S af e t y

Hydrogen Safety
Fundamentals
Sarah Eck, P.E., CCPSC ■ Michael D. Snyder, P.E. ■ DEKRA Process Safety

As the number of producers and end-users of hydrogen grows,

so too does the importance of its safe handling and use.

H
ydrogen use has dramatically increased in recent to ignite. All engineers are familiar with the fire triangle and
years, especially as it has grown in popularity as a the idea that three conditions must be present to sustain com-
transportation fuel. Although hydrogen has been used bustion: an oxidant (often air), fuel, and an ignition source
in industry for decades, its use as a fuel for vehicles or for (Figure 1). Establishing a basis of safety for this hazard
stationary power generation in consumer environments is requires understanding the fuel properties and preventing
relatively new (1). Hydrogen is traditionally used to make situations where the three combustion conditions are present.
ammonia for fertilizer, remove sulfur in fuels in oil-refining Hydrogen is unique from other ignitable vapors and
processes, manufacture silicon chips, and hydrogenate oils in gases because it has unusually wide flammability limits
the food industry. It is also a common reactant and byprod-
uct in the specialty chemical and pharmaceutical industries.
Many chemicals have inherent risks that must be man-
aged, and hydrogen is no exception. If managed appropri-
ately, hydrogen can present less risk than other fuel sources.
For example, hydrogen is nontoxic. And, because hydrogen
is lighter than air, it dissipates rapidly when it is released,
unlike hydrocarbon-based fuels. However, although it is a
commonly used and understood molecule, hydrogen pres-
ents unique safety challenges. Therefore, it is important for
every engineer and facility support specialist to know and
understand how to identify and mitigate hazards presented
by hydrogen.

Establishing a basis of safety

All fuels are associated with some degree of danger and p Figure 1. A self-sustaining combustion reaction requires a fuel, an oxidant, and
can cause a safety incident if not handled properly. The most an ignition source. At normal pressure and temperature, removing one side of the
common hazard associated with hydrogen is its propensity fire triangle prevents combustion from occurring.

36  aiche.org/cep  December 2021  CEP

Copyright © 2021 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).
Not for distribution without prior written permission.
coupled with a low minimum ignition energy (Figure 2).
The relatively high laminar burning velocity of hydrogen-air
mixtures also represents a significantly large consequence
potential from fire and explosion scenarios. The laminar
burning velocity influences the sizing of deflagration vents
for enclosures and overpressure calculations involving
unconfined vapor cloud explosions (VCEs).
Enclosures and spaces that may contain hydrogen (like
other fuels) will require adequate ventilation and purging
to maintain the atmosphere below the lower flammability
limit (LFL) so that the space is too fuel-lean to ignite. Note
in Figure 2 that although hydrogen has a wide flammabil-
ity range, its LFL is higher than that of other common fuels
such as propane and gasoline vapor.
As with other common fuels, if a continuous stream of
hydrogen ignites while it is being released under pressure,
a jet fire may result. These flames can be nearly invisible
when dust or soot are not present, so fires can burn unde-
tected if sensing equipment is not being used. The pressure
at which hydrogen is released and the size of the hole deter-
mine the size of the jet fire. For this reason, many codes and
standards recommend flame detection equipment installa-
tions that alert personnel to prevent them from inadvertently
contacting the flame. If the hydrogen release does not
immediately ignite, precautions must be taken to address
the potential explosion hazards, especially in congested or
enclosed spaces.
Liquified hydrogen use presents the typical haz-
ards associated with handling cryogenic fluids. Several
respected suppliers of cryogenic fluids provide complemen-
tary safety resources, such as Air Products’ Safetygram 16,
“Safe handling of cryogenic liquids” (2). Cryogenic burns
are a potential risk, and if a cryogenic liquid is released, it
can hover at ground level until it expands as it warms. This
phenomenon can rapidly displace air in a space without
ever, the rate of hydrogen generation can accelerate under
certain process upset conditions, or as a result of an operator
error, in a way that exceeds the design limits of the equip-
ment and other safety mitigations.
Facilities must engage in robust hazard analysis with
multidisciplinary teams to consider what process upsets or
mitigation failures may cause situations with intolerable risk,
and what additional mitigations are needed. For example,
on the night of May 3, 2019, an explosion occurred at the
AB Specialty Silicones facility in Waukegan, IL. The facil-
ity processed silicone hydride emulsions, which are known
to react to form hydrogen when mixed with strong acids
and bases, or if the material is heated to high temperatures.
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(CSB) investigation concluded that an unintended chemical
reaction occurred in a batch reactor when an incompatible
chemical was unintentionally pumped into the vessel. This
unintended chemical reaction produced hydrogen gas in
equipment that could not contain the pressure. The hydro-
gen escaped the equipment and ignited within the building,
resulting in an explosion that killed four people and seri-
ously injured one (3).
The hazard analysis process should also consider a slow
accumulation of hydrogen that could occur over time in an
enclosed space, for example, in a battery charging room.
If the ventilation fan in the battery charging room has an
outage, it may lead to an accumulation of an explosive level
of hydrogen in the room; if no detection instrumentation is
present, operators may be unaware of the hazard.
In the specialty chemical and pharmaceutical industries,
80 0.35
75.0%
70 0.29
0.30

