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Dirk Klopper
in this issue, are read, with the former seen to validate memorie
township childhood as a form of resistance to the depredations o
apartheid era, the latter seen to contextualise memories of a whites-o
childhood through the creation of textual disjunctions between
personal and the historical.
Nostalgia is always going to be a lying memory in the face of
empirical circumstance, is always going to be a wishful colouring o
past, as suggested not only by Freud but also by Marx. For F
nostalgia arises from the irrecoverable loss of childhood, home
mother, and constitutes a kind of mourning, which is not necess
problematic, and perhaps even beneficial, as a way of processing
working through, loss. What is problematic, for Freud, is obses
nostalgia, which constitutes a narcissistic identification with th
object, and manifests as an ambivalent melancholia, one
simultaneously disavows and idolises what has been lost ("Mourn
and Melancholia" 249). Marx seemingly takes a tougher stand aga
nostalgia, seeing it as a reactionary sentiment, a "superstition abou
past" that has to be overcome in favour of a progressive politics o
future, one that urges us to have "the dead bury their dead"
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 106). Curiously, though,
admired classical Greek culture, describing the ancient Gree
"normal children" whose frankness, beauty and simplicity we mod
wish to emulate (Grundrisse 51) - a sentiment that accords with
psychodynamics of nostalgia. We might say that, in a sense, the an
Greeks provided Marx with a usable memory of the emergence, n
the personal self, but of the historical self.
In associating the ancient Greeks with the simplicity of childh
and by projecting this as a trait we admire, Marx's understan
enables us to conceive of a homologous relation between the histo
self and what Freud examines as the personal self. This marriage,
were, of the psychoanalytic and the dialectic, the personal and
historical, has been the subject of much theoretical integration
Marx and Freud. A recent theorist who works in this way, Svet
Boym, repeatedly cited in the essays included here, sees no
demarcation between a nostalgic feeling vividly tied to the sens
experiences of childhood and a nostalgic feeling tied to the
political events of history, and interweaves into her examinatio
nostalgia the antinomies not only of the personal and the historic
also of the secular and the sacred. She argues that nostalgia is "a
mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an
enchanted world with clear borders and values; it could be a secular
expression of a spiritual longing, a nostalgia for an absolute, a home that
is both physical and spiritual, the edenic unity of time and space before
entry into history" (The Future of Nostalgia 8).
The notion that nostalgia is in some way regressive, whether it
relates to a personal or a political history, is a legacy of the hermeneutics
of suspicion. We are the intellectual heirs, the children, of Marx and
Freud. But Marcos Natali, for one, takes issue with the notion that
nostalgia is necessarily regressive, and rejects the teleological
understanding that underpins it. He claims that the "bad politics" and
"bad histoiy" arguments traceable to Marx rest on an understanding, on
the one hand, of history "as necessarily emancipatory, progressive, and
rationally comprehensible" and, on the other hand, of the past as
irrecoverable ("History and the Politics of Nostalgia" 21). The lens of
history is not the only way, he says, of relating to the past. He also
contests the psychoanalytical notion of nostalgia as fictional and
irrational, claiming that whereas the historical materialist view of
nostalgia as politically suspect is based on oppositions between
"conservatism and progressiveness, servitude and freedom, reaction and
progress," the psychoanalytic view of nostalgia is based on oppositions
between "fiction and fact, irrationality and rationality" (19-20). This
structural arrangement is only valid, he observes, in a "disenchanted
setting" (23).
Natali quotes Kristeva on the "strange" memory of the melancholic,
a memory that upholds the contradictory claim that although "everything
has gone by" I nevertheless remain "faithful to those bygone days" (23),
and concludes: "If one does not believe that everything has gone by, and
if one is not atheistic and disenchanted, then a different conceptual
territory emerges. We would in that case be in the presence of something
other than nostalgia, melancholia, or even mourning; that vocabulary,
along with the political critique of nostalgia, would therefore lose its
ground" (23). Natali's critique of the historical argument, whether
materialist or empiricist, resonates with my sense that nostalgia, in the
first instance, is about my past, which is not necessarily the same as our
past, and does not inevitably implicate a shared past, at least not in the
sense of another who experiences the past in the same way I do. My past
of, the lost object, the subject is the site of an incomplete loss, one that
kept alive and worried over, thus sustaining the impossible possibility o
recovery (396). So Freud, in his invocation of the lost object, and Ma
in his invocation of classical Greece, both allow for the energising dream
of an unlikely access to the pristine circumstance of an original memor
of what has come into being.
The memory of loss is a memory of what has been or is imagined to
have been, not as an empirical fact but as the condition of a future.
subject to whom memory is given does not record events like a vid
camera at a security gate, but binds events through the emotional inter
invested in them, orientating the already past in the living present to t
potentiality of the future. Jacques Lacan phrases it more evocatively an
precisely than this when he says: "What is realised in my history is
the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the pres
perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what
shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming" ("T
Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis" 86).
This sense of a transformational subject, a subject who realises h
history in relation to his unfolding desire, also informs Wal
Benjamin's notion of messianic time when he claims that "our image
happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption," a
says that the same applies "to our view of the past" ("Theses on th
Philosophy of History" 254). His cryptic declaratives transfigure eve
they affirm the historical materialist premise of his argument: "The pa
carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redempti
There is a secret agreement between past generations and the prese
one. Our coming was expected on earth" (254). If our coming w
expected on earth, and has come about on account of this expectatio
then our coming anticipates future comings through the expectations ou
coming has created. Inasmuch as we are the future of the past, we
also the past of the future. That is, we are not only nostalgic subjects bu
also the subjects of nostalgia.
In yielding to a drift of thought occasioned by my deliberations
the meaning of nostalgia, I find myself adrift between histori
materialism, psychoanalytic phantasm and emancipatory mysticism
With these elusive coordinates on home, and this interminable defer
of a homecoming, a nostos, I begin to wonder about the absence of t
home that presumes the homecoming, about how being haunted by hom
WORKS CITED