, there was a breach of the contract, particularly the term of the contract, as Gel had pre-
terminated it. Jungkook's options were limited to the penalty clause of their contract. Instead of the right to
sue on the full rental for a year, the agreement restricted him to recover and Gel to pay five monthly rentals
only and attorney's fees. Thus. Gel is correct that her liability should be limited to five monthly rentals and
attorney's fees
7. Brenda saw the online advertisement of Evelyn, who sells limited edition sneakers. Through an exchange
of text messages, Evelyn and Brenda agreed that: (i) Evelyn will sell to Brenda a pair of brand-new sneakers
for Php 25,000.00; (ii) Brenda will deposit the purchase price in Evelyn’s bank account; and (iii) Evelyn will
deliver the sneakers within ten days from deposit. Brenda deposited the purchase price and Evelyn
acknowledged receipt thereof. Before the delivery of the sneakers, Evelyn received an offer from Rosela to
buy the same sneakers for Php 35,000.00. Evelyn candidly tells Brenda that she is selling the sneakers at a
higher price to another buyer, and sends this text message to Brenda: “Sizt, may iba pala akong buyer na
mas malaki yung offer, sorry! Balik ko nalang bayad mo, keri?” Evelyn claims that since the sneakers have
not yet been delivered to Brenda, she can still withdraw the offer.
Is Evelyn’s contention tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)
No, Evelyn's contention is not tenable.
Under the Civil Code, upon the perfection of the contract there arise reciprocal obligations of the parties. In
a contract of sale, the seller is bound to deliver and transfer ownership of the thing, while the buyer is bound
to pay the price.
In this case, Evelyn and Brenda had a perfected contract when they had a meeting of minds over the sale of
a brand new sneakers for P25,000.00. Brenda had deposited the purchase price as agreed. Evelyn was bound
to deliver the item. She could no longer withdraw the offer as it was already accepted by Brenda and, more
importantly, Brenda had already performed her end of the contract.
Thus, Evelyn should deliver the sneakers to Brenda.
8. In 2017, Alma orally sold a parcel of unregistered land to the spouses Ray and Shane for Php 500,000.00.
Upon receipt of the initial payment of Php 350,000.00, Alma delivered possession of the land to the spouses.
Shortly thereafter, Alma died. In order to formalize the sale, Ray and Shane convinced Josie, one of Alma’s
children, to sign a notarized deed of confirmation of sale. In consideration thereof, Josie received Php
150,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price. On the strength of the notarized confirmation of
sale, the spouses were able to transfer the tax declaration of the property in their names. Later, Josie died.
In 2020, the surviving children of Alma discovered the oral sale of the land to Ray and Shane. They demanded
the return of the property on the following grounds:
(i) the oral contract of sale is void because it does not appear in a public instrument; and
(ii) assuming the sale is not void, it is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Ray and Shane insisted
that the sale of the land to them was both valid and enforceable.
Are the contentions of the heirs of Alma tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)
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No, the contentions of the heirs of Alma are not tenable.
Indeed, under the Civil Code, the sale of real property should not only be in writing but must also be in a
public instrument. However, these rules are only for convenience and enforceability. An oral sale of real
property is valid and may be enforced if it is partly or fully consummated.
In this case, the sale was originally made between Alma and the Spouses Ray and Shane. A portion of the
purchase price was already paid by the buyers. The balance was paid to Josie, one of Alma's children, because
Alma had already died. Although it was only Josie, and not all the heirs, who executed the notarized deed of
sale, this is an issue between the heirs which did not render the original oral sale invalid or unenforceable.
Hence, the other heirs of Alma cannot assail the sale.
9. Aida, for the consideration of Php 5,000,000.00, sold her parcel of land to Lorna, as evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Sale. Lorna, however, failed to deliver the amount in full, paying only Php 500,000.00 as
down payment. Because of the nonpayment of the balance, Aida simply sold the same parcel of land to Fe
with the intention of returning to Lorna the Php 500,000.00 down payment.
Who among Aida, Lorna, and Fe owns the property? Explain briefly. (5 points)
Lorna owns the property.
Under the Civil Code, in sales, ownership is transferred to the buyer either by actual or constructive delivery.
The execution of a public instrument such as a notarized deed of sale is a mode of constructive delivery. The
failure of the buyer to pay the price simply gives the seller the right either to demand payment or to rescind
the sale. In this case, Aida sold the property to Lorna, and they executed a notarized deed of sale. Ownership
has already transferred to Lorna. Lorna's failure to pay the balance of the purchase price did not revert
ownership to Aida. Aida should first either demand payment of the price or properly rescind the sale.
Thus, no longer the owner of the property, Aida could not sell it to Fe.

