More Than Fighting For Peace?: David Curran

The Anthropocene: Politik–Economics–Society–Science
David Curran
More than
Fighting
for Peace?
Conflict Resolution,
UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of
Training Military Personnel
The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—
Society—Science
Volume 8
Series editor
Hans Günter Brauch, Mosbach, Germany
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15232
http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS.htm
http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_08.htm
David Curran
More than Fighting

for Peace?
Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping,
and the Role of Training Military Personnel
123
David Curran
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations
Coventry University
Coventry
UK
ISSN 2367-4024 ISSN 2367-4032 (electronic)

The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science
ISBN 978-3-319-46303-2 ISBN 978-3-319-46305-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46305-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016952003
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Internal title page photo: Mongolian peacekeepers on patrol interacting with children in Leer County,
South Sudan, January 5, 2016 (Leer, South Sudan).
Credit: UN Photo/Zenebe Teklewold
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Acknowledgements
This book has benefited greatly from the support of a number of people.
First, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Tom Woodhouse, whose
considerable contribution to the conflict resolution field has been a driving factor in
shaping my understanding of the potential role of peacekeeping (and peacekeepers)
in conflict resolution processes. Thank you to my colleagues at the Centre for Trust,
Peace and Social Relations (Coventry University) for the support, encouragement
and time to bring this book together. To work on a daily basis with such a diverse
and fascinating group of people is a privilege. Many thanks to the series editor,
Hans Günter Brauch, for his interest in the topic, excellent support in putting the
book together and for the advice in refining the text. My gratitude as well as to the
anonymous reviewers who helped shape the latter drafts.
I would like to thank staff from the Defence Forces, Ireland who have been
welcoming, candid and open to discussing the practicalities of United Nations
peacekeeping. In particular Colonel (Dr.) Brendan O’Shea, who has been most
helpful in assisting me in getting access to courses and course material at the UN
Training School Ireland, and has offered fascinating insights into the challenges
of the civil-military dimensions of peacekeeping activities. I extend my gratitude to
staff at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (and wider UN family—
Secretariat, Diplomats, and NGOs) who have assisted me in developing my ideas
regarding the development of UN policy. Amidst the many substantial challenges
that UN peacekeeping faces, it is heartening to know that the ‘system’ contains
diligent, hard working people who do their very best to ensure it goes some way to
meeting the enormous expectations placed upon it.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my family for their support and encour-
agement throughout this process. From the initial interest in pursuing academic
studies through to the present day, their support has been invaluable.
v
vi Acknowledgements
Finally, but most importantly, thanks to Lena who has been amazing in many
ways. Thank you for offering your views and opinions in helping shape my ideas,
your organisational help, and for keeping me sane with tea, coffee, cake, gardening
and cycling (a quality combination). Danke schön.
Coventry, UK David Curran

August 2016
Abbreviations
AU African Union
BATNA Best Alternative to a Negotiated Settlement
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO Definition)
CMCOORD Civil-Military Coordination (UN Office of the High Representative
of Humanitarian Affairs Definition)
CPTM Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials
CSDP Common European Security and Defence Policy
DFS Department of Field Support (United Nations)
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)
EU European Union
FIB Force Intervention Brigade
FPU Formed Police Unit
IAPTC International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee (of the UN)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ITS Integrated Training Service (United Nations)
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unites en République
démocratique du Congo)
MONUSCO UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la
Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OASEA Office for Addressing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKTI Peacekeeping Training Institute
POTI Peace Operations Training Institute
QIP Quick Impact Project
vii
viii Abbreviations
RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGTM Standard Generic Training Materials
SHIRBRIG Standard High Readiness Brigade
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)
STM Specialised Training Material (United Nations)
TCC Troop Contributing Country
TNA Training Needs Analysis (United Nations)
UN United Nations
UNAMSIL United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone,
UN-CIMIC UN-Civil-Military Cooperation (UNDPKO Definition)
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East)
UNEPS United Nations Emergency Peace Service
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIF I Phase 1 UN Intervention Force
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIL* United Nations Mission in Leinster: a fictitious UN peacekeeping
mission to assist course participants at the UN Training School,
Ireland
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTSI United Nations Training School Ireland
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Part I Trends in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeper Training

2 Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and the Role of Training . . . . . . . 17
3 The Development of Training Structures in the United Nations . . . . 37
Part II Specific Areas of Engagement

4 Negotiation Training for Military Peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5 Civil-Military Relations Training for Military Peacekeepers . . . . . . . 83
Part III Looking Ahead

6 Towards the Military Conflict Resolution Practitioner? . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
About this Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
At the beginning of 2016, over 90,000 military personnel from 124 countries were
serving in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (UN 2016a, b). They
were—and will continue to be—deployed into challenging post-conflict environ-
ments where the likelihood of violence remains high. Moreover, these personnel are
deployed as part of a peace process, and are thus situated as an anchor point in the
transition from war to peace. This dimension of their work therefore means that a
range of skills and techniques are relied upon, which come not only from traditional
military training, but also from other, non-traditional fields.
It is here where the academic field of conflict resolution has made a valuable
contribution to understanding international peacekeeping. Since the 1970s, studies
have sought to understand international peacekeeping as a necessary stage in
conflict de-escalation, and ultimately transformation (Galtung 1976). From this,
there is a history of engagement including studies which seek to understand the
skills peacekeepers may need to assist them in their day to day activities (such as
approaches to negotiation, mediation, and cultural awareness), and the role that
international peacekeeping plays in wider projects of conflict resolution. However,
a gap exists insofar that there are few extensive studies on the training needs of
military peacekeepers, and the role that the conflict resolution field can play in
addressing such needs. It is into this nexus where this book provides a contribution.
It demonstrates linkages between conflict resolution and peacekeeping through the
lens of training of military peacekeepers.
This book therefore offers a multi-layered synthesis of how conflict resolution
theory and skills interact with pre-deployment training programmes for military
personnel embarking on peacekeeping operations. This incorporates theoretical
approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, through to UN initiatives
designed to equip military personnel with the ability to deal constructively with
violence. With peacekeeping operations—particularly those sanctioned by the
UN—continuing to be a highly used means to attempt to manage and resolve
international conflict, the requirements for military personnel to understand how to
carry out their work in a more proficient manner, and also contribute to the
© The Author(s) 2017 1
D. Curran, More than Fighting for Peace?, The Anthropocene:
Politik—Economics—Society—Science 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46305-6_1
2 1 Introduction
transformation of conflict zones into ones where positive peace can flourish, is
paramount.
By looking through the lens of training programmes for military peacekeepers,
the main question that guides this book is what role does conflict resolution theory
and practice play in peacekeeping? In this, the book will look at two broad areas of
training for peacekeeping. Firstly it will examine training programmes which aim to
impart skills in negotiation, and cultural awareness. These skills have been high-
lighted as being necessary in giving military peacekeepers creative, non-violent
solutions to potentially violent situations. Secondly, the book will look at
civil-military relations. This area reflects the increasing role that peacekeepers play
in early-stage peacebuilding, as well as the impact that the field of conflict reso-
lution has had in informing training programmes to understand new dimensions in
the civil-military relationship.
1.1 Aims
The aim of this book is twofold. Firstly to contribute to the practice of training
peacekeepers and; secondly, to make a contribution to the field of conflict
resolution.
Taking the first point, the book makes a contribution to the practice of training
military personnel for peacekeeping operations. At a strategic level, the book
examines the training frameworks that have been developed at the UN, as well as
looking at broad thematic approaches that the UN has taken to conflict and its
resolution. This will incorporate the institutionalisation of ‘early stage peace-
building’ as a formal activity of UN peacekeeping operations, as well as cross
cutting resolutions on Women Peace and Security, Protection of Civilians, and
Children in Armed Conflict.
At an operational level, it seeks to examine how these initiatives have been
implemented into training regimes for military peacekeepers. In particular, the
development of UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs), in areas
such as civil-military relations, cultural awareness, and negotiation will be exam-
ined, as will the role of peacekeeping training centres. Here, the UN Training
School, Ireland (UNTSI) will be looked at specifically as an example of a training
school which has sought to distil developments at a strategic level into modules for
personnel at a pre-deployment stage.
At a tactical level, the book identifies how peacekeeper training has looked to
inform the ‘routine duties’ of military personnel when they are deployed on UN
peacekeeping operations. Typical duties in peacekeeping environments identified in
this book (negotiation, communication, civil-military relations) arguably do not
1.1 Aims 3
come naturally to conventional military personnel, thereby requiring considerable

‘shifts in traditional or conventional military culture toward a culture or psychology
suitable for peacekeeping’ (Woodhouse 1998: 163).
This change in culture has been aptly illustrated by Tom Woodhouse, who
suggests that peacekeeping asks military personnel to understand that instead of
destroying an enemy, a soldier may have to negotiate with them, and instead of
blowing a door off its hinges in a search and cordon operation, the military may
have to learn to knock on it (Woodhouse 1998: 163). A broader understanding of
the change necessary is offered by Tillet, who argues that peacekeeping involves:
the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from confrontation to third
party imposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid hostilities, to
improve communication between the parties, and to advance the process of reconciliation.
This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict—political, military and
economic—as well as the social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and
impartial approach while operating in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among the
protagonists, often under difficult and provocative circumstances (Tillett 1996: 3).
The requirement to understand the necessity to develop an expanded skillset for

peacekeeping is not new: the 1984 International Peace Academy Publication, the
Peacekeeper’s Handbook, outlines what it terms to be the ‘necessary skills required
for effective peacekeepers’. They are outlined in Box 1.1 below. Importantly, this
contains a range of tasks which seem specific to peacekeeping and less so to
standard military training. Of course, there is crossover in certain skills, but the
range of non-violent actions indicates that peacekeeping operations have been for
some time considered an alternative activity to standard military activities. Nor is it
confined to academic texts on peacekeeping. In 2006, a journalist noted the range of
new techniques after a chance meeting with a group of soldiers on a Pan-African
training course for a UN Observer Missions in Mali:
What was more interesting for me, as a former English language training specialist, was the
focus on communication skills and the types of activity I was familiar with: team-work,
role-play, dealing with the unexpected, how to behave in difficult encounters with inter-
locutors from different cultures. It all made sense: from paralinguistics (how to recognise
danger - the tone of voice, the facial expression, and how these give signs of suspicion, fear,
aggression…), to response (how to show peaceful intentions, submission, hold up your
hands, step back, back down…) (Daniel 2006).
However, analysis of training this wider skillset into peacekeepers is, and will
continue to be necessary. Peacekeeping operations evolve, with broadening man-
dates tasking peacekeepers to have awareness of a range of military and
non-military issues. Additionally, personnel are deployed into highly volatile
post-conflict environments, where the actions of interveners can have significant
effects. In seeking to explore how conflict resolution theory and practice has
engaged with training programmes for peacekeeping, the book makes a valuable
contribution to assisting those who undertake training (both trainers and recipients).
4 1 Introduction
Box 1.1: List of soldier’s qualities as outlined in the Peacekeepers

Handbook. Source: International Peace Academy (1984: 272–278).
The handbook offers a list of the ‘main credentials a peacekeeper requires’.
(a) Patience. ‘A peacekeeper or a peacemaker needs to have infinite patience.
Never should he expect quick results or solutions but rather he should
evaluate repeatedly his achievement in the context of his aim.’
(b) Restraint. ‘Because of the special relationship between the third party and
the parties to the dispute, any display of emotion on the part of the former
can disadvantageously affect his credibility as a negotiator or pacifier.’
(c) Advocacy. ‘Since the third party’s weapon is not a self-loading rifle but
his ability without force or threats to persuade both sides to avoid vio-
lence and settle their differences by peaceful means, it is basic to his role
that he cultivates an attitude and approach founded on his own person-
ality and understanding. The advocacy that he is called upon to undertake
is (1) Negotiation, (2) mediation, (3) conciliation, and sometimes
(4) arbitration.’
(d) Personality. ‘He has to combine an approachable, understanding and
tactful manner with fairness and firmness. The unapproachable and
tactless are resented and often ignored, while the weak are put upon
and exploited.’
(e) Persuasion and influence. ‘The degree of persuasion called for is more a
matter of quiet reasoning than direct pressurising, while influence should
take the form of indirect suggestion rather than action manipulation.’
(f) Perspective. ‘If a third party peacekeeper is to be effective and avoid
making misjudgements he has to keep the conflict, his part in it, and the
reactions of all concerned, in proper proportion. A clear understanding of
the motivations and ethnic and cultural structures of the respective dis-
putants is all important to the peacekeeper in the exercise of his third
party role.’
(g) Attitude and Approach. ‘It is reasonable to demand a high level of
objectivity from the members of a peacekeeping Force in their assess-
ment, evaluation and in their reporting of actions taken by the respective
sides in a dispute. Given this fundamental principle, the peacekeeper,
maker and builder must strive not to pre-judge any issue or controversy
but, as has already been pointed out, to consider each and every case on
its merits alone, bearing in mind the antecedents and the factors affecting
the reactions and motivations of those responsible for the particular case
problem.’
(h) Flexibility and Speed.
1.1 Aims 5
(i) Humour. ‘Good humour makes for good working relations, because a
man of good humour is accessible and approachable—a quality of con-
siderable importance in a peacekeeper when negotiating with the
respective parties to a dispute.’
(j) Vigilance and Alertness. ‘The two human factors most important in a
soldier’s mentality make up.’
This book also makes a theoretical contribution, particularly to the field of

conflict resolution research, a field guided by the normative aim of ‘transforming
actual or potential violent conflict into non-violent processes of social, political and
other forms of change’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2016: 10). Approaches to conflict
resolution include a range of short, medium and long-term strategies undertaken by
a range of actors which aim to minimize violence, overcome antagonism between
adversaries, find mutually acceptable outcomes, with the hope of facilitating
enduring settlements (Kriesberg 2001: 408). Work specifically examining the role
of training for military peacekeepers forms a small part of the wider literature
towards peacekeeping from the conflict resolution field, with notable works being
provided by Betts Fetherston, and Deborah Goodwin, both of whom the book will
draw on.
Additionally, it will contribute to what Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall
have termed as ‘cosmopolitan conflict resolution’. Taking a cue from cosmopolitan
theorists who have advocated forms of cosmopolitan democratic governance at
local, regional and international level (Archibugi 1995; Held 1995), Cosmopolitan
approaches are based on the understanding that conflict exists in a hybrid context,
linking global, regional and local dynamics. Such ‘transnational conflict’ therefore
requires ‘constructive means of handling conflict at local through to global levels in
the interests of humanity’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 265). This inclusive effort
notes that approaches to conflict resolution are not situated within one particular
state, society, or established centre of power, but one which has sources and
approaches at multiple levels. As the book will demonstrate in its forthcoming
chapters (particularly Chap. 2), there is an identified role for peacekeeping opera-
tions under UN auspices within this framework. Cosmopolitan approaches have
been deemed ‘the number one priority as ensuring that conflict resolution is indeed
truly international’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 425). Through investigating whether
current military training for peacekeeping reflects an emerging cosmopolitan
dimension in international forms of conflict resolution, the book offers a contri-
bution to the broader field.
There are two further areas where this book contributes. Firstly is that it outlines
an updated account of the skillset necessary for peacekeeping operations, and where
conflict resolution theory and skills may offer an input. This incorporates studies
undertaken into peacekeeping operations in the 2000s—a period which has seen
advances in what is expected of peacekeepers in a multitude of areas. Secondly, it
6 1 Introduction
will incorporate studies which examine peacekeeping interventions from the per-
spective of the ‘peacekept’: those who live in the areas where peacekeepers are
deployed. These studies reflect the range of perspectives of peacekeepers and UN
peacekeeping, and offer a critical lens of the work of the UN. This links to the final
area where the book contributes to theoretical approaches to peacekeeping and
conflict resolution: how peacekeepers are trained. Through exploring John Paul
Lederach’s elicitive approach to training, the book examines an approach drawn
from the conflict resolution field which asks practitioners to reflect on their role
within conflict, and how they can use their own individual approaches to better
influence wider conflict resolution processes. By examining this area of ‘how’
peacekeepers are trained, the book will advance the discussion as to how conflict
resolution theory can play a valuable role in the activity of military peacekeeping.
1.2 Defining ‘Peacekeeping’ and Peacebuilding?
1.2.1 Peacekeeping
The UN Charter offers no definition of peacekeeping; therefore meaning that those

who drive peacekeeping policy forward often attempt to find a definition to best
reflects on-going activities. As peacekeeping falls between Chapter VI and
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this means that the scope for what is defined as
‘peacekeeping’ can be broad.
Early, or ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations deployed during the Cold War
(though there were notable exceptions) were widely seen to be an activity which
involved lightly armed, UN sanctioned, soldiers, ‘generally deployed in linear
buffer zones between belligerents’ who used military force ‘only in a passive
manner’ (Hillen 2000: 79). The formal approach taken by peacekeeping during this
time was characterised by the Hammarskjold/Pearson Model of peacekeeping,
which relied heavily upon five key principles (Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:
93–94).
i. The principle of consent from the combating parties for the establishment of
the mission;
ii. The non-use of force by the peacekeeping mission except for in circumstances
of self defence;
iii. The principle of voluntary contributions from small, neutral countries to
participate in the force;
iv. The principle of an impartial peacekeeping force; and
v. The principle of peacekeeping operations being controlled by the Secretary
General.
As peacekeeping has developed, the five key principles have reduced, and now
peacekeeping is guided by a ‘holy trinity’ (Bellamy et al. 2010: 174) of consent,
1.2 Defining ‘Peacekeeping’ and Peacebuilding? 7
impartiality, and the non-use of force apart from self defence and defence of the
mandate. Moreover, the tasks asked of peacekeepers has broadened, particularly as
a result of multifaceted deployments in the 1990s, where UN peacekeeping oper-
ations became involved in nation building (Jett 1999: 28). Such operations—and
the complex nature these tasks involved—resulted in military peacekeepers being
asked to liaise with a much wider number of civilian organisations, as well as learn
to negotiate with local armed groups and facilitate agreements over ceasefires, aid
delivery, and the return of refugees (Stewart 1993). Additionally, doctrinal devel-
opments from troop contributors (MOD 1995; JDDC 1998) brought in more formal
approaches to managing different levels of consent amongst parties to the conflict,
using increased force in peacekeeping operations, and engaging in early-stage
peacebuilding.
The most recent iteration of the UN’s approach to peacekeeping is outlined in
the 2008 UN publication ‘Principles and Guidelines of United Nations
Peacekeeping’. The UN’s definition of peacekeeping forms part of a larger spec-
trum of ‘peace operations’, which incorporate differing levels of coercive capacity
(robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement), as well as engagement in peace-
building processes. The definitions are outlined in Box 1.2.
Box 1.2: How the UN Principles and Guidelines Define Peace operations.
Source: UN (2008: 17–18, 99)
Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile,
where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements
achieved by the peacemakers… peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily
military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after
inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements—military,
police and civilian—working together to help lay the foundations for sus-
tainable peace.
Robust Peacekeeping: The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping
operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council,
to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to
civilians or risk undermining the peace process.
Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the
Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of
military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and
security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security
Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies
for enforcement action under its authority.
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of
lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all
levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable
peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of
8 1 Introduction
creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by

addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a com-
prehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the
functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the
State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.
As can be seen, UN definitions expect that those involved in a peacekeeping

operation will be operating under mixed identities. Every activity—be it peace-
keeping, robust peacekeeping, or peacebuilding—operates in a fluid environment.
This means that pinning down an exact definition of peacekeeping differs from
mission to mission. The UN’s definition therefore attempts to maintain the flexi-
bility to operate across missions.
Peacekeeping can also be a robust activity, and the overlap between
consent-based peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, and peace enforcement is one
which also challenges the definitional solidity of the activity. Under the narrowest
form of ‘robust’ peacekeeping, peacekeepers are mandated, under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, to use force at a tactical level to provide freedom of manoeuvre for
the peacekeepers, and to protect the mandate. That is, according to Thierry Tardy,
to ‘prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate, or more broadly the
peace process, is ‘taken hostage’ by spoilers’ (Tardy 2011: 152).
Furthermore, as the Chap. 3 will demonstrate, peacekeeping operations have also
developed in such a way that mandates which guide missions cover a range of
important ‘cross cutting’ issues. These issues—Protection of Civilians, Women
Peace and Security, and Children and Armed Conflict—bring new challenges and
opportunities to the activity of peacekeeping.
This being a book about UN peacekeeping, and the development of training
programmes for duties under the UN flag, it is appropriate that the definitions of
peacekeeping as outlined by the UN are used. This is predominantly as the book
starts from the point of agreement with Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall’s
assertion that that the central aim of UN peacekeepers has not been to defeat a
national enemy, but to ‘support peace processes, protect civilians and fulfil legiti-
mate international mandates’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 170). Therefore peace-
keeping operations have a ‘vital’ conflict resolution role to play in the most intense
periods of destructive conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 147). The UN’s own
definition of this activity—‘a technique designed to preserve the peace, however
fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements
achieved by the peacemakers’ (UN 2008: 18)—links to this, and provides a positive
illustration of the nexus between the military activity of peacekeeping, and the role
of conflict resolution theory.
1.2.2 Peacebuilding
Likewise, with the book focusing on UN operations, it is appropriate that the book
utilizes the UN’s definitions of peacebuilding, as outlined in Box 1.2. The UN has
since expanded on this by stressing that peacekeeping activities should be con-
ducted in a manner that facilitates post-conflict peacebuilding, help to prevent a
relapse into conflict, and assist progress towards sustainable peace and develop-
ment. This means UN peacekeepers are ideally to be understood as early peace-
builders (UN 2010: 2).
On a wider level, peacebuilding has been described as the ‘institutionalisation of
peace’ (Aggestam/Bjorkdahl 2013: 8). As David Last argues, the challenge of
countries where the UN deploys operations is far beyond controlling violence, and
incorporates the rebuilding of government, civil society, and the ‘public space’ for
debate (Last 2000: 87). Peacebuilding projects therefore seek to complement the
provision of security that military forms of peacekeeping ideally provides, through
utilizing a range of non-military actors (both local and international) to facilitate the
transition towards peaceful societies.
Yet, defining peacebuilding—particularly on a macro-level—is a difficult chal-
lenge, with differing actors, perceptions, timeframes, and intentions all contributing
to a substantially broad field. Macro-level Studies of peacebuilding have often
looked to the broad process of political projects of democratization, economic
reform, and security sector reform in post-conflict societies. These are often argued
as being in line with liberal democratic values (Newman et al. 2009: 6), and stem
from Boutros Ghali’s approach of a ‘comprehensive approach’ to peace outlined in
the 1992 Agenda for Peace (Ghali 1992), which posited the links between conflict
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The political nature of
post conflict peacebuilding is thus brought into question, as is the actions and
intention of interveners (Pugh et al. 2008: 3). Moreover, there are differences
between technical approaches based on the capacities of international organisations
(known as deductive approaches), and the requirements of context specific situa-
tions (inductive processes) (Cousins/Kumar 2001: 5–10).
This particular study however will look towards micro-level approaches to how
military personnel deployed on peacekeeping operations undertake local level
peacebuilding tasks. Betts Fetherston’s work (which in many ways has been fun-
damental to providing linkages between peacekeeping and conflict resolution the-
ory), outlined three ways in which peacebuilding functions at a micro-level. Firstly
an activity which builds economic and/or political infrastructure; second, an activity
‘targeted specifically a reconciliation’ or restoring severed interactions; third, the
provision of humanitarian aid (Fetherston 1994: 138). More recent studies of
peacebuilding outline more characteristics of what informs the activity, with
Schrich offering seven principles (Schrich 2013: 8). Peacebuilding in this context is:
• Informed by robust participatory, on-going conflict assessment
• Informed by conflict sensitivity that reduces the possibility of unintentional
harms that could increase the risk of actual violence or social divisions
10 1 Introduction
• Designed to address drivers and mitigators of conflict

• Built on local capacities to manage and resolve conflict peacefully
• Driven by local ownership
• Informed by social dialogue to build consensus and trust
• Inclusive of all relevant stakeholders throughout programming and
implementations.
Through their daily activities, military peacekeepers can facilitate each of these
processes. As Chap. 3 will outline, the UN has identified particular roles that
peacekeepers at this micro-level in the development of peacebuilding programmes.
Moreover, in Chap. 5, which examines civil-military relations, aspects of these
micro-level approaches to peacebuilding will be evident.
1.2.3 The Training Framework
When reading this book, it is important to bear in mind that the peacekeeping
training architecture is slightly amorphous. Although the UN is the body which
military peacekeepers are ultimately serving under, the responsibility of training of
such peacekeepers falls to the member states who contribute them (known as Troop
Contributing Countries, or TCCs). The UN (through the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, or DPKO) has a role (as shall be seen), in providing
standardised training materials through what are known as the Core
Pre-Deployment Training Materials, but the very size of peacekeeping contribu-
tions, and demands that are placed on the DPKO means that the body relies on a
decentralized structure to train peacekeepers. This is where organisations such as
the UN Training School, Ireland (UNTSI) are important. As shall be seen in
Chap. 5, UNTSI is an example of a national UN training school which incorporates
UN training materials, but undertakes the training itself.1
Nevertheless, the focus on this book is how the UN approaches training for
military peacekeepers. There is great worth in examining the UN. On a policy level,
The UN is effectively the anchor point of efforts to coordinate peacekeeping policy
and practice: UN Security Council Resolutions create missions, the UN DPKO
looks to inform and guide these resolutions, as well as support missions, and the
UN General Assembly looks to offer a forum for all troop contributors in the
oversight and development of peacekeeping policy.
This links both to conflict resolution and cosmopolitan scholars, who understand
the role of the UN as a legitimate third party intervener in conflict. Scholarship from
the conflict resolution field identifies the UN as the ‘essential’ global institutional
framework for the realisation of conflict resolution goals, for its ‘unique reservoir’
of legitimacy, or integrative power. Furthermore, it is hoped that the UN can
continue to be the only ‘genuinely global institution capable of delivering
1
A wider discussion about the training architecture will be provided in the concluding chapter.
authoritative endorsement of fundamental international values, and of conferring

legitimacy on the most difficult international undertakings’ (Ramsbotham et al.
2011: 327).
This book will focus on pre-deployment training of military personnel preparing
to undertake peacekeeping deployments. The UN defines pre-deployment training
as ‘generic, specialized, and, where appropriate, mission-specific peacekeeping
training that is based on UN standards and takes place prior to deployment to a
DPKO-led mission’ (UN 2016a, b). Pre-deployment training is delivered by
member states to military personnel in their country of origin, and is also delivered
through the UN’s Integrated Training Service. Although pre-deployment training is
complemented by ‘induction training’, and ‘on-going training’, these are outside the
scope of this book.
Additionally, it focuses on ‘collective training’, defined as approaches which
‘builds the attitudes, skills and knowledge required to assemble an effective team’
(Arbuckle 2006: 151), and ‘professional advancement training’, where ‘individual
potential is built and tested, not for the present job but for future employment,
thereby building collective capacities on the enhanced potential of individuals’
(Arbuckle 2006: 151). Peacekeeping is not at the core of military training: it is an
addition to the central military skills. Where this addition is incorporated is an area
for debate, as in some cases it is incorporated at an earlier stage than others.
However, this book does not aim to examine the holistic cycle of military training,
and where peacekeeping training fits into it; instead, the focus is on what the
training encompasses insofar as the requirements of specific peacekeeping skills.
The book’s conclusions offer thoughts on the wider implications of peacekeeping
training.
The peacekeeping field is exceptionally large, with a high number of soldiers,
training organisations, and training regimes. This makes it difficult to gain a
grounded idea in how training is carried out, and what influences it. Although not
wishing to sell itself as a ‘definitive account’ of training, this book provides a
valuable contribution to the literature through offering a selection of peacekeeping
training models, and investigating to what extent conflict resolution influences and
informs the training regimes on offer.
1.3 On the Structure of the Book
The chapters of the book are divided into three parts. Part I of the book provides the
platform to understand trends in conflict resolution concerning peacekeeping and
peacekeeper training. This incorporates Chap. 2, which is an overview of the
conflict resolution field, and how this relates specifically to peacekeeping opera-
tions. The chapter begins by offering an overview of where conflict resolution
theory identifies a role for UN peacekeepers, including the development of cos-
mopolitan models of peacekeeping. It then drills down, firstly into studies which
have examined the activities of deployed peacekeepers, and how they have utilised
12 1 Introduction
conflict resolution skills. It then looks specifically at the training dimension, in

particular the role of elicitive approaches, and how such approaches can link to UN
peacekeeping. Following on from this, Chap. 3 outlines policy developments that
have been made at the UN level. This takes at its starting point the changes brought
in as a result of the 1999 ‘Brahimi report’. Since then, bureaucratic changes have
been made to the UN’s training structures, as has there been significant develop-
ment on a thematic level, most notably through the linking of peacekeeping to early
stage peacebuilding. It then examines how training programmes have been updated
to reflect these developments, and how peacekeepers themselves are playing a
greater role in reflecting on the training they receive.
Part II of the book looks specifically at two areas of peacekeeper training where
conflict resolution theory and skills have gained traction. Chapter 4 examines
negotiation and cultural awareness training for peacekeeping operations. This
includes an outline of where negotiation contexts have been identified at the tactical
level of a peacekeeping operation, and how peacekeepers have specifically used
negotiation as a means to provide creative non-violent solutions to potentially
violent situations. The chapter outlines strategies which are used to engage military
personnel in negotiation skills, drawing on the extensive work undertaken by
Deborah Goodwin, whose work at the Royal Military Training Academy Sandhurst
has developed negotiation skills for the British military. Taking the lead from
Goodwin’s work, the chapter will also examine the utility of ‘interest-based
negotiation’ in formulating training programmes for UN peacekeepers. Chapter 5
looks at civil-military relations. This broad topic area incorporates the relationship
between military personnel and civilian partners. These civilian partners may be
international interveners (such as NGO’s or UN agencies), but also those who live
in the deployment zone and are affected by the everyday activities of a UN
peacekeeping operation. It is here where guidance towards civil-military relations
has been developed to incorporate the role of a broader awareness of what con-
stitutes ‘civil’. Additionally, through examining a training exercise at the UN
Training School, Ireland, the chapter focuses on the importance of
relationship-building this area, and the utility of John Paul Lederach’s elicitive
approach to addressing conflict and its resolution.
Part III looks ahead, and asks what opportunities exist for further engagement
between the fields of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, but also outlines the
current challenges regarding the training dimension. Chapter 6 engages in the
opportunities, focussing specifically on the emergence of a ‘type’ of military
peacekeeper which has a higher understanding of concepts drawn from the conflict
resolution field, aligned with a more elicitive decision making framework. This type
of soldier also resonates with cosmopolitan scholarship, which has for some time
investigated the role of military personnel in upholding cosmopolitan values. The
chapter then asks what this may mean for future cosmopolitan peacekeeping
commitments, and incorporates ideas behind a standing UN peacekeeping force.
Chapter 7 concludes the book, by outlining key challenges for the training of UN
peacekeepers. In this chapter, three main challenges are outlined: the development
of robust peacekeeping; the relatively loose training architecture and; questions as
1.3 On the Structure of the Book 13
to whether training is effective. These challenges are both short-term, encompassing

missions that are currently on going, and long-term, bringing in questions about the
broader interaction of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping.
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14 1 Introduction
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Part I
Trends in Conflict Resolution and
Peacekeeper Training
Chapter 2
Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution,
and the Role of Training
As the introductory chapter outlined, this book aims to understand the role conflict
resolution plays in training programmes for military peacekeepers, and the ways in
which training of military peacekeepers represents a further manifestation of the
links between the two fields. In order to gain a solid conceptual base, this chapter
examines where academic texts have noted the need for training in peacekeeping
operations. What is drawn from such a survey is the first step towards a
multi-levelled synthesis in order to locate where the call for increased conflict
resolution training for peacekeepers is coming from, which is complemented by a
survey of the ‘policy literature’ in United Nations documentation and practice, and
practitioner and academic understandings of civil-military relations, negotiation and
cultural awareness.
The military role in what is arguably a conflict resolution process has not always
been welcomed. Gordenker and Weiss’s 1991 study of peacekeepers in disaster
zones argues that ‘in the best of all worlds, use of the military should probably be
avoided in disasters’. This is because, in their view, militaries care little about
undermining local cultures and values, they do not make maximum use of available
local infrastructures for managing and distributing aid, they increase dependence
from the local population on external sources of assistance, thy do not harmonize
with local development efforts, and ultimately do not contribute to the resolution of
conflicts (Gordenker/Weiss 1991: 10).
Moskos’ 1976 study of military peacekeepers in the UN force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) is also sceptical, but comes from the angle that militaries (or at least
those he studied) already have sufficient training to intervene as third party peace-
keepers (indeed, Gordenker and Weiss could actually look towards these arguments
as justification of their scepticism about military involvement). Moskos’ research
leads him to the conclusion that the level of training that military contingents receive
makes little difference to their performance as peacekeepers, and notes that for the
UNFICYP operation, each different nationality received a different level of training,
from the most in depth (such as Canada and Sweden), to virtually no training at all

18 2 Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and the Role of Training
(such as the United Kingdom). However, this training had a minimal impact when
compared with the learning process of the troops once deployed. Moskos adds:
It is important to stress the generalization that the constabulary ethic was primarily
engendered by on-duty, in-the-field peacekeeping experiences. This is also to say that
informal learning arising out of the field situation was a more determining factor in forging
the constabulary ethic than was peacekeeping training prior to arrival in Cyprus (Moskos
Jnr 1976: 96–97).
If anything, Moskos argues, the formulation of pre-deployment training for

peacekeeping operations may ‘retard’ the emergence of a constabulary ethic
amongst soldiers, and that it could lead to peacekeepers operating under false
expectations of how they are accepted by the local population, or will lead troops to
‘believe the peacekeeping force will be fully efficacious in realizing permanent
solutions’ (Moskos Jnr 1976: 134). Possibly this view can be understood in the
context in which it was written: the UNFICYP case study was (and still is) a largely
benign operation, and many of the tasks bestowed upon peacekeepers were in fact
to keep belligerents apart along a designated ceasefire line. However, the ‘con-
stabulary ethic’ that Moskos speaks about is still very much apparent in peace-
keeping operations, so this argument must not be thrown away as a ‘dated logic’.
Nevertheless, linkages between the field of conflict resolution and the activity of
peacekeeping have been well established, and the role of training military peace-
keepers in the necessary skills for conflict resolution activities has been advocated by
scholars. This chapter outlines this through looking firstly at the strategic level:
where studies seek to outline where peacekeeping fits into the academic theory of
conflict resolution. Here, work by Galtung, Fetherston, and Woodhouse and
Ramsbotham will be outlined. It then examines how scholarship from the conflict
resolution field has sought to reflect this engagement in the day-to-day activities of
peacekeepers, particularly with regards to the skillset required for peacekeeping
operations. Next, the chapter focuses specifically on where training in conflict res-
olution skills has been defined as a necessity in preparation of peacekeepers. Finally
the chapter looks to how peacekeepers could be trained in such skills, utilising John
Paul Lederach’s elicitive approach to training conflict resolution practitioners.
2.1 Wider Theoretical Approaches
To start, we look at where conflict resolution theory has interacted with peace-
keeping operations on a theoretical level. Both initially conceptualised and devel-
oped in the decades following the Second World War, conflict resolution
scholarship has increasingly investigated what role peacekeeping can play in wider
theoretical frameworks.
Johan Galtung’s 1976 study looks to the incorporation of peacekeeping into more
radical conceptions of peace. Galtung’s research considers that a basic dilemma for
peacekeeping is distinguishing between, and reacting to, different types of violent
2.1 Wider Theoretical Approaches 19
conflict. Peacekeeping, for example, can work effectively to deal with horizontal
conflicts, which he defines as conflict between ‘equals with no element of dominance’
(i.e. between two states). However in conflicts where both parties are not equal
(i.e. a conflict between the centre and periphery within a state), peacekeeping runs the
danger of preserving a status quo as a result of intervening. Through containing the
conflict and maintaining the status quo, the peacekeeping force is actually taking a
side in the conflict (Galtung 1976a, b: 284). To illustrate this, Galtung outlines three
ways which peacekeeping is conceptualised in the context of how it should react to
vertical conflict (conflict between a strong centre and weaker periphery):
1. The formalistic stand (third party intervention which will handle any war in the
same way);
2. The let-it-work-itself-out stand (with no third party intervention);
3. The use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace stand (where third party interven-
tion seeks to remove both direct and structural violence).
Galtung rejects the first two approaches outright, and chooses to explore
the third strand. Although he outlines problems in it, Galtung advocates the
use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace approach, arguing that doctrines of
non-intervention in the affairs of a state must be rejected, and that through rejecting
these doctrines, peacekeeping operations would ‘unequivocally… break through
these artificial walls called regions and states mankind has built around itself’
(Galtung 1976a, b: 286). He goes on to argue that:
A peacekeeping operation in a vertical conflict should be more like a one-way wall,
permitting the freedom fighters out to expand the liberated territory, but preventing the
oppressors from getting in (Galtung 1976a, b: 288).
Though set in the Cold War context, Galtung’s early attempts to conceptualise
peacekeeping, and the possible role the activity could play in projects of peace, did
establish a working understanding that the two fields could be interlinked.
Betts Fetherston’s 1994 study ‘Towards a Theory of United Nations
Peacekeeping’, takes a more instrumental approach, linking UN operations to theo-
retical work on contingency and complementarity models in conflict resolution.
Fetherston suggests that existing definitions of peacekeeping were ‘inadequate’
because they ‘have not been placed within a larger framework’. From this, Fetherston
attempts to offer a theoretical framework to ‘analyze the utility of peacekeeping as a
third party intervention and as a tool of conflict management’ (Fetherston 1994a, b:
139–140). She further argues that:
It is not enough to send a force into the field with a vague notion that they should be
impartial and help to facilitate settlement. To act as a third party in a protracted violent,
polarized conflict is an extremely difficult and delicate task. Diplomats, academics and
others who have acted in the capacity of a third party are generally well trained, highly
experienced individuals with a good base of knowledge about the particular conflict. On the
whole, peacekeepers have limited preparation and experience (Fetherston 1994a, b: 140).
Noting that peacekeeping operations represent a form of third party intervention

