Hazard Identification

What can go wrong and how?

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QRA procedure
Define the potential accident scenarios

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario … Scenario n

Estimate the frequencies Evaluate the consequences

Estimate the impact

Estimate the risk

Evaluate the risk

Identify and prioritize potential risk reduction measures

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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
TECHNIQUES

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Hazards related to the chemical itself

Harmful, irritant or sensitising

Flammable

Corrosive

Oxidising

Toxic

Dangerous for the environment

Explosive

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Material property data for HA

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Hazard Identification Methods
• Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure:
– Safety Reviews
– Checklist
– Relative Ranking
– Preliminary Hazard Analysis

• Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure:

– What-If Analysis
– What-If/Checklist Analysis
– HAZOP – Hazards & Operability study
– FMEA – Failure Mode & Effects Analysis
– FTA – Fault Tree Analysis
– ETA – Event Tree Analysis

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Hazard Evaluation

• Each technique has strengths and weaknesses;

• Performing a hazard evaluation without understanding its

motivation and without no well-defined purpose is a
waste of time and efforts.

• Factors that influence the selection of a techniques

include:
– Motivation for the study
– Type of results needed
– Type of information available

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Motivation for the study

• Why do we want to do this study?

– Development of new processes?
– Improvement of existing process?
– Extension of an existing process (change)?
– Decommissioning of a process?
– Satisfy a regulatory or legal requirement?

• Is information needed to make risk-informed decisions

concerning a process?

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Type of Results Needed

• List of hazards

• List of potential incident situations

• List of alternatives for reducing risk

• Identification of areas needing further study

• Input for a quantitative risk analysis

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Type of Information Available

• Available information depends on:

– Stage of life the process when the study needs to be done

• E.g.: conceptual design of a process:
– It is highly unlikely P&ID is already proposed:
– E.g. What-If Analysis is more appropriate than HAZOP

– Quality and currentness of documentation.

• E.g., for an existing process, if P&IDs are not up-todate:
– HAZOP can not be performed
– Study may not only futile but a waste of time and resources.

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Type of Information Available to
Perform the Study

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Choice of Hazard Evaluation
Techniques

Checklist
Checklist

What if-

HAZOP
What-if
Pre-HA
Review

FMEA
Safety

ETA
FTA
R&D
Conceptual Design
Pilot Plant Operation
Detailed Engineering
Construction / Start-up
Routine Operation
Expansion or Modification

Incident Investigation
Decommissioning

Commonly Used Rarely Used or Inappropriate

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Typical Staff Effort

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Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

SAFETY REVIEWS

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Purpose
• Ensure that the plant and its operating and maintenance
practices match the design intent and construction
standards:
– Keeps operating personnel alert to the process hazards;
– Reviews operating procedures for necessary revisions;
– Seeks to identify equipment or process changes (new hazards);
– Evaluates the design basis of control systems, instrumented
protective systems, and emergency relief systems;
– Reviews the application of new technology to existing hazards;
– Reviews the adequacy of maintenance and safety inspections.

• Success strongly depends on the experience of the Team

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Types of Results

• Provides qualitative descriptions of potential safety

problems and suggested corrective actions.

• Report includes:
– deviations from the design intentions;
– deviations from authorized procedures;
– lists of newly discovered safety issues.

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Resource Requirement

• Process material safety properties;

• Applicable codes and standards;
• Previous safety studies;
• Detailed plant descriptions (P&IDs and flowcharts);
• Plant procedures for start-up, shutdown, normal
operation, maintenance, and emergencies;
• Personnel injury reports / incident reports
• Maintenance records (functional checks, PRV tests,
vessel inspections)

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3 steps of a Safety Review
• Preparing for the review
– Assemble a detailed description of the plant (See resource
requirements)
– Schedule interviews with specific individuals responsible for safe
process operation

• Performing the review

– Should start with a general orientation tour of the plant and progress
to specific inspections and interviews
– Roundtable discussion

• Documenting the results

– Report with specific recommended actions.
– Justifications the recommendations
– Plan for Follow up actions

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Some questions to be addressed
• Is there a system for keeping important process documentation and drawings up to date?

• Is the equipment in good condition?

• Are the pressure reliefs or other safety devices properly installed, well-maintained, and
properly identified?

• Do plant records show the history of inspecting and testing the equipment and safety
devices?

• Are pressure vessels or critical or hazardous service equipment repaired by certified

welders?

• For equipment that handles corrosive or erosive materials, have metallurgical inspections
and metal-wall-thickness measurements been taken at frequent intervals?

• Does the plant have trained inspectors available whose recommendations for repair or
replacement are accepted by management?

• Are safe work practices followed and permits used?

