2018 AdministrationSociety

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/277972542
Accounting for Accountability: A Critical Reﬂection

on the Private Higher Education in Bangladesh
Article in Administration & Society · March 2018

DOI: 10.1177/0095399715587523
CITATIONS READS
4 1,311
1 author:
Mohammad Nurunnabi
Prince Sultan University
137 PUBLICATIONS 3,407 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Tourism terrorism and wellbeing View project
PSU COVID-19 Project 2020 View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Mohammad Nurunnabi on 11 April 2018.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

587523
research-article2015
AASXXX10.1177/0095399715587523Administration & SocietyNurunnabi
Article
Administration & Society
2018, Vol. 50(3) 429–470
Accounting for © The Author(s) 2015
DOI: 10.1177/0095399715587523
Accountability: A Critical journals.sagepub.com/home/aas
Reflection on the Private

Higher Education in
Bangladesh
Mohammad Nurunnabi1
Abstract
The World Bank has pioneered the concept of “private” in developing countries
with the aim of creating economic and social sustainability since the 1990s.
This study examines private universities by focusing on the accountability
framework in Bangladesh. Using a multi-method approach (a survey of 1,046
students from all 52 universities in the country and policy documents from
1992-2014), the study reveals that weak macro accountability (specifically,
a vague regulatory framework, lack of enforcement, government leniency,
and corruption) is a contributing factor in the unsuccessful drive for higher
growth of private higher education institutions (HEIs). The study also raises
a question on the success of the Washington Consensus in a developing
country. The findings demonstrate that urgent attention is required from
the Bangladesh government and donor agencies (The World Bank, the
UNESCO, and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]).
Keywords
private, accountability, World Bank, Washington Consensus, higher
education institution, developing country, Bangladesh
1Prince Sultan University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Corresponding Author:
Mohammad Nurunnabi, Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration,
Prince Sultan University, P.O. Box No. 66833, Rafha Street, Riyadh 11586, Saudi Arabia.
Email: mnurunnabi@psu.edu.sa
430 Administration & Society 50(3)
Introduction
The underlying philosophy of neoliberal economic reform emerged in most
developing countries1 in the mid-1980s due to public sector inefficiency.
Keynesianism in the mid-1970s was replaced by free market economies (as
per the Washington Consensus). A turning point came with the Berg Report
(The World Bank, 1981), which blamed governments for perceived develop-
ment failures in sub-Saharan Africa, criticizing widespread state intervention
in the region (Cramer, 1999). The state itself was conceived as the problem
rather than the solution (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). The idea of the “Washington
Consensus,” meanwhile, was coined by Williamson (1993) to refer to the
economic policy agenda that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank followed during the 1980s. It recommends that governments
should reform their policies by following a number of measures, specifically,
“pursue macro-economic stability by controlling inflation and reducing fiscal
deficits; open their economies to the rest of the world through trade and capi-
tal account liberalization; liberalize domestic product and factor markets
through privatization and deregulation” (Gore, 2000, pp. 789-790). The pri-
mary aim of this policy approach was to reduce the role of the state to gener-
ate the necessary conditions for a market-led economy through the private
and deregulation of markets (Babai, 1988; Battaglio, 2009; Cramer, 1999;
Galal, Jones, Tandon, & Vogelsang, 1994; Gore, 2000; Marangos, 2009;
McCleery & De Paolis, 2008; Öniş & Şenses, 2005; Williamson, 1993, 1997;
The World Bank, 1981, 1994a, 1995). Private has become the most signifi-
cant agenda of the World Bank (Richardson & Haralz, 1995) and it should
also be noted that, since the 1980s, the World Bank has influenced the educa-
tion sector enormously in developing countries (Bonal, 2002). For instance,
about 70% of all structural adjustment loans made during the 1980s con-
tained a private component (Cook, 1997; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995), and the
World Bank’s funding accounted for 25% of the total International
Development Assistance to education in the mid-1990s (Bennell, 1996, p.
235). Education loans in the World Bank budget increased from less than 4%
in 1980 to 10% by 1996 (Mundy, 1998). Currently, the World Bank is the
largest funder of education in developing countries.
The concept of the private higher education is not new in the global econ-
omy and it has played a significant role in developing countries (Altbach,
1999; Banya, 2001; Biesta, 2004; Hopper, 1998; Rabossi, 2010; Ransom,
Siew-Mun, & Selvaratnam, 1993; Tilak, 1991). Since the 1990s, private sec-
tor universities have emerged in developing countries such as Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ghana, Hungary, India, Russia, Cyprus, Bolivia,
and Brazil (Amaral & Teixeira, 2000; Ball, 2007, 2009; Quddus & Rashid,
Nurunnabi 431
2000; Tikly, 2003; UNESCO, 2014; The World Bank, 1994b, 2000, 2008,
2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). It has also been argued that despite the growth
of private sector higher education, the question of “what private sectors can
and cannot deliver” should be investigated (The World Bank, 2000). The
accountability issues of private universities are not addressed in reality (The
World Bank, 2014d). The World Bank has recently put more effort into rec-
ommending that states establish a regulatory framework to oversee their pri-
vate universities’ activities (Fielden & LaRocque, 2008; The World Bank,
2008). As this is an under-researched area, this study explores these account-
ability issues by investigating the following research questions:
Research Question 1: What are the roles of private higher education

institutions (HEIs) in terms of accountability?
Research Question 2: What is the role of regulators in private HEIs?
Research Question 3: What are the major obstacles to bridging the
accountability gap in private HEIs?
The study is focused upon private higher education in South Asia2 with
specific reference to Bangladesh for the following four reasons. First,
Bangladesh, with more than 156 million people (156,594,962 in 2013,
151,125,475 in 2010, up from 67,627,868 in 1971) is one of the E93 coun-
tries. The population has increased by 131.56% since its independence in
1971. Furthermore, 29.9% of the population is below 15 years of age.
However, due to the high level of poverty, the Gross National Income (GNI)4
per capita has not increased significantly over the last 5 years (US$620 in
2009, US$690 in 2010, US$770 in 2011, US$830 in 2012, and US$900 in
2013).
Second, Bangladesh has seen an increasing demand for private higher
education. In 1970, there were only six public (state-run) universities, with
26,390 students (16.8% were female) in comparison with 34 public universi-
ties with 197,252 students in 2012. After the introduction of the concept of
private higher education in 1992, the number of students grew exponentially,
with 314,640 students enrolled in private HEIs in 2012 (The University
Grants Commission of Bangladesh [UGC] Annual Report, 2012). Private
universities provide for 61.46% of the university students, up from 44.74% in
2003, a clear indication that the demand for private higher education has
significantly increased.
Third, Bangladesh’s government is allocating an increasingly lower per-
centage of the national budget to the higher education sector. Figure 1 shows
that the government allocated 0.83% of the national budget in 2011-2012
compared with 0.81% in 2002-2003. It has also been argued that the
1 0.92
0.86 0.88
0.9 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.83
0.79 0.78
0.8 0.75
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Figure 1. Higher education budget as a percentage (%) of national budget in

Bangladesh (2002-2011).
government allocates “only 2.1% of GDP to education, but just 0.12% to

tertiary education, of which 85% goes to meet the recurring expenditures”
(The World Bank, 2014b, p. 1; 2014c, p. 1). However, UNESCO in its
“Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2014” argued that the alloca-
tion of states’ national budgets for education should be at least 20%, and 6%
of the GDP. In terms of budget allocation, Bangladesh is the lowest in South
Asia (10.3% in Maldives, 4.7% in Bhutan, 4.6% in Nepal, 2.4% in Pakistan,
and 3.3% in India). The continuously lowest public spending on education
relative to GDP in Bangladesh encourages the establishment of more private
HEIs. This is due to the fact that private universities are not funded by the
state and can meet demand created by poor state provision.
Finally, despite a positive employment growth rate (the unemployment
rate in 2012 was 5%) and higher university participation, there is also the
paradox of high graduate unemployment in Bangladesh. The total graduate
unemployment rate is 47%, which is the highest in South Asia (“High
University Enrolment,” 2014, p. 9). So, this disparity between higher enroll-
ment and unemployment raises a question on the quality of education provid-
ers in Bangladesh. This is possibly because the government is not concerned
about the misalignment between labor market needs and higher education
provision. Therefore, the number of private universities is increasing
rapidly.
The study is organized into seven sections. The next section provides an
overview of private higher education in Bangladesh, including its historical
Nurunnabi 433
influences. Section “Literature Review” offers a literature review, and an

accountability framework is presented in section “Accountability
Framework.” The “Method” section describes the research methodology. The
“Results and Discussion” section reports the findings of the study, and the
final section contains the conclusions and limitations of the research and sug-
gests directions for future research.
Background of Private Higher Education in

Bangladesh
The current education structure of Bangladesh can be divided into three
major stages: primary, secondary, and higher education. Primary education
(Grades I-V, ages 6-10) is a 5-year cycle taught by primary level institutions;
secondary education is a 7-year cycle (Grades VI-XII, ages 11-17), with 3
years in junior secondary, 2 years in secondary, and 2 years in higher second-
ary level institutions; and then higher education (age 18 and above, Grades
XIII and above) is a 3- to 5-year cycle, managed by higher level institutions.
In addition to public schools, private primary and secondary schools also
receive support from the government. HEIs consist of two categories: private
and public. HEIs provide degree passes (3 years), degrees with honors (4
years), master’s (1 and 2 years), and other higher degrees (e.g., MPhil, PhD,
MBBS, and DBA).
Historically, higher education in Bangladesh has been influenced by the
British Education system. This is because Bangladesh was a British Colony
until 1947 and then part of Pakistan until 1971. The Hunter Commission
(1882, the Legislative Council of the Government led by Lord William
Hunter), the Raleigh Commission (1902, led by Sir Thomas Raleigh), and
the Calcutta University Commission, also known as the Sadler Commission
(1917-1919, led by Sir Michael Ernest Sadler) made significant recommen-
dations for education reform in British India. The Hunter Commission
emphasized primary education and proposed private higher education and
the Raleigh Commission focused upon higher education (the Raleigh Bill
became the “Indian Universities Act 1904”). The Sadler Commission inves-
tigated the overall state of British Indian Education and suggested that the
European model was not suitable in India for socioeconomic reasons. The
Sadler Commission also proposed that the first 2 years of university educa-
tion were to be incorporated into the state system in 1917 and the first public
university, Dhaka University, was subsequently established in 1921 (now in
Bangladesh).
During World War II, Sir John Sargent, the Educational Advisor to the
Government of India, provided a comprehensive scheme of education for
16 16 16
14
12
11
10 10
8
7
6
5
4 4
3
2 2 2
1 1 1
0
Figure 2. Number of private universities from 1992 to 2013 (n = 79).
educational reform in India. The Sargent Report of 1944 recommended that

the standard of university education must be raised; admission policy must be
revised; competent teachers should be appointed; the duration of bachelor
courses should be 3 years; and a higher education monitoring authority
should be established. According to the recommendations of the report, the
University Grants Committee was constituted in 1945, later renamed the
UGC in 1956. After British rule ended, two committees, the Akram Khan
Committee (1947) and the Ataur Rahman Khan Committee (1957) intro-
duced a compulsory School Textbook Board in 1954 and separate streams for
education in 1959: Arts, Science, and Commerce.
After its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh had six public
universities with only 26,390 students (Ministry of Education, Bangladesh)
because of a lack of development of the private sector. No new public univer-
sities were established until 1980. To promote higher education, the govern-
ment established the National University in 1992. Later, with the help of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Open University was established in
1993 (Bangladesh Open University Act, 1992). During the mid-1980s, the
private sector started to increase its involvement in education. Subsequently,
private universities were founded in Bangladesh based on the Private
University Act, 1992, Act No. 34 of the BNP’s (Bangladesh National Party)
rule (Figure 2).
The BNP and the Awami League are the two main political parties in
Bangladesh. They have been in power as follows: BNP from 1991 to 1996
Nurunnabi 435
Table 1. Students Enrollment and Teachers in Private University (1997-2012).
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012

