Title : JOSE C. TECSON vs HON.

RAFAEL SALAS Executive Secretary

Citation : G.R. No. L-27524
July 31, 1970
Ponente : FERNANDO, J.:
Facts :
Jose Tecson, the Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works was given a directive by the
Executive Secretary Rafael Salas to be detailed to the Office of the President, to assist in the San
Fernando Port Project, reporting directly to Commodore Santiago Nuval, the Presidential
Assistant on Ports and Harbors. Sometime thereafter, acting by presidential authority, the
Executive Secretary, ordered the nullification of Tecson's detail to the Office of the President.

Tecson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the Salas detail order although
issued by Authority of the President, should be approved by the Budget Commissioner and the
Commissioner of Civil Service. The respondent argued that the petitioner's contention would
contravene to the generally accepted principle which recognizes presidential 'power control' over
the executive department. Further, the temporary assignment of the petitioner to the said office
is not a demotion in rank and salary, neither is it to be considered as a disciplinary action against
him and it does not involve removal from his present position by transferring him to another
position in a lower class. He will retain his position as the Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of
Public Works. The lower court dismissed the case thus the appeal. The Petitioner-Appellant is
stressing that he had a valid cause of action as there was a removal or at least a transfer of position
without his consent contrary to the constitutional provision. The dismissal was affirmed.

Issue :
Whether or not the assignment of Tecson on temporary detail to the office of Commodore Nuval
constitutes removal from office without cause.

Held :

The question raised is on the appraisal of the validity of the acts of the President or Congress is
one of power, it is not for the Court to inquire on the motives that may have prompted the
exercise of a presidential authority, though at the most, it can look into the question of whether
there is a legal justification for what was done. This is the manifestation of the concept of
separation of power.

In the case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior, Justice Laurel expounded on the basic philosophy of
the presidential type of government, under this type the department organization in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive department and the acts of
the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. Even if we are to consider the Civil Service Act, the transfer did not result to
reduction in rank or salary. To require as a prerequisite to its validity the approval of subordinate
to an action taken by their superior, the President, who tinder the Constitution is the Executive,
all prerogatives attaching to such branch being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those
discharging purely executive function in the national government, he lie gives orders to all and
takes orders from none. The transfer did not amount to removal, while rightfully the Constitution
guarantees the security of a public official's term, as well as his right to be compensated, there
can be no disputing the truth of the assertion that the overriding concern is that the task of
government be performed and performed well. In the directive he remained Superintendent of
Dredging in the Bureau of Public Works. There was no demotion in rank. There was no diminution
of salary.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is hereby affirmed

G.R. No. 182722

DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE [DCCCO], Represented by Felicidad L. Ruiz, its
General Manager, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

THE FACTS
• Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) is a credit cooperative registered with and
regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) with the following objectives and
purposes: (1) to increase the income and purchasing power of the members; (2) to encoure
savings and to promote thriftiness among members; and (3) to extend loans to members for
provident and productive purposes.
• (BIR) Operations Group Deputy Commissioner, issued Letters of Authority authorizing BIR
Officers to examine petitioner’s books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal
revenue taxes for the taxable years 1999 and 2000.
• On 2002, DCCCO received Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes for taxable
years 1999 and 2000. The deficiency withholding taxes cover the payments of the honorarium of
the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees, and interest
on savings and time deposits of its members.
 • DCCCO informed BIR that it would ONLY pay the deficiency withholding taxes EXCLUDING
penalties and interest
• . After payment, DCCCO received from the BIR Transcripts of Assessment and Audit
Results/Assessment Notices, ordering petitioner to pay the deficiency withholding taxes,
INCLUSIVE of penalties, for the years 1999 and 2000.
• DCCO's contention: Under Sec. 24. Income Tax Rates. — x x x x (B) Rate of Tax on Certain Passive
Income: — (1) Interests, Royalties, Prizes, and Other Winnings. — A final tax at the rate of twenty
percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest from any currency bank deposit
and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar
arrangements; x x x applies only to banks and not to cooperatives, since the phrase "similar
arrangements" is preceded by terms referring to banking transactions that have deposit
peculiarities. Therefore, the savings and time deposits of members of cooperatives are not
included in the enumeration, and thus not subject to the 20% final tax. Also, pursuant to Article
XII, Section 15 of the Constitution, 25 and Article 2 of Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938) or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines, cooperatives enjoy a preferential tax treatment which
exempts their members from the application of Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC.