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Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

CHECKLIST

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Purpose

• Uses a written list of items or procedural steps to verify

the status of a system in order to:

– Ensure that organizations are complying with standard

practices.

– Provide a common basis for the review of a hazard assessment

– If combined with another hazard evaluation method (What-

If/Checklist Analysis) can be used to identify Hazards

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Types of Results

• Qualitative results

• List of questions which receive the following answers:

– “yes”
– “no”
– “not applicable”
– “needs more information”

• List of possible safety improvement alternatives for

managers to consider

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Resource Requirement
• Appropriate checklist:
– Based on deficiencies or differences with standard design or
operating practices
– Checklist prepared from prior experience

• Engineering design procedures

• Standard Procedures Manual

• Someone to complete the checklist who has basic

knowledge of the process being reviewed.

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Examples

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Examples

http://www.harsnet.net/harsmeth/HarsMeth%20text/HarsMeth%20version%202.pdf

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Examples

http://www.harsnet.net/harsmeth/HarsMeth%20text/HarsMeth%20version%202.pdf

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Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

RANKING METHODS

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Purpose
• Determine the process areas that present the most significant:
– hazard of concern
– the potential severity of consequences
– the overall risk

• Determine the processes that that present significant hazards

and require further deeper study.

• Compare several process siting, generic design, or equipment

layout options, to choose the “best” option.

• Should normally be performed early in the life of a process,

before the detailed design is completed
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Ranking Methods

• Numerical values that represent the relative level of

significance that the analyst gives to each hazard,
potential consequence or risk depending on the approach
used.

• Ordered list of processes, equipment, operations, or

activities.

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Ressource Requirements
• Basic physical and chemical data on the substances used in
the process or activity.

• General process diagrams and equipment layout drawings

• Maximum inventories of materials

• Plant’s process conditions

• Geographic layout of material storage areas is usually

needed.

• Do not normally require detailed process drawing

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

• Dow Chemicals have developed this method and found it

useful.

• As part of safety promotion in the process industries,

they have made it available to others;

• The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) rates relative

hazards of storing, handling, processing flammable and
explosive materials

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

• Breaks the process down into units or sections

• Methodology:

– Define the material factor

– Adjust this with various penalties

– Then take credits for safety procedures and safety systems

– Finally arrive at a number that rates the hazard

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Material factor

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

The material factor is a

property of the chemicals
being handled.
Compute for mixtures or
use worst value

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
• Penalties for general process hazards:

– Exothermic reactions that might self-heat

– Endothermic reactions that could react because of an external heat

source such as a fire

– Material handling and transfer, including pumping and connection of

transfer lines

– Enclosed process units preventing dispersion of escaped vapors

– Limited access for emergency equipment

– Poor drainage of flammable materials away from the process unit

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Penalties for
General Process
Hazards Factor
(F1)

F1 General Process
Hazards Factor

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
• Penalties for special process hazards:

– Toxic materials, which could impede fire fighting

– Less than atmospheric pressure operation with a risk of outside air entering

– Operation in or near the flammable limits

– Dust explosion risks

– Higher than atmospheric pressure

– Low-temperature operation with potential embrittlement of carbon steel

vessels

– Quantity of flammable material

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Penalties for
Special Process
Hazards Factor
(F2)

Special Process
F2
Hazards Factor

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Process Unit Hazards Factor (F3) F1  F2  F3

Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) F&EI  F3  MF

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Material
factor

General Process
Hazards Factor

Special Process
Hazards Factor

F&EI

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Determining the degree of hazard from the Dow F&EI

F&EI index value Degree of hazard

1 – 60 Light

61 – 96 Moderate

97 – 127 Intermediate

128 – 158 Heavy

128 – 158 Severe

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Control C1

Isolation C2

Fire protection C3

Loss control credit factor

(C1 x C2 x C3)

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

F&EI

Loss control
credit factor

Base Maximum Probable

Value of area of
Property Damage = exposure ($)
x Damage factor
(Base MMPD in $) (based on F&EI

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

F&EI

Loss control
credit factor

Actual Maximum Probable

x Loss control
Property Damage = Base MMPD (in $)
credit factor
(Actual MMPD)

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Dow Fire and Explosion Index

Example: new facility for handling

tanker deliveries of butadiene

Butadiene has material factor of 24

(flashpoint -105oC, poor “NFPA
health rating”, high heat of
combustion)

1.5 x 2.94 = 4.41

FEI = 4.41 x 24 = 106

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Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

PRELIMINARY HAZARD
ANALYSIS

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Purpose

• Evaluate hazards early in the life of a process.

• Applied during the conceptual design or R&D phase of a

process plant and can be very useful when making site
selection decisions.

