Psychology, Crime and Law

ISSN: 1068-316X (Print) 1477-2744 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gpcl20

The Relationship between Human Needs and

Criminogenic Needs

Tony Ward & Claire Stewart

To cite this article: Tony Ward & Claire Stewart (2003) The Relationship between
Human Needs and Criminogenic Needs, Psychology, Crime and Law, 9:3, 219-224, DOI:
10.1080/1068316031000112557

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316031000112557

Published online: 27 Oct 2010.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 843

View related articles

Citing articles: 10 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gpcl20
Psychology, Crime & Law, September 2003, Vol. 9(3), pp. 219
/224

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN NEEDS AND

CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS
TONY WARDa* and CLAIRE STEWARTb
a
Department of Criminology, University of Melbourne, 234 Queensberry Street, Melbourne
3010, Australia; bInstitute of Disability Studies Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway,
Burwood 3125, Melbourne, Australia

(In final form 3 October 2002)

INTRODUCTION

We are delighted to have the opportunity to respond to the commentary by Bonta and
Andrews (2003, this issue) on our paper exploring the relationship between human needs
and criminogenic needs (Ward and Stewart, 2003). We are concerned about the absence of
serious critical debate concerning the risk
/need model and the danger that the field will
harden into orthodoxy just as restrictive and problematic as that previously associated with
the ‘‘nothing works’’ movement several decades ago. In our opinion, there is a real need to
provide alternative rehabilitation models and also to critically scrutinize the relationship
between clinical practice and the wider social and political context. It is important to be
empirical but not empiricist in the narrow sense; theory construction and evaluation matter,
and alongside the detection of phenomena are an essential part of the scientific process.
Bonta and Andrews make three major criticisms of our paper and argue that we (1)
discount the evidence for the risk
/need model, (2) appeal to ‘‘intuitive’’ beliefs not science in
the development of the needs model and selectively report evidence, and (3) dismiss the risk
/
need model on purely ideological grounds. Before replying to these specific points we would
first like to make a couple of general observations.
First, Bonta and Andrews appear to have misunderstood the central thrust of our paper.
One of our stated aims was to clarify the relationships between criminogenic needs and
human needs. It was never our intention to claim that the concept of criminogenic needs was
unimportant or unnecessary. We argued that the goods or goals individuals seek are
partially determined by their fundamental interests and concerns, that is, their basic needs.
Basic needs are usefully construed as innate propensities to engage in certain activities that,
if not met, result in harm or increased risk of harm in the future. Whether or not basic needs
can be met in a manner that will promote an individual’s well-being depends crucially on the
existence of specific internal (capabilities) and external conditions. Internal conditions refer
to psychological characteristics such as skills, beliefs, attitudes and values. External
conditions refer to social, cultural, and interpersonal factors that facilitate the development

*Corresponding author. E-mail: t.ward@criminology.unimelb.edu.au

ISSN 1068-316X print # 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/1068316031000112557

219
220 T. WARD AND C. STEWART

of the above psychological characteristics and include effective parenting, education,

vocational training, social supports and the opportunity to pursue valued goals.
Criminogenic needs are associated with the distortion of these conditions and can be viewed
as internal or external obstacles that prevent basic needs from being met in an optimal
manner. That is, an individual is hypothesized to commit criminal offences because he lacks
the capabilities to realize valued outcomes, in his environment , in personally fulfilling and
socially acceptable ways. The different classes of criminal needs (i.e. dynamic risk factors)
reflect problems achieving the types of primary human goods. For example, impulsivity
indicates a lack of the internal conditions to achieve the good of autonomy while social
isolation indicates a lack of skills necessary to establish strong social relationships, and so on
(see below). Thus, human goods reflective of a fulfilling lifestyle are derived from, or made
possible by, the meeting of basic psychological needs and the possession of the necessary
internal and external conditions.
Therefore, criminogenic needs are critical elements in the rehabilitation process and it is
important that therapists detect and seek to remove them. However, we argue that a useful
way of doing this is to consider their relationship to basic human goods (arising from needs,
etc.) as this helps us to understand why there is a problem and what to do about it.
Second, Bonta and Andrews fail to address most of our criticisms of the risk
/need model:
that criminogenic needs are value laden; they are effectively only range riders (i.e. do not
inform clinicians what to do in therapy); the use of the term ‘‘need’’ is inappropriate and
misleading; the relationship between the four principles comprising the model is not
specified; the relationship between criminogenic needs is not clear (in our model it is); the
relationship between the vocational and therapeutic aspects of treatment is unclear; there is
no explanation as to why criminogenic needs arise; and the neglect of the essential role of
noncriminogenic needs in practice. We argue that a needs based or good lives (Ward, 2002)
model of offender rehabilitation can deal with these problems and therefore provides a
theoretically informed and defensible approach to offender rehabilitation.