10. Laica and Jessica, who are best friends, are both engaged in moneylending at predatory interest rates.
Running out of funds, Laica borrows Php 2,000,000.00 from 6 of 7 Jessica for two months at a monthly
interest rate of 10%. Jessica releases the borrowed amount after Laica signs a promissory note. Laica then
relends to Monica the borrowed amount of Php 2,000,000.00 for two months, at an interest rate of 30%.
After two months, Laica fails to pay Jessica, prompting Jessica to file a collection suit against the former, for
the Php 2,000,000.00 principal and 10% interest per month pursuant to their agreement. Laica counters that
the monthly interest rate of 10% is exorbitant and should be reduced to the legal rate of interest at 6% per
annum.
Which between the positions of Laica and Jessica is tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)

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 exorbitant, excessive, unconscionable
Laica's position is tenable.
Under the law and jurisprudence, exorbitant, excessive and unconscionable interest on loans is void. The
willingness of the parties to stipulate on such void interest is inconsequential.
In this case, the monthly interest rate of 10% is highly excessive, exorbitant and unconscionable. This
monthly interest rate would make the interest rate at 120% per annum. There is no estoppel here. Even
though the parties voluntarily agreed on the said interest rate, it does not make it valid.
Hence, Laica is correct and the interest rate should be reduced to the legal rate of interest at 6% per annum.
11. Leon is the owner of a condominium unit located directly above the condominium unit owned by Anj. In
2014, Leon undertook renovations in his unit’s bathroom, which caused water to leak from his bathroom
down to Anj’s unit, and caused extensive damage to Anj’s belongings. As Anj had obtained property
insurance on her unit and its contents from Proverbial Insurance Co. (PIC), Anj was able to recover the value
of the damage in September 2016. In October 2022, PIC, as subrogee of Anj, sued Leon to recover the
insurance proceeds it paid to Anj. Leon interposed prescription to dismiss the suit of PIC. PIC counters that
the payment of the insurance proceeds in 2016 created, by way of legal subrogation, a 10-year period within
which to file the suit against Leon.
Is PIC correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)
No, PIC is incorrect.
Under the Civil Code, the prescriptive period to recover based on quasi-delict is four years, counted from
the occurrence of the negligent act resulting in damage. This limitation applies even to the subrogee who
assumes the legal right to collect a claim of another.
In this case, the subject incident happened in 2014. PIC paid Anj in 2016. But PIC, as subrogee of Anj, only
sued Leon, the negligent third party, in 2022, or eight years after the incident.
Hence, PIC’s action has already prescribed.
12. Gio, single, joined a marathon organized by Takbo Co. For lack of alternative routes, the marathon course
included a public road which was not blocked-off from vehicles. Takbo Co. solicited the sponsorship of Kotse
Corp. for added financial support. Gio was hit by a jeepney driven by JD on the public road and died. The
parents of Gio sued Takbo Co. and Kotse Corp. for damages. The court ruled that Kotse Corp. is solidarily
liable for damages with Takbo Co. for being one of the principal movers of the event due to its sponsorship.
Is the court correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)
No, the court is not correct.
Under the civil code, solidarity is not presumed. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly
so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
In this case, neither law nor contract requires solidarity. The marathon was organized by Takbo Co. Kotse
Corp. only added financial support. It did not have a hand in the preparation and conduct of the marathon.
On the contrary, Takbo Co., as organizer, was solely responsible for the safety of the marathoners.
Thus, the complaint against Kotse Corp. should have been dismissed.
13. Eka, a Filipina, and Du-guil, a Korean, married in the Philippines. Thereafter, they moved to Seoul, South
Korea. While there, Du-guil began to ignore Eka. He was always out with his friends and usually came home
drunk. When Eka could not take their marital situation anymore, she asked for a divorce. Du-guil agreed on

