Pakistan’s political conflict is not about elections anymore

It is a bigger political game, never played before in Pakistan with such

spirit and massive public support to a player in the field. It is in the
open, a more complex power struggle than we have seen in the past
through so many crises the country has endured. 

The game has two dimensions, one very old, unsettled issue of civil-
military relations, and the other, relatively new, between dynastic
political forces with stakes in maintaining the status quo and the
movement of Imran Khan against them. 

The new strength that this movement has acquired since Khan’s
ouster on the night of April 9 this year has turned public focus and
interest to the root problems of Pakistan’s politics and the real cause
of national decay, endemic disorder and instability. If there is any
winner so far, it is the narrative of Khan, which has shaped the new
phase of his two-and-half decades of active resistance to the power
elites.

dynastic politics
It is clear that the two major dynastic political families controlling the
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-N
(PMLN) and their allies have pursued policies against national
interests and run a corrupt patronage system with a very broad
network of beneficiaries in politics, businesses, bureaucracy and
judiciary to maintain their hold on power.

Khan’s storyline goes like this: It is systemic elite corruption that has
caused the decline of Pakistan, and recovery will require making them
accountable for the wrongs they have committed against the country
and the people. However, that will not be possible without wresting
power from them by popular support.

To the misfortune of the old guard elites, the narrative has sunk deep
into the political psyche of the largest and most volatile section of the
population, the youth, urban middle classes and now general public at
all levels. This doesn’t mean the ‘corrupt’ patronage system of the
traditional ruling class has crumpled altogether; it is weakened but
they are resisting change by pooling up their strength.

Never have we seen such a large, diverse, and previously conflictive

alliance of political parties in a single fold, as we see today in the
form of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). It has religious,
sectarian, regional, ethnic and the two main former rival political
parties, the PPP and PMLN together to fend off the challenge.

What makes them stand and stick together?

The rise of Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaf, proved too big a
political force after the 2018 elections to confront by each doing it
alone. Most of them faced criminal and corrupt investigations,
heightened accountability and the daily rhetorical tirades of Khan.

Being old hands in politics, experienced and deft at making and

breaking governments in the past, they played the final round pulling
Khan’s allies and his party members of the National Assembly on to
their side. His reactive, relentless campaign for the last seven months
has seen his popularity rise unimaginably high. This is the real worry
for the PDM. It fears, and rightly so, that if elections are held earlier
than scheduled late next year, Khan may sweep with more than two-
thirds majority, meaning he may turn autocratic, revengeful and put a
last nail in the coffin of dying political dynasties or cripple them to
never rise again. 

civil-military relations

We have seen many politicians airing views against Pakistan’s

powerful military leadership in the past, but never so loud, so
consistent and clearly stated, as by Khan. He has gone much farther
than the conventional allegations of anti-democracy. He has cast a
doubt on their integrity. This may push the PDM and the military
establishment to a tighter hug, and their allies in the media and
bureaucracy fear that if Khan succeeds, they all lose out. To his
advantage, the titanic plates of mass support have shifted in his favor.
If things go wrong, we may expect an earthquake, a political tsunami,
or worse.
In Pakistan, treating democratic oppositions as traitors is the easy
way out

There are many signs of democratic decline in Pakistan but one

consistent weakness has been the troubled relations between the
majorities forming government and those in opposition. If democracy
is practiced in true spirit, opposition parties will have a legitimate
place in the system as an alternative, a government-in-waiting.

Practically, the parties quite often change places from government to

opposition and from opposition to government in mature and
institutionalized western democracies. In a competitive system, the
political parties take their case to the people for the next electoral run,
and depending on who gets the fresh popular mandate, a new
government is formed. That’s not the end for the party losing at the
polls; it will play its role as an opposition in the legislature and out in
the public. In true democracies, the government and opposition are
two sides of the same coin and an integral part of the political system.
One cannot function without the other. 

However, political life in our part of the world doesn’t go by any

democratic theory or practices elsewhere. The history of Pakistan is
replete with examples of electoral majorities making it difficult for the
opposition parties even to survive, let alone accepting their legitimacy
or nationalist credentials. Quite often, political opponents in power or
in the opposition are given labels of ‘traitors,’ anti-state and anti-
Pakistan. There are three explanations for the opposition-are-traitors
phenomena—colonial legacies, history of partition and the feudal
culture of the country.

colonial legacies

Pakistan has a complicated political inheritance of British rule, which

include state, political institutions, laws and conventions that have
continuously impacted developments after independence. British rule
didn’t rest on consent but coercion. Stability of the Empire required
submission to alien rule. The colonizers ruthlessly suppressed any
sign of resistance by word or deed to make an example out of the
‘traitors.’ Every freedom fighter was a rebel and many laws were
written to treat anti-British activities as seditious. Rulers in Pakistan,
both military and civilian, have added more to harsh colonial era laws,
like Article-6 of the Constitution that is very loosely interpreted to
frame opponents in treason cases, for which it is hard to get bail. It is
the easy way out for governments to harass the opposition by using
‘treason charges’ instead of engaging in negotiations and building
consensus to resolve political disputes.

history of partition The Muslim leaders of a very diverse

subcontinent were bitterly divided on the idea of Pakistan as an
independent country in 1947. Those who opposed it as a way out for
Muslim majority areas were demonized as ‘anti-Pakistan’, despite the
fact they had accepted it and began participating in the post-
independence political process.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a democratically elected prime minister, banned

the National Awami Party of Baloch and Pashtun nationalists in 1974
and put their entire leadership in jail for years to face ‘treason’
charges..

The great and ugly game in Pakistan’s heartland

Defections or breaking ranks with one’s party to support its political

rivals in the national and provincial assemblies for long has been a de-
stabilizing issue in Pakistan’s parliamentary history. The system
Pakistan inherited from colonial Britain rests on the principle of a
majority party in the national and provincial assemblies forming the
government. The executive being born out of the legislature is
accountable to it, and stays in power as long as it enjoys the
confidence of the majority. In case no party wins a majority in the
elections, the one with more seats than others will exercise its first
right to form the government, but the President will require the new
government to obtain a vote-of-confidence or show a majority in the
legislature. The same procedure is followed in the provinces when
elections produce a divided mandate, necessitating cobbling together
uneasy political coalitions. Parties with thin majorities in the past
have faced problems from factions and dissident ambitious leaders
within their fold forming ‘forward blocs’ to bring the government
down by switching sides. The rival parties and state institutions have
used the agency of individual turncoats, ‘forward blocs’ and buying
off of smaller parties to change a regime without taking the trouble of
fresh elections.

Intense polarization and Pakistan’s democratic future

Pakistan has been a polarized polity and consequently, a divided

society for the past half century, and even longer if we look back
deeply into its history.

It started with the serious differences among the political elites of the
country over the character of the state, quality of federalism,
relationship between religion and governance and ideological choices.
One may argue that it could be a normal process in a diverse nation’s
struggle to take a definite direction and achieve stability in the
formative phase. But one wonders why it would take nine years in
writing the first constitution and then its annulment within three years
without any general elections or transfer of power happening under it.
Without getting into the details, it was the inability of the ruling elites,
their diverse regional backgrounds, personal vested interests in power
grabs, and for that purpose, engineering of political manipulation to
wreck governments and forms new ones.
Factions of the same elite under different party platforms kept
displacing one another from power endlessly until the military took
over in 1959.

The recent ouster of former prime minister Imran Khan, despite the
fact that he had the largest party in the parliament with 156 members
losing power to a motley group of political factions, the closest
second having only 86 members and forming the new government,
speaks a great deal about persistent polarization. The sad story of
Pakistan is that naked factional elite interests have shaped these
power plays, often by seeking friendly intervention from the powerful
judicial and security institutions.

The normal and expected role of the political elites in any form of
political system is working toward stability, order, national unity,
solidarity and continuity along with ensuring progress, social and
economic development.
The Pakistani elites have done quite the opposite: polarizing and
dividing people along ethnic, religious, ideological and narrow
political lines. Generation after generation, coming from the same
feudal-tribal social background, they have promoted political values
that run counter to nation and state-building in ethically and
demographically diverse society.
Ultimately, it is the rapacious character of the Pakistan ruling classes,
their low commitment to rule of law and accountability and access to
power as means of material benefits that have stunted the growth of
democracy. In such conditions, the military has assumed the role of
‘guardian’ of the state, and has regularly managed political conflicts
erupting over power struggles among the elites.
The present polarization between the PTI and the rest of the 11 so-
called political parties and factions is not new. It is a continuation of
the same historical pattern, only the main characters have changed.
Each successive confrontation has been more severe than before. The
ongoing clash looks like political warfare with no-holds-barred,
barely covered with a fig leaf of constitutionality.

This has been in the making for the past nine years when Imran Khan
challenged the fairness of the 2013 elections. The others, in return,
questioned the accuracy of the 2018 vote and vowed to oust him from
power by forming a joint alliance, launching street demonstrations,
and finally succeeding by winning over dissidents from his party and
coalition partners and moving successfully a vote-of-confidence
motion in the National Assembly.
The sudden change of heart by four coalition groups supporting Khan
and the open betrayal of 20 members of his party have raised many
troubling questions about the neutrality of powerful state institutions.
This adds another dimension to the political conflict playing out in
media, civil society and the general public. 
Khan has instantly decided to engage in popular agitation against
what he calls an ‘imported’ government by weaving a narrative of
foreign ‘conspiracy’ and accusing some as ‘traitors.’ His decision to
resign from the national assembly en-masse is stunning and may
prove to be an adventurous path to Azadi‘liberation’ for the country.
He will be doing politics now not in the parliament but in the streets,
rousing public anger against the ‘corrupt mafia’ and demanding fresh
elections.

The foul language of Pakistani politics

Name-calling, insults, personal attacks, public humiliation, even

murder, torture, abductions and the illegal confinement of political
opponents-- is as old as Pakistan’s first democratic transition in the
early 70’s. It was the time and rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from
leading a popular movement against Ayub Khan, to becoming the first
civilian chief martial law administrator, and prime minister success.
While taking to the streets to dislodge Field Martial Mohammad
Ayub Khan, who was then the president of Pakistan, he would turn
his political guns of rhetoric and insult on eminent political leaders of
competing parties. He would mock them, give them dirty names and
often use invectives. He wilfully presented himself as a polemical
populist to seek attention and attract big crowds. The bigger the
public gatherings he addressed, the greater he engaged in the
belittlement of politicians from other political parties. 

The political culture of maligning opponents has roots in multiple

sources, like social intolerance, the rise of extremism and political
anxiety generated by unprincipled power politics in the country. 

Rasul Bakhsh Rais

In Pakistan, attacking the superior judiciary has a long history

It’s not new and it’s been happening for a very long time. When the
political elite of Pakistan, whether in government or opposition see a
case going against their own interests, they begin attacking Supreme
Court judges left, right and center. In their power struggles, which
they often engage with through constitutionally questionable means,
they spare no institution if they have lost or fear losing an important
case for adjudication in the courts. 

There is a consistent pattern of political disputes ending at the

doorsteps of the Supreme Court. The reason is the unwillingness of
the government and opposition parties to sit around the table and
resolve issues through dialogue.

Factions within and the future of the PTI 

The description of Pakistani politics, as of the elite by the elite and for
the elite may sound cynical, but it is accurate if we closely examine
the dominance of dynastic political families.

In the entire history of Pakistan, no political party has been able to

complete two consecutive tenures in office. That tells us all about
political instability due to the frequent making and unmaking of
political alliances and coalitions. In my view, there are hundreds of
political families that keep shifting their political weight in favor of
one or another political coalition. With great experience at hand, they
can make a good guess of the political climate, and sensing political
storms, they show no signs of embarrassment in moving to a secure
political tent.

The media madness in Pakistan

is chaotic and conflictive. It was not a democratic but the military

regime of Pervez Musharraf that freed, liberalized and proliferated
electronic media about two decades ago. Before that, Pakistanis were
used to watching only one channel, Pakistan Television, popularly
known as PTV. Successive regimes in Pakistan had used a monopoly
over the airwaves to use radio and television more as a tool of
propaganda than to inform and educate the population. Many decades
ago, PTV made some of the best drama serials and offered
outstanding musical and entertainment programmes, but like other
government run entities, it deteriorated and lost credibility with the
people. Even for news about their own country, people would turn to
foreign news channels.

As the economy boomed under Musharraf, private channels became

an attractive option for all sorts of businesses in Pakistan for
advertising. Then the government also pumped billions of rupees into
the electronic media to publicize its programmes, policies, and
achievements.

For a while the media played a friendly, often supportive role for the
military regime. It served both, the military got stability and positive
publicity, and the electronic media reaped material benefits. Huge
revenues enabled the media to pay journalists shifting from
newspaper to electronic channels massive amounts, especially the
anchorpersons that have become national celebrities, part of the elite
culture and elite networks of Pakistan.

The new electronic media and those running it got empowered so

rapidly and on a scale never seen before in the country.

Although there have been complaints about channels forced to

practice some sort of self-censorship, in the comparative sense the
media in Pakistan is one of the freest in the region.

This freedom is a great value if exercised with restraint, responsibility

and with the supremacy of societal and national interests in mind. The
problem in many developing societies like Pakistan is weak
professionalism and issues of integrity that enable vested economic
and political interests to capture a bigger space on the media. Worse
than that, in many cases, hidden hands and parties run the media
through front companies. Powerful business houses, especially in real
estate, and dynastic political families have established deep influences
within the media through means of patronage that in the Western
world would amount to bribery. Every party in Pakistan is concerned
about self-image, as anywhere, and engaged in shaping supportive
narrative and political discourses; and so is the government and some
state institutions.

The media has emerged as the main battleground for competing ideas,
controversies and debates, currently between the government and the
opposition parties now united under the banner of Pakistan
Democratic Movement. The political talk shows begin early in the
evenings, seven days a week, and last till late in the night over every
channel and in all national languages. Every hour, the anchor may
change, but the issues under discussion for the day and the format of
the participating commentators remain the same. For two to three
hours, Pakistanis get heavy doses of political controversies, half-
truths, conspiracies and routine allegations and insinuations of wrongs
against all sides of the political divide. What is interesting is that the
moment we see the parade of spokespersons, the views become
predictable. The representatives of different parties can be seen
strictly following their party lines, defending allegations of corruption
against their party bosses valiantly, and even picking up fights on
camera.

What goes for a political ‘comment’ is hate-mongering, confrontation,

and conflictive posturing. At the end of the day, a common viewer is
left confused and pessimistic about the future of the country and
himself or herself. I believe media cannot take refuge in being the
messenger or acting as a common forum for all, as it leaves saner
voices out and plays to the tunes of powerful political interests. They
benefit from the chaos-- not the country, democracy or freedom in
their truest sense.

Long marches on Islamabad and the politics of protest 

No other country has adopted the political terminology of ‘Long

March’ as universally and across the political spectrum as the
religious, sectarian, ethnic and the major political parties of Pakistan
during the last 30 years. There cannot be a better tribute to the
revolutionary and mass mobilization strategy of Mao Zedong
anywhere in the world than in the endless ‘long marches’ to lay siege
around the capital city, Islamabad against a sitting government, quite
often to remove it from power, and sometimes to address a particular
issue. 

We live in different times, and even the Chinese have gone back on
what Mao had stood for— socialism. However, the symbolism and
mythology of the ‘long march’ remains alive in Pakistan, China’s
long-term strategic partner and neighbor.

 Rasul Bakhsh Rais

Interestingly, religious parties with very little to no representation in
the parliament have launched most of the marches. They lack public
support, but have dedicated constituencies among their respective
religious followers, and have built up street power to menace any
government in power. Each time they highlighted a specific issue—
corruption, finality of prophethood and rigging of elections-- but
mixed it with the larger manifesto of Islamizing the state and society. 

Balancing the institutions

Institutional imbalance has been one of the major causes of setbacks
to democracy
Institutional imbalance has been one of the major causes of setbacks
to democracy, political instability, and a reason for the worsening of
civil-military relations, subordination of judiciary and politicisation of
bureaucracy. When institutions function within their constitutional
limits, and each keeps supremacy of the Constitution before personal
or institutional interests, a formal systemic balance follows. The
principle which defines the balance among institutions is the
separation of powers. No democracy can function as a true democracy
without separating powers—legislative, executive and the judicial.
This has been a major challenge, a dilemma and the root cause of all
problems that we confront.

It began with the executive bringing the superior judiciary under its
sway. Having done this, it was able to dominate the legislature—
parliament, which is assumed to be a sovereign institution. The
executive authoritarianism of early years of independence and the
four interventions, lasting for 30 years, controlled the legislature and
the judiciary. The transition to democracy three times created elected
political executives but the system turned out to be equally
authoritarian with concentration of powers in the powerful office of
the prime minister. Both the judiciary and the legislature remained
heavily overshadowed by the power and influence of the prime
ministers. Military’s intervention in politics, its subversion of the
Constitution and rearranging of institutional powers to benefit the
ruling generals has been a greater cause of institutional imbalance
than any other. The legacies of military rule have lingered on, and
security establishment’s control over security and critical foreign
policy issues has often resulted in bouts of power struggles with some
of the civilian regimes.

There are two reasons for it. First, there has been a distrust of the
civilian politicians, particularly their tendency to move now and fast
in claiming greater civilian space on security and foreign policy
issues. Second, the continual crisis of performance legitimacy of the
civilian leaders. Civilian supremacy needs to be established, but what
can be the best strategy? Learning from successful post-military
regime elsewhere, it requires two elements. First, mutual trust,
consultation and consensus on critical national issues. Even in best of
democracies, the political executives pursue an extensive deliberative
process involving the military, intelligence agencies, foreign policy
establishment and the political executive. Good politics is about
finding a common ground, what is doable and what helps achieve a
general agreement on the national objectives and best course of action
for achieving them. Second, is the record of performance of a civilian
government, which would give it deeper roots and acceptance within
the population, and eventually greater influence to sell its argument to
the security establishment.

Challenging the political establishment

The political establishment represents powerful political families of
Pakistan
Besides the familiar, and much, controversial ‘establishment’ —
which means primarily the military or security establishment — is the
political establishment, comprising the PPP, the PML-N and their
allies among the regionalist parties.The political establishment
represents powerful political families of Pakistan. It has strong roots
in the electoral constituencies on account of land, shrine, biradari or
tribe. This is the social base of political elite class of Pakistan. The
industrialists, like the Sharif, and businessmen have joined the
powerful elite club through the agency of military regimes.

There are three other factors that have historically added to the power
and influence of the political establishment. First, it is the popular
representation that gives it legitimacy to be members of the
assemblies, cabinets and public office holders in the district
governments. Getting power through popular vote gives the elite class
constitutional authority to rule without accountability
The second factor that adds to the power of the political club is
political patronage. It is true that no democracy can function
effectively without political patronage, but it is, and what it is not
raises many controversies about its being a legitimate tool of politics.
It is common knowledge that the members of the assemblies take a
certain percentage as ‘commission’ from contractors. Trillions of
rupees have been given away since 1988. The ruling elite has grown
fabulously rich through commissions, contracts, and questionable
deals with national and foreign companies.

The third reason for the power of the political establishment is

systematic, vast-scale corruption. Pakistan stands 117 among 180
countries on the international corruption ranking. The estimated
amount of Pakistanis holding dollar wealth abroad is two hundred
billion. It couldn’t happen without ruining the legal, bureaucratic and
accountability systems.

Who will or can challenge the power of the political establishment.

There is no social movement directed at the ruling class and its
corruption. The institutions have been rendered absolutely weak,
almost dysfunctional. The recent assertive role of the apex judiciary,
the National Accountability Bureau and more recently of the Federal
Investigation Agency in reviving, investigating and unearthing cases
of corruption by the elite families and their functionaries are signs of
hope.

But this is a not a big challenge, from institutions, that the political
class has weakened in the past, and can do the same in the future. This
is actually a challenge the people must offer when deciding who to
vote for.
How did the political crisis escalate?

The Pakistani parliament voted no confidence in Prime Minister Imran

Khan in the early hours of 10 April, in a culmination of tensions that had
been building for some time. The Khan government brought its two rivals
together by consistently targeting their top leadership through a flawed
accountability process overseen by the controversial National
Accountability Bureau. Meanwhile, public anger at the government was
growing because of soaring inflation and governance failures. Politicisation
of the bureaucracy and interference in policing deprived citizens of basis
services and security. The prospect of unrest was real. Yet when the
opposition agreed on a common goal, ousting Khan through constitutional
means – a no-trust vote in parliament – it posed a far bigger threat to the
prime minister’s survival in office.

What role has the country’s powerful military played?

The military supported Khan before he formed his government, leading the
opposition to claim that the PTI owed its victory in the 2018 elections to the
generals. After Khan took power, he enjoyed nearly free rein in the
domestic domain while the military high command retained control of
sensitive foreign and security policy files. Khan and his cabinet ministers
were often keen to emphasise that the PTI government and the military
leadership were “on the same page”.

Khan’s hardline anti-West foreign policy has also likely played a role in the
military’s decision to distance itself from its political ally. The prime
minister’s ill-timed visit to Moscow had taken place just days before the
opposition lodged its 8 March no-trust motion. of Ukraine and also
emphasised that Pakistan had a “long and excellent strategic relationship
with the U.S., which remains our largest export market”.

What lies ahead as general elections approach?

The incoming coalition government faces multiple challenges. First of these

is to defuse political tensions by offering to work with the opposition as
Prime Minister Sharif has already done, while also resisting the temptation
to settle political scores. The government also needs to stabilise the
floundering economy, including by securing assistance from international
financial institutions. Militant groups, especially the Pakistani Taliban,
which has been making a comeback in the tribal belt along the Afghan
border, are again an increasing threat. When in government, the PTI was
already in confrontation mode with the Election Commission of Pakistan,
accusing the body that oversees elections of partisanship. Now in
opposition, the former prime minister will likely give even less credence to
the Commission’s ability to conduct free, fair and credible elections.

The following issues need attention for promoting a responsible civil-

military relationship within a democratic constitutional framework:
(1) A decision on the part of the top brass of the military to restrain
their political ambition and stay within their professional domain. The
civilian leaders must also respect internal service autonomy of the
military.
(2) The civilian political leaders, especially those in power, must
create a credible civilian alternative to military rule by ensuring good
governance and a judicious political management.
(3) Strengthen the civilian institution and processes in a genuinely
democratic framework rather than pursuing personalised and
patrimonial governance. The democratic institutions must ensure
conflict management and these should become the pivot of power and
authority.
(4) The democratic institutions and processes must ensure delivery of
basic services and facilities to its citizens.
(5) Only the policies based on genuine political participation and
socio-economic justice promote strong attachment among the people
for the political system which strengthens the role of civilian
institutions and processes.
(6) A consensus among the key political players not to cultivate the
military for pursuing their individual political agenda.
(7) A minimum reliance on the military for undertaking purely
civilian tasks. The calls to the military “in aid of civil” should be as
minimum as possible. (8) The military’s political clout will increase
in the countries that face acute external military threats and internal
security issues, including terrorism.
(9) Appointment of highly professional political leaders to foreign
policy, defence and internal security portfolios.
Democracy does not simply mean the holding of elections and
establishment of democratic infrastructure. The people who manage
democratic institutions and processes must imbibe its principles and
norms so that these are fully reflected in the political system.

