THE CONSEQUENTIALIST FRAMEWORK

Consequentialism is an attractive ethical approach because it provides clear and

practical guidance – at least in situations where outcomes are easy to predict. The
theory is also impartial. By asking us to maximize benefit for the largest number of
people (or, for Peter Singer and other preference utilitarian’s, creatures who have
preferences), we set aside our personal biases and self-interest to benefit others
(Centre, T.E 2021).
In the Consequentialist framework, we focus on the future effects of the possible
courses of action, considering the people who will be directly or indirectly affected. We
ask about what outcomes are desirable in a given situation, and consider ethical
conduct to be whatever will achieve the best consequences. The person using the
Consequences framework desires to produce the most good.
Among the advantages of this ethical framework is that focusing on the results of an
action is a pragmatic approach. It helps in situations involving many people, some of
whom may benefit from the action, while others may not. On the other hand, it is not
always possible to predict the consequences of an action, so some actions that are
expected to produce good consequences might actually end up harming people.
Additionally, people sometimes react negatively to the use of compromise which is an
inherent part of this approach, and they recoil from the implication that the end justifies
the means. It also does not include a pronouncement that certain things are always
wrong, as even the most heinous actions may result in a good outcome for some
people, and this framework allows for these actions to then be ethical.
According to Ohio University 2022, by this process, the consequentialist theory is
morally beneficial. It provides decisive transparency, as steps are aligned with the
ethically reflective goal. This utilitarian approach works well with decisions that affect
large groups of people, because it maximizes positive consequences for some and
minimizes unfavorable consequences for others.
However, there are disadvantages to this theory. Calculating the consequences of
actions can be difficult due to unforeseen circumstances. These uncertainties may
result in bringing about more harm than good. The implication here is that the end
justifies the means — this may result in compromising the happiness of the minority for
the overall benefit of the majority.
In business management, these decisions do not necessarily cause harm to large
groups of people, though they can influence a company’s financial standing and
longevity. If a company is not truthful about its product or service when marketing to
customers, this is not ethical work, and the influence on consumers’ purchasing habits
can have long-lasting outcomes.
The paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose classic proponents were
Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). (For
predecessors, see Schneewind 1997, 2002.) Classic utilitarians held hedonistic act
consequentialism. Act consequentialism is the claim that an act is morally right if and
only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all
minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible
act available to the agent on that occasion. (Cf. Moore 1912, chs. 1–2.) Hedonism then
claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad.
These claims are often summarized in the slogan that an act is right if and only if it
causes “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” This slogan is misleading,
however. An act can increase happiness for most (the greatest number of) people but
still fail to maximize the net good in the world if the smaller number of people whose
happiness is not increased lose much more than the greater number gains. The
principle of utility would not allow that kind of sacrifice of the smaller number to the
greater number unless the net good overall is increased more than any alternative.
Classic utilitarianism is consequentialist as opposed to deontological because of what it
denies. It denies that moral rightness depends directly on anything other than
consequences, such as whether the agent promised in the past to do the act now. Of
course, the fact that the agent promised to do the act might indirectly affect the act’s
consequences if breaking the promise will make other people unhappy. Nonetheless,
according to classic utilitarianism, what makes it morally wrong to break the promise is
its future effects on those other people rather than the fact that the agent promised in
the past.
Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the best explanation of
our moral intuitions. This argument might surprise those who think of consequentialism
as counterintuitive, but in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intuitions that
trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, often judge that it
is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but not morally wrong to kill one person
to save a million. They never specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is
not morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for deontologists to
justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists can simply say that the line belongs
wherever the benefits outweigh the costs (including any bad side effects). Similarly,
when two promises conflict, it often seems clear which one we should keep, and that
intuition can often be explained by the amount of harm that would be caused by
breaking each promise. In contrast, deontologists are hard pressed to explain which
promise is overriding if the reason to keep each promise is simply that it was made
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2009). If consequentialists can better explain more common moral
intuitions, then consequentialism might have more explanatory coherence overall,
despite being counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, Chap.
III; and Sverdlik 2011.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this way, it still
might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker 2000).
Consequentialists also might be supported by deductive arguments from abstract moral
intuitions. Sidgwick (1907, Book III, Chap. XIII) seemed to think that the principle of
utility follows from certain very general self-evident principles, including universalizability
(if an act ought to be done, then every other act that resembles it in all relevant respects
also ought to be done), rationality (one ought to aim at the good generally rather than at
any particular part of the good), and equality (“the good of any one individual is of no
more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other”).
Other consequentialists are more skeptical about moral intuitions, so they seek
foundations outside morality, either in non-normative facts or in non-moral norms. Mill
(1861) is infamous for his “proof” of the principle of utility from empirical observations
about what we desire (cf. Sayre-McCord 2001). In contrast, Hare (1963, 1981) tries to
derive his version of utilitarianism from substantively neutral accounts of morality, of
moral language, and of rationality (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2001). Similarly, Gewirth
(1978) tries to derive his variant of consequentialism from metaphysical truths about
actions.

REFERENCES
Centre, T. E. (2021b, December 14). Ethics Explainer: Consequentialism. THE ETHICS CENTRE.
https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer-consequentialism/

A Framework for Making Ethical Decisions | Science and Technology Studies. (n.d.).
https://www.brown.edu/academics/science-and-technology-studies/framework-making-ethical-decisions

University. (2022, July 29). 3 Ethical Decision-Making Frameworks. https://onlinemasters.ohio.edu/blog/3-

frameworks-for-ethical-decision-making/

Consequentialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). (2019, June

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/