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The Arab Spring and its Unexpected

Consequences
Yassamine Mather
Published online: 29 May 2014.

To cite this article: Yassamine Mather (2014) The Arab Spring and its Unexpected Consequences,
Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 42:1, 73-86, DOI: 10.1080/03017605.2014.909977

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 Critique, 2014
Vol. 42, No. 1, 73–86, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017605.2014.909977

The Arab Spring and its Unexpected

Consequences
Yassamine Mather
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In the aftermath of the defeat of the Arab Spring, this article looks at the inevitable
failure of political Islam in power in Egypt and Tunisia and the unexpected
consequences of the Arab Spring. This is done both in terms of the United States’
apprehensions about Saudi Arabia’s ability to control Jihadists in Syria and Libya but
also its shift towards resolution of its conflict with Iran’s Islamic Republic.

Keywords: Arab Spring; Political Islam; United Sates; Syria; Egypt; Muslim Brother-
hood; Iran; Nuclear Deal

More than three years after what became known as the Arab Spring there is little sign
of the kind of political and social change called for by the protestors. In Egypt a
military court has sentenced 528 supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood to death.
Hundreds have died since July, when the army deposed Mohammed Mursi. Egyptian
writer Ahdaf Soueif, speaking to the BBC, summed up the mood of many: ‘Basically,
this isn’t the third anniversary for the revolution that we were hoping for. The
security state is back and also a great many activists are in jail.’ Ironically the official
gatherings to celebrate the 2011 uprising, in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, were
organised by the military, who are keen to portray themselves as the saviours of the
nation—in reality they are the saviours of the ruling elite.1
In Tunisia and in Egypt opposition to the rulers, whether ‘moderate’ Islamists
(Tunisia) or the secular military (Egypt), is not tolerated. The economic situation is
catastrophic. There are no new jobs—on the contrary unemployment and uncertainty
are on the rise and the majority of the population cannot afford many basic goods.
The jails are full of political prisoners and the banning of oppositionists is part and
parcel of the new order.
Having said that, at least in Tunisia and Egypt there is some kind of political life.
However, in Syria, where in the early days of the uprising opponents of the Assad

1
BBC news, 24 March 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25888916

© 2014 Critique
 74 Y. Mather

regime raised demands for political freedom, the ‘revolution’ has been hijacked to
such an extent that there is now in effect a war by proxy between Iran’s Islamic
Republic and Saudi Arabia. Having declared that the use of chemical weapons was the
‘red line’ the Syrian leadership should not cross, the USA has now accepted Russian
proposals for a ‘diplomatic solution’. If the original decision to launch a ‘limited
military strike’ was unpopular, retreating from it proved to be as unpopular and, both
in the USA and beyond, critics have claimed that the climbdown is an expression of
indecision, of weakness.
A series of unexpected events left the US administration with little choice. First,
there was some cynicism in most Western countries regarding claims of justifying
war on the basis of ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The Iraq war created distrust even
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amongst the most die-hard supporters of imperialism. Austerity and the continuing
effects of the financial crisis have also played a part in generating a mood of
opposition to a Syrian war. The result is that parliamentarians in the UK voted down
Cameron’s attempt to join a rapid US attack and all the signs were that Congress
was unlikely to endorse Obama either. In many ways the Russian proposal for a
compromise, a few days after the USA had tried to gain the support of allies at the
G20 conference, saved the administration from further humiliation.
Against this, and irrespective of the specifics of the Syrian conflict, US backtracking
had international repercussions. The Washington Times summarised the situation as
follows: ‘Obama’s “red line” vow turned a lighter shade of pink, with secretary of state
John Kerry saying a US military strike “might” be necessary if talks led by Russia fail
to compel Syria to turn over its chemical weapons’.2
In the Middle East, mainly amongst America’s Sunni allies, the Gulf emirates,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as the jihadists in the Syrian opposition, there is
anger. If the threat of war against Syria was directly linked to USA–Iran relations, the
subsequent negotiations with Iran, in the last few months of 2013 and the first
quarter of 2014, are signs of historic changes in US policy in the Middle East. For the
first time in 34 years, a US president has spoken to his Iranian equivalent, and
the two countries’ foreign ministers have held face-to-face negotiations as well as a
number of phone conversations. Contrary to what the supporters of the reformist
movement in Iran claim, the dramatic changes in Iran–USA relations are not simply
a consequence of the June 2013 elections and the coming to office of a ‘moderate’
president in Iran. We now know that secret meetings between US and Iranian
officials took place in Oman last year, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency.
Above all, the initially secret and latterly open meetings that have led to the current
negotiations mark a radical change in US policy towards the region. For most of the
last three and a half decades, in fact since the coming to power of the Islamic
Republic in Iran, US foreign policy in the Middle East has been to keep its two main
allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, at loggerheads with the Islamic Republic. This post-1979