CRITICISM 1
/ DISCOUNTING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE RISK /NEED MODEL

There are several strands to this objection. First Bonta and Andrews claim that that ‘‘they
have always said that criminogenic needs are dynamic risk factors’’, implying that we have
simply ignored this in order to score essentially a political point. Second, they claim that the
risk
/need model is not incompatible with goals such as ‘‘living the good life’’ and that we
imply that an emphasis on criminogenic needs thwarts such a possibility. Third, that we
simply ignore the evidence for the risk needs model such as that supplied by the LSI-R. The
claim here is that we downplay down the empirical adequacy of the model.

Reply
Concerning the first point, the fact remains that that the term ‘‘criminogenic needs’’ still
refers to the concept of need. We accept that they are not categorical needs in any
straightforward sense but believe that the reasons for this view should be clearly
demonstrated. Our aim was to clarify the relationship between criminogenic needs and
human needs but at the same time demonstrate why the concept of need in the categorical
sense is not applicable. However, as we also stated in our paper, criminogenic needs could be
 HUMAN AND CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS 221

viewed in some senses as instrumental needs, that is, inappropriate means to the securing of
human goods (e.g. relationships, status, material well-being, etc.).
Concerning the second point, that we claim that a focus on criminogenic needs is
incompatible with living a ‘‘good life’’. In our general comments made earlier it is clearly
stated that a focus on criminogenic needs is compatible with living a different kind of life but
is not sufficient. In other words it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for living such
a life. It is not sufficient because the presence of criminogenic needs simply indicates that the
necessary internal and external conditions for achieving basic human goods are not in place.
The step is to ensure that this occurs and this can only happen if the therapist relies on
guidance from a theory of needs or a more constructive, strengths-based rehabilitation
model (see Ward, 2002).
In the third point under this general criticism, Bonta and Andrews state that we downplay
and ignore the impressive evidence for the utility of the risk
/need model. This is rather
puzzling as in the paper we are very clear that it has many positive features but is simply
insufficient on its own to guide rehabilitation. For example, directly quoting from our paper:

There is much to admire in the theory of criminogenic needs. It provides an empirically defensible and
theoretically elegant framework to guide the design and implementation of rehabilitation programmes in the
correctional domain. In addition, the use of the term ‘‘need’’ to direct intervention efforts promises to ground
rehabilitation policy in a psychological and normative theory of criminal offending. However, while Andrews
and Bonita have developed a useful theory, it does have some weaknesses. (p. 19)

We have not gone into the details of all the research evidence supporting the risk
/need
model as our paper is essentially a theoretical one, and our major concern was to sketch out
the foundations for an alternative approach. However, the human goods or needs based
approach explicitly incorporates or ‘‘embeds’’ many of the positive features of the risk
/
needs (e.g. the construct of criminogenic needs).

CRITICISM 2
/ SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND APPEALS TO INTUITIVE BELIEFS

The second major criticism really hinges on the claim that our needs-based approach is not
based on data and simply reflects old ideas recycled. Ideas, Bonta and Andrews maintain,
that do not have empirical support and therefore should not be seriously considered. For
example, Bonta and Andrews state that

what is the alternative (and better) model offered by Ward and Stewart? It is essentially a humanistic,
psychodynamic conceptualization of needs that is long on popular appeal but short on evidence.