warning, because hydrogen is both odorless and color- 0.26

60
less. In spite of this property, hydrogen is nontoxic, and 0.24 0.25
Flammable Range, % in Air

in outdoor systems the gas rapidly disperses and rises into

Ignition Energy, mJ

50
the atmosphere. 0.20

40
Hazards of hydrogen
0.15
Many resources are available that explain the properties
30
and hazards of hydrogen. In the chemical process indus-
tries (CPI), experts should be consulted to ensure that the 0.10
20
equipment design, mitigation, and administrative systems 15.0%
that support the process are appropriate for the risks that 10.1% 0.05
10 7.6%
are present. 5.0% 4.0% 0.02
2.1%
Reactive chemistry concerns. Hydrogen is a byproduct of 1.4%
0.00
0
many chemical processes, including battery charging opera- Natural Gas Propane Gasoline Vapor Hydrogen
tions, reactions of metal dusts in water, and batch processing
operations that involve organic chemistry. Often, typical p Figure 2. Hydrogen’s flammability range is larger than other fuels. In addition,
operations do not present a fire or explosion hazard. How- hydrogen takes very little energy to ignite.

CEP  December 2021  aiche.org/cep  37

Copyright © 2021 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).
Not for distribution without prior written permission.
 S af e t y
hydrogen is sometimes used as a reactant, or hydrogen may
be formed as a byproduct during processing. These chemi-
cal reactions can have energetic behavior that poses an
over­pressure hazard during process upsets. Overpressure
scenarios are not unique to hydrogen, and venting non­
reactive systems can be addressed through standards such
as the Compressed Gas Association’s (CGA’s) G-5.5.
Codes and standards often recommend that intended hydro-
gen discharges to the atmosphere be vented at a sufficient
height and location such that radiant heat will not harm
personnel or property.
However, systems that involve chemical reactions pose
unique hazards that these standards do not address. Chemi-
cal reactions should be screened for runaway potential and
the vessel emergency pressure relief should be sized using
Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS)
methodology to address a worst-case overpressure scenario.
Relief sizing can be a challenge because the effluent must
be discharged to a safe location and both the jet fire and
explosion hazards must be considered. Typically, facilities
that will deal with chemical reactions need to partner with a
development chemist or qualified laboratory to understand
the runaway reaction hazards and determine an appropriate
design for their emergency pressure-relief systems.
Common scenarios that may cause a runaway reaction
include adding the rate-limiting ingredient too quickly, add-
ing too much catalyst, intermittently turning a batch agitator
on and off (i.e., jogging the mixer), or overheating a vessel.
If screening tests identify energetic behavior, additional data
may need to be collected to help size emergency pressure
relief or aid in the design of other mitigation systems.
Mechanical integrity challenges. On April 2, 2010,
a carbon steel heat exchanger ruptured at a petroleum
refinery, killing seven workers. The cause of the equipment
failure was high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA),
a damage mechanism that results in cracking and other
defects within steel. HTHA occurs in high stress areas
within piping and vessels, and it is more likely to occur at
Hydrogen Quick Facts
• Small molecule that migrates quickly
through openings and many polymeric
materials (e.g., plastics)
• Less dense than air (rises)
• Low ignition energy (0.016 mJ)
• Wide flammability limits (4–75% in air)
• Low limiting oxygen concentration (5%)
• White/invisible flame that is hard to detect when dust or
other contaminants are not present
38  aiche.org/cep  December 2021  CEP
high processing temperatures that are above 400°F (4).
The failure mechanism of HTHA depends on several
factors that require expert review to ensure continued safe
operation of equipment. Internal or outside experts who
understand how to leverage inspection data with operations
history should conduct an analysis and recommend changes
in equipment design and testing procedures if hydrogen
attack could occur. This expertise should also be leveraged
during capital project work and when managing change to
explore inherently safer measures that avoid risk. Resources
such as API (RP) 941, “Steels for Hydrogen Service at
Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refiner-