Number of students 5,668 32,791 46,080 124,267 200,939 314,640
Number of teachers 636 1,608 4,543 3,668 5,710 11,755
Students teacher ratio 9:1 20:1 10:1 34:1 35:1 27:1
% of female students — — 17.5 24.08 24.45 25.27
% of female teachers — — 13.9 22.87 29.79 26.26
Source. Data are available from Ministry of Education (2014), Bangladesh Bureau of Educational
Information & Statistics (BANBEIS; 2014), http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/db_bb/university_educai-
ton_1.htm, and The UGC Annual Report 2012.
Note. — indicates data are not available; UGC = University Grants Commission.
and from 2001 to 2006; Awami League from 1996 to 2001, 2009 to 2013, and
2014 to present; Military-backed government from 2006 to 2008. Under the
BNP Political regimes (1991-1996 and 2002-2006), a total of 44 universities
were established. The present government of the Awami League was not ini-
tially in favor of private higher education policy. They established only eight
during 1996-2001. Surprisingly, 27 private universities were established in
the last 2 years (2012 and 2013) under the present democratic government of
the Awami League. No universities were established in 8 years (1994, 1997,
1998, 1999, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010).
As of August 30, 2014, there are 79 private universities in Bangladesh
(UGC Annual Report, 2014; Figure 2). Fifty-six universities are located in
Dhaka (the capital of Bangladesh) and 23 are located outside Dhaka.
According to its 2012 Annual Report, the UGC suspended four universities in
October 2006; however, they are operating again after getting a stay order
from the High Court. The number of students of private universities has been
increasing significantly during the last 5 years (61.46% in comparison with
public universities with 38.53% in 2012). Table 1 shows that during 2013, the
total number of students who enrolled for various courses was 314,640
(25.27% were female students); there were 11,755 teachers (26.26% females);
the student–teacher ratio was 27:1. The low number of enrolled female stu-
dents indicates a gender disparity in higher education in Bangladesh.
Strikingly, 32.5% teachers are part-time, which is a matter of concern regard-
ing teaching quality.
Addressing the governance of private higher education in Bangladesh, the
government introduced the Private University Act, 2010, Act No. 35 of 2010.
According to this Act, the Ministry of Education is responsible for overall
policy formulation, planning, monitoring, evaluation, and the execution of
plans and programs of higher education. The UGC ultimately carries out the
Ministry of Education
The University Grants Commission of

Bangladesh (UGC)
Private Universitiy
Board of Trustees (BOT) Finance Committee
Syndicate Recruitment Committee
Discipline Committee
Academic Council
Academic Faculty/Institute
Academic Department
Curriculum Committee
Figure 3. Current governance structure of private university.

Note. UGC = University Grants Commission; BOT = board of trustees.
state’s monitoring of private universities. The initial aim was to enable more
stakeholder involvement via various committees (Board of Trustees,
Syndicate, Academic Council, Faculties, Institutes, Curriculum Committee,
Finance Committee, Faculty Recruitment Committee, and Disciplinary
Committee; Figure 3). However, The World Bank (2014d) stated that “Most
of the private universities have failed to meet the minimum requirements of
physical infrastructures, full-time qualified faculty, libraries, teaching aids
and other facilities to provide proper education” (p. 1). For example, 23 of 79
universities have no vice chancellor and most of the universities have no
permanent campus; their trustees were given excessive powers because the
trustees were present on all the state committees, which had no detailed
guidelines and no guidelines for an accreditation council. These loopholes
attract non-compliant activities in relation to the Act. The UGC Chairman
also stated in 2012 that
none of the Private universities are obeying the Private University Act 2010
properly. Only a handful—10 private universities—are in good position. Others
Nurunnabi 437
are not accountable. Moreover, we are annoyed to see that ownership problems
still remain in most of the private universities . . . they aren’t listening. If we
terminate their all academic activities and other activities, they restart their
activities again after gaining permission from the high court. So, the UGC
needs more power to stop such activities. (Eduicon, 2012, p. 1; “Study of
Corrupt University,” 2014)
Again, no foreign universities or their branches can operate any academic

activities or confer degrees in Bangladesh. The governance structure raises a
serious question regarding accountability issues (Figure 3).
Literature Review
The current state of higher education in developing countries is somewhat
weak and no developing country can claim to have achieved complete suc-
cess with private HEIs (The World Bank, 2000, 2008, 2014d). This is
because of a lack of domestic capacity to meet demand (Altbach, 1999),
and political and cultural factors (Bøyum, 2014). Bøyum (2014) also argued
that educational justice is treated in isolation from social justice in develop-
ing countries. Quddus and Rashid (2000) argued that the collapse of com-
munism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brought many profound
changes, the most remarkable of which is the private higher education.
They found that policymakers in developing countries necessarily adjusted
both their mind-sets and practice to embrace the free market in an effort to
assure good-quality higher education. They found inconsistencies in tuition
fees and private HEIs, mainly in serving the elites in the societies.
With regard to Portugal’s experience, Amaral and Teixeira (2000) found
that a very large private sector of HEIs has developed, but also that no real
market has emerged. This is because private sector is less responsive (a
simultaneous lack of regulation, lack of quality in degrees) to economic and
social needs than the public sector. In sub-Saharan Africa, Banya (2001)
found that because public HEIs face huge challenges (such as increased
enrollments, fiscal challenges, quality issues, and rising graduate unemploy-
ment), the governments in the region have less control over private HEIs. The
governments think that establishing private HEIs is an alternative route to
solving the problems of public universities. Meier (2004) found a high level
of corruption in the education sectors of developing countries. The conse-
quences of corruption are endemic and result in high education drop-out
rates, especially among the poor who cannot afford to pay bribes and irregu-
lar fees (Transparency International Bangladesh [TIB], 2014).
Fielden and LaRocque (2008) revealed that private HEIs in developing
countries have an uneven record of self-regulation, and tend to operate with
low-quality physical infrastructure and human resources, and with a lack of

enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. They argued for establishing an
accreditation agency in developing countries. Countries like Kenya, Ghana,
Tanzania, Indonesia, and the Philippines operate accreditation systems at the
private HEIs level.
Regarding the World Bank’s role, Collins and Rhoads (2008) found that
the private sector was relatively weak in developing countries such as Uganda
and Thailand. They argued that one-size-fits-all solutions do not work in
developing countries. They noted that the World Bank is legitimizing its posi-
tion through private programs, but on the contrary, is also imposing “condi-
tions to loans that restrict national support for higher education and the
development of public universities” (p. 215), raising the issue of contradic-
tions in the World Bank’s real ambition toward HEIs in developing countries.
In a developed country’s experience, Ubillos (2005) argued that “the most
striking point about privatization in Spain is the succession of different priva-
tization policies used by the central government, involving three different
stages and very diverse economic and political rationalities” (p. 131).
However, Al’Abri (2011) found that education policy in Oman had been seri-
ously affected by private processes.
In a cross-country study, Holzhacker, Chornovian, Yazilitas, and Dayan-
Ocher (2009) examined the private experiences of four countries, including
the development and expansion of private HEIs, the increased reliance of
public HEIs on private funding, and the operation of colleges and universities
in a businesslike manner in Brazil, Mongolia, the Netherlands, and Ukraine.
In Mongolia, they found that the country followed a market-driven approach,
with minimal government control and a diminished involvement of the pub-
lic sector, as well as the full transfer of institutions from state to private own-
ership. The criteria for establishing a new HEI were weakly defined, with a
lack of experienced teachers, and a lack of monitoring guidelines. In Ukraine,
despite having a wide range of private HEIs, the government exerted strict
control over both state and private HEIs. The study revealed that government
officials accepted bribes for licensing and accreditation and that cheating is
rampant in Ukrainian HEIs. In Brazil, the government was also actively
involved in the regulation of private HEIs. In the case of the Netherlands,
independent agencies were involved in regulation.
Levy (2013) argued that the overall decline of private HEIs raises a question
on the credibility and realities of education quality. For example, there has been
a decline in enrollments in Romania from 36% to 22% (1992-2005; Pachuashvili,
2009) and in Argentina only seven private HEIs were established between 1995
and 2008 (Rabossi, 2010). Similarly, Levy found some mixed evidence of pri-
vate HEI success. For example, despite the high growth of private HEIs,
Nurunnabi 439
government policy in Ethiopia was detrimental to the growth of HEIs, possible

because of public sector lobbying with government agencies. He also concluded
that heavy regulation would restrict the growth of private HEIs.
In discussing the widening participation in private HEIs in Ghana and
Tanzania, Morley (2014) raised questions about value for money and how far
students are valued. She found that students who enrolled for private HEIs
were from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds and had a history of being
failed by the education sector; also, many universities were below minimal
quality standards, and some unscrupulous lecturers were found to be involved
in corruption (e.g., enhancing grades in return for sexual or monetary favors).
In the Case of Bangladesh, Hopper (1998, p. 5) noted that “3-year under-
graduate degrees took an average of 6 years to complete in major prestigious
public universities in Bangladesh.” M. Alam and Haque (2004) found that
due to some unscheduled closures of public universities, students were moti-
vated to study in private universities in Bangladesh. M. Alam, Haque, and
Siddique (2007) found that the politicization of higher education had an
adverse impact on quality assurance in Bangladeshi private HEIs. They
observed that the number of students was growing in private HEIs, but also
found an ineffective administrative structure, a lack of regulation, and an
absence of quality control among HEIs.
Al-Samarrai (2008) argued that the country’s poor governance structure
and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms were weakening the
links between policy and implementation in terms of achieving national edu-
cation goals in Bangladesh. G. M. Alam (2009) also mentioned that private
HEIs in Bangladesh are now considered as a business good rather than a
public good due to poor governance. He strongly argued that the governance
and regulatory mechanisms initially set up for public systems may not be
suited to private HEIs. In a recent study, The World Bank (2014b) evidenced
that the governance arrangements in HEIs reflect the politicization of aca-
demic decision making and operations in Bangladesh. Some other issues
were also highlighted, including the lack of internal and external quality
assurance measures, and the recruitment of properly qualified staff.
Accountability Framework
Accountability can be defined as “being answerable to audiences for per-
forming up to prescribed standards that are relevant to fulfilling obligations,
duties, expectations, and other charges” (Schlenker, 1997, p. 242). Individuals
are expected to adopt and implement a solution involving the least effort
(cognitive miser or acceptability heuristic) when audience views are known
(Tetlock, 1983, 1992). In contrast, they are more likely to engage in complex
and self-critical thinking (preemptive self-criticism) when audience views