2
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/12/obama-now-hopeful-russian-deal-avoid-syria-strike/?
page=all
 Critique 75

policy has had one strategic focus: preventing a repetition of Iran’s Islamic revolution
in another Muslim country. Ironically it was the Arab Spring, the rise and subsequent
failure of political Islam in the Arab world, that alleviated this fear, and the US is now
prepared to move towards rapprochement with Iran.
As for Libya, the situation could not be more chaotic. Genuine opposition to the
regime of Muammar Gaddafi had no chance of surviving once the USA, France, the
UK and Italy got involved—cheered on by sections of the European ‘left’. The new
‘democracy’ the USA brought to Libya is in reality gunpoint chaos masquerading as
government, while armed militias—some political, others just criminal—including
appendages of al Qa’eda, rule the country. The militias are clearly powerful enough to
kidnap the country’s prime minister and half of the Egyptian embassy staff. In fact
the new ‘democratic government’ in Libya is itself a coalition made up of political
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representatives of the various militias.

I do not suggest that the uprisings in Libya or Syria resulted from a conspiracy by
Western powers or Gulf states, a view put forward by some supporters of Gaddafi and
Assad. On the contrary, I firmly believe the Arab Spring was an inspiration to those
opposed to such dictators.
According to sections of the media, including some left-leaning reporters, it is
Twitter, Facebook and new forms of communications that are responsible for the
spreading of the uprising from one Arab capital to another. The truth is more
complicated. I have mentioned colonial history, artificial borders and dictatorial
rulers. Minority Alawis found themselves in power in Syria, and minority Sunnis in
predominantly Shia Iraq, while Kurds were separated in different states, and
Christians and Jews were uprooted from their country of origin. Then there was
the 1980–1988 war between Iran and Iraq fuelled by US interests, which left at least
half a million dead, the civil war in Lebanon and Israeli attacks against Palestinians.
Add to all this the transfer of the burden of the economic crisis from the West to
the periphery post-2008. Mass unemployment sparked events in Tunisia, Egypt and
elsewhere, while the process of intensification of economic and social crises, and the
increase in the cost of living and particularly of food played a significant part in the
Arab awakening and its timing. Since 2008, Western capitalists have been taking a far
more cautious attitude towards investment in the Arab world. This has affected the
economies of the Gulf, but also those of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, whose migrant
workers used to send money back to the homeland and have now been forced to
return, adding to the massive unemployment statistics. In Syria, the country is also
facing the consequences of severe sanctions on Iran, in terms of that country’s ability
to provide economic assistance aimed at propping up the Assad regime and its
regional ally, Hezbollah.
Iran had provided Syria with subsidised oil since 1982, when Damascus agreed to
close Iraq’s pipeline through Syrian territory. In the last few years Iran’s inability to
sell its oil on the world market, together with the collapse of Iranian economy, has
reduced its capacity to support Syria. The Syrian currency was losing its value in a
situation of ‘managed decline’ for more than two years, further reducing the regime’s
 76 Y. Mather

ability to hold down prices, particularly food. None of this is to play down the
increasing opposition based on political demands which fuelled the rebellion.
For France and Italy in 2011, and currently Obama, Cameron and Hollande, the
desire for military intervention is also about diverting attention from internal
problems. There is no appetite whatsoever for a full-scale war. However, there is and
has always been an eagerness for short, sharp air raids. The USA is very open as to
why it would get involved. In the words of the White House, US action ‘will be
guided by what is in the best interests of the United States’.
It is true that under normal circumstances the USA and Israel would have
preferred keeping Assad in power. However, two years into the civil war, according to
some reports Iranian revolutionary guards are running the Syrian military, and
Iranian heavy artillery is being employed in Damascus. If that is the case then both
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the USA and Israel would be in favour of regime change in Syria.