(incorporating both conflict resolution and conflict settlement strategies), and that
there exists no framework for understanding when to intervene, (and how inter-
ventions can be effective), Fetherston links peacekeeping to Fisher and Keashly’s
contingency model. Arguing that it ‘seems to offer the best possibility for a more
effective management of conflict’ (Fetherston 1994a, b: 123), Fetherston uses this
contingency approach as it offers a suitable ‘middle ground’ between those highly
empirical forms of conflict analysis, and the school of thought which argues against
any formulated analysis of intervention.
The contingency model, as outlined in Fisher and Keashly’s 1990 research, is a
model devised to match third party intervention to certain characteristics of the
conflict. Fisher and Keashly’s research outlines four main stages of a conflict:
(1) Discussion, (2) Polarization, (3) Segregation, and (4) Destruction. From this,
they match third party strategies to each stage. Stage 4 of this (destruction) is where
peacekeeping is the strategy of choice, to ‘assist in the separation of the parties and
the control of violence’. This is the first stage of intervention at the most destructive
level, which aims to give space for other forms of third party intervention
(Fisher/Keashly 1991). Fisher follows this up in his 1994 research which espouses
the important role of peacebuilding as a bridge between peacekeeping and peace-
making. Fisher’s diagram (in Box 2.1) helps to illustrate this
Box 2.1: Approaches to Peace in a contingency model. Source: Fisher

(1993: 258)
STAGE OF SEQUENCE OF OUTCOMES FOR

ESCALATION INTERVENTIONS DE-ESCALATION
Destruction Peacekeeping Control Violence
Peacebuilding
Segregation Peacepushing De-escalate or

control hostility
Peacebuilding
Polarization Peacebuilding Meet basic needs

improve relationship
Peacemaking
Discussion Peacemaking Settle interests

Thus, in order for peacekeeping to be effective in this model, Fisher argues that
the sooner that the need ‘to control overt violence is followed by other interven-
tions’, the better. Fetherston agrees with this assessment in her investigation and
advocates that effective coordination must be made between the traditional security
aspects and the civilian peacebuilding aspects of the operation. Without this, in
Fetherston’s view, operations face ‘insurmountable odds’ of moving beyond con-
trolling violence and maintaining a status quo1 (Fetherston 1994a, b: 150).
Within this framework, peacekeeping can be visualised in a two-tiered approach.
Firstly peacekeepers ‘working in the area of operation at the micro-level facilitating
a more positive atmosphere’, and secondly peacekeeping operations ‘cooperating
and coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts at the macro-level’
(Fetherston 1994a, b). Fetherston suggests that peacekeeping can play a valuable
role in the successful resolution of conflicts by creating an environment that is
conducive to a further resolution of conflict (much like the important role of
pre-negotiation). She finds that:
Co-ordinating peacekeeping at the micro-level at least begins the groundwork of what
might be called a ‘pre-resolution’ or a ‘pre-peacebuilding’ phase. This has taken the form of
coordination of local level resolution processes, either at the initiative of local people or at
the initiative of the peacekeepers (Fetherston 1994a, b: 151–152)
Examples of such local level resolution initiatives were observed in both

Namibia and Cyprus, where efforts went beyond ‘dealing with one specific problem
at one point in time and tried to establish a longer-term process which would deal
with future problems’, thus linking up the micro- and macro-level of peacekeeping
(Fetherston 1994a, b: 157). As shall be seen later in the chapter, the important of
training peacekeepers in particular skills is paramount for this model to function.
Scholarship from Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham also highlights the
growing trend of conflict resolution scholarship focusing on peacekeeping. Their
1996 study Terra Incognita: Here be Dragons, applies Azar’s Protracted Social
Conflict theory (Azar 1990) to contemporary conflict. From this, Woodhouse and
Ramsbotham noted that peacekeeping operations were being increasingly deployed
in International-social conflict: a conflict neither purely inter-state, not intra-state,
but somewhere between the two. Using this framework, Woodhouse and
Ramsbotham’s response to the failures of peacekeeping deployments in Bosnia,
Somalia, and Rwanda was to advocate the use of the ‘middle ground’ between
peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 1996).
Ramsbotham/Woodhouse’s (2001) edited publication Peacekeeping and
Conflict Resolution was published at a time when the UN itself was reassessing its
peacekeeping architecture. Released during this time of transition and uncertainty,
the book reflects on the current debates underscoring peacekeeping operations by
stating that ‘the future of UN peacekeeping will depend on the capability and
willingness to reform and strengthen peacekeeping mechanisms, and to clarify its
role in conflict resolution’ (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2000: 3).
1
This argument is also analysed in Chap. 5, which deals with civil-military relations.
Thus, the authors argue, the purpose of the collection is to ‘consider the contri-
bution that conflict resolution can make’ in the development of future peacekeeping
practices. The book offers the viewpoints of academics who apply conflict resolution
theory to peacekeeping practice, and ‘experienced military peacekeepers seeking to
enrich peacekeeping by uses of conflict theory’ (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2000: 6).
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution provides a number of contributions spanning
the spectrum of international conflict resolution efforts from prevention to peace-
keeping to peacebuilding, and provided a crucial contribution as it solidifies links
made between the two fields. The publication includes Stephen Ryan’s contribution
which advocates the important role of military peacekeeping in the early stages of
the peacebuilding enterprise. This built on earlier work by Ryan, which argues for
more thought to be put towards creating comprehensive peace strategies, and
identifies that in a range of areas (the provision of security for returning refugees,
humanitarian relief, civilian projects, and election monitors), there is a recognised
need for the military to work closely with non-military components. This impor-
tance, Ryan asserts, shows peacekeepers ‘acting less like a conflict manager and
more like a midwife at the birth of a new society’ (Ryan 2000: 40).
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall’s Contemporary Conflict Resolution has
continued to treat peacekeeping in the wider framework of conflict resolution. First
published in 1999, this major contribution to the field of conflict resolution
incorporates peacekeeping practice as part of international efforts to alleviate
conflict and facilitate positive peacebuilding (Ramsbotham et al. 1999). Writing in
their 2011 edition of the book, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall argue that:
we reiterate that the new field of conflict resolution and the new enterprise of UN peace-
keeping were born in the same decade – the 1950s – and from the outset shared a similar
agenda. The central aim of Peacekeepers has not been to defeat a national enemy, but to
support peace processes, protect civilians and fulfil legitimate international mandates. Even
when traditional military combat capabilities are required, the overall use and intention of
such capabilities is to enhance peace (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 170).
In looking forward to the ‘next stage’ of how conflict resolution theory can
incorporate UN peacekeeping operations, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham look
towards ‘cosmopolitan peacekeeping’ (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005). This
approach is strongly linked to broader work undertaken by Woodhouse,
Ramsbotham and Miall on cosmopolitan conflict resolution, defined as ‘the need for
an approach that is not situated within any particular state, society or established site
of power, but rather promotes constructive means of handling conflict at local
through to global levels in the interests of humanity’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 265).
Building on cosmopolitan scholarship from authors such as Held (1995), Kaldor
(2001), as well as Archibugi (1995), the cosmopolitan conflict resolution project
itself is ‘driven by the deep logic… that only full engagement with emerging
non-western and non-northern practices and norms can… fulfil the original aspira-
tions of the founders of the [conflict resolution] field’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 226).
Regarding cosmopolitan peacekeeping, the UN is seen as being both a ‘mani-
festation of clear progress having been made over the last sixty years from a conflict
resolution perspective and as central to aspirations for further progress in the future’
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 272). Woodhouse and Ramsbotham identify the con-
tinued rise in deployed peacekeepers (from below 25,000 between 1999–2000, to
over 100,000 between 2010–2011 (Perry/Smith 2013: 3)), as showing a commit-
ment by the international community to peacekeeping as a ‘vital instrument in
pursuing conflict resolution goals internationally’ (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005).
However, they argue that there exists a requirement for a ‘reconstructive agenda’ to
be considered at global and local levels of peacekeeping governance to better allow
it to handle violent conflict in a constructive manner. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham
make this point by arguing that initiatives at international (through the creation of
UN peacekeeping operations), regional (the EU and AU Peace and Security
Architecture), sub-regional (through the sub-regions of the African Standby Force),
and national (in certain states becoming ‘lead nations’ of peacekeeping interven-
tions) levels have had a degree of success in operationalizing cosmopolitan norms.
However, on a global level, initiatives such as the incorporation of UN standing
forces, and reform of the UN’s decision-making frameworks are necessary. On the
‘local level’, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham outline the necessity of ‘CIMIC and
Community Liaison and Mediation Programmes’, centred on interaction with a
multitude of local voices and actors, (a key factor in projects of cosmopolitan
conflict resolution) (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005: 143).
Woodhouse follows this work on in an article with Curran (Curran/Woodhouse
2007), which investigates the emergence of a cosmopolitan ethic at the regional level
through the emergence of the African Union’s (AU) standby brigades and conflict
prevention network. The authors find that African developments to create standby
brigades (in particular policy following the Joint G8–African Union Plan to Enhance
African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations) can be conceptualised
in a cosmopolitan framework. Curran and Woodhouse argue that the emergence of
thinking and institutional capacity in Africa takes theorizing about peacekeeping
closer to a cosmopolitan ethic, based on safeguarding Human Security (Curran/
Woodhouse 2007: 1070).
The linking of peacekeeping to theories of conflict resolution has thus devel-
oped, with cosmopolitan peacekeeping representing the latest stage in this cross-
over. This theoretical expansion has opened up the conceptual space for other, more
focussed studies of how the experiences of peacekeepers and peacekeeping oper-
ations fit into a conflict resolution framework. Importantly, if peacekeeping is to be
seen as a conflict resolution process, then those that undertake peacekeeping—the
peacekeepers—should be viewed as potential conflict resolvers.
2.2 Operationalising the Theory:

The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Links
To return to Galtung, informing his wider theoretical work was research into the
day-to-day activities of UN peacekeepers. Galtung’s survey of Norwegian peace-
keeping troops stationed in Lebanon and the Congo in 1976 asked soldiers their
opinions on ‘how UN forces should be better able to carry out their job?’ In
response, troops asked not for ‘better military training’, but for ‘better police
training’, and a number of the soldiers felt that they ‘should be better informed
about the conflict’, as well as being ‘better trained in dealing with people from other
countries’ (Galtung 1976a, b).
On the other hand, Galtung’s study also reveals that although soldiers felt that
they needed the skills outlined above to facilitate closer relations with the local
population, they found that better arms and equipment were just as critical in
bringing about success in a peacekeeping operation. Thus Galtung reasons that
soldiers felt that their military role was ‘inadequate’ for the closeness needed with
the population in low temperature situations (where this closeness would be needed
to really understand the social and human conditions of the deployment area), and
their level of arms was inadequate for situations when there was a high likelihood of
combat: peacekeepers were sat uncomfortably in the middle. This logic leads
Galtung to believe that the peacekeeping troops were in fact not asking to be
‘disarmed military forces’, but ‘armed police forces’. He observes that:
On the one hand there is a relatively clear minimum role definition in terms of guard and
observation duty, keeping the parties apart with a very modest display of arms, showing
behaviour rather than attitude. On the other hand there is another type of role: being
involved, being apart and party to the entire conflict system, showing attitude as well as
behaviour, but trying to mediate and trying to help build a new social structure encom-
passing the antagonists. The former role is possible but not very effective, the second is
very effective but not possible (Galtung 1976a, b: 278).
Diehl, Druckman and Wall’s analysis of peacekeeping operations offers a more

quantitative approach to understanding the differing roles of peacekeepers (Diehl
et al. 1998), yet links to some of the issues raised by Galtung. Reflecting on the
peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s, the authors find that in addition to conflict
control mechanisms, peacekeeping had been extended to take account of peace-
building and peacemaking. This in turn leads to an increased emphasis on mediation,
facilitation, consultation, conciliation, and communication: important parts in the
‘modern peacekeepers toolbox’ (Diehl et al. 1998: 36). Their study goes on to scale
the interrelationships between different peacekeeping functions, noting that each
peacekeeping operation,2 has a ‘mix and match’ of different skills. For example,
some operations will have a higher emphasis on observation and monitoring, others
would have increased emphasis on the restoration of civil institutions. The majority
of skills that are inherent in these operations are non-traditional skills, and the
minority of the overall skills needed are drawn from military and combat fields.
Wall and Druckman expand on this in 2003, through their examination of the
importance of mediation in peacekeeping operations. This is done through an
analysis of factors influencing and constraining peacekeepers in mediation scenarios
2
The 12 types outlined were: traditional peacekeeping; observation; collective enforcement;
election supervision; humanitarian assistance during conflict; state/nation building; pacification;
preventative deployment; arms control verification; protective services; intervention in support of
democracy.
2.2 Operationalising the Theory: The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Links 25
with groups in conflict zones, based on interviews with U.S. and Canadian officers
who had recently returned from peacekeeping duty in Bosnia, where interviewees
were asked to recount a situation where they had to mediate a dispute. The results
reveal a high number of mediation situations. In the first round of interviews (34
peacekeepers), 100 % reported mediations; the second round (16 peacekeepers)
63 %; and the third round of interviews (79 peacekeepers), 55 % reported having a
mediation experience (Wall/Druckman 2003). Each account was logged and put
into a table (outlined in Box 2.2 below). From this, the authors find 28 different
reactions to mediating the dispute. Only in three of these cases did the reaction
involve the threat of force or the preparation to use force (cases entitled ‘threaten’,
‘set security’, and ‘force’) (Wall/Druckman 2003: 693–705).
Box 2.2: Peacekeepers Mediation techniques (taken from Wall and

Druckman’s analysis on Mediation in Peacekeeping Missions). Source:
Wall/Druckman (2003)
Meet separately: Peacekeeper meets with disputant separately.
Listen to disputant’s side: Peacekeeper has disputants state their points.
Argue for concessions: Peacekeeper argues for or proposes a speci-
fic concession or agreement point or nego-
tiates a compromise.
Gather information: Peacekeeper collects or asks for information
from the disputants or others and does
research to obtain information.
Educate/advise: Peacekeeper educates, persuades, or advises
on disputant as to how he or she should
think or act.
Have third party assist: Peacekeeper offers or gets third party’s
assistance for the disputants or the peace-
keeper and also gathers information or
advice from the third party.
State other’s point of view: Peacekeeper presents or argues other dis-
putant’s point of view and asks a disputant
to see the other disputant’s point of view.
Meet together with disputants: Peacekeeper meets together with disputants
or puts them together.
Apologize: Peacekeeper has one disputant apologize or
acknowledge his or her faults.
Peacekeeper assists: Peacekeeper personally offers or gives
assistance and takes a specific action.
Relax: Peacekeeper makes specific statements to
calm the disputants.
Break time: Peacekeeper stops the quarrelling and has
disputant rest.
Peacekeeper’s data: Peacekeeper provides objective data about

the dispute or the environment.
Threaten: Any threat from the peacekeeper.
Criticize: Peacekeeper criticizes a disputant’s person,
attitude, and behaviour or uses a specific
label (e.g., “You are rude.”).
Call for empathy: Peacekeeper enhances the other disputant or
calls for respect of the other; peacekeeper
puts a positive face on the other disputant,
noting he or she is a good person.
Cite dependency: Peacekeeper expresses similarities or inter-
dependence in disputants’ goals, fates, and
needs (includes mentioning personal costs
of disagreement and benefits of agreement).
Have drink with disputants: Peacekeeper has a drink with the disputants
prior to agreement.
Analyse the disputants: Peacekeeper analyses disputants and grasps
each disputant’s characteristics.
Example: Peacekeeper cites example or similar case.
Praise disputants: Peacekeeper praises the disputant who is
being addressed.
Quote law or rule: Peacekeeper quotes a specific law or rule
that is relevant to the dispute.
Written agreement Peacekeeper has disputants sign a
quasi-legal written agreement governing
their future behaviour.
Separate disputants: Peacekeeper separates the disputants.
Call higher authority: Peacekeeper communicates with his head-
quarters to report information or ask for
advice.
Set security: The peacekeeper takes steps to establish
security for himself or his troops.
Force: The peacekeeper uses coercive force in
some manner.
Monitor: Peacekeeper observes the disputants, their
interaction, or factors in the environment.
The vast majority of responses focus on non-traditional skills, and a first glance
of these techniques would highlight a number of conflict resolution techniques,
including conflict analysis (through the technique of ‘analyze the disputants’),
2.2 Operationalising the Theory: The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Links 27
negotiation (‘Meet together with disputants’), active listening (‘listen to the dis-
putant’s side’), and conflict de-escalation (‘relax’, ‘break time’, ‘have drink with the
disputants’). This framework therefore offers a clear outline of how conflict reso-
lution skills are utilised in an operational environment. Wall and Druckman’s
analysis does however find that not all of the techniques on this list are compatible
with operating orders given to peacekeepers, and many were an ad hoc reaction to
specific circumstances. Out of the original 28 techniques, 14 remained after an
examination of the operating orders for the particular missions.3
This broadening of studies into peacekeeping practice, backed up by wider
theoretical approaches that situated peacekeeping in conflict resolution frameworks
has led to studies which outline the importance of training military personnel in
conflict resolution skills. With peacekeepers being placed into environments where
increased non-traditional skills are essential, the role and form of training becomes
the more important.
2.3 The Training Dimension
Betts Fetherston’s approaches to peacekeeping (outlined above), which looked to

link peacekeeping to conflict resolution processes, emphasises the importance of
providing training in ‘contact skills’ to military peacekeepers. In this, there are two
types of contact skills—skills in conflict resolution, such as mediation, negotiation,
and conciliation, and the skills important for effective cross-cultural interaction.
Fetherston emphasises the importance of these contact skills for deployed peace-
keepers, arguing that the ‘essence of peacekeeping as a third party intervention must
be contact skills’ (Fetherston 1994a, b: 219). She adds:
It is through the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, medi-
ation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or manifestly
violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution. Non-contact skills are
functional and differ depending on the specific mandate of the specific mission. It is also the
case that contact skills require more time and effort on the part of the trainer and the trainee
(Fetherston 1994a, b: 219).
Fetherston’s findings show that there is a lack of training in contact skills for
military peacekeepers, and where these skills are covered, it is usually a minimal
contribution (so minimal, that Fetherston questions its usefulness). Her findings also
support the view that there is great importance in ‘providing specific training to effect
a shift from a military to a peacekeeping attitude and to learn and practice contact
skills’ (Fetherston 1994a, b: 217). Moreover, Fetherston outlines a contradiction in
the justifications for this lack of contact skills training for peacekeeping operations.
3
The cut down list is: separate disputants, meet separately, meet together with disputants, listen to
a disputant's side, gather information, have third-party assist, relax, have a break, threaten, quote
law or rule, call higher authority, force, monitor, and set security.
She finds that although there is recognition of the third-party role played by
peacekeepers, it is widely believed that junior levels already have these skills, thus
not justifying the need for specialist training. Much of this is due to a fundamental
contradiction in peacekeeping operations, where military peacekeepers keep ‘dis-
tance’ from the conflict parties, yet have to demonstrate ‘closeness’ in their third
party conflict resolution based roles (Fetherston 1994a, b: 223). These findings echo
Galtung’s conclusions (from his study of Norwegian peacekeepers outlined above),
which also illustrated the difficult position of peacekeepers in a conflict zone.
Fetherston’s work goes on to examine training initiatives for the Canadian
Forces, Irish Defence Forces, and regional cooperation between Nordic Countries.
Through examining these specific case studies, Fetherston reasons that the training
for peacekeeping heavily overlaps training for traditional military roles, leaving the
peacekeeper unprepared for his or her role as a third party intervener. More
specifically, Fetherston outlines four key problems with the training approaches:
firstly, a lack of standardization in programmes; secondly, a lack of coherence in
training and in the development of training programmes; thirdly, a lack of evidence
and research supporting training goals based on training needs; and finally, a lack of
clear objectives and methodology which directly reflect a wider approach to the
peaceful resolution of conflict and which are then related directly to peacekeeping
activities (Fetherston 1994a, b: 203–208).
This work is supplemented by Fetherston’s 1994 article Putting the peace back
into peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994a, b). In it, Fetherston outlines the importance of
training for peacekeepers. She argues that a lack of training for peacekeepers means
that the task that peacekeepers undertake in representing the international com-
munity’s message of ‘non-violent consensual conflict management’, becomes
increasingly difficult. Although it appears dated in policy terms (the body of work
being written twenty years before the publication of this book) Fetherston’s work is
of key importance when framing this particular project. Her work establishes an
important link between the micro-level issues such as military negotiation,
civil-military relations, and ‘pre-peacebuilding’, with broader debates about the role
and function of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, through outlining contact
skills, Fetherston defined a set of non-traditional techniques that are critical into the
effective functioning of a peacekeeping operation. The longevity of Fetherston’s
work will be apparent throughout this book.
‘Contact skills’ also appear in Paul Diehl (whose work with Druckman and Wall
is outlined above) and Alexandu Balas’ study on peace operations. Diehl and Balas
see military training for peacekeeping operations as one of ten challenges that face
peacekeeping in the twenty-first century, and argue that the multifunctional nature
of peacekeeping operations has meant that operations ‘depend for their effective-
ness on a complex set of what has been referred to as ‘contact’ (more diplomatic)
skills’ (Diehl/Balas 2014: 212). Arguing that if soldiers do not possess necessary
skills, operations won’t be ‘effective at a micro-level and may jeopardize some
macro-goals’. Such skills are defined by Diehl and Balas as ‘interpersonal and
intergroup relations, communication, negotiation, and in the case of military
operations, a mix of combat and political skills’ (Diehl/Balas 2014: 212).
2.3 The Training Dimension 29
Williams’ 1998 study of peacekeeping and civil-military relations reflects on the

nature of post-1990 deployments, and states that military training must be specif-
ically geared to ‘peacekeeping’s demands’, adding that appropriate military training
and education is ‘essential’ if peacekeeping deployments are to be effective. In
particular, Williams draws attention to the need to emphasise the ‘softer aspects of
military science’, such as managing resources, civilian control and human rights
and that peacekeeping units should be trained in humanitarian reporting and
assessment, mediation and conflict resolution techniques (Williams 1998: 72).
Williams also finds that lessons from Bosnia and Somalia have taught the valuable
lesson that peacekeepers need to be better prepared for the cultural challenges faced
in deployment areas. This can be rectified to some extent through peacekeepers
being made aware of cultural norms of behaviour. Underlying this, Williams
argued, was the ‘importance of collaboration with civilians, both within missions
and on their fringes’ (Williams 1998: 73).
Studies also look towards the practical application of conflict resolution theory in
training for military peacekeepers. Tillet’s research argues for serious re-evaluation
of training for UN operations, stating that for those preparing to undertake peace-
keeping operations ‘training in conflict resolution is essential’ (Tillett 1996: 10).
Informing this, Tillett argues, are a number of challenges which military peace-
keeping personnel face. These include a lack of power to coerce, no way of easily
identifying the status or power of the person with whom they are dealing, a limit to
the amount of communication with the local population, and that they are ‘subject to
instructions which require them to act in a policing rather than a military role’ (Tillett
1996: 3). Furthermore, he notes the considerable challenges that being deployed on a
peacekeeping operation can pose to a soldier trained in traditional skills, and what is
required in the soldiers’ toolbox in order to meet such challenges. Tillet explains:
…[peacekeeping] involves the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from
confrontation to third party imposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to
avoid hostilities, to improve communication between the parties, and to advance the process of
reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict—political,
military and economic—as well as the social and cultural environment (Tillett 1996: 3).
Tillett outlines a training scheme that Australian forces undertook to incorporate

conflict resolution processes in order to prepare them for deployment. The training
consisted of three components: (1) An introduction to conflict and conflict resolu-
tion; (2) the concept of analytical problem solving; (3) the application of the concept.
In particular, Tillett focussed on incorporating John Burton’s Problem Solving
approach to the training. This was done through participants being asked to develop
an inventory of potential conflict areas within the experience of peacekeeping
operations, and then to identify and explore options for eliminating, minimising, or
surviving each incident of conflict. This involved identifying appropriate resources,
personal and interpersonal skills and support mechanisms. Tillett adds that this
process was not just an exercise in developing a list of potential problems and their
solutions: it gave ‘the participants practical experiences in an analytical and (to use
Burton’s term) proventive approach to conflict resolution’ (Tillett 1996: 6).
Deborah Goodwin also works extensively on training the military in

non-traditional skills. In particular, her work specialises on negotiation skills for
soldiers in the British military, whom she trains at the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst. Much of this has informed her work, especially on the emergence of the
‘Soldier Diplomat’, and the importance of negotiation skills (negotiation skills will be
covered in the Chap. 4, with Goodwin’s work on the ‘soldier diplomat’ being
investigated in Chap. 6). Goodwin underlines differences between the tasks of
peacekeeping and war fighting, stating that emphasis is on ‘talking, liaising and
negotiating one’s way out of a difficult situation’, as well as ‘building working rela-
tionships within an operational area’ (Goodwin 2005: 129), which indicates the need
for ‘contact skills’ to look for non-violent solutions to conflict (negotiating out of a
difficult situation) as well as for relationship building with civilian actors and NGOs in
a deployment zone. Moreover, Goodwin finds that peacekeeping duties demands that
soldiers have to modify pre-existing knowledge of conventional warfare. This means
that soldiers can either adapt the knowledge, or ‘learn new, related skills’. This links to
the argument put forward by Diehl, Druckman and Wall for an expansion of the
peacekeepers ‘toolbox’, to incorporate a greater breadth of skills.
To a small extent Goodwin agrees with Moskos, by contending that pre-
deployment training has its limitations when compared with actual deployment on
the ground. However, she is clear in stating that there is an important role in training
soldiers for peacekeeping purposes, in particular negotiation skills, arguing that
good negotiation training ‘increases one’s ability to understand and handle human
conflict and its resolution’ (Goodwin 2005). Goodwin goes on to say that:
Any pre-deployment training ought to replicate, as explicitly as possible, the mutability of
the peacekeeping role and the emphasis on negotiating skills, tempered with military
knowledge (Goodwin 2005: 137).
Goodwin is concerned that ‘speedy’ briefings in a deployment zone (with little

preceding deployment) may result in soldiers entering a country with a limited
knowledge of the culture, customs and even the political situation. Furthermore, a
reliance on such briefings leaves soldiers with little or no practice in what she terms
as ‘essential peacekeeping skills’, such as negotiation (Goodwin 2005: 136).
Goodwin’s work, like Fetherston, will appear again in this study. Both have
made significant steps forward in progressing the links between peacekeeping and
conflict resolution on theoretical and practical terms. The chapter will now look
towards what could arguably be the next stage in the analysis of the linkages
between peacekeeping and conflict resolution: the incorporation of John Paul
Lederach’s Elicitive approach to training conflict resolution practitioners.
2.4 Incorporating the Elicitive Approach 31
2.4 Incorporating the Elicitive Approach
Lederach’s elicitive approach to conflict resolution takes on a much broader range

of issues than training, but it is in models of training for conflict resolution where
this book finds solid linkages. Although based on experiences of mediation training
sessions with civilian groups, Lederach’s work on theorising prescriptive and
elicitive models provide a useful tool for interpreting what was observed, both in
terms of training civil-military relations and other conflict resolution skills.
Lederach firstly distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge bases.
When understanding conflict and conflict resolution, participants in a given setting will
have either an implicit or an explicit knowledge and understanding of conflict. He finds
that implicit knowledge refers to accumulated knowledge of how ‘conflict operates in
our given milieu of origin and how it is handled in out cultural context’: how we have
understood conflict from our own experiences (Lederach 1996: 44). Explicit knowl-
edge, on the other hand, refers to a ‘focussed, intentional effort to increase one’s
knowledge about conflict and how to handle it’: where one actively seeks to gain
further knowledge from a variety of sources such as studying, researching, training and
focussed experience (Lederach 1996: 44–45). Understanding these two very different
forms of knowledge is essential in order to understand how training processes work.
Lederach suggests that both knowledge bases are present in a training session, and that
the role of the two knowledge bases will vary in relation to the training model provided.
Lederach finds that training for conflict resolution comes in two distinct forms.
Firstly, the prescriptive model, which ‘assumes that the expert knows what the par-
ticipants need’ (Lederach 1996: 48–49). Here, the trainer/expert will bring ‘packages’
built around his or her specialised knowledge and experience in the field of conflict
resolution. In this model, the knowledge flow is predominately from trainer to
receiver, with the knowledge of the trainer being a ‘key resource’, which is transferred
to participants, who attempt to emulate it. The benefits of such an approach:
lie in its capacity to outline and permit participants to interact with an approach to conflict
resolution and to understand and master the particular strategies and techniques it entails
(Lederach 1996: 51–52).
This interaction is useful to participants who wish to expand their knowledge of

new models of conflict and conflict resolution. It also provides opportunity for ‘new
thinking, improving skills, and feeling more confident’ about how to deal with
situations of conflict (Lederach 1996: 58). Furthermore, Lederach finds that the
training benefits from the considerable experience and knowledge gained from the
trainer, whose techniques can also be useful in a number of settings and provide
participants with concrete set of ideas and skills. In relation to pre-deployment
training on peacekeeping, this can be related to the range of documents and
guidance which outline different aspects of peacekeeping, key partners, institutions,
and goals. Or in other words, the ‘mapping’ of the peacekeeping domain.
The elicitive approach, on the other hand, is centred on the implicit knowledge
of the participants. This type of training is therefore based on how participants
understand conflict and its resolution. The foundation of this is:
implicit indigenous knowledge about ways of being and doing is a valued resource for
creating and sustaining appropriate models of conflict resolution in a given setting
(Lederach 1996: 55).
Although this is different from the prescriptive approach, Lederach argues that
the focus on indigenous knowledge does not exclude comparison with other models
of conflict resolution. It in fact ‘brackets’ them, with the focus primarily on dis-
covering ‘what people already have in place and already know about the strengths
and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution’ (Lederach 1996: 56). It
also does not blindly trust the participants’ knowledge over other models, as it is
designed with a degree of trust in participants to ‘have the capacity and creativity to
identify, name, critique, create, and recreate models that correspond to needs they
experience and identify’. The role of a trainer in this scenario is more akin to a
facilitator who ‘brackets’ his or her own experiences and techniques, in order to
develop a ‘participatory process of discovery’ (Lederach 1996: 58). Lederach
therefore outlines two distinct forms of training. Each of these forms possesses
alternate roles for the trainer, the delivery, the focus on implicit and explicit
knowledge, and the overall training model. The utility of Lederach’s model has
been highlighted in approaches to cross-cultural approaches to conflict resolution
education as assisting in developing ‘culturally appropriate conflict resolution
processes that make sense to the participants and provide them with practical and
useful knowledge and skills’ (Loode 2011: 72). However, it is an approach not
specifically attached to the ‘conventional views of conflict resolution or prescriptive
conflict transformation that can often be found, for example, in UN mission
handbooks’ (Dietrich 2014: 53).
Although it the links are emerging, Lederach’s elicitive model provides a useful
frame for understanding the development of peacekeeping training in this area. This
has been reflected in reflections from those engaged in training military peace-
keepers. Goodwin’s account may not use Lederach’s exact language, but there are
strong similarities:
a learning method that is frequently overlooked is the sharing of ideas with mentors and
colleagues, through general conversation or more formal interviews. This experience tends
to promote higher-level skills, and the refinement of technique and approach, since
improvement has no limits (Goodwin 2005: 143).
As shall be seen as the book progresses, elicitive approaches to conflict reso-

lution have begun to influence training for peacekeeping operations. In terms of this
chapter, attempts have been made to link the training of peacekeepers to wider
approaches of emancipatory conflict resolution. Wolfgang Dietrich’s study into the
2.4 Incorporating the Elicitive Approach 33
role of elicitive learning in international approaches to conflict resolution identifies

a central role for Lederach’s approach in a number of civilian and military-led
approaches to intervention (undertaken by what Dietrich calls ‘peace workers’)
(Dietrich 2013: 13). Dietrich’s study seeks to ‘emphasise the ‘personal qualities of
peace workers as well as teaching and practice and the art and science of efficient
communication in processes of transformation’ (Dietrich 2013: 14). He says of the
elicitive approach
Elicitive transformation work begins when a mediating third party enters the conflict
environment. The simple presence of the third party already amounts to a transformation.
The technical question as to why the conflict has arisen remains in the background, and the
relationship level, the ‘how’ of the transformation, moves into the center. As a result, peace
work is both structured and flexible (Dietrich 2013: 13).
Within this, military peacekeepers must play a critical role, operating with a high
level of self-awareness, ‘at first within the military structure, and then also with
civilian mission personnel and the local population’. This requires, in Dietrich’s
view, personnel who are ‘willing to navigate the perilous territory of international
armed conflicts in a way that actively contributes to elicitive conflict transformation
across the entire range of ranks’. Being able to do this requires ‘requires thoughtful
training and preparation for each specific mission, and responsible, specialized
workers with a clear awareness of themselves’ (Dietrich 2013: 174)
2.5 Conclusion
This brings the chapter full circle. As has been seen, the chapter has started by
examining broad approaches to peacekeeping and conflict resolution, taking into
account how conflict resolution theory has influenced peacekeeping and vice versa.
Important in this is the cosmopolitan approach, which seeks to identify a role for
peacekeeping in strengthening cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution. From this,
the chapter begins to drill down, defining where conflict resolution scholarship has
outlined a specific skillset for peacekeepers, and the importance of aligning training
programmes to meet these non-traditional military tasks. With the addition of ‘how’
these personnel could be trained, the chapter again looks to add another link in the
chain, arguing that elicitive approaches in training for peacekeeping personnel may
be necessary for these peacekeeping to have a better chance of addressing violent
conflict and building sustainable peace.
Through investigating training in ‘non traditional skills’ such as civil-military
relations, negotiation and cultural awareness, this book examines approaches that
seek to strengthen relations with those affected in conflict zones, and provide
non-violent solutions to potentially violent situations. This is an area that
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham defined as requiring a degree of capacity building in
their model of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. As the book progresses, we shall see the
increasing awareness of contact skills in training programmes, but also the possible
emergence of elicitive approaches. Taken together, these developments could

strengthen the role of peacekeeping in wider processes of conflict resolution.
The next chapter will build on this by reflecting the developments from within
the UN towards peacekeeper training. In studying the linkages between peace-
keeping and conflict resolution, it is essential to understand the range of policy
initiatives—and their limits—at the UN.
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Education.” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 29(1): 65–84.
Moskos Jnr, C. C. (1976). Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force.
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Perry, C. and Smith, A. C. (2013). Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping: A
New Dataset, 1991–2012. New York, International Peace Institute.
Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., Miall, H. (2011). Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Third
Edition). Cambridge, Polity.
Ryan, S. (2000). United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles. Peacekeeping and Conflict
Resolution. T. Woodhouse and O. Ramsbotham. London, Frank Cass. 27–47.
Tillett, G. (1996). Conflict Resolution Training for Military Peacekeepers. INCORE Conference on
Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers. University of Ulster,
INCORE.
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Resolution 47(5): 693–705.
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Papers. New York, Oxford University Press.
Woodhouse, T. and O. Ramsbotham (1996). Terra Incognita: Here Be Dragons. Peacekeeping and
Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Conflict: Some Relationships Considered. INCORE
Conference on Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers. University of
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Woodhouse, T. and Ramsbotham, O. (eds.) (2000). Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution.
London, Frank Cass.
Woodhouse, T. and Ramsbotham, O. (2005). “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization
of Security “ International Peacekeeping 12(2): 139–156.
Chapter 3
The Development of Training Structures
in the United Nations
The chapter is based around the conceptual and structural changes that entered
United Nations peacekeeping in the 2000s. The starting point for this was the
publication of the ‘Report of The Panel on UN Peace Operations’, more commonly
known as the ‘Brahimi Report’ in 2000, and the resultant structural and policy
changes. This led to progress in the creation of ‘Principles and Guidelines’ for UN
peacekeeping operations, and a re-invigorated training regime.
Those in the previous chapter who examined the training requirements for
peacekeepers also realized the necessity of solid bureaucratic arrangements for UN
peacekeeping training. Not all assessments were positive. Betts Fetherston’s work
pointed to generally poor training for deployment to new missions, particularly
officers for specific UN Military Observer, and UN Staff Officer positions, and that
training for peacekeeping outside the top-seven contributors was ‘generally poor or
non-existent’ (Fetherston 1994). Moreover, Fetherston found little evidence of
standardisation of training or empirical research to confirm the effectiveness of
training and how it related to activities in the field. In a 1998 article, she warned that
without basic work in thinking about what peacekeepers do and why they do it
‘training will continue to be inconsistent and inappropriate’, adding that ‘[i]f we
only prepare people for war it is far more likely that is what we will get’ (Fetherston
1998). This links to Diehl, Druckman and Wall’s study (also from 1998), which
noted that their expanded toolbox of skills was not being reflected in the pro-
grammes that train peacekeepers. Through their examination of the practices of 79
peacekeeping training programmes, the authors found that only 13 % of the training
activities involved non-traditional skills (Diehl et al. 1998: 51–52).
Diehl and Balas’ 2014 study examines the role of training regimes in incorpo-
rating their version of ‘contact skills’ into peacekeeper training, noting the rise in
joint training initiatives evident amongst groups of states (highlighting moves made
by Nordic countries to align training). Their approach to training however, is to
look beyond current training, arguing for further standardization, the possibility of
national forces ‘earmarking’ troops, and the use of ‘specialized personnel outside
conventional military establishments’ (such as the use of specialized civilian police)
38 3 The Development of Training Structures in the United Nations
in peace operations (Diehl/Balas 2104: 214). Dietrich’s analysis looks more at the
nation state level, arguing that there is little political appetite for increasing
pre-deployment preparation for peace operations. In order for this to change,
Dietrich suggests that a generational shift may be required to arrive at the ‘strategic
conclusion’ that peace workers need to be trained, with the inevitable retirement of
‘long-serving officers who are reluctant to let go of acquired concept and attitudes’
(Dietrich 2013: 174). The only other way in which there would be a move towards
increased training in Dietrich’s view would be as a result of public pressure
resulting from a mission ‘carried out at one’s front door such as in Europe during
the Balkan wars’ (Dietrich 2013: 174).
A theme identified from these surveys is that however desirable increased
training in contact skills, there are challenges in institutionalising such training.
This arguably comes as a result of nation state unwillingness, little standardisation,
or an imbalance between the top and bottom contributors of forces to UN opera-
tions. It is important to investigate these claims further. This chapter will do this by
examining how the UN has developed its training for military peacekeepers, par-
ticularly in the areas defined in the previous chapter. It will go to show that at the
UN level, there has been a shift in training needs and priorities identified for
pre-deployment training, and that the UN has attempted to develop stronger
structures to help provide this.
3.1 Wider Policy Initiatives in the UN
It is important to remember that the ‘official’ field of peacekeeper training in the UN