Second, they also state that the research evidence presented by Deci and Ryan contains no
studies with delinquent or criminal offenders. The implication here appears to be that unless
we directly demonstrate the utility of the need construct with offenders, evidence from other
populations is misleading or irrelevant. Third, they claim that our position is a
psychodynamic one, an approach that has no demonstrated validity with offenders. Finally,
Bonta and Andrews argue that we simply want a ‘‘return to the good old days when
treatment providers relied on nondirective, relationship-oriented techniques to build feelings
of well-being.’’
222 T. WARD AND C. STEWART

Reply
Concerning the first claim that the ideas we construct our theory with are without relevant
empirical support, it is true that we do assume that offenders by virtue of being human
beings share the same needs as other human beings. In the paper we make the claim that
‘‘the mind has a rich inherited architecture or basic nature that predisposes people to engage
in certain activities and to seek certain types of goals’’. There is a remarkable consensus (in
Western culture at least) regarding the lists of primary human goods described and noted in
psychological research (Cummins, 1996; Emmons, 1999; Deci and Ryan, 2000), evolutionary
theory (Arnhart, 1998), and philosophical anthropology (Rescher, 1990; Nussbaum, 2000).
Thus there is reasonable evidence that human beings do indeed seek primary human goods,
although there are a number of ways of translating such goods into everyday lives. There is
also the tantalizing recent research of Maruna (2001) indicating that offenders who desist
from crimes do so because they have fashioned more adaptive identities and live more
fulfilling lives. Therefore, it is simply not the case that our claims are based on intuitive ideas
or common sense without any empirical or theoretical support.
Relatedly, we are at a loss as to why offenders should not be viewed first as human beings
and second as human beings who have committed unlawful acts. Where is the evidence that
they should not be so regarded? We believe that this is a reasonable and justifiable
assumption, one made in many domains of correctional psychology. For example, in the
sexual offending domain Marshall has powerfully argued that sex offenders are remarkably
similar to nonoffenders in most important respects and therefore should not be regarded as
intrinsically deformed or nonhuman (Marshall, 1999).
Second, it is true that we did not cite any study applying the ideas of Deci and Ryan to an
offender population
/ to our knowledge there are no such studies yet. However, they do
base their theory of human needs on a considerable amount of empirical evidence and
conclude that ‘‘...the experienced satisfaction of these three needs was directly related to
psychological health and well-being’’ (Deci and Ryan, 2000, p. 244). The whole point of
writing the paper was to consider the value of such a needs-based approach to the
rehabilitation of offenders; basically to sketch out a possible framework. Science proceeds
through theory construction as well as theory testing, and as such our project is scientifically
and theoretically justifiable. We have attempted to provide a broader theoretical framework
for correctional rehabilitation, one that draws from recent developments in personality
research, goal theory and research, evolutionary psychology, research on well-being, etc.
Therefore, our approach is theoretically and empirically guided and the claim that it simply
represents common sense or wishful thinking is both unjustified and somewhat mischievous.
Third, our position is certainly not psychodynamic but rather based on a combination of
modern personality research, evolutionary psychology, social cognition, and social learning
theory. Additionally, we do not, and have not in the paper, recommend the use of
psychodynamic interventions to rehabilitate offenders. In fact, from the perspective of our
model, clinicians are urged to use interventions that install the necessary internal and
external conditions to secure basic human goods, in the appropriate contexts. The choice of
interventions would be guided by those that are best supported by the evidence. There is no
question of abandoning the hard earned gains of the risk
/need model, it is simply a question
of extending its scope and conceptual reach. This would involve more effective tailoring and
selection of interventions, and additionally, explicitly linking good lives conceptualizations
with the acquisition of such skills. The strategies based on the risk
/need model are
appropriate; the problem resides in the underlying model of offender rehabilitation: it is too
 HUMAN AND CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS 223

reductionistic, too negative, and not sufficiently attuned to the psychological reality of
individuals’ everyday lives, and the crucial role of human goods in such lives.
Finally, we do argue that the construct of well-being and its component goods (mastery,
relatedness, health, relationships, etc.) should guide rehabilitation. However, in our model
well-being is achieved only if individuals possess the internal (skills, etc.) and external
(resources, opportunities) conditions necessary to achieve a number of basic human goods.
Moreover, we claim that different individuals will weight the various goods somewhat
differently and also, that context is a critical factor that needs to be taken into account when
constructing a rehabilitation plan. Therefore, the focus is clearly on installing skills and
conditions, not well-being; high levels of well-being are simply a consequence of living in
certain ways and are not the primary treatment target. Well-being is simply an indicator that
individuals have the skills, etc. in place to be able to live a relatively risk-free life.