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the condition that Eka would be the one to file for divorce, and that the ground should be “no fault”,
meaning, neither of them is at fault or neither would be accused of any wrongdoing. After the divorce, Eka
went back to the Philippines and filed a case to have the judgment of divorce recognized. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) denied Eka’s petition because she alone filed for divorce, in violation of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. According to the RTC, Article 26 requires that either the foreign spouse alone
initiates the filing of the divorce or, at the very least, Eka and Du-guil should have filed for divorce jointly.
Is the RTC correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)
No, the RTC is not correct.
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that when a Filipino is married to a foreigner and a divorce is validly
obtained which capacitates the foreigner spouse to remarry may be recognized here in the Philippines and
it capacitates the Filipino spouse as well to remarry. This provision has been interpreted in Republic vs.
Manalo as to recognize the foreign divorce even if filed by the Filipino spouse.
In this case, Eka, a Filipina, was married to Du-guil, a Korean. They moved to South Korea and obtained a
divorce there. That divorce may be recognized here in the Philippines in a proper petition with proof of the
foreign divorce, the law of the country where the divorce was granted, and the national law of the foreigner
spouse which allows divorce. Thus, the RTC should not have denied the petition.
14. During Remy’s pregnancy, her father Gavin executed a will bequeathing his rest house in Calatagan,
Batangas to Remy’s unborn child. While Gavin and Remy, who was then seven months pregnant, were on
their way to Calatagan, they figured in a car accident on December 1, 2021 which resulted in the
instantaneous death of Gavin and the premature delivery of Remy on the same day.
At 8:30 a.m. on December 3, 2021, the newborn baby died. Is the devise in favor of the baby valid? Explain
briefly. (5 points)
Yes, the devise in favor of the baby is valid.
Under the Civil Code, personality begins at conception. A conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it is born alive if it had an intra-uterine life of seven months or
more, or born alive and stayed alive for at least 24 hours if it had an intrauterine life of less than seven
months. Thus, an unborn child can be the recipient of a donation, devise or legacy.
In this case, Gavin bequeathed through his will his rest house to Remy's unborn child. Gavin was aware and
conscious of Remy's soon to be born baby. The baby had an intrauterine line of seven months but was born
alive and stayed alive for two days, more than the time prescribed by law.
Thus, the devise is valid and may be received by the child's heirs.
15. [This item has two questions.] Miguel, who died single and childless, was survived by his two legitimate
brothers Romy and Rolly, and his nephews Arno and Pabs, the legitimate sons of his predeceased legitimate
brother Edgar. Before his death, Miguel executed a one-page notarial will, inclusive of an attestation clause
and a notarial acknowledgment, with only one testamentary disposition bequeathing his entire estate to
Romy and Rolly. The will was not paginated and was attested by four witnesses: Uno, Dos, Tres, and Quatro.
It was the eve of Quatro’s 17th birthday when the will was executed. The will was written in the Ilocano
dialect which Miguel knew and understood, but the witnesses did not. Miguel and the witnesses signed at
the end of the testamentary disposition. The attestation was also written in the Ilocano dialect which, when
translated to the English language, reads as follows: “This will of Miguel was written in ONE page. We, the
attesting witnesses, signed at the end of the will and at the bottom of this attestation in the presence of
Miguel and of each of us.” Each of the four witnesses signed below the attestation clause. Because none of
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the witnesses knew and understood the Ilocano dialect, the attestation was interpreted to them by Miguel’s
lawyer who was present to notarize the will.
(a) Does the fact that the will was written in a dialect known only to Miguel invalidate the will? What
about the absence of the marginal signatures of the testator and the witnesses? Explain briefly.
No, they did not invalidate the will.
As to the dialect or language in which the will is written, the Civil Code only requires that it be understood
by the testator. The law also provides that if the attestation clause is in a dialect or language not known to
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. Finally, as to the signatures, the law requires that the will be
signed on each and every page thereof.
In this case, the will was in the Ilocano dialect or language known and understood by Miguel. Although the
witnesses did not understand it, the attestation clause was nevertheless interpreted to them. Lastly, the will
complied with the signature requirement. It was a one-page will and the testator and the witnesses signed
at the end of the testamentary disposition. There was no need to sign on the left margin.
Hence, the alleged defects are not fatal to the will
(b) May the will nonetheless be admitted to probate? Explain briefly. (5 points)
Yes, the will may be probated.
It is settled that in probate of wills, the subject of inquiry is the testamentary capacity of the testator and
the due execution of the will. The intrinsic validity of the will is not a proper issue.

