Chichester Dam

Risk Assessment Summary Report

Hunter Water Corporation
11 August 2023
The Power of Commitment
 Project name Comprehensive Surveillance Inspection and Dam Risk Report for Chichester Dam

Document title Chichester Dam | Risk Assessment Summary Report

Project number 12579541
File name 12576111_REP_Chichester Dam Risk Assessment Report - WORKING - for summary report_.docx
Status Revision Author Reviewer Approved for issue
Code
Name Signature Name Signature Date
S4 0 M. Ulph N. Malcolm N. Malcolm 10/08/23

S4 1 M. Ulph N. Malcolm N. Malcolm 11/08/23

GHD Pty Ltd | ABN 39 008 488 373

29 Christie Street, Level 2
St Leonards, New South Wales 2065, Australia
T +61 2 9462 4700 | F +61 2 9475 0725 | E slnmail@ghd.com | ghd.com

© GHD 2023
This document is and shall remain the property of GHD. The document may only be used for the purpose for
which it was commissioned and in accordance with the Terms of Engagement for the commission. Unauthorised
use of this document in any form whatsoever is prohibited.

The Power of Commitment

Contents

1. Introduction 1
1.1. Assessments and upgrades over time 2
2. About the risk assessment 4
2.1. Results of the risk assessment 4
2.2. How the consequence of failures are assessed 4
3. Managing the possibility of dam failure 7
3.1. Assessing risk reduction measures 7
3.1.1. Short term options 7
3.1.2. Long term options 9
3.2. What happens next? 9

Table index
Table 2.1 Failure modes and their probabilities 6

Figure index
Figure 1.1 Chichester Dam assessment and upgrade timeline 2
Figure 1.2 Chichester Dam 3
Figure 2.1 Failure Modes in relation to the Safety Threshold 5

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam ii

1. Introduction
Around Australia and many parts of the world, dams are used for purposes such as to capture, store and manage
water for drinking, for power generation, or for irrigation. Because of the nature of a dam, holding thousands or
millions of tonnes of water against gravity, there is always a risk of failure over time.
Chichester Dam is no exception, and various assessments of the safety of the dam have been carried out since
the dam was first built between 1915 and 1926. As technology and engineering improve, assessments can
consider more elements and can be more accurate, however there is still uncertainty around the findings.
The state government in New South Wales is responsible for the management of dam safety standards and
directs dam owners to assess dam safety through risk-based audits and inspections. NSW dam safety legislation
requires certain reviews to be undertaken annually, five yearly and every 15-years.
More information on this is available at www.damsafety.nsw.gov.au.
This summary report presents a simplified overview of the most recent assessment, and of the recommendations
that follow. Hunter Water will consider the assessment and then decide what actions to take as a result.
Since its construction, Chichester Dam has been iteratively upgraded and modified to meet changing demands
and to ensure safety and reliability of supply. Remedial works have been undertaken at the dam on four separate
occasions in 1965, 1980 – 84, 1994 and, most recently, in 2003. In the majority of these cases the works were
required to deal with increasing estimates of very rare flood events in the valley. This is detailed below in
Figure 1.1.
Given the advancement in dam technology over time and the appropriate thorough nature of these risk
assessments, it is not unexpected that actions are needed to ensure the dam continues to operate safely for many
decades to come.
GHD was engaged by Hunter Water Corporation to carry out a risk assessment for Chichester Dam. Dam
engineers and safety specialists worked closely with key staff at Hunter Water to decide which types of risks were
likely with this type of dam, and the areas of investigation they would undertake. The risk assessment does not
look at the standard risks around operating infrastructure, such as slips, trip and falls, or even a fire, but focuses
only at the risks of dam failure.
There are several ways that a dam can fail, and to understand these it is useful to first know the names of certain
parts of a dam. The photograph below shows these parts and provides the names that are used in this summary
report, and in the main report.