are unknown (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Proper accountability ensures more
transparency in HEIs (Altbach, 1999; Altbach & Teferra, 2004).
In the public administration literature, accountability is regarded as the
central concept of public administration (Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008;
M. Bovens, 1998, M. A. P. Bovens, 2005; M. Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans,
2014; Dubnick, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2011; Dubnick & Frederickson, 2010;
Dubnick & Justice, 2004; Dubnick & Yang, 2011; Johnston & Romzek, 2008;
Romzek, 1996, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, 1998; Romzek & Ingraham,
2000; Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012;
Romzek et al., 2011; Ryan, & Walsh, 2004; Yang, 2012). Romzek and
Dubnick (1987) emphasized accountability as answerability and managing
expectations. Similar to this idea, M. Bovens (1998) highlighted accountabil-
ity as the sense of liability among agents of governance. It is something that
is imposed on actors and to which actors must respond (Dubnick, 1998).
According to Romzek and Dubnick (1987), “public administration account-
ability involves the means by which public agencies and their workers man-
age the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organization”
(p. 228). Dubnick and Yang (2011) opined that “Accountability involves the
means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expec-
tations generated within and outside the organization” (p. 171). Prior research
has made significant progress over the two decades and has focused on vari-
ous accountability issues. Regarding New Public Management (NPM),
Dubnick (2005) argued that the performance-centered program improves
government accountability. Johnston and Romzek (2008) argued that privati-
zation and hybrid organizations lead to great accountability challenges and
require particular accountability capacities (Acar et al., 2008; Romzek et al.,
2012). Acar et al. (2008) therefore suggested that accountability should be
viewed as managing diverse expectations from multiple stakeholders. Yang
(2012) questioned that
accountability remains to be an irritating problem: It is unclear exactly how

public managers deal with conflicting accountability pressures and how
accountability systems can make a positive difference. This problem becomes
more pressing in the new governance environment that is more fluid, uncertain,
and complex and in which power is shared by actors with relatively equal
standing. (p. 256)
Several studies have examined accountability issues in relation to HEIs in

developed countries (Ball, 2007, 2009; Biesta, 2004; Boer & Goedegebuure,
2007; Dean, 1999; De Lissovoy & McLaren, 2003; Huisman & Currie, 2004;
Hunt, 2009; Olssen, Codd, & O’Neill, 2004; McLendon, James, & Russ,
Nurunnabi 441
Accountor Accountee
[Accounting for] Accountability [Accounting for]
• Management & Students

Administration (A1)
• Academics (A2)
• Regulation (A3)
• Government (A4)
Figure 4. Accountability dimensions—Conceptual model.

Note. A1 and A2 are micro accountability; A3 and A4 are macro accountability. A = account-
ability dimension.
2006; Tikly, 2003; Webb, 2011). The key condition with accountability is
dependent on an axiological argument (Ball, 2009). Most prior studies dis-
cuss the theoretical paradigm of accountability and HEI policies. Huisman
and Currie (2004) and Webb (2011) called for a broader dimension of
accountability to measure the outcome of policies and practices in HEIs. In
this study, accountability may be defined as policies, practices, procedures,
and assessment of outcomes that measure the quality of performance of pri-
vate HEIs. Following prior studies (Romzek, 2000; Webb, 2011), the account-
ability framework in this study builds up an analytical heuristic triangle,
illustrating four propositions (“A” denotes the Accountability dimension) as
Figure 4 shows.
A1: Management and Administration,

A2: Academics,
A3: Regulatory Framework, and
A4: Government’s action.
These four propositions describe specific aspects of accountability in an

attempt to ascertain how more accountability can provide benefits for private
HEIs. First, the Accountability of Management and Administration in HEIs
includes tuition fees, registration/enrollment, classroom facilities, students’
involvement in decision-making processes, library facilities, research, cam-
puses, personal counseling services, and not-for-profit motives (Boer &
Goedegebuure, 2007; McLendon et al., 2006). Second, the Accountability of
Academics involves university teachers’/instructors’ specialized degree(s) in
their respective fields, assessment criteria, feedback, required office hours,

effective communication via email or blackboard, and caring about students’
academic issues (Huisman & Currie, 2004). Third, the Accountability of the
Regulatory Framework encompasses existing laws such as the Private
University Act (1992, 2010), and the effective implementation of the national
regulatory framework (Hunt, 2009; Romzek, 2000). Fourth, the Accountability
of the Government’s action is concerned with the rapport between the gov-
ernment’s role (via the Ministry of Education and the UGC of Bangladesh)
and HEIs, as well as considering political pressure and corruption (TIB,
2014; TI, 2014; Webb, 2011).
The first two dimensions (A1 and A2) can be described as micro forms of
accountability and the next two dimensions (A3 and A4) are macro forms of
accountability. Macro forms of political accountability deal with the govern-
ing mentality toward societal control and demarcate the governing practices
to some extent (Foucault, 1991), whereas micro forms deal with individual
organizational behavior within the society (Tikly, 2003). The linkages
between these macro and micro forms portray the overall accountability sce-
nario of HEIs (Biesta, 2004). Understanding the linkages can also be useful
in relation to the private–public partnerships in HEIs (Ball, 2007).
Prior research highlights that there is no perfect model of accountability
(Weber, 1999). Romzek and Johnston (2005) stressed that accountability is
based on the classic principal-agent model but it has serious limitations in the
context of private HEIs. This is because private organizations are not subject to
direct political accountability (M. A. P. Bovens, 2005). Dubnick and Yang
(2011) offered accountability matrix that can be regarded as a problematic situ-
ation, which is perceived occurs at different stage (input, process, outcomes).
At the input stage, accountability mechanism is associated with how to struc-
ture, manage, and monitor the problematic situation that results. However, the
tensions exist among the various notions of accountability (input, process, and
output; Dubnick, 2005). In this study, I focus upon input- and process-based
accountabilities (the problem-solving agent assigns to the solution). The key
issue here is how input and process-based accountabilities tend to drive the
adoption of private HEIs in Bangladesh (also addresses the answers to the
questions of “for what?” and “to whom?”). However, due to paucity literature
on accountability in private HEIs in developing countries, future research could
be conducted by linking input–outcome accountability mechanism.
Method
A multi-method (also referred to as a mixed methodology) approach involv-
ing survey and document analyses was adopted for this study. Such an
Nurunnabi 443
approach entails the application of two or more sources of data or research

methods to the investigation of a research. According to Fuentes (2008), a
multi-method approach provides “richer detail than either method can gener-
ate alone” (p. 1592). The complementary principle in terms of the acceptabil-
ity of multi-methods means that this is often a better approach than a single
method (Jick, 1979). Importantly, in terms of the generalization of the con-
clusions reached, a multi-method approach offers insights and evidence that
will contribute toward a wider set of plausible explanations (Bennett &
Braumoeller, 2006), which can also be applied more widely. This approach
also creates a bridge between ontological (quantitative) and epistemological
(qualitative) schools of thoughts in the research paradigm (Modell, 2010).
First, in terms of the present research’s survey, all the respondents met the
following criteria: They were students studying undergraduate or postgraduate
courses in private universities in Bangladesh and were willing to participate
voluntarily. The data were collected from 52 private universities between June
and December 2012. The population of the current study represents all
Bangladeshi private universities (as of June 2012, the total number of private
universities was 52). Initially, a total of 1,560 questionnaires were sent to the 52
universities (30 questionnaires to each university). In total, 900 respondents
replied by October 2013. Further requests for participation were subsequently
made in early November 2013 for the rest of the participants, and a further 215
replied. Out of 1,115 (initial 900 + further 215) respondents, 69 respondents’
questionnaires were excluded due to missing information. The adjusted sample
size was therefore 1,046 (900 + 215 – 69) and the true response rate was
67.05% (1,046/1,560). The response rate is typically seen as high and accept-
able compared with prior studies (G. M. Alam, 2009). The non-response bias
was mitigated through extensive effort and a follow-up strategy by the
researcher. A statistical test (a chi-square) was also conducted to detect bias.
The result does not show a statistical significant difference. Non-response bias
was unlikely to be a problem for this study. The present study is unique in
gathering a large sample of a developing country’s experience.
The preliminary questionnaire was developed based on the accountability
framework and on prior research (Boer & Goedegebuure, 2007; Huisman &
Currie, 2004; Hunt, 2009; McLendon et al., 2006; Romzek, 2000; Webb, 2011).
Then, it was modified and peer reviewed by a focus group of 43 participants
(28 students studying undergraduate and postgraduate programs at five private
universities, five academics from four universities, six management staff from
three universities, and a member of governmental staff from the UGC). One
official of the Ministry of Education was invited to participate but declined.
The feedback from this focus group helped to ensure that the wording, format,
length, and sequencing of the questionnaire were appropriate. The
questionnaire was made up of three parts: Demographic information in Section

A, Accountability of private universities in Section B, and Open space for opin-
ion/comments in Section C (see the appendix for the Survey Questionnaire of
this study). All the questions in Section B were closed-ended and constructed
according to the Likert-type scale with a value of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree), as suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007). The 5-point Likert-
type scale was used because the majority (31 out of 43) of the participants in
the focus group felt uncomfortable with a more complex scale of 7 points. The
study followed the appropriate ethical guidelines. Students were given the
absolute right to withdraw at any time and their anonymity was guaranteed
(Bryman & Bell, 2007; Henslin, 1995). All the respondents were coded and
pooled for analysis so that individual students could not be identified.
Second, the study also evaluates selected public documents, including offi-
cial reports by the government (Private University Act, 1992, Bangladesh;
Private University Act, 2010, Bangladesh; Bangladesh Bureau of Educational
Information & Statistics; The UGC of Bangladesh; Ministry of Education;
Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education (Directorate of Secondary and
Higher Education, 2014); The Higher Education Quality Enhancement Project
[HEQEP, 2014]), those of donor agencies (The World Bank, IMF, ADB, IFC
(International Finance Corporation), UNICEF, UNESCO), and by indepen-
dent research institutes (TIB, TI), newspapers (The Daily Star, New Age, The
Bangladesh Observer, Prothom Alo, University World News, The Economist).
All documents were published between 1992 and 2014 in relation to private
universities in Bangladesh. The primary objective in evaluating the docu-
ments was to triangulate the research method and to understand the ways in
which the private HEIs idea was constructed in Bangladesh. This approach
was followed by prior research (Bøyum, 2014; Gür, Çelik, & Özoğlu, 2012).
The ethical argumentation used is based on Walton’s (2003) model.
Results and Discussion