• Used as a design review tool before a process P&ID is

developed.

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Types of Results
• Qualitative description of the hazards related to a process
design.

• Qualitative ranking of hazardous situations:

– Based on the significance of the causes and effects of the incident:

• Hazard Category I Negligible
• Hazard Category II Marginal
• Hazard Category III Critical
• Hazard Category IV Catastrophic

– Can be used to prioritize recommendations for reducing or

eliminating hazards in subsequent phases of the life cycle of the
process.

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Resource Requirement

• Available plant design criteria

• Written description of the conceptual design
• Equipment specifications
• Material specifications
• Basic chemicals, reactions, and process parameters
• Major types of equipment
• Other sources of information:
– hazard studies of similar facilities
– operating experience from similar facilities

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Some factors to be considered
• Hazardous plant equipment and materials
– e.g., fuels, highly reactive chemicals, toxic substances, explosives,
high pressure systems, and other energy storage systems

• Safety-related interfaces between plant equipment items and

materials
– Material interactions, fire/explosion initiation and propagation, and
instrumented protective systems

• Environmental factors that may influence the plant

equipment and materials
– earthquake, vibration, flooding, extreme temperatures, electrostatic
discharge, and humidity

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Some factors to be considered
• Operating, testing, maintenance, and emergency
procedures
– human error importance, operator functions to be
accomplished, equipment layout/accessibility, and personnel
safety protection

• Facility support
– storage, testing equipment, training, and utilities

• Safety-related equipment
– mitigating systems, redundancy, fire suppression, and personal
protective equipment

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Example

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Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

WHAT IF ANALYSIS
WHAT IF/CHECKLIST

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Purpose
• Unstructured method to identify hazards, hazardous
situations, or specific hazard leading to a hazardous situation
from a What If Question
– Not concerned with “how” failures occur

• Identify possible their consequences

• Identify existing safeguards

• Suggests alternatives for risk reduction if possible

• Powerful method for a very experienced team. Otherwise

elements may be missed.

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Type of Results

• Answers to a list of questions about the process (tabular

listing).

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Resource Requirements
• Chemical data, process descriptions, drawings, and
operating procedures.

• Very flexible method that can be used at any stage of

the life cycle of a process;
– Available information depends on the life cycle phase

• Can be used even with limited process information and

knowledge;

• Preliminary questions should be developed to start of the

discussion
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Example of "What-If"
• Question:
– What if the raw material is the wrong concentration?

• Answer:
– If the concentration of the acid could be doubled, the reaction
could not be controlled and a rapid exotherm would result.

• Recommendation:
– Install emergency shut-down device
– Install emergency relief system
– or take special precautions when loading the raw material
• Place a valve on the line just before the reactor, that way the inlet flow
can be controlled

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Example of "What-If"

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What If/Checklist
• Hybrid method combines the advantages of both methods What-If
and Checklist

• Advantages Checklist part of the method:

– Built from experience of people
– Avoid missing known hazards
– Gives a systematic nature to the analysis

• Advantages What-If Analysis part of the method :

– Allows creativity and brainstorming beyond the experience of the assessing
team

• This technique is very effective and popular

• Often used as a first hazard evaluation on a process (precursor for

more detailed studies).
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Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY

STUDY (HAZOP)

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Objectives

• Identify Hazards

• Identify Operability Problems

• HAZOPs Use Multi-Disciplinary Team Approach

• Guide word based

• Structured and Systematic

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Strengths
• Creative approach for identifying hazards, particularly
those involving reactive chemicals

• Exhaustively examines the potential consequences of

process upsets or failure to follow procedures

• Systematically identifies engineering and

administrative safeguards and the consequences of
safeguard failures

• Gives all participants a thorough understanding of the

system
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HAZOP Team Composition

• Team Leader – generally with HAZOP experience

• 5-7 team members optimum, depending on scope of

effort

• Scribe

• Consultants

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HAZOP Team Composition
• Example of Technical Members for new design
– Design Engineer
– Process Engineer
– Commissioning Manager
– Instrument Design Engineer
– Chemist

• Example of Technical Members for Existing design

– Plant Superintendent
– Process Supervisor
– Maintenance Engineer
– Instrument Engineer
– Technical Engineer

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Team Leader Attributes

• Patience
• Stamina
• Organized
• Quick thinking
• Friendly and cooperative
• Able to focus simultaneously
on multiple items
• Able to read people
• Imaginative
• Seeks consensus
• Respected by team
• Diplomatic
• Ability to keep meeting on
track

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Scribe Attributes

• Attention to detail
• Responsive
• Good listener
• Good typing skills
• Good spelling/grammar skills
• Process/technical knowledge