In this case, there is nothing to show that Miguel's capacity to execute a will was impaired. Also, the will had
substantially complied with the formal requirements of the law. Thus, it may be allowed.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2022 CIVIL LAW BAR EXAM QUESTIONS PART 2
1. [This item has two questions.] Pepe and Pilar are adjoining lot owners. Suppose Pepe’s lot is titled and
without his knowledge, it was encroached upon by Pilar whose lot is untitled but who honestly believed that
the encroached portion, where she built a small bungalow house, is still within her property.

(a) Is Pilar a builder in good faith? Discuss Pepe’s right as against Pilar. Explain briefly.
No, Pilar is not in good faith.

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Under the Civil Code, a builder is not in good faith if he or she is aware or ought to be aware that the property
belongs to another. When land is registered, registration is constructive notice to the whole world.
Moreover, when something is built on land belonging to another, the builder loses everything and is only
entitled to the payment of necessary expenses for preservation of the land.
In this case, Pepe's land is registered land. Pilar is constructively notified thereof. Thus, Pilar is a builder in
bad faith. Pepe can demand Pilar to vacate the land and demolish Pilar's bungalow house, with due
reimbursement of the necessary expenses.

(b) Suppose it is Pilar’s lot that is titled and Pepe’s lot is untitled, would Pilar be a builder in good faith?
Discuss Pepe’s right as against Pilar. Explain briefly.
Yes, Pilar would be a builder in good faith.
Under the Civil Code, a builder is deemed in good faith if he or she is not aware that the property belongs to
another. There is also no constructive notice if the land is not registered. The landowner on whose land
something has been built, planted or sown may appropriate the thing after indemnifying the builder, planter
or sower of his necessary, useful and ornamental expenses. He or she may also sell the land, unless the land
is of greater value than what has been built, planted or sown, in which case, the latter may pay rent.
In this case, Pilar is a builder in good faith because she honestly believed that the encroached portion is
within her property. She is not also expected to know that the land belongs to Pepe because Pepe's
ownership has not been registered. That said, Pepe may choose either to appropriate Pilar's bungalow house
after payment of indemnity, or to require Pilar to pay rent.
2. [This item has two questions.] Thea, Vanessa, and Sophia are siblings who are co-owners of a 600-sq. m.
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12345 situated along Bangkal Road, Makati City. Thea decided to sell her
share, an undivided 200-sq. m. portion of the property, to Alyssa, a Filipino nurse who has been living in
Canada for the last ten years. Alyssa, without the knowledge of Sophia and Vanessa, built a modest house
on the 200-sq. m. portion abutting the road and leased it to Stell for Php 15,000.00 per month.

(a) Could Thea legally transfer her share of the property to Alyssa without the consent of Vanessa and
Sophia? Explain briefly.
Yes, Thea could legally transfer her share to Alyssa without the consent of Vanessa and Sophia.
Under the Civil Code, a co-owner shall have the full ownership his or her undivided share in the co-owned
property and may sell or alienate the same without the prior consent of the other co-owners. The buyer
simply acquires the said share and substitutes the former in the co-ownership if no partition is made.
In this case, Thea was the owner of one-third of the 600-square-meter property, or 200 square meters
thereof. Consistently, Thea's buyer, Alyssa only acquired a 200 square meter portion of the co-owned
property which pertained to Thea.
Thus, Thea's sale to Alyssa is valid even without the consent of Vanessa and Sophia.
(b) Can Vanessa and Sophia respectively legally demand from Alyssa a one-third share in the rentals?
Explain briefly.
Yes, Vanessa and Sophia can demand their respective one-third share in the rentals.
Under the Civil Code, the co-owners shall share in the benefits, as well as in the charges, proportional to
their respective interests. Income from rents is a benefit that the co-owners have the right to share.

