Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912

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Geotextiles and Geomembranes

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geotexmem

Professional Practice Paper

An extended data base and recommendations regarding 320 failed T

geosynthetic reinforced mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls
Robert M. Koerner∗, George R. Koerner
Geosynthetic Institute, 475 Kedron Avenue, Folsom, PA 19033, USA

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: In 2013, the authors wrote a paper which was published in the Journal of Geotextiles and Geomembranes on the
Geosynthetics failure of 171-mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls reinforced with geotextiles or geogrids, Koerner and
Geogrids Koerner (2013). The paper generated many reprint requests via both the publisher and the authors, and it won
Geotextiles the best paper of the year award. Furthermore, it generated considerable awareness of the situation and gen-
Walls
erated additional case histories while providing details of such failures. Presently, we have 320 failures which
Slopes
are reported in this paper. The database includes 99 cases of excessive deformation and 221 cases of collapse of
Reinforcement
at least part of the respective walls.
The main statistical findings (including the original 171 failures) are as follows:
1. 313 (98%) were private (as opposed to public) financed walls.
2. 253 (79%) were located in North America; the vast majority being in the U.S.
3. 240 (75%) were masonry block faced.
4. 226 (71%) were 4–12 m high.
5. 301 (94%) were geogrid reinforced; the other 6% were geotextile reinforced.
6. 246 (77%) failed in less than four years after their construction (12 of which actually failed during con-
struction).
7. 232 (73%) used silt and/or clay backfill soils in the reinforced zone.
8. 245 (76%) had poor-to-moderate compaction.
9. 317 (99%) were caused by improper design or construction (incidentally, none were caused by geosynthetic
manufacturing material failures).
10. 201 (63%) were caused by internal or external water (the remaining 37% were caused by soil related issues).
While the number of reported walls in this paper is almost double the number reported in 2013, the change in
percentages of the above items is relatively small with the notable exceptions of walls failing in longer time
intervals (by 9%) and even greater use of fine grained backfill soils (by 12%).
As with the original paper, updated opinions and recommendations in several of the above listed areas are
presented. Also, several new types of failures are reported, such as guard fence instability and soil erosion at the
toe of the wall. However, the overall critical issues continue to occur and no lessening of failures is apparent with
this new set of data. The critical issues are the following;

• fine grained silt and clay soils continue to be used for the reinforced zone backfill.
• poor placement and compaction of these same fine grained backfill soils is regularly reported.
• drainage systems and utilities continue to be located within the reinforced soil zone.
• there is little attempt at water control either behind, beneath or above the reinforced soil zone, and.
• While
design details appear to be inadequate or not followed by the installation contractor.
the issues reported in 2013 did indeed prompt the initiation of an inspector's certification program
(Geosynthetic Certification Institute - Inspector Certification Program) it has not been very successful and has
attracted only 24-participants to date. Hopefully this updated paper will energize the parties involved and the
MSE reinforced wall community at large to take appropriate action in correcting the situation described herein.