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HAZOP Methodology
Start

Select a
Select study
process
nodes
section
Record and
assign action
items
Pick a process Explain the
design
parameter intention
Apply guide
Develop Action
words to process
items
parameters

Assess
acceptability Typical causes
based on of deviations
consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation

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HAZOP Methodology
Start

• Selection of NODES Select a

– Major process vessels
Select study
process
nodes
section
• Reactor
• Storage vessel
• Catch tank Explain the
design
intention

– Major process lines connected to process vessels

• Inlet line for feed A
• Inlet line for feed B
• Discharge line

– Pumps and compressors

– Heat exchangers

– Etc

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HAZOP Methodology

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HAZOP Methodology

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HAZOP Methodology
Start

Select a
Select study
process
nodes
section
• Choice of a process parameter
– Flow Pick a process Explain the
design
– Pressure parameter intention

– Temperature
– Level
– Composition
– Source
– Destination
– Duration
– Sequence

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HAZOP Methodology
• Choice of a Guide Words
Start

– NO, NOT, NONE

– MORE, HIGHER, GREATER Select study
Select a
process
nodes
section
– LESS, LOWER
Record and
– AS WELL AS
assign action
items
Pick a process Explain the
– PART OF parameter
design
intention

–
Develop REVERSE
Action
items
Apply guide
words to process
parameters
– OTHER THAN
– etc

Assess
acceptability Typical causes
based on of deviations
consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation

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HAZOP Methodology

Choice of a
Guide word

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HAZOP Methodology
• Choice of a Guide Words
Start

– NO, NOT, NONE

– MORE, HIGHER, GREATER Select study
Select a
process
nodes
section
– LESS, LOWER
Record and
– AS WELL AS
assign action
items
Pick a process Explain the
– PART OF parameter
design
intention

–
Develop REVERSE
Action
items
Apply guide
words to process
parameters
– OTHER THAN
– etc

Assess
acceptability Typical causes
based on
consequences
of deviations
Parameter + Guide
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
Word = Deviation
deviation

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HAZOP Methodology

Parameter + Guide Word = Deviation

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HAZOP Methodology

Parameter + Guide Word = Deviation

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HAZOP Methodology
Start

Select a
Select study
process
nodes
section
Record and
assign action
items
Pick a process Explain the
design
parameter intention
Apply guide
Develop Action
words to process
items
parameters

Assess
acceptability Typical causes
based on of deviations
consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation

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HAZOP Methodology
• Example on a particular node

– Parameter: Flow

– Guide Word: No

– Deviation  No + Flow

– Cause
• Supply pipe ruptured upstream

– Consequences
• Release of material with possible toxic effects and/or fire and explosion

– Recommendation
• Install pressure sensor
• Mechanical integrity program

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HAZOP Example

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FAILURE MODES AND
EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

90
Purpose
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) identifies :

– How single equipment can fail (or be improperly operated)

• open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc
• E.g. for pump: Fails to stop when required, Stops when required to run,
Seal leak/rupture, Pump casing leak/rupture

– How each failure mode’s affects the system or plant:

• Determines the effect (E) of the failure mode (FM) by the system’s
response to the equipment failure

•  Generates recommendations for increasing equipment

reliability (improving process safety)

91
Type of Results

• FMEA generates a qualitative, systematic reference list

of equipment, failure modes and effects.

• A worst-case estimate of consequences resulting from

single failures is included.

• But:
– Rarely investigates damage or injury that could arise
– Not useful for identifying combinations of failures

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Resource Requirements

• System or plant equipment list or P&ID

• Knowledge of equipment function and failure modes

• Knowledge of system and responses to equipment

failures

• Staff requirements will vary with the size and

complexity of equipment

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Type of Results

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Type of Results

95
Type of Results

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SUMMARY

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Typical outcomes of HazID
Techniques
• Lists of identified hazards, perceived problems, or
potential incident scenarios;

• Descriptions of the significance of these problems or

incidents (e.g., risk posed by each scenario);

• Recommendations for:
– Reducing or eliminating the hazards;
– Coming into compliance with codes or standards;
– Reducing the risks associated with the incident scenarios.

98
Outcomes of HazID Techniques

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How to prioritize actions
• Most hazard evaluations result in lists of recommendations for reducing
the risks.

• One could examine the potential causes and effects of an incident

(providing this is given by the technique)

• How to rank these recommendation; Suggestions:

– Identification of any situation that violates a regulations, standards;

– Analysts’ understanding of the risk posed by the potential incidents;

– Analysts’ perception of the risk reduction gained by implementing a specific

recommendation;

– Risk reduction gained by implementing a specific recommendation in

comparison to the resources required to implement it.

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References

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