Respondents’ Characteristics
From the survey results of the 1,046 respondents, it was observed that respon-
dents were 78.1% male and most of them were aged between 18 and 27 years
(97.6%); 88.6% were single, 67.9% were from a small university, and 91.1%
were Muslim (Table 2). This is understandable because Bangladesh is a pre-
dominantly Muslim country and only 25.27% of students enrolled for courses
in private universities in 2012 were female (The UGC Annual Report, 2012).
The reason for the large number of respondents in this study being from small
universities is that there were only six universities (American International
Nurunnabi 445
Table 2. Respondent Characteristics (n = 1,046).
Characteristics Number of respondents %

Age
18-22 618 59.1
23-27 394 37.7
28 and above 34 3.2
Total 1,046 100
Gender
Male 817 78.1
Female 229 21.9
Total 1,046 100
Marital status
Single 927 88.6
Married 105 10.0
Divorced 14 1.4
Total 1,046 100
Category of university
Small university 710 67.9
Large university 336 32.1
Total 1,046 100
Religion
Muslim 953 91.1
Hindu 67 6.4
Christian 14 1.3
Buddhist 3 0.3
Missing value 9 0.9
Total 1,046 100
Education level
Undergraduate 925 88.4
Postgraduate 66 6.3
Others 55 5.3
Total 1,046 100
Education (studying year)
Year 1 253 24.2
Year 2 248 23.7
Year 3 269 25.7
Year 4 250 23.9
Year 5 and above 26 2.5
Total 1,046 100
(continued)
Table 2. (continued)
Characteristics Number of respondents %

Tuition fees (average per year in Tk.)
30,000-50,000 146 14.0
51,000-70,000 98 9.3
71,000-90,000 139 13.3
91,000-110,000 300 28.7
110,000-130,000 166 15.9
131,000 and 197 18.8
above
Total 1,046 100
Absence in last 6 months
Less than 4 days 351 33.6
5-10 days 349 33.4
11-15 days 171 16.3
16-20 days 89 8.5
21-25 days 35 3.3
26 and above 40 3.8
Missing value 11 1.1
Total 1,046 100
Note. Tk. = Taka, the local currency unit of Bangladesh.
University Bangladesh; BRAC University; East West University; Independent

University, Bangladesh; North South University; and Southeast University)
in the “large” category in the country, whereas the other 46 were “small.”
In addition, 88.4% respondents were studying for undergraduate degrees
whereas only 6.3% represented postgraduate studies. In terms of education
years, there was on an average an equal selection of year 1 to year 4 students
(97.5%), whereas only 2.5% were in year 5 and above. The tuition fees vary
across different universities in an academic year (from Tk. 30,000
[US$384.12] to 131,000 [US$1,664.53] and above5). This is because there
are no clear guidelines for unified tuition fees in Bangladesh from the UGC
(“Certificate Business in Private Universities,” 2014; Transparency
International Bangladesh (TIB), 2014). Furthermore, 67% of the respondents
were absent for fewer than 10 days in the last 6 months of the academic year.
The underlying factor for this limited absence was that the instructors of pri-
vate universities award marks for presence in class (for instance, 5% out of
100%) and so students are inclined to get this easy mark.
Nurunnabi 447
Factor Analysis
A factor analysis was carried out to reduce from 43 statements to four
Accountability Dimensions (Table 3). Principal components analysis and vari-
max rotation were used to transform the data into composite variables in a sum-
marized form (Gorsuch, 1983). Following the factor analysis, statements with
factor loading of less than 0.4 were excluded in the analysis. Furthermore, state-
ments with eigenvalues equal to or greater than 1 were considered significant.
The analysis resulted in a reduced 29 statements, as follows: A1: Management
and Administration [Q1, Q2, Q3, Q7, Q8, Q10, Q11, Q16, Q17, Q18]; A2:
Academics [Q21, Q22, Q23, Q27, Q28, Q29, Q30, Q31, Q32, Q33, Q34, Q35];
A3: Regulatory Framework [Q36, Q37, Q38, Q39]; and A4: Government’s
action [Q41, Q42, Q43]. The factors from this analysis were able to explain
65.92% of the total variance. This is higher than the prior studies: Kwan and Ng
(1999) reported 54.2% and Tan and Kek (2004) reported 65%.
Reliability and Validity

A reliability test was conducted for each accountability dimension. It was
found that the Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficients for the four dimensions
ranged from .759 (Regulatory Framework) to .878 (Academics), which
exceeded the recommended .7 level (Cronbach, 1951). To test the construct
and discriminant validity, Nunnally’s (1978) method was used in this study
(Table 4). For instance, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy exceeded .50, the level recommended in a prior study (Bryman &
Cramer, 1997). Bartlett’s Sphericity test of four dimensions was significant at
a .0001 level, which led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of the four
accountability dimensions and the conclusion that there were correlations in
the data set that were appropriate for factor analysis. Bryman and Cramer
(1997) suggested that correlation between variables should not exceed .8 or
.9. In this study, all the correlations were measured at lower than .8 (Table 5).
Regression Analysis
To further investigate the determinants of the overall accountability dimen-
sions as dependent variables, a regression analysis was conducted. Most
studies on accountability in the literature are qualitative or conceptual in
nature (Acar et al., 2008; Dubnick, 2003, 2005; Romzek, 1996; Romzek &
Dubnick, 1987, 1998; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000; Yang, 2012). Yang (2012)
noted that “Few studies use accountability institutions/expectations as the
dependent variable, and even fewer studies examine them as the independent
Table 3. Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation.
Factors and items A1 A2 A3 A4 Communalities

Management and Administration (A1)
Q11 .810 .585
Q10 .792 .597
Q2 .751 .543
Q7 .693 .972
Q3 .679 .557
Q17 .678 .658
Q1 .672 .563
Q18 .607 .490
Q16 .596 .687
Q8 .540 .983
Academics (A2)
Q22 .724 .487
Q21 .706 .433
Q23 .672 .447
Q34 .671 .546
Q28 .659 .686
Q33 .648 .571
Q35 .629 .541
Q32 .608 .568
Q30 .607 .564
Q29 .578 .618
Q27 .565 .548
Q31 .553 .519
Regulatory Framework (A3)
Q39 .655 .623
Q38 .606 .591
Q37 .557 .633
Q36 .510 .547
Government’s action (A4)
Q43 .650 .758
Q42 .828 .798
Q41 .737 .701
Note. Extraction method: principal components analysis; rotation method: varimax with Kaiser
normalization, which converged after four iterations.
Nurunnabi 449
Table 4. Reliability and Validity.
Kaiser- Bartlett’s
% Cronbach’s Meyer-Olkin Sphericity
Factors Eigenvalue variation α measure test
Management and 6.819 68.19 .771 .791 .0001*
Administration (A1)
Academics (A2) 7.619 63.50 .878 .901 .0001*
Regulatory 2.327 58.19 .759 .758 .0001*
Framework (A3)
Government’s 2.215 73.84 .818 .671 .0001*
action (A4)
*p < .0001 level.
and dependent variables simultaneously” (p. 260). In the present study, over-
all accountability as dependent has been derived from the survey
instrument.
The regression analysis was performed by taking the ratings of 1,046
respondents in relation to the four accountability dimensions and items
related to the extracted factors. These extracted factors have been taken as
four independent variables. The purpose of the analysis was to identify the
significant factors in contributing to the accountability framework in this
study. The regression model of this study is as follows:
OA = β0 + β1A1 + β2A2 + β3A3 + β4A4 + ε,
where the dependent variable OA is the overall accountability. The indepen-
dent variables are as follows: A1 = factors score of the Management and
Administration, A2 = factors score of the Academics, A3 = factors score of the
Regulatory Framework, A4 = factors score of the Government’s action, β0 =
(1)
constant, β1−β4 = the parameters or regression estimates, and ε = the stochas-
tic disturbance term.
The multiple regression results are shown in Table 6. In all four account-
ability dimensions, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were less than 10 and the
tolerance levels were more than 1 (see Table 6). This suggests that the regres-
sion model was not subject to any multicolinearity problems in interpreting
the regression analysis results (Myers, 1990). The Durbin–Watson score was
1.818, which means that the regression model was significant. Table 6 also
shows that the model that emerged from the regression had an adjusted R2
value of .759, which means that the four accountability dimensions accounted
for 75.9% of the variation. All four independent variables were significant
(p < .001).
450
Table 5. Correlations Matrix and Descriptive Statistics.
Management and Regulatory Government’s

Accountability Administration Academics Framework action M SD
Accountability 1 3.284 0.630
Management and administration .707** 1 3.302 0.723
Academics .739** .502** 1 3.440 0.703
Regulatory Framework .573** .388** .448** 1 3.150 0.832
Government’s action .467** .241** .378** .479** 1 2.940 1.062
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level, one-tailed.

Nurunnabi 451
Table 6. Regression Analysis: Four Accountability Factors (n = 1,046).

Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity
coefficients coefficients statistics
Variable B SE β t Significance Tolerance VIF
(Constant) .133 0.056 — 2.384 .017 — —

Management and .362 0.016 .416 22.642 .001 .684 1.463
Administration
Academics .365 0.017 .407 21.167 .001 .624 1.602
Regulatory .121 0.014 .160 8.409 .001 .640 1.563
Framework
Government’s .074 0.011 .125 7.031 .001 .735 1.360
action
Model summary
R .872
R2 .760
Adjusted R2 .759
F change 823.669
Significance F change .001
Durbin–Watson 1.818
F value 823.669
Significance .001
Note. Dependent variable: Accountability; Independent variables: Management and Administration (A1), Aca-
demics (A2), Regulatory Framework (A3), and Government’s action (A4). VIFs = variance inflation factors.
The findings indicate that all four dimensions are contributing factors to
the overall accountability of private higher education sector in Bangladesh.
The standardized coefficients beta (parameter estimation) value indicates
that Regulatory Framework (.160) and Government’s action (.125) were
less able to explain accountability, whereas the Management and
Administration (.416), and Academics (.407) factors were more likely to
determine the level of accountability of private HEIs in Bangladesh. This
is understandable because the respondents, as students, are not familiar
with the regulatory issues surrounding private HEIs in Bangladesh. It is
also apparent that private HEIs should be more accountable through more
effective governance and ensuring that they use qualified academics.
The statistical results warrant caution as to the limitations of findings
because it is difficult to generalize (Tan & Kek, 2004). Therefore, the results
need to be interpreted in relative rather than absolute terms (particularly the
findings on the Regulatory Framework and Government’s action).
MV % 0.9%
SD% 6.9%
D% 21. 3%
UC% 27.5%
A% 32.6%
SA% 10.8%
Figure 5. Accountability of Management and Administration (A1).