COURT’S RULING
• CTA FIRSTDIVISION. Petitioner is ORDERED TO PAY the respondent deficiency withholding taxes
on interests.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc. According to the CTA En Banc,
petitioner’s business falls under the phrase "similar arrangements;" as such, it should have
withheld the corresponding 20% final tax on the interest from the deposits of its members.

ISSUE
• Whether or not DCCCO is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings
and time deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well as the delinquency
interest of 20% per annum?

HELD

DCCCO is not liable. The NIRC states that a "final tax at the rate of twenty percent (20%) is hereby
imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary
benefit from the deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangement x x x" for
individuals under Section 24(B)(1) and for domestic corporations under Section 27(D)(1).
Considering the members’ deposits with the cooperatives are not currency bank deposits nor
deposit substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1), therefore, do not apply to members of
cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations, respectively.
Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the State to foster
the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and
harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice.
Thus, to encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their
growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is apparent in Articles 61
and 62 of RA 6938, which read:

ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. — Duly registered cooperatives under this Code which
do not transact any business with non-members or the general public shall not be subject to any
government taxes and fees imposed under the Internal Revenue Laws and other tax laws.
Cooperatives not falling under this article shall be governed by the succeeding section.

ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. — Cooperatives transacting business with both members and
nonmembers shall not be subject to tax on their transactions to members. Notwithstanding the
provision of any law or regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers
shall enjoy the following tax exemptions; x x x.

This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized that cooperatives

exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary objective of every cooperative is to
provide goods and services to its members to enable them to attain increased income, savings,
investments, and productivity. Therefore, limiting the application of the tax exemption to
cooperatives would go against the very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the exemption
to members of cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of the
legislature. Thus, although the tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this should be
construed to include the members.

ART. 126. Interpretation and Construction. – In case of doubt as to the meaning of any provision
of this Code or the regulations issued in pursuance thereof, the same shall be resolved liberally in
favor of the cooperatives and their members.

In the ruling in the case of Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,32 to wit: The spirit, rather than
the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
Moreover, no less than our Constitution guarantees the protection of cooperatives. Section 15,
Article XII of the Constitution considers cooperatives as instruments for social justice and
economic development. At the same time, Section 10 of Article II of the Constitution declares
that it is a policy of the State to promote social justice in all phases of national development. In
relation thereto, Section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitution states that the promotion of social
justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance. Bearing in mind the foregoing provisions, we find that an
interpretation exempting the members of cooperatives from the imposition of the final tax under
Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC is more in keeping with the letter and spirit of our Constitution

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

150 SCRA 259 G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

Facts:

Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso a land from their deceased parents, wherein two of
them, Celestino Padua and Eustaquia Padua, sold their shares to the Alonzo’s who occupied an
area representing the portions sold to them by enclosing it in a fence and building a house.

The other coheirs lived in the same lot, including the portions sold to the Alonzo’s. Eustaquia,
who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla Padua, who later
claimed redemption petition, was close friends with the Alonzo’s and are neighbors whose
children went to school together.

Two of the coheirs, Mariano Padua and Tecla Padua, sought to redeem the area sold to the
petitioners on two separate occasion, but was both dismissed by the trial court; the first because
it appeared that he was an American citizen and the second was on the ground that the right has
lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.

The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court, citing Articles 1088 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, wherein the coheirs are entitled to redeem the portion being
sold within 30 days from notice in writing of the sale, and Article 1623 that deliberately selected
a particular method of giving notice, which is written notice.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court interpreted and applied the relevant laws correctly.

Ruling:
Yes, the trial court interpreted and applied the relevant laws correctly because the details prove
the likelihood of the notice happening at one point. Although Articles 1088 and 1623 are explicit
in their condition, the court stuck to the spirit of the law and gave leeway to the Alonzo’s. The
court was satisfied that the other brothers and sister were actually informed, although not in
writing, of the sales, and that such notice was sufficient

Estrada v. Desierto G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

Former President Joseph Estrada filed two petitions, first, a petition for prohibition against the
Ombudsman for its preliminary investigation on the information filed for plunder, graft and
corruption; and second, a petition for quo warranto against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Facts:

Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson went on air and accused President Joseph Estrada of receving
money from jueteng lords, resulting in Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.'s privelege speech in Senate
accusing Estrada of the same. This led to the joint investigation of the Blue Ribbon Committee
and Committee on Justice, and the call of some members of the House of Representatives to
impeach Estrada.