In other words, imperialist intervention should never be taken out of the context of
the current international political and economic situation. That is what determines
imperialist policy, not the desire to ‘save lives’. There are no exceptions to this.
In such circumstances it is difficult to talk of an Arab Spring. However, the mass
protests, strikes and other events witnessed over the last three years, including the
coming to power of ‘moderate’ and not so moderate Islamists, will have long-term
effects in the region, and this article will attempt to explain the political and economic
reasons for the upsurge, as well as discussing the consequences of the defeat of the
Arab Spring.

Background to the Arab Spring

On 17 December 2010 Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year old fruit seller, set himself on fire
in front of a government building, sparking riots across Tunisia and beyond. Tunisians,
followed by Egyptians, demonstrated against the constant degradation of their living
conditions. They had tolerated political dictatorship, corruption and cronyism during
the Ben Ali and Mubarak eras, but now they were angry at the impotence and
subservience of their rulers vis-à-vis US imperialist interventions in the region and felt
humiliated by their acceptance of continued Palestinian oppression. In addition those
rulers had since the early 1980s pushed through economic restructuring programmes
and a neoliberal economic agenda unchallenged. Economic misery, frustration with
ever increasing unemployment and a growing gap between rich and poor fuelled the
revolt.
In countries ruled by semi-secular governments (Egypt, Tunisia, Syria) the super-
rich were identified as pro-Western, decadent and anti-Islamic. Yet these govern-
ments’ ruthless repression of the left had created a situation where Islamists, often
supported by Saudi funds, could benefit from the political vacuum created when
protestors took to the streets, expressing frustrations built up over decades.
Many outside the region were surprised by the fact that demonstrations starting in
Tunisia spread to Egypt and beyond, but the reason for this lies in the common colonial
 Critique 77

history of the region. With the exception of Egypt, the Arab states are recent creations,
less than a century old, and, although the mass media is keen to blame some of the more
recent conflicts on a ‘Sunni–Shia divide’, there is a more complicated story of arbitrary
borders dividing nationalities, of local rulers deliberately chosen from religious
minorities and imposed by the colonial powers aiming to divide and rule.
Most of these countries were part of the Ottoman empire. In the 17th century it
boasted 32 provinces, but by the early 20th century its collapse was well underway.
Syria, for example, was part of the Ottoman empire until 1918 (from 1516): it was
an Ottoman elayat (province) governed by a vali (administrator). Egypt was a
‘khedivate’(autonomous tributary state) until 1882, when in effect it became part of
the British empire. The country became a British protectorate in 1915 and finally
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gained formal independence in 1922.

Nationalist and Ba’athist regimes gained prominence during the Cold War, when
they benefited from Soviet financial and political support. Pro-Soviet ‘official
communist’ parties, some with considerable working class support, were instructed
by Moscow to dissolve and join the Ba’athists. After the collapse of the eastern bloc,
nationalist bureaucrats at the head of these states slid easily back into the Western
fold. They set themselves up as semi-dynastic dictators and became authoritarian
supporters of the neoliberal economic agenda—vanguards of International Monetary
Funf-style economic restructuring programmes, privatising state-owned assets and
often enriching their own close allies.

Economy
Contrary to what the defenders of the ‘free market’ economy tell us, authoritarian
regimes not only embrace neoliberal economic policies, but they can also push
forward such policies with little or no opposition, having already suppressed secular,
left-wing forces and labour activists. In fact Islamists, often associated with the bazaar
and industry, also benefit from free-market economic liberalisation, whether in
power or in opposition. Rulers such as Mubarak, Ali, Assad and Gaddafi survived by
imposing repressive measures. They decimated the revolutionary left, but generally
left the Islamists alone.
It is not difficult to see how, for example, Egypt was affected by the world
economic crisis of 2008. International Monetary Fund figures show the rate of growth
falling from 8.7% in 2006 to 4.6% in 2009 and 1.0% in 2010–2011—and, of course,
these figures do not show the growing gap between rich and poor.
. Egypt’s foreign currency income relied on the export of goods to Europe, but in
2008–2009 merchandise exports dropped from 33 to 15%.3

3
International Labor Organization, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/cairo/downloads/trade_book.
pdf (accessed 24 March 2014).
 78 Y. Mather