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree; MV = missing
value; UC = uncertain.
Micro Accountability
As indicated in the “Accountability Framework” section, micro accountabil-
ity in this study focused upon the Management and Administration (A1) and
Academics (A2) of private HEIs. Regarding Management and Administration,
43.4% of the respondents agreed on the management and administration’s
effectiveness (Figure 5); 27.5% were undecided and 28.2% disagreed.
Respondents were critical of higher tuition fees because these were increas-
ing every year but the relevant authority failed to provide any guidelines or a
cap policy to stop that trend (Quddus & Rashid, 2000). The governance struc-
tures did not involve stakeholders in the committees (G. M. Alam, 2009;
Al-Samarrai, 2008; Fielden & LaRocque, 2008) and managements were
careless about research and library facilities. Unsurprisingly, like other devel-
oping countries, most of the private HEIs in Bangladesh operate as profit
centers (M. Alam et al., 2007). In addition, with the exception of few large
universities, the majority of universities did not have their own permanent
campus.
In relation to academics, the majority of respondents (52.4%) were posi-
tive about their instructors (Figure 6) whereas 27.4% were not certain about
the efficiency and effectiveness of the academics they knew. Interestingly,
although the respondents were generally positive about the qualifications of
their instructors (66.57%), the assessment criteria and feedback appeared
meticulous and quite complex to them. Corruption in terms of enhancing
grades is rampant in Bangladesh. Corruption in all sectors is well known
because Bangladesh has been declared one of the most corrupt countries in
Nurunnabi 453
MV % 0.6%
SD% 3.7%
D% 15.7%
UC% 27.4%
A% 38.4%
SA% 14.0%
Figure 6. Accountability of Academics (A2).

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree.
the world (TI, 2014). However, corruption in the education sector is quite
new. One implication is that this will create a culture, which will be unlikely
to vanish in the future. Similar findings were reported by Meier (2004) in
developing countries, Holzhacker et al. (2009) in Mongolia and Ukraine and
Morley (2014) in Ghana and Tanzania. Furthermore, the majority of respon-
dents did not make any comment on their instructors’ ability to explain things
clearly, or on required office hours or effective communications. This is pos-
sibly because of the shortage of full-time academic staff in Bangladesh and
because part-timers have less commitment toward maintaining office hours.
Overall, there were 32.5% part-time instructors in 52 universities in 2012
(The UGC Annual Report, 2012).
Macro Accountability
In this study, “macro accountability” is based on the two factors of Regulatory
Framework (A3) and Government’s action (A4) in relation to private HEIs in
Bangladesh. With respect to the regulatory framework, respondents were not
divided in their opinions. Most of them expressed the view that the existing
regulatory framework is not effectively implemented; 31.2% also doubted
the existing regulatory framework (Figure 7). This could be due to the fact
that the UGC is not active in enforcing the regulations; rather, it is a provider
of policy prescription. The two relevant Acts (the Private University Act,
1992, Bangladesh, and the Private University Act, 2010, Bangladesh) regard-
ing private HEIs both share a lack of guidelines and implementation mea-
sures. For instance, in 2004, according to “40-45 Varsities Way Behind
Prerequisites” (2004), 40 to 45 out of 49 universities lacked compliance with
SD% 7.45%
D% 21.5%
UC% 30.1%
A% 30.6%
SA% 10.4%
Figure 7. Accountability of Regulatory Framework (A3).

regulations; in 2005, 50 universities were offering courses without approval

from the UGC (“Eleven Private Universities Offer 50,” 2005) but notices
were only given to six universities (“Ministry Serves Notice on Six Private
Universities,” 2005). Related allegations were also raised in 2006 based on
the announcement that 15 universities were advertising courses in daily
newspapers without the UGC’s approval; unfortunately no action was taken
against them (Illegal Courses, Mysterious Outer Campuses,”2006, “Private
Universities Continue to Hoodwink UGC,”2006). Similar findings were
reported by Amaral and Teixeira (2000) in Portugal and by Banya (2001) in
sub-Saharan African countries. However, the findings of this present study
contradict Levy (2013) who argued that heavy regulation will restrict the
growth of private HEIs in developing countries. In the context of Bangladesh,
the regulations are there, but lack sufficient enforcement.
Regarding the government’s action, 34.6% respondents were critical of
the government’s role in privatizing HEIs in Bangladesh (Figure 8); 24.8%
did not provide any comment. One possible reason for silence is that some
respondents felt intimidated with regard to making any comments on the gov-
ernment in a developing country like Bangladesh. The current tendency of
the government agencies (in particular, the UGC of Bangladesh, the Ministry
of Education, and the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education) is
approval for new universities after accepting bribes and sometimes via politi-
cal connections (M. Alam et al., 2007; “Private Univs Make Money at
Education’s Cost,” 2014). As mentioned, the UGC of Bangladesh is the sin-
gle statutory body responsible for external quality assurance in higher educa-
tion in Bangladesh. The major functions of the UGC are to assess the needs
Nurunnabi 455
SD% 13.4%
D% 21.2%
UC% 24.8%
A% 25.7%
SA% 14.8%
Figure 8. Accountability of Government’s action (A4).

of university education and formulate plans for its development; determine

the financial needs of the universities; evaluate the educational programs of
university teaching departments, institutes, and other constituent bodies; and
to visit the universities as and when necessary to evaluate programs and
assess their needs and requirements. However, the UGC has repeatedly been
questioned over its inspection and supervision of universities since the incep-
tion of private universities in Bangladesh. The UGC has only 13 personnel
and one of its members is responsible for supervision. Furthermore, the
Ministry of Education has only seven staff who are responsible for the
approval, auditing, supervision, and disciplinary action where necessary
against private universities in the whole of Bangladesh (“‘Thieves’, Certificate
Business and UGC’s Alarm,” 2014).
According to TIB (2014), 29.6% of private universities are run by busi-
nessmen with strong political connections with the government. It was also
found that during 2012-2013, most of the approved new universities’ owners
were democratic government officials (the Awami League), such as relatives
of the Prime Minister, the State Minister’s wife, the Whip of the Parliament,
three Awami League leaders, a relative of an adviser to the Prime Minister,
the Home Affairs Minister, the former Awami Students’ League (Chattra)
President, an Awami League Advisory Council Member, an Awami League
lawmaker, and the Minister and Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Education (“Seven New Private Univs Soon,” 2013).
Allegations have been made regarding selling certificates (certificating busi-
nesses; “Certificate Business in Private Universities,” 2014), having no vice
chancellors or faculties (“12 Universities Run With Unauthorized Staffs,”
2007; “Twenty Seven Private Varsities,” 2004), and having no compliance

with current regulations. No corrupt universities have been shut down to date.
Interestingly, the government denies the findings of the report of the TIB
(2014), which also imply that the government has played a role in exerting
corruption (“Prove Allegations or Apologise,” 2014; “TIB Report and State
of Denial,” 2014). Prior research has also found that the government is lenient
in overseeing the overall activities of private HEIs in developing countries
(Collins & Rhoads, 2008 [Uganda and Thailand]; Holzhacker et al., 2009
[Mongolia]).
Moreover, 133 of the 1,046 (12.72%) respondents provided additional
views on three of the accountability dimensions (Table 7). The majority of
respondents were male and from large universities. None of them commented
on the regulatory framework dimension. The majority (64.66%) commented
on administration and management and 19.5% commented on the govern-
ment’s role. In summary, these views highlighted the unhelpful nature of stu-
dent advice, the misbehavior of admin staff, corruption in relation to student
admission, the profit-making motives of management, the nepotism of some
academics in grading, the political connectedness behind promoting low-
graded universities, unequal grading policies across private universities, high
tuition fees, and high student-to-teacher ratios. Corruption, unfair grading
and profit-making issues were highlighted most often. Despite the high
growth in the enrollments of private universities in recent years in Bangladesh,
low numbers of foreign students have sought to study there due to the per-
ceived low-quality assurance and lack of accountability (“International
Students in Private Universities,” 2014; TIB 2014). The government’s Private
University Act (2010) focused on quality assurance, the accreditation coun-
cil, and research issues. As part of this process, the HEQEP was established
to improve learning and research in the private HEIs (Ministry of Education,
2014).
Conclusion
The study has investigated the accountability issues of private universi-
ties in a developing country, Bangladesh. In particular, the following
questions were explored: What are the roles of the private HEIs in terms
of accountability? What is the role of the regulators in privatizing HEIs?
And, what are the major obstacles to bridging the accountability gap in
private HEIs? An accountability framework (encompassing macro and
micro accountability) was derived from the prior research (Huisman &
Currie, 2004; Webb, 2011). Based on a survey (1,046 respondents from
all 52 universities in Bangladesh) and documentary analysis, the study
Nurunnabi 457
Table 7. Respondents’ Additional Views (n = 133).
Accountability No. of
dimensions Problems respondents %
Management and Higher students–teachers ratio 6 4.5
Administration
(A1)
Higher tuition fees 10 7.5
No own campus 10 7.5
Students advising system is not 15 11.3
helpful
Misbehavior of admin staff 9 6.8
Website is not updated 8 6.0
regularly
Students intake by corruption 13 9.8
Profit-making motives 15 11.3
Academics (A2) Lack of qualified lecturers 7 5.3
Nepotism in grading 14 10.5
Government’s Political connectedness of 9 6.8
action (A4) promoting low-graded
universities
The UGC is careless in 12 9.0
enforcing law
Not equal grading policy 5 3.8
among universities
Total 133 100.0
Note. Respondents additional views characteristics: male = 89, female = 44; large university =
70, small and medium university = 63; Management and Administration: 86; Academics: 21;
Government’s action: 26. UGC = University Grants Commission.
has revealed two interesting findings. First, the study is one of the first to
explore the accountability gap in a developing country through research
involving all private universities. Hence, the study contributes to the lit-
erature on the private HEIs as to how accountable they are. Second, macro
accountability (complexities in the regulatory framework, lack of enforce-
ment, and governmental leniency toward quality control issues) is the
most important contributing factor to the unsatisfactory consequences of
the rapid growth of private HEIs in Bangladesh. Corruption (in terms of
both macro and micro accountability) is rampant in Bangladeshi HEIs.
For instance, corrupt practices in approving HEIs, corruption via enhanc-
ing grades through bribes, and the effects of political connectedness all
contribute to an accountability gap. Continually corrupt practices and
violation of regulations with impunity are part of a well-established cul-

