Group Processes

Professor Ravi Thiruchselvam

Can we Promote Peace in the Middle East?
The Role of Attributions

Halperin et al. (2011)

 Attributions of Social Behavior

Dispositional Attributions Situational Attributions

 Can we Promote Peace in the Middle East?
The Role of Attributions

Reading Comprehension Task

Below is part of an article that was published recently in the most prestigious
psychological journal in the United States, American Psychologist. After many
years of uncertainty regarding the issue, the view presented in the article is
considered to be the established opinion among psychologists worldwide. The
study's results have far-reaching consequences for political and social processes
and therefore have had great influence on researchers as well as political leaders.
Please read the article summary carefully and answer the questions at the end of
it.
 A Group’s Character is Not Fixed – Violent Groups Can Change Their Ways (A
Group's Character is Like an Anchor – It Never Changes)

In many cases we witness acts of terrorism and other immoral acts, carried out by
different groups and nations. In many such cases we hope and believe that at some
point these groups and nations will come around and change their ways in a
positive direction. The results of a series of comprehensive studies that were
recently published in the Unites States show that this expectation has justification
(has no justification). Over the past 20 years Professor Edward Jones and his
colleagues at Harvard University have been studying trends and changes in the
violent behavior of animals, human beings and groups. As far as is known, this is the
most large-scale and detailed study that has been conducted in this field.
The major finding in this study is that extreme and violent behavior of the
overwhelming majority of subjects changed dramatically (stayed fixed) throughout
the years and was greatly (not) influenced by changes in the political context or
internal leadership changes. According to Professor Jones, "The study's results
clearly show that extreme and violent behavior is not a fixed characteristic of
individuals or groups, but a behavioral pattern influenced by context and leadership
(is a fixed characteristic, inherently entrenched within the nature of individuals or
groups). For this reason, it is to (cannot) be expected that when extreme leadership
is replaced with more moderate leaders, the extreme groups will change their
behavior and will present more conciliatory and pro-compromise attitudes and
behavior." The reason for this, according to the article's authors, is that in most
cases in which groups behave fanatically and violently towards other nations, they
do it as a result of leaders' manipulations, and not because the group members'
"evil" characteristics (characteristics deeply rooted within their nature and culture).
For example, one of the first studies, carried out on monkeys, showed that when
violent monkeys were transferred to a friendlier environment and were separated
from the extreme group leaders, the level of violence towards their caregivers and
other monkeys decreased dramatically (stayed constant). Studies conducted
among humans found that groups perceived as extreme or violent towards other
groups and nations changed their behavior significantly (did not change their
behavior at all) when their leaders were replaced.
 “All Jews/Palestinians are evil by nature.”

“All that Jews/Palestinians really want is to annihilate our homeland.”

“Jews/Palestinians should never be trusted.”

Change attributions for behavior

Dispositional à Situational

Less negative
attitudes
towards enemy
group

Willingness to compromise for peace

Halperin et al. (2011)
Crime and Punishment
Altering beliefs about free will
4 Shariff et al.

Prison-Sentence Recommendation
5

(out of 7)
4

1
Neutral Anti-Free-Will Neutral Neuroscience
Passage Passage Articles Articles
Study 2 Study 3
Shariff et al. (2014)
Fig. 1. Mean recommended prison sentence for a hypothetical criminal in Study 2 (neutral and anti-
free-will conditions) and Study 3 (neutral and neuroscience conditions). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.

was used in order to isolate participants’ desire for pun-
ishment as retribution.1 The passage further focused par-
ticipants on retributive, rather than consequentialist,
punishment by noting that the prosecution and defense
had agreed that the rehabilitation would prevent recidi-
vism and that any further detention after rehabilitation
would offer no addition deterrence of other potential
(~5 years) compared with participants who read the neu-
tral passage (~10 years).
Therefore, Study 2 demonstrated that experimentally
diminishing free-will beliefs alters legal judgments by
reducing inclinations for retributive punishment. In Study
3, we aimed to bolster this finding using a subtler manip-
ulation and measuring ratings of blameworthiness in
Group Polarization
 Group Polarization
The average post-group response will tend to be more extreme in the same
direction as the average of the pre-group responses

Risk-taking behaviour

Attitudes on social and moral issues

Jury decisions

Person Perception

Myers and Helmut Lamm (1976)