is relatively new. At the time when Betts Fetherston was developing the concept of
contact skills, the UN had only begun to recognize the value of standard training
itself. The first time that peacekeeper training was formally recognized by the UN
General Assembly was through resolution A/RES/49/37, passed in December 1994.
The resolution advised a number of steps for the UN and its member states to
undertake, including the establishment of ‘basic guidelines and performance stan-
dards’, a peacekeeping training coordination programme, the establishment of
peacekeeping training centres, and the possibility of regional training advisory
teams (UN 1994).
Since then, training for peacekeeping operations appears regularly in the annual
report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (also known as the
‘C34’). The C34 offers an annual ‘state of affairs’ on peacekeeping in general, with
training fitting into a number of areas in the report. More recently, the C34’s focus
on training peacekeepers has become more in-depth, reflecting the complexities
involved in peacekeeping operations. The 2015 C34 for instance states the
following:
3.1 Wider Policy Initiatives in the UN 39
The Special Committee notes the increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations and the
continuously rising demand for resources, which necessitate further cooperation in
peacekeeping training among Member States, including the provision of training oppor-
tunities, partnership with peacekeeping training institutions worldwide, and assistance to
new and emerging troop- and police- contributing countries (UN 2015a, b: 60).
To see how peacekeeping training has responded to wider structural changes in

peacekeeping operations, it is worth going back to 2000, a year which saw the
beginning of significant changes in the structures of training, but also the expanding
range of thematic training requirements.
3.2 The Brahimi Report and Subsequent Change
Perhaps the most critical development for peacekeeping policy, and therefore
peacekeeping training, was the publication in March 2000 of the ‘Report of The
Panel on UN Peace Operations’. The report, more widely known as ‘The Brahimi
Report’ (after the panel’s head Lakhdar Brahimi), came at a time of reflection for
the UN, where self critical reports outlined the organisation’s failure to protect
civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica (UN 1999a–e), and was commissioned to
‘assess the UN ability to conduct peace operations effectively, and to offer frank,
specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity’
(UN 2000a–e: viii). The report was presented to the Security Council, containing
some 57 explicit recommendations and over 100 implicit recommendations which
covered areas such as doctrine, deployment, staffing and the use of Information
technology (Guéhenno 2002: 73).
Training was an important theme in the Report, which warned that a mix of
military downsizing, a growth in regional peacekeeping, and more scepticism from
national legislatures and public opinion towards peacekeeping was leading to a
depletion in the ‘pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from
developed countries to serve in United Nations-led operations’ (UN 2000a–e: 18).
It went on to outline the frailties in peacekeeping operations:
Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations, and in any case the various con-
tingents in an operation are unlikely to have trained or worked together before. Some units
may have no personnel who can speak the mission language. Even if language is not a
problem, they may lack common operating procedures and have differing interpretations of
key elements of command and control and of the mission’s rules of engagement, and may
have differing expectations about mission requirements for the use of force (UN 2000a–e:
18).
This not only challenged ability to deploy quickly and effectively, but it also
impacted on effective mandate implementation and the ability of a peacekeeping
operation to foster ‘secure local environment for peacebuilding’ (UN 2000a–e: 5).
Such concerns were heavily influenced by the near-failure of the UNAMSIL
operation in Sierra Leone, which suffered as a result of poorly trained and equipped
troops. This was reflected in the report, which noted that the problems of command
and control that arose in that particular operation was the ‘most recent illustration of
what cannot be tolerated any longer’, and strongly advised that troop contributors
ensure that the troops which they provide fully understand the ‘importance of an
integrated chain of command, the operational control of the Secretary-General and
the standard operating procedures and rules of engagement of the mission’ (UN
2000a–e: 45). This led the panel to recommend that in order to operate as a coherent
force, troop contributors, at the very least, should ‘have been trained and equipped
according to a common standard, supplemented by joint planning at the contin-
gents’ command level’ (UN 2000a–e: 19).
The Brahimi Report repeated the calls made in the 1994 General Assembly
Resolution, and advised on common standards, placing responsibility with the UN
Secretariat in particular recommending that the UN establish ‘the minimum train-
ing, equipment and other standards required’ for forces to participate in operations.
It also recommended that better equipped member states assist troop contributors
from ‘less developed countries’ to enable them to reach the UN’s minimum stan-
dards (UN 2000a–e: 19). It also recommended that the Secretariat should send a
training team to confirm the level of preparedness of each potential
troop-contributing country to ‘meet the provisions of the memoranda of under-
standing on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deploy-
ment’. In the report’s view, those states who do not meet the UN’s standards ‘must
not deploy’ (UN 2000a–e: 20).
Importantly, the Report finished with a profound note to what peacekeepers need
to understand with regards to gender and culture issues. Though this does not
necessarily result in an outright recommendation, it highlights the need for UN
peacekeepers to be sensitive to the conflict environment, and can be linked to
Fetherston’s contact skills outlined in the previous chapter1:
United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are obliged to respect
local norms, culture and practices. They must go out of their way to demonstrate that
respect, as a start, by getting to know their host environment and trying to learn as much of
the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that
they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that home might be, particu-
larly when the United Nations takes on a transitional administration role. And they must
also treat one another with respect and dignity, with particular sensitivity towards gender
and cultural differences (UN 2000a–e: 45–46).
In order for the UN to meet the challenges set out by the Brahimi panel, a
process of ‘aggressive reform’ was required. Therefore, the DPKO was separated
into two distinct divisions: one division to deal with the policy of peacekeeping
(which kept the name ‘Department of Peacekeeping Operations’—DPKO), and the
other to deal with the logistics and procurement aspects (the Department of Field
1
Fetherston outlines contact skills as ‘the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation,
facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or man-
ifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution’.
3.2 The Brahimi Report and Subsequent Change 41
Support—DFS) (UN 2007: 24). Sat between these two departments is the ‘Policy,
Evaluation and Training Division’. This division, as described by the Secretary
General provides an
integrated capacity for the development of peace operation doctrine and policy, informed
by the systematic capturing of best practices and lessons learned, the standardization,
design and delivery of training based upon doctrine and/or policy and the evaluation of
mission performance in implementing mandates (UN 2007: 21).
The rationale for creating the division was the continued call from member states
to have lessons learned capacities closely allied with creating common doctrine and
training. The division remains central to the two departments, and is planned to
facilitate the sharing of policy development, common doctrine, best practices and
evaluation and training capacities, and ensure that common approaches and stan-
dards are applied in both the DPKO, DFS, and also within missions. Thus a number
of departments (the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the Integrated
Training Service as well as new Evaluation and Partnerships Sections) were
amalgamated into one that is responsible for the evaluation of best practices, lessons
learned, doctrinal guidance, and development of common training standards. This
change is significant, as it has placed training at the centre of the DPKO, and would
link training closely to wider developments in the department.
In 2015, the UN commissioned a new high-level report into peacekeeping. The
‘Report of the High Level International Panel on Peace Operations’, examined a
considerable range of tactical, operational, and strategic issues related to the con-
duct of UN operations. The report of the panel underscored the importance of the
UN’s role as a ‘central point in coordinating a stronger global training partnership’
(UN 2015a, b: 72), and reflected positively on the reform agenda outlined above.
Yet, training programmes continue to be, in the view of the report, ‘significantly
under resourced’ (UN 2015a, b: 72). As a result, the high level panel recommended
that the next stage in the structural development of training standards for UN
operations is to establish what it terms as ‘global partnerships’, where the DPKO
and ITS ‘assist’ member states in ‘updating their training of the “new basics”
required of peacekeepers in more challenging settings’ (UN 2015a, b: 73).
Additionally, it recommended that a junior commanders course be established to
train officers to be better prepared for the ‘significant expectations’ placed upon
them in decentralised peace operations’.2
Such reform is significant for UN peacekeeping operations, particularly set
against the broader thematic developments through the 2000s in policy towards
peacekeeping operations. As shall be seen below, there has been a range of policy
developments in UN operations which have impacted on the role of conflict res-
olution skills for UN peacekeepers.
2
This shall be further revisited in Chap. 6.
3.3 Thematic Changes in Peacekeeping
Perhaps the widest set of thematic reforms in UN peacekeeping has been between
the linkages between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This has occurred at
strategic, operational and tactical levels in UN operations. At a strategic level, the
UN (via General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security Council Resolution
1645) established the Peacebuilding Commission. The commission is comprised of
31 member countries,3 and is mandated to ‘focus attention on the reconstruction
and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support
the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sus-
tainable development (UN 2005). The Peacebuilding Commission plays a signifi-
cant role in the process of long-term peacebuilding in post-conflict countries, with
UN peacekeeping operations being replaced by smaller, more civilian orientated
operations.
This ‘spirit’ of linking peacekeeping to peacebuilding has also manifested itself
at a strategic level through the UN Security Council’s adoption of Security
Council Resolution 2086 in 2013. Resolution 2086 outlines ten areas in which
peacekeeping personnel could play a direct role in the provision of peacekeeping
tasks. This ranges from DDR and SSR strategies, through supporting rule of law
and the establishment of political processes, to monitoring of human rights,
assisting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protecting civilians (UN
2013a–f). The resolution followed on from a 2010, joint DPKO/DFS paper, which
outlined the requirement for peacekeepers to be understood as early peacebuilders.
In particular the paper found three specific areas where peacekeepers can make a
considerable difference.
• Firstly through articulating peacebuilding priorities by supporting consensus
among national counterparts and the broader international community, and
guiding overall strategy development and implementation.
• Secondly, through enabling other national and international actors to implement
peacebuilding tasks, by providing a security umbrella, monitoring commitments
entered into by parties to the conflict, expanding and preserving political space,
coordinating assistance efforts, delivering administrative and logistical enabling
support and coordination or direct management of various resource streams—
these refer to the traditional securitization tasks that peacekeepers are often
asked to do. In particular protecting UN staff and civilian workers, as well as
those in a conflict zone who are working towards peace.
3
The Full list of member countries: Seven from the Security Council (including the five permanent
members); Seven from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), giving particular consid-
eration to countries with experience in post-conflict recovery; Five from the top 10 financial
contributors to the UN budgets, including voluntary contributions to UN agencies and programs
and the Peacebuilding Fund; Five from the top 10 providers of military personnel and civilian
police to UN missions; and Seven additional members, to redress geographical imbalance and
include countries with post-conflict experience, to be elected by the General Assembly.
3.3 Thematic Changes in Peacekeeping 43
• Thirdly, through implementing certain early peacebuilding tasks themselves,

including engaging in early capacity building in certain areas, in close collab-
oration with other partners. This refers to what are commonly known as quick
impact programmes (UN 2010: 2).
The vehicle to interpret these strategic level approaches to the operational level
is the ‘Integrated Operation’ framework. The development of the Integrated
Operation comes from the conviction amongst the UN Secretariat that ‘peace-
keeping failures of the 1990s were at least partly attributable to the various elements
of the UN acting separately, and occasionally at cross purposes’
(Jennings/Kaspersen 2008: 445). This process led to the adoption in 2006 of the
Integrated Missions Planning Process Guidelines, which describe integration
missions as
the guiding principle for the planning, design and implementation of complex UN opera-
tions in post-conflict situations, for linking the different dimensions of peace support
operations (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and
security), and integrating the imperatives of each dimension into its strategic thinking and
design (UN 2006a–c: 3).
These changes have led Jennings and Kaspersen to conclude that integration
‘seems to have become an entrenched principle that will guide the planning,
development and implementation of UN peace operations in years to come’
(Jennings/Kaspersen 2008: 446). In De Coning’s view, the integrated mission
concept ‘combines the peace and security responsibilities of a UN peace operation
with the development and humanitarian mandates typically represented in the UN
Country Teams’ (De Coning 2007).
Bringing the links to the tactical level, peacekeepers are being tasked to develop
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), defined as ‘small-scale, rapidly-implementable
projects, of benefit to the population. QIPs are used by peacekeeping operations ‘to
establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process,
thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation’ (UN
2013a–f: 2). Such projects can offer tangible benefits. For instance, lessons learned
from the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone note how QIPs were commonly used
in ‘potentially volatile areas’, so that ‘a peace dividend could be seen immediately’
(UN 2003: 28). In addition, a number of contingents deployed throughout the
country applied their skills to develop local capacities, both through providing extra
security and through QIPs4 (UN 2003: 28). A UNAMSIL public opinion survey
noted this:
Sierra Leoneans described that the UN peacekeepers had built roads and bridges, road
networks, shelters, health centers, radio stations, schools, mosques, churches, and market
structures. They gave out free medical care and medicine, free school supplies, food, and
clothing. They built quality water wells, rehabilitated prisons, carried out night patrols, and
4
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale projects carried out predominantly by military
personnel. The Sierra Leone Lessons Learned report notes how QIPS were commonly used in
‘potentially volatile areas’, so that ‘a peace dividend could be seen immediately’ (UN 2003: 28).
built town clocks. All of this builds good will and trust with the local population. Building
roads, schools, and other development projects enables people to strengthen their own
capacities to be productive and return to normal life, ultimately contributing to peace
(Kranso 2005: 9).
However, as the following chapter will outline in more depth, the drive to link
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, linked with such projects, carries important
ramifications as to how military personnel understand how to develop effective
working relationships with civilian organisations, as well as those who have lived
through the conflict.
At the same time, there has been the development at the other end of the scale:
the use of robust force in peacekeeping operations. The publication of the Brahimi
report instigated significant changes in approaches to peacekeeping. Whereas
peacekeeping operations (as outlined in the introduction) had traditionally relied on
consent of the belligerent parties, the Brahimi Report argued that in intra—state
conflict, smaller fighting forces and paramilitary groups with little or no ties to
political structures would be less likely to offer full consent to the deployment of
UN peacekeepers.5 Thus there was an implicit expectation that consent was not
solidified in post-conflict environments in the way that the UN had assumed in
previous operations. Following on from this, the Report proposed that UN peace-
keepers be authorised to use force against what it termed as ‘spoilers’ to a peace
process.6 It argued that:
Rules of Engagement should not limit contingents stroke-for-stroke responses but should
allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations
troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations,
should not force United Nations Contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers (UN
2000a–e: 9).
Importantly, force would have to be used in an impartial manner. Impartiality,

defined in the Brahimi Report, was the adherence to the ‘principles of the [UN]
Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles’
(UN 2000a–e: 9). This was mirrored by Secretary General Kofi Annan, who sug-
gested that the ‘UN should abandon outdated concepts of neutral peacekeeping and
replace them with a more muscular form of peace enforcement’ (Bullion 2001).
The use of force in UN peacekeeping is an exceptionally fluid concept, and is not
without its controversy. Observers have noted a lack of clarity in helping peace-
keepers understand the consent issue, and a need for further guidance on when and
how to apply force (Friis 2010: 62–63), as well as the strategic concerns of using
5
The experience of the UNPROFOR intervention in Bosnia, where consent was manipulated by
some groups to create ‘breathing space’ to re-arm, was an influencing factor here.
6
The term ‘spoilers’ also being used in the UK peacekeeping doctrine JWP-3-50 Peace Support
Operations.
3.3 Thematic Changes in Peacekeeping 45
robust force if the host country is ‘lukewarm’ about it (Tardy 2011: 156). Durch and
England argue that that there has been evidence of ‘melding of peacekeeping and
warfighting’ in a number of militaries since the 1990s. They argue that
The motivation now, as defense resources in many countries thin out, seems to be the
construction of an omni-competent force that can spin on a dime—physically, opera-
tionally, and psychologically—from peacekeeping to war-fighting, including counterin-
surgency or counterterrorist operations, as complex circumstances dictate (Durch/England
2009: 44).
The book will revisit robust peacekeeping in its later chapters, particularly in its
conclusions.
3.4 Cross Cutting Resolutions
As well as the developments to the concepts of peacekeeping outlined above, there

have been thematic developments to peacekeeping through the development of
‘cross cutting resolutions’, introduced through the UN Security Council.
Mandates for peacekeeping operations come directly from UN Security Council
Resolutions. Specific training requirements for peacekeeping however are not
usually contained in mission-specific mandates. This is despite a brief appearance in
1999, in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1270, which formed the
mandate of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The
resolution underlined the importance of training UNAMSIL personnel in ‘inter-
national humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and
gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness
and civilian-military coordination’ (UN 1999a–e). However, this was a one-off with
regards to specific mission mandates, with few mentioning the necessity of
well-trained peacekeepers. However, where there are more clear ideas as to a role
for non-traditional military skills for peacekeeping, it is necessary to look to the
UN’s three ‘cross cutting resolutions’. These thematic resolutions cut across all
peacekeeping operations, and are focussed on three overarching themes: children in
armed conflict, women, peace and security, and the protection of civilians in armed
conflict.
Regarding the issue of children in armed conflict, UNSCR 1261 (UN 1999a–e),
requests that the Secretary General ensure that UN peacekeeping personnel have
access to ‘appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children’, and
urges states, regional and international organisations to ensure that ‘appropriate
training’ is included for personnel involved in similar activities. UNSCR 1314 (UN
2000a–e) builds on this by calling for child protection staff to be included in
operations, and the provision of training to personnel about the rights of women and
children. In 2001, UNSCR 1379 added that training is required in where interna-
tional human rights, humanitarian and refugee law has a relevant impact on children
(as well as assessing at the impact of HIV/AIDS) (UN 2001). UNSCR 2143 (UN
2014a, b) updates this by recommending that member states ‘include child pro-
tection in military training’ and that troop contributing countries ‘undertake targeted
and operational trainings’ in preventing violations against children.
On the topic of ‘women, peace and security’ UNSCR 1325 made a direct ref-
erence to training for peacekeeping operations, requesting the Secretary General to:
provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the
particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all
peacekeeping and peace-building measures (UN 2000a–e).
It also invited member states to incorporate such elements into training, as well
as HIV/AIDS training, into national training programmes (UN 2000a–e). UNSCR
1820, passed in June 2008 focused on women being targets of violence, and
requested the Secretary General (alongside Security Council, the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant
States) to develop training programmes to help peacekeepers ‘better prevent, rec-
ognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civil-
ians’. Furthermore, it also requested the Secretary General to develop training as
part of a strategy to combat sexual exploitation and abuse, to ensure ‘full
accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel’ (UN 2008a–e). In
2009, UNSCR 1888 explicitly outlined the importance of training peacekeepers in
understanding gender-based approaches, awareness of sexual violence in deploy-
ment zones, and in the UN’s zero tolerance approach to Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse by UN peacekeepers (UN 2009a–d). These demands were reaffirmed in
2010, via UNSCR 1960, (which included recognition of scenario-based training
exercises on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse), and UNSCR 2106 (2013)
(which advocates ‘comprehensive gender training of all relevant peacekeeping and
civilian personnel’) (UN 2013a–f), and UNSCR 2122 (UN 2013a–f).
UN Security Council Resolutions pertaining to the protection of civilians in
armed conflict outline a range of recommendations regarding the training of mili-
tary peacekeepers. In these Resolutions, one can identify a move towards training in
a broader range of skills. For instance, UNSCR 1265 states the following:
14. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that United Nations personnel involved in
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate training in
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and
gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and
civilian-military coordination, and urges States and relevant international and regional
organizations to ensure that appropriate training is included in their programmes for per-
sonnel involved in similar activities (UN 1999a–e).
UNSCR 1296 develops this by further requesting that the Secretary General to
ensure that UN personnel have appropriate training, and urging that member states
to disseminate ‘appropriate instructions’ and to ‘ensure appropriate training’ is
included for peacekeeping personnel (UN 2000a–e). UNSCRs 1674 and 1738 (both
passed in 2006a–c) make little reference to training for military peacekeepers,
3.4 Cross Cutting Resolutions 47
focussing mainly on protection of journalists and media personnel and calling on

parties to respect civilian protection issues (UN 2006a–c). On the tenth anniversary
of UNSCR 1265, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1894, which restated the
need for appropriate training for personnel in issues of civilian protection, as well as
requesting member states to configure training programmes to raise awareness and
responsiveness to issues of civilian protection, and, reflecting the ‘trends’ in
mandates since UNSCR 1265, ‘including training on HIV/AIDS and zero tolerance
of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions’ (UN 2009a–d). In
2014, UNSCR 2175 focussed on attacks to humanitarian personnel, and linked the
protection of civilians to the delivery of humanitarian aid and the creation of a
secure environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance. By doing so, it asked
the Secretary General to ensure that mandates of relevant UN peacekeeping oper-
ations ‘where appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, help to contribute to a secure
environment to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian
organisations, in accordance with humanitarian principles’ (UN 2014a, b).
Such cross-cutting resolutions have an influence on deployed operations, and
have impacted the training needs for military peacekeepers. Immediately, one can
identify an increased need to understand international humanitarian and human
rights law, particularly pertaining to civilians in armed combat, and women and
children. Furthermore, protecting civilians in areas of armed violence has led to
broader training requirements, with personnel being required to provide a greater
deal of accompaniment to civilians, as well as increasing patrols in civilian areas.
This is apparent in the Secretary General’s 2009 progress report on the MONUC
operation, which stated that as part of the protection of civilians mandate, the
mission ‘has provided armed escorts on market days to ensure that villagers can
travel to and from the marketplace’ (UN 2009a–d).
Nevertheless, intentions from the Security Council can be vague, and gaps
remain over how operations implement mandates. A DPKO commissioned report
into the operationalisation of measures designed to meet the needs of civilian
protection notes how this impacts on training.
These gaps [in understanding the Security Council’s intentions] also manifest themselves in
the extremely limited training that… uniformed personnel receive on the protection of
civilians prior to deployment. This leaves senior mission leaders and contingent com-
manders to make decisions about mission strategy and tactics in the absence of clear
guidance from the Council, the Secretariat, Member States or the General Assembly’s
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). Even the ability of talented senior
leaders to craft coherent approaches is compromised by issues of preparedness, as they
often serve without a clear understanding of what protection of civilians mandates mean,
how it is to be addressed and whether it is a priority (Holt/Taylor 2009: 8).
Since 2000, there have therefore been significant structural and thematic changes
to peacekeeping operations. The UN, through the DPKO has attempted to capture
these changes through policy guidance and a revamping of training programmes.
The chapter will now outline these developments, offering an outline of the 2008
‘Principles and Guidelines’ for UN operations, and the introduction in 2009 of the
Core-Pre-deployment Training Materials.
3.5 Capturing the Policy: The UN Principles

and Guidelines
In order to capture the broadening of peacekeeping activities, and define the

requirements for peacekeepers, the DPKO created the ‘United Nations Principles
and Guidelines’ in 2008. The main intention of the Principles and Guidelines is ‘to
support civilian, police and military personnel who are training and preparing to
serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations’ (UN 2008a–e: 9–10). In doing
so, they offer an indication of what the DPKO believes to be the current and future
projections are in peacekeeping operations—what they term as the ‘scope and core
business’ of deployment (UN 2008a–e). However, the Principles and Guidelines
document is clear in its restrictions, outlining that it is not a doctrine which seeks to
override military doctrines of individual member states (Gowan 2008: 466).
In outlining how missions operate, the Principles and Guidelines outline what it
believes to be the ‘typical’ types of conflict zones into which UN operations deploy:
Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in the aftermath of an
internal conflict face a particularly challenging environment. The State’s capacity to pro-
vide security to its population and maintain public order is often weak, and violence may
still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic infrastructure is likely to have been
destroyed and large sections of the population may have been displaced. Society may be
divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have
been committed during the conflict, further complicating efforts to achieve national rec-
onciliation (UN 2008a–e: 19).
From this, the Principles and Guidelines outline the ‘core functions’ of peace-
keeping operations. Firstly, UN operations create a ‘secure and stable environment
while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security’, whilst maintaining full
respect for the rule of law and human rights. Secondly, operations are to facilitate
political processes by ‘promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the
establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance’. Thirdly,
peacekeeping operations ‘provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations
and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a
coherent and coordinated manner’ (UN 2008a–e: 23).
Military peacekeepers predominantly fit into the first function—the creation of a
secure and stable environment. However, in order to facilitate the second and third
points, military personnel must enter into the ‘spirit’ of dialogue, reconciliation,
coherence and coordination, in effect being early stage peacebuilders. The
Principles and Guidelines therefore state that multidimensional operations play a
‘catalytic’ role in critical peacebuilding activities, such as DDR, Mine action, SSR,
protection of human rights, electoral assistance, and support to restoration of state
authority (UN 2008a–e: 26). This catalytic role is further facilitated by peace-
keepers possessing a ‘thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs
and culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the evolving
interests and motivation of the parties’ (UN 2008a–e: 32).
3.5 Capturing the Policy: The UN Principles and Guidelines 49
The Principles and Guidelines further ask that peacekeepers understand the
cultural misunderstandings that exists between civilian and military actors in an
operation, as well as showing awareness of the importance of national and local
ownership of peace processes as a multiplier of legitimacy of the peacekeeping
force.7 Additionally, they advise that serious attention is paid to managing the
impacts of the mission itself. Such impacts are split into three distinct areas:
• Social impact (for example, in the conduct and behavior of staff);
• Economic impact (for example, on housing and staple foods and materials); and
• Environmental impact (for example, waste management or water usage).
The Principles and Guidelines makes it very clear that personnel should be alert
to ‘potential, unforeseen or damaging consequences of their actions and manage
these as quickly and effectively as possible’. Without doing this, the legitimacy and
credibility of the mission will be jeopardised, and its popular support lost. Thus it is
essential that UN peacekeeping personnel must adhere to national laws (where
these do not violate fundamental human rights standards), respect local culture, and
maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct (UN 2008a–e:
81). This will further be explored when related to civil-military relations in Chap. 5.
Regarding how peacekeepers respond to threats with using force, the Principles
and Guidelines looked to add ‘robust peacekeeping’ to the peacekeeping termi-
nology. Robust peacekeeping would fall between peacekeeping8 and ‘peace
enforcement’,9 and is described as thus:
The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the
authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose
activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process (UN 2008a–e: 98).
The Principles and Guidelines outlines that robust peacekeeping maintains the
consent of the host government and/or the main parties to the conflict; peace
enforcement may involve the use of force at a ‘strategic or international level’.
However, it recognises that the line between robust forms of peacekeeping and
peace enforcement may become ‘blurred’ at some times, especially when in the
midst of a deployment (UN 2008a–e: 19).
7
CPTM modules on such topics are examined in more detail in Chap. 5.
8
Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has
been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers… peace-
keeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of
forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements—military, police
and civilian—working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.
9
Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a
range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to
restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council
may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under
its authority.
Therefore, the main marker for using force is consent. Here, the Principles and
Guidelines offer a similar approach to that of the Brahimi Report by arguing that the
universality of consent ‘becomes even less probable in volatile settings, charac-
terized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties,
or by the presence of other spoilers’ (UN 2008a–e: 32). With deployment zones
often characterised by such ‘spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace
process or pose a threat to the civilian population’ (UN 2008a–e: 34), the Principles
and Guidelines identified a need for operations to use ‘all necessary means’ to deter
attempts to disrupt an agreed peace process, protect civilians, or assist local
authorities in maintaining law and order:
By proactively using force in defense of their mandates, these United Nations peacekeeping
operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment
conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed (UN
2008a–e: 34–35).
By making this link, the Principles and Guidelines look to balance the use of
force by peacekeepers with the peacebuilding requirements of an operation, or as it
has been termed elsewhere, using the ‘carrot’ and the ‘stick’ interchangeably in
peacekeeping deployments (Wilkinson 1998).
3.6 The Core Pre-deployment Training Materials
The next stage of the post-Brahimi reform of peacekeeping was to reflect the
Principles and Guidelines, cross cutting resolutions, and wider thematic develop-
ments in updated training programmes. Up until 2009, the UN had been using the
‘Standard Generic Training Materials (SGTMs)’. The SGTMs were the principle
pre-deployment training modules for UN peacekeepers, and were focussed on three
main areas, dependant on the level of military personnel being trained. Level 1
SGTMs were aimed at soldiers at officer level, and consisted of thirteen modules10
covering a wide range of topics pertinent to peacekeeping operations. However,
studies undertaken by the Integrated Training Service found that there were sig-
nificant weaknesses in the provision of pre-deployment training, as provided by the
SGTMs. In particular, the SGTM content was seen as being ‘too generic and
voluminous, and does not adequately address key operational and mission-specific
challenges’ (UN 2008a–e: 7).
10
The list is as follows: 1a—The UN system; 1b—UN peacekeeping operations; 2—structure of
UN Peacekeeping Operations; 3—Legal frameworks for UN peacekeeping operations; 4—Stress
management; 5a—Code of Conduct/Code of Conduct Case Studies; 5b—Cultural awareness; 5c—
Gender and peacekeeping; 5d—Child protection; 6—Personal security awareness; 7—Landmines
and UXO Awareness; 8—Human rights for peacekeepers (inc. human rights roles for peace-
keepers and human rights exercise; 9—Humanitarian assistance; 10—UN Civil-military coordi-
nation; 11—Communication and Negotiation; 12—Disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration; 13—Media relations.
3.6 The Core Pre-deployment Training Materials 51
Thus, resulting from a recognised need in the DPKO that ‘training materials
needed to be updated to reflect newly developed policies within DPKO and DFS
and made more relevant to the work of peacekeeping personnel in the field’ (UN
2009a–d: 1)11 the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) were intro-
duced in May 2009. The CPTMs thus provide the latest attempt to impart the
‘essential knowledge’ required for peacekeeping personnel—military, police and
civilian—to function effectively in a UN operation, and provide them with a ‘shared
understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping
to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations can function effectively in a coherent
manner’ (UN 2009a–d).
The CPTMs form one part of a set of ‘comprehensive pre-deployment training
standards’ for all categories of personnel, and are designed to go hand in hand with
what are termed as ‘specialized training materials’, which will focus on specific
skills. The materials are split into four distinct units. These are described in Box 3.1
below:
Box 3.1: UN CPTM Units—official descriptions. Source: UN (2009a–d).