. Major European and US transnationals—for example, Orange, IBM and Xerox—

which had benefited from cheap skilled labour in Cairo and Alexandria, were
quick to close down or cut back on production.
. Tourism, accounting for 11% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), was
also affected by the economic crisis. The number of tourists in the first six months
of 2010 dropped to 732,000—down from 1,029,000 for the same period in 2009.4
. Remittances from Persian Gulf countries were also a significant factor. In Egypt
5% of national GDP came from this source. Post-2008 there were massive
reductions in many projects in the Persian Gulf area; many construction plans
were abandoned and workers were laid off.5
We should also remember that US politics was tied to and dictated economic rewards
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in the Middle East. Dictatorial regimes soft on Israel were beneficiaries of US

loans, including Mubarak’s Egypt. Governments prepared to trade with Israel were
rewarded—qualifying, for instance, for duty-free exports to the USA.
Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) were supposed to be an extension of the USA–
Israel Free Trade Agreement. They were supposed to help ‘broaden support’ for the
Middle East peace process and produce ‘tangible economic benefits’ for Jordan,
Egypt, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, by stimulating their economies and
increasing employment. However, a condition was attached: they had to agree to
import at least 12% of their goods from Israel.6 This was a form of bribery—financial
gain in exchange for political obedience.
Between 2005 and 2008, Egyptian QIZ exports to the USA grew by 57%. In 2010
they made up 40% of the country’s exports to the USA, while the textile sector had
over 700 companies. The economic crisis in the USA had a major effect on this
sector, reducing foreign currency incomes.
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries, as major oil producers with small
populations, played a significant role in the economy of the Arab countries, and here
lies the problem that later forced a rethink in Washington. These powerful, small
countries were and remain the main source of funding for the Muslim Brotherhood
and the more Jihadist Islamic forces. However, support for the Islamic movement was
not purely reactionary. It expressed a resentment of Mubarak’s subservience to the
USA and the Sadat/Mubarak peace deals with Israel—a resentment of the political
implications of QIZs.
Egyptians faced additional hardship, as the price of all food products, including
rice, wheat and corn, increased sharply in international markets from 2006 to 2008.

4
Tourists to Egypt fall 30 per cent in year to June: State figures, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/
12/19455/Business/Economy/Tourists-to-Egypt-fall–per-cent-in-year-to-June-S.aspx (accessed 24 March 2014).
5
Country assessment, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/tr11assess.pdf (accessed 24
March 2014).
6
See ‘United States, Egypt and Israel to Launch Historic Trade Partnership’, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/archives/2004/december/united-states-egypt-and-israel-launch-hi (accessed 24 March 2014).
 Critique 79

In particular, the price of rice rose threefold in a five-year period, meaning it went
from around US$600 per ton in 2003 to more than US$1800 in May 2008.7
Despair resulting from the economic situation; anger at the role of the army and
the police, and at the impotence of Arab rulers in dealing with the Palestinian issue;
the psychological effects of the defeat of Ba’athism in Iraq, seen by many Arabs as an
insult to their national and regional Arab pride—all of these played a crucial part in
these uprisings.

Muslim Brotherhood
There is no denying that, in the absence of any serious secular organisations (most
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leftwing groups were banned, their members arrested and in some cases executed) at
the time of Mubarak’s downfall, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was the largest, best
organised political force in the country. The Brotherhood’s success in forming the
government should not be interpreted as proof of the popularity of political Islam,
but rather a reflection of the weakness of other political forces.
It was therefore inevitable that, once the MB tried to impose Sharia law on every
aspect of society, once it became clear that it had no serious economic plan apart
from continuing the neoliberal economic policies of the previous regime, it lost much
of its support base. Most bourgeois parties that come to power after mass protests end
up adopting ‘pragmatic’ measures, and this was true of the MB, as far as both
economic and international policies were concerned—all talk of economic justice was
conveniently forgotten. However, the rhetoric used regarding religious laws was
uncompromising and in fact became more hard-line as time went by.
The Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, won 47% of the
seats in the Egyptian parliament in January 2012, when media reports concentrated
on the imposition of Sharia law, a ban on alcohol, gender segregation, and so on.
However, Egyptian business largely welcomed the FJP victory, which was said to
herald optimism about economic recovery. The MB’s Islamic capitalist economy, like
the one in Iran’s Islamic republic, was very much a compromise between two views:
interventionist and laissez-faire.
One thing is clear: for all the talk of ‘moving towards an Islamic economy’
(interest-free banking and all), Egyptian banks and the stock market did not see any
economic threat from the rule of the MB. The Brotherhood’s economists were well
aware that Islamic banking encompassed a tiny proportion (less than 4 per cent) of
the local sector and the FJP was not in a rush to change things. On the contrary, the
party’s strategy was to encourage depositors and borrowers.
A powerful group of Islamist industrial and commercial leaders, headed by Khairat
el-Shater—a multimillionaire businessman and former political prisoner of the
Mubarak era who had been a victim of assets confiscation in the past—was an FJP
strategist and senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood by 2012. El-Shater and his