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In this case, Alyssa became a co-owner after buying Thea's share. Although Alyssa did not get the consent of
Vanessa and Sophia before constructing a house and leasing it to Stell, she is bound to hold in trust and
deliver upon demand the shares of Vanessa and Sophia in the rental income.
Thus, Alyssa should give to Vanessa and Sophia their respective one-third share in the rentals.
3. [This item has two questions.] With the intent to develop a subdivision, Oliver bought a parcel of land
adjacent to a subdivision owned by Phil. Oliver’s land had no direct access to the highway, as it was blocked
by a kamote plantation owned by Josh. Phil’s subdivision, on the other hand, already had a direct access to
the highway. To facilitate the release of the license from the Department of Human Settlements and Urban
Development, Oliver presented a contract to sell between him and Josh over the kamote plantation, on the
representation that he would construct an access road thereon.

Pending approval of the license, Oliver sought the consent of Phil to connect the road that would be built by
him with the main road of Phil’s subdivision. Phil allowed him to do this pending their negotiation on the
compensation to be paid. With the eventual grant of the license, Oliver began the development of his
subdivision. To protect the right of way over Phil’s subdivision, Oliver was able to cause an annotation of
adverse claim on Phil’s property.

However, when Oliver’s subdivision was already completed, and with the adverse claim annotated, Oliver
believed that he no longer needed to buy the kamote plantation and accordingly rescinded the contract to
sell with Josh.

When Oliver and Phil failed to arrive at an agreement on the consideration for the easement, Phil built a wall
blocking the road constructed by Oliver that connected Oliver’s subdivision with his. Oliver filed a complaint
seeking the establishment of an easement of right of way through Phil’s subdivision which Oliver claimed to
be the most adequate and convenient access to the highway. On the other hand, Phil filed a petition to have
the adverse claim cancelled.

(a) Is Oliver entitled to a right of way through Phil’s subdivision? Explain briefly.
No, Oliver is not entitled to a right of way through Phil's subdivision.
Under the Civil Code, to be entitled to a right of way, the dominant estate must be surrounded by other
immovables without any access to a public road. The isolation must not be due to the proprietor's own acts.
In this case, Oliver's property was surrounded by the properties of Josh and Phil. At the start, in order to
obtain a license to develop his subdivision, Oliver had entered into a contract to sell to buy Josh's property
to construct an access road thereon. But when the license had been granted, Oliver cancelled his contract
to sell with Josh. Consequently, Phil had closed the temporary access road that he granted to Oliver due to
the failure of negotiation on the compensation. Oliver's predicament is his own making.
Thus, Oliver is not entitled to a compulsory right of way. He should negotiate to buy either Josh's or Phil's
property.

(b) Is there basis to have the adverse claim cancelled? Explain briefly.
Yes, there is a basis to cancel the adverse claim.

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Under the law, an adverse claim is a notice that the claimant has a right adverse to the registered owner.
The annotation is to give notice to third persons and protect the claimant's rights during the pendency of
the controversy.
In this case, Oliver filed the adverse claim to protect his right to have access while he was negotiating with
Phil the compensation for the right of way. It was contingent upon a final agreement on the right of way.
Considering, however, that the negotiations failed and Phil was no longer willing to give Oliver a right of way,
the adverse claim had lost its purpose.
Hence, the adverse claim may now be cancelled.
4. The spouses Santos are the registered owners of Lot 2 located in Umaga Subdivision, Caramoan,
Camarines Sur, covered by TCT No. 1369. Lot 2, which has been occupied by the spouses Santos for about
11 years, has a one-storey residential house which was already erected thereon when Lot 2 was purchased
by them from the spouses Cruz in 2005. At the time of the acquisition of Lot 2, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which
was also owned by the spouses Cruz, was an idle land without any improvements. Lot 1 remained empty
until the spouses Cruz started the construction of a two-storey residential house thereon in 2018. The house
constructed on Lot 1 being taller than the spouses Santos’ one-storey residential house, the spouses Cruz’s
two-storey residential house obstructed the light, air, and view of the spouses Santos’ residential house. The
spouses Santos bemoaned how, prior to the construction on Lot 1, they received enough bright and natural
light from their windows. The construction rendered their house dark such that they are unable to do their
normal activities in their house without switching on their lights.