ture over the last 22 years, raising a serious question on the accountability
of the government and the regulator. In this regard, the study contradicts
Levy (2013) who found that private HEIs were declining worldwide. In
Bangladesh, the growth of private HEIs is not due to market demand or
social justice but seemingly part of the government’s political agenda.
In addition, in common with prior studies in developing countries (G. M.
Alam, 2009; Al-Samarrai, 2008; Amaral & Teixeira, 2000; Banya, 2001;
Fielden & LaRocque, 2008; “High University Enrolment,” 2014; Holzhacker
et al., 2009; Morley, 2014; Quddus & Rashid, 2000; TIB, 2014; The World
Bank, 2008, 2014b), this study finds higher tuition fees, higher student–
teacher ratios, unequal grading policies, a lack of clear assessment and feed-
back, a lack of universities with their own campus and full-time teaching
staff, and a profit-motive mentality.
Although privatization is the most tangible manifestation of economic
development and growth for developing countries required by the Washington
Consensus (Battaglio, 2009; Cramer, 1999; Megginson, 2005), by the begin-
ning of the 1990s the Washington Consensus was itself facing serious chal-
lenges. Gore (2000) argued that the main challenge to the Washington
Consensus is the convergence between East Asian developmentalism and
Latin American neostructuralism (p. 789). The Washington Consensus’s
blanket demand for privatization is weak (Stiglitz, 1994). McCleery and De
Paolis (2008) also opined,
After guiding development policies for nearly 20 years, the Washington

Consensus lies in shambles. Although selected components remain relevant for
development policies around the world, some specifics of the broader policy
package and, more generally, the concept of a standardized package of policies
applicable to all developing countries have clearly been discredited. (p. 438)
The post-Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a; 1998b)

has a concept of private unlike that reflected in structural adjustment pro-
grams of the 1980s and 1990s (Marangos, 2009). The key issues, including
regulation and competition policy, are both seen as the preserve of the post-
Washington Consensus state (Stiglitz, 1998a). The post-Washington
Consensus recognizes that privatizations were often not well planned: “From
today’s vantage point, the advocates of privatization may have overestimated
the benefits and underestimated the costs” (Stiglitz, 1997a, p. 19). Öniş and
Şenses (2005) also accepted that the post-Washington Consensus provides an
improvement on the Washington Consensus (p. 263).
Nurunnabi 459
Yet, at the same time, the failure of the post-Washington Consensus is

reflected in the findings of the current study. The present findings suggest
that pervasive state failure with corruption in government is major areas of
concern in the context of neoliberal reforms in a developing country like
Bangladesh. It is inevitable that the World Bank’s influence on the education
policies of developing countries has been characterized by strict loan condi-
tionality. Their capacity to shape international policy making has grown
enormously whereas the accountability of their projects simply has not: “The
IMF or the World Bank were neither created nor structured to undertake or to
be accountable for such far-reaching activities” (Woods, 2001, p. 89). This
lack of accountability both of the government of a developing country and of
the international donors undermines the dogmatic attachment to private as a
developmental panacea in Bangladesh.
The paucity of the prior research means that important opportunities to con-
tribute to the policy-making agenda in developing countries remain ready to be
explored. These findings suggest policy implications for government, the
World Bank, and the IMF. For instance, the need for more stringent enforce-
ment and lower levels of corruption still must be addressed seriously by the
state and the World Bank. If successful, this could assist local and international
policymakers (The World Bank, the IMF, the ADB, and UNESCO) in applying
this concept more effectively to HEIs in developing countries.
The study has some limitations. For example, a large number of respondents
were reluctant to talk about the government’s role and stayed silent. The control
variable has not been used for that. Although this is understandable in a devel-
oping country context, future research could be done on how to control unde-
cided responses. The study did not explore donor agencies’ behavior toward the
private HEIs. There is scope for future research on how donor agencies’ fund-
ing is disseminated to private HEIs in developing countries and its effective-
ness using a longitudinal study. Finally, the study has focused upon a developing
country, but studying a group of countries may enrich the findings. There is
need to extend the literature and integrate the current accountability framework
comprising private HEIs of a group of developing countries so that the flux and
transformability of accountability can be better illustrated. Nevertheless, the
findings of the present study can be generalized in terms of the failure of the
post-Washington Consensus on private HEIs in a developing country’s
experience.
Appendix
Survey Questionnaire
Section A: Demographic information
1. Name:_________________________________________________
______________
2. Your age: □ 18-22 □ 23-27 □ 28 and above
3. Gender: □ Male □ Female
4. Marital Status: □ Single □ Married □ Divorced □ Other
5. Religion: □ Muslim □ Hindu □ Christian □ Buddhist □ Others
6. Education (studying at): □ Undergraduate □ Postgraduate □ Other
7. Education (studying year): □ Year 1 □ Year 2 □ Year 3 □Year 4 □Year
5 and above
8. Tuition fees (average per year): □ Tk. 30,000-50,000 □ Tk. 51,000-
70,000 □ Tk. 71,000-90,000 □ Tk. 91,000-110,000 □ Tk. 110,000-
130,000 □ Tk. 131,000 and above
9. How many days have you been absent in your university in the last 6
months (approximately)? □ less than 4 □ 5-10 □ 11-15 □ 16-20 □
21-25 □ 26 and above
Section B: Accountability of private universities

Please circle how well you think we are doing in the following areas: 5 =
strongly agree (SA), 4 = agree (A), 3 = uncertain (UC), 2 = disagree (D) and
1 = strongly disagree (SD)
A1: Questions regarding Management and Administration

1. Services are usually provided as promised or advertised
2. Members of management are credible and instill confidence in you
3. Management is cooperative
4. They have ability to hire the right people
5. Convenience of campus location
6. Students:teacher ratio is low
7. Tuition fees are not increasing at a larger rate
8. Advisor for registration/enrollment (add/drop) policies are reasonable
9. Wider range of subjects to choose in registration
10. Classroom is well equipped (e.g., high technology)
11. Adequate class size
12. Library facilities are 24 hr
13. T hey encourage you to participate in decision-making process (e.g., student rep. in board
meeting)
14. Research seminars/research activities
(continued)
Nurunnabi 461
Appendix (continued)
15. Disability facilities (ease access)
16. They compassionately solves student issues and problems
17. They respond to your queries/issues promptly
18. They provide personal counseling services
19. Management is not working for commercial/profit motives
A2: Questions regarding Academics (e.g., lecturers/professors)
20. Lecturers/professors have specialized degree(s) in their respective field
21. The lecture contents are comprehensive and in detailed
22. The lecturers/professors encourage you to engage in group activities
23. The assessment criteria is clearly identified before the exam
24. The assessment feedback is detailed
25. The assessment is not questionable (such as nepotism)
26. They maintain the required office hours
27. Responding to your letter/email on time
28. They show sincere interest in solving your problem
29. They communicate well with you regarding academic-related issues
30. E xplaining things clearly . . . (fully answering your questions, explaining clearly, giving you
adequate information; not being vague)
31. B eing positive . . . (having a positive approach and a positive attitude; being honest but not
negative about your problems)
32. M aking you feel at ease . . . (being friendly and warm toward you, treating you with
respect; not cold or abrupt)
33. S eeming genuinely concerned, connecting with you on a human level; not being indifferent
or “detached”
34. T hey accurately understand your concerns; not overlooking or dismissing anything
35. R eally listening . . . (paying close attention to what you were saying; not looking at the
notes or computer as you were talking)
A3: Questions regarding Regulatory Framework
36. You are aware of existing law regarding any malpractice
37. The private universities are ethical in making profit
38. You can think of going for legal action if anything goes wrong
39. T he existing educational regulatory frameworks are effectively being implemented
A4: Questions regarding Government’s action
40. T he government has major role(s) to play in overseeing the private universities activities
41. The Ministry of Education is active in its role (e.g., enforcement issues)
42. T he University Grants Commission is active in its role (e.g., enforcement issues)
43. T he political pressure is not a barrier to take actions against corrupt private universities
Section C: Open space for opinion/comments on private universities in

Bangladesh (e.g., problems or any type of suggestions to improve the current
scenario)
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.
Notes
1. The term “developing country” refers to low- and middle-income countries.
The term country, used interchangeably with economy, does not imply political
independence. According to the World Bank (2014c), low-income economies
are defined as those with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$1,045
or less in 2013; middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of
more than US$1,045 but less than US$12,746; high-income economies are those
with a GNI per capita of US$12,746 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-
middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of US$4,125 (http://
data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups).
2. South Asia consists of eight developing countries, namely, Afghanistan, India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal (http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD).
3. The “E” stands for education and the “9” represents nine countries. E9 is a forum
of nine countries—Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Nigeria, and Pakistan. These countries are highly populated countries and also
represent more than 60% of the world’s population (more than two thirds of the
world’s illiterate adults and more than half of the world’s out-of-school children).
The E9 Initiative by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) for achieving “Education for All” (EFA). (http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/
education-for-all/coordination-mechanisms/e-9-initiative/).
4. GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the GNI, converted to U.S. dol-
lars, divided by the midyear population. (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD).
5. Taka (Tk.) is the local currency unit of Bangladesh. According to the World
Bank, in 2013, US$1 = Tk. 78.10 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.
FCRF).
References
Acar, M., Guo, C., & Yang, K. (2008). Accountability when hierarchical authority is
absent views from public-private partnership practitioners. The American Review
of Public Administration, 38, 3-23.
Al’Abri, K. (2011). The impact of globalization on education policy of developing
countries: Oman as an example. Literacy Information and Computer Education
Journal, 2, 491-502.
Alam, G. M. (2009). Can governance and regulatory control ensure private higher
education as business or public goods in Bangladesh? African Journal of Business
Management, 3, 890-906.
Nurunnabi 463
Alam, M., & Haque, S. (2004). Private higher education in Bangladesh. In N. V.