7
Spengler, ‘Food and Failed Arab States’, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MB02Ak01.html
 80 Y. Mather

close partners were in favour of a liberal, market economy and a ‘business-friendly’

climate. These multi-millionaires were given the task of leading the ‘Renaissance
Project’, the Brotherhood’s ambitious scheme to oversee economic planning, public
administration, health and education.
At the same time the Brotherhood’s interventionist faction pursued a policy of
export substitution in cooperation with the private sector; it called for control of the
budget deficit and public debt, and restrictions on public spending (although the
minimum wage was increased in the first year of the MB government). This faction
also called for measures to strengthen competition, anti-trust legislation and the
raising of the ceiling for tax exemptions.
The most damaging part of the MB’s economic policy was its attitude towards poverty.
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It was a top-down approach, relying on charity rather than better wages and more rights for
workers. In opposition and at election time the MB had embarked on far-reaching,
organised charity work, a kind of continuous financing of support through charities (many
set up with funds originating in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states). Some FJP
supporters were also advocating making zakat—a form of charitable donation, equivalent
to 2.5% of income, that Muslims are supposed to pay to help the poor—compulsory,
although the MB was not in power long enough to implement it. From the onset (even at
the time of proposing the electoral programme) the party separated the issue of poverty
from economic development and planning, classifying it as policy for ‘social justice’.
Distributing food parcels paid for by Saudi Arabia might work during an election
campaign. However, in a country of 70 million, where almost a third of the population live
below the official poverty line, permanent charity was not going to be a sustainable option.
FJP election propaganda promised support for workers in the tourism industry,
whose income supports 11% of the population, yet it was obvious that the drive for
prohibitions on alcohol consumption and swimwear, and towards gender segregation
would adversely impact on mass tourism—cheap package holidays to sea resorts, for
example, as well as the upper end of the market. Then in June 2013 Mursi appointed
a leading figure from the hard-line Islamist group, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, which
claims responsibility for the murder of dozens of tourists in 1997, as governor of
Luxor province. Egyptian tourism is not doing well, but the appointment infuriated
tourism workers, who protested by blocking the entrance to government offices in
Luxor.
The MB used every opportunity to attack the democratic gains of the uprising,
often relying on its ally, the army—ironically the very force that eventually removed it
from power. The ‘constitutional decree’ that Mursi adopted allowed him to modify
legal proposals in line with Sharia law—but more than 70% of the population had
refused to participate in the referendum to approve the Islamic constitution.
There was discrimination against the Christian minority, constituting 10% of
the population, and in recent months it has faced new forms of sectarianism and
intimidation. In accordance with Sharia law, financial levies known as jizya (originally a
9th century form of taxation on non- Muslims) were imposed on Copts by the Islamic
gangs. Christians also suffered state persecution through the criminalisation of so-called
 Critique 81

blasphemy, which was part and parcel of the Islamist constitution pushed through by
Mursi.
Mursi in particular became a hate figure after he labelled all those who opposed
him agents of foreign powers. In his last speech before the army stepped in he
lamented: ‘How can the best of leaders make major achievements in such a poisonous
atmosphere?’
Before last summer’s coup the MB had lost many of its supporters. However, the
subsequent ban, repression and arrests directed against the Brotherhood have
undoubtedly restored some of its popularity amongst sections of the population.
Islamist hard-liners are very good at playing the victim when they are in opposition,
even though, as Egypt demonstrated when the MB had a cosy relationship with the
army, they may be willing to become ruthless dictators.
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The military coup in the summer of 2013—just like in 2011, when the armed forces
intervened to depose Mubarak—had one aim: to put an end to the revolutionary
process. The longer the protests continued, the stronger the fear of genuine revolution.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates continue to pour billions of
dollars into the Egyptian economy. However, as in Tunisia, Syria and Libya, Egypt’s
economic and political problems are so endemic, so serious that no amount of cash
can resolve the situation even in the short term.