 Group Polarization: Influences and Causes

Moderating Factors
Group composition: polarization is stronger when groups are homogenous; members are
seen as likeable and friendly; physical closeness
Presence of an outgroup: polarization is stronger when exposed to an outgroup
Initial position: polarization is stronger when initial position is more extreme (versus neutral)

Causal Factors
1) Persuasive arguments
2) Social comparison
Myers and Helmut Lamm (1976); Sunstein (1999)
The Crowd-Emotion Amplification Effect

Goldenberg et al. (2021)

 The Crowd-emotion Amplification Effect
The Crowd-Emotion-Amplification Effect 439

a b

1s
Fig. 1. Task used in Study 1. Participants saw an array of one to 12 faces expressing different degrees of either anger or happiness; the
arrays appeared on the screen for 1 s (a). Participants were then asked to evaluate the average emotion expressed by these faces by adjust-
ing the intensity of a single morphed face on a scale from 1 to 50 (b).
Goldenberg et al. (2021)
 The Crowd-emotion
The Crowd-Emotion-Amplification Effect
Amplification Effect

Difference Between Estimated and Real

4

Mean Group Emotion 3 Angry faces

Negative Arrays
HappyArrays
Positive faces

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of Faces
Fig. 3. Difference between estimated and real mean emotions (estimated Goldenberg et al. (2021)
– real) for
positive and negative face arrays as a function of number of faces in Study 1. Gray areas
 The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind
By the mere fact that he forms
part of an organized crowd, a
man descends several rungs in
the ladder of civilization.
Isolated, he may be a
cultivated individual; in a
crowd, he is a barbarian—that
is, a creature acting by
instinct.

An individual in a crowd is a
grain of sand amid other
grains of sand, which the wind
stirs up at will"

-- Gustav Le Bon (1895)

De-individuation
 Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology
1976, Vol. 33, No. 2, 178-183

Effects of Deindividuation Variables on Stealing

Among Halloween Trick-or-Treaters
Edward Diener Scott C. Eraser
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign University of Southern California
De- Arthur L. Beaman Roger T. Kelem
individuation University of Montana Portland, Oregon

in Groups A naturalistic study was conducted on Halloween to assess the effects of three
deindividuation variables on stealing by children. Concealed raters unobtru-
sively observed over 1,300 trick-or-treating children who were assigned to
various conditions and given an opportunity to steal candy and money. The
independent variables were anonymity versus nonanonymity, alone versus
group, and groups with or without a child who was made responsible for the
group actions. Significantly more stealing was observed under conditions of
anonymity (p < .001) and in the presence of a group (/><.001). There was
also an interaction effect between these variables. Altered responsibility af-
fected the transgression rate only when both the leader and members were
anonymous. The highest rates of stealing occurred among anonymous children
in groups with altered responsibility.

What forces act on members of antisocial
groups to transform socialized individuals into
uninhibited persons? Festinger, Pepitone,
and Newcomb (1952) postulated that when
group members are not seen as individuals, a
so it was not directly manipulated in the
present study.
Research on anonymity suggests that this
variable may have its strongest effect when
combined with group presence. Festinger et
Changes in self-consciousness as the cause
of de-individuated behaviors

Diener and Wallbom (1976)

 De-individuation

Reduced
Immersion in Group Uninhibited behavior
self-consciousness
Is de-individuation inherently negative?

Spivey and Stephen Prentice-Dunn (1990)

Bystander Apathy
Kitty Genovese
 Bystander Apathy
Kitty Genovese

While there was no question that the attack occurred, and that some neighbors ignored cries for help,
the portrayal of 38 witnesses as fully aware and unresponsive was erroneous. The article grossly
exaggerated the number of witnesses and what they had perceived. None saw the attack in its entirety.
Only a few had glimpsed parts of it, or recognized the cries for help. Many thought they had heard
lovers or drunks quarreling. There were two attacks, not three. And afterward, two people did call the
police. A 70-year-old woman ventured out and cradled the dying victim in her arms until they arrived.
Ms. Genovese died on the way to a hospital.
Bystander Apathy

Darley and Latane (1968)

seizures). The naive subject talked last in the In the above conditions,
series, after the last prerecorded voice was played.2 college students. In a fin
When it was again the victim's turn to talk, he from the same introductor