One way to judge the quality of democracy is to review the

disposition and conduct of the key players, ie, political parties and
leaders. How far they internalise the norms and values of democracy
and practise them in managing political and societal affairs.
Therefore, political idiom and discourse of the political leaders must
reflect democratic norms of mutual respect, decency and deference
towards divergent viewpoints. The differences are resolved through
dialogue and accommodation rather than turning these into personal
or group enmity.

A good number of political leaders and parliamentarians use non-

democratic and un-parliamentary idiom to address their political
adversaries. Others, who may not indulge in such rude and ill-
mannered interaction, are unable or unwilling to stop their party
colleagues from adopting such a disposition that brings a bad name to
democratic institutions and processes.

Several factors explain the decline in the quality of political discourse

and the use of outrageous remarks by parliamentarians. First,
parliamentary elections have become such an expensive exercise that
only sufficiently wealthy people can take part in it. Certain
professions in Pakistan have thrown up a large number of wealthy
people during the last two decades, who are convinced that their
economic clout gives them a licence to pursue their agendas any way
they wish. These people hardly care about democratic values and
norms except when these serve their personal interest and inflated
ego.
Second, political partisanship has intensified so much that most
leaders equate their party interest with the national interest and do not
hesitate a moment in rejecting the viewpoint of their rival political
party. There is very little, if any, regard for consensus-building, merit
and professionalism. The partisan interest rides supreme.

Third, major political parties encourage their activists to adopt a tough

and insulting disposition towards the activists of the rival political
parties. The major confrontation is between the PML-N and the PTI
as the latter is attempting to challenge the former’s monopoly of
power in Punjab. Their members are often engaged in mud-slinging
against each other which has lowered the quality of political
discourse.

Fourth, political talk shows on the private sector TV have also

contributed to degrading political interaction among the competing
political parties. Many anchors and producers invite political leaders
to their programmes who have the reputation of engaging in verbal
fights with their rival party leaders. A leader is likely to get more
invitations for TV talk shows if he/she develops the reputation of
making controversial remarks or heckles the political rivals. Most
political parties have “loose and rude” talkers who are praised by the
party top leaders for neutralising the arguments of the political rival.
The PML-N has excelled in preparing a team of party activists whose
only task is to “praise Nawaz Sharif and condemn Imran Khan” on
the media. Such TV shows have contributed to diminishing decency
in political exchanges.

Fifth, the party top leaders do not reprimand their parliamentarians or

other activists for their indecent and un-parliamentary disposition.
The top leaders like Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan do not regularly
attend parliamentary sessions and that gives their respective party
members an opportunity to make free-for-all speeches in the house.
The absence of top leader from the house also causes the quorum
problem. A good number of members do not turn up for the session or
stay there briefly.

The overall governance pattern negates the principles and spirit of

democracy. Instead of creating viable democratic institutions and
processes the focus is on building personalised political fiefdom.
Professionalism, administrative nonpartisanship and judicious
handling of state resources and socio-economic development are
replaced with unconditional loyalty to the chief. All development
work for the people is projected as personal favours of the ruler. As
the distribution of state patronage and development fund are done by
the ruler at the personalised level, there is a race in the political party
for showing allegiance to the chief. One way of proving the loyalty is
to praise the chief all the time and adopt a derogatory disposition
towards political adversaries. Such a political culture is the major
obstacle to democratic consolidation.

The above statement on the poverty of democracy in Pakistan is not

meant to make a case for discarding it. The deficiencies in Pakistani
democracy are correctable — provided the top political leaders of the
major political parties agree to mend their ways. They need to work
towards implementing the norms of democracy in the management of
day-to-day politics and turn their political parties into self-sustaining
political machines with internal democracy. The culture of
sycophancy needs to be replaced with professionalism and
experience. The top leaders must attend the assembly sessions with
greater frequency. They must make sure that the members attend the
sessions regularly, take part in the proceedings and maintain the
decorum inside and outside the house. The sooner they make such a
beginning the better.
The first major requirement of genuine democracy is the holding of
regular elections that are perceived as fair, free and transparent by
the major competing political parties. All of them should get a level-
playing ground and the procedures from the filing of the nomination
papers to election campaign and the polling day arrangements as well
as counting of votes and the declaration of result should to the
satisfaction of the candidates and independent observers.  The voters
and the political parties should learn from electoral experience that
they can change the government through the ballot box.

Second, democracy is based on liberal constitutionalism. It needs a

well-established constitutional and legal system that recognises civil
and political rights, equality of all citizens irrespective of religion,
caste, ethnicity or language and region. An independent judiciary
ensures that the Rule of Law is available to all citizens. The civil and
political rights have to protected not only from the excesses of state
institutions and functionaries but also secured against powerful
interest groups that resort to violence or a threat thereof against any
particular community or region.

Third, the accountability of rulers and their immediate families is

another condition for improving the rating of democracy. No ruler is
above law and he/she can be held accountable for their official
conduct while in office.  There should be no tolerance for the conflict
of official and private financial interests on the part of the rulers.   The
people holding key political offices cannot pursue personal
commercial interests and the members of their immediate family
cannot exploit the official position of their parents or guardians to
their financial and business advantage

Fourth, all major government transactions, especially involving state

funds, must be transparent and available to any one for inspection. If
sensitive security issues are involved in any official transaction it
could be shared with the relevant committee of the parliament and
public dissemination of information can be avoided.

Fifth, democracy cannot be sustained if the elected political

government cannot control corruption and partisan use of state
resources by the permanent and political officials of the government. 
Any democratic system will falter if the key government leaders and
officials freely engage in illegal practices for making money, allow
some people to engage in corrupt practice to secure state resources,
ignore financial corruption and looting of state funds in order to build
political support. Merit and professionalism should be the main
criteria for managing state affairs.

Sixth, the government must provide basic services to citizenry to

secure their voluntary loyalty for state institutions and processes.
These services include education and health facilities for all, provision
of clean drinking water, civic amenities and related facilities that
make it possible for the citizens to lead a peaceful and secure life with
the hope of better prospects for the future.  The more the government
works for the welfare and betterment of the common folks, the greater
are the prospects that the people would be politically and
psychologically attached with the political system.

Seventh, the state policies must take care of the disadvantaged

sections of the populace. The state must intervene in the economic
and societal domains in order to remove sharp economic disparities
among people and regions and work towards promoting socio-
economic egalitarianism. If inequities increase in the society, it will
contribute to breeding discontent, alienation and violence.

This seven-point criteria can be used to judge the quality of

democracy anywhere. What matters most is the overall direction of
the political system.  Democracy will become sustainable if the
governance system is moving in the direction of achieving these goals
and the citizens learn from experience that the government is
genuinely working towards improving the quality of their life.

The countries that have returned to liberal constitutionalism and

democracy after long years of military or authoritarian rule, must
learn from the counties like Turkey, Indonesia and Brazil, to name a
few, on pushing the military back and  strengthening electoral
democracy. These civilian governments performed in the economic
domain, ensured good governance, provided a relatively secure and
peaceful living to common people and gave them the hope for a better
future.  A non-performing government cannot secure democracy only
by engaging in propaganda against the military to subdue it.  Can
Pakistani rulers learn from these countries on improving the prospects
of democracy? 

Published in The Express Tribune, September 19 th

, 2016.