Tunisia
The situation in Tunisia is slightly better, only because the Islamists have backed
down from many of their original Sharia-based proposals. On 27 January the
Tunisian parliament voted by 216 votes to 200 for a new constitution—the first since
Ben Ali’s overthrow and the result of a compromise between the Islamists and the
secular opposition.
However, conflict between the two continues. Two opposition leaders have been
assassinated, a number of soldiers and policemen have been killed and there are
reports of suicide attacks at beach resorts. As in Egypt, tourism is badly affected by
new Islamic legislation, lack of security and political uncertainty. There are reports of
torture taking place in Tunisian jails, sometimes resulting in death.
In today’s Tunisia you can be hassled, harassed, assaulted and even threatened with
death if you dare express an opinion not to the liking of the Islamists. If you are a
woman you can face all this just for wearing ‘inappropriate’ clothes or for leaving
home after dark. While the mass media presents Tunisia as a rare, positive exception
to the disappointments following the Arab Spring, those living in the country have a
different opinion.

Consequences of the Arab Spring

What can we learn from the events of the last three years? It is far too early to judge
the significance of the Arab Spring in terms of the revolutionary process in the
 82 Y. Mather

region, Arab unification and threats of war. However, the obvious conclusions are
probably those that affect both imperialism and the peoples of the region.
First and foremost, 35 years after the first Islamic revolution (Iran 1979), even if
Islamists come to power in another Middle Eastern country (as they did in Egypt),
the following would apply:
. They are unlikely to be allies of Iran’s Shia regime. On the contrary there will
probably be antagonism towards non-Arab Iran. Shia supreme religious leaders in
Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei, promised their people and the
world that future revolutions in the region will be Islamic in character and will
seek to imitate Iran’s 1979 revolution. Indeed, at first glance events in Egypt and
Tunisia in 2012–2013 seemed to confirm this prediction. Yet even as the Muslim
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Brotherhood was gaining support in Egypt, and later as it came to power, it

became quite apparent that the Shia–Sunni divide meant they were unlikely to be
allies of Iran’s Islamic Republic. In fact, Tehran’s antagonistic attitude towards the
pro-Saudi MB government in Cairo was as pronounced as it had been towards
Egypt under Mubarak. US strategists had to accept that, even if political Islam
came to power in another Middle Eastern country, it was their allies in Saudi
Arabia and the Persian Gulf who would control the purse strings and dictate how
events unfolded—not Iran. Even if an Islamic revolution succeeded in the Arab
world, the Iranian model would not be repeated.
. Political Islam is unlikely to remain in power, as in Egypt. The Islamists will not
be able to keep any of their promises about ‘social justice’ in the absence of any
economic plan beyond those of neoliberal capitalism. The failure of the Muslim
Brotherhood to maintain its support and retain power in Egypt, and the workers’
strikes and mass demonstrations of the summer of 2013 proved beyond doubt that
in the first quarter of the 21st century—unlike 1979 Iran—the life of Islamic
governments will be short. Such regimes misunderstand the political and
economic reasons behind the upheavals of 2011–2013, underestimate the anger
of the youth movement and fail to realise that empty promises of ‘equality and
social justice’—even buoyed with expensive propaganda paid for by Saudis—might
work at election times but can easily become the source of disillusionment once
the new government fails to deliver. In Egypt the army had forged a convenient
alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood; however, when it became clear that
dissatisfaction with the Morsi government was fuelling the fires of another
uprising, the military intervened in order to head off the revolutionary movement.
For the USA this was yet another awakening: fresh Islamic governments were
unlikely to last as long as the Islamic Republic.
. For all the money it has spent, Saudi Arabia will not be able to control the
plethora of Islamic movements it has financed. A decade ago, the US ‘war on
terror’ led to the coming to power of a Shia government in Iraq, ironically making
Iran a more powerful force in the region. Since then, Iran and the USA have,
despite themselves, been forced to work together to prop up the occupation-
friendly Shia government in Baghdad. This situation has given Iran unprecedented
 Critique 83