CRITICISMS 3
/ IDEOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION

The basic complaint here is that we are simply engaging in intellectual trickery and arguing
from an entrenched ideological position in our critique of the risk
/need model. There is also
the additional claim that we do not follow the dictates of good theory construction and
therefore our model is based on poor scientific reasoning.

Reply
We must admit to being a bit puzzled by this criticism. It is true that we take theory
construction and critique seriously and see it as an essential part of the scientific enterprise.
We are not empiricists (although we are empirical
/ see below) and therefore do not view
theories as simply laws that summarize relationships detected by empirical research. From
such a position any theorizing should be exclusively grounded in data and also not infer
underlying entities that cannot be easily measured or at least operationalized in some way.
We are empirically minded, however, and believe that one indicator of a good theory is its
ability to explain empirical phenomena. But there are also other equally important epistemic
values (or good making features of theories) such as explanatory depth, heuristic value,
simplicity, scope, coherence, and consistency with other domains of knowledge. We are
critical realists and as such argue that we know the world in terms of our best theories but
assume that there is a world to know, and that we increasingly converge on true descriptions
of the way it works (Hooker, 1987). The construction of a theory can help to concentrate
research and clinical attention and, by doing so, open up domains of inquiry. It is important
that data gathering is guided by ideas otherwise the researcher is (metaphorically) blind and
in danger of simply undertaking a fishing expedition (Hooker, 1987). Therefore, our focus
on theory development in the absence of an exactly relevant data set (i.e. need data on
offenders) is clearly acceptable from the perspective of this model. Our framework has
heuristic value, arguably great explanatory depth, is consistent with related knowledge
domains (evolutionary psychology, personality theory, goal theory, anthropology, well-
being research, positive psychology, etc.), and has a high degree of coherence. We refute the
argument that we are intent on entrenching a favoured ideology; in fact we do not have any
such position. Our aim is simply to enrich and broaden the risk
/need approach to offender
rehabilitation by accepting that offenders are human beings, and as such are active, goal-
224 T. WARD AND C. STEWART

directed individuals who seek basic human goods and whose offending will reflect these
tendencies. Therefore, any intervention should take this into account and not simply be
focused on risk management; this is a necessary but not sufficient focus for intervention
efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

We have set out to reply to Bonta and Andrews’s criticisms of our paper on human needs
and criminogenic needs. In their commentary they claimed that we ignored the empirical
evidence supporting the risk
/need model, based our needs model on inadequate data, and
have constructed the model in an unscientific and ideological manner. We have refuted each
of these claims in turn and also argued that Bonta and Andrews have mistakenly seen our
paper as an attempt to reject the concept of criminogenic needs completely. This could not
be further from the truth. In our view criminogenic needs represent distortions or omissions
in the internal and external conditions necessary to achieve important human goods. Our
framework is humanistic but is also a contextual, pluralistic one and is perfectly consistent
with the use of empirically supported therapies.

References
Arnhart, L. (1998). Darwinian Natural Right: the Biological Ethics of Human Nature . Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.
Bonta, J. and Andrews, D. A. (2003). A commentary on Ward and Stewart’s model of human needs.
Psychology, Crime, & Law , 9.
Cummins, R. A. (1996). The domains of life satisfaction: an attempt to order chaos. Social Indicators
Research , 38, 303
/328.
Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. (2000). The ‘what’ and ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-
determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry , 11, 227
/268.
Emmons, R. A. (1999). The Psychology of Ultimate Concerns . New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Hooker, C. A. (1987). A Realistic Theory of Science . Albany, NY: State University of New York.
Marshall, W. L. (1999). Current status of North American assessment and treatment programs for sexual
offenders. Journal of Interpersonal Violence , 14, 221
/239.
Maruna, S. (2001). Making Good: How Ex-convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives . Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and Human Development: the Capabilities Approach . New York, USA:
Cambridge University Press.
Rescher, N. (1990). Human Interests: Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Ward, T. (2002). Good lives and the rehabilitation of offenders: promises and problems. Aggression and
Violent Behavior , 7, 513
/528.
Ward, T., and Stewart, C. A. (2003). Criminogenic needs and human needs: a theoretical critique. Psychology,
Crime, & Law , 9.