Bystander Apathy
made a few relatively calm comments, and then,
growing increasingly louder and incoherent, he
were tested in a three
condition.
continued: Time to help. The majo
the time elapsed from the
I-er-um-I think I-I necd-er-if-if could-er-er-some- until the subject left her e
body er-er-er-er-er-er-er give me a liltle-er-give the subject left her room,
me a little help here because-er-I-er-I'm-er-er-
assistant seated at the end
h-h-having a-a-a real problcm-er-right now and ably went to the assista
I-er-if somebody could help me out it would-it without the subject having
would-er-er s-s-sure be-sure be good . . . because- the experiment was termin
cr-there-er-cr-a cause I-er-I-uh-I've got a-a one of As soon as the subject
the-er-sei er-cr-things coming on and-and-and or after 6 minutes had
I could really-er-use some help so if somebody assistant disclosed the tru
would-er-give me a little h-help-uh-er-er-er-er-er ment, and dealt with any
c-could somebody-er-er-help-er-uh-uh-uh (choking subject. Finally the subject
sounds). . . . I'm gonna die-er-er-I'm . . . gonna concerning her thoughts
die-er-help-er-er-seizure-er-[chokes, then quiet]. emergency, and completed
The experimenter began timing the speed of the ism, anomie, and authorita
real subject's response at the beginning of the vic- a social desirability scale (C
tim's speech. Informed judges listening to the tape a social responsibility sca
have estimated that the victim's increasingly louder 1964), and reported vital s
Darley and Latane (1968)
and more disconnected ramblings clearly repre- data.
 tributions suggest that had the experiment from one
been allowed to run for a considerably longer is consid
time, few additional subjects would have help from
380 JOHN M. DARLF.V AND BIBB LATANIR
responded. five duri
Bystander Apathy
Speed of Response
instance,
fit, the vi
To achieve a more detailed analysis of the by the s
TABLE 1 formed into a "speed" sc
results, each subject's time score was trans- compared
tion. Afte
'KCTS 01? GROUPS SIZE ON LIKELIHOOD AND loo reciprocal of the response getting h
SPEED or RESPONSE in all thr
and multiplying by 100.
Effect of
% responding Time Speed transformation was to Victim de
Group size N by end of fit in sec. score
ences between longer wereSevera timerun
2 (5 & victim) 13 85 52 .87 ducing the contribution femaleto
was eithe
s

3 (S, victim, & 1 other) 26 62 93 .72 arbitrary 6-minute limit thought o t

6 (.9, victim, & 4 others) 13 31 166 .51 speed score indicates ata Bellev
student w
fas
2
Note.—p value of diffciences: x = 7.91, p < .02; 7'' = 8.09, An analysis12o 16O 2ooof variance
24O 28O
8
The fo
person wi
p < .01, for speed scores. effect ofBeginning
Seconds from group
of Fit sizeprobability
is
where n i

FIG. 1. Cumulative distributions of helping responses. one of n

(/> < .01). Duncan multipl
Every one of the subjects in the two- cate that all but the two-
person groups, but only 62% of the subjects groups Darley and differ
Latane significantly
(1968)
 Implicit Bystander Apathy

Group Condition 2-person condition

Imagine that you and a friend are sitting in a crowded
movie theater. There are people in front of you,
behind you, and to your sides. Although there are
some children, the audience is mostly adults, and you
are just watching the movie previews.
Imagine that you and a friend are sitting alone in a
movie theater. You and your friend have the entire
theater to yourself, and you are just watching the movie
previews.

Garcia et al. (2002)

 Bystander Apathy Re-visited

Individual Likelihood versus Aggregate Likelihood

Philpot et al. (2019)

 Individual Likelihood versus Aggregate Likelihood
INTERVENTION IS THE NORM IN REAL-LIFE PUBLIC CONFLICTS 5

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Wim Bernasco

At least one bystander intervened in 90.9%

et al., 2011; Liebst et al., 2018; Lindegaard et al., 2017).
Specifically, a bystander was determined as an intervener
if they attempted to placate the conflict with any of the
following acts: pacifying gesturing; calming touches;
blocking contact between conflict parties (Figure 1c);
holding, pushing or pulling an aggressor away from the
conflict (Figure 1c); consoling a victim of aggression;
providing practical help to a physically harmed victim
(for the full Observational Codebook containing detailed
descriptions of all study variables, see online materials at
https://osf.io/xzjsg/).
For each clip, coders recorded the total number of
interveners. This provided descriptive detail regarding
the sum of interveners per context and allowed for the
assessment of situational bystander intervention. In ad-
dition, coders noted the total number of bystanders at an
event (M ! 16.29, SD ! 13.16), the duration of the
conflict (M ! 3.27 minutes, SD ! 4.20), and the national Philpot et al. (2019)
context of each clip. To test the reliability of the coded
Group Formation and Rivalry
Robbers Cave
Realistic Conflict Theory
Minimal Group Paradigm

How Are Groups Formed?