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: rmk27@drexel.edu (R.M. Koerner).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geotexmem.2018.07.013
Received 26 March 2018; Received in revised form 19 July 2018; Accepted 22 July 2018
Available online 29 August 2018
0266-1144/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner
Fig. 1. Cross section and principal elements of a mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) wall (ref. Elias et al., 2001).
1. Background
In 1966, H. Vidal of France wrote the first of several papers on
“reinforced earth”, a technique he initiated, developed, patented and
promoted (Vidal, 1966, 1969a, 1969b, 1970). His system used long
closely-spaced 100 mm wide steel strips connected to metallic facing
and extending back into the soil mass so as to provide sufficient fric-
tional anchorage. Its success was (and is) outstanding. Over time, the
original facing type has varied (concrete square panels, concrete hex-
agonal panels, timber, gabions, geocells, etc.) as well as the reinforce-
ment itself (from steel strips-to-steel mesh-to-polymeric geotextiles and
geogrids). Discussions with designers, manufacturers and contractors
lead us to estimate that as many as 200,000 geosynthetic reinforced
mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls have been built worldwide of
the type shown in Fig. 1. Additional estimates by forensic engineers
specializing in failures of this type of structure suggest that 1–3% have
failures, thus approximately 4000 have problems and this data base of
320 represents 8% of the total. The status of metallic reinforced MSE
structures that have failed is not known to the authors and is not the
subject of this study or paper.
The polymeric reinforcement materials that are involved consist of
various types of geotextiles and geogrids and are shown collectively in
Fig. 2. It should be noted that all of the failures listed in this paper make
a facing angle of greater than 70° with the horizontal, thus are classified
as walls rather than slopes. Reinforced MSE slopes, at facing angles
lower than 70°, are inherently less prone to failure and are not included
herein. Incidentally, our records indicate only eight (8) such reinforced
slopes have failed.
2. Failure modes
While improper performance of any structure or system involving
geosynthetics is (or should be) of keen interest to the geosynthetics
community, the number of failures of MSE walls has been very large
particularly in North America. This is perhaps biased due to the ma-
jority of the authors contacts and information being in the U.S. but that
is conjecture. Our first investigations were in the 1980's and within the
next ten years, we had accumulated data on 26 such failures. Koerner
and Soong (2001) subdivided the failures into excessive deformation
and partial or complete collapse categories as shown in Fig. 3. At that
point, we began soliciting information on failures from others and
published data on 82 failures via an internal Geosynthetic Institute
report; see Koerner and Koerner (2009). These failures grew to 171 in
number and were published in this journal five years ago, Koerner and
Koerner, 2013. As mentioned earlier, the current number is 320. The
information on all of the case histories has been obtained from the
following sources:
• published cases = 98
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Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912
• GSI file cases = 23
• colleagues cases = 121
• others, e.g., internet and brochures = 78
Within this total there are 99 cases of excessive deformation and
221 cases of collapse. The excessive deformation cases are somewhat
subjective since the allowable deformation of any given structure
generally varies between owner, designer and contractor. It can be, and
often is, a very contentious situation. Sometimes, but certainly not al-
ways, such deformation leads to collapse. That said, when collapse oc-
curs it is often near the top of the wall, however, central, lower and
complete collapses of walls have also been reported. Also, the length of
collapsed walls varies greatly, i.e., from a few meters to over a hundred
meters. When collapse occurs, the facing invariably falls away from the
reinforcement leaving it (the reinforcement) retaining a portion of the
reinforced fill soil behind. Of course, when global failures occur the
entire MSE system is involved in the failure.
3. Main statistical findings
The following ten items were felt to be of paramount interest in this
study with the number and relevant percentages associated with each
item obtained from the 320 case history failures.
1. 313 (98%) were private (as opposed to public financed) walls
2. 253 (79%) were located in North America, the vast majority being
in the U.S.
3. 240 (75%) were masonry block faced
4. 226 (71%) were 4–12 m high
5. 301 (94%) were geogrid reinforced; the other 6% were geotextile
reinforced
6. 246 (77%) failed in less than four years after their construction (12
of which actually failed during construction)
7. 232 (73%) used silt and/or clay backfill soil in the reinforced zone
8. 245 (76%) had poor-to-moderate compaction
9. 317 (99%) were caused by improper design or construction (in-
cidentally, none were caused by geosynthetic manufacturing fail-
ures)
10. 201 (63%) were caused by internal or external water (the re-
maining 37% were caused by soil related issues)
Each of these ten items will now be described in greater detail.
3.1. Wall ownership
There were only 7 (2%) of the failed walls owned by public federal,
state and local agencies, and 313 (98%) by private owners. Among the
private owners the distribution of applications was as follows;
R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912

Fig. 2. Various types of geosynthetic reinforcement used in MSE walls and slopes. (GSI photographs).
(a) Various types of reinforcing geotextiles. (b) Various types of reinforcing geogrids.

• 91 (29%) were housing developments and apartments, 3.3. Facing types

• 117 (37%) were commercial shopping centers and malls,
• 61 (20%) were businesses and industrial parks,
• 41 (13%) were private roads, hospitals and schools, and
• 3 (1%) were landfill berms.
3.2. Location by continent
The large majority of facing type failures consisted of modular
concrete blocks. These are also referred in the U.S. as segmental re-
taining walls, or SRW's. It might be noted that this type of wall facing is
more readily observable than others insofar as distress is concerned.
The distribution was as follows;

While the large majority of the failures were in North America • 240 (75%) were modular concrete blocks,
(almost all being in the USA), there are cases in all parts of the world as • 55 (17%) were welded wire mesh with geogrid backup,
the following indicates; • 13 (4%) were wrap-around geosynthetics,
• 8 (3%) were discrete concrete panels, and
• 253 (79%) were in North America, • 4 (1%) were timber faced.
• 45 (14%) were in Asia,
• 14 (5%) were in Europe,
• 4 (1%) were in Africa, 3.4. Maximum height

• 2 (0.5%) were in South America, and

• 2 (0.5%) were in Oceania. All of the wall deformations or collapses, obviously failed at, or
near, their maximum heights. One wall actually collapsed at three

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R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912

Fig. 3. Two categories of MSE wall failures (GSI photographs).