Unit 1: A Strategic Level overview of United Nations Peacekeeping
‘Addresses strategic level issues and outlines the basic definitions and
rationale for United Nations peace and security activities, while familiarizing
participants with the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping.’
Part 1—Introduction to UN Peacekeeping
Part 2—Fundamental Principles of UN Peacekeeping
Unit 2: The Establishment and functioning of UN Peacekeeping
Operations
‘Moves from the strategic to the operational level, by explaining how the
Security Council establishes mandates for UN peacekeeping operations and
how those are operationalized by the UN Secretariat and the mission
leadership. It also familiarizes participants with key elements of command
and control in UN peacekeeping and mission management structures.’
Part 1—Establishment and Operationalization of Security Council Mandates
in Peacekeeping Operations
Part 2—How United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Function
Unit 3: Effective Mandate Implementation
‘Addresses those cross-cutting issues which all peacekeeping personnel must
know to implement their mandate effectively at the operational level to ensure
11
Although the SGTMs have been replaced, they represent a considerable amount of the existing
knowledge that is in the UN system at the present time, so throughout the study, specific SGTM
modules are referred to. However, as this chapter is examining the recent changes that are being
undertaken in the UN, it focuses specifically on the CPTM programme.
sustainable peace and an eventual handover to local actors and the UN

Country Team (UNCT).’
Part 1a—International Law Relevant to Peacekeeping Operations
Part 1b—Human rights Protection in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Part 1c—Women, Peace and Security: The Role of UN Peacekeeping
Operations
Part 1d—Protection of Children: the Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations
Part 2—Working with Mission Partners
Unit 4: Standards, Values and Safety of UN Peacekeeping Personnel
‘Addresses policies and procedures related to individual peacekeeping per-
sonnel. (Tactical level issues will be addressed primarily in induction training
because they are mandate-specific.)’
Part 1—Conduct and discipline
Part 2—HIV/AIDS and UN Peacekeeping Operations
Part 3—Respect for Diversity
Part 4—Safety and Security
The CPTMs also encourage tutors and instructors to supplement units with their
own activities and resources, plus offer the option of assessment to be a more formal
or informal process (the informal being based on group discussion amongst par-
ticipants). Moreover, the CPTM package advises that different training modules
have different instructor profiles. Such profiles range from instructors who under-
stand the UN, those who have had personal experience in the UN, those who have a
‘thorough understanding’ of international humanitarian and human rights law—
particularly in relation to the rights of women and children, and those who have had
dealings with cases of misconduct (UN 2009a–d: 3–7).
The move towards a new training framework is therefore a significant step
forward in aligning the UN’s policy, principles and guidelines. The next step has
been to continually evolve the training needs through the development of a training
needs assessment.
3.7 What Works? the UN’s Training Needs Assessment
Part of the strategic plan of the Integrated Training Service’s is to ‘identify current
and future training priorities’ (UN 2008a–e: 3), with a regular training evaluation
exercise (every three or five years), resulting in the development of training stan-
dards. The result of this has been the Strategic Training Needs Assessment (TNA),
which aims to identify gaps in the skills and knowledge required for peacekeepers
to be able to carry out their jobs effectively and also to identify where training has
succeeded in equipping peacekeepers.
3.7 What Works? the UN’s Training Needs Assessment 53
Table 3.1 Additional Understanding the mandate and rules of engagement

training needs for military
Technical skills specific to the mission (e.g. crowd control,
and police personnel
intelligence)
Ability to build relationships with local leaders
Negotiation
Source (UN 2013a–f: 34)
Training Needs Assessments have been undertaken in 2008 and 2013, and have
captured attitudes from peacekeeping personnel towards the topics and delivery of
training. The 2013 survey gathered information from interviews with more than 800
peacekeeping personnel and UN partners in 13 different duty stations, and elec-
tronic surveys completed by more than 4,500 peacekeeping personnel, 68 Member
States and their national peacekeeping training institutions (UN 2013a–f: 1).
In order to continue charting the training requirements of military peacekeepers,
this chapter therefore focuses on the military respondents. It is important to
recognise the importance of this particular training survey, insofar that it is one of
the few training surveys which has taken into account the views of a wide range of
military peacekeepers from a number of contingents in a number of operations (UN
2008a–e).
Significantly, the 2013 TNA identified a requirement from military personnel to
engage in skills drawn from the conflict resolution field. The extent to which
military peacekeepers deem conflict resolution an important part of their job is
illustrated through the following list of ‘additional training needs’, identified by
military and police respondents at unit level (Table 3.1).
This can be linked to the recommendation to include material from seven subject
areas in pre-deployment training from uniformed personnel, outlined in Table 3.2.
Importantly, the Table highlights several areas akin to skills drawn from the conflict
resolution field, including increased cultural awareness, as well as negotiation and
communication skills. Importantly, the 2013 TNA outlined that ‘Member State
respondents rated these subjects as high priority and not sufficiently covered in UN
provided Core and Specialized Training Materials’ (UN 2013a–f: 45).
Conflict resolution skills were also apparent in the longer-term training needs for
uniformed peacekeeping personnel. The 2013 TNA identified that regarding
Table 3.2 Recommendations to improve pre-deployment training material

Teamwork and working with colleagues in different components;
Cultural diversity and working in multi-cultural teams;
Communicating effectively orally and in writing with colleagues and external stakeholders;
Analytical skills and problem solving in a peacekeeping context;
Protection of civilians;
Mentoring and advising;
Negotiation and decision-making
Source (UN 2013a–f: 45)
Table 3.3 Learning methods

This learning method would be effective for peacekeeping learning
“Lessons learned” case studies
Simulations or scenario-based learning
Teaching others/sharing my experience
Cross-training/exchange with other sections
Exchange programmes between field and HQ
Source UN (2008a–e: 26)
‘ongoing training’—defined as training undertaken during assignment—the main

training attended was ‘cultural diversity’. This was followed by substantive issues
(Child Protection, Human Rights, Protection of Civilians and to a lesser extent
Humanitarian Issues and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration), English
language, and importantly, ‘soft skills’, which includes ‘Teamwork, Conflict
Management, Presentation and Communication’ (UN 2013a–f: 30).
The subject area is one important facet of peacekeeper training, but needs to be
complemented by the ‘type’ of training received by military peacekeepers. The
2013 TNA did not reflect this, yet the 2008 TNA offers an insight into the preferred
type of training received by military peacekeepers. Respondents were asked to
indicate from a list of learning methods that were the ones they considered to be
most effective for peacekeeping training. The military responses are outlined in
Table 3.3.
Added to this, Table 3.4 illustrates firstly what peacekeeping training centres’
believe to be the most effective forms of training peacekeepers, and to what extent
such methods are used.
These results from 2008 are complemented in the 2013 survey, in which uni-
formed personnel recommended that pre deployment training be improved through
developing a ‘more practical and dynamic approach, including real simulations and
exercises’ (UN 2013a–f: 44). The tables demonstrate that understanding how pro-
grammes train military peacekeepers is a critical facet of any wider attempt to
understand training. The results of both tables reveal a preference for a wide range
of learning methods. Hence there is a defined need to understand to what extent
methods of learning assist military peacekeepers. The analysis of civil-military
relations in the following chapter illustrates a desire for joint training with military
and civilian bodies. Observations of training programmes to enhance soldiers’
awareness of the civil-military relationship, and negotiation highlight the benefits of
simulations/scenario-based learning. They also show that room exists for what
Lederach terms as elicitive responses, based on the knowledge of the participant, as
opposed to the trainer.12
12
Lederach’s elicitive approach is analysed in more depth in Chap. 2, and its application to
civil-military relations in Chap. 5.
3.8 Conclusions 55
Table 3.4 The most effective learning methods for delivering peacekeeping pre-deployment
training according to PKTIa respondents
Learning method This method is Our institution uses this
effective (%) method (%)
Encouraging participants to share their 63 77
experiences
Inviting guest experts and specialists 63 82
Classroom instruction 63 83
Simulation or scenario based learning 58 70
Lessons learned case studies 57 67
Audio-visual/CD/DVD/Tape 57 77
Hands-on Practice 55 63
Mentoring/coaching system 33 40
Exchange programmes 32 32
Facilitating the shadowing of 27 43
experienced personnel
Distance Learning 23 17
E-learning programmes 22 25
Source UN (2008a–e: 46)
a
Peacekeeping Training Institute
3.8 Conclusions
Some themes are present throughout the documents analysed. Firstly, the
peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus is firmly entrenched in UN thinking. Whilst
macro approaches to peacebuilding is still the subject of debate—particularly the
economic models introduced to post conflict societies, and the drive for
‘democratisation’—it represents a considerable change to the role and function of
military peacekeepers. At a minimum, greater understanding of the peacebuilding
functions of an operation is now required amongst military peacekeepers. Any
further tasks—including liaising with civilian components, providing assistance to
civilian organisations, understanding the needs of the civilian population within the
deployment zone, and when to actually provide a form of peacebuilding in the guise
of Quick Impact Projects—is arguably not an uncommon feature of a modern
peacekeeping operation. Thus the role of ‘civil-military relations’ is becoming
increasingly important in peacekeeping operations. This is discussed further in the
Chap. 5.
There is also a recognised need for peacekeepers to show an increased under-
standing of legal norms and customs pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed
conflict. Although militaries are subject to a number of conventions and legal norms,
the cross-cutting mandates have tasked military peacekeepers to be even more aware
of issues pertaining to children in armed conflict and women, peace and security.
Again, this poses another challenge on training institutions and programmes to
ensure that those soldiers who are to be deployed at least have an understanding of the
cross cutting issues that appear in their mandates.
The training needs assessment offers similar lessons. Again, it is encouraging to
see that peacekeepers are proactively requesting an increase in ‘contact skills’ in
their training programmes, with a desire for increased negotiation and communi-
cation skills being a constant theme running through the results. However, this
desire is still apparent many years after Fetherston argued for increased ‘contact
skills’ for military peacekeepers. This could be explained by the high turnover of
peacekeepers, and the higher turnover of nationalities taking part in peacekeeping—
the current list of contributing nations being at 123 (UN 2016). With such a con-
siderable change in personnel, difficulty exists in the capacities for training to be
fully effective.
In addition, ‘grey areas’ exist in peacekeeping operations, a factor highlighted by
the Principles and Guidelines. In addition to the challenges associated with the
peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus, is the blurred distinction between peacekeep-
ing, robust peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Since the Brahimi Report, the
UN has attempted to clarify this area through the Principles and Guidelines and
Security Council mandates. However, it is still up to the troop commander and
soldiers under his/her command to understand the situation, context, and conse-
quences of the level of force to be used. This poses a particular challenge to
peacekeepers. Observations of training programmes (in Chaps. 4 and 5) outline
programmes which allow soldiers to reflect more on the operating environment and
context of their actions.
This, and the previous chapter have identified where there is an identified role for
training military personnel in skills drawn from the conflict resolution field. By
offering both academic and policy approaches to the training dimension, a solid
conceptual base is offered for the second section of this book to investigate specific
training requirements and responses in the areas of negotiation skills and
civil-military relations. The second section of the book is to investigate further the
training of skills drawn from the conflict resolution field for peacekeeping opera-
tions. In particular it will examine two areas that were outlined by Fetherston in her
‘contact skills’ thesis. Firstly, the role of negotiation and cultural awareness in
military training for peacekeeping; secondly the development of training which
contributes to early stage peacebuilding.
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Part II
Specific Areas of Engagement
Chapter 4
Negotiation Training for Military
Peacekeepers
As well as short term benefits—predominantly the avoidance of violence and

escalation—negotiation in peacekeeping environments plays a significant role in
wider processes of conflict resolution. Betts Fetherston likened military negotiation
in peacekeeping environments to ‘conciliation’, encouraging parties to make con-
ciliatory gestures that would lead to further resolution. This process involves
‘pacification process and gentle persuasion which aims to restore severed com-
munication’, and can be placed at a pre-negotiation stage, which decides the
framework and mood for which further negotiation may take place (Fetherston
1994: 110–111). The pre-negotiation stage is of critical importance when attempting
to move from peacekeeping towards peacebuilding. Fetherston examines this in the
context of Fisher and Keashly’s contingency model (as outlined in Chap. 2):
Peacekeeping when operating from the rationale of a contingency model can be visualised
in a two-tiered approach, with peacekeepers working in the area of operation at the
micro-level facilitating settlement or facilitating a more positive atmosphere, coupled with
peacekeeping, cooperating and coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts at
the macro level (Fetherston 1994: 150).
For this relationship building to be effective there is a training requirement for

military personnel engaging in peacekeeping operations. This is reflected in the
UN’s Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs), which describe negoti-
ation and conflict management as ‘specialized soft skill subjects which need study,
good understanding and experience based expertise (UN 2014: 132).
This chapter looks at how negotiation training for peacekeepers has been
developed. It will take account where negotiation has been identified in the
peacekeeping literature, focussing particularly on contexts defined in the literature
as ‘tactical level military negotiation’. It will then offer a historical overview of
negotiation in UN peacekeeping, highlighting in particular the pivotal role of
negotiation in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in Bosnia and the
impact this had in developing the field. The chapter will then examine ways that
training in negotiation has been implemented. The work of Deborah Goodwin in

62 4 Negotiation Training for Military Peacekeepers
drawing the links between military negotiation and interest-based approaches to the
activity will be analysed, before the chapter outlines the UN’s approach to nego-
tiation training for military personnel.
4.1 Negotiation at the ‘Bottom Level’ of a Peacekeeping

Operation
Negotiation is relevant at every level of a peacekeeping operation, ‘from senior

commanders meeting with faction leaders to soldiers at isolated observation posts
who may become involved in trying to control an incident or even arbitrate a
dispute’ (Woodhouse 1999: 33). Therefore, scholarship from the conflict resolution
field has advocated further exploration of the question of ‘how in practice can
problem-solving, negotiation and mediation skills be used’ in peacekeeping envi-
ronments (Woodhouse 1999: 33).
This is because negotiation is ever present in the creation, mandating, and
execution of a peacekeeping operation. Approaches to negotiation as part of the
process of peacekeeping operations can be identified at a strategic level in the
process of formulating peace agreements, as well as the force generation process
within the UN. When missions are operationalized, forms of negotiation are seen at
the level of force commander (or his/her political partners), in building their rela-
tionship with security, political, and humanitarian actors. Below this, there are
identified negotiation frameworks on a localised level with regards to the
semi-formal relationship that is built with non-governmental organisations and
civilian partners (to be further explored in the following chapter).
However, it is below these levels where military personnel encounter a higher
number of ad hoc situations which require varying degrees of communication skills.
This has been described as ‘tactical level military negotiation’ (Goodwin 2005).
The preparation of personnel to engage in tactical level negotiation will therefore be
the focus of the chapter.
There are three ways in which tactical level military negotiation can be identified
in existing studies of peacekeeping. Firstly, the literature identifies specific exam-
ples of tactical level military negotiation. For instance, Newland and Waller record
the skills used by soldiers in the UNPROFOR Mission to gain access through
roadblocks, and found that UNPROFOR and the UNHCR1 responded to the
obstruction of humanitarian relief ‘with a combination of persistence, negotiation,
threat (rarely carried out), and the non-aggressive use of UNPROFOR military
assets’ (Newland/Meyers 1998: 20–21). In the case of other UN missions, Ray
Murphy examines the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Lebanon, and
notes challenges of resorting to negotiation
1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
4.1 Negotiation at the ‘Bottom Level’ of a Peacekeeping Operation 63
In attempting to diffuse potentially violent situations by using maximum restraint and

negotiation, UNIFIL risked being accused of backing down and not enforcing the mandate
effectively. Such solutions were preferable to becoming embroiled in the civil strife taking
place in Lebanon and then being forced to withdraw (Murphy 1999: 53).
The second area is the identification of a skill set that facilitates tactical level
military negotiation scenarios. Here, Christopher Leeds’ research investigates
aspects of cross-cultural mediation and finds the disparities in military cultures
when compared with the tasks that they are asked to outline:
Professional soldiers used to share a military organizational culture associated with
destroying an enemy and achieving victory. Increasingly, soldiers are involved in missions
in which a win–lose scenario is inappropriate, focusing on non-coercive and facilitative
activities rather than on stopping aggression. Their duties resemble police work where
negotiating replaces fighting (Leeds 2001: 95).
Sometimes, the nationality of peacekeepers provides a head start for the skills
possessed for negotiation. MacDonald suggests that Irish peacekeepers ‘enjoy a
high level of acceptability’ among parties in a peacekeeping environment, due to
such characteristics which include: acknowledged neutrality; a proven record of
fairness and impartiality; high standards of professionalism; and, natural friendli-
ness. Such characteristics, in MacDonald’s view, ‘help to diffuse tensions and…
enhance the prospects of negotiation on the ground’ (MacDonald 1997: 96).
Murphy finds that the lack of heavy weaponry possessed by the Irish military,
combined with more engagement in small skirmishes (as opposed to ‘full scale
battles’), both go some way to complementing the needs for peacekeeping opera-
tions. On this basis, a military (such as the Irish Defence Forces) unaccustomed to
offensive military operations ‘can be very adept at resolving confrontations by
negotiation and mediation’ (Murphy 1998: 36).
It is not only nationalities that influence soldiers’ characteristics, as job type also
plays a role. Grist examines the role of the military observer in UN operations and
argues that the importance of personal relationships between the observers and
members of the warring sides ‘should not be overlooked’, as factors built from the
personalities of the observers (or ‘good chemistry’ in the author’s view) provide a
foundation for trust and confidence. Grist argues that:
The work of the observer or monitor in this informal pre-negotiation process is often critical
to later success or failure, and is an important, though often unstated function of such
missions (Grist 2001: 72).
The third area of enquiry at this level identifies what skills and traits are further
required to make tactical level military negotiation more effective. Such investi-
gations reflect on studies of deployed peacekeepers. For instance Johansson and
Larsson’s study of Swedish forces argues that in addition to good military
knowledge, it is necessary for soldiers serving under the UN flag to have ‘extended
skills’ such as ‘diplomacy, negotiating and mediating’ (Johansson/Larsson 1998:
137). In a later study carried out by the same authors, they argue that a main
‘stressor’ for soldiers serving on a peacekeeping operation is the ‘conflict between
strong aggressive impulses seeking an outlet and the inability to express them’. In
this light, the authors state that as well as being trained in traditional combat skills:
So-called ‘civilian skills’, such as conflict resolution and negotiations, cross-cultural rela-
tions, and restraint in application of force, should also be emphasized (Johansson/Larsson
2001: 73).
Tom Woodhouse notes the increasing number of calls for more conflict reso-
lution capacity for peacekeepers. In particular, the changing nature of doctrine
configured to win ‘hearts and minds’. Such an end requires a management of
consent (through impartiality, legitimacy, mutual respect, minimum force, credi-
bility and impartiality) as well as the promotion of ‘good communication, of
negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches to community relations’
through civil affairs programmes (Woodhouse 2000: 15). This approach to fostering
support from the host population is taken up by Jakobsen, who argues that nego-
tiation (alongside a ‘wide array of consent-promoting techniques’) must be
employed in order to ‘generate trust and cooperation’ (Jakobsen 2000).
This has an impact on the peacekeepers themselves. Caddick-Adams argues that
in order to foster ‘regional and local factional support’ a great deal of emphasis is
placed on the shoulders of ‘the most junior commanders’. He notes that while a
potential failure can cause problems at higher levels, ‘the actions of a bright junior
commander or liaison officer can avert a serious crisis with careful negotiation or
the massaging of a local faction commander’s ego’ (Caddick-Adams 1998: 151).
This leads Caddick-Adams to conclude that the where there has been success in
both the missions he studied (UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia), it
‘has been achieved by junior commanders’ (Caddick-Adams 1998: 151).
In turn, studies look to identify the characteristics of a soldier suited for tactical
level negotiation. Kernic sees two faces of peacekeeping, which corresponds to two
different ‘faces’ of the soldier. The first face—that of traditional peacekeeping—
asks the soldier to assume the role of a ‘diplomat in uniform’, who ‘negotiates
between conflicting parties without using force’. This must be considered against
the second face—that of peace enforcement—where the more ‘traditional military
image’ of a soldier is assumed (Kernic 1999: 124).
4.2 The Development of Negotiation in Peacekeeping

Operations
Micro-level disputes caused by a lack of training can have significant effects on the
performance of a peacekeeping mission. Diehl and Balas use the simple example of
a roadblock to illustrate this:
The lack of appropriate negotiation skills at a roadblock inspection of vehicles could
damage relations and cooperation with the local population; it might also undermine trust in
the operation by other conflict actors who rely on peacekeepers to detect weapons
4.2 The Development of Negotiation in Peacekeeping Operations 65
smuggling. Although the overall mission may not be jeopardized, mistakes by peacekeepers
may result in civilian deaths or make the peacekeepers themselves vulnerable to violent
action (Diehl/Balas 2104: 213).
This use of the roadblock highlights a useful way in which to illustrate the
requirement to negotiate in peacekeeping deployments.
In the scenario, personnel are presented with a task to plan a military escort for
an aid delivery from Village A to Village B. However, between villages A and B,
residents of Village C have set up a road block on the main road, as they felt that
they deserved some of the aid that was destined for Village B. A small, armed
militia man the roadblock. The task for the military escort is to make their way
through this checkpoint to Village B. The question is for personnel, is what should
they do.
There is a wide range of possible responses to this. On the one hand, there may
be a desire to turn around and return to base; it may not be in the mandate to
negotiate with Village C, and personnel may not want the extra stresses of nego-
tiating a further aid delivery. Alternatively, a reaction may be to drive straight
through the roadblock, showing no signs of stopping, as well as brandishing
weapons in order to retaliate to any signs of gunfire. Between these two examples,
the possibility of negotiation may become apparent. For instance a small amount of
aid could be offered to the residents of Village C, in return for access along the road
(UNTSI 2007).
This scenario is helpful to understand how negotiation is used in a peacekeeping
context. In terms of this particular case, and the three methods suggested, there is
considerable divergence between the approaches that were employed. Taking the
first and second approaches, we see two approaches which may have been useful in
the short-term, but ultimately negative in the long-term. In the first case, absolute
avoidance is shown, which may save the escort the trouble of having to negotiate a
roadblock, (which was not in their mandate). However, this can be weighed against
the fact that Village B would not receive any aid, and that the escort’s attitude
towards Village C could be interpreted as showing the international presence to be
weak. On the other hand, the third approach showed the international force to be
highly robust, through smashing their way through the barrier. Although this has
may yield positive results concerning assured delivery of aid, it runs a high risk of
alienating local opinion to the operation as well as heightening the possibilities of
those operating the roadblock to escalate their levels of force to stop any future
escorts. Thus, there is value in exploring options for negotiation. In the immediate
term, the result of negotiating a way through the checkpoint would be less than if no
negotiations took place and the convoy passed without obstruction: for the military,
less of the aid may be delivered (if giving part of the aid to Village C becomes part
of a settlement), and the inhabitants of Village C may still not get as much aid as
Village B. However, this outcome increases the chance of positive relations
between the peacekeepers and the inhabitants of Village C. It may also prevent
feelings of antagonism from Village C towards those other Villages in the area who
are receiving aid.
The ‘roadblock scenario’ has played an important role in gaining a broader

appreciation of the necessity to negotiate in peacekeeping operations. One such
attempt to formalise training into this context was developed in 2002 at the Centre
for Conflict Resolution, at the Department of Peace Studies (University of
Bradford). This particular exercise was based on a composite of convoy events in
the Bratunac/Srebrenica area of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Spring of 1993.
A more detailed description of the scenario is presented in Box 4.1 below.
Box 4.1: Humanitarian Aid Delivery in War-Zones—Case Study:

Srebrenica, Bosnia Hercegovina2 1993. Source: Lewer/Reynolds (2002).
It is spring 1993. A UNHCR food convoy, which set off from Belgrade
escorted by UNPROFOR soldiers, has arrived at the outskirts of Bratunac (a
Bosnian Serb town) in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The convoy consists of 15
UNHCR trucks carrying 150 tons of food, medical supplies, blankets and
soap. The convoy is on its way to Srebrenica (about 10 miles from Bratunac),
an enclave established as a UN ‘safe area’ for Bosnian Muslims, which is
surrounded by Serb forces.
The convoy has received all necessary permissions from Bosnian Serb HQ
at Pale to travel through Serb territory to Srebrenica. In order to secure these
permissions, the Bosnian Muslims agreed to allow Serbs to be evacuated (by
the UN) from neighbouring Tuzla. The overall situation in the country is
extremely volatile, with the Serbs rapidly gaining territory with devastating
effects on civilians.
The convoy has had a long and difficult journey from Belgrade, with many
stops. For example it was held up for a long time at Zvornik on the
Serbian-Bosnian border. As it approaches Bratunac it is forced to stop yet
again because of a crowd of angry Bosnian Serb civilians who are blocking
the road. Positioned on the side of the road is a detachment of Serbian militia.
International news reporters are present at the scene.
The creators of the training exercise reflected that in the real life case studies on
which the exercise was based, Bosnian Serb forces hindered aid delivery in Eastern
Bosnia for four main reasons:
• Passage of aid is stopped according to the orders of the highest Bosnian Serb
authorities due to political or military reasons
• Passage is stopped according to orders of the highest authorities but it is pre-
sented as a will of local militias on check points
• Passage is denied by local militia commanders
• Aid passage is stopped by the local civilian population, as a sign of protest
(Lewer/Reynolds 2002: 49).
2
The authors’ use of this spelling format has not been changed.
The exercise sought to involve all four approaches in the role-play, by incor-
porating a multitude of different actors at a number of different levels. Over 25
different roles were defined3 each with different ends, and means which to achieve
them. Within the role-play negotiation occurred at two levels. The first level was
negotiation by ‘those at the broader political and military levels’, and the second
level at the micro-negotiation context of the roadblock. Within the micro-level
negotiation of convoy delivery, the creators of the exercise make the point that ‘UN
officials in charge of these convoys must, therefore, have plenty of courage,
negotiation skills, and patience in order to fulfil their task’ (Lewer/Reynolds 2002:
49).
As well as being a good utensil in outlining the necessity of negotiation practices
in peacekeeping environments, there is a longer history of militaries learning about
the necessity of negotiation in peacekeeping contexts through the operational
experience of the roadblock. A significant example here is the development of
negotiation training for peacekeeping operations developed in the United Kingdom
(UK) after UK forces were deployed in the UNPROFOR during the 1990s.4
UNPROFOR provided the backdrop for the creation of UK peacekeeping doctrine
Wider Peacekeeping, which provided guidance for soldiers and training institutions.
It is a critical document when understanding the evolution of conflict resolution
skills into military peacekeeping activities, as it fully explored the issue of consent
in peacekeeping environments and how acting non-violently to potentially violent
situations influenced this. It argued:
For Wider Peacekeeping therefore, consent is confirmed as foundational to any prospect of
long-term success. Lessons learned reports have highlighted the point that seeking to
promote and sustain consent is the most important activity in which the tactical commander
can engage. The history of peacekeeping has consistently shown that consent is the only
effective vehicle for carrying peacekeeping operations forward (MOD 1995: 2–6).
Negotiation skills were integrated into the doctrine to a high degree, and were
outlined as one of the key techniques to achieving consent in a conflict zone.5 This
was linked to ‘pillars’ of consent—a number of principles which a mission needed
to adhere to in order to foster and maintain consent. Amongst these was ‘minimum
use of force’, which consequently pushed peacekeepers towards using non-violent
forms of conflict management. Wider Peacekeeping states with regard to the use of
force that it could become ‘liable to become sources of future resentment and
3
Actors came from the following list: Local officials from Bratunac, Bosnian Serb Militia,
UNHCR Convoy, UNPROFOR Escort, International Committee of the Red Cross, Medicins Sans
Frontiers, Oxfam, United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General,
UNHCR headquarters, UNPROFOR Headquarters, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe Headquarters, Oxfam Headquarters, Government of Bosnia Hercegovina.
4
As a result of the UNPROFOR engagement, the UK briefly become the top UN TCC in
mid-1995.
5
The full list is: Negotiation and mediation, Liaison, Civil Affairs, Public information, Community
Information, Community Relations.
hostility which may inhibit control and manifest in outbreaks of further violence
and prolongation of the conflict’ (MOD 1995: 2–7).
The emergence of negotiation and non-use of force in Wider Peacekeeping was
influenced by the use of roadblocks as a principal impediment to the effective
delivery of humanitarian aid to enclaves within Bosnia throughout the UNPROFOR
operation. Usually such roadblocks would consist of a small number of armed men
blocking a road with obstacles and landmines (either anti-personnel, or anti-tank).
Although it looked like a militarily small task to use force to destroy the roadblock,
the UN’s mandate relied on the consent of all parties to ensure the convoys would
get through, thus any increase in force could mean that consent would be withdrawn
to the operation. Thus, UN peacekeepers were required not to use force, but
negotiate their way through the roadblocks.
General Sir Michael Rose (who commanded the UNPROFOR operation from
1994–1995) found roadblocks ‘never blocked convoys in such a systematic manner
that a military response from UNPROFOR became inevitable’. Instead, he argued,
those who created the roadblocks played a ‘cat-and-mouse’ game which involved
giving into the UN when the ‘pressure on them grew too much’, and then becoming
obstructive when the UN moved on and concerned itself with other issues (Rose
1999: 361–362). This links to Deborah Goodwin’s analysis, which found that the
main aim in stopping peacekeepers at checkpoints was purely to achieve disruption,
and ‘appeared to be to delay and hamper the military from achieving its mission’
(Goodwin 2005: 19). Newland and Meyers cite one example in particular, where in
May 1992 a convoy had to negotiate its way through 90 roadblocks between Zagreb
and Sarajevo, with ‘many of them manned by undisciplined and drunken soldiers of
indeterminate political affiliation’. The authors note that:
The parties, though unwilling to explicitly oppose humanitarian assistance, did in fact
oppose it when it helped to sustain the very populations they were trying to eliminate. The
tactics of obstruction were endless delays, fruitless negotiations, outright blockades and,
sometimes, attacks (Newland/Meyers 1998: 20–21).
Colonel Bob Stewart (who commanded the first British battalion to arrive in the
country in 1992) approached such roadblocks with an attitude that negotiation as
paramount. He argued:
Without a mandate to force our passage through, we would have to negotiate all the way to
our destinations. It would be no good simply launching a convoy and hoping that it would
be able to get through the many checkpoints to its destination. We had to create the right
conditions in which to operate, which might entail a ceasefire or at least a containment of
the fighting between local forces… Faced with a choice between either forcing our way
through using military power or negotiating, I would obviously use the latter option unless
there was no other way (Stewart 1993: 61–2).
Stewart’s approach was to seek out avenues to negotiate. Thus an extensive

system of liaison officers was established to ensure that his battalion could maintain
regular contact with local commanders. In Stewart’s view, building relationships
with local commanders was of high importance, and liaison teams were essential to
facilitating this success. Stewart found that personal relationships were ‘vital’
in situations with no established order, as ‘often a problem which seems impossible

one moment can be solved almost instantly in a conversation’ (Stewart 1993: 319).
As the conflict went on, the idea of having to negotiate through roadblocks was
tested, with commanders and contingents increasingly assuming a tougher line.
General Sir Michael Rose argued for a ‘robust’ response from contingents when
stopped at a checkpoint. To show what can be achieved through the threat of force,
he used the example of a Swedish Battalion’s action at a checkpoint:
Hendrikson [the Swedish Commander] had led their [the Swedish contingent] first convoy
across the conflict line. At a Bosnian Serb roadblock, he was confronted by an aggressive
soldier who told him he had orders not to allow him to pass. Hendrikson immediately put a
loaded pistol to the soldier’s head and informed him that he had just received a new set of
orders. The convoy was allowed through without any further interruption (Rose 1999: 50).
Although General Rose agreed with this policy, and argued that the battalion
were well respected throughout the mission, it did bring wider problems associated
in refusing to negotiate at a checkpoint. Woodhouse, Fetherston and Ramsbotham
note this in their assessment of the role of conflict resolution theory and practice in
the UNPROFOR operation. They find that although there was admiration for the
Swedish approach, it ultimately led to three Swedish peacekeepers being taken
hostage by Bosnian gunmen (although ironically they were released unharmed after
negotiations) (Fetherston et al. 1994: 24). Nevertheless, General Rose maintained
his view that ‘if national contingents had adopted a universally robust approach on
the ground’, the chances of success would have been improved (Rose 1999: 361–
362).
This debate however highlighted the need for a coherent approach to training for
peacekeepers, which was reinforced by post-operational assessments of the
UNPROFOR deployment. Colonel Bob Stewart asserted that UN operations are
‘officers’ wars’, in which the balance of success or failure depends on the attitude of
the officers who have to establish networks in the field, and implement UN policy
into practice. This is to some extent reinforced by Fetherston, Ramsbotham and
Woodhouse, who argue that peacekeepers operate:
… at the critical interface between ‘structural-political’ attempts to broker mediated set-
tlements at one set of levels (in this case reaching from Pale and Sarajevo through Belgrade
and Zagreb to Moscow and Washington), and the task of monitoring or implementing them
at another, including ‘cultural-communal’ tasks such as relief work, refugee repatriation,
communal policing, reconstruction, overcoming breakdown in communication and local
reconciliation (Fetherston et al. 1994: 13).
Deborah Goodwin contends that that because of the high number of instances
where negotiation was ‘thrust’ upon soldiers (in most cases through negotiating at
roadblocks), many found that they were ‘inadequately trained in negotiation skills’.
Her investigation finds that the experiences gained through the UNPROFOR
deployment ‘indicated that individuals were either good negotiators or were not,
and had little time to alter the fact for the better’. With inadequate training, soldiers
had to handle negotiations which had a high chance of failing, when coupled with a
pervading hostility and cultural misunderstandings. As Goodwin says, ‘a great deal
of damage could be done with very few words’ (Goodwin 2005: 175). With this
lesson in mind, belief developed in the peacekeeping community that amongst the
skills needed for conducting peacekeeping operations, ‘negotiation was one of the
most important duties, but one of the least practised in the pre-deployment phase’
(Goodwin 2005: 191).
It was also noted amongst the conflict resolution community that the ‘roadblock
scenario’ was a unique case-in-point to highlight the wider issues of negotiation
within peacekeeping operations. Woodhouse, Ramsbotham and Fetherston’s
assessment of UNPROFOR from a conflict resolution perspective noted the ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ power approaches needed for peacekeepers negotiating at a micro-level.
Throughout 1992 and 1993, UNPROFOR soldiers required a great deal of ‘skill,
professionalism, judgement and restraint’ in order to deal with the myriad of issues
they were confronted with on a daily basis. In the authors’ view, the development of
‘contact skills’ was essential in order for soldiers to develop their ‘soft’ power
skills. The authors argued that:
contact skills are defined as those skills which support activities involving direct contact
with armies and militias, civilian populations, humanitarian agencies, and other contingents
of the peacekeeping force. They are in essence the communication skills required by the
third party interveners enabling them to utilise their soft power capabilities (Fetherston et al.
1994: 14–16).
Thus, on both sides of the military/conflict resolution divide, a growing recog-

nition emerged that understood the need of a role for conflict resolution in
micro-level military negotiation.
4.3 Goodwin’s Tactical Level Military Negotiation

and the Interest-Based Model
In bringing the field of conflict resolution, the operational necessity to negotiate at

the tactical level, and the UK experience together, Deborah Goodwin provides a
significant contribution to understanding the role of negotiation in peacekeeping
operations. Her work, as well as wider work undertaken by the UK military in
negotiation training, shall be highlighted.
Much of the rationale behind Goodwin’s analysis of the military and negotiation
comes from her conclusions that established analysis of small scale negotiations
(taken from a number of different fields, including business, labour management,
conflict resolution, or game-theory modelling) ‘did not reflect or complement the
situations within which serving personnel found themselves’ (Goodwin 2005: xvi–
xvii). Likewise, Goodwin reflects on the changing nature of military peacekeeping
in the 1990s and developed a working understanding of negotiation at this bottom
level:
4.3 Goodwin’s Tactical Level Military Negotiation … 71
Circumstances were dictating that the military, primarily in their role as peacekeepers, were
required to interact with a multiplicity of organisations and individuals on operations in
order to achieve safe resolutions to volatile situations. Whilst a military force is inextricably
linked with armed response, and this remains an option in most deployments, the growth of
civil-military liaison work and non-confrontational encounters with warring factions to
uphold a mandate of neutrality dictate an urgent requirement for any soldier to negotiate
responsively and effectively (Goodwin 2005: xvi).
This account highlights interactions with a multiplicity of organisations and

individuals, civil-military relations and finally ‘non-confrontational encounters’
with warring factions. Such actions cover both intended formalities, and ‘flash-
points’—areas of crisis negotiation.
Goodwin’s analysis compares factors of negotiation in tactical-level military
contexts with other negotiation contexts. Factors that include threat moves, power
play, context, culture, communication, use of force, time imperative, and interests
all are understood as having ‘high’ levels of importance in affecting the
tactical-level military negotiation, whereas in other contexts, these would all be of
low or variable importance. Following on from this, Goodwin’s main contention is
that situations in which the military soldier has to negotiate differs from other forms
of negotiation, and that there will be situations where soldiers have to negotiate
effectively under ‘duress, physical threat, and armed intervention’ (Goodwin
2005: 3).
Goodwin categorises tactical level military micro-negotiators as Type D learners.
These are defined as ‘learners who are to be frequent micro negotiators in given
contexts with greater personal or scenario implications for their failure/success’
(Goodwin 2005: 138, 2013). However, she finds that such learners are stifled with a
very low starting knowledge of negotiation and its finer nuances (bordering on
ignorance about the subject). This becomes problematic when the negotiator finds
him/herself in a personal life-or-death scenario in the real world (Goodwin 2005:
140). Developing negotiation training for this type of learner therefore requires a
number of different approaches, in particular a mixture of classroom-based teach-
ing, scenario based learning, and life-like simulations.
Negotiation training for officer cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
is undertaken by the Communication and Applied Behavioural Sciences
Department (where Deborah Goodwin teaches). The training offered by the
department reflects many of Goodwin’s ideas and approaches towards peacekeeper
training, and which focuses on teaching cadets a broad range of skills and tech-
niques centred on four thematic areas: problem solving and creative thinking;
motivating and team building; communicating and influencing; and leading and
managing change. It is from this range of themes that the department aims to
provide future officers with the necessary base skills to become ‘tactical level micro
negotiators’ (Goodwin 2005). The military roadblock is used to some extent in
preparing soldiers for negotiation contexts. However, it is now seen as one of many
contexts in which soldiers find themselves having to negotiate with civilians,
NGOs, or belligerent groups of non-governmental organisations (O’Neill 2013).
Classroom-based teaching is based around ‘brainstorming sessions’, where

cadets are encouraged to think creatively about a particular context or situation, and
share their thoughts with other members of the class. In such sessions, approaches
are invited from cadets as well as pooling together of different ideas and responses
from the learners. This leads to a ‘diversity of issues and solutions’ from the group,
with different groups providing different outcomes. Goodwin goes on to advocate a
form of learning that shares similarities with Lederach’s approach outlined in
Chap. 2:
a learning method that is frequently overlooked is the sharing of ideas with mentors and
colleagues, through general conversation or more formal interviews. This experience tends
to promote higher-level skills, and the refinement of technique and approach, since
improvement has no limits (Goodwin 2005: 143).
Beyond teaching, small role-plays are also incorporated into training. Goodwin
suggests that the utility of simple role-plays lies in their ability to ‘illustrate phases
of negotiation, use and application of language and the nuances of body language’,
though they do have limitations in being able to focus on ‘subtleties, psychological
concerns, linguistic details, or even realism’ (Goodwin 2013: 8).
In order to overcome such limitations, Goodwin suggests the inclusion of sim-
ulation exercises, which provide a ‘realistic representation of likely negotiation
processes, plus the inherent external factors, which will all be pertinent to the
learner’ (Goodwin 2005: 138–140). For students to effectively learn about nego-
tiation in this framework, Goodwin argues that the context is ‘vital’ in order for the
learner to transfer their theory into practice in a meaningful way. Furthermore for
the military, attention must be paid to rules of engagement, as well as current
scenarios into which personnel are likely to find themselves deployed. Finally, and
heeding more elicitive approaches, guided role-play ideally offers structured and
constructive feedback through immediate debriefs which utilise ‘both trainer and
learner response to enable a more proactive learning cycle to develop’ (Goodwin
2005: 140).
Linking this to wider work on negotiation training in non-military fields, authors
have cited systematic reviews of university and professional school curricula, which
suggest that the most common single technique used to train negotiation was the
use of simulations and role-play exercises. For instance, Hal Movius argues that
such exercises help trainees through experience, help reveal training participants’
‘naïve theories of negotiation’, offer opportunities to try new skills, and to ‘illustrate
the relevance and application of underlying principles and themes’ (Movius 2008:
515).
Interest-based negotiation has had a significant impact on Deborah Goodwin’s
work. She argues that being aware of interests ‘lies at the heart of conducting a
successful negotiation, and this is no different in the case of military negotiation’.
Goodwin goes on to argue that if parties in the military context understood interests,
the higher the chance of a ‘more satisfactory evaluation of what is going on,
particularly in a volatile or aggressive context’, allowing for a more productive
exchange (Goodwin 2005: 46).
The move towards interest-based approaches to negotiation was seen as a radical

move from traditional bargaining practice, exploring themes involving ‘the
importance of moving beyond positions to addressing underlying interests’ and the
‘importance of achieving results while maintaining long-term relationships (Movius
2008: 511). The work in developing models of interest-based negotiation came
from the ‘Harvard School’, in particular, the work of Fisher, Ury, and Patton
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 21–52). Their book, Getting To Yes builds on work
carried out at the Harvard Negotiation Project to develop what they term ‘principled
negotiation’,6 described as ‘a straightforward method of negotiation that can be
used under almost any circumstance’ (Fisher et al. 1991: 11). It follows four key
areas:
People: Separate the people from the problem
Interests: focus on interests, not positions;
Options: generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do
Criteria: insist that the result be based on some objective standard.
The authors argue that in order to separate people from the problem, it is
important to understand that conflict lies is in ‘people’s heads’. They find that:
Truth is simply one more argument – perhaps a good one, perhaps not – for dealing with the
difference. The difference itself exists because it exists in their thinking. Fears, even if
ill-founded, are real fears and need to be dealt with. Hopes, even if unrealistic, may cause a
war. Facts, even if established, may do nothing to solve the problem (Fisher et al. 1991:
23).
On this basis, principled negotiation seeks to separate the underlying interests of

each negotiating party from the overt positions taken. A close examination of
underlying interests ‘will reveal the existence of many more interests that are shared
or compatible than ones that are opposed’ (Fisher et al. 1991: 43). Following from
this, the authors explore where negotiators can examine options for mutual gain,
suggesting that problems arise where ‘all available answers appear to lie along a
straight line between their position and yours’. In fact, according to Fisher, Ury and
Patton, there is almost certainly room for shared interests and mutual gain, ranging
from developing a ‘mutually advantageous relationship’ (Fisher et al. 1991: 59), or
through satisfying each sides’ interests through a ‘creative solution’. To facilitate
this process, objective criteria are to be used, and the more that standards of
‘fairness, efficiency or scientific merit’ are used, the more likely that any final
agreement is to be ‘wise and fair’ (Fisher et al. 1991: 86).
It is in the final part of Fisher, Ury and Patton’s analysis of principled negotiation
where closer links emerge with military-level tactical negotiation. Firstly, is the
concept of the BATNA—Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, which is the
standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured. The BATNA
6
‘Principled Negotiation’ will be referred to when specifically discussing Fisher, Uri and Patton’s
work. Otherwise the term ‘interest-based negotiation’ will be used.
can be used as the yardstick for any proposals offered during the negotiation pro-
cess. The authors briefly connect this principle to armed negotiation, stating that the
BATNA can assist in negotiation on merits, as opposed to negotiation on physical
power. Secondly is ‘negotiation jujitsu’:
when they assert their positions, do not reject them. When they attack your ideas, do not
defend them. When they attack you, don’t counterattack. Break the vicious cycle by
refusing to react. Instead of pushing back, sidestep their attack and deflect it against the
problem. As in the Oriental martial arts of judo and jujitsu, avoid putting your strength
against theirs directly; instead, use your skill to step aside and turn their strength to your
ends (Fisher et al. 1991: 114–115).
Fisher, Ury and Patton offer a number of skills and techniques to improve
‘negotiation jujitsu’, including advice of how to look for and understand the
interests behind stated positions, recasting personal attacks as attacks on the
problem, and inviting criticism and advice.
Finally, they outline the use of ‘dirty tricks’ by parties to a negotiation. Such
dirty tricks involve deliberate deception, phony facts, ambiguous authority, dubious
intentions, and less than full disclosure. These tactics lead the authors to argue that a
negotiation procedure could exist about the very rules of the negotiation itself—a
meta-negotiation (Fisher et al. 1991: 135–140). ‘Dirty tricks’ and ‘negotiation
jujitsu’ approaches are usually utilised during tense negotiation practice and may be
more prominent in the tactical level negotiation scenario.
Goodwin’s analysis of military training also notes the importance of the
BATNA. When discussing the importance of the BATNA upon decision-making
and behaviour in negotiation, Goodwin argues that BATNAs may prove to be
‘particularly pertinent in the eventual propositions concerning military tactical level
negotiation’. She adds that the BATNA may allow a greater insight into ‘the effect
of situational behaviour such as aggression, or an escalation of armed response, and
the extent to which it might affect the negotiation itself’ (Goodwin 2005: 57).
Interest based approaches to training personnel in negotiation skills are evident
beyond the United Kingdom. Cedric De Coning and Ian Anderson’s 2007 publi-
cation developed under Training for Peace Africa, entitled ‘Conflict management
for Peacekeepers’, engages with the interest-based approaches outlined above. The
publication, outlined as a practical guide ‘to assist in dealing with conflict in a
peacekeeping environment’ (Henderson/de Coning 2007: 6), outlines the core
components of interest-based negotiation, as well as the key characteristics of a
negotiation process. This includes guidance on the physical process of setting up
negotiations, including advice on: preparation, opining a negotiation, explorations
of interests and finding solutions, and closure and agreement (Henderson/de Coning
2007: 81).
The roadblock scenario is outlined as an example of where peacekeepers may be
asked to negotiate, as well as using the BATNA in the peacekeeping environment.
This is outlined in Box 4.2.
Box 4.2: A roadblock BATNA, from ‘Conflict management for