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 1

1.1. Assessments and upgrades over time
The timeline below shows the various investigations and upgrades to Chichester Dam since its construction in
1926.

Figure 1.1 Chichester Dam assessment and upgrade timeline

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 2

Figure 1.2 Chichester Dam

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 3

2. About the risk assessment
Risk assessments generally consider two aspects, that is the likelihood of an event occurring and the
consequence if it were to occur. Where the failure of a large dam is concerned, the likelihood is usually low, but
the consequence is significant. Many ‘failure modes’ – or different ways that the dam could feasibly fail (break),
were considered during the risk assessment. Those considered to be credible or feasible for this dam were
investigated more closely.
The Assessment Report contains a lot of detail about the type of failure, how it could occur and what stages might
bring about the failure. This summary report tries to simplify each of those parts of the main report, to make them
easier to understand.

2.1. Results of the risk assessment

Potential failure modes were considered which could be caused by the following factors:
– Prolonged high rainfall over months or years leading to re-activating a historical landslide on the relatively
steep northern side of the dam, which results in the dam failing. The annual probability has been calculated to
be about 1 in 10,000.
– Flooding of different types, that places considerable stresses on the dam, leading to failure in the structure of
the dam. There are seven calculated failure modes from flooding, due to the number of possible areas in the
dam where a break could commence. The highest annual probability has been calculated to be approximately
1 in 500.
– Earthquake that weakens the dam structure, so that when a flood or large rainfall event happens later, the
dam fails. There are three calculated failure modes resulting from an earthquake. The highest annual
probability out of these has been calculated to be about around 1 in 40,000.
These probabilities are the chances of failure in any given year, if Hunter Water was to do nothing as a result of
this assessment. This won’t be the case, as Hunter Water has a range of activities that it currently undertakes and
will look at other actions to prioritise in order to manage these risks and seek to reduce them.
Understanding the risks means that Hunter Water can continue to be proactive in planning and deliver safety
upgrades for the dam and enhance our emergency response plan’s ‘disaster readiness’ for all foreseeable hazards
that may compromise the safety of the dam.
The risk calculations were carried out in accordance with the Government Gazette of NSW No. 113 of 18 March
2022 as required by the NSW Dams Safety Regulation (2019).

2.2. How the consequence of failures are assessed

Under the NSW regulatory framework, dam risk assessments consider the consequences of potential dam failure.
For Chichester Dam, a detailed assessment was undertaken in 2017 to estimate the consequences of a failure to
human life and property. This 2017 study only considered the consequence of a potential dam failure and did not
assess the likelihood. Likelihood is assessed separately in the current report.
Chichester Dam is a large structure, holding 18,000 million litres of water when full. Were it to fail in a severe
scenario, the worst-case potential loss of life figures vary between 2 and 60 people, depending on the time of day
that the failure were to occur.
In considering these figures, it is important to note that a number of conservative assumptions have been made
including that people at risk downstream have not been warned of the possibility of the dam failing in advance, and
that the caravan park downstream is fully occupied.

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 4

Figure 2.1 Failure Modes in relation to the Safety Threshold

The eleven failure modes are shown on the above graph, a more detailed version of which is listed as Figure 8.1 in
the full Assessment Report. In each case the potential loss of life has been approximated. The blue line represents
the aggregated or combined risks across all of the failure modes. As the blue line is above the diagonal Safety
Threshold this brings about the requirement for action to reduce the probability of failure, the potential for loss of
life, or both.
These modes are described in more detail below in Table 2.1, and more detail is provided in the main report in
Section 6 – Analyses of failure modes.