Have the spouses Santos acquired an easement of light and view with respect to Lot 1 owned by the
spouses Cruz? Explain briefly.
Yes, the Spouses Santos acquired an easement of light and view.
Under the Civil Code, easements may be acquired by prescription or by title. It is acquired by title when there
exists an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both,
should either of them be alienated.

In this case, both Lots 1 and 2 were owned by Spouses Cruz. On Lot 2 existed a one-story residential house
with windows. Lot 1, on the other hand, was an idle land with nothing constructed thereon. The house with
its windows, on Lot 2, was an apparent sign of easement of light and view. It, therefore, forbade Spouses
Cruz from constructing anything that would violate the easement.
Hence, Spouses Cruz cannot deprive the Spouses Santos of their light and view. They could only construct a
building on Lot 1 after observing the distances allowed by law.
5. In 2014, a wealthy young couple, the spouses Tan, moved by the spirit of generosity and love for their
hometown in Siquijor, decided to donate a one-hectare lot in favor of the province of Siquijor. The Deed of
Donation pertinently provides:

“The herein DONORS hereby voluntarily and freely give, transfer and convey, by way of unconditional
donation, unto said DONEE, all of the rights, title and interest which the aforesaid DONORS have or which
pertain to them and which they owned exclusively in the above-described real property over a one hectare
portion of the same, solely for hospital site only and for no other purpose, where a provincial government
hospital shall be constructed.”

The donation was recorded in the Registry of Deeds, and a certificate of title to the property was transferred
to the province of Siquijor. In accordance with the Deed of Donation, the construction of a hospital building
was started in the following year.

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However, for reasons unknown, only the foundation of the hospital building has, to this day, been
completed.

Do the spouses Tan have valid grounds to revoke the donation? Explain briefly.
No, the Spouses Tan have no valid grounds to revoke the donation.
Under the Civil Code, a donation is an act of liberality which transfers a property to another who accepts it.
Donations may be conditional or unconditional. In case of conditional donations, the law on obligations and
contracts shall apply.
In this case, the donation is a conditional donation even though it states "unconditional" because the done,
the Province of Siquijor, was obliged to construct a hospital. The Deed of Donation, however, did not provide
for a period for its completion. Here, the province had already started with the construction, although only
the foundation has been finished.
Thus, the deed of donation cannot be revoked.

6. Being an overseas worker, Salvador issued to Ronaldo a duly notarized Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing the latter to enter into a contract of lease over Salvador's property covered by TCT No. 122433
for a period of three years with SISI Corp. Salvador entrusted to Ronaldo the owner's duplicate of the TCT in
case SISI Corp. needed to verify the same.

Hearing rumors that the subject property was sold, Salvador went to the Register of Deeds and was shocked
to find out that TCT No. 122433 had been cancelled and TCT No. 334388 had been issued in Eduardo’s name.
To vindicate his property rights, Salvador filed a complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance.
Salvador was able to prove that he was out of the country when the purported sale was executed.

On the other hand, Eduardo claims to be an innocent purchase for value, stating that he paid the fair market
value to Ronaldo and that he relied on the fact that Ronaldo presented the original owner’s duplicate of
Salvador’s TCT. He likewise inspected the property and determined that Salvador was indeed the owner.

If you were the judge, decide. Explain briefly.