The Senate opened the impeachment trial after receiving the signed Articles of Impeachment
from the House of Representatives. During the trial, a controversy occurred when a 11-10 vote
by the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope allegedly containing the
petitioner had a secret bank account. EDSA II ensued, demanding Estrada's resignation.
Negotiations in Malacañang occured to peacefully transition power.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn into office. On the same day, Estrada signed a vaguely
worded letter stating that he is unable to exercise the powers of the presidency. As a result, Arroyo
discharged her power's as the President and the Senate terminated the Impeachment Court.
Soon after, several cases were filed against Estrada for plunder, graft and corruption.

Estrada then filed the petition for prohibition and petition for quo warranto. Alleging (1) he did
not resign from office, (2) he is only on leave and Arroyo is only an Acting President, (3) he is
inhibited from resigning due to the pending impeachment trial (4) the President enjoys immunity
from all kinds of suit, and (5) Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation
due to public prejudice of guilt.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Estrada resigned from office?
2. Whether or not Estrada is a President on leave for inability to discharge the power of the
presidency, thus, respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President?
3. Whether or not Estrada is immune from criminal prosecution?
4. Whether or not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity?

Held/Ratio:

1. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Puno, held that he validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form, and that there are only two requisites: (1) there
must be an intent to resign, and (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. More
so, a public official has the right not to serve and can resign from the their post. Thus, the
resignation of Estrada is not in dispute because during the negotiations the resignation of Estrada
was already implied.

2. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Puno, held that the Court cannot pass upon the claim
of a President’s inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. Since, the question
is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress as provided by the Constitution.
Nonetheless, in this case, both houses of Congress have already recognized Arroyo as the
President, relying upon the recognition that Estrada’s inability to exercise the powers and duties
of the presidency.

3. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Puno, held that the President cannot use their
resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution. Even when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against the President. Thus, any prosecution amounting from the preliminary
investigation of the Ombudsman into the alleged plunder, graft and corruption cases is valid.

4. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Puno, held that the burden of proof lies with the
person alleging that there is public prejudice; and that there needs to be a showing of more
weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render
a bias free decision. Thus, the Ombudsman is not enjoined from continuing their investigation
into the alleged plunder, graft and corruption cases, since, Estrada merely offered hostile
headlines as proof. The Court dismissed both petitions

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

GR NO. 160261
Nov. 10, 2003

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico,
Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.

On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

ISSUE:
WON Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

HELD:
No. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
“judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments
of the government.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of
powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness,
its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution

is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.

Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes
at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.
League of Cities vs. Comelec G.R. No. 176951. Feb. 15 2011 MR

FACTS:

The tenor of the case is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional
because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Specifically the new
and higher income requirement of P100 Million imposed by R.A. No. 9009(20m Before).

ISSUE:

Because they are not written in the Local Government Code, is the exemption clause in the 16
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional?

RULE:

No, The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered
by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the
LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent
of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws
was gauged. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the
pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A.
No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The
exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that
intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

(connected sa ruling)

Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and
Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent
municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory
R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to
become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were
centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of
agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it
is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality By the way, No need
to write this

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive
years, based on 1991 constant prices

30 Luego v. CSC No. L-69137 (1986) J. Cruz / Tita K

Subject Matter: Law on public officers; commencement of official relations; by appointment

Summary: Luego was appointed as Administrative Officer II. CSC revoked his appointment and
appointed Tuoza in his place after finding that Tuozo is better qualified for the position. WON the
CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee, the SC ruled in the negative. Both Luego and Tuozo were
qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the
case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner’s
appointment. CSC had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed
that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor

Doctrines: The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Appointment
is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.

Parties:
Petitioner FELIMON LUEGO
Respondent CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO

Facts:

Petitioner Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service
Commission approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by
the private respondent and another employee, and provided “there (was) no pending
administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any
decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment.” After
protracted hearings, the CSC found Respondent Felicula Tuozo better qualified than the
petitioner. Thus, CSC appointed Felicula Tuozo to the position of Administrative Officer II in place
of the petitioner, revoking the latter’s appointment.

Issue/s:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter. (NO)

Arguments:

Solicitor General argues that petitioner could be validly replaced because his appointment was
temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause. Having accepted such
an appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran
the risk of an abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution.