Minimal Group Paradigm

Biling & Tajfel (1973)

 Child Development, May ⁄ June 2011, Volume 82, Number 3, Pages 793–811

Consequences of ‘‘Minimal’’ Group Affiliations in Children

Yarrow Dunham Andrew Scott Baron
University of California, Merced University of British Columbia

Susan Carey
Harvard University

Explicit Attitudes
Three experiments (total N = 140) tested the hypothesis that 5-year-old children’s membership in randomly
Implicit
assigned ‘‘minimal’’ groups would be sufficient Attitudes
to induce intergroup bias. Children were randomly assigned
to groups and engaged in tasks involving judgments of unfamiliar in-group or out-group children. Despite an
absence of information regarding the relative status of groups or any competitive context, in-group prefer-
ences were observed on explicit and implicitResource Allocation
measures of attitude and resource allocation (Experiment 1),
behavioral attribution, and expectations of reciprocity, with preferences persisting when groups were not
described via a noun label (Experiment 2). In addition, children systematically distorted incoming information
by preferentially encoding positive information about in-group members (Experiment 3). Implications for the
developmental origins of intergroup bias are discussed.
& Liben, 1997). First, they provide
gical validity, as most real-world
all do not come with a menu of
m which one must merely choose.
tion tests risk confounding a gen-
Child Development,
r negativity bias with actual recall.
Experiment 2 demonstrated a ten-
ute positive actions to members of
Consequences
if a recognition memory task
ed recall of positive actions per-
Yarrow
in-group, it would be difficult
is constituted a memoryUniversity
bias rather
plication of that attributional bias.
d for free recall as our primary
ure.
erence. Immediately following the
res, children were asked which
an in-group member. Planned contrasts revealed
that this effect was driven primarily by recall of
positive actions; positive actions were more fre-
quently recalled for in-group members than for
out-group members, t(44) = 2.41, p = .02, whereas
recall of negativeMay ⁄ June 2011, Volume
actions did not82, Number
vary 3, Pages 793–811
as a function
of group, paired t(44) = )1.23, p > .23.
Members of the control group evidenced the
sameof ‘‘Minimal’’
tendency Group
to recall more Affiliations
negative than positivein Children
actions (1.18 negative vs. 0.53 positive actions),
to Dunham
main effect of valence, F(1, 17) = 8.87, pAndrew < .01, butScott Baron
there were
of California, Mercedno effects of story on memory (p > .09)
University of British Columbia
and no interaction between story and item valence
(p > .36). Mean rates of recall
Susan Carey did not differ for the
experimental and control groups, 3.9 total items
Harvard University
1.6
Ingroup

uld rather play with, and their 1.4 Outgroup Memory Recall
esponse was recorded. For this 1.2
Three experiments
data for participants in test condi-(total N = 140) tested the hypothesis that 5-year-old children’s membership in randomly
1
# Recalled

assigned ‘‘minimal’’
uded, as control participants heard groups would be sufficient to induce intergroup bias. Children were randomly assigned
to groups and engaged in tasks 0.8 involving judgments of unfamiliar in-group or out-group children. Despite an
stories and so none of the play-
absence of information regarding0.6 the relative status of groups or any competitive context, in-group prefer-
d were in an in-group. This
ences were observed on explicit 0.4 and implicit measures of attitude and resource allocation (Experiment 1),
nal sample of behavioral
45 children for this
attribution, and expectations of reciprocity, with preferences persisting when groups were not
0.2
described via a noun label (Experiment 2). In addition, children systematically distorted incoming information
0
by preferentially encoding positive information
Positive
about in-group members
Negative
(Experiment 3). Implications for the
Results developmental origins of intergroup bias are discussed.
Action Valence
IN-GROUP LOVE OR
OUT-GROUP HATE?
 IN-GROUP LOVE OR
OUT-GROUP HATE?

Although we could not perceive our own in-groups excepting as they contrast to out-
groups, still the in-groups are psychologically primary. . . . Hostility toward out-groups
helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required. . . . The familiar is
preferred. What is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, less “good,” but there is not
necessarily hostility against it. . . . Thus, while a certain amount of predilection is
inevitable in all in-group memberships, the reciprocal attitude toward out-groups may
range widely.

-- Allport (The Nature of Prejudice;1954)

Neural Encoding of Minimal Groups
 MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM
NUMERICAL ESTIMATION STYLE

Please indicate
the number of
dots you saw

Please indicate
the number of
dots you saw

You are an
UNDERESTIMATOR

Ratner, et al., 2014

 TRIAL STRUCTURE

500ms 500ms

UNDERESTIMATOR
2000ms OVERESTIMATOR

2000ms

750ms
750ms

1250ms
1250ms

Credit: Natalie Kuhn

EEG
Minimal Group Paradigm
 Minimal Group Paradigm
, D.M. Amodio / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 298–301 299

e extracted from visual

n of a face. Specifically,
vent-related potential—
negative-polarity neuro-
ral scalp sites approxi-
has been identified as a
g (Bentin, Allison, Puce,
ERP component known
Rossion & Caharel, 2011;

differing on established
ave been examined pre-
& Nelson, 2010; Ito &
d, 2003; Ofan, Rubin, &
obre, 2008). Important-
tgroup faces differed in Fig. 1. Minimal group effect on N170 amplitude. Results indicated a larger N170 effect
, and the groups were to ingroup faces than outgroup faces. Ratner & Amodio (2013)
 A REPLICATION

In-group
Amplitude (µV) Out-group

N170

Time (ms)

Credit: Natalie Kuhn

Own-race Bias in Face Recognition

Meissner & Brigham (2001)

Research Article
The Cross-Category Effect
Mere Social Categorization Is Sufficient to Elicit an
Own-Group Bias in Face Recognition
Michael J. Bernstein, Steven G. Young, and Kurt Hugenberg
Miami University
ABSTRACT—Although the cross-race effect (CRE) is a well-
established phenomenon, both perceptual-expertise and
social-categorization models have been proposed to ex-
plain the effect. The two studies reported here investigated
the extent to which categorizing other people as in-group
versus out-group members is sufficient to elicit a pattern of
face recognition analogous to that of the CRE, even when
perceptual expertise with the stimuli is held constant. In
Study 1, targets were categorized as members of real-life
Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Although there are many varia
of this hypothesis (Ng & Lindsay, 1994), the core argu
is that de facto racial segregation leads perceivers to hav
ferential expertise in processing same-race versus cross
faces. This differential expertise then leads to differentia
ognition accuracy. The lesser contact with individuals of
races than with individuals of the same race yields fewe
portunities for distinguishing between cross-race faces, m
ing perceivers are relatively inexpert at distinguishing bet
 Are minimal out-groups readily feared?

In-group Out-group

Navarette et al. (2012)

Fear Learning: Classical Conditioning

Fear

Fear

Fear
Fear Learning: Classical Conditioning

Fear

Fear

Fear
Fear is Readily Acquired for Minimal Out-group Faces
592 C.D. Navarrete et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 33 (2012) 590–593

Yet, perhaps there are d

processing of categories
historically deep social ide
versus those characterized a
selection operating on the f
evolved different decisio
extinction of the fight–flig
with which individuals ma
those to which one has not
has an informational basis
out-group (such as ethnic g
and that information is rein
with an individual from th
activate the neural processe
a fear response toward mem
there is no such prior b
Fig. 1. Fear response by target group and trial. Smoothed means include a temporally shifting groups
95% confidence interval around the out-group target group. negative conditioned respon
Navarette et al. (2012)
Why Do We Form Groups?
 Me and We: Social Identity Theory

1. People try to achieve or to maintain positive social identity.

2. Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group
and some relevant out-groups.

3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more
positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct.

Diehl (1990)
 Me and We: Social Identity Theory

Form Minimal Groups

Opportunity to enhance in-group No opportunity to enhance in-group

Oakes and Turner (1980)

Lemyre and Smith (1985)
Core Motives: Belongingness and Security