Varghese (Ed.), Private higher education (pp. 1-53). United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Institute of Educational
Planning (IIEP), Paris.
Alam, M., Haque, S., & Siddique, S. F. (2007). Private higher education in
Bangladesh. Paris, France: International Institute for Educational Planning.
Al-Samarrai, B. (2008). Governance and education inequality in Bangladesh (Paper
commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2009, Overcoming
Inequality: Why governance matters). Washington, DC: United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
Altbach, P. (1999). Private higher education: Themes and variation in comparative
perspective. Prospects, 24, 311-323.
Altbach, P., & Teferra, D. (2004). African higher education: Challenges for the 21st
century. Higher Education, 47, 21-50.
Amaral, A., & Teixeira, P. (2000). The rise and fall of the private sector in Portuguese
higher education. Higher Education Policy, 13, 245-266.
Babai, D. (1988). The World Bank and the IMF: Rolling back the state or backing its
role. In R. Vernon (Ed.), The promise of privatization: A challenge for American
foreign policy (pp. 254-275). New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations
Books.
Ball, S. J. (2007). Education plc: Understanding private sector participation in public
sector education. New York, NY: Routledge.
Ball, S. J. (2009). Privatising education, privatising education policy, privatising edu-
cational research: Network governance and the “competition state.” Journal of
Education Policy, 24, 83-99.
Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information & Statistics. (2014). Retrieved from
http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/
Bangladesh Open University Act. (1992). Act No. 38 of 1992. 21 October 1992.
Banya, K. (2001). Are private universities the solution to the higher education crisis
in sub-Saharan Africa? Higher Education Policy, 14, 161-174.
Battaglio, R. P. (2009). Privatization and citizen preferences: A cross-national analy-
sis of demand for private versus public provision of services in three industries.
Administration & Society, 41, 38-66.
Bennell, P. (1996). Using and abusing rates of return. International Journal of
Educational Development, 16, 235-248.
Bennett, A., & Braumoeller, B. (2006). Where the model frequently meets the
road: Combining statistical, formal, and case study methods (Working paper).
Washington, DC: Departments of Government, Georgetown University.
Biesta, G. (2004). Education, accountability, and the ethical demand: Can the demo-
cratic potential of accountability be regained? Educational Theory, 54, 233-250.
Boer, H., & Goedegebuure, L. (2007). Modern governance and codes of conduct in
Dutch higher education. Higher Education Research & Development, 26, 45-55.
Bonal, X. (2002). Plus ca change . . . the World Bank global education policy and the
post Washington Consensus. International Studies in Sociology of Education,
12, 3-22.
Bovens, M. (1998). The quest for responsibility: Accountability and citizenship in

complex organisations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bovens, M., Goodin, R. E., & Schillemans, T. (2014). The Oxford handbook of public
accountability. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bovens, M. A. P. (2005). Public accountability. In E. Ferlie, L. Lynne, & C. Pollitt
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public management (pp. 182-208). Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Bøyum, S. (2014). Fairness in education—A normative analysis of OECD policy
documents. Journal of Education Policy, 29, 856-870.
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2007). Business research methods. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (1997). Quantitative data analysis with SPSS for Windows.
London, England: Routledge.
Certificate business in private universities: What we should do. (2014, July 3). The
Daily Observer.
Collins, C. S., & Rhoads, R. A. (2008). The World Bank and higher education in
the developing world: The cases of Uganda and Thailand. In D. P. Baker &
A. W. Wiseman (Eds.), The worldwide transformation of higher education
(International Perspectives on Education and Society) (Vol. 9, pp. 177-221).
London, UK: Emerald Group.
Cook, P. (1997). Privatization, public enterprise reform and the World Bank: Has
Bureaucrats. Journal of International Development, 9, 888-897.
Cook, P., & Kirkpatrick, C. (1995). The distributional impact of privatization in
developing countries: Who gets what and why? In V. V. Ramanadham (Ed.),
Privatization and equity (pp. 35-48). London, England: Routledge.
Cramer, C. (1999). Privatisation and the post-Washington consensus: Between the
lab and the real world? (Centre for Development Policy & Research (CDPR)
Discussion Paper 0799). London, England: School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London.
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests.
Psychometrika, 16, 97-334.
Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
De Lissovoy, N., & McLaren, P. (2003). Educational “accountability” and the vio-
lence of capital: A Marxian reading. Journal of Education Policy, 18, 131-143.
Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education. (2014). Ministry of Education.
Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved from http://www.dshe.gov.bd/content.
php?id=about_dshe
Dubnick, M. J. (1998). Clarifying accountability: An ethical theory framework. In C.
Sampford & N. Preston (Eds.), Public sector ethics: Finding and implementing
values (pp. 68-81). Sydney, Australia: The Federation Press.
Dubnick, M. J. (2003). Accountability and ethics: Reconsidering the relation-
ships. International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 6, 405-441.
(Reprinted in the Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Policy, pp. 1-14,
New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, 2003).
Nurunnabi 465
Dubnick, M. J. (2005). Accountability and the promise of performance. Public

Performance & Management Review, 28, 376-417.
Dubnick, M. J. (2011). Move over Daniel: We need some “accountability space.”
Administration & Society, 43, 704-716.
Dubnick, M. J., & Frederickson, H. G. (2010). Accountable agents: Federal per-
formance measurement and third-party government. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 20(Suppl. 1), 143-159.
Dubnick, M. J., & Justice, J. (2004, September 2-5). Accounting for accountability.
Paper prepared for presentation at the 2004 meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Dubnick, M. J., & Yang, K. (2011). The pursuit of accountability: Promise, problems, and
prospects. In D. C. Menzel & H. L. White (Eds.), The state of public administration:
Issues, challenges, and opportunities (pp. 171-186). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Eduicon. (2012, October 7). Pvt varsities aren’t following Private University Act
2010-UGC. Retrieved from http://www.eduicon.com/News/Details/1026.html.
Eleven private universities offer 50 courses without UGC approval. (2005, January
18). New Age.
Fielden, J., & LaRocque, N. (2008, June). The evolving regulatory context for pri-
vate education in emerging economies (Discussion paper). Washington, DC:
International Colloquium on Private Education, The World Bank.
Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.),
The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (pp. 87-104). Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press.
40-45 varsities way behind prerequisites. (2004, October 19). The Daily Star.
Fuentes, C. M. M. (2008). Pathways from interpersonal violence to sexually transmit-
ted infections: A mixed method study of diverse women. Journal of Women’s
Health, 17, 1591-1603.
Galal, A., Jones, L., Tandon, P., & Vogelsang, I. (1994). Welfare consequences of sell-
ing public enterprises: An empirical analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gore, C. (2000). The rise and fall of the Washington Consensus as a paradigm for
developing countries. World Development, 28, 789-804.
Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). Factor analysis (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Gür, B. S., Çelik, Z., & Özoğlu, M. (2012). Policy options for Turkey: A critique of
the interpretation and utilization of PISA results in Turkey. Journal of Education
Policy, 27, 1-21.
Henslin, J. M. (1995). What is sociology? In J. M. Henslin (Ed.), Down to earth soci-
ology: Introductory readings (pp. 8-18). New York, NY: The Free Press.
The Higher Education Quality Enhancement Project (HEQEP). (2014). A proj-
ect of University Grants Commission of Bangladesh, Ministry of Education,
Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved from http://www.heqep-ugc.gov.bd/
index.php/home/subproject.
High university enrolment, low graduate employment analysing the paradox in
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. (2014). The
Economist: International Unit. Retrieved from http://www.britishcouncil.in/
sites/britishcouncil.in2/files/british_council_report_2014_jan.pdf.
Holzhacker, D., Chornovian, O., Yazilitas, D., & Dayan-Ocher, K. (2009).

Privatization in higher education: Cross-country analysis of trends, policies,
problems, and solutions. Washington, DC: Institute for Higher Education Policy.
Hopper, R. (1998). Emerging public universities in Bangladesh: Public enemy or
Ally. In G. A. Philip (Ed.), Private higher education a global revolution. Boston,
MA: International Higher Education, The Boston College Centre for International
Higher Education.
Huisman, J., & Currie, J. (2004). Accountability in higher education: Bridge over
troubled water? Higher Education, 48, 529-551.
Hunt, S. (2009). Transatlantic recognition issues: Seeking new directions in the
twenty-first century. Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice,
16, 65-81.
Illegal courses, mysterious outer campuses dodge universities watchdog. (2006, June
2). New Age.
International students in private universities. (2014, May 29). The Daily Star.
Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/international-students-in-private-
universities-26120.
Jick, T. (1979). Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in Action.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 602-611.
Johnston, J. M., & Romzek, B. S. (2008). Social welfare contracts as networks: The
impact of network stability on management and performance. Administration &
Society, 40, 115-146.
Kwan, P. Y., & Ng, P. W. K. (1999). Quality indicators in higher education: Comparing
Hong Kong and China students. Managerial Auditing Journal, 14, 20-27.
Lerner, J., & Tetlock, P. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability.
Psychological Bulletin, 125, 255-275.
Levy, D. C. (2013). The decline of private higher education. High Education Policy,
26, 25-42.
Marangos, J. (2009). What happened to the Washington Consensus? The evolution of
international development policy. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 38, 197-208.
McCleery, R. K., & De Paolis, F. (2008). The Washington Consensus: A post-mortem.
Journal of Asian Economics, 19, 438-446.
McLendon, M. K., James, C. H., & Russ, D. (2006). Called to account: Analyzing the
origins and spread of state performance-accountability policies for higher educa-
tion. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 28, 1-24.
Megginson, W. L. (2005). The financial economics of privatization. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Meier, B. (2004). Corruption in the education sector: An introduction. Transparency
International, and Christian Michelsen Institute, Berlin, Germany.
Ministry of Education. (2014). Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved from http://
www.moedu.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=26
&Itemid=262/
Ministry serves notice on six private universities. (2005, March 1). New Age.
Modell, S. (2010). Bridging the paradigm divide in management accounting research: The
role of mixed methods approaches. Management Accounting Research, 21, 124-129.
Nurunnabi 467
Morley, L. (2014, Summer). Inside African Private Higher Education: Contradictions

& Challenges. International Higher Education, 76, 14-15.
Mundy, K. (1998). Educational multi-lateralism and world (dis)order. Comparative
Education Review, 42, 448-478.
Myers, R. (1990). Classical and modern regression with applications (2nd ed.).
Boston, MA: Duxbury.
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Olssen, M., Codd, J., & O’Neill, A. M. (2004). Education policy: Globalization, citi-
zenship and democracy. London, England: Sage.
Öniş, Z., & Şenses, F. (2005). Rethinking the emerging post-Washington Consensus.
Development and Change, 36, 263-290.
Pachuashvili, M. (2009). The politics of higher education: Governmental policy
choices and private higher education in post-communist countries (Doctoral the-
sis). Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
Private universities continue to hoodwink UGC. (2006, May 27). New Age. Retrieved
from http://newsfrombangladesh.net/view.php?hidRecord=109183
Private University Act. (1992). Bangladesh. Act No. 34 of 1992 (9 August 1992),
Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary.
Private University Act. (2010). Act No. 35 of 2010 (18 July).
Private univs make money at education’s cost. (2014, July 1). New Age. Retrieved
from http://newagebd.net/26542/private-univs-make-money-at-educations-cost/
#sthash.b3glSDIA.dpbs.
Prove allegations or apologise, Nahid tells TIB: Private universities deny allegations.
(2014, July 3). New Age. Retrieved from http://newagebd.net/27338/prove-alle-
gations-or-apologise-nahid-tells-tib/#sthash.h9vpRoKZ.4CaKmZa4.dpbs.
Seven new private univs soon. (2013, September 3). New Age. Retrieved from http://
newagebd.com/old_archives/detail.php?date=2013-09-03&nid=63720.
Quddus, M., & Rashid, S. (2000). The worldwide movement in private universities.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 59, 487-516.
Rabossi, M. (2010). Universities and fields of study in Argentina’ program for
Research on Private Higher Education (Working Paper 15). Albany, New York,
NY: University at Albany.
Ransom, A., Siew-Mun, K., & Selvaratnam, V. (1993). Improving higher education
in developing countries (EDI Series). Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Richardson, R. W., & Haralz, J. H. (1995). Moving to the market: The World Bank in
transition. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council.
Romzek, B. S. (1996). Enhancing accountability. In J. L. Perry (Ed.), Handbook of
public administration (pp. 97-114). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Romzek, B. S. (2000). Dynamic of public accountability in an area of reform.
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 66, 21-44.
Romzek, B. S., & Dubnick, M. J. (1987). Accountability in the public sector: Lessons
from the challenger tragedy. Public Administration Review, 47, 227-238.
Romzek, B. S., & Dubnick, M. J. (1998). Accountability. In J. M. Shafritz (Ed.),
International encyclopedia of public policy and administration (pp. 6-11).
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Romzek, B. S., & Ingraham, P. (2000). Cross pressures of accountability: Initiative,

command, and failure in the Ron Brown plane crash. Public Administration
Review, 60, 240-253.
Romzek, B. S., & Johnston, J. M. (2005). State social services contracting: Exploring
the determinants of effective contract accountability. Public Administration
Review, 65, 436-449.
Romzek, B. S., LeRoux, K., & Blackmar, J. M. (2012). A preliminary theory of infor-
mal accountability among network organizational actors. Public Administration
Review, 72, 442-453.
Romzek, B. S., LeRoux, K., Johnston, J., Blackmar, J., Kempf, R., & Schede, J. (2011,
June 2-4). Informal accountability dynamics within service delivery networks.
Paper presented at the 11th National Public Management Research Conference,
Syracuse, NY.
Ryan, C. M., & Walsh, P. (2004). Collaboration of public sector agencies:
Reporting and accountability challenges. International Journal of Public Sector
Management, 17, 621-631.
Schlenker, B. (1997). Personal responsibility: Applications of the triangle model.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 19, 241-301.
Stiglitz, J. (1994). Whither socialism? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stiglitz, J. (1997a). An agenda for development in the twenty-first century. In J. E.
Stiglitz & B. Pleskovic (Eds.), Annual World Bank conference on development
economics. Washington, DC: World Bank (pp. 17-31). Retrieved from https://
www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/1998_Agenda_for_
Development.pdf
Stiglitz, J. (1997b, December 12). Workshop on issues of reform and development in
China, Tokyo, Japan.
Stiglitz, J. (1998a, May). The East Asian crisis and its implications for India.
Commemorative Lecture for the Golden Jubilee year Celebration of Industrial
Finance, Corporation of India, New Delhi, India.
Stiglitz, J. (1998b, January 7). More instruments and broader goals: Moving toward
the post-Washington Consensus (The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture). Helsinki,
Finland: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics
Research (UNU-WIDER).
Study of corrupt university practices sparks anger. (2014, July 11). University
World News. Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.
php?story=20140710164756482.
Tan, K. C., & Kek, S. W. (2004). Service quality in higher education using an
enhanced SERVQUAL approach. Quality in Higher Education, 10, 17-24.
Tetlock, P. (1983). Accountability and complexity of thought. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 45, 74-83.
Tetlock, P. (1992). The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a social
contingency model. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 331-376.
“Thieves”, certificate business and UGC’s alarm. (2014, September 15). The Daily
Observer. Retrieved from http://www.observerbd.com/2014/09/15/43214.php.
Nurunnabi 469
TIB report and state of denial. (2014, July 09). The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://
www.thedailystar.net/tib-report-and-state-of-denial-32418.
Tikly, L. (2003). Governmentality and the study of education policy in South Africa.
Journal of Education Policy, 18, 161-174.
Tilak, J. B. G. (1991). Privatization of higher education. Prospects, 21, 227-239.
Transparency International. (2014). Fighting corruption in South Asia: Building
accountability. Berlin, Germany.
Transparency International Bangladesh. (2014). TIB recommends 16 measures for
governance of private universities. Dhaka, Bangladesh.
12 universities run with unauthorized staffs. (2007, July 18). Prothom Alo (In Bengali)
Twenty seven private varsities running without vice-chancellors. (2004, August 16).
The Bangladesh Observer.
The University Grants Commission of Bangladesh (UGC) Annual Report. (2012).
Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved from http://www.
ugc.gov.bd/university/?action=private.
The World Bank. (1981). Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Washington, DC: Author.
The World Bank. (1994a). Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, results and the road ahead
(A World Bank Policy Research Report). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The World Bank. (1994b). Higher education: The lessons of experience. Washington,
DC: Author.
The World Bank. (1995). Policies and strategies for education: A World Bank review.
The World Bank. (2000). Higher education in developing countries: Peril and prom-
ise (The Task Force on Higher Education and Society). Washington, DC: Author.
The World Bank. (2008, June). The evolving regulatory context for private education
in emerging economies (Discussion Paper). Washington, DC: Author.
The World Bank. (2014a). Bangladesh: Connecting minds in higher education.
The World Bank. (2014b). Bangladesh: Country summary of higher education.
The World Bank. (2014c). Bangladesh data. Washington, DC: Author.
The World Bank. (2014d). How to fix poor quality education in South Asia.
Ubillos, J. B. (2005). Changing objectives and formulas in privatization policies: The
case of Spain. Administration & Society, 37, 131-167.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2014, March).
Increasing tax revenues to bridge the education financing gap (Education for All
Global Monitoring Report). Washington, DC: Author.
Walton, D. (2003). Ethical argumentation. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
Webb, P. T. (2011). The evolution of accountability. Journal of Education Policy,
26, 735-756.
Weber, E. P. (1999). The question of accountability in historical perspective: From
Jackson to contemporary grassroots ecosystem management. Administration &
Society, 31, 451-494.
Williamson, J. (1993). Democracy and the “Washington Consensus.” World

Development, 21, 1329-1336.
Williamson, J. (1997). The Washington Consensus revisited. In L. Emmerij (Ed.),
Economic and social development into the XXI century (pp. 48-61). Washington,
DC: Inter-American Development Bank; Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press. [Distributor]
Woods, N. (2001). Making the IMF and the World Bank more accountable.
International Affairs, 77, 83-100.
Yang, K. (2012). Further understanding accountability in public organizations:
Actionable knowledge and the structure-agency duality. Administration &
Society, 44, 255-284.
Author Biography
Mohammad Nurunnabi, PhD CMA SFHEA FRSA FAIA(Acad), is an associate
professor in accounting and chair of the Department of Accounting at Prince Sultan
University, Saudi Arabia. He holds a PhD in accounting from the University of
Edinburgh, United Kingdom. He is a senior fellow of Higher Education Academy
(HEA), United Kingdom, an academic fellow of the Association of International
Accountants (AIA), and fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (RSA). His research has
appeared in Advances in Accounting, Incorporating Advances in International
Accounting, Research in Accounting Regulation, Environment, Development and
Sustainability, International Journal of Critical Accounting, Journal of Human
Resource Costing & Accounting, International Journal of Health Care Quality
Assurance, Journal of Asia Business Studies, and Journal of Business Economics and
Management. His current research focuses on Accountability, International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), Implementation in Emerging Economies, Tax Evasion,
Corruption and Accounting Development, Politics, Regulation and Enforcement,
Theory of the Role of the State, Privatization of Higher Education, and Governance
and the Sovereign State.
View publication stats

2018 AdministrationSociety

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2018 AdministrationSociety

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

Accounting for Accountability: A Critical Reﬂection

Article in Administration & Society · March 2018

Tourism terrorism and wellbeing View project

PSU COVID-19 Project 2020 View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Reflection on the Private

1Prince Sultan University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Research Question 1: What are the roles of private higher education

Figure 1. Higher education budget as a percentage (%) of national budget in

government allocates “only 2.1% of GDP to education, but just 0.12% to

influences. Section “Literature Review” offers a literature review, and an

Background of Private Higher Education in

Figure 2. Number of private universities from 1992 to 2013 (n = 79).

educational reform in India. The Sargent Report of 1944 recommended that

Table 1. Students Enrollment and Teachers in Private University (1997-2012).

1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012

The University Grants Commission of

Board of Trustees (BOT) Finance Committee

Syndicate Recruitment Committee

Figure 3. Current governance structure of private university.

Again, no foreign universities or their branches can operate any academic

low-quality physical infrastructure and human resources, and with a lack of

government policy in Ethiopia was detrimental to the growth of HEIs, possible

and self-critical thinking (preemptive self-criticism) when audience views

accountability remains to be an irritating problem: It is unclear exactly how

Several studies have examined accountability issues in relation to HEIs in

• Management & Students

Figure 4. Accountability dimensions—Conceptual model.

A1: Management and Administration,

These four propositions describe specific aspects of accountability in an

their respective fields, assessment criteria, feedback, required office hours,

approach entails the application of two or more sources of data or research

questionnaire was made up of three parts: Demographic information in Section

Results and Discussion

Table 2. Respondent Characteristics (n = 1,046).

Characteristics Number of respondents %

Table 2. (continued)

Characteristics Number of respondents %

Note. Tk. = Taka, the local currency unit of Bangladesh.

University Bangladesh; BRAC University; East West University; Independent

Reliability and Validity

Table 3. Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation.

Factors and items A1 A2 A3 A4 Communalities

Table 4. Reliability and Validity.

*p < .0001 level.

Management and Regulatory Government’s

**Correlation is significant at the .01 level, one-tailed.

Table 6. Regression Analysis: Four Accountability Factors (n = 1,046).

Variable B SE β t Significance Tolerance VIF

(Constant) .133 0.056 — 2.384 .017 — —

Figure 5. Accountability of Management and Administration (A1).

Figure 6. Accountability of Academics (A2).

Figure 7. Accountability of Regulatory Framework (A3).

regulations; in 2005, 50 universities were offering courses without approval

Figure 8. Accountability of Government’s action (A4).

of university education and formulate plans for its development; determine

2007; “Twenty Seven Private Varsities,” 2004), and having no compliance

Table 7. Respondents’ Additional Views (n = 133).

violation of regulations with impunity are part of a well-established cul-

After guiding development policies for nearly 20 years, the Washington

The post-Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a; 1998b)