Peacekeepers’. Source: Henderson/de Coning (2007: 81)
An unescorted WFP food convoy is caught in an unexpected rebel roadblock.
The rebels are demanding food supplies and are threatening violence. If they
refuse to let the convoy go, the convoy’s BATNA is either: to try to escape
and risk attack, to radio for help and hope to keep the rebels engaged long
enough for troops to arrive; or, to hand over food and suffer the consequences
of breaking policy.
4.4 Training in the United Nations
The first attempts at institutionalising negotiation skills in UN training (through the

SGTMs) followed the interest-based approach to negotiation. Importantly, it out-
lined the complex ‘communication environment’ that peacekeepers were deploying
into:
The peacekeeper will typically be communicating with somebody from another culture,
without a common language, often under threatening or tense situations in a context where
people are stressed and easily irritable (UN 2006: 1).
Within this, the SGTM stated that peacekeepers will be placed under situations
where they will be ‘interacting with another person or persons with the objective of
reaching an agreement between them’ (UN 2006: 1). Impacting this was the role of
different cultures that characterise the negotiation environment:
Show respect and do nothing to offend: The foundation of cross-cultural communication is
respect. The golden rule is to do nothing that will offend the other culture. If you are
professional, humble, friendly and respectful your chances of not offending anybody are
very good… every culture has developed customs and tradition to regulate formal com-
munications like negotiations and mediations (UN 2006: 8).
It has been this approach to culture which has been more sustainable in the
updated training materials. The SGTM’s replacement—the Core Pre-Deployment
Training Materials (CPTMs)—do not incorporate a specific module on negotiation,
although they offer an in-depth approach to training peacekeepers to work with
diverse cultures.
The CPTMs subsumed the negotiation component of training into a more broad
range of principles. Thus, they are more concerned with understanding who is being
negotiated with, as opposed to the negotiation itself. As a result, the CPTMs offer a
concerted effort to foster understandings of cultural differences between groups.
This attempts to go further than traditional understandings of the obvious differ-
ences between military and civilian groups, by outlining thematic areas where
differences may occur.
The closest that the CPTMs get to a specific module on negotiation is the unit
entitled ‘Working with Diversity’. The unit begins by stating that the peacekeeper’s
ability to ‘maintain respectful relationships and communicate effectively’ constitute
key determinants as to how successful the operation will be. It adds that many of the
peacekeepers’ choices are influenced by ‘being aware of the diverse backgrounds
and being sensitive to different ways of doing things’ (UN 2009: 81–82). Following
this, the CPTM asks that peacekeepers show a degree of reflexivity in order to
increase chances of improving decision-making. Awareness of peacekeepers’ own
perspectives ‘allows us to consider the possibility that there may be other ways of
seeing a situation’ (UN 2009: 89). Thus, from the outset, there is a concerted effort
to both understand the ‘other’ culture(s), as well as being reflective about one’s own
culture.
In order to understand the impact of culture on communication, the CPTM offers
a number of visual aids to explain the dynamics of culture. Figures 4.1 and 4.2
show these attempts to define the issue of culture to peacekeepers. Figure 4.1
provides various dimensions of diversity, uncovering the different layers of culture.
Figure 4.2 shows an exercise given to trainees, where they are asked to write about
the obvious and less obvious aspects of culture (the obvious is above the waterline
and the less obvious is below the waterline).
Although relatively straightforward, these exercises introduce concepts for
military peacekeepers to help them understand the complex cultural environment
into which they are deploying, and also how their own cultures may affect it.
The CPTM also examines ‘common differences’ which may hamper effective
communication during negotiations. This is arguably a more culturally aware
Fig. 4.1 Dimensions of diversity. Source UN (2009: 83)

4.4 Training in the United Nations 77
Fig. 4.2 Iceberg exercise. Source UN (2009: 89)
method of approaching contact with the host population than the SGTMs, which
offer a ‘blueprint’ of negotiations. The main areas of ‘common difference’
according to the CPTM are:
• Attitudes regarding authority and management
• Body language and gestures
• Religion
• Family and roles
• Dress Code
• Concepts of time (UN 2009: 93–97)
Under each of these headings, the unit provides examples of where cultural
differences lie. Like the exercises outlined above, the importance lies not in the
depth of the topics. Instead the significance is in the intention to encourage military
peacekeepers aware of the role of culture, and the considerable difference in cultural
interpretations of regular activities. As Goodwin argued above, a great deal of
damage can be done with very few words in negotiation environments. The CPTM
here illustrates the value attached to avoiding this.
As stated, the CPTMs do not contain an outright section on negotiation and
mediation (unlike the SGTMs). It could be argued that by focussing more on the
‘human aspect’ of interactions, as opposed to the ‘processes’ of the negotiation,
that the CPTMs link to some of the key guidelines in Fisher, Ury and Patton’s
Getting to Yes. One of the fundamental aspects of their principled negotiation
process is an ability to understand the negotiating parties: putting the people first.
In Fisher, Ury and Patton’s view, a working relationship based on ‘trust, under-
standing, respect, and friendship’ can make negotiations ‘smoother and more
efficient’, and that relationships need to be based on accurate perceptions, clear
communication, appropriate emotions, and a forward-looking, purposive outlook

(Fisher et al. 1991: 19).
Drilling further down into UN training materials, the negotiation aspects of the
CPTMs are complemented by UN Specialised Training Materials (STM) for
UN-Civil Military Cooperation (UN-CIMIC). STMs are intended to be below the
level of the CPTMs, more focussed on particular issues. The STM on UN-CIMIC
states that UN-CIMIC officers ‘must be equipped with negotiation and mediation
skills as necessary’, as due to their ‘neutral third party’ nature, there may be a
requirement for them to ‘manage conflict through communication and negotiation’
(UN 2014: 130). Reflecting the ad hoc nature of negotiation at this level, the STM
makes the point that peacekeepers should not be surprised to be engaged by being
asked to negotiate, as ‘negotiations and conflict management are routine events’
(UN 2014: 132–133). These negotiations may be formal or informal with the
UN CIMIC Officer being the ‘focal point for communication with host community,
civil society, government representatives and fellow external actors’ (UN 2014:
133).
From this, the STM outlines key approaches across about negotiation, focusing
in particular on the role of interest-based approaches. It makes the point that as well
as having a sound knowledge of mission objectives and interests, successful
negotiation depends on ‘understanding the interests of other parties and ability to
arrive at acceptable way forward’ (UN 2014: 131).
This focus on interests provides a baseline for how peacekeeping operations
should deal with negotiations (at least in the CIMIC context). The STM outlines the
distinction between traditional win-lose bargaining, and the interest-based approach
to joint problem solving between those in negotiations, before outlining how this
may be operationalized in a meeting scenario with a negotiating partner.
Throughout the STM there is a reliance on communication techniques, for instance
through asking peacekeepers to follow ‘basic communication techniques’ during
negotiations. It expands by stating:
Listen attentively and understand the view point, even if you do not agree, what is being
said [sic]. Encourage the other party to speak by your willingness to listen; show genuine
interest in solving the problem at hand (UN 2014: 132).
This culminates in a scenario-based exercise with a fictitious meeting with

‘Colonel Zed’. Those taking the STM are given a biography of Colonel Zed, and
asked to break into smaller groups to discuss two questions:
1. How will you and the UNAC team prepare to make this negotiation a success?
2. What are the other aspects which can be discussed amongst the negotiators and
for better preparation?
In reflection on the exercise, the STM makes the point that ‘understanding the
local cultural context and different perspectives is linked to peacekeeping opera-
tions success factors and of essence for UN-CIMIC Officers’ (UN 2014: 135). In
4.4 Training in the United Nations 79
many ways the CIMIC STM can be linked to the interest-based negotiation
approach of separating the people from the problem: taking time to understand the
context of the communication and what is driving the interests of the other partiers.
4.5 Conclusions
Negotiation training for military peacekeepers provides evidence of conflict reso-

lution theory and practice being incorporated into training programmes for military
peacekeepers. This is illustrated in the shared awareness of the ‘roadblock exercise’
from both the military and conflict resolution community, as well as Goodwin’s
interpretation of military training through the lens of Fisher, Ury and Patton’s
approach to principled negotiation. Here also one can see the impact of particular
operations on how the field develops. In this case, the UK’s experience of
UNPROFOR had radical effects on how negotiation was conceptualised in the
peacekeeping context.
What does this particular chapter mean for the field of peacekeeping and conflict
resolution? Peacekeepers continually find themselves in dangerous situations where
responses include pursuing the path of negotiation, or resorting to the use of robust
force. There is often no clear answer, and peacekeepers have resorted to either
option in a number of examples. However, there is a need for peacekeepers to add
negotiation skills to their traditional toolbox of skills (inclusive of the traditional
military tasks). There is also a requirement for military peacekeepers to expand their
decision-making capacities, to deal with the dilemmas of when to use force, when
to negotiate, when to end negotiations, and whether there is an appropriate time to
employ the BATNA.
As an aside, it is often asked whether such training is effective for peacekeeping
operations. Although studies are yet to be conclusive in the military field, studies do
exist in industry of the effects of increased negotiation training for personnel. Hal
Movius’s analysis of negotiation training cites a positive example of a study
undertaken on its impact. The study was undertaken with sixty-four graduate stu-
dents at Columbia Teachers College taking a twenty-hour conflict resolution course
over three weekends. Forty-two similar students who did not take the course served
as a control group. Half of the participants in the group received ‘multisource’
feedback (from the participant, a friend, a supervisor, and a subordinate or col-
league) before the course, and half after the course. Feedback was designed to ‘tap’
conflict-related feelings and behaviors. Movius describes the findings of the study
as ‘significant’. He adds
Four weeks after the first measurement, training participants reported feeling significantly
fewer negative emotions in conflict situations, had a more positive view of conflict and
reported a more constructive work climate after the training. Perhaps more significant, their
raters (observers who knew the subjects well) reported that participants used more ‘uniting’
and ‘informing’ behaviors in conflict situations than they had before the training (Movius
2008: 523).
Moreover, the study showed that supervisors of the participants noted that more
constructive outcomes to conflicts appeared when participants were involved.
Although there is still much work to be done, it is again encouraging to see that
such training bears fruit. It is with this in mind that this study strongly supports
Goodwin’s claim that ‘when the ultimate goal is the desire to provide military
practitioners with knowledge and skills in negotiation that might save lives, the
impetus for pertinent training is evident’ (Goodwin 2005: 141).
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Chapter 5
Civil-Military Relations Training
for Military Peacekeepers
This chapter will broaden the analysis of conflict resolution skills in peacekeeping
environments to incorporate the development of civil-military relations,1 an
important early step in processes of peacebuilding.
The goal of peacebuilding, as outlined by John Paul Lederach, is to focus on
more than the short-term challenges of getting belligerents to the negotiating table.
Instead, it ‘must include tasks like broader transformation, reconciliation and social
reconstruction’ (Lederach 1995: 203). For this model to work, organisations
involved in peacebuilding must intentionally devise frameworks for including
participation from all different ‘levels’ of conflict setting, from the political leaders
at the top, through the local leaders in the middle, down to the local grassroots and
combatants at the bottom. Critical to this is the bottom level, where the vast
majority of the population are based, and local indigenous empowerment can take
place between the local population and outsiders (Lederach 1995: 213).
Peacekeeping operations have something to offer this process, through setting the
right conditions for peacebuilding—a ‘pre-resolution phase’. This is where the
civil-military relationship, if carried out productively, can effectively coordinate
micro-level initiatives which will feed into macro-level structures (Fetherston 1994:
157).
Peacekeeping operations, in the UN’s view, should not be a ‘substitute for the
root causes of conflict’ (UN 2014a, b). Nevertheless, they offer the potential to
move from negative concepts of peace (the provision of security), towards more
positive forms based on ‘more comprehensive peacebuilding and peacemaking
activity’ (Fetherston 1994: 153). However, the conditions where is undertaken are
beset by challenges in building and maintaining productive relationships. This can,
in turn colour the peacebuilding endeavour. As Angstrom notes ‘far too often,
relations between civil and military are treated as a technical matter of more or less
coordination’, whereas such relations should be seen as relating to ‘fundamental
political norms of how societies should be organised’ (Angstrom 2013: 225).
‘Civil-military relations’ is used except where policy refers to it a different name.

1

84 5 Civil-Military Relations Training for Military Peacekeepers
This is why understanding the training dimension of ‘civil-military relations’ is

fundamentally important. As the chapter will show, there are a number of chal-
lenges in building effective relations between military peacekeepers, their civilian
counterparts, and those who constitute the host population. As a result, the
development of wider-reaching training programmes that incorporate approaches
from the conflict resolution field have been identified as suitable policy responses.
Coming back to the overall argument of the book, as peacekeeping is a form of
intervention strategy into conflict, those who are undertaking it need to—at the
least—have awareness of their role in conflict and its resolution.
This chapter examines the challenges of civil-military relations, and how training
programmes look to address such challenges. After looking at definitional issues,
the chapter is split into three sections. The first examines the challenges of building
relations between military and civilian actors, looking first at the dynamic between
military and civilian organisations, before examining identified challenges between
military peacekeepers and the ‘local’ population. The chapter then looks to where
academic and policy literature identifies training as a suitable policy response to
these challenges. Finally it offers an overview of existing training programmes
designed to impart knowledge to peacekeepers about both the formal guidance for
civil-military relations, and the less formal ‘grey areas’ of interaction. Here, it
includes an example of a training simulation undertaken at the UN Training School,
Ireland.
When taking into account the UN’s developing policy of using peacekeepers as
early-stage peacebuilders as outlined in Chap. 3, the importance of training military
peacekeepers in necessary skills to facilitate peacebuilding is clear. From an aca-
demic perspective, it demonstrates where increased understanding of conflict res-
olution theories (particularly those identified by Fetherston) and practice—through
of elicitive approaches—may increase chances of peacekeeping being part of a
wider process of positive transformation.
5.1 Defining Civil-Military Relations
The definition and role of civil-military relations, is, like that of ‘peacekeeping’ one
made of multiple constructions and meanings. This has brought with it a ‘prolif-
eration of conflicting and inappropriate titles, job descriptions, and training stan-
dards’ (UN 2008a–d: 4).
The UN has devoted considerable time to developing a working relationship in
the field between the civilian and military bodies. The very make-up of the
organisation means that serious attention is given to harmonising efforts whilst
deployed in a peacekeeping operation. This has resulted in differing definitions
which place emphasis on the military and civilian roles within operations. On the
one hand, the UN’s Office of the High Representative of Humanitarian Affairs (UN
OCHA) see the role of Civil-Military Coordination, or what they term
‘UN-CMCoord’, as being a process of ‘essential dialogue and interaction’ between
5.1 Defining Civil-Military Relations 85
civilian and military actors. Such dialogue is necessary in order to ‘protect and
promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and
when appropriate pursue common goals’. This can be ‘facilitated’ by liaison or joint
training incorporating military and civilian actors (UN 2014a, b: 48). This definition
of the activity refers clearly to the importance of non-military actors in post conflict
environments, and the protection of humanitarian principles.
On the other hand, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines
UN Civil-Military Coordination, or ‘UN-CIMIC’ as the ‘operational and tactical
coordination between the UN military and civilian partners, among them the
civilian components of UN field missions, UN police, UN agencies, funds and
programmes, host national government, non-governmental organisations, and grass
roots organisations’ (UN 2010a, b: 2). UN-CIMIC outlines a requirement for
peacekeepers ‘to maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions
for civilian organisations and partners, especially the host nation government, to
allow the peace process to unfold, and contribute to achieving the mission objec-
tives’ (UN 2010a, b: 5). This is done broadly in two ways: firstly through
‘civil-military liaison and information sharing’—which supports interaction
between military and civilian components, making respective partners aware of
processes, frameworks, and sensitivities included in different working styles; and
secondly through civil assistance—which looks to ‘facilitate interaction between
the mission and local civilian population and authorities, through community
support projects undertaken by military components (UN 2010a, b: 6–7). When put
in comparison with the UN OCHA definition, one can see a much broader
definition.
However, the NATO approach to what it terms ‘CIMIC’, outlines a more
military-led approach to civil-military relations. A number of TCCs are NATO
member states, and thus follow NATO doctrine in a number of areas. In NATO
terminology, CIMIC is:
The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as
international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies (NATO 2013:
2-1).
Here, CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation that ‘a NATO Commander

employs with all the civilian actors within his area of operations in order to carry
out his mission’ (Rollins 2001: 123). Therefore, in order for it to work effectively, a
military force commander effectively ‘controls’ the project, making it a more
military-focused definition than those of the UN outlined above. This has led to a
degree of criticism from the UN, with a DPKO directive on civil military coordi-
nation noting that NATO’s CIMIC doctrine is an example of an approach which has
a ‘conceptual meaning which detracts from the UN Integrated approach’. In turn,
this ‘creates confusion in responsibilities (particularly with civilian counterparts in
the humanitarian community), inhibits understanding, and ultimately decreases
efficiency and effectiveness’ (UN 2008a–d: 4).
UN OCHA sums up the differences between the different forms of civil-military

relations. UN-CMCoord is designed to ‘protect and promote humanitarian princi-
ples’; UN-CIMIC is only defined in the context of a UN Peacekeeping Operation,
where it is conducted ‘in support of the wider peace process and not solely in
support of the military commander’s intent or humanitarian objectives’; CIMIC, is
defined as being at the opposite end of the spectrum to UNCMCoord, with activities
‘conducted in support of political or military objectives’ (UN 2014a, b: 8).
Although there are differing power imbalances in each of the doctrines outlined,
there is a defined requirement for military actors to share the same space—and at
times similar activities—with civilian actors. This has brought a range of issues
which have influenced how training programmes are undertaken. This chapter has
grouped these issues into two main challenges: the military and civilian agencies,
and; the military and the ‘local’.
5.2 Challenges to Developing Effective Civil-Military

Relations I: The Military and Civilian Agencies
Attempts to find coordination mechanisms between the military and civilian

agencies have been made since the mid 1990s, through the department of peace-
keeping operations (DPKO 1996: 4), as well as other UN bodies which deal with
the coordination of civilian agencies in the UN (IASC 2004: 3). However, the
inevitable consequence of such close cooperation has been an uneasy working
relationship between the military and civilian actors, particularly when ‘humani-
tarian objectives of different agencies and NGOs cannot be separated from military
and political objectives’ (Gamba 1998: 6).
With both components essentially working towards the same goal, the military
have traditionally been criticised for crossing over into work essentially designated
for humanitarian organisations (Slim 1996: 134–138). This ambiguity has led to
‘fundamental obstacles’ to closer relations. Most pertinent are ‘major differences in
culture, mandates, resources, levels of authority and experience, as well as problems
of personality (in leadership) and functional areas of responsibility’ (TCP
2002:147). Institutional culture clashes have frequently been highlighted as a major
stumbling block for effective civil-military relations in this domain. Duffey outlines
mutual unfamiliarity between the military and civilian actors, resulting in each actor
forming ‘ill informed’ stereotypes. She explains that the military would be char-
acterised as an ‘insensitive, ill informed, controlling, and inflexible war-machine’,
whereas NGO personnel would often be seen as ‘sandal-wearing, two faced,
undisciplined and uncoordinated liberals’ (Duffey 2000a, b: 149).
These cultures frequently clash in methods of decision making, accountability,
operational and management styles, use of force, approaches to time and success,
media styles, and relationships with the local population, or in Beatrice Pouligny’s
description, the ‘infinite variety’ of training and professional careers, cultural
5.2 Challenges to Developing Effective Civil-Military … 87
origins, interstate factors, and differences in communication and language, combine

to complicate interactions (Pouligny 2006: 133). Gamba finds that although there is
a generally recognised principle that long-term political and developmental issues
need to be resolved, military and civilian approaches to achieving this may appear
radically different. Whereas civilian agencies take the longer-term perspective, the
military approach is geared to ‘do something for, rather than with, people’, meaning
that little thought is given to ‘long term management implications of what they
construct or repair’ (Gamba 1998: 9). Rubenstein, Keller and Scherger take a more
critical view of military perspectives, noting that in a number of interviews with
staff involved in civil-military relations, the over-riding trend was that military
interlocutors would look to assert ‘dominance and control’ over the process
(Rubinstein et al. 2008: 544).
To a certain extent, UN documentation understands these institutional culture
clashes. The UN’s Principles and Guidelines note the ‘significant’ cultural differ-
ences that exist between the management cultures of military and civilian actors. In
particular, it notes that while civilian organisations function with ‘a high degree of
tolerance for ambiguity and highly flexible management models’, military organi-
sations ‘tend to seek to minimize ambiguity by making informed assumptions
within a strong planning culture’. Therefore, in order for missions to be effective,
the Principles and Guidelines suggests that such different institutional cultures need
to be reconciled, however without stifling the ‘cultural diversity that constitutes one
of the United Nations main strengths’ (UN 2008a–d: 71).
Others expand on this cultural approach, particularly the ‘disparate under-
standings of the meanings of partnership and cooperation’ (Rubinstein et al. 2008:
543). Rubenstein, Keller and Scherger argue that the dominance of military con-
cerns in mission planning has exacerbated these cultural misunderstandings, com-
plicating the chances of interoperability (Rubinstein et al. 2008: 544). The authors
offer an example of the barriers which were put up by both military and civilian
actors in the field, which is worth quoting at length. They find that conversations
with NGO and military personnel had a ‘distressing commonality’:
conversations always began with professions of respect for one another’s concerns and an
expression of a desire to work as partners. This was followed by a discussion of the
practicalities of operating together, which inevitably revealed differing preferences and
incentives. The stumbling points could be at any level, including the humanitarians’ con-
cern for the preservation of humanitarian space as a key symbolic component of their world
view, the military’s concern for unitary command and coordination also as a key symbol of
their world view, and disagreements about the proper site for mission activities. At this
impasse, the earlier professions of respect and partnership were repeated. The conversation
resumed with an examination of the practicalities involved, only to clash once again.
Depending on the patience and will of the interlocutors, this pattern of profession of respect
and partnership, followed by disagreement, returning to a profession of respect and part-
nership, could continue for some time. But, nearly universally, the conversations we
observed ended with the parties failing to reach genuine agreement – reaching a false
consensus, at best (Rubinstein et al. 2008: 544).
Underlying the potential culture clash is the danger of a loss of consent to the
military presence. When levels of consent drop (as they do in peacekeeping)
observers have for some time noted that humanitarian organisations attempt to
distance themselves from the military (Gamba 1998: 9). Though often necessary
from a humanitarian standpoint, it often has a baffling effect on the military actors,
and has given humanitarian actors ‘something of a reputation in military circles for
equivocation’ (Slim 1996: 131–132).
The issue of consent is now even more pertinent largely due to the development
of robust models of peacekeeping and the impact that this has had on the practice of
UN peacekeeping deployments (Johnson 2009: 66). With the evolution of third
generation peacekeeping, the principle of consent in UN peacekeeping is no longer
the ‘Rubicon’ that it once was. In the Brahimi Report, consent is raised as an issue
which can be ‘manipulated’ by combatants and belligerent groups and accordingly,
this has led to peacekeeping forces to expect a loss of consent from ‘spoilers’ to a
peace process. This could be problematic, as deployments where military peace-
keepers are encouraged to rely on the impartial use of force as opposed to ensuring
consent, run the risk of hampering the ability of humanitarian organisations to carry
out their work in a consent-based environment.
When linked to the development of the integrated approach,2 there exists a
potential to further put pressure on the independence of humanitarian actors in the
field, with the possibility of ‘profound and unintended consequences in terms of the
maintenance of humanitarian space generally’ (Gordon 2007: 116). Eide et al.
highlight this:
In contrast to its Cold War days, the United Nations of today does not shy away from taking
a side in a peace process, for instance in favour of an internationally recognised transitional
government and against the ‘spoilers’ trying to undermine the transitional process. On the
other hand, for some humanitarian actors, be they humanitarian agencies or NGOs working
closely with the UN, the well-established humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality
and impartiality must still be upheld (Eide et al. 2005: 6).
This leads to a deepening of problems in differentiating the responsibilities,

mandate and actions of humanitarian actors and the ‘UN politico-military strategy’,
which accordingly has ‘obvious implications’ for humanitarian space and inde-
pendence (Gordon 2007: 115). This becomes even more pronounced as new mil-
itary contributors, with differing doctrinal approaches to intervention enter into
peacekeeping commitments (Curran/Holtom 2015), The UN’s Principles and
Guidelines flag up the difficulties of integration for the humanitarian and devel-
opment components of an operation, particularly ‘if they are perceived to be too
closely linked to the political and security objectives of the peacekeeping mission’.
In the worst case, this can lead to personnel and operations being placed in danger
and leads the Principles and Guidelines to recommend that ‘appropriate dialogue,
2
To serve as a brief reminder to what the integrated mission concept, it is worth revisiting the UN’s
2006 definition as outlined in the Integrated Missions Planning Process Guidelines: ‘the guiding
principle for the planning, design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict
situations, for linking the different dimensions of peace support operations (political, development,
humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), and integrating the imperatives of
each dimension into its strategic thinking and design’ (see Chap. 3 for more details).
communication and contingency planning’ are carried out to ensure that such
eventualities are prepared for (UN 2008a–d: 54). Additionally, this has been
highlighted in the UN’s own concept note on ‘robust peacekeeping’, which outlines
that a risk of robust peacekeeping would be ‘greater insecurity and retaliation either
against peacekeepers or ‘soft’ targets such as humanitarian actors and the local
population’ (Tardy 2011: 162).
5.3 Challenges to Developing Effective Civil-Military

Relations II: The Military and the ‘Local’
Further to the organisational issues between the military and humanitarian organ-
isations, the impact of the peacekeeping operations on the local population is
significant for the study of civil-military relations. These consequences are mainly
focussed on the local population and how they are affected by a peacekeeping
deployment.
Primarily, it is of critical importance to understand the local population as
something considerably more positive than just the victims of violence, and a
potential ‘trouble spot’. Pouligny argues that peacekeepers must think of the people
that they encounter as ‘genuine actors, rethinking their situation and expressing
something about it’ (Pouligny 2006: 67). Local civil society actors may also be
highly trained in conflict resolution—not just its own cultural methods—but
through local NGOs devoted to conflict resolution. This takes us back to Lederach’s
point at the beginning of this chapter, where interveners ‘identify, validate and
support’ peace making processes, in the form of people and ‘cultural processes’ that
are rooted within the conflict setting (Lederach 1995: 220), reflected in a rich body
of work has looked to examine the interface between the ‘local’ and international in
wider peacebuilding frameworks (Richmond 2005). Cosmopolitan approaches to
peacekeeping also specifically look to incorporate concerns of ‘groups at the lower
or micro level of conflict’ (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005: 144).
Whilst identifying the potential of the local population as peacebuilders in their
own right, it is important to outline that military peacekeepers have had particular
difficulties in building sustainable relationships with the local populations in
post-conflict societies. Although there are positive developments in terms of
training which encourages locally led models of peacebuilding (to be seen further
on in this chapter), It is predominantly the difficulties that have influenced the
development of training in this area.
Challenges have been identified almost immediately as peacekeepers arrive.
Ammitzboel offers a description of the process that follows after the deployment of
a peacekeeping operation. With the deployment of the mission, the host population
have an initial ‘state of optimism’. What generally follows this is a ‘general state of
frustration’ as time passes, as the ‘livelihoods and living conditions of the local
people do not improve as expected or even deteriorate’ (Ammitzboell 2007: 70).
Pouligny notes how much of this could be down to the on-the-ground activities of
those involved in the operation, and argues that along with the influx of the ‘white
all-terrain vehicles’ and workers who occupy hotels and move around the towns,
are serious reservations from the local population who argue ‘we don’t see what
they are doing’ (Pouligny 2006: 108). She finds that:
…the resulting incomprehension was expressed in exactly the same terms: they are seen
‘running around everywhere in their big white cars’ or ‘travelling around’, but basically
‘They solve nothing’, ‘They do nothing’, ‘They just look around’ quite often impatience
also appears: ‘If it’s to find out about the situation, we don’t need them/there exist thou-
sands of findings and reports. Everybody knows what’s wrong in this country. Why spend
more money for that? (Pouligny 2006: 108).
This highlights a critical gap between expectation and reality pertaining to the
relationship between the civilian population and peacekeeping operation, which
permeates projects which are designed to bring benefits. For instance, relief projects
and ‘Quick Impact Projects’ (outlined in Chap. 3) are not met with undue support.
In fact, Poulingy finds that rather than giving peacekeepers credit for these projects,
‘people readily stressed that ‘if they [peacekeepers] had wanted, they could have
done so much more’ (Pouligny 2006: 117). As Rubenstein argues more generally,
the actions of the interveners are always ‘doubly meaningful’, with the intervener
maintaining his/her view on the issues and actions taken, and those who receive the
intervention making similar actions meaningful from ‘within their own experience
and cultural framework’ (Rubinstein 2005: 529). Such double meaning, in
Rubenstein’s view, leads to a gap in understanding.
This ‘double meaning’ becomes more pronounced when military peacekeepers
are placed under pressure in situations that, although tense, would not require a
traditional military response. Pouligny outlines one such situation from the
MINUSTAH operation in Haiti where the lack of response was seen in two totally
different lights:
When a battle broke out between two rival gangs, in a lower-class area of Ca Haitien… in
the north of the country, the blue-helmeted troops ‘had a few rocks thrown at them, so they
left. In reality they did not know how to control the situation’. For the senior officials of the
mission the reaction was in accordance with instruction: both soldiers and police were
supposed to avoid getting involved in that sort of event; they must simply watch to see that
things did not get worse, and for that reason they generally returned to the scene after the
event. For the inhabitants of the district, it was a sign of ill will and incompetence (Pouligny
2006: 111).
Linked to this is how military peacekeepers approach cultural differences in

deployment zones. More traditional approaches to civil-military relations with the
host population have been largely to provide ‘hardware’, defined as ‘civilian pro-
tection, the restoration of public utilities and the repair of roads and buildings’.
However movement towards ‘appropriate social policies to win the hearts and
minds of the host societies’ is deemed of equal importance (Soeters et al. 2004:
366). Rubenstein’s anthropological approach to peace operations notes that there
are two main concerns that drive militaries to develop cultural awareness through
increased training and education. Much of this work is directed towards
emphasising the need for interveners (in this case, the military) gaining a deeper
understanding of culture than the ‘surface’ meanings that are identified in training
manuals and pre-mission briefings. Rubenstein recognises the point in basic
briefings on cultural knowledge, insofar as they offer ‘useful recommendations’.
However, he argues that such briefings are seen as being akin to travellers’ advice:
although the information is useful on a base level, they ‘provide no generative
understanding that can be used to think through novel situations which interveners
inevitably face’ (Rubinstein 2005: 532). Rubenstein argues that in order to be fully
culturally aware, interveners must pay attention to the:
learned systems of meaning, transmitted through natural language and other symbol sys-
tems, having representational, directive, and affective functions, and capable of creating
cultural entities and particular senses of reality (Rubinstein 2005: 533).
Without sufficient attention being paid to the above, Rubenstein warns of the
danger of cultural simplification: that interveners can lead to an ‘assumption of
homogeneity’ for the host population, developing into a ‘uniform’ set of assump-
tions and expectations of the host population, how they will act, and how they will
understand and react to the intervention. The danger of this, is that interveners miss
the ‘great variation in the ways that culture is understood and enacted among people
within a society’ (Rubinstein 2005: 531).
Such simplification can manifest itself in a plethora of negative ways.
Rubenstein argues that a simplified approach towards culture existed amongst
Canadian forces deployed to the UNOSOM I force in Somalia in the early 1990s (in
particular, the Canadian Airborne Regiment). This lens, which viewed all Somali
teenagers as looters, led to all Somali teenagers caught stealing from the Canadian
camp being treated as such. This ‘looter’ frame of reference had ramifications on
how the youths were treated, and how ‘peacekeepers thought about these Somalis’
rights’. Ultimately, Rubenstein argues, this factor contributed to the torture and
murder of sixteen year old Shidane Abukar Arone, who was caught breaking into a
regimental compound of the Regiment in March 19933 (Rubinstein 2005: 531–
532). It was this event that led to the commissioning of a report into non-traditional
training for Canadian military peacekeepers. The report points out that for peace-
keepers themselves, a lack of understanding of the local population will increase
feelings of isolation and stress, and ‘contribute to the perception of surrounding
populations as ‘them,’ and thus possible antagonists’ (LaRose-Edwards et al. 1997:
52). Additionally, a lack of knowledge of the cultural context leads to ‘misreading
of individuals’ and groups’ intent’ as well as ‘a failure to recognize opportunities
for concessions, agreements, cease-fires, or other steps forward in peacekeeping
objectives’ (LaRose-Edwards et al. 1997: 52).
These simplifications and misunderstandings can also manifest themselves neg-
atively regarding the facilitation of ‘local ownership’ of peacebuilding processes.
3
This, according to the New York Times is one of the ‘most jarring episodes in recent Canadian
history’ http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/world/the-killing-of-a-somali-jars-canada.html,
accessed 18th August 2009.
UN policy on peacekeepers as early peacebuilders identifies that ‘fostering political