Ratio: NO – CSC is not authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and then order his replacement by the
latter.
 Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The determination of the
kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by law with the appointing power
and not the Civil Service Commission. CSC is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the
appointing official on the nature or kind of the appointment to be extended. Indeed, the approval
is more appropriately called an attestation of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the
position to which he has been named. CSC merely has to check compliance with Civil Service
Laws.
 Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.
 It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of
another officer or body, like the Commission on Appointments under 1935 Constitution.
Appointments made by the President of the Philippines had to be confirmed by that body and
could not be issued or were invalidated without such confirmation. The Commission on
Appointments could review the wisdom of the appointment and had the power to refuse to
concur with it even if the President’s choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No
similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil Service Decree.
 On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority
of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down
by the law. Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses
the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment
is approved; if not, it is disapproved.

o In this case both the petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the
position in controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and
prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner’s
appointment.
o It had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
o Private respondent to the petitioner, the Commission was probably applying Rule V,
Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies, which provides that “whenever
there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the employee
who is most competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility.” This
rule is inapplicable, however, because neither of the claimants is next in rank. Moreover, the next-
in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of
present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the
appropriate eligibility.

Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Commission on Civil Service dated March 22, 1984,
is set aside, and the petitioner is hereby declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by virtue
of his permanent appointment thereto dated February 18, 1983.

NOTES: WON Luego’s appointment was temporary. (NO – it was a permanent appointment.) The
appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected
by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary. The stamping of the words “APPROVED as TEMPORARY” did not change the character
of the appointment, which was clearly described as “Permanent” in the space provided for in Civil
Service Form No. 33. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the
appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to
depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the
appointee to the position.
LAPINID V. CSC (1991)

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

The Facts:

Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who
reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a
review of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he
should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his
preferential right thereto.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It
is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of
protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).

Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin
Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio
Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and
suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the
implementation hereof.

Decision:

Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals,[2] this Court said: The only function of the Civil
Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil ServiceLaw, and when it finds the appointee to be
qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to
attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that
both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it
functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity
of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it
considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on
the discretion vested in the appointing authority. The determination of who among several
candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of
the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every
particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications
such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be
valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty,
ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of the service. Given the demands of a
certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the Office concerned provided the
legal requirements for the office are satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard Appointment is a highly discretionary act
that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the
subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of his
qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of
the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under
the Constitution and the applicable laws.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil

ServiceCommission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19,
1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990,
is made PERMANENT. No costs

January 28, 1980 G.R. No. L-52265 SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, NATIONAL TREASURER, and DIRECTOR OF PRINTING,
respondents. Occeña Law Office for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FACTS:

Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg.
51 (providing for the elective and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52
(governing the election of local government officials scheduled on January 30, 1980), 53 (defining
the rights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite, simultaneously
with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed amendment of
Article X, Section 7, of the 1973 Constitution).

ISSUE:

(1) whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to authorize the holding of
local elections;
(2) assuming it has such power, whether it can authorize said elections without enacting a local
government code;
(3) as it may validly perform the foregoing, whether it can schedule such elections less than
ninety, (90) days from the passage of the enabling law; and;
 (4), assuming further that the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution is
valid, whether the plebiscite con be legally held together with the local elections.

HELD:

After deliberating on the memoranda and arguments adduced by both parties at the hearing as
January 15, 1980, the Court finds no merit in the petition.

1The legislative power granted by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution to the National
Assembly has been explicitly vested during the period of transition on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the constitution.The power to regulate the manner of
conducting elections, to Prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the Manner
in which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has not
cited any provision of the Constitution, as amended by the Amendments of 1976, which expressly
or by implication deny to the Interim Batasang Pambansa the authority to call for local elections.
Petitioner’s invocation of the Report of the Committee on Transitory Provisions of October 13,
1972 does not. support his contention that the Interim Batasang Pambansa has no power to call
local elections.

2Neither can We find in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution any requirement that the
enactment of a local government code is a condition sine qua non for the calling of the local
elections by the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, the holding of local elections does not, in
any manner, preclude the enactment of a local government code by the Batasang Pambansa at
some later period.

3Section 6 fixes the “election period” by stating that unless fixed by the Commission in special
cases, the election period shall commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall
end thirty (30) days thereafter.

4Considering that the proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution

extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment
Rodolfo S. De Jesus, Et Al. vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

Facts:

The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves RATA, rice
allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized
by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed
and ordered the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial
Water Utilities Act of 1973.

Issue:

Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even
if authorized by the LWUA.

Held:

Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA
is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A
Water District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198.
The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that
payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.