(a) Excessive wall deformations. (b) Partial or complete wall collapses.

different locations with repairs being made after each incident. The
most common failure heights were in the 4–8 m range as given in the
following data;
• 39 (12%) were less than 4 m,
• 136 (43%) were from 4 to less than 8 m,
• 90 (28%) were from 8 to less than 12 m,
• 24 (8%) were from 12 to less than 16 m,
• 11 (3%) were from 16 to less than 20 m, and
• 20 (6%) were greater than 20 m.
3.5. Type of geosynthetic reinforcement
By far the most common type of reinforcement was geogrids which
occurred in 301 (94%) of the cases. The remainder were geotextile
reinforced, i.e., 19 (6%). None were polymer straps or anchors although
this type of geosynthetic reinforcement is rarely used.
3.6. Failure timeline and service lifetime
The oldest three failures occurred in 1987 and only 31 (10%) failed

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Fig. 4. Timeline of wall failures reported herein.
in the following ten years. Thereafter, failures occurred much more
frequently with the peak year being 2009 with 29 (9%) in that year
alone. See Fig. 4 for the complete timeline of these failures.
The data also shows that when failure occurs it does so quite soon
after construction. Interestingly, 12 (4%) of the walls failed during
construction before the planned height was reached. The largest
number of failures 246 (77%) were from 1 to 4 years after construction.
Service lifetime of the group of 320 failures were as follows;
• 62 (19%) were less than 1 year,
• 88 (28%) were 1 to less than 2 years,
• 96 (30%) were 2 to less than 4 years,
• 37 (12%) were 4 to less than 6 years,
• 15 (4%) were 6 to less than 8 years,
• 2 (1%) were 8 to less than 10 years, and
• 20 (6%) were greater than 10 years.
3.7. Type of backfill soils
Within the reinforced soil zone, all types of soils have been used in
the 320 failure case histories. As shown in Fig. 5 and 88 (28%) were
considered to be coarse grained while 232 (72%) were fine grained.
Unfortunately, there was insufficient soil description in most of the case
histories to define the soil type more rigorously, but the general ten-
dency to use fine-grained soils was apparent.
Fig. 5. Backfill soils used in 320 (100%) MSE wall failures. (GSI figure).
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Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912
3.8. Relative compaction of backfill soils
Optimally a percent compaction and moisture content of the backfill
soil in the reinforced soil zone would be preferred over a more quali-
tative assessment but such detail was only available for a few of the
published cases. What was available was a relative compaction ranking
of good, moderate or poor. Furthermore, it was seen that the “good”
compaction was associated with the more granular soils but that was
not a consistent finding. The following is what is available for the 320
cases;
• 75 (25%) – were of good compaction,
• 114 (34%) – were of moderate compaction, and
• 131 (41%) – were of poor compaction.
3.9. Primary responsibility for the failures
To discriminate each failure between design or construction was
difficult but felt to be of prime importance. In this regard, the use of fine
grained backfill soil in the reinforced zone was considered a design
failure since the soil backfill type should be specified by the designer
and verified accordingly. Note that poor compaction of that same soil
was considered a construction failure. Specific situations, however,
might have reversed this reasoning (such as owner directed soil or value
engineered projects) and perhaps joint responsibility may have been
assigned. The following, however, is our best estimate in this regard;
• 250 (78%) were design failures,
• 67 (21%) were construction failures, and
• 3 (1%) were facing material (masonry block or timber) failures.
3.10. Basic failure mechanisms
Finally, we grouped the primary failure mechanisms into four ca-
tegories; two soil related and two water related. Both soil and water
related categories were then considered as being either internal or ex-
ternal to the reinforced soil mass. Fig. 6 illustrates these four individual
mechanisms. We emphasize primary since several of the failures had
multiple mechanisms involved, but without a detailed forensic analysis
of each case, we made the necessary singular assumption.
In Fig. 6 it is seen that internal instability; e.g., wide spacings, short
lengths, low shear strength soil, and guard fence instability (McKelvey,
R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner
Fig. 6. Basic failure mechanisms reported herein.
Note that “*” represents the majority of failures reported in each category. (a) Internal instability 71 (22%). (b) External instability 48 (14%). (c) Internal water 114
(37%). (d) External water 87 (27%).
2015) accounts for 71 (22%) cases. Wide reinforcement spacings and
short reinforcement lengths are the most common. External instability;
e.g., poor foundation soils, erosion control at the wall toe, sloping exit
angles, excessive surcharge loads, seismicity and low global shear
strength accounts for 48 (14%) cases. High surcharge and toe erosion
are the most common. Internal water; e.g., leaking drainage systems
(catch basins, inlets and pipe joints), broken water mains, and in-
filtrating or perched water accounts for 114 (37%) cases. Leaking
drainage systems and pressure pipe breakage are the most common.
External water; e.g., from surface infiltration, the retained zone, tension
cracks and elevated water level accounts for 87 (27%) cases. Tension
cracks and infiltration are the most common.
4. Most common failure issues
The following five topic areas appear to the authors to be at the core
of most of the 320 MSE wall failures under discussion. Each will be
briefly explained along with suggested recommendations for avoidance
in the future.
4.1. Fine grained soil in reinforced zone backfill
Fig. 5 presented the various types of soils used in the reinforcement
zone of the 320 case history failures. Readily seen is that 232 (72%) of
the failure cases used silt and/or clay soil types. The reason for use of
such soils is felt to be their availability at a low or even zero cost in
comparison to the cost of sands and gravels, which usually have to be
imported to the site. The concern over, and critical issue of using, such
fine grained soils is that they have low to extremely low hydraulic
conductivity. Of course, this can be properly avoided by proper design,
see Kempton et al. (2000) among others. If present, water within,
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Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912
behind or beneath such a reinforced soil zone can mobilize hydrostatic
pressures, which, we feel, are rarely accounted for in the design process.
If such fine grained soils are used, the design must include (in the au-
thors opinion) back and base drains so as to route water away from the
reinforced soil zone; see Berg et al. (2009), Collin et al. (2002) and
Bernardi et al. (2009). This is well within the state-of-the-practice using
drainage geocomposite materials for the back drain and a wide selec-
tion of materials (drainage geocomposites, gravel, sands, pipes, etc.) for
the outlet base drain. In addition, the upper ground surface must be
sealed and properly drained so as not to allow surface water to
permeate into the reinforced soil zone or cascade over the wall facing;
see Berg et al. (2009), Collin et al. (2002) and Bernardi et al. (2009).
Fig. 7 illustrates both of these protection details when using fine-
grained soil backfills in the reinforced zone.
4.2. Poor placement and compaction of fine grained backfill soils
It was noted that 245 (76%) of the failure case histories had poor-or-
moderate compaction. When using sands and gravels, compaction is
almost automatic, with placement equipment often achieving the de-
sired density. With silts and clays, however, compaction is more diffi-
cult, yet well within the state-of-the-practice. In general, 95% standard
Proctor compaction should be achieved throughout the reinforced soil
zone; see Berg et al. (2009), Collin et al. (2002) and Bernardi et al.
(2009). To be noted is that construction equipment must stay away
from the wall facing (from 1 to 2 m) at all times since outward de-
formation of the facing has occurred in the past.
4.3. Drainage systems located within the reinforced soil zone
It was noted that 47 of the 114 (41%) internal water failures were
R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner
Fig. 7. MSE wall section showing drainage geocomposite back drain and outlet
system, geotextile filters, as well as a geomembrane surface waterproofing
layer. Also note that the soil shading in the reinforced soil zone suggests
granular soil or gravel which is usually not the situation as reported herein
(compl. TenCate Geosynthetics Inc.).
“plumbing related”. In this regard, both pressure pipelines and drainage
pipelines with catch basins must be removed from the reinforced soil zone.
MSE walls, particularly when backfilled with fine grained soils, in-
variably settle vertically downward and move laterally outward. Such
settlement can even result in a backward rotation of the structure; see
Jewell (1996). Pipelines simply cannot respond to such movements,
i.e., they break if pressure related and they pull apart if drainage re-
lated; see Fig. 8 for the latter. The resulting discharged water escaping
within the reinforced zone is simply unacceptable. Recommended in
this regard is to move the drainage system to behind the reinforced soil
zone and furthermore to couple it with the back and base drains as
shown in Fig. 9; see Berg et al. (2009). This also requires the slope to
drain away from the top of the wall facing thereby avoiding a waterfall-
effect with its possible toe erosion. In this way, all possible water
sources (with their accompanying hydrostatic pressures) are removed
from entering the reinforced soil zone.
4.4. Improper external water control
It was noted that 29 of the 87 (33%) external water failures were
surface water related. Again, the upper surface of the reinforced soil
zone should slope backward and away from the face of the wall, recall
Fig. 9, and furthermore it should be sealed with a geomembrane or
geosynthetic clay liner as shown in Fig. 7; see Berg et al. (2009), Collin
et al. (2002) and Bernardi et al. (2009). As is commonly the case, when
the reinforced soil zone deforms away from the retained soil zone, a
tension crack is formed between the two zones; recall Fig. 3b upper
right photograph. Such cracks must be immediately and continuously
filled with soil and joint sealer or else the hydrostatic pressure scenario
depicted in Fig. 10 is likely to occur.
Fig. 8. Improper location of drainage inlets and related piping within reinforced soil zone and subsequent pipe separation and leakage. (GSI photographs).
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Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912
4.5. Improperly assessed or misunderstood design details
Since the design of MSE structures is usually undertaken using a
computer program, parametric variations of sensitive variables can be
readily evaluated. Even further, the potential failure plane trajectory
can be nicely understood. By this we mean that a piecewise internal
failure can be distinguished from a circular arc external failure. Several
available computer programs can readily accommodate these different
failure modes.
As an example, the following parametric variations were performed
using such a program (Leshchinsky, 1997) to gauge the sensitivity of
each of the variables investigated. The following trends were observed.
(a) As the reinforcement length shortens, both internal linear and ex-
ternal circular arc failures are negatively affected.
(b) As the reinforcement spacing increases, internal piecewise linear
failures are negatively affected.
(c) As the exit angle at the toe of the slope increases, external circular
arc failures become more prevalent.
(d) As the backfill soil shear strength decreases, internal piecewise
linear failures become more prevalent.
(e) As water filled tension cracks occur, both internal linear and ex-
ternal circular types of failures are negatively affected.
(f) As the phreatic surface in front of and within the backfill soil in-
creases, external circular arc failures become more prevalent.
Obviously additional design variables can be selected for in-
vestigation, all of which give the necessary insight into the behavior of
MSE structures. In this regard, the Federal Highway Administration
Design and Construction Guidelines (Berg et al., 2009) describe other
situations of concern.
5. Summary and recommendations
This paper (building on previous reports and papers) presents 320
cases of MSE wall failures resulting in either excessive deformation or
actual collapse. The primary causes of the failures are felt to be in-
adequate or improper design and/or construction. The major design
inadequacy appears to be the use of fine grained soils in the reinforced
soil zone and the lack of proper drainage procedures along with the
poor practice of placement of “plumbing” and other utilities within the
reinforced soil zone. This combination must be halted along with the
shifting of all utilities from out of the reinforced soil zone, per Fig. 9, is
highly recommended. The major construction inadequacy is the approved
use of fine grained silt and clay backfill soils insofar as their inadequate
placement and compaction. The incorporated water stemming from
such situations leads to hydraulic pressures being mobilized behind the
facing or within the reinforced soil zone and requires the use of back
and base drains so as to dissipate the pressures and properly remove the
water at the front of the wall. Thus, both design and construction issues
are negatively interrelated with one another when it comes to the use of
fine grained soils and proper drainage controls.
Interestingly, there are no cases involving improper manufactured
R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner Geotextiles and Geomembranes 46 (2018) 904–912