dialogue and conflict management at the local level’ is a key enabler in early
peacebuilding activities (UN 2010a, b: 3). Additionally the promotion of ‘national
and local ownership of the peace process in the host country’ is identified as an
essential factor in the success of a peacekeeping operation (UN 2016). However,
studies of local ownership and UN missions identify hesitancy on the UN’s part to
hand over ownership of projects to local partners. This has been put down to two
broad reasons. Firstly, a lack of confidence in the capabilities of partners to be able to
manage projects which require technical expertise and understanding of political
processes and institutional functions. Secondly, a lack of shared end-state, in par-
ticular a lack of trust that local actors share the ‘broadly liberal principles of the UN,
including democracy, free-market economic policies, and human rights, which are
perceived to be the surest form of protection against conflict recidivism’ (von
Billerbeck 2015: 302). This has left the UN institutionally in a situation where there
is a contradiction between its normative values towards local ownership, and its
operational effectiveness in engaging effectively with the host population.
Differing expectations of a mission, and a lack of cultural awareness therefore
manifest themselves in a variety of ways, bringing challenges to UN peacekeeping
operations. However, there are particular seismic events which expose many of the
challenges outlined above, but also uncover deeper uncomfortable truths about the
negative impacts that peacekeepers can bring to the local population.
Included in this would be the impacts of poor environmental awareness of
peacekeepers, which can have catastrophic consequences on the host population.
Take for instance the 2010 outbreak of Cholera in Haiti, which was attributed to
recently arrived MINUSTAH peacekeepers. The outbreak killed more than 8,000
people since and infected over 670,000, leading to protests against MINUSTAH’s
presence. Lemay-Herbért’s account of the hostility towards MINUSTAH noted that
after the outbreak, a 2011 survey Columbia University survey conducted in 2011
showed that 65 % of Haitians living in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince
would like MINUSTAH to leave within a year, while another survey conducted a
year later has 72.2 % holding similar opinion (Lemay-Hébert 2014: 206)
What also influenced the negative opinions towards MINUSTAH was a sig-
nificant number of allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by
MINUSTAH Personnel (Lemay-Hébert 2014: 205). This leads the chapter to
possibly the most obvious challenge that there is to UN peacekeepers effectively
being part of early stage peacebuilding.
High-publicity cases of SEA have tarnished the image of the UN in the past
(Independent 1994; Whitworth 2004). However, it was in 2001 where reports of
acts of SEA committed by UN personnel (including military, civilian and police) on
vulnerable members of the local population in a number of missions were leaked to
mainstream news outlets. A UNHCR investigation into the matter resulted in a
leaked report, which exposed the UN organisation to some of the most damaging
allegations it has received in modern times. In response, the Secretary General’s
office released a policy bulletin containing special measures for protection for SEA.
It opened by defining sexual exploitation as ‘any actual or attempted abuse of a
position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including,

but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual
exploitation of another’. The term ‘sexual abuse’ is defined as ‘the actual or
threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal
or coercive conditions’ (UN 2003: 1). Importantly, the policy introduced a ‘Zero
Tolerance’ policy towards SEA, which forbids sexual relations with any persons
under 18, prohibits Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex,
and strongly discourages relations with beneficiaries of assistances (UN 2003: 2).
However, allegations continued to surface in operations in the DRC, Haiti,
Burundi and Liberia (SCR 2006: 1–2), resulting in the Secretary General com-
missioning a much wider report into the allegations. The result was the publication,
‘A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in
United Nations peacekeeping operations’, more commonly known as the ‘Zeid
Report’.4 The Report outlines a wide range of negative consequences of acts of
SEA. In terms of the civil-military relationship, SEA ‘damages the image and
credibility of a peacekeeping operation and damages its impartiality in the eyes of
the local population’ (UN 2005: 9). Moreover, it outlines a key factor which has
important ramifications on how peacekeepers prepare for peacekeeping:
A consistent theme throughout the history of the Organization is the degree to which
peacekeeping personnel have often failed to grasp the dangers confronting them, seduced
by day-to-day conditions that can be viewed as benign. In other words, United Nations
peacekeeping personnel have often read normalcy into a situation that is far from normal.
And it is this inability on the part of many peacekeepers to discern the extent to which the
society is traumatized and vulnerable that is at the root of many of the problems addressed
in the present report. Peacekeeping is — and always will be — dangerous, demanding and
exceptional, and no participant should assume peacekeeping to be ‘normal’ (UN 2005: 2).
The report outlines a number of characteristics of peacekeeping deployments

which were brought to the attention of its authors, such characteristics are far from
the ‘normality’ of day-to-day life in peacetime (UN 2005: 10). It is into this
environment where peacekeepers arrive. According to the Report, it is the failure of
a number of peacekeepers to treat this environment as non-normal that leads to
them becoming involved in acts of SEA.
Since the Zeid Report, allegations have been made against UN peacekeepers.
A 2008 report by Save the Children UK found that troops associated with the
DPKO ‘were identified as a particular source of abuse’ in areas that were studied
(Csáky 2008: 8).5 Additionally, examples can be drawn from missions in Angola,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
East Timor, Eritrea, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Somalia
(Ferstman 2013: 3). The short and long term impacts on the victims of this is
4
After the author of the report, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein of Jordan.
5
Although the Report adds that certain operations will have a higher proportion of military
peacekeepers (and this may influence figures), areas with a more mixed representation of military,
civilian and police peacekeepers appeared to have higher allegations made against military
peacekeepers.
distressing enough, but the impacts on the wider dimensions of peacekeeping is best
summed up by Murphy:
The reality of prostitution and sexual exploitation in this context is all the more disturbing
as UN peacekeepers are supposed to facilitate a return to normality in a war-torn society
and not to breach the trust placed in it by the local population. The UN presence is intended
to protect those most vulnerable, not to exploit them (Murphy 2006: 531).
There is no exact science to human-human interactions. However, there are lines

which peacekeepers should not cross, in particular the boundaries encompasses by
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, the Geneva Conventions and
elaborated in the Zeid Report. Pouligny gives suggestions of what peacekeepers
should refrain from in a peacekeeping deployment:
[The peacekeeper] has to be aware that his behaviour in a foreign setting is assessed in
exactly the same way as if he was in his own village or district: as a ‘foreigner’ not
speaking a word of the local language, arriving in a big car driving at all sorts of speed,
splashing and running over those who had the misfortune to be in his way, breaking all the
laws of politeness and normal propriety, and beginning to flirt with his daughter and, in the
worst case, rape her (Pouligny 2006: 178).
Calls for increased understanding are incorporated into the Principles and
Guidelines, which warns of the possible side effects of a UN deployment. It states
that the size of a UN operation’s ‘human and material footprint is likely to have a
direct bearing on its impact, or perceived impact, in the community’, and that
negative impacts of a mission (which also includes poor driving and vehicle
accidents, and lax waste management practices) can ‘seriously undermine the
perceived legitimacy and credibility of a mission, and erode its popular support (UN
2008a–d: 81). From this, it asks that three impacts be kept in mind in planning.
Firstly, the social impact which involves sources of friction that result from different
cultural norms of mission staff and the population of the host population. Secondly,
that the economic impact is understood, in particular the driving up of local house
prices and accommodation, as well as the demands on local producers for staple
foods and materials (which could result in shortages for the local community). The
final aspect is the environmental impact, and the effects of poor waste management
and levels of water usage. Overarching this is the general rule that UN personnel
should be alert to any ‘potential, unforeseen or damaging consequences of their
actions’ and be prepared to manage such consequences (UN 2008a–d: 81).
5.4 The Desired Impact of Training on the Enhancement

of Civil-Military Relations
With this range of challenges, it is of little surprise that training is seen as an

essential step in effective relationship building. UN Agencies who coordinate
humanitarian affairs recommend that the military actively seek to understand the
complex network of humanitarian assistance, including local, national and
5.4 The Desired Impact of Training on the Enhancement … 95
international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. They urge the
military to understand what impact they have on the local actors and parties to the
conflict, arguing that military personnel must be made aware of the importance of
responsiveness towards local sensitivity and ‘adherence to the actuality and per-
ception of impartiality and independence’ whilst deployed in a peacekeeping
environment (IASC 2004: 6).
This comes through joint training between the military and civilian organisa-
tions, an approach which has often been outlined as a key component to improving
relations between military and humanitarian organizations (Gamba 1998: 10).
Troop contributors have reflected on the importance of training. In 1997, a
Canadian Military-funded study of non-traditional techniques of training for mili-
tary forces argued that awareness of cultural and functional variations of other
peacekeeping partners is of ‘key importance’ in the success of an operation. Their
report recommended that the Canadian military receive training ‘on dealing with
other military and civilian field partners, so as to increase Canadian ability to play a
role in enhancing unity of effort by all civilian-military components of a UN field
operation’ (LaRose-Edwards et al. 1997: 51).
The UN has reflected this in its own studies of integrated operations. The draft
Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the effectiveness of integrated
peacekeeping training in peacekeeping operations finds that there are areas that
cross over the traditional military/civilian boundaries. In order to address such
issues training is suggested which involve more than one component of a peace-
keeping operation:
Cross-cutting functions performed by more than one component such as DDR, Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and HIV/AIDS, and training and education in areas of single
or dual component specialization whose cross-cutting effects bear on other components,
such as the military’s Rules of Engagement affecting the freedom of movement of civilian
staff (OIOS 2007: 6).
Additionally, the UN-commissioned Report on Integrated Missions: Practical

Perspectives and Recommendations argues that common training is a valuable tool
‘for enabling better interoperability between conflicting organisational cultures’ and
offers a number of recommendations for the design of missions (Eide et al. 2005:
37). Importantly, these include the development of a common training framework
and on-the-ground training facilities (Eide et al. 2005: 41). This reaffirms notions
that coordination between civilian and military groups can be best formulated
through training programmes and the reliance on the ad hoc nature of engagement is
unreliable at best. However, the report finds that although the UN is taking steps in
the right direction, there must be more of a ‘buy in’ from the whole UN community.
Training has also been advised as a step forward in building relations with the
host population. Regarding an increased awareness of culture, Williams notes that
many of the problems that occurred in Bosnia and Somalia might have been
avoided if the forces that were deployed had better prepared for the cultural chal-
lenges which they encountered in the conflict zone. This led him to conclude that
peacekeeping forces ‘need to be made aware of local culture and norms of
behaviour’, and that there should be emphasis placed on the ‘importance of col-
laboration with civilians, both within missions and on their fringes’ (Williams 1998:
73). Duffey expands on this by arguing that intercultural skills are ‘essential tools in
any third party’s toolbox’. If such skills (which Duffey argues are closely related to
contact skills) are not developed, then peacekeepers will lack an understanding of
the conflict, including the ‘local conceptions of the conflict and cultural means for
resolving it’ (Duffey 2000a, b: 163). While the understanding of local cultures may
encourage peacekeepers to ‘build upon local resources’, or employ more sensitive
processes of intervention, Duffey argues that a result of a lack of such training
exacerbates the potential for cultural misunderstandings and undermines relations
with local populations.
In attempting to address instances of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, the UN has
rapidly sought to develop training programmes. Combating SEA by UN peace-
keepers is a multi-faceted task, with training identified as a key component in
reducing and preventing further incidents. Observers have argued that
pre-deployment training must be enhanced, and that the focus should be on human
rights, with issues related to gender, culture and SEA looked at from a ‘rights-based
approach’ (Kent 2007: 60). The policy to develop training has been reflected in UN
Security Council Resolutions. For instance, UNSCR 1820 (2008), which focussed
on the broader topic of sexual violence in conflict affected areas, requested the
Secretary General, in cooperation with the Security Council, Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations and its working group, as well as relevant states, to:
Develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humani-
tarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by
the Council to help them better prevent, recognise and respond to sexual violence and other
forms of violence against civilians (UN 2008a–d).
Moreover, the Zeid Report recommends that intensive training be organised by

the DPKO for peacekeepers arriving on missions as well as in-mission training for
troops. The report places obligations on troop contributing countries to ensure that
contingent commanders ‘are aware of their responsibility to ensure that their con-
tingents attend and receive such training prior to deployment’ (UN 2005: 18). Much
of this training should be aimed to convey the messages set out in the Secretary
General’s bulletin, as well as outlining the ‘importance that the Organization
attaches to the elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse’ (UN 2005: 18).
This is seen in missions. In the case of the MONUC mission in the DRC,
Security Council Resolution 1265 encouraged MONUC to ‘conduct training for
personnel targeted to ensure full compliance with its code of conduct regarding
sexual misconduct’ (UN 2004). A UN-commissioned lessons learned report into the
activities of the MONUC Office for Addressing SEA found that training is ‘the
most effective preventative measure against sexual exploitation and abuse’, rec-
ommending that train the trainer programmes be set up with the support of the UN
headquarters and Public Information Office (Dahrendorf 2006: 16). However, the
5.4 The Desired Impact of Training on the Enhancement … 97
attachment to responsibility at the level of contingent commander is critical.

A MONUC lessons-learned report found that the impact of training a contingent is
limited. Unless the responsibility goes up the command chain, little is achieved6:
A day after arriving in MONUC, a 120-member Formed Police Unit (FPU) was briefed by
the OASEA and the SRSG on sexual exploitation and abuse. All members including senior
officers attended the briefing session. That same day, and continuing for several weeks, a
number of FPU members used the services of a young man to procure prostitutes.
The OASEA investigation found that the Commanding Officer and his senior officers knew
that members of the FPU were visiting prostitutes but had failed to implement measures that
would have prevented their subordinates from engaging in such activities. The BOI con-
cluded that nine FPU members had engaged in activities prohibited by the Code of Conduct
and that the Commanding Officer had failed to exercise proper command and control. The
entire FPU was withdrawn by the Police Contributing Country (Dahrendorf 2006: 11).
This is an important reminder of the limitations of training in a peacekeeping

context, and is one of the issues that the book will return to in the concluding
chapter.
5.5 Training Implications
This section will now focus on examples of training practice, and how training has
developed in terms of military peacekeepers relating to civilian agencies, and local
partners. It will then look at an example of a civil-military relations course, run at
the UN Training School, Ireland (UNTSI). UNTSI has been the focal point of the
Irish Defence Forces’ effort to standardise preparation for peacekeeping operations,
and runs courses for the Defence Forces, as well as International partners. Courses
include the International Civil-Military Relations Course (the focus of this chapter),
the International Peace Support Operations Course, Pre-Deployment Briefings for
Defence Forces personnel due to deploy in UN operations, the International Human
Rights Course, and an International Protection of Civilians Course (UNTSI 2016).
5.6 Training for Relations with NGO’s
As the chapter outlines, there exists a considerable degree of material which has
sought to define, critique, and refine the relationship between military and civilian
actors. This has led to advances in training, particularly regarding increasing mil-
itary personnel’s understanding of who civilian agencies are, and what they may be
aiming to achieve. Training exercises organised through African Civil Military
Coordination (ACMC) programme are pertinent here. The ACMC was a
6
OASEA—Office for Addressing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation; BOI—Board of Inquiry; FPU—
Formed Police Unit.
collaboration between a number of African-based Peacekeeping Training Institutes,

and ran between 2004 and 2006, conducting regional courses in civil military
coordination, as well as courses for female peacekeepers, and in-mission courses for
the UNMEE, MONUC, AMIS, and UNMIS7 missions.
The first example from the ACMC is a training exercise that asks participants to
respond to a request from a humanitarian organisation which is known to maintain a
strict policy of independence from military actors. The exercise is outlined in
Box 5.1:
Box 5.1: Civil military relations exercise: Principles and Guidelines.

Source: De Coning (2007: 293–294)
This exercise is taking place at Battalion level. You are deployed in North
Kivu as part of MONUC. You are in the Battalion Commander’s senior staff
08h00 morning briefing.
The Civil-Military Liaison Officer (CMLO) informs the meeting of the
following request:
Yesterday afternoon I had a meeting with Monique Reckson of Médecins
sans Frontière (MSF)-Holland. She informed me that they operate two mobile
clinics. These are essentially ambulances that visit all the villages along the
main road between X and Y on a fixed schedule. As you are aware, the heavy
rains over the past week have caused several mudslides and the road is
completely blocked just before the bridge at K. As a result, MSF have not
been able to visit the villages beyond K for the past four days.
Yesterday morning a number of villagers from M, which lies approxi-
mately 6 km beyond K, arrived here on foot and informed MSF that many
people at M and surrounding villages are suffering from diahorea and that
three children have already died. MSF suspects an outbreak of cholera. MSF
have been unable to reach M to make an assessment of the seriousness of the
situation because of the mudslides at K, and have asked for our assistance.
They have asked us if we can use one of our amphibian APCs to ferry four of
their staff and equipment across the river. They would like to cross the river
before 11h00 today and return at around 16h00.
As you know, MSF does not normally approach us with such requests as
they have a very strict policy of neutrality and impartiality. It must have taken
quite a bit of discussion for them to have even approached us with this
request. Monique explained that it is important for them not to be associated
to closely with the UN and especially the military peacekeepers, because they
want to maintain their independence from us.
7
UNMEE—UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea; MONUC—United Nations Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unites en République
démocratique du Congo); AMIS—African Union Mission in Sudan; UNMIS—UN Mission in the
Sudan.
5.6 Training for Relations with NGO’s 99
They have thus indicated that they would not want to travel with us to K.
They will make their own way and meet us at K at a pre-arranged time. They
have asked us to have a minimum military presence at the river crossing, and
suggested that we should preferably have only the one APC and crew pre-
sent. And they have asked that the APC and crew be unarmed, as their SOPs
do not allow them to travel in a vehicle with weapons.
The task here for participants is to discuss how best to respond to the request
(bearing in mind the guidance they follow as UN peacekeepers), and also to con-
sider the implications of the different possible scenarios. This encourages personnel
to understand not just the ‘correct’ course of action, but to additionally reflect on the
impacts of the actions on relationship building with the civilian actor.
Further exercises in the African Civil Military Coordination Programme seek to
build on this, by encouraging participants to role-play humanitarian actors. For
instance, in the exercise on ‘Joint Planning’, one participant is given the
following role:
You are the CIMIC Officer at the Force HQ of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB).
You have an idea to make use of CIMIC patrols to gather humanitarian information, such as
basic demographics, humanitarian needs, and so on. In order to present your idea to the
meeting you have invited various UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs to a meeting (De
Coning 2007: 297–303).
Other participants are invited to play the role of representatives from different
civilian agencies, including the United Nations International Children’s Emergency
Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme, Oxfam International, Medicinés Sans
Frontiérs (MSF), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Importantly, each different representative has different motivations, expectations,
and attitudes towards how the relationship with the military should be built. For
instance, whereas the Oxfam representative is asked to suggest that the military
‘count the number of people who are using mosquito nets, and ask that numbers be
reported per village of people that need mosquito nets’ (De Coning 2007: 306), the
representatives from MSF and the ICRC are asked to argue strongly that the mil-
itary is not used to gather humanitarian data. Of course, the roles are fictitious, but
the exercise introduces the concept that not all civilian organisations are the same,
and that there is a range of opinions as to what military peacekeepers can and
should do. In addition, it encourages participants, through scenario-based role-play,
to understand the views and perspectives of others.
In the UN context, the development of civil-military relations with NGOs in UN
peacekeeping training programmes offer an illustration as to the changing percep-
tions of the civil military relationship, moving from strict definitions to a more
‘fluid’ state of affairs.
Earlier models of UN training, through the now-replaced Standard Generic
Training Materials (SGTM) outlined civil-military coordination mechanisms as
being to ‘facilitate coordination, support, joint planning and the constant exchange
of information’ (UN 2006: 4). The key roles for military peacekeepers within this
would be to ‘provide a safe and secure environment’ (UN 2006: 3–4), as well as be
prepared to exchange information, be it through meetings, written or electronic
communication or joint operation centres (UN 2006: 7). Although both are critical
to the success of the operation, they did not offer a wide range of possibilities for
effective civil-military relations. These tasks were set within a wider context that
could indicate that the SGTM was set within restricted boundaries. This can be seen
through identified local and national partners. The importance of coordinating with
‘official partners’ was highlighted, particularly between the UN mission and other
‘international, bilateral and NGO components’, and between the mission ‘local
Government/Administration and the parties to the conflict’ (UN 2006: 1). Here,
importance was attached to the ‘traditional’ structures within a post-conflict envi-
ronment. On an international level, there was reference to the international and
bilateral providers as well as NGOs. On a local level, there was emphasis on the
local authorities and government, as well as parties to the conflict, but no emphasis
on local groups that were not belligerent groups, or active political groups outside
of governance structures.
Significant development has come through the introduction of the Core Pre
Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) in 2009, which have broadened the role of
the military in terms of coordination. They do this by using case studies which
illustrate the links between effective coordination between military and political
components and the ability of the operation to fully carry out its peacebuilding
functions (UN 2009a–e: 50). The CPTMs also outline current UN thinking on
pursuing positive as well as negative peace, through arguing that the success of
peacekeeping missions is ‘measured by more than just the absence of conflict’ and
that the ‘reestablishment and development of strong institutions and respect for the
rule of law are also important conditions for success’. This is further underlined by
the CPTMs’ argument that the building of such institutions cannot be achieved
‘through the threat, or use, of military force alone’ (UN 2009a–e: 48).
The UN CPTMs attempt to foster a better understanding of the humanitarian
community, and introduce the military audience to recognise the consequences of
their actions on civilian agencies. The CPTM Unit 3 (Part 2) entitled Working with
Mission Partners begins by acknowledging that some humanitarian organisations
will feel that their principles of impartiality and neutrality will be ‘jeopardized’ if
they are too closely associated with the military component, or the UN operation as
a whole. Because of this, the CPTM states that it is important to recognise the
independence of humanitarians, ‘respect their principles and be sensitive to their
approach in remaining neutral and impartial’ (UN 2009a–e: 102). It also makes
clear the role of the UN peacekeeping mission, and its military components:
UN peacekeeping operations… are generally not humanitarian actors themselves although
they may provide a secure and stable environment which allows other humanitarian actors
to carry out activities (UN 2009a–e: 102).
5.6 Training for Relations with NGO’s 101
To reinforce this, the CPTMs propose an exercise for participants to discuss

issues of mission leadership. This is done through an organised panel discussion
where speakers—ideally two or three ‘persons who have recently held various
higher positions in a UN peacekeeping operation’—present their experiences and
are asked questions from participants (UN 2009a–e: 66). Although this does not
encompass an elicitive approach, it does offer some flexibility in the prescriptive
based approach that UN training offered through the SGTMs.
5.7 Training for Relations with Expectations

of the Host Population
Perhaps the most significant development in UN training is in programmes which

recognise the importance of the host population and institutions in the development
of a peace process. Importantly, the CPTM outlining ‘Fundamental principles of
UN Peacekeeping’ notes that this involves reaching out to all parts of the country,
and ‘not just those in power or those with guns’ (UN 2009a–e: 55). Following on
from this, the module asks that peacekeepers consult all parts of the local com-
munity to decipher factors for success. While peacekeeping has often been subject
to the robust critique that argues that operations only look towards the traditional
sources of power, the module recognises the importance of other groups.
It is important that peacekeeping personnel talk to all parts of society about what their needs
are and how the mission’s work can improve their lives. This means local officials, but also
non-governmental organizations, different political parties, women’s associations, youth
and student groups. All opinions need to be heard and understood (UN 2009a–e: 56).
It also argues that the promotion of national and local ownership will be critical
in the development of consent for the mission, stating that operations which have
worked with local actors on the ground have ‘built a solid relationship’ with them,
which in turn has facilitated the handover of the peacebuilding tasks to the host
population (UN 2009a–e: 56). Here again the CPTMs reflect UN policy on
peacebuilding mandates, and the ‘bigger picture’ of pursuing positive aspects of
peace in its operations. This is illustrated through a case study of the MINUSTAH
operation in Haiti, which worked alongside residents in cleaning large rubbish piles
in the Bel Air Neighbourhood (the rubbish piles were being used as barricades by
armed gangs). The joint ownership of the project, in the view of the CPTMs, led to
a building trust and consent from the local population (UN 2009a–e: 56).
The CPTMs further make this point in another Unit, entitled ‘Working with
mission partners’, which further underlines the importance of working with all
actors within the host population and not just the host government.8 It states that
8
Although this is qualified by the module stating that the host government is ‘by far the most
important non-UN actor with whom a peacekeeping mission collaborates’, as it ‘has the most to
lose’.
regular dialogue must be maintained with religious leaders, women and student
associations, academics, professional organisations and other parts of the civil
society. As a result of this consultation, peacekeepers ‘can get to understand the
society in which they are working, and support them to ensure the sustainability of
the peace’ (UN 2009a–e: 96–97). In terms of longer-term peacebuilding, such
partnerships are promoted as being essential for the success of the peacekeeping
operation, as well as offering a significant example of how the UN is aiming to
consult a much wider range of groups to facilitate a positive transformation from
negative into positive peace. Again, this can relate to Fetherston’s assertion that
peacekeeping operations can play a critical role in setting a conducive atmosphere
for longer term peacebuilding to take place, by ‘coordination of local level reso-
lution processes’ (Fetherston 1994: 157).
5.8 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
UN policy attaches high value in training as one of the key ways in which to
address the prevalence of SEA amongst deployed military personnel, with training
programmes seen as a key aspect of the UN’s ‘prevention’ strategy (alongside
awareness-raising, and ‘preventative measures’). The UN CPTMs therefore incor-
porate added emphasis on addressing SEA. As well as outlining the definitions of
misconduct, the SEA module asks peacekeepers to understand a number of issues
surrounding cases of SEA. It asks soldiers to look at three key questions:
What makes members of the host community vulnerable?
What does differential power mean in the peacekeeping context?
Why is it important that trust is not abused?
The answer to the first question highlights the need for peacekeepers to be aware
of the prevalence of a ‘collapsed community’ with a lack of awareness of rights and
obligations amongst the population, a history of unequal power relations and a
‘prevalence of gender-based violence’ (UN 2009a–e: 23). In relation to what dif-
ferential power means, peacekeepers are pointed to an imbalance between eco-
nomic, social or educational status, a dependence by one on the assistance of
another to sustain living, and one being in a position of authority over the other.
Such a scenario is common in a peacekeeping environment. Finally, the answers to
why it is important not to abuse trust are examined. The three reasons given by the
CPTM here are that it further victimises vulnerable people, it violates the human
rights of victims, and it disrupts families and communities. This goes into much
more depth than previous UN training and through offering a context to the conflict
zone into which peacekeepers are deployed it provides a much wider base of
knowledge for the peacekeepers (UN 2009a–e: 23–24).
As well as the questions noted above, the CPTM also offers a degree of
participant-led learning through encouraging group work and discussions. In this
case, participants are invited to discuss (in small groups) examples of SEA that
5.8 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 103
occur in their home county or in peacekeeping missions. Although a small part of

the overall module—which is very much based on disseminating information—this
again offers participants a chance to use their implicit knowledge and gained
experience to inform the training session (UN 2009a–e: 3).
The training module then offers a number of case study examples to test
peacekeepers on what they believe to be ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in scenarios where
SEA may be taking place. For each scenario, peacekeepers are asked four
questions:
(a) Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse a position of vulnera-
bility for sexual purposes?
(b) Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse differential power for
sexual purposes?
(c) Has the UN personnel in this scenario actually or attempted to abuse trust, for
sexual purposes?
(d) Does this scenario constitute prohibited act(s)?
(e) Which uniform standards on sexual exploitation and abuse have been vio-
lated? List as many as apply9 (UN 2009a–e: 46).
Peacekeepers are given seven scenarios to examine. While some scenarios are
more straightforward, others may fall into slightly more grey areas. The two
highlighted examples in the box below illustrate this.
Box 5.2: Example questions in Conduct and Discipline Unit of

UN CPTM. Source: UN (2009a–e: 51–52)
Example 3: Carlos, a military commander posted in the southern district, has
helped set up a boys’ soccer club in the town where his national contingent is
deployed. Carlos enjoys the soccer games, but he particularly enjoys the
access the club gives him to local adolescents. He gives presents (magazines,
candy, sodas, pens) to various boys in exchange for sexual acts. He thinks
there’s nothing wrong with this, since the boys like the presents he gives
them.
Example 5: Josie is an adolescent refugee in one of the camps. Pieter, one
of the food distribution staff, who works for WFP, has offered to giver her a
little extra during the distribution if she will be his “special friend”. She
agrees willingly. Both of them agree that they should start a sexual rela-
tionship and neither one of them think that anything is wrong. Josie hopes
that the relationship will be a passport to a new life in another country, and
Pieter does nothing to discourage these hopes.
All questions apart from ‘(e)’ require yes/no answers.

9
The questions are set to demonstrate that there are many different contexts in
which acts of SEA can take place. This is also reinforced the answers for questions
a–d in all seven examples given (including the two examples above) being ‘yes’.
Additionally, the CPTM also refers to the impact that SEA has on the rela-
tionship between the peacekeepers and the local population. One of the stated
‘dramatic’ consequences is
The duty and care of the peacekeepers appears to be a vain statement. People talk about
impunity and the failure of the UN to take responsibility for the suffering of victims of such
acts (UN 2009a–e: 33).
This overshadows the efforts of peacekeeping missions to ‘address the very

critical political issues faced by the mission’, a theme that runs throughout the
overall training programme.
Additionally, the CPTM module on human rights in peacekeeping operations is
strongly worded on the importance of peacekeepers avoiding any activity that is
linked to SEA. It states that ‘under no circumstances can peacekeeping personnel be
involved in sexual violence or exploitation of women, children or the local popu-
lation in any way’, and that the power imbalance often seen in peacekeeping
environments between the peacekeepers and host population must be used ‘to do
good’, by ‘supporting dignity and equality between women and men, as the UN
Charter states you should’. Linking this into the relationship with the local popu-
lation, the CPTM states that the behaviour for peacekeepers can have ‘far reaching
impacts’ on the success of operations, and the exploitation of women or children
can ‘call into question the legitimacy of the whole peacekeeping operation’ (UN
2009a–e: 11).
Looking at SEA training, it is clear that a prescriptive approach to learning is
apparent. This is no surprise, as the key goal is to ensure that all personnel who
undertake the CPTMs in this area are given the information in the most unam-
biguous way possible.
5.9 Putting Training into Practice: The UN Training

School, Ireland
The UN Training School Ireland (UNTSI) offers a good example of the mixing of
classroom instruction and simulation in terms of developing training for
civil-military relations, through the annual UNTSI International Tactical CIMIC
Course. The course, aimed at Irish Defence Forces and international personnel, is
run over a three-week period, of which the first two weeks are devoted to
class-based lectures and exercises, and the third week an exercise.
The first two weeks cover a wide range of topics, including skills that would be
seen in the conflict resolution field such as negotiation, mediation, and cultural
awareness. The first week introduces approaches to civil-military cooperation for the
military, incorporating differing approaches (NATO and UN), cross-governmental
5.9 Putting Training into Practice: The UN Training School, Ireland 105
strategies, personal protection, protection of civilians, and pertinent UN strategies

(such as UNSCR 1325). Week two of the course incorporates increased focus on the
civilian agencies of the UN, as well as UN humanitarian principles and guidelines.
These two weeks allow participants the opportunity to gain the knowledge of what
constitutes appropriate action within deployment, examples of good and bad prac-
tice, and the necessary laws and regulations that cover conduct in a peacekeeping
operation (with a particular focus on civil-military relations).
Predominantly this is a prescriptive form of learning, where ‘experts’ with
experience or expertise in each field will lecture course participants. In turn, space
for reflection and discussion is opened up. Discussion about these concepts was
helped as a number of participants and trainers on the CIMIC course had experience
of deployment in UN-led operations (particularly in Liberia and Lebanon), and
were able to offer their viewpoints.
Box 5.3: List of learning outcomes from 2014 UNTSI International

CIMIC Course programme instruction.10 Source: UNTSI (2014: 11)
• Peacekeeping today
• Introduction to CIMIC
• The Comprehensive Approach
• Protection of Civilians
• The United Nations
• NATO and PRTs
• UN Security Council Resolution 1325
• Village assessments
• Mediation and negotiation
• First aid
• Personal protection
• International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights, Sexual and Gender
Based Violence, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
• Religion and Religious Leader Engagement
• CMCoord
• International Committee of the Red Cross, and Medicines Sans Frontiers
• Cultural Awareness
• Working with the media.
The third week of the course, entitled Exercise Mission Point is a

week-long-scenario-based exercise, with course participants being ‘deployed’ at a
Defence Forces Camp in the Wicklow Mountains. The physical relocation of course
10
Here, it should be noted that UNTSI’s course (like many other of its type) is in a constant state of
evolution, to ensure that new trends, doctrine, and guidance pertaining to the civil-military rela-
tionship are captured.
participants from the Training School to a more remote area complements the
scenario, which sees participants deployed with the ‘United Nations Mission in
Leinster’ (UNMIL). The scenario is explained in Box 5.4.
Box 5.4: Exercise Mission Point. Source: UNTSI (2014: 32–39)

