Killing Animals:

The Benefits of a Utilitarian View

PHIL1008 Essay 2 - Topic 2

Introduction

Within Elizabeth Harman’s 2011 paper “The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death”,

she argues: It is wrong to kill animals without a very good reason. This essay will examine

Harman’s non-consequentialist position as a framework for analysing animal ethics, adapting her

arguments through a utilitarian lens to complement and resolve some of the complexities and

conflicts raised by non-consequentialist views. By justifying and incorporating utilitarian principles,

three compelling arguments against Harman’s claims will be explored: 1) Killing an animal does not

hurt it, 2) Death is not bad for animals because they lack sufficient psychological connection with

their futures, and 3) McMahan's time-relative interests view (2002). The purpose of this paper is to

adopt a dual utilitarian and non-consequentialist perspective when considering the original claim;

An attempt at formalising such a system is not within the scope of this paper.

Why Utilitarianism?

For one, it could be argued that Harman’s paper does not lend well to practical applications. She

examines the issue of animal ethics (specifically, animals of “intermediate mental sophistication”)

with deontological principles that place high levels of intrinsic value on an (individual) animal’s life,

focusing heavily on immediate harm whilst neglecting aggregate and future wellbeing. As a result,

her non-consequentialist position can lead to conflicting judgements in complex ethical situations

where it is often difficult to determine what constitutes a “very good reason”. I illustrate this through

an example of self-defence:

Consider a scenario where a highly dangerous tiger is suffering from a

debilitating disease that is highly contagious and poses a risk to other animals
 and even humans. A non-consequentialist perspective that solely focuses on

individual rights may prioritise the right to life of the suffering animal, even if it

means jeopardising the health and wellbeing of other beings. Utilitarianism,

conversely, considers overall wellbeing and could justify shooting the tiger to

prevent the spread of the disease and protect humans from harm.

This example acknowledges that death harms the tiger, and that shooting it would deprive it of a

future. Harman would prohibit the shooting on the basis of her prohibiting painful animal death,

thus reducing the scope of potential solutions in such a way that neglects human wellbeing.

By adopting a consequentialist perspective in line with Peter Singer's utilitarian stance, we can still

recognize the ethical imperative to include non-human beings capable of experiencing suffering into

moral consideration. Singer (1990) asserts that the interests of any being seeking to avoid suffering

should be duly acknowledged, including animals displaying pain-avoidance behaviour.

Consequently, actions that cause harm generate negative utility, while actions resulting in positive

benefit yield positive utility. As such, the concept of a "very good reason" encompasses actions and

their consequences that ultimately promote higher average utility and aggregate wellbeing in the

long term.

This paper argues for the importance of integrating utilitarian perspectives to enhance our

understanding of the implications surrounding non-consequentialist animal ethics. By reconciling

Harman's views on animal death with utilitarian considerations, one can achieve a comprehensive

ethical framework that evaluates all beings. By doing so, this hybrid perspective considers aggregate
wellbeing, ensures impartial and consistent assessment of consequences, and examines the

long-term effects on animal welfare and ecosystems. Furthermore, this holistic approach

encompasses individual rights and intrinsic value whilst prioritising overall wellbeing.

Addressing Arguments

In this section, this paper will examine arguments that seemingly justify the unnecessary killing of

animals and present scenarios where utilitarians and pure non-consequentialists would differ on the

appropriate response. By analysing these arguments through a utilitarian lens within a

non-consequentialist framework, we can develop a greater understanding of the ethical

considerations surrounding animals and their welfare. Primarily, by prioritising aggregate wellbeing

we can uphold Harman's standpoint while further addressing concerns about individual rights and

intrinsic value. To clarify, both utilitarians and non-consequentialists would disagree against the

three following arguments; The purpose of this section is to highlight edge cases where a difference

in solutions may arise.

First Argument: Killing an Animal Does Not Hurt It

Imagine a scenario where a wild gorilla is suffering from a severe and untreatable

injury that causes constant pain and distress. The gorilla’s condition is incurable,

and its chances of recovery are non-existent.

Harman's non-consequentialist view would deem killing the gorilla morally wrong due to the

inflicted harm and suffering, advocating instead for alternative solutions such as palliative care.

However, from a utilitarian perspective, the overall wellbeing and consequences must be considered.
Allowing the gorilla to continue suffering with no hope of relief would prolong its pain and distress,

negatively impacting its welfare. Ending the gorilla's life in a humane and painless manner,

according to utilitarianism, would alleviate immediate suffering and eliminate the ongoing negative

utility associated with its pain.

Harman’s position fails to consider the potential relief and reduction of harm that could be achieved

by ending its life, highlighting the limitation of a non-consequentialist perspective as it struggles to

provide ethical justification for animals experiencing significant pain.

Second Argument: Death is Not Bad for Animals Because Animals Lack

Sufficient Psychological Connection with Their Futures

In an overpopulated coral reef ecosystem, a particular species of fish is causing

substantial damage by depleting resources and disrupting the ecosystem's balance.

However, the fish remains unaware of the detrimental consequences it poses to its

own future. Other marine species dependent on the reef are experiencing

population declines, putting the entire ecosystem at risk. This situation could be

fixed by removing excess fish, though a small number will most likely die in the

process.

The utilitarian perspective advocates for removing the excess fish population, even if it results in the

death of some individuals, to benefit the overall ecosystem's wellbeing and sustainability. However,

Harman's non-consequentialist view opposes the killing, and hence removal, of any fish as she

believes animals have a psychological connection to their futures. Losing out on a potentially good
future is morally significant, regardless of a fish's cognitive capacities and the chances of a 'good'

future occurring to it.

The utilitarian prioritises aggregate wellbeing and ecological balance, justifying the sacrifice of

some fish for the benefit of the remaining marine animals. In contrast, Harman emphasises the

intrinsic value and individual rights of the fish, opposing their deaths regardless of their cognitive

capacities, thus neglecting the long-term effects on ecosystems. The conflicting viewpoints

showcase the complexities of ethical considerations when balancing ecosystem health and the rights

of individual animals.

Third Argument: McMahon’s Time-Relative Interests View

Consider a butterfly that is trapped in a spider's web. The butterfly struggles

frantically, experiencing fear and distress as it tries to free itself. The spider,

known for its venomous bite, approaches the struggling butterfly with the intent to

capture and immobilise it. In this situation, the butterfly is clearly in immediate

distress, expressing a desire to avoid suffering in the short term. Assume

additionally that the spider's venom, although capable of causing temporary

paralysis and severe pain, is not lethal and that the butterfly has the potential to

recover fully after being released from the web.

The utilitarian would weigh the intensity of the butterfly's current pain against the expectation of its

eventual recovery and future wellbeing, potentially concluding that a greater net utility would be

achieved by ending the butterfly's suffering quickly, despite preventing it from experiencing a

healthy future life. Conversely, Harman’s non-consequentialist position would prioritise the
butterfly's interest in its future. She would argue against killing the butterfly, emphasising its

individual right to have a healthy future without harm.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated the benefits that arise from adopting a utilitarian lens within a

non-consequentialist framework by examining popular arguments against Harman’s claim: It is

wrong to kill animals without a very good reason. Through this synthesis, we have recognized the

importance of incorporating both individual rights and intrinsic value while prioritising the

aggregate wellbeing of animals. This approach allows for a holistic evaluation that considers overall

utility, maintaining a comprehensive assessment of future consequences which explores the complex

relationship of animals and humans within ecosystems.

Such a dual framework reminds us of the interconnectedness of all beings, highlighting the

significance of our actions in shaping the lives of animals and the ecosystems they inhabit. It

encourages us to consider the broader consequences and ripple effects of our choices, emphasising

the need for responsible and compassionate stewardship of the natural world. By embracing this

comprehensive and nuanced perspective, we are better equipped to navigate the complex moral

landscape within animal ethics.

Word count – 1401

Bibliography

● Harman, E. 2012. The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death. The Oxford

Handbook of Animal Ethics. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0027.

● McMahan, J. 2022. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2002.154.

● Singer, P. 1990. Animal Liberation, second edition, New York: New York Review of Books.