Fig. 9. Suggested shifting of internal drainage systems from within to behind the reinforced soil zone.

geotextile or geogrid reinforcement products. Yet, the geosynthetics man-
ufacturer is often the first organization challenged when excessive de-
formation or collapse occurs. One other final point to be emphasized is
the realization that 313 (98%) of the cases were in the private sector.
Thus it appears that liberties are being taken for MSE walls at shopping
centers, industrial parks, housing developments, private facility infra-
structure projects and the like, that are not being taken by public sector
(federal, state and local) regulatory agencies. The reasons for this
disparity between private and public owned walls are conjecture (e.g.,
lack of peer review of plans and specifications, less control over backfill
soil, lack of inspection during construction, etc.) but are most important
so as to correct this situation going forward. Clearly, authoritative and
regularly updated codes, guides and practice documents along with
qualified and/or certified field inspectors (see GCI-ICP) are critical to
have and to be implemented accordingly.
Whatever the cause or causes of this large number of MSE wall

Fig. 10. Modular block wall collapse progression due to hydraulic pressure in tension cracks.

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R.M. Koerner, G.R. Koerner
failures having geosynthetic reinforcement, the situation sheds a poor
light on everyone involved in the process. This large number of failures
should be mitigated going forward so as to continue the use of such
geosynthetically reinforced MSE walls. Hopefully this paper will aid in
this regard.
Acknowledgements
This paper is made available through financial assistance of the
Members, Affiliated Members and Associate Members of the
Geosynthetic Institute (GSI). We sincerely thank them in this regard.
See our website at www.geosynthetic-institute.org for member organi-
zations along with contact persons.
In addition, the authors specifically acknowledge the following
persons who contributed multiple case histories to the data base: Felix
Jaecklin, Dov Leshchinsky, Blaise Fitzpatrick, Steve Wendland, Jay
McKelvey, Jason Wu, Rick Valentine and John Wolosick … Thank you!
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