UN Mission in Leinster (UNMIL) deployed in Leinster, a province of the
country Hibernia, where the main ethnic group is Gael.
Leinster itself is comprised of three ethnic groups: The Majority Gael, and
two minority groups Lavian (15 %) and Athian (10 %). The only recorded
incident of inter-ethnic conflict was ‘Battle of Timolin’ in 1742, where Athian
and Gael joined forces to defeat the Lavians.
The 2010 economic downturn had severely damaging effect on Leinster, in
particular, the county of Wicklow. Lack of money and funding from central
government resulted in militant extremists (predominantly Lavians) taking
over the day-to-day running of all local government in Wicklow. Local
police, confined to urban areas were unable to influence activity in rural areas.
The Prime Minister of Hibernia ordered military units to deploy to
Wicklow. The Chairman of Wicklow County Council, Jim Murphy (Lavian)
then declared himself to be the only local political and military authority in
the county, claiming that Lavians had been persecuted by Athians and Gaels.
Additionally, the Wicklow Reserve Defence Militia (WRDM), in support of
Murphy, occupied towns and villages, setting up checkpoints on main roads.
A small conflict between the central government and WRDM led to an
uneasy ceasefire being declared. In turn, this led to the ‘Colbinstown
Agreement’, which created a Zone of Separation between fighting forces, the
return of over 2000 IDPs to their home, and the deployment of the ‘United
Nations Mission in Leinster’.
Course participants are split into small UNMIL CIMIC groups, and are tasked at
the beginning of each day to undertake ‘typical’ duties of the civil-military coor-
dination cell in a UN peacekeeping deployment. This would involve meeting with
protagonists in the conflict, the wider UN agencies, and humanitarian organisations.
In the scenario, all of these roles are role-played by Masters-level students from a
partner University (who play the civilian and humanitarian organisations), and
members of the Irish Defence Forces (who role-play key protagonists).11
During the week, a number of themes inform meetings. These include flows of
internally displaced people, the construction of IDP camps, negotiation regarding
freedom of movement for humanitarian supplies, and coordination with protago-
nists and civilian agencies concerning the return of ‘prisoners’, taken during hos-
tilities. Each CIMIC group would use meetings to gain agreement, and exchange
information. Information gathered in meetings would be taken back to the military
Findings here are taken from field notes from research visit to UNTSI in November 2014.
11
5.9 Putting Training into Practice: The UN Training School, Ireland 107
headquarters, and shared with other CIMIC groups, as well as those roleplaying the
mission command.
Additionally, and importantly in this analysis, each CIMIC group would be
assigned a mentor, who would observe the CIMIC group’s actions during their
tasks. At the end of each meeting, the mentor would take the group to one side, and
ask a series of questions. The first set of questions would be ‘in-role’, focusing on
the scenario, the information the group received in meetings, and what they would
do with that information. For the second set of questions, participants were asked to
come ‘out of role’, to reflect on the meeting, and the level to which their interactions
with protagonists/agencies influenced the building of relationships, and in turn, the
overall process of early-stage peacebuilding.
This process effectively leads to three different forms of learning for course
participants. Firstly, participants were able to refine their ‘Generic problem solving
skills’. Such ‘problems’ would be activities such as setting up systems to ensure the
regular passing of information amongst teams, having to deal with impromptu
roadblocks set up by belligerent groups, and reacting to unforeseen events. Course
participants were often quick in identifying and responding to such challenges, due
mainly to the wealth of previous experience and training they accrued through their
individual careers.
Secondly, course participants were able to match the theory that had been taught
during the first two weeks to the reality of the scenario, defined as ‘CIMIC—related
skills’. This is an understanding of the range of issues involved in CIMIC, in
particular applying knowledge from the first two weeks of the course, identifying
who does what, and identifying the boundaries of when the military could act, when
the military should act, and when the military need not act. This meant that at times
there was further complexity, as what at first would appear to be the easiest solution
would end up being (for one reason or another) not the most appropriate solution.
This was where the strength of having role-players was obvious, as it illustrated that
CIMIC was a process with multiple stakeholders, each with their own interpretation
of what should and should not be done in the deployment zone.
Finally, course participants were able to develop deeper skills, more akin to
Fetherston’s ‘contact skills’. Here, participants learned how their actions as third
party interveners affect relationships in conflict zone with stakeholders in the peace
process. In particular, gaining awareness of how actions/approaches may have
longer-term impact on relations and opportunities to build trust/foster spirit of
peacebuilding,12 reflecting Rubenstein’s approaches to ‘double meaning’ outlined
above. This form of learning brought together the two areas identified above,
mixing traditional approaches to problem solving, plus an evolving knowledge of
12
This micro-level peacebuilding has been reflected in conflict resolution literature—for instance,
Fetherston argues that ‘Co-ordinating peacekeeping at the micro-level at least begins the
groundwork of what might be called a ‘pre-resolution’ or a ‘pre-peacebuilding’ phase. This has
taken the form of coordination of local level resolution processes, either at the initiative of local
people or at the initiative of the peacekeepers’—(Fetherston, A.B., Towards a Theory of United
Nations Peacekeeping. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).
the CIMIC process. However, the third layer of complexity—that of relationship

building—was at times less obviously noted amongst participants as they reflected
on experiences of meetings and events, but was teased out at times by the mentors
assigned to groups. This reflective learning is more time-intensive, as it asks the
participants to come ‘out of role’ for a set time, in order to reflect on the impact
(both positive and negative) that they may have had on wider processes of
peacebuilding. One positive example may indicate this point: Whilst observing the
debrief of a CIMIC team who had met the UNMIL civilian component, the mentor
asked open questions of the group, offering them a chance to reflect on the meeting.
Members of the CIMIC team, who had earlier in the week had a problematic
meeting with civilian agencies, took to this line of questioning well. In response,
they explored how they may have approached other meetings had this one came
earlier in the week, focussing in particular on the conduct of meetings, and dif-
ferences between military and civilian approaches.
What the third area also demonstrates is an elicitive form of learning, based more
on the implicit knowledge of the participants as opposed to the explicit knowledge
of the trainer. The open questions from the mentor during the debrief, aligned with
the mentor ‘facilitating’ conversation (as opposed to pointing out what was right
and what was wrong) offered value to the process. Admittedly, this relies to some
extent on the group dynamics of the participants, but as the participants had been
through two weeks of the course, they felt comfortable reflecting on their own role
in processes of peacebuilding, be it positive or negative. The elicitive approach seen
in Exercise Mission Point can be applied to Robert Rubenstein’s understanding of
how culture is understood in peacekeeping training. As suggested above,
Rubenstein argues that significant effort needs to be placed on emphasising the need
for interveners (in this case, the military) gaining a deeper understanding of culture
than the ‘surface’ meanings that are identified in training manuals and pre-mission
briefings. Whereas the first two learning experiences in the exercise (problem
solving skills, and CIMIC related skills) built on the ‘rules’, it was learning and
reflection in the third area which allowed participants to understand deeper issues
related to relationship building, beyond the ‘rules’ of what is and is not appropriate.
5.10 Conclusions
As outlined earlier in the book, peacekeeping has an identified role in establishing a

secure environment for wider processes of transformation. However, when this is
boiled down to the activities of those deployed in operations, there are significant
challenges in achieving this broader framework. These challenges—be it interaction
between military and civilian organisations, or the military and the local population
—consistently re-appear throughout missions. What can be seen is that training
programmes are adapting to account for the challenges of closer integration in both
the breadth of topics in training for civil-military relations, and the approaches as to
how these topics are introduced into training.
5.10 Conclusions 109
In terms of topics, training for civil-military relations has evolved, with training
programmes now incorporating a much wider range of principles, ideas and issues
at the heart of peacekeeping operations. Role-play based exercises undertaken
through the African Civil Military Cooperation programme indicate this, with
personnel being asked to assume a range of NGOs, each with differing approaches
to how they relate with military actors. Additionally, the development from the
SGTM to the CPTM shows evolution in the United Nations. The SGTMs focus on
civil-military cooperation was based on a minimal role for the military, centred
mainly around information sharing and providing security in the conflict zone.
Whilst the CPTM sees these as important, they open up the role of civil-military
cooperation to a larger interpretation and expand on the roles for the military. In
terms of who the ‘civilians’ are in this civil-military interface, the CPTMs have
broadened to incorporate interaction with all parts of the host population, and not
just bilateral donors, UN agencies and the host government. The CPTMs espouse
the values of local and national ownership in processes, as well as asking peace-
keepers not to consult only with ‘those in power or those with guns’. Additionally,
It is significant that there is development in programmes aimed to raise awareness
of the impacts of SEA by peacekeeping personnel. These programmes are of critical
importance to civil-military relations as they address areas which have a huge
impact on the civilian acceptance of a peacekeeping operation.
Moreover, evidence of elicitive approaches is becoming apparent in the models
of training delivery. Prescriptive approaches still dominate, and are mainly used
where training modules offer ‘policy’ and guidelines of what is acceptable and not
acceptable in terms of the expectations of the military. Here, for instance, one
would look towards the first two weeks of UNTSI training course, which offers a
clear set of assumptions and guidelines to be ‘trained’ to soldiers before deploy-
ment. However, there is room to manoeuvre within the prescriptive approach. The
CPTMs leave room for participant led discussion and learning. Each CPTM has an
opportunity for participants to reflect on the issues that are identified, providing
space for group work. The CPTM modules covering SEA as well as coordination of
UN agencies are good examples here. Although this is not the fully elicitive
approach espoused by Lederach, it offers a slightly more flexible model of a pre-
scriptive approach. While the majority of knowledge comes from the module (and
the trainer who is delivering it), there exists room for participants to reflect.
The addition of elicitive approaches to learning have been identified in the UN
Training School, Ireland, which has used models of mentor-led facilitation to tease
out responses to conflict and relationship building. Through bringing military
personnel ‘out of role’ within the role-play context, course participants were able to
reflect on their abilities to build relationships, and the extent to which they influence
conflict for the better, and the worse. The increasing uses of elicitive frameworks
for training military peacekeepers links with concepts over the identity of military
peacekeepers into the future. The following chapter will discuss this further.
Moving towards a more reflective approach may also have broader effects on the
debate over local ownership. Concluding her study of the UN’s challenges in
operationalizing the normative commitment to facilitating local ownership of peace
process (noted above), Billerbeck argues that the UN has a choice, where it may
either prioritize normative objectives by embracing the version of local ownership
‘which emphasizes broad and substantive inclusion, but then must accept that
outputs and liberalization may come about slowly’, or prioritize operational
objectives where the UN cedes very little ownership to local actors (von Billerbeck
2015: 312). Arguably, an elicitive approach with an increased focus on groups that
do not find their voice through being a party to the conflict or being a major political
party could reinforce a strengthening of the normative value of promotion of local
ownership, which incorporates a locally led approach to peacebuilding. This would
strengthen the UN’s legitimacy as a third party intervener, and complement cos-
mopolitan approaches to peacekeeping.
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Part III
Looking Ahead
Chapter 6
Towards the Military Conflict Resolution
Practitioner?
So far, this book has made the case that there is a continued requirement for skills
and theory drawn from the conflict resolution field to be incorporated into training
programmes for military peacekeepers. This is predominantly in three areas. Firstly,
in skills needed for peacekeeping. Negotiation, cultural awareness, understanding
needs, and communication skills are all areas where the conflict resolution literature
has made significant inroads. The necessity to develop and maintain training pro-
grammes in these areas has been identified to assist peacekeepers in a range of
activities, from the day-to-day interaction between actors in a post-conflict envi-
ronment, through to the potentially volatile situations that peacekeepers find
themselves in when encountering armed groups.
The second area is through using concepts of conflict resolution theory to help
peacekeepers understand their role as agents of peacebuilding. This is not to say
that as soon as peacekeepers arrive, they are automatically seen as bringers of
peace. What this book argues is that models of training exist which asks military
personnel to understand their impact on wider processes of relationship building.
Such impacts can be positive, for instance in communicating and coordinating
actions with civilian partners and local actors. They can also be negative, through
damaging actions ranging from miscommunication and other actions that impinge
the civil-military relationship, to significantly harmful actions such as exploitation
and abuse. Through using training programmes to impart the importance of the
overall process of conflict resolution in post conflict environments, military
peacekeepers will have a higher possibility that they understand the bigger picture,
their role within it, and the impact their actions have.
Finally, the third area is related to ‘how’ military personnel are trained to
understand the skills and wider picture necessary in peacekeeping. Here, there are
signs of an emergence of Lederach’s elicitive approach in training programmes for
military peacekeeping activity. This is important in two ways. Firstly, as it provides
a suitable approach to get military personnel to understand their role in broader
processes of conflict resolution and relationship building in post conflict environ-
ments. Secondly, through using this method, it indicates to military peacekeepers
116 6 Towards the Military Conflict Resolution Practitioner?
that they have a role in conflict resolution processes, and are more than purely
‘boots on the ground’. If military personnel are to be a part of UN peacekeeping and
peacebuilding efforts in post conflict environments, then there is a necessity that
training treats them to some degree as conflict resolution practitioners. This could
be why Wolfgang Dietrich classifies them as ‘peace workers’ in his assessment of
the role of elicitive training (Dietrich 2013).
This chapter will look at what this may mean for military personnel, arguing that
there exists a move amongst some militaries towards making their personnel more
attuned to the tasks associated with peacekeeping. It will then argue that although
there has been a series of positive developments, there are significant challenges in
integrating a conflict resolution perspective into the identity of military peace-
keepers. This may therefore necessitate discussion to move onto wider structural
considerations as to how peacekeeping is approached at state and international
levels.
6.1 The Soldier Diplomat and Strategic Corporal:

Towards Growing Acceptance of Conflict Resolution
Practitioners in the Military?
As said at the beginning of this book, there has long been reluctance from within
the military to understand peacekeeping as a military activity. Either peacekeeping
has been seen as a job too much divorced from standard military practice, or
alternatively, a well-trained military officer would naturally have the skills to be a
good peacekeeper. However, military establishments are beginning to agree that
military personnel should be trained for peacekeeping roles. Importantly, this leads
onto new definitions of how one should perceive a trained military peacekeeper.
This section takes as its starting point Deborah Goodwin’s suggestion that ‘the
modern world is witnessing a revival of the role of the soldier-diplomat in the
military operational context’. This type of soldier is a product of the operational
context into which militaries are being deployed, and according to Goodwin:
Needs to possess and display a multiplicity of responses within a conflict zone, ranging
from ‘traditional’ outright warfare (where there is a complete negation of negotiation) to a
seemingly antithetical skill in the form of negotiation (where armed conflict is avoided).
Such a range of response creates a complex decision-making context for the modern soldier
(Goodwin 2005: xvii).
Goodwin outlines a number of characteristics (mainly found in UN mandates),

which have influenced the need to develop junior soldiers into more ‘rounded’ ones.
These include the ‘inclusion of non-combative imperatives’, new and varied rules
of engagement, and stress on the ‘the relevance and importance of negotiation,
enquiry, mediation and conciliation as preferred ways to resolve disputes’
(Goodwin 2005: xvii). The result of this complex mix of characteristics is to create
a ‘complex decision making environment’ for the soldier.
6.1 The Soldier Diplomat and Strategic Corporal: Towards … 117
This complex-decision making environment informs much of Byrne’s article on

the development of the ‘strategic corporal’ in the Irish Defence Forces Review.
Reflecting on the ‘constabulary role’ of the Irish soldier, Byrne suggests that such a
soldier is expected to have a great deal more than the traditional proficiency in
fighting wars, but also be capable of providing humanitarian aid and performing a
‘wide range of other activities relating to order and stability’. The study goes on to
describe the attributes of the ‘strategic corporal’:
The strategic corporal is considered a competent, professional, technologically proficient
decision-maker who is acutely aware of his actions… This role requires the ability to adapt
to an ever-changing environment and this environment is becoming multi-dimensional and
more easily subjected to global review through media relations (Byrne 2007: 101).
According to Byrne, the ‘strategic corporal’ will have to deal with a number of
different pressures, including rapidly changing technology, an awareness of ‘ethnic
issues’, increasing globalisation and ever changing security implications (Byrne
2007: 96). This necessitates an expansion of decision-making frameworks, with
Byrne highlighting two in particular. Firstly, the ‘analytical’ model, based on a
‘scientific, quantitative approach’, dependent on a ‘high level of situational cer-
tainty and accuracy’. Secondly, a participative form of decision-making, which is
more reflective of the situation and allows lower-ranked officers greater involve-
ment in decision making (Byrne 2007: 97). This second type of decision-making is
more akin to elicitive approaches espoused by Lederach, but one seen less in Irish
military training. Ultimately, Byrne understands the benefit in soldiers using both
approaches. Critically, he also attaches importance in understanding the benefits of
autonomy that the reflective process provides.
The ‘strategic corporal’ concept has appeared elsewhere. For example Liddy’s
account in the Australian Army Journal describes a soldier that possesses ‘technical
mastery in the skill of arms while being aware that his judgement, decision-making,
and action can all have strategic and political consequences that can affect the
outcome of a given mission and the reputation of his country’ (Liddy 2005: 140).
Although Liddy notes that officially there is no ‘exact belief’ as to the skills needed
for the ‘strategic corporal’, a general view held by senior officers in the Australian
Army is that he/she is highly trained in skills related to conventional warfare but
supplemented with a number of specific skills which will assist them in duties in
‘multidimensional operations’. These skills, as outlined by Liddy, are ‘foreign
language, cultural awareness, media training, negotiation techniques and conflict
resolution skills’ (Liddy 2005: 145), as well as ‘restraint in the use of force,
impartiality in action and the resolution of crisis by mediation’ (Liddy 2005: 144).
To train the strategic corporal, Liddy finds that new training requirements will be
in such areas as ‘the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural awareness, and the dis-
criminate use of force, as well as improved liaison and mediation skills’. The
training impacts of the ‘strategic corporal’ in the Australian case has led practi-
tioners to recommend moving from a ‘training culture’ to an ‘educational culture’
(Liddy 2005: 144).
Taking the above examples into account, there exists within militaries the
emergence of the ‘soldier-diplomat’, or ‘strategic corporal’. In some cases, this is
seen as being more than just a new type of decision making for soldiers. In
Batistelli’s view, ‘the movement way from the professional ideal emphasising the
warrior hero toward an ideal emphasizing the soldier scholar and soldier-statesman’
is a positive step in the creation toward what he terms as a ‘postmodern military’1
(Batistelli 1997: 468).
One may ask how the strategic soldier is linked to conflict resolution theory.
This is a pertinent question, as much of the strategic soldier literature is based on
army doctrine, publication and thought. It is also linked to such ‘tactical’ approa-
ches to warfare, such as the ‘three block war’,2 the goals of effective decision
making in complex environments, and to some extent even been linked to the
counter-terrorism and stabilisation approaches seen in Afghanistan and Iraq
(Kiszely 2007). However, the concept of the strategic soldier/soldier
diplomat/strategic corporal is significant for conflict resolution purposes. If the
goal of international peacekeeping operations is to provide a vehicle for
de-escalation of violent conflict, then it is imperative for soldiers to not contribute to
cultures of violence, or at least be aware of the recriminations of their actions. As
Daniker argued in 1995, soldiers will have to continually be aware that the ‘the final
goal cannot be a tactical victory, but strategic peace’ (Daniker 1995).
This balance places a pressure on the shoulders of a military peacekeeper.
Regarding this, Fetherston and Nordstrum explore the impact of habitus on the
abilities of third parties to effectively resolve conflicts. Habitus refers to ways of
understanding and acting that individuals develop and learn. These forms of
understanding and acting are consistent with an individuals’ ‘social and historical
setting’. Fetherston and Nordstrum warn of the dangers of putting soldiers, trained
predominantly for war, into a conflict environment, arguing that:
There is no switch inside a blue helmet that automatically turns a soldier trained for
war-fighting into an individual prepared to work non-violently and with cultural sensitivity
in a highly militarised environment (Fetherston/Nordstrum 1995: 21).
Additionally, as peacekeeping involves the use of military force—at times in a

robust manner—a critical amount of pressure is placed on individual soldiers to
understand the force that they have at their disposal, and the impacts, both short and
long-term, it has. Woodhouse finds in his 1999 assessment of peacekeeping and
conflict resolution that working in conflict zones involves a complex process of
balancing a range of contradictory issues, including coercion with consent pro-
motion, military containment with humanitarian relief, as well as promoting ‘civic
1
The other steps being an increasing reliance on civilian employees, integration of women,
increasing public acceptance of homosexuals as serving soldiers, greater independence of soldiers’
spouses, and an increasing alternatives to conscientious objection and ‘civilian alternatives to
military service’.
2
Described as ‘the entire spectrum of military challenges in the span of a few hours and within the
space of three contiguous city blocks’ (Byrne 2007).
6.1 The Soldier Diplomat and Strategic Corporal: Towards … 119
action to rebuild communities economically, politically and socially’ (Woodhouse

1999: 10).
This has an impact on cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping and conflict
resolution. In order for cosmopolitan peacekeeping to be effective, operations
require the integration of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power roles, with the peacekeeping
force being ‘robust enough to use force to protect populations, yet having ‘enough
conflict resolution capacity to facilitate operations across the conflict–development–
peacebuilding continuum’ (Curran/Woodhouse 2007). Taking the first part of the
equation, a degree of force must be used to ensure the creation of ‘negative
peace’—freedom from violence—and the creation of political and humanitarian
space. Consequently, this places demands on the intellectual capacity of the ‘soldier
diplomat’. In particular, through understanding the level of force to be used, how it
relates to achieving the mandated tasks of the operation, and the impacts of the use
(or non use) of force on the immediate environment.
The second part—the creation of positive peace—is of equal importance. Elliott
argues that in addition to defending societies from violence, cosmopolitan peace-
keeping missions may be expected to, where necessary:
Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from criminal activities or
various destructive forms of particularist politics, and to engage in rebuilding local legit-
imacy and pluralist democratic practices (Elliot 2004: 25).
Kaldor asserts that the role of peacekeeping is to assist ‘islands of cosmopoli-

tanism’ within civil wars. ‘Just as warring factions depend on outside support’ she
argues, ‘so there needs to be a conscious strategy of building on local cosmopolitan
initiatives’, as opposed to the top-down imposed peace initiatives that were seen
through the 1990s (here she uses Bosnia as a case in point, where political nego-
tiations at the highest level took precedence over local initiatives) (Kaldor 2001:
122). Linking this to conflict resolution, which is very much based on principles of
‘addressing underlying structural or cultural asymmetries’ (Ramsbotham et al.
2005: 317), one can argue that future forms of peacekeeping can be ‘understood as
a component of a broader and emancipatory theoretical framework centred on the
idea of human security’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 147).
Thus, we can see the two broad outlines of cosmopolitan peacekeeping—to put
the hawks back in their box, and also to let the doves out of their boxes.
Cosmopolitan scholars have linked these broad roles to the ‘type’ of soldier
envisaged for future operations, thus offering early conceptions of the ‘cos-
mopolitan soldier’. Kaldor explains such tasks are being ‘between soldiering and
policing’. She states that peacekeepers will be asked to assume traditional tasks
(such as separating belligerents, maintaining ceasefires, controlling airspace), new
tasks, including ‘the protection of safety zones and relief corridors’, and activities
‘close to traditional policing tasks—ensuring freedom of movement, guaranteeing
the safety of individuals, especially returned refugees or displaced persons, and the
capture of war criminals’ (Kaldor 2001: 125). Lorraine Elliot’s work into cos-
mopolitan militaries offers a wider definition than the more traditional issues of
protection. She argues that coercive power to defend cosmopolitan law ‘must be
embedded in a suite of policy responses which account for conflict prevention as

well as conflict resolution’. Therefore cosmopolitan missions might be expected to
both ‘help defend and, where necessary, restore civil society’ in areas under threat
from ‘destructive forms of particularist politics’, as well as engaging in the
rebuilding of ‘local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices’ (Elliot 2004: 25).
6.2 Barriers to Operationalising Cosmopolitan Norms
Although these advances are encouraging, it does not mean that militaries are now,
by definition, cosmopolitan. Challenges remain, particularly concerning the extent
to which personnel accept and maintain these new skillsets, as well as the reluctance
to institutional change from military organisations. In order to offer a considered
account of where one fully understands cosmopolitan ethics with regards to
peacekeeping, it is important to examine the barriers that are still in place.
First, to examine the level of change required in military personnel to become
peacekeepers. As outlined above, Fetherston and Nordstrum suggest that there no
‘switch’ exists inside a UN helmet which turns a soldier into a peacekeeper
(Fetherston 1995: 21). Much of this can be due to the ‘warrior ethic’ instilled into
soldiers. As described by Kiszely, the warrior ethic is thus:
To be effective in combat, an army needs its members to have a self-perception of warriors as
fighters; and the army as a whole needs to be imbued with the characteristic spirit, or ethos,
of the fighting warrior: the desire to close with the enemy and kill him (Kiszely 2007: 10).
It is this warrior ethos that is the overriding identity in the military, and any
attempted change in the posture of a military from war fighting to peacekeeping
must acknowledge this.
Nevertheless, new challenges in deployments mean new challenges to identity.
Britt notes that in the late 1990s, soldiers became subject to a ‘new’ set of identity
images, including ‘peacekeeper, peacemaker, humanitarian, mediator, observer, and
multinational ‘interactant’’. Such identities are ‘forced’ upon the soldier, who, by
and large, will have joined the armed forces with the primary role of ‘defending
national interests through the use of force’ at the forefront of their minds. Thus,
there are psychological ambiguities for the soldier when he or she is asked to
assume such ‘new’ identities, although they may not be the primary role first
assumed by the soldiers. Britt highlights an earlier research project that found that
36 per cent of US soldiers participating in Operation Joint Endeavour to Bosnia
disagreed with the statement that the role of peacekeeper was relevant to their
military training. Britt sees that this ‘loose bond’ is exacerbated with a lack of
training practice (Britt 1998: 119). This also concurs with Thompson and Pasto’s
view that ‘[s]oldiers can feel ambivalent about the upcoming peace support oper-
ation if warrior training clashes with the more neutral peacekeeping role’
(Thompson/Pato 2003: 224).
6.2 Barriers to Operationalising Cosmopolitan Norms 121
Such factors could offer a reason for the results of a study cited by Wisher into
the skills deterioration in military peacekeepers. Wisher highlights a study under-
taken by the US Army Research Institute for Behavioural and Social Sciences,
which examined twenty-seven tasks selected for training prior to US soldiers
deploying in Bosnia or Hungary as part of the IFOR Operation Joint Endeavour
deployment in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995. A sample of soldiers was asked a
number of questions about the tasks after a two-month period of not using them.
Whereas more ‘traditional tasks, such as ‘indications of mines/booby traps’ had a
high retention rate (99 %), skills which link to ‘contact skills’ fare less well. For
instance, the retention rate of ‘negotiation’ after two months was 36 %, the task of
‘reacting to the media’ had a retention rate of 54 %, understanding the rules of
engagement had a retention rate of 42 %, and ‘react to civilian on the battlefield’
had a skills retention rate of 8 % (Wisher 2003: 97).
These mixed identities can further be identified in the issue of ‘force protection’,
an activity described as a responsibility to ‘safeguard’ military personnel from
various threats (Kretchik 2004: 20). Kretchik examined policies regarding force
protection from six militaries (UK, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Poland,
USA) serving in Bosnia Herzegovina from 1995–2001, under the NATO banner.
He found that whilst peacekeepers from five out of the six nations found that
positive relations with the local population was critical for a successful mission, not
one US officer interviewed found such relations essential. Much of this was due to a
considerable reliance of ‘force protection’ by the US forces. This had an effect on
civilian attitudes towards the force as a whole. Kretchik explains that local people
who lived in British, Canadian, German and Polish sectors welcomed and engaged
well with patrols. However, US troops were consistently met with suspicion:
Where the majority of multinational troops smiled, waved and frequented bistros for a tea
or coffee in the majority of cases with a reduced protection posture, US troops secured a
perimeter while one officer wearing body armour and helmet approached people with an
interpreter and perhaps one or two others. The difference in mood was striking: warm in the
majority of situations where non-US troops operated and a chilly reception for the US
contingent (Kretchik 2004: 34).
This is not the only example where force protection has had an impact on the
positive role that military peacekeepers can play. Gooren argues that in the Dutch
military, although soldiers ‘appreciated’ gaining information through interaction
with the civilian population, force protection ‘frequently took priority over main-
taining friendly relations with the local population’ (Gooren 2006: 59).
The strength of the warrior ethic has an impact on the performance of deployed
military personnel on a peacekeeping mission. Franke highlights the UN’s opera-
tions in Somalia in the 1990s, where he argues that soldiers, unable to grasp the
vague mandates given to them, followed two distinct identities. Some pursued a
‘humanitarian strategy’, where conscious efforts were made to not negatively
stereotype all Somali’s, and an effort made by soldiers to understand Somali culture
and custom. The other distinct identity followed was the ‘warrior strategy’, where
soldiers used the behaviour of a small number of rioters as a general stereotype for
all of Somali culture, treated the whole of the population as ‘potential enemies’, and
attempted to hide any signs of vulnerability. Franke argues that this experience (as
well as other post-cold war peacekeeping endeavours) has called into question
‘what it has traditionally meant to be a soldier’. As a consequence, he argues that
adjustments need to be made not only in military doctrine, but also in the military’s
‘combat-orientated warrior identity’ (Franke 2003: 33–35). Furthermore, LaRose
Edwards, Dangerfield, and Weeks find that the ‘stresses and strains’ of operations
such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia revealed to outsiders the ‘partial
inadequacy of general-purpose combat training for peacekeeping’. They found in
their study that those who served in the multidimensional operations in ‘failed
states’ were the first to identify any shortcomings (LaRose-Edwards et al. 1997).
Linked to this, Durch and England examined the trouble in assuming that all
soldiers can ‘shed’ the baggage of their warrior ethos, and change their mind-set to
that of a peacekeeper, and warn that it may not be the case that all soldiers are
equally as well suited to rapidly shifting roles:
One could envisage such adaptation in a thirty-four-year-old Special Forces sergeant with
fifteen years of experience and special education and training in winning local support for
his campaign. One has more trouble seeing it in a nineteen-year-old line infantryman with a
high school education and at most a year of field experience of any sort under his belt. In all
armies, the latter types of personnel far outnumber the former (Durch/England 2009: 44).
Anthony King’s analysis of the United Kingdom’s Helmand Campaign in

Afghanistan (under the NATO flag) examines the utility of the ‘Warfighting Ethos’
of UK forces, particularly the impact of this ethos on processes of stabilisation in
the country. Whilst it has been proved to be ‘highly effective’ in the UK military’s
ability to carry out kinetic actions, King argues that at times a fine line could be
identified ‘between a willingness to act decisively and accept the risks associated
with that action and a positive alacrity to become engaged in combat as a profes-
sional good in itself’ (King 2010: 324). As a result, tactical activity would often
trump ‘careful political consideration’ of the situation or long term priorities, with
such activity taking precedence over less spectacular but strategically decisive
missions such as training Afghan national security forces, or negotiating with local
leaders in order to learn about the environment (King 2010: 325).
The mixed identity is not only felt at the tactical level, as national military
structures often show reluctance in developing their working patterns. Highlighting
the impacts of mixed identities on higher levels of the military hierarchy, Hills notes
the reaction to the UK’s peacekeeping commitments in the immediate aftermath of
the Kosovo intervention. Through her examination of the reaction in the press by
senior army figures, she found that there was certainly a feeling that too much
emphasis on peacekeeping style deployments would result in UK forces becoming
a ‘gendarmerie’, with a diminished reputation for fighting (Hills 2001: 87). She
refers to an MOD lessons learned report from the Kosovo intervention to further
underline this point. ‘While our forces need to be trained in the special skills
required for peacekeeping’ the report argued, it ‘must not be at the expense of their
readiness for more demanding joint, all arms warfighting operations’. In addition,
6.2 Barriers to Operationalising Cosmopolitan Norms 123
the report reaffirmed the view that a ‘serviceman trained and equipped for war may
do an effective job on a peacekeeping operation… but one just trained for peace-
keeping is not ready for high intensity operations’ (MOD 2000: 38).
Kernic also makes a telling argument as to how certain military thinkers react to
the difference in skills needed for peacekeeping operations, and the apparent
‘numbing effect’ this has on soldiers ability to fight and execute the ‘warrior ethos’.
He contends that with an increasing degree of peacekeeping experience, the
Austrian military soon found that in order to be more effective, it needed to develop
‘civilian skills’. However, the reaction in Austria from some officers and public
commentators was those operations—and the skills they demand—could ‘under-
mine’ combat capabilities. Hence, instead of requesting that the soldiers be better
trained in the ‘civilian skills’, ‘they demanded tougher combat training for soldiers
before and during peacekeeping operations’ (Kernic 1999: 123). In addition,
Thierry Tardy investigates the French military’s challenge in managing the ‘identity
problem’ between the ‘warrior’ identity traditionally associated with the French
military, and the function and skills of ‘peacekeepers’. Tardy notes that although
the French military has been involved in a number of peacekeeping operations since
the end of the Cold War, it has been ‘keen to maintain the primacy of the combat
functions of its soldiers which were not to be jeopardized by the contribution to
peace operations’ (Tardy 2014: 771).
This highlights the tendency of militaries to be resistant to the pressures of
institutional change. Gooren, studying the Dutch military, argues that militaries are
‘strongly attached to traditions; to familiar embedded practices; and to standard
operational procedures that have withstood the test of time’ (Gooren 2006: 54).
Similar problems are highlighted by Kiszely, who notes that there is opposition in
the UK to ‘moderating the warrior ethos’, which is largely due to the fear that
stability operations are a ‘sideshow’ to what the military train for (Kiszely 2007: 21).
Even those countries with considerable experience of peacekeeping have noted
debates over the incorporation of peacekeeping into national military identity.
Langille’s thesis on the creation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada
highlights the conservatism that existed in Canadian military hierarchies (a military
noted for its peacekeeping experience). In the debates throughout the early to mid
1990s leading up to the development of a possible training centre, Langille found that
there was a considerable amount of opposition to the notion of turning a redundant
military facility into a peacekeeping training centre. This was due to a military
conservatism that existed in Canada at the time, which was highly sceptical of a
dedicated peacekeeping training centre, or the idea of developing particular training
for peacekeeping. For example Major General Lewis Mackenzie dismissed the idea
of setting up the centre, stating ‘I think we’re unanimous in the military that there is
no special training (required) for the peacekeeping soldier’ (Langille 1999: 101).
6.3 Structural Changes? Redefining Foreign and Defence

Policy or Radically Re-envisioning UN Peacekeeping
As well trained as military peacekeepers are, it is important to remember that they

are tools of the nation state, and even within a peacekeeping context they remain so.
Therefore it is worth looking to wider structural changes that could assist in the
broader acceptance of these skills, and the identities which they forge. This section
will examine two possible areas of change. Firstly the extent to which we can see
examples of nation states that possess a cosmopolitan outlook in foreign and
defence policy. Secondly, whether there is the possibility of a strengthening of UN
structures to incorporate standing peacekeeping capacities.
Structural change may come in the form of developing foreign and security
policy towards an increased focus on multilateral institutions, and international
forms of conflict resolution. In this vein, the state has been advocated as a cos-
mopolitan agent in its own right. Lawler notes calls for the state to act as a force for
good in itself, against manifestations of violent groupings and actions not along
state lines, but along lines of ‘blood and ethnicity’ (Lawler 2004: 59). Thus the
‘good state’ can be an effective vehicle for advancing cosmopolitan values. The
good state is described as being a state ‘committed to moral purposes beyond itself’
and to a ‘robust internationalism in its foreign policy’. Internationalism, in turn is
described as being an approach to foreign policy ‘constructed around an ethical
obligation on the part of state actively to pursue authentically other-regarding
values and interests’ (Lawler 2004: 56).
Though this conception of the good state invites ‘the charge of naivety from
realists’ and being accused of being narrow-minded by cosmopolitans (Lawler 2004:
50), examples exist where nation states espouse and act upon cosmopolitan objec-
tives. Ireland provides a possible example here. Service to international institutions
is embedded in the Irish Constitution itself (under Article 29), which states:
1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation
amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.
2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of
international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination
(Government of Ireland 1937).
Irish legislation dictates that for there to be deployment of Defence Forces
personnel in ‘peace support missions’, a ‘triple-lock’ must be met. This lock con-
stitutes government agreement, parliamentary approval, and—importantly—a UN
mandate.3
The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs aligns itself with peacekeeping and
conflict resolution tasks. In 2007, the Department set up the Conflict Resolution
Unit, to ‘lead work on enhancing Ireland’s engagement in conflict resolution
3
Though under a 2006 amendment, personnel may also be deployed for ‘such reasons as training
and humanitarian operations under the authority of the Government’.
6.3 Structural Changes? Redefining Foreign and Defence Policy … 125
activities internationally’ (DOFA 2016). The unit’s work is in four main areas:
sharing lessons from the Northern Ireland peace Process; working with the OSCE;
working with civil society; working with the UN and other multilateral organisa-
tions, and; working with the academic community. This informs the three main
strands of the Conflict Resolution Unit’s work: peacemaking, peacebuilding, and
peace process lessons sharing. Within the peacemaking section, there is a Mediation
Support Unit, which primarily collates peacemaking experiences and gathers les-
sons learned. The unit coordinates training for mediators, offers advice on UN
standards and procedures, and has assisted in mediation projects in East Timor4 and
Uganda.5 Furthermore, support is provided to conflict prevention, reconciliation
projects, and security sector reform, alongside research into where lessons from the
Northern Ireland Peace Process can be used elsewhere.
In addition, Irish defence policy is linked to the strengthening of multilateral
institutions. The 2015 Irish Government’s Defence White paper opens with a
foreword from the Minister for Defence, which states:
Ireland has a long and proud tradition of participation in UN mandated peace support
operations. The deployment of the Defence Forces on such missions continues to provide
an active and very tangible demonstration of Ireland’s commitment to supporting the
maintenance of international peace and security. This has enhanced Ireland’s reputation
throughout the world (DoD 2015: v).
The White Paper, which sets out Irish Defence Policy until 2025, aims to ensure
the Irish Defence forces will continue to be at the forefront of attempts to under-
stand and engage with peacekeeping. This has been done through the announce-
ment of an ‘Institute for Peace Support and Leadership Training’, which would
have ‘international standing and contribute to the overall development of knowl-
edge and experience in the areas of peace support and conflict resolution’ (DoD
2015: 32). The institute would be supported by the UN Training School Ireland
(whose work is outlined in the previous chapter), and is backed up by an approach
that recognizes that solutions sought in the area of conflict resolution ‘cannot be
addressed by military means alone and requires the fusion of civil and military
capabilities to comprehensively prepare for conflict resolution in the twenty first
century’ (DoD 2015: 33).
The Irish approach to multilateralism is not unproblematic. Challenges remain
regarding alignment to UN guidance, with studies of the Defence Forces’ approach
to doctrine, training, and standby arrangements noting the competing role of the EU
and NATO in influencing Irish approaches (Burke/Marley 2015: 7). Nevertheless,
observers note that as a result of the friendships won at the UN as a result of
peacekeeping, Ireland has a ‘sentimental loyalty to the blue-helmet not widely
shared among developing countries’ (Burke/Marley 2015: 4). Arguably, this
structural acceptance of UN peacekeeping influences the attitudes of military
4
Where it supports the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and works with conflict prevention
projects including assistance in the establishment of an early warning system for future conflict.
5
Where it supported the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
personnel towards the organization, and the duties that they are asked to undertake
as peacekeepers.
Nevertheless, relying on all states to progress cosmopolitan values in their
defence and security structures may not be sufficient to ensure the longer-term
development of cosmopolitan conflict resolution values amongst military peace-
keeping personnel. National priorities can change easily (particularly in countries
which do not have peacekeeping as a priority activity for their armed forces), and as
seen with the examples highlighted regarding institutional change in militaries
resistant to change, the pace of change is slow and often contested.
Therefore, it may be worth exploring the feasibility of specially trained peace-
keeping forces created on a standing basis at the international level, free from state
and national interests. Elliot sums this up, in her work on cosmopolitan-minded
militaries:
The deployment of cosmopolitan force (and forces) must be detached as much as is possible
from statist and great power purposes and that it must be conducted under the authority of
broadly-based international institutions such as the United Nations… Military forces that
are used in support of cosmopolitan force must be qualitatively as well as materially
different from traditional militaries in their identity and value structures (Elliot 2004: 24).
Cosmopolitan scholarship has long advocated a standing UN peacekeeping force

(Curran, 2015). Goulding finds that a UN force based on cosmopolitan values
would make it more difficult for troop contributing countries to use participation in
UN operations to ‘advance their national interests’. This would be particularly
relevant in smaller operations in which ‘a dominant UN contingent could be the
champion of cosmopolitan values’ (Goulding 2004: 112). Held also argues for a
long term shift of the nation state’s coercive capacity to regional and global
institutions, with the ultimate aim of ‘demilitarization and the transcendence of the
war system’ (Held 1995: 279).
Policy proposals for some kind of UN standing force have surfaced in a number of
proposals from within the UN, from national governments (the Netherlands, Canada
and Denmark), and through proposals from within parliamentary structures, such as
the United Nations Rapid Deployment Act, proposed to the US House of
Representatives in 2001 (US Congress 2001). Such proposals for a standing
peacekeeping force are as old as the UN Charter itself. Article 43 (under Chapter VII)
of the Charter requests states to make available to the Security Council ‘armed forces,
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security’ (UN 1945). Furthermore, within the UN, there have
been ambitious calls for the reform of the structures that assist peacekeeping oper-
ations. The revival of the UN’s Military Staff Committee (MSC)—a ‘dormant’ area
of the UN charter—has been proposed as a way to improve the UN’s ability to launch
effective peacekeeping operations.
Member States made incremental steps towards a serious standby peacekeeping
force system through the development of the Standard High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG). The Brigade was set up in response to a request made in the UN’s
1995 Working Group on a Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High
Readiness Brigade to establish a ‘multinational brigade-size force at high readiness’

(SHIRBRIG 1995). The Memorandum of Understanding for SHIRBRIG outlines
its main concept:
The SHIRBRIG will only be employed on a case-by-case basis in a manner safe-guarding
national sovereignty considerations in peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security
Council under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, including humanitarian
tasks. The SHIRBRIG, as an integral formation – i.e. consisting of elements from all types
of arms, including manoeuvre units, medical, logistics and communications – will only be
employed for deployments of up to 6 months duration, and it should not be considered for
routine rotation of forces in connection with ongoing missions (SHIRBRIG 1996).
The brigade became operationally available to the UN in 20006 and was

involved in five UN Missions,7 which were under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, to
mainly assist with the establishment of headquarters and planning for missions
(SHIRBRIG 2010). Deployments were generally met with success, and the
SHIRBRIG model gained credit for its work. The official lessons learned report into
the brigade (published in 2009) states that SHIRBRIG had a reputation for pos-
sessing ‘a cohesive force with the highest level of peacekeeping expertise and
training standards’ (CISR 2009: 22). It was also highly regarded within the DPKO,
whose lessons learned department maintained that ‘what SHIRBRIG did it did well’
(CISR 2009: 96). In addition to the operations which it assisted in setting up, the
brigade assisted in activities related to enhancing African capabilities, as well as
developing a ‘Civil-military cooperation start up kit’ and a ‘Rapid
Deployment/Interim Headquarters concept’ (CISR 2009: 8).
However, although the operation had noted success, the impact of SHIRBRIG
was limited. Many of the aspirations of setting up a standing brigade were realised
in a somewhat smaller reality as SHIRBRIG staff often formed the ‘nucleus’ of
mission headquarters. It was only in UNMEE, where the possibilities of a large
rapid deployment were realized. Even when this was deployed, its strength was
1,200–1500 troops, and not at the brigade size of 2,000–5,000 envisaged.
It was mainly due to such limitations that the initiative was disbanded in 2009.
The lessons learned report identifies SHIRBRIG’s ‘cumbersome decision-making
process’ as well as a lack of resources and political will, as important factors in
making the initiative untenable (CISR 2009: 8). Furthermore, the report states that:
‘Bottom line is that the force generation did not work properly.’ The SHIRBRIG
model offers both positive lessons insofar as what can be achieved by like-minded
states to deal with rapid deployment, but also negative lessons on how such a force
can be side-linedd by other needs. The lessons learned report best sums this up by
6
Sixteen nations have signed one or more SHIRBRIG Documents. They are—Argentina, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Seven other nations (Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Jordan, Latvia and Senegal) are participating as observers.
7
UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea), UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia),
UNAMIS (Sudan).
stating that such an ambitious agenda like that of SHIRBRIG ‘can only remain as
strong as the support received from its own member-nations’ (CISR 2009: 97).
Looking to the future, SHIRBRIG’s failure has not meant that proposals for
standing peacekeeping capacities have dried up. In fact, a number of interesting
proposals have been put forward that link the skillset outlined above with rapidly
deployable peacekeeping forces under UN command.
A more comprehensive concept of a UN force comes in the form of Langille’s
2002 proposal for a UN standing force. His proposal for the creation of a UN
Emergency Service—what he termed a UN ‘911’—which would be based on a
force (including deployable elements, base support and administration) of
approximately 13,200 personnel.8 Langille recommends that this force can address
human needs including ‘protection, security, health and hope’ (Langille 2002: 113),
would work under a robust mandate aligned with Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
but also have the conflict resolution capabilities to build and maintain consent.
Langille suggests that all ranks should be ‘trained in contact skills such as medi-
ation and dispute resolution to help ensure that minor conflicts are quickly con-
tained before they risk early escalation’ (Langille 2002: 110). The civilian
component of the force, would address specifically on issues related to human
needs as well as working to ‘restore hope’. Langille argues that the success of
progressing to such a force will depend on the willingness of officials to recognise
the ‘potential contribution of conflict resolution and peace studies’ (Langille 2000:
243). Additionally, central to the vision is that the UN is a guarantor of such a force.
Michael Codner elaborates on this idea, proposing a standing UN force ‘inde-
pendent of particular national or regional cultural stereotypes’ (Codner 2008: 62).
The reasons for this are more entrenched in policy considerations. Codner argues
that a dilemma has emerged, where on the one hand, there is an increasing need for
considerably larger ‘comprehensive’ operations, and on the other hand, is the
existence of restrictive national interest amongst possible contributors:
the governments and electorates that own the more competent and combat capable of
military forces may be unwilling to commit to elective operations with uncertain outcomes
(Codner 2008: 62).
This leaves Codner to conclude that there is room for ‘serious consideration’ for
a combat capable force distanced from national ownership—a UN Emergency
Service—recruited from ex-servicemen and women to begin with, and ‘young
civilians’ in the future. Codner elaborates on the development of the UN
Emergency Service, arguing that in the first stage it is to be used as a preventative
measure, deploying in situations where preventative diplomacy is needed (Codner
2008: 61). The main thrust of the proposal is the creation of a ‘Phase 1 UN
Intervention Force’ (UNIF I). This would be a small military force combining
8
The force would comprise of military (10,270 personnel), police (850 personnel) and civilian
volunteers (550 personnel).
civilian, police and judicial capability. The tasks for the UNIF I force would include
to:
• prevent violence from escalating;
• assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;
• provide the emergency framework for UN efforts to resolve the conflict and
commence negotiations;
• secure a base, communications and airfield for a subsequent UN force;
• provide safe areas for persons and groups whose lives are threatened by the
conflict;
• secure humanitarian relief operations; and
• assess the situation and provide first-hand information for the Security Council
so that an informed decision can be made on the utility and feasibility of further
UN involvement.
This list of tasks focuses on ‘hard’ power aspects of securitising space for the
protection of civilians and humanitarian agencies. Codner suggests that such a force
would be based on the concept of the US Marine Expeditionary Unit, which
numbers a total size of 2,200, though the UNIF1 force would be considerably
larger, comprising of up to 10,000 troops.9 The capability of UNIF1 would be a
highly trained ‘specialised’ infantry, whose main task would be to convey the
‘diplomatic message that they genuinely represent a potential more powerful
follow-on capability that could be deployed by UN sanctioned national combat
forces’ (Codner 2008: 61–62). Codner’s ideas relate to those espoused by Langille
which include to provide a framework for a UN force, without the emphasis on
national interest, with conflict resolution capabilities allied to the ability to defend
the UN mandates and provide security to the civilian population.
A series of proposals that link the soft power aspects of Langille’s with the
robust framework espoused by Codner is the body of research emerging around the
creation of a ‘United Nations Emergency Peace Service’ (UNEPS). Based at UN
designated sites (including a mobile field headquarters), the force is outlined as
being a ‘first-in, first-out’ service, designed to supplement existing UN operations
as well as offering early warning and preventative capacities. With regard to per-
sonnel, Herro, Labourne and Perkins outline the composition of such a force:
UNEPS personnel would be individually recruited from among those who volunteer from
many countries so it would not suffer the delays of ad hoc forces, the reluctance of UN
members to deploy their own national units or gender, national or religious imbalance. Its
personnel would be expertly trained and coherently organized to avoid the challenges of a
lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness and experience in resolving conflicts (Herro et al.
2009: 52).
9
Comprising of an infantry battalion reinforced with an artillery battery, combat engineering
platoon, light armored reconnaissance company, tank platoon, reconnaissance platoon, as well as
other various units which would fit into particular missions.
Importantly, the UNEPS force is designed to have a considerable civilian

dimension. Suthanthiraraj, Quin and Mendez’s study on regional perspectives of a
UNEPS force argue that although it would contain military and police contingents
to ‘undertake protective functions’, the force will place equal emphasis on civilian
non-military capacities, enabling it to ‘perform certain peacebuilding as well as
peacemaking functions’. Furthermore, in the UNEPS concept, civilian/military
units would be created, consisting of individuals trained with ‘wider professional
competencies’ such as social workers, health professionals, human rights lawyers
and gender specialists (Suthanthiraraj et al. 2009: 15).
6.4 Conclusion
The aim in looking at future developments in peacekeeping operations comes from

the belief amongst a number of conflict resolution scholars (this author included)
that peacekeeping operations can be part of a transformative form of conflict res-
olution. However, the present form—contained within a system of nation states—
means that peacekeeping’s potential to be truly transformative is challenged.
Therefore it is worth exploring the potential of either members states to develop
their concepts of foreign and defence policy, or whether there is the potential for
more transformative structures at an international level.
Importantly, this chapter has shown that there is a convergence between military
practitioners, conflict resolution scholarship, and cosmopolitan scholars over the
future requirements for military personnel deploying on peacekeeping operations. If
current trends continue, the ‘soldier diplomat’ of the future will: be trained in
conflict resolution techniques akin to Fetherston’s contact skills; possess the
capabilities to make considered judgements on ‘blurred lines’ such as rules of
engagement and the complex nature of peacebuilding activity; and, be deployed in
operations where protection of civilians will play a critical role.
However, the missing part of the equation is exactly who that soldier will
represent. In a fully cosmopolitan outlook, he or she will represent a standing UN
force. In a more pragmatic-cosmopolitan outlook, the soldier diplomat will be
representing a state with cosmopolitan values.
In looking at these two levels, a contradiction can be identified. On the one hand
(the nation state), capacities for peacekeeping exist, but alongside highly variable
levels of acceptance towards cosmopolitan approaches. On the other hand (the
international), there is greater degree of acceptance of cosmopolitan principles, but
very little capacity or will to implement even the most modest forms of standing
peacekeeping capacity. Although current capacities are still state-centric, there is
cause for cosmopolitans to be optimistic. The development of peacebuilding
practice in the UN, the importance attached to protection of civilians, the integration
of civil-military cooperation into military practice, and the incorporation of ‘soft’
power roles in military training all suggest an evolution towards cosmopolitan
conceptions of peacekeeping operations.
6.4 Conclusion 131
However, this book advocates that further steps are made to enhance cos-
mopolitan approaches towards standing peacekeeping capacities. It acknowledges
that there are considerable political and operational hurdles in their development,
but argues that continued engagement through investigating where and how
standing capacities can enhance current structures is necessary. The proposals
outlined above are not without policy relevance, and they do provide an anchor
point for those wishing to strengthen cosmopolitan approaches to conflict man-
agement and resolution. Such reassessment could incorporate more ambitious
agendas of change to the way peacekeeping is governed, how it is mandated, and
how power is distributed. These challenges will bring uncomfortable discussions,
and the potential for radical approaches, but it is better to have these types of
discussion than not to have them at all. If such proposals are kept in a dormant state,
the cosmopolitan peacekeeping project (at least at the UN level) will suffer.
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militaries in the Twenty-First Century. L. Elliot and G. Cheeseman. Manchester, Manchester
University Press. 49–64.
Liddy, M. L. (2005). “The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education.”
Australian Army Journal 11(2): 139–148.
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Journal of Strategic Studies, 37(5): 770–792.
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Praeger. 91–110.
Woodhouse, T. (1999). International Conflict Resolution: Some Critiques and a Response. Centre
for Conflict Resolution Working Paper No. 1. Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This final chapter will look at more immediate challenges for UN peacekeeping
operations, how they may influence training peacekeepers, and their impact on the
relationship that peacekeeping has with the conflict resolution field. Firstly, it
examines increasing use of robust force in UN missions; secondly the peacekeeping
training architecture and; thirdly, the extent to which training can be evaluated.
After this analysis, the chapter indicates areas for future research in this field.
7.1 The Development of Robust Peacekeeping
As said in the introduction, robust peacekeeping is part of the UN’s response

toolbox in peacekeeping environments. The UN’s Principles and Guidelines outline
that robust peacekeeping sits between peacekeeping and peace enforcement,
allowing for a tactical use of force against armed groups who are in opposition to a
peace process. ‘Robust’ peacekeeping is described by DPKO as: ‘The use of force
by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the autho-
rization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose
activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process’ (UN
2008). This has been a theme developing in peacekeeping since the early 2000s,
where the Brahimi Report (as Chap. 3 outlines) set the scene for UN peacekeeping
to develop capacities to ‘allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire
that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect’
(UN 2000: 9).
The use of force by UN peacekeepers is very much influenced by the security
situation of areas which operations are deployed to. In 2014, it was reported that
more than two thirds of all peacekeeping personnel are operating in ‘contexts with
significant levels of ongoing violence’, including operations in Darfur, South
Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Ladsous 2014). UN peacekeeping operations are therefore increasingly
136 7 Conclusion
deployed into areas which lack clear political frameworks, are beset by violent
armed actors, transnational criminal networks, and terrorist organisations (UN
2014). Therefore, the level to which military personnel are able to respond to the
threat of violence, and whether robust action can be taken proactively opens up
more questions for the definition. This has obvious implications on the requirement
for peacekeeping personnel to understand the role of non-violent solutions to
potentially violent situations, including understanding processes of negotiation, and
possessing the tools to understand conflict and its resolution.
In March 2013 the UN Security Council, through UN resolution 2098 (28 March
2013), authorized of a first-of-its-kind ‘a ‘Force Intervention Brigade’ (FIB) as part
of the existing UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo1 (MONUSCO). The FIB, as outlined by UNSC Resolution 2098, is
comprised of three infantry battalions: artillery, special force and reconnaissance. It
is mandated to carry out targeted operations to ‘neutralize and disarm… Congolese
rebels and foreign armed groups’ in the east of the country, as part of a wider drive
by MONUSCO to ‘proactively protect civilians’ (UN 2013).
What this means for wider peacekeeping practices is open to question.
Resolution 2098 states that the force would operate ‘without creating a precedent or
any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’ (UN 2013). This could
mean that the specific operation has meant that exceptional measures were needed,
and that through attaching an intervention brigade to ‘neutralize and disarm’ a
number of armed non-state groups in the East of the country, the UN is developing
a suitable one-off response. However, the possibility of this becoming a precedent
for peacekeeping operations is evident. This was one of the outcomes from a
lessons learned report into the initiative, which reflected that there was debate as to
the extent to which the boundaries of peacekeeping had been stretched.
Interestingly, the report noted that a view existed amongst some participants who
informed the report that peacekeeping is an ‘elastic enough term to include highly
kinetic operations’ (TCP 2014: 14).
This represents a challenge to training peacekeepers, and also to the use of
peacekeeping as an instrument which aims to de-escalate conflict. As the book has
previously noted, those who have worked on training peacekeepers have warned
about the mixture of responses that military peacekeeping personnel trained for
peacekeeping are expected to possess. For instance, Fetherston and Nordstrum’s
warning that there is ‘no switch inside a blue helmet’ that turns a warfighter into an
‘individual prepared to work non-violently and with cultural sensitivity in a highly
militarised environment’ (Fetherston/Nordstrom 1995: 21). In addition, Anthony
King’s analysis of the UK military Helmand Campaign in Afghanistan highlighted
in the previous chapter notes how the warfighting ethos of UK military personnel
would trump ‘careful political consideration’ of longer-term priorities (King 2010:
1
MONUSCO taken from the French ‘Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la
Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo’.
7.1 The Development of Robust Peacekeeping 137
325). Though the UK forces deployed in the Helmand Province were not on a UN
peacekeeping operation, this highlights an important point of the interplay between
using force and sustaining peace. On a more strategic level, Deborah Goodwin’s
analysis of military negotiation offered a broader insight into the challenges of
action taking precedence over ‘less spectacular’ activity:
What has become noticeable over the last few years is that the range of conflict resolution
options in strategic international dealings has tended to become more and more limited,
with a result that negotiation has become less attractive in terms of immediate global
strategic interaction. Talking looks weak; action looks strong, especially to a global media
audience that can instantly witness results, or the lack of them (Goodwin 2010: 5).
The challenge therefore is for those engaged with peacekeeping to ensure it is

still part of a wider political process of conflict resolution. At a strategic level, this
has been made clear by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace
Operations report, which argued that the ‘primacy of politics should be the hallmark
of the approach of the United Nations to the resolution of conflict’. This includes all
stages, including the ‘management of violent conflicts and longer-term efforts at
sustaining peace’ (UN 2015a, b: 11). Through making this a clear message, the high
level panel reiterated the unique strategic role that the UN can play in the resolution
of violent conflict.
On an operational level, the High Level Panel warned specifically that operations
such as the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade’may make the UN forces,
and the mission as a whole, a party to the conflict’ (UN 2015a, b: 32), and warned
that ‘extreme caution must guide any call for a UN peacekeeping operation to
undertake enforcement tasks and that any such mandate task should be a
time-limited, exceptional measure’ (UN 2015a, b: 32). Again, this indicates a
positive sign that the message that peacekeeping in the main is an activity reliant on
consent, and not on using violent force.
Finally at a tactical level, a 2015 post-operational report from an Indian con-
tingent based in the UN Mission in South Sudan demonstrates that even when
presented with the opportunity to use robust force, it may be the non-use of force
that can yield greater results. The report, as given by the Military Advisor of the
Permanent Mission of India to the International Peace Institute event in 2015 goes
as follows:
A patrol… stopped at 14.30 hours at Kadiba. While talking, suddenly 4 round[s of] bullets
was [sic] fired towards the patrol team from the bushes. But… the military liaison officer
and the patrol commander warned not to fire and if it continues, the patrol would take strict
action… then firing stopped. Some 45–50 men came out of the bushes, armed with AK47’s,
bows and arrows. No damages are reported. Later, the Moro people [those who fired the
shots] told that they thought us as SPLA [Sudan People’s Liberation Army] and also shared
that there are many armed groups, each group with 25–30 persons defending their tribal
people from SPLA attacks (IPI 2015).
In summing up the action, the Military Advisor stated that three lessons were
clear. Firstly, the contingent demonstrated restraint when deciding not to return fire,
a point put down to ‘excellent training’. Secondly, the non-action of peacekeepers
138 7 Conclusion
had maintained the impartiality of the UN. Impartiality was viewed as ‘the best
security for our troops’. Finally, that human intelligence was established with the
group, but only after ‘contact’. In summing up this lesson, the Military Advisor
made an important distinction between a standard military response, and a peace-
keeping response:
However, had the patrol fired back… it would have led to collateral damage, impartiality of
the UN being questioned, and a stigma on the mission. But that would have been the
standard military response (IPI 2015).
The importance of training military peacekeepers to react non-violently to vio-

lent situations is paramount in a peacekeeping environment. Moreover, a challenge
exists for future research from the conflict resolution field to ensure that the activity
of peacekeeping operations—both on tactical and strategic levels—maintains its
role within a conflict resolution framework. An unchecked move towards increased
robustness means that peacekeeping looses its capacities for de-escalation, and
ultimately resolution.
7.2 The Training Architecture
With this in mind, it is important to look at the challenge of coordinating the

training given to peacekeepers. The incorporation of conflict resolution skills into
training programmes for military peacekeepers is no easy task. In order therefore for
‘peacekeepers to have sophisticated skills and to operate in a cohesive and coor-
dinated way’ (Cutillo 2013: 10), the training architecture that supports these
peacekeepers needs to be sustainable.
However, there are challenges in achieving this. First and foremost is the simple
difficulty of an overstretched Department of Peacekeeping Operations. There exists
below 1000 members of staff at headquarters, meaning that that the ratio of
headquarters staff to field personnel is nearly 1:100. When placed in comparison
with, NATO which has a ratio of 1:18, the level to which the DPKO’s is ‘over-
stretched’ is clear (CIC 2009: 2). With regards to coordinating training, a 2013
report stated that there are 19 members of staff working on training within head-
quarters (CIC 2013). Although this is to be complemented by mobile training
teams, and in-mission training, the number is considerably small.
Therefore, the peacekeeping training architecture is one which relies on the
support of Troop Contributing Countries. This means there has been a ‘recurring
emphasis’ on terms such as ‘partnership’ and ‘networks’ in the UN strategy (Cutillo
2013: 6). Such a structure can obviously hamper attempts of instigating a rigorous
training regime. A number of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) have nor-
malized their relationship with UN peacekeeping, developing it as part of their
national identity. This has brought improvements in training. However, in the case
of a significant number of UN Member states, this is not the case (Cutillo 2013: 7).
With Troop Contributing Countries wary of ceding sovereignty regarding how
7.2 The Training Architecture 139
military personnel are trained (UN approaches are not intended to replace national
doctrine or training), the ability of the UN to enforce standards in peacekeeper
training is limited. Therefore the tools at the UN’s disposal in getting member states
to better train their personnel fall predominantly towards the ‘carrot’ as opposed to
the ‘stick’.
In addressing this challenge, two broad developments in training for peace-
keeping operations have emerged. Firstly, the development of peacekeeping
training centres, and secondly, the rise of internet-based training courses.
The development and spread of international peacekeeping training centres
marks out the deepening of the culture and practice of training for military
peacekeeping, and the international norms that guide it. Training centres, such as
the UN Training School, Ireland, provide a valuable space for military practitioners
and civilian staff to train peacekeeping personnel in non-traditional skills. The
burgeoning number of centres around the globe comes under the umbrella organ-
isation, the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).
Since its foundation in 1995, the IAPTC has held fifteen annual conferences and has
a membership of 102 member institutions. The organisation describes itself as being
a forum for training personnel for discussions relating to training ‘without their
having to deal with national interests (and sometimes restrictions)’ (IAPTC 2016).
Such joint training ventures have been outlined as being cosmopolitan in nature.
Bergman outlines cooperation between Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden,
Denmark, Norway) through the NORDCAPS model as being a framework ‘in
which the Nordic states’ joint commitment to international peace can be furthered’
(Bergman 2004: 175). Even the concept of the IAPTC could be aligned with
cosmopolitan values. The IAPTC Training centres are encouraged to cooperate with
each other and non-military peacekeepers (police and civilian staff), and to work to
UN standards and policies, without recourse to national politics and interests.
The Internet is also playing an increasingly important role in communicating
new forms of training to a broader range of military peacekeepers. As Ramsbotham,
Woodhouse and Miall state, the field of conflict resolution is being affected by the
impact of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in such a way ‘that tra-
ditional distinctions between national, international and local levels of activity are
being eroded and the basis for a global partnership for peacebuilding is being
constructed’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 363).
Here, it is important to look at the work of the Peace Operations Training
Institute (POTI), which was created in 1995 under the UN Institute for Training and
Research (UNITAR) to provide self-paced correspondence training courses on
different aspects of UN peacekeeping. More recently, POTI has separated from
UNITAR, and updated its courses from correspondence to the e-learning platform.
The organisation still maintains the UN’s seal of approval for online training. This
was most recently outlined in the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations 2015 report, which welcomed ‘the free and multilingual delivery of
peacekeeping distance learning through the E-learning’ (UN 2015a, b: 61). The
mission statement of the organisation links to the assertion from Ramsbotham,
Woodhouse and Miall about ICT eroding national and international boundaries:
140 7 Conclusion
The Peace Operations Training Institute is dedicated to providing globally accessible and
affordable distance-learning courses on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security
operations to men and women working to promote peace worldwide (POTI 2016a, b).
The Institute has grown at an exceptional rate since beginning. In 1998, there
were 1,500 students enrolled from fifty-six nations (Kidwell/Langholtz 1998: 97).
Now, POTI trains a considerably higher number, with all military, police and
gendarmerie personnel from African, Latin American and Caribbean nations able to
enrol free, under the ELAP (E-Learning for African Peacekeepers) and ELPLAC
(E-learning for Peacekeepers from Latin America and the Caribbean) programmes.
According to the Institute, since the ELAP programme was launched in 2006, over
200,000 African peacekeepers have been enrolled (POTI 2016a, b).
Though the UN’s capacities to undertake training are at a drastically over-
stretched level, the decentralized nature of peacekeeping training has allowed
organisations such as POTI and regional peacekeeping training institutes to flourish.
Though there will be questions as to the standardization across these initiatives,
they play an important role in ensuring that the skills necessary for peacekeeping
are not lost.
7.3 Does Training Work?
Further to the two challenges outlined above, is the difficulty of quantifying the
results of training. Studies into training for peacekeeping note that links between
training and performance are ‘elusive and hard to track’. Although it would be
positive to quantify the results of training into effective negotiation, the UN—like
any other organization—will have to rely on academic study and anecdotal evi-
dence. This is because there exists no frameworks to assess peacekeepers’ perfor-
mance (Cutillo 2013: 3), with the UN itself noting in 2010 that there exists ‘no
methodology or standards for the evaluation of the performance of military con-
tingent units in peacekeeping missions’ (UN 2010: 19)
From a conflict resolution perspective, understanding the impact of conflict
resolution training of military peacekeepers will continue to be of critical impor-
tance. A number of studies from academic and policy fields have sought to add to
the considerable anecdotal evidence about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of
peacekeepers in contributing to positive peace in a conflict zone, yet very few have
been able to chart the impact of negotiation training in peacekeeping environments.
A considerable study of a peacekeeping operation is thus required. Again, examples
exist: Galtung’s study of UNIFIL contingents in 1976 (Galtung 1976) offers a prime
example, as does Wall and Druckman’s 2003 research on mediation in operations
(Wall/Druckman 2003). Such an examination may require an extended period of
time with a peacekeeping contingent, from pre-deployment stage through to the end
of deployment.
7.3 Does Training Work? 141
This challenge is also significant when considering with misdemeanours and

transgressions of peacekeeping personnel. It is in this area where the quality,
training and preparedness of peacekeepers will be placed in the spotlight. In par-
ticular, the continual revelations of cases of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse are well
documented. This is despite there being CPTMs that address the UN’s Zero
Tolerance approach to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse since 2009. If peacekeepers
(albeit a very significant minority), continue to be accused and charged with
exploitation, uncomfortable questions will be asked about the quality of training
they receive. Therefore initiatives to understand how training is undertaken and
skills retained in peacekeeping are essential.
7.4 Final Summation
In reflection, this book determines where there are further links between the fields
of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping. It does this by using examples of
training theory and practice to understand how conflict resolution skills are being
imparted to soldiers preparing for deployment. Regarding negotiation training, there
exists a vast number of ad hoc negotiation experiences at the tactical level, thereby
demonstrating the requirement for training programmes and exercises which deal
specifically with this important aspect of contemporary peacekeeping deployments.
In addition, civil-military relations strategies are understood as having the potential
to facilitate forms of conflict transformation, which aim to ‘actively envision,
include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given
setting’ (Lederach 1995: 213). Lederach’s approaches to elicitive forms of training
development in how peacebuilders are trained (Lederach 1996: 56–58) further has
the opportunity to significantly influence how peacekeepers view themselves as
interveners, and how relationships are built.
Training for military peacekeepers has developed significantly since Betts
Fetherston first investigated training in her 1994 publication. In turn, the develop-
ment of training programmes—specifically in the areas of civil-military relations,
negotiation, and cultural awareness, represents a manifestation of the links between
conflict resolution and military peacekeeping. As the previous chapter demonstrates,
increasing training in non-traditional military skills is having an impact on the roles
and responsibilities of military peacekeepers. This has opened up debates within the
military over what ‘type’ of soldier is best suited to peacekeeping operations, a
debate that finds resonance in the conflict resolution and cosmopolitan fields.
Through examining the new demands on peacekeepers, and how militaries are
learning to cope with such new demands, we can see an emerging cosmopolitan
ethic amongst the training regimes, informing wider debates about cosmopolitan
forms of peacekeeping. Where this may take us regarding approaches to peace-
keeping is yet to be seen. At a national level, there is a possibility that states become
more cosmopolitan in their outlook. Here, Ireland has proved to be an interesting
case study. However, if the process of relying on all states to demonstrate a level of
142 7 Conclusion
altruism to the multilateral system is to ask too much, then it is worth examining the
strengthening of the UN’s capacities. The UN is seen as a vehicle to progress global
cosmopolitan objectives forward. With this in mind, strengthening its capacities up
to and including the development of standing peacekeeping capabilities (which
complement existing procedures) could strengthen cosmopolitan approaches.
Looking to the future, this book can be used as a springboard to expand the
scope of understanding how conflict resolution interacts with the world of peace-
keeping. From a conflict resolution standpoint, this book understands it has limi-
tations insofar as it uses conflict resolution theories and concepts largely drawn
from the Global North. The next stage of conflict resolution, according to
Woodhouse, Ramsbotham, and Miall, is to globalize the conflict resolution field,
incorporating views and perspectives from different cultures, religions and
nationalities. Additionally, approaches to conflict resolution continually evolve, as
the work undertaken into Transrational Peace Research demonstrates. Such an
approach seeks to understand the correspondence between the internal processes
amongst each individual and the way that individual relates to wider society
(Dietrich 2014: 50). Moreover, with the vast majority of peacekeepers hailing from
outside the Global North, there is a significant opportunity to seek to understand
how alternative understandings of conflict and its resolution manifest themselves in
training programmes for peacekeepers from the Global South. There is also scope to
further understand training for non-military uniformed personnel, in particular UN
police and UN observers.
The role of conflict resolution in peacekeeping should not be understated. In fact,
it is arguably its conflict resolution role that makes peacekeeping a unique activity
in international affairs. In responding to the immediate pressure of violent conflict,
and planning for the medium to long term future of peacekeeping operations, the
requirement for reflective, conflict sensitive peacekeepers that can de-escalate
conflict and open space for peacebuilding is paramount. If peacekeepers are to act
‘less like a conflict manager and more like a midwife at the birth of a new society’
(Ryan 2000: 40), then they must be trained to encounter the complex challenges
that this role inevitably brings
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Centre for Trust, Peace and Social
Relations
A Leading UK Centre for Academic and Research Excellence
The Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) builds on the strong and
distinguished track record of scholars at Coventry University working on human
security, peace studies and social relations. Working across disciplines and focused
on these critical areas of socio-political and economic significance, the Centre has
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Politik—Economics—Society—Science 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46305-6
146 Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations
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Website:
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/areas-of-research/trust-peace-social-relations/.
About the Author
Dr. David Curran’s primary research interest is in

developments in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping.
Since completing his Ph.D. at the Department of Peace
Studies, University of Bradford in 2011, David has
undertaken research into a range of topic areas includ-
ing the role of conflict resolution in training pro-
grammes for military peacekeepers; Protection of
Civilians in UN Peacekeeping; the evolution of
rapid-reaction peacekeeping and peacebuilding forces
such as the African Union standby brigades, EU bat-
tlegroups; and the potential of specialized UN rapid
reaction capabilities. In addition, David has researched
and published on the role of the United Kingdom in UN peacekeeping policy and
practice.
David’s research seeks to understand the extent to which international peace-
keeping and peacebuilding missions form an effective tool of conflict resolution.
This provides a lens to analyse a range of areas, from the training that peacekeeping
personnel receive, to the wider principles that underpin peacekeeping operations,
and the motivations of those who intervene.
Among his major publications are: “Muddling on through? Cosmopolitan
peacekeeping and the protection of civilians”, in; International Peacekeeping
(2016), “The United Kingdom and United Nations peace operations” (with Paul D.
Williams), in; International Peacekeeping, 23,5 (November, 2016), “Training for
Peacekeeping: Towards Increased Understanding of Conflict Resolution”, in;
International Peacekeeping, 20,1 (March 2013); “The EU and the Third Pillar”, in
Fiott, D., Koops, J. (eds.), Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: A
Contribution to Third Pillar Approaches, Basingstoke, Palgrave (2014); “The
‘Bradford model’ and the contribution of conflict resolution to the field of inter-
national peacekeeping and peacebuilding”, in: UOC Journal of Conflictology, 3,1
(May 2012); (with Woodhouse, T.): “Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and peace-
building in Sierra Leone: What can Africa Contribute?”, in: International Affairs,
83,6 (November 2007); (with Fraser, T., Roeder, L., Zuber, R., (eds.), ‘Perspectives

148 About the Author
on Peacekeeping and Atrocity Prevention—Expanding Stakeholders and Regional

Arrangements’, New York, Springer (2015).
Address: Dr. David Curran, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry
University, Innovation Village Building No. 5, Cheetah Road, Coventry, CV1 2TL.
Email: david.curran@coventry.ac.uk.
Website: http://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/research-directories/researchers/david-
curran-/.
About this Book
This book provides a contemporary account of the linkages between the academic
field of conflict resolution and the practice of military peacekeeping, through the
lens of pre-deployment training for military personnel about to embark on UN
peacekeeping operations. Military personnel serving on United Nations peace-
keeping operations are deployed into highly challenging post-conflict environ-
ments, where the likelihood of violence remains high. Moreover, these personnel
are deployed part of a peace process, and are thus situated as an anchor point in a
transition from war to peace. This dimension of their work therefore means that a
range of skills and techniques are relied upon, which come not from traditional
military training, but from other, non-traditional fields. It is into this gap where the
academic field of conflict resolution has made a valuable contribution to under-
standing international peacekeeping. Since the 1970s, studies have sought to
understand international peacekeeping as a necessary stage in conflict de-escalation,
and ultimately transformation. From this, there is a history of engagement including
studies which seek to understand the skills peacekeepers may need to assist them in
their day to day activities (such as approaches to negotiation, mediation, and cul-
tural awareness), and the role that international peacekeeping plays in projects of
conflict transformation.
However, a small number of these studies systematically explore the issue of the
role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers.
Although training is often cited as one of many factors in mission success, few
studies actually seek to explore what non-military skills are focused on, and what
methods are used to train peacekeepers. Thus, by examining training for military
peacekeeping, the book will fill a critical gap in the field. By using the lens of
training, the book offers a unique insight not only into the skills that are transferred
(such as mediation, negotiation and cultural awareness), but the extent to which
such training offers an appreciation of the role that peacekeepers play in conflict
resolution. Moreover, the areas of training that the book will cover—negotiation,
cultural awareness, and civil-military relations—are critical factors in peacekeeping
operations, and provide a unique insight into the role of conflict resolution theory
and practice. The analysis of training will allow wider insights to be made into

150 About this Book
future compositions of peacekeeping, and where conflict resolution can make an

impact.
The book is split into three sections. Section one (Chaps. 2 and 3) examines
academic and policy approaches to training peacekeepers in conflict resolution
skills, incorporating approaches from the conflict resolution field, as well as
developments in UN policy. Section two (Chaps. 4 and 5) looks at how these have
manifested into training programmes in negotiation skills, cultural awareness, and
civil-military relations. Section three (Chap. 6) examines where this may take
peacekeeping in the future, proposing possible cosmopolitan directions for the
activity.
Contents
Introduction—Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and the Role of Training—The
Development of Training Structures in the United Nations—Negotiation Training for
Military Peacekeepers—Civil-Military Relations Training for Military Peace-
keepers—Towards the Military Conflict Resolution Practitioner?—Conclusion.
More on this book is at:
http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_08.htm.

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The Anthropocene: Politik–Economics–Society–Science

More than Fighting

ISSN 2367-4024 ISSN 2367-4032 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016952003

© The Author(s) 2017

More on this book is at: http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_08.htm

Copyediting: PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, AFES-PRESS e.V., Mosbach, Germany

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

Coventry, UK David Curran

RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Part I Trends in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeper Training

Part II Speciﬁc Areas of Engagement

Part III Looking Ahead

come naturally to conventional military personnel, thereby requiring considerable

The requirement to understand the necessity to develop an expanded skillset for

Box 1.1: List of soldier’s qualities as outlined in the Peacekeepers

This book also makes a theoretical contribution, particularly to the ﬁeld of

1.2 Deﬁning ‘Peacekeeping’ and Peacebuilding?

The UN Charter offers no deﬁnition of peacekeeping; therefore meaning that those

creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by

As can be seen, UN deﬁnitions expect that those involved in a peacekeeping

• Designed to address drivers and mitigators of conflict

1.2.3 The Training Framework

authoritative endorsement of fundamental international values, and of conferring

1.3 On the Structure of the Book

conflict resolution skills. It then looks speciﬁcally at the training dimension, in

to whether training is effective. These challenges are both short-term, encompassing

Schrich, L. (2013). Conflict Assessment and Peaceuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory

© The Author(s) 2017 17

If anything, Moskos argues, the formulation of pre-deployment training for

2.1 Wider Theoretical Approaches

Noting that peacekeeping operations represent a form of third party intervention

Box 2.1: Approaches to Peace in a contingency model. Source: Fisher

STAGE OF SEQUENCE OF OUTCOMES FOR

Destruction Peacekeeping Control Violence

Segregation Peacepushing De-escalate or

Polarization Peacebuilding Meet basic needs

Discussion Peacemaking Settle interests

Examples of such local level resolution initiatives were observed in both

2.2 Operationalising the Theory:

Diehl, Druckman and Wall’s analysis of peacekeeping operations offers a more

Box 2.2: Peacekeepers Mediation techniques (taken from Wall and

Peacekeeper’s data: Peacekeeper provides objective data about

2.3 The Training Dimension

Betts Fetherston’s approaches to peacekeeping (outlined above), which looked to

Williams’ 1998 study of peacekeeping and civil-military relations reflects on the

Tillett outlines a training scheme that Australian forces undertook to incorporate

Deborah Goodwin also works extensively on training the military in

Goodwin is concerned that ‘speedy’ brieﬁngs in a deployment zone (with little

2.4 Incorporating the Elicitive Approach

Lederach’s elicitive approach to conflict resolution takes on a much broader range

This interaction is useful to participants who wish to expand their knowledge of

As shall be seen as the book progresses, elicitive approaches to conflict reso-

role of elicitive learning in international approaches to conflict resolution identiﬁes

emergence of elicitive approaches. Taken together, these developments could

Archibugi, D. (1995). From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cosmopolitan

Loode, S. (2011). “Navigating the Unchartered Waters of Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution

3.1 Wider Policy Initiatives in the UN

It is important to remember that the ‘ofﬁcial’ ﬁeld of peacekeeper training in the UN

To see how peacekeeping training has responded to wider structural changes in

3.2 The Brahimi Report and Subsequent Change

3.3 Thematic Changes in Peacekeeping