Process Safety Management Boot Camp Training

Oil & Gas Skills (OGS)

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Module 1
Introduction

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Your trainers

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Moment for safety

 Emergency instructions
– Exits and assembly points
– Alarms and exercises

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Course aim

 Explain what process safety management is

 Describe why it is important
 Explain how it can be achieved
 Provide an overview of the key elements of process safety management

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Who are you?

 Name
 Discipline
 Business division
 Years of experience
 Expectations
– What do you expect to gain from this training programme?
– What are you prepared to give to this programme?

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Paperwork

 Course materials
– Presentation material
– Summary
– Exercise hand-outs
 Forms
– Registration form
 Feedback
– Feedback to improve training
 Examination
– After PSM course week 2

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Working together agreement

 We will aim to start / finish in time

 Late comers / early leavers are responsible for catching up without disrupting the session
 Limit use of electronics
– No use of mobile – phone on “discrete”/”silent”. If cannot be avoided, take urgent calls outside
training room
– No use of laptop for purposes other than for exercises and taking notes
 We all have something to learn and to teach
– Questions are encouraged
– Ideas are for sharing
 One person speaks at a time, and no side conversations
 Monitor your airspace

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Course programme
Day 1 and day 2: Introduction Day 4: Manage risk
Mod 1 Introduction and welcome Mod 13 Elem 8 Operating procedures
Mod 2 Introduction to PSM Mod 14 Elem 9 Safe work practices
Mod 3 Introduction to hazards and risk Mod 15 Elem 10 Asset integrity and reliability

Mod 4 Introduction to barrier concept Mod 16 Elem 11 Contractor management

Mod 5 Introduction to HSE management systems Mod 17 Elem 12 Training and performance assurance
Mod 18 Elem 13 Management of change
Day 2: Commit to process safety Mod 19 Elem 14 Operational readiness
Mod 6 Elem 1 Process safety culture Mod 20 Elem 15 Conduct of operations
Mod 7 Elem 2 Compliance with standards Mod 21 Elem 16 Emergency management
Mod 8 Elem 3 Process safety competency
Mod 9 Elem 4 Workforce involvement Day 5: Learn from incidents
Mod 10 Elem 5 Stakeholder outreach Mod 22 Elem 17 Incident investigation
Mod 23 Elem 18 Measurement and metrics
Day 3: Understand hazards and risk Mod 24 Elem 19 Auditing
Mod 11 Elem 6 Process knowledge management Mod 25 Elem 20 Management review and continuous improvement
Mod 12 Elem 7 Hazard identification and risk analysis
Mod 26 Course wrap-up

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Piper Alpha

 July 1988, UK shelf North Sea

 167 people killed
 Platform lost in 3 hours time
 Over 10% of UK oil production ceased
 Financial losses of £2000M
 Worst incident that has occurred on offshore
platform
 .Occidental pulled out of North Sea

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Group exercise –
Piper Alpha

 Watch video
 Identify causes and contributing factors
 Identify which of these could have been addressed by an improved design or different operational
practices

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Why did it happen?

Lack of
Poor design features
Communication

Primary cause was a Combination of bad

lack of management and
communication - poor design
night shift unaware features of safety
that safety valve had safeguards turned
been removed from “controllable” incident
back-up pump into fatal disaster

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Why did it happen – contributing design flaws

 Layout not favourable for dealing with major hazards

– No spatial separation of production modules and other modules, in particular living quarters
– Critical systems for emergencies (including the control room and radio room) were so close to
the production modules as to be inoperative in crisis situations
 Relatively large inventory of pipelines on the platform
– Lack of isolation facilities at or near to Piper Alpha
 Poor design of the panels in the control room led to read out problems and false alarms
 Lack of redundancy in the safety systems, and many critical safety systems were dependent on
central electric power generation

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Why did it happen – contributing design flaws

 Inadequate blast and fire protection

– Inadequate blast resistance of fire walls (fire walls B/C and C/D breached after initial explosion)
– Automatic deluge system was turned off
– Location and exposure of pipeline/riser emergency shutdown (ESD) valves to fires
– Manual fire-fighting system was poorly designed; bad location, no redundancy, poor protection
of the pipes against fires and blasts
 Inadequate escape and evacuation facilities
– Limited and insufficient redundancies in escape routes
– Accommodations were not smoke-proof
– Lifeboats, life-rafts and other means of escape were all grouped at one end of the platform

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Managing process safety – holistic view

Safety culture  Known and understood process safety

hazards and associated risks
 Process safety hazards are managed by
three types of barriers
– Plant
– Process
– People
Hazards  Barrier management is embedded in a
(safety) management system
People  Safety culture embodies the
Management system fundamentals of the management systems

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