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 5

Table 2.1 Failure modes and their probabilities
Failure
Mode Failure Mode ID
Number
1 LD-Rf-Sl-1
2 LA-Hy-Sl(Fdn)-2
3 LA-Hy-Sl(Cn)-3
4 LA-Eq-Sl(Fdn)-4
5 SP-Hy-Sl(Fdn)-5
6 SP-Hy-Sl(Cn)-6
7 SP-Hy-Sl(Apr)-7
8 SP-Eq-Sl(Fdn)-8
9 RA-Hy-Sl(Fdn)-9
10 RA-Hy-Sl(Cn)-10
11 RA-Eq-Sl(Fdn)-11
Approximate
annual
Simplified Description
probability
of failure
The historical landslide area is reactivated after extended heavy rainfall. 1 in 10,000
The landslide damages the northern portion of the dam and leads to
complete breach.
Very rare flood occurs, causing sliding of the dam on a rock defect 1 in 600
beneath the dam in the northern abutment.
Very rare flood occurs. Northern portion of the dam structure fails leading 1 in 10,000
to a breach.
Extreme earthquake occurs, which leads to damage of anchors and 1 in 40,000
drainage and subsequent failure of the dam due to sliding of the northern
portion of the dam.
Extreme flood event occurs, causing sliding of the dam on a rock defect 1 in 5,000
in the foundation beneath the spillway.
Extreme flood occurs. Part of the dam structure around the spillway fails 1 in 5,000
leading to a breach.
Extreme flood event occurs, causing extensive downstream erosion and 1 in 5,000
undercutting of the dam leading to failure on a rock defect in the
foundation beneath the spillway.
Extreme earthquake occurs, which leads to damage of anchors and 1 in 40,000
drainage and subsequent failure of the dam due to sliding of the spillway
portion of the dam.
Very rare flood occurs, causing sliding of the dam on a rock defect 1 in 500
beneath the dam in the southern abutment.
Very rare flood occurs. Southern portion of the dam structure fails leading 1 in 7,000
to a breach.
Extreme earthquake occurs, which leads to damage of anchors and 1 in 40,000
drainage and subsequent failure of the dam due to sliding of the southern
portion of the dam.
GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 6
3. Managing the possibility of dam failure
For the estimated risks that are above the safety threshold outlined in the NSW Dams Safety Regulation (2019), it
is recommended that Hunter Water look at the range of suggested actions in addition to work that is already being
carried out. Major dam reviews like this always identify opportunities for improvement. As a responsible dam
owner, Hunter Water has invested in upgrading its dams after every major review.
Based on the results of this risk assessment, the following recommendations are made:
– Review and update the dam break and consequence assessment in accordance with the most current
practice.
– Undertake further investigations and analysis of the historical landslide area and dam including installation of
monitoring instruments.
– Develop a concept design to stabilise the dam wall and spillway aprons.
Note: These activities can be done simultaneously.

Advance warning of potential dam failure

Many scenarios for dam failure have warning signs or indicators that enable people and communities downstream
to be warned of an increase in the risks.
For example:
– If the dam is full and overflowing, the pressure on the dam is at its highest – this means there is a higher risk
than at other times when the dam is not spilling, or not full.
– If there has been considerable continuous rain over months or possibly years, there may be an increased
likelihood of the historic landslide becoming weaker.
– If there is a large earthquake, the dam may be weakened, leading to a higher risk during future high rainfall or
flooding events if repairs or modifications can’t be made in the interim period.
– The dam is equipped with multiple monitoring instruments and is inspected by specially trained staff to
confirm that the dam is behaving as expected.

Risk assessment conclusion

– There is no cause for alarm. The risks of failure have not significantly changed in recent years, especially
considering the ongoing monitoring and the additional works that Hunter Water have been undertaking for
decades. Our understanding of these risks has improved as a result of new technology and techniques.
– Safety risk at the dam has been considered over the years based on guidelines and knowledge at the time.
This is the first time that a risk assessment has been carried out in this particular way, under the current State
government guidelines.

3.1. Assessing risk reduction measures

3.1.1. Short term options
Reduce Reservoir Storage Level
Reducing the reservoir storage level is likely to reduce the downstream consequences due to the reduced volume
of water being released for a sunny day failure. This was not recommended as it wouldn’t significantly reduce the
risks since the water level at this dam quickly rises in a flood.

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 7

Inspection frequency
Currently routine inspections are carried out daily by Hunter Water’s trained dam caretakers. The staff undertaking
the inspections undergo specialised dam surveillance training every 5 years.
Hunter Water also provide staff on-site 24/7 when the dam is full and spilling (water level above RL 157.0 m AHD),
or prior if it is obvious that the dam will trigger an alert in afterhours.
Immediate inspections are also undertaken in the event of an earthquake. If any damage to the dam is noted, staff
will remain on site.
The frequency of inspections is in accordance with Australian Guidelines on Dam Safety Management and is
considered acceptable. It is important this frequency is maintained until long term options can be implemented.

Instrumentation
The dam is fitted with a range of instrumentation, and monitoring is carried out daily.
The frequency at which these instrumentations are monitored is in accordance with Australian Guidelines. In
addition to these, it is recommended that some additional instruments be considered to improve monitoring.
Piezometers – installation of further piezometers within the dam, especially at the left abutment and spillway. The
pore pressure beneath the dam is a key factor in assessing the stability.
Landslide instrumentation – installing instrumentation for the landslide to monitor movement and changes in
porewater pressure.

Further studies and investigations

Current data gaps would benefit from the following studies and investigations. These would both help validate
some assumptions made in the risk assessment and inform the design of long-term options:
– A more targeted investigation of the historical landslide, with appropriate high-quality sampling and testing, in
conjunction with the installation of monitoring instrumentation.
– A preliminary assessment was completed as part of this project but could be further improved with a more
comprehensive study of the reservoir rim.
– Targeted investigations of the foundation and existing concrete with shear strength testing to confirm strength
properties.

Maintenance
The following maintenance is recommended to be undertaken in the short term:
– Continue to flush drains on the right abutment.
– Continue to flush drains in the spillway apron.

Caravan Park Temporary Closures

Hunter Water works closely with the Ferndale Park, which is located immediately downstream of the Chichester
Dam. Currently, the caravan park is temporarily closed during major flood events, to reduce potential risk to
guests. These arrangements have been in place for many years.
In light of new information regarding dam safety, it is recommended that these protocols be revisited to ensure that
they remain fit for purpose. This may include earlier notification to evacuate the caravan park when major rain
events are forecast.
Hunter Water will engage directly with the operators of the caravan park on the possible risks, and solutions.

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 8

3.1.2. Long term options
A new downstream concrete buttress
A downstream concrete buttress would improve the dam stability and would also enable construction of an
improved spillway.

Post-tensioned anchoring
Installing new post tensioning anchors along the dam would increase the dam’s resistance against sliding.
As part of the anchor option, there may opportunities to install new drainage on the left side of the dam where
there is minimal drainage. The new drainage would also improve the stability in this location.

Decommissioning of dam
In addition to the above options, some consideration could be given to the decommissioning of the existing dam to
remove risks of failure. This would only be considered after other options have been exhausted.
Hunter Water’s Lower Hunter Water Security Plan outlines a range of future water supply options, including a
connection with the Glennies-Lostock Dam system in the Upper Hunter, and desalination in the Lower Hunter. The
Lower Hunter Water Security Plan is available here.

Landslide treatment
Any treatment to the historical left abutment landslide area should only be completed once further investigations
are completed and the properties and shape of the area better understood. Treatment of the area may include
drainage to reduce groundwater pressures.

3.2. What happens next?

As detailed above, Hunter Water routinely monitors the dam and carries out a range of inspections. Hunter Water
will now consider the new information and options that are available and continue to look for ways to increase the
safety of Chichester Dam, as it does for all water infrastructure that it manages. Long term options could have an
indicative timeframe of between five and 10 years from initial investigations to construction.

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 9

ghd.com The Power of Commitment

GHD | Hunter Water Corporation | 12579541 | Chichester Dam 10