political influence. For all the hysteria in the USA about Iran’s clerical regime, the
military success in overthrowing Saddam has aided the creation of a ‘Shia belt’
from the eastern borders of Iran to the Mediterranean, via Iraq, Syria and
Lebanon. Initially the Arab Spring found genuine supporters in Syria (Iran’s
second main ally in the Arab world) and the protests by students, youth and
Kurds against Assad’s dictatorship gained momentum. These protests were a
genuine expression of the hopes of the Syrian people. Yet Saudi Arabia and its
allies also saw an opportunity to intervene. The aim was to bring about a speedy
overthrow of the Alavi regime of Assad and thereby weaken Iran’s regional role—
and it was a big surprise that Iran actually got involved in the conflict to prop up
Assad. However, the events of last summer, and the brutality of Islamic jihadists in
both Syria and Iraq (where they engaged in the systematic use of car bombs in
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Shia civilian areas), whose methods and ideology began spreading to Libya and
elsewhere, became a source of concern for US strategists. Saudi rulers who were
financing these ‘holy warriors’ were incapable of controlling them. For the USA
this was a turning point in its policy towards Syria, and may have been as
significant, if not more so, than the US administration’s failure to get international
or congressional support for limited military intervention. In addition, as far as the
survival of the Iraqi regime was concerned, Iran and the USA had more in
common than they had previously envisaged.
. Last but not least, the USA is well aware that sanctions have destroyed Iran’s
economy. The punitive measures imposed by the USA and its allies might have
failed to stop the nuclear programme, or make much of a dent in the private
wealth of senior clerics, but they were effective enough to ensure that Iran was no
longer in a position to become a real threat to US strategy in the region.
The above issues have already had dramatic political consequences, including a
change in US foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. Negotiations with Iran on the
nuclear issue and the Geneva talks on Syria are both part of this. There is once more
an urgency in Washington to ‘resolve’ the Palestinian issue and this explains US
secretary of state John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy, rushing between nuclear deals,
Syrian talks and the Palestine–Israel negotiations.
For the peoples of the region there will be further consequences. The political and
economic issues that caused the Arab uprising are as pertinent today as they were
three years ago. However, political Islam is no longer considered in such high esteem
by so many and it is not viewed as an agent for fundamental change. This does
present a window of opportunity, albeit a small one, for the revolutionary left.
For socialists, every war, every local conflict has a history and is a continuation of
politics by other means. That is why, faced with complicated scenarios currently
playing out in the Middle East and the north of Africa, the left has to consider the
consequences of what it advocates—be it foreign intervention or ‘military support’ for
this or that dictatorship. First of all, in trying to make sense of a conflict, including
civil wars, we cannot rely on media reports, eye-witness statements or even short
visits. Both sides—in Syria the reactionary regime and the religious-fundamentalist
 84 Y. Mather

opposition—will exaggerate the extent of atrocities committed by their opponents

and it is quite healthy to be sceptical about every statistic, every report of brutality or
mass murder.
In fact it is untrue that Washington has refused to deliver weapons to the Syrian
opposition. According to the New York Times, by March 2013 the CIA had smuggled
in ‘3,500 tons of military equipment’ via Turkey.8 As for Saudi Arabia and Qatar, they
make no secret of the funds and weapons they are running into Turkey and Lebanon
for the opposition.9 The fact that these weapons have found their way into Jihadist
hands is no coincidence.
The progressive forces who initiated a popular uprising in Syria are under attack by
Shia/Alawi forces associated with the Assad regime, as well as Sunni Jihadists and al
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Qa’eda, and the left is not in a position to gain much support during the current civil
war. The most brutal, reactionary Islamist forces have gained the upper hand and no
amount of wishful thinking will change that fact. Sections of the Syrian opposition
have even publicised some of their own atrocities in the last few months.
For Marxists in the UK, France or the USA, the main struggle is against global
capitalism. Imperialism is our main enemyand we call for its defeat. How can we
invite them to ‘impose peace’ in Libya? How can we call on Western governments to
arm ‘the revolution in Syria’? What kind of ‘revolutionary’ force will seek or accept
Western arms to fight a dictator whose very survival until now has depended on the
global interests of imperialism? Even if it were successful, would this not be regime
change from above?
What kind of conditions would be imposed on the Syrian opposition in exchange
for this support? Already one Syrian opposition leader, the National Coalition’s first
president, Moaz al-Khatib, has resigned, complaining that foreign powers were
placing too many conditions on their aid to opposition forces. On the other hand,
why should the West arm a genuine revolutionary force, when throughout the last
few decades it has done precisely the opposite, propping up reactionary states that
suppressed the left? What would be the economic or political rationale?
I have always argued against support for reactionary anti-Western forces (such as
Iran’s Islamic Republic or its proxies in the region, including Assad and Hezbollah);
however, I cannot deny that there is a global hierarchy of states and, despite the
complications of the Middle East, there is no reason to choose between support for
Western intervention and becoming apologists for reactionary states or Islamist
forces, Shia or Sunni.
Advocating any form of intervention—not just military, but in the form of support
for sanctions, participation in pro-imperialist ‘tribunals’ to condemn dictatorial
rulers, and so on—is at the end of the day not just striking a compromise with
imperialism: it is siding with and supporting it. It is to accept regime change on

8
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/world/middleeast/arms-airlift-to-syrian-rebels-expands-
with-cia-aid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (accessed 24 March 2014).
9
R. Fisk, ‘If Alawites Are Turning Against Assad Then His Fate Is Sealed’, The Independent, 23 July.
 Critique 85

imperialist terms, to accept the fist of military involvement under the glove of
humanitarian intervention.

False Choice
In Afghanistan, revolutionary groups were able to oppose both US imperialist
intervention and the Taliban and al Qa’eda, refusing to join with the Taliban in a
‘united front’ against imperialism. They rightly pointed out that the Taliban would
turn their guns on them before attacking the invader. Similarly inside Syria no-one on
the left should choose between, on the one side, Alawi reactionary repression aided by
the revolutionary guards of Iran’s Islamic Republic and Hezbollah, and, on the other,
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Western-funded Islamists and other sectarian, reactionary forces, including al Qa’eda.

There is a thin line that cannot be crossed, and that is calling for Western
‘intervention’ and accepting conditional support from imperialist forces.
As for Arab nationalism, it had little to offer the masses in its heyday, but in these
dying stages of its existence Ba’athism, Nasserism and the only substantial force
that exists, fundamentalist Islam, have become a plague on the region. The ‘official
communist’ parties of the Middle East, which repeatedly acted as supporters of and
apologists for these regimes, must take their share of blame for this appalling situation.
However, all of these states exist as a result of colonial history. Current conflicts do
not exist in a vacuum, independent of such history. We cannot pretend there was no
Ottoman empire, no Italian rule in Libya. We have to remember that current Syrian
borders are the result of a rather arbitrary partitioning of the Ottoman empire that
brought together different peoples and religions (Alawi, Shia, Kurd, Assyrian) within
the same borders under a French mandate. These borders were set entirely according
to imperialist requirements following the First World War.
We cannot obliterate the history of the 1951–1969 Idris period in Libya, when
Britain was involved in extensive economic projects and was the country’s biggest
supplier of arms. We cannot ignore the fact that, towards the end of the Gaddafi era,
the USA and its European allies conveniently forgot the repression previously
undertaken by the regime. Gaddafi’s role in the massacre at Abu Salim prison, where
1270 prisoners were said to have been killed, was no longer mentioned. No-one
doubted the use of torture, lengthy jail terms for political opponents, or the execution
and disappearance of Libyan dissidents. Yet during the ‘war on terror’, Gaddafi was
an ally—Tony Blair, Condoleezza Rice and other ‘dignitaries’ visiting him were no
longer concerned about such matters.
The same is true of Assad after the mass murder in Homs. So what has changed?
Why is the Western press now suddenly concerned about repression? I offer two
reasons. The first is the Arab Spring—itself partly a consequence of three decades of
conflict in the region, of hated dictators supported by the West and of increased
immiseration of the countries of the periphery following the 2008 economic crisis,
which I will deal with later. The second is the changing map of the region, with the
increasing influence of Iranian/Shia/Alawi forces ironically brought about by the
 86 Y. Mather

collapse of the Iran’s two main enemies: Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
There is no doubt that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah are
playing a significant military role in support of Assad in Syria and, as US secretary of
state John Kerry and others have pointed out, the current conflict is as much about
weakening Iran as it is about Syria. However, many armed groups among the Syrian
opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, are also
financed and armed by Iran’s main enemies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
All this is a direct result of the war in Iraq and the coming to power of a Shia
government in Baghdad, courtesy of another imperialist intervention in the region.
Finally let me add an Iranian view. Recent military engagement in the Middle East
and north Africa has played a crucial role in extending the life of dictatorships in the
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region. In Iran, sanctions have caused unprecedented suffering—this particular form

of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has so far cost of the lives of thousands of Iranians,
who have been deprived of medication, of the basics of life. Yet millions of Iranians
look at the current civil war in Syria and the situation in Iraq and they fear the chaos
that might follow the collapse of the Islamic regime. This and this alone makes them
prepared to tolerate a brutally reactionary government, makes them willing to
support impossible moves to reform the regime from within. And, of course, in this
they are mistaken: the Islamic Republic cannot be reformed.