If I were the judge, I would decide in favor of Salvador.
Under the Civil Code, an agent may only exercise the powers expressly authorized and those incidental
thereto. Acts entered by the agent without authority or in excess of his or her authority shall be
unenforceable against the principal. Furthermore, a third person dealing with a purported agent must
require the presentation of the power of attorney or the instructions as regards the agency. A buyer who
does not examine the authority of the agent is not an innocent purchaser for value.
In this case, Ronaldo was authorized only to lease Salvador's property as shown in the Special Power of
Attorney. Had Eduardo exercised due diligence by requiring Ronaldo's authority, he would know that
Salvador did not authorize Ronaldo to sell the property.
Thus, Salvador's complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance should prosper.
7. Atoy is one of the five children of Jawo. Jawo was the registered owner of a fourhectare parcel of land in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna covered by TCT No. 77347. When Jawo died, the owner’s duplicate of the TCT was kept by
Jawo’s daughter, Akiko (sister of Atoy), who resided in the said property. Wanting to have the said four-
hectare property registered under his name, Atoy got in touch with Franz who had special connections with
the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. TCT No. 77347 was then cancelled and TCT No. 84660 was issued

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in Atoy’s name on January 29, 2013. Atoy immediately mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Sta. Cruz
(RBSC). Upon default and after being declared the winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, RBSC
consolidated ownership with the issuance of TCT No. 94477 in its name.

How will Akiko and the other heirs of Jawo be able to successfully argue that RBSC is not an innocent
purchaser for value? Explain briefly.
According to law and jurisprudence, an innocent purchaser for value is one who has no notice, either actually
or constructively, of any defect in his or her title or in that of his or her transferor. Furthermore, when there
are circumstances that should impel one to conduct an inquiry, a reliance on the title is not sufficient.
In this case, Akiko and the other heirs of Jawo can argue that while the title was in the name of Atoy, the
property was occupied by Akiko. If RBSC had conducted an ocular inspection, it would have known that the
seller was not in possession. Moreover, had RBSC inquired with Akiko why she was in the property, RBSC
would have known that the property was inherited land that had not yet been settled and distributed among
the heirs. Lastly, as a bank, RBSC was mandated to exercise extraordinary diligence in its dealings, especially
in the purchase of real properties.
8. How does the New Civil Code distinguish between immovable and movable properties? Explain briefly
and give two examples for each.
According to the Civil Code, immovable properties are those that are immovable by nature, by destination,
by incorporation and by analogy. Examples are lands and buildings. On the other hand, movables are those
excluded from the enumeration of immovable properties and those which can be moved from place to place.
Examples are books and cars.
9. [This item has two questions.] This case involves two competing titles: TCT No. 23456 in the name of Flor
and TCT No. 65432 in the name of de Luna. Flor’s title was derived from Rodrigo. Rodrigo’s title was originally
obtained through a judicial confirmation of title in 1950 based on a survey plan approved in 1931. On the
other hand, de Luna derived her TCT No. 65432 from Diaz who obtained an original title through judicial
confirmation of title at a much later date, in 1970, on the basis of a survey plan approved in 1921. It turned
out that Flor’s TCT No. 23456, although titled prior in time, was based on a survey plan that was marred with
numerous blatant, obvious and serious defects, to the point that the trial court found it dubious, irregularly
approved and was therefore fake.
(a) Discuss the principle of “qui prior est tempore, potior est jure” in the torrens system of land
registration.

The principle of qui prior est tempore, potior est jure" simply means that one who is first in time is first in
right.
Applied in the Torrens System of land registration, the one who has earlier registered his or her title has a
superior right over one who has registered his or hers, later in time.

(b) As between Flor and de Luna, whose title should be declared valid and whose title should be voided?
Explain briefly.
Between Flor and de Luna, Flor's title should be declared valid.
Applying the principle of qui prior est tempore, potior est jure, one who is first in time is first in right.
In this case, Flor's title was derived from the title of Rodrigo which was registered in 1950 while the title of
de Luna's title was derived from the title of Diaz which was registered in 1970. That the survey plan upon
which Rodrigo's or Flor's title is based was allegedly irregularly issued cannot affect his or Flor's title. It is the

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title that prevails, not the survey plan. A certificate of title is indefeasible, incontrovertible and conclusive,
unless cancelled or annulled in an appropriate direct proceeding.

10. In 2008, a fire razed the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga (RD). Several titles on file were
burned. Long before the fire, Tito, Vic, and Joey had been living in a 350-sq. m. lot covered by TCT No. 49933,
which they inherited from their parents. The original of TCT No. 49933 on file with the RD was among the
titles which were burned. To effect the partition agreed among them, the siblings filed a verified petition for
reconstitution of the TCT before your court.

To support the petition, the siblings presented: (i) a notarized affidavit of loss duly recorded and registered
with the RD; (ii) a photocopy of TCT No. 49933; (iii) real property tax declarations and receipts to evidence
payment of real property taxes, together with the sketch and subdivision plan; (iv) a Land Registration
Authority (LRA) Report which states that the survey and subdivision plans and the technical description of
the property may be used as a basis for inscription of the technical description of the reconstituted property;
(v) a microfilm copy of the plans and technical description on file with the LRA; and (vi) the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate executed among them.
The public prosecutor, duly deputized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), prays for the denial of the
petition, and argues that the foregoing documents are insufficient for reconstitution of TCT No. 49933.

Should the petition for reconstitution be granted? Explain briefly.

No, the petition for reconstitution should not be granted.
Under the law, when the original copy of a transfer certificate of title is lost or destroyed, it may be
reconstituted using, primarily, the owner's duplicate of the transfer certificate of title or a certified true copy
of the certificate of title previously issued by the register of deeds.
In this case, the original of TCT No. 49933 on file with the Register of Deeds was destroyed when the Register
of Deeds of San Fernando was burned. Tito, Vic and Joey should have presented their owner's duplicate of
TCT No. 49933 or a certified true copy thereof. However, what they presented were a photocopy only and
an affidavit of loss of said title. The other evidence presented, like the real property tax declaration, survey
plan and microfilm of technical description could only establish the identity of the land, but could not prove
the issuance of the original of TCT No. 49933.
Thus, the petition for reconstitution should be denied.
11. Ely borrows Php 2,000,000.00 from Mia and mortgages a parcel of land to secure the loan. The mortgage
provides for a 5% monthly interest, a five-year maturity period, a default provision in case of non-payment
of interest or principal, and an extrajudicial foreclosure provision. On the fourth year, Ely fails to pay interest
for three consecutive months. After sending a demand letter, Mia declares Ely in default and extrajudicially
forecloses the mortgage. Mia is the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale, and consolidates ownership upon
the lapse of the redemption period.

Can Ely have the foreclosure annulled and recover the property? Explain briefly.
Yes, Ely can have the foreclosure annulled and he can recover the property.
According to jurisprudence, excessive, exorbitant and unconscionable interest is void and cannot be
imposed. Particularly, the rate of interest • at 5% per month has been held to be too high as it would make
the annual interest at 60% per annum. If the interest rate is void, then the principal obligation is not yet due

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and demandable, applying the rule on application of payments that the payment shall be applied first on the
interest, and then on the principal. The interest should first be computed at the legal rate, and then paid.
In this case, Ely contracted to borrow P2 Million from Mia with an interest of 5% per month. This rate is void
and cannot be collected. The legal interest rate of 6% per annum should be imposed instead. This being the
case, Ely's obligation is not yet due as it would require a recomputation of the amounts due: first the proper
interest, then the principal.
Thus, it was premature for Mia to foreclose the mortgaged property. All proceedings pursuant thereto
should be annulled.

12. Luz is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 500 square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan and
covered by TCT No. R-248016. Luz agreed to sell to Minda the land for Php 500,000.00, payable in ten
monthly installments, with the first installment payable upon execution of the contract to sell, to which
Minda acceded. They also agreed that the title to the land shall only transfer to Minda upon full payment of
the consideration, and that any and all taxes, fees, and expenses incidental to the sale will be paid by Minda.

Draft a notarized contract to sell between Luz and Minda.

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