ies and Petrochemical Plants,” can be leveraged to identify
hazards and material performance concerns.
Facility staff should also be aware of hydrogen embrittle-
ment within metals, a damage mechanism in which hydrogen
penetrates the metal lattice of (typically) iron-based and
nickel-based alloys. This mechanism can increase the risk of
catastrophic brittle fracture of the metal. The rate and amount
of material deterioration is a function of the material type
and properties, process conditions, and mechanical stress-
ors involved. To avoid the risk associated with hydrogen
embrittlement, it is important to carefully follow engineer-
ing recommendations for material selection and to instate a
robust asset integrity testing and inspection program.
Material selection in hydrogen service is often over-
looked because the failure mechanisms involving hydrogen
can be complex and often require expertise to identify how
seemingly subtle details can impact material performance.
Additionally, many facilities are unaware of lessons learned
by those outside their company. Potential learnings are
often put forward by NASA, smaller scale laboratories,
fuel stations, and petroleum refineries. These safety lessons
can be relevant to any operation that uses hydrogen and
can also be applied to facilities with different technology.
The online Hydrogen Tools Portal (https://h2tools.org)
contains dozens of case studies that share lessons learned
through many industries, including a page devoted to
incidents caused by material compatibility. The portal
offers a link to Sandia National Laboratories’ web-based
resource that summarizes research and information from
technical reports regarding hydrogen’s impact on materials
of construction (5).
Besides HTHA and hydrogen embrittlement, engineers
should be aware of several other mechanical integrity chal-
lenges when selecting and maintaining equipment. Elasto-
mer and gasketing materials must be carefully selected for
the operating pressure and temperatures to ensure adequate
sealing surfaces, as hydrogen can diffuse through some
materials. Contact a mechanical integrity expert to assess
what maintenance and operational measures are neces-
sary to assure proper material selection, carefully manage
Copyright © 2021 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).
Not for distribution without prior written permission.
change, and conduct quality assurance activities to ensure
that the proper materials are installed to avoid piping, gas-
keting, or vessel failure (6).
Human factors hazards. Hydrogen’s low density can
cause concerns in confined spaces, enclosed processing
equipment, and within process buildings. Unlike hydro­
carbon vapors that are heavier than air and sink to low
points, hydrogen releases rise and can accumulate at high
points such as building rooflines, high-point piping, and
sewer dead legs.
Many contractors, manufacturing workers, and engineers
are familiar with protecting plants from heavier-than-air
hydrocarbon vapors but are unfamiliar with “looking up” to
identify fire and explosion hazards. Be mindful that work-
ers may be unaware of the risk associated with hydrogen
accumulation. When conducting maintenance and non-
routine work, additional measures and robust work processes
may be necessary to aid in hazard recognition and ensure
that a thorough job safety analysis is completed before the
work is performed. Facilities must establish adequate hazard
awareness onboarding programs and governance systems to
ensure that all workers understand that the buoyant nature of
hydrogen can introduce risk in areas of the plant they are not
accustomed to reviewing.
Common hazards discovered in field audits and human
factors assessments may include finding ceiling-mounted
electrical devices that are not intrinsically safe; hot-work
permits that are issued without testing atmospheres at the
high-point traps within equipment or enclosures; failure
to provide ventilation; or failure to design piping that does
not have piping dead legs or high points that can form a
pocket of hydrogen accumulation. Although these measures
seem fundamental, incidents have occurred due to a lack
of hazard awareness, as demonstrated in an October 2011
Waxahachie, TX, process upset and fire. A facility was
destroyed when hydrogen ignited and the fire spread to
nearby ignitable materials, which were not properly isolated
or separated. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) cited the facility for inadequate
ventilation and failing to conduct a hazard assessment (7).
Technical aspects of identifying hazards
and managing risk
Identifying process hazards and managing risk is a three-
step process:
1. Establish and maintain process safety information that
is important to understanding the design basis of the system.
2. Conduct hazard identification and risk analysis on
the facility when managing change and when conducting
permitted work.
3. Implement and maintain safety controls.
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) provides
Copyright © 2021 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).
Not for distribution without prior written permission.
Many contractors, manufacturing workers,
and engineers are familiar with protecting
plants from heavier-than-air hydrocarbon
vapors but are unfamiliar with “looking up” to
identify fire and explosion hazards.
numerous resources that explain these principles, which are
not unique to facilities that store or transfer hydrogen.
An additional way to help manage risk is to assign
experts to participate on hazard analysis teams and review
boards that manage facility change. These team members
must know current revisions and understand how to imple-
ment the codes, standards, and good engineering practices
associated with hydrogen used at their facility. Codes and
standards establish the minimum requirements to protect
workers and other structure occupants, the neighboring
public, and first responders. Many of these recognized and
generally accepted good engineering practices are available
online for free or at a low cost. Currently, a multitude of
resources are available in the U.S. and Canada through the
Hydrogen Tools Portal, which was developed by the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory with support from the U.S.
Dept. of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renew-
able Energy (EERE) (8).
A few helpful sources of information include the
following:
• International Building and Fire Code Requirements
• CGA H-3, “Cryogenic Hydrogen Storage”
• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 2,
“Hydrogen Technologies Code”
• NFPA 55, “Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids
Code”
• ISO 19880-1, “Gaseous Hydrogen – Fuelling stations”
• FM Global Datasheet No. 7-91, “Hydrogen.”
It is important to remember that many federal and local
governments require that facilities that handle hydrogen are
designed and maintained to meet certain revisions of certain
codes, standards, and good engineering practices. It is also
important to follow any risk management practices required
by the facility’s insurance carrier. Additional resources can
be obtained by accessing the Center for Hydrogen Safety at
www.aiche.org/chs.
Regardless of the industry involved or application, there
are common mitigations that organizations leverage. A few
of these measures are mentioned below.
Safety by design. Process designers should consider
how to make the situation inherently safer by limiting the
volume of hydrogen inventory stored in one place and
eliminating scenarios where it can cause an explosion. An
example of a way to make a situation inherently safer is
CEP  December 2021  aiche.org/cep  39
 S af e t y
Fixed flammable gas and flame detectors
are recommended for facilities that
transfer and store bulk hydrogen.
to locate the storage and transfer equipment outside and
to avoid enclosing equipment in a shed or building. It is
important to eliminate traps and dead-legs in piping and
vents where hydrogen is transferred. The materials of con-
struction of any part of the system that comes into contact
with hydrogen should be thoroughly evaluated; material
compatibility is closely tied to the operating conditions such
as pressure and temperature.
Inventory management and facility spacing. Although
facilities often try to design systems so that they will pre-
vent a fire or explosion, the facility must be designed with
the assumption that ignition can occur to help minimize
the impact of primary and secondary fires and explosions.
Bulk inventories of hydrogen must be located with respect
to surrounding facility buildings and units to help limit
risk to the surrounding facility and personnel. Minimum
separation distances of bulk gaseous hydrogen inventories
that are provided in both NFPA 2 and NFPA 55 consider
unignited and ignited jet flames of hydrogen at various
pressures. The characteristics of the jet flame will depend
on the effective leak diameter and pressure of the leak, so
considerations must be provided for the specific situation
in which bulk hydrogen is used and transferred. Additional
details are provided in NFPA 2, Appendix E. Ideally, the
facility layout and explosion venting should be config-
ured so that personnel and other parts of the facility will
not be harmed should an incident occur. In some situa-
tions, additional control measures may include protecting
or reinforcing buildings to withstand blast pressures that
may be generated in an explosion. In these situations, an
engineering analysis may be required in conjunction with
a hazard analysis to assure that the design meets company
risk tolerance.
If hydrogen is ignited during a release, a critical mea-
sure to help mitigate the situation is to isolate the supply
from the leak point. It is not unusual for facilities to install
multiple remote stations or push buttons for workers to
activate a shut-down sequence that quickly closes isola-
tion valves located at the tank. In most instances, a jet fire
should not be extinguished until the supply source of the
leak is contained to prevent potential hydrogen accumula-
tion and explosion.
Ventilation. Hydrogen systems are often located
outdoors to avoid explosion concerns. Enclosed rooms
40  aiche.org/cep  December 2021  CEP
must be ventilated with systems that have reliable air flow
detection alarms. Ventilation should focus on high points,
such as the roofline, where hydrogen can accumulate. Per
NFPA 91, “Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Convey-
ing of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Particulate Solids, (2020
Edition),” ventilation should be designed to maintain the
concentration of hydrogen below 25% of the LFL and
equipment should be routinely tested to ensure it is operat-
ing to that design basis.
Purging and inerting equipment. The limiting oxygen
concentration of hydrogen is low and the flammable limits
are wide. This presents unique concerns when equipment
is open to the air before or after a hydrogen transfer. Safety
incidents have occurred in the past because equipment was
not adequately inerted with nitrogen prior to use, or a man-
ual powder addition introduced air into the system, resulting
in an explosion. It is not uncommon for some facilities to
establish unique inerting or purging procedures that have
undergone robust hazard analysis and are controlled through
safety systems or controls. Follow the guidance in NFPA 69,
“Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems,” to calculate
the appropriate measure to take to purge and inert equipment
to recommended safe levels (9).
Ignition source management. Manage ignition sources
via bonding, grounding, and ensuring that electrical devices
meet applicable hazardous area classification require-
ments. A robust hot-work program must be implemented
and enforced. The program must consider precautions to
adequately purge and ventilate high-point traps, and then
include a step to sample the atmosphere before work starts.
Ceiling-mounted equipment should be inspected to ensure
that it meets the hazardous area classification requirements
of NFPA 497, because many facilities that typically handle
hydrocarbon vapors do not require installation of classified
equipment at those elevations.
Leak and flame detection systems. Fixed flammable
gas and flame detectors are recommended for facilities that
transfer and store bulk hydrogen. Flammable gas detectors
must be placed so that they can sense likely leak points of
hydrogen. Typically, they are mounted at high points within
rooms and near ventilation intakes. Flame detection systems
are necessary because hydrogen jet fires can be nearly invis-
ible. Detectors need to provide information to a continuously
staffed control room and/or automatically initiate a shut-
down sequence to set the process into a safe state.
Human factors assessments. Employees and contractors
should be trained on and understand operations with high-
risk potential and the human-factors controls that help error-
proof the work environment. Workers should conduct a field
tour of critical aspects of the work that will be performed,
and they should be able to recall the locations of hazards
and how to correctly perform tasks. The key is to provide
Copyright © 2021 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).
Not for distribution without prior written permission.
an opportunity for personnel to understand what to do, why
they do it, and how, as these activities help personnel com-
mit important concepts to memory.
In addition to hazard awareness training, implement
checklists that include critical steps for certain kinds of
activities to help prevent missed or skipped steps, such as
testing high points in confined spaces prior to conducting
hot work. Management of change (MOC) protocols should
include checklists with expertise review to confirm that
changes align with codes and standards, and to evaluate the
change for potential unintended consequences that could
result in a safety event.
Embracing a risk-based process safety program
The technical aspects of avoiding risks are important, but
they cannot be implemented effectively without developing
organizational competency, culture, and management sys-
tems. Even when managing small inventories of hydrogen,
organizations must be diligent to avoid complacency.
Many facilities that manage smaller inventories of
hydrogen, or manage inventories of material that can form
hydrogen as a byproduct, fall outside of the boundaries of
a legal requirement to implement a process safety manage-
ment program. Facilities that best manage their risk rec-
ognize the importance of developing work processes and
robust management systems at their facilities. CCPS offers
complementary resources to implement a risk-based process
safety program that can be scaled based on the complexity
SARAH ECK, P.E., CCPSC, is a Senior Process Safety Engineer at
DEKRA North America, a global testing, consulting, and certification
company. Her career includes roles in manufacturing, environmental,
health, and safety (EHS), and process safety at Eli Lilly, Stepan Co.,
Hemlock Semiconductor, and Corteva Agrisciences. In addition, she
serves on the technical committee for the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 401, “Recommended Practice for the Preven-
tion of Fires and Uncontrolled Chemical Reactions Associated with
the Handling of Hazardous Waste,” and she contributes to CCPS
Project 276, “Guidelines/Essentials of Safe Work Practices.” She has
a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering from Purdue Univ. and
is both a Professional Engineer and Certified Process Safety Profes-
sional (CCPSC).
MICHAEL D. SNYDER, P.E., CSP, CFPS, is the Operational Risk Man-
agement Practice Vice President for DEKRA North America. He was
previously the Global Director of Safety and Loss Prevention for
Dow Corning Corp., responsible for leading the company’s occu-
pational and process safety programs. He currently serves on the
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Advisory Board and is a
former member of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standards Council. He is also a technical committee member of
NFPA 30, “Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code,” NFPA 1, “Fire
Code,” and NFPA 1720, “Standard for the Organization and Deploy-
ment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Opera-
tions and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Depart-
ments.” Snyder earned a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering
from Cornell Univ. and a master’s degree in occupational safety and
health from Columbia Southern Univ. He is a registered professional
engineer in Michigan, a Certified Safety Professional (CSP), and a
Certified Fire Protection Specialist (CFPS).
Copyright © 2021 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE).
Not for distribution without prior written permission.
of the process and the organization managing the risk. It is
unique from other legal requirements in that it introduces
a set of management systems in addition to organizational
culture and competency-building components. The program
includes mechanisms to adopt the codes and standards previ-
ously mentioned in this article, and it helps to:
• build the competency and skill development of all staff,
including frontline workers, their supervisors, and technical
support personnel
• build a strong facility culture that is cognizant of the
explosive properties of hydrogen and willing to stop work if
conditions seem unsafe
• implement robust management systems that establish
a technical basis of safety, hazard identification and risk
assessments, safe work practices, emergency procedures,
operational excellence around procedures, and a robust asset
integrity program. CEP
Literature Cited
1. Hydrogen Tools, “Hydrogen Fuel Cell Codes & Standards,”
H2 Tools, https://h2tools.org/codes-standards (accessed
Oct. 26, 2021).
2. Air Products, “Safe Handling of Cryogenic Liquids,” Air
Products Safetygram 16, https://www.airproducts.com/-/media/
airproducts/files/en/900/900-13-079-us-safe-handling-of-cryo-
liquids-safetygram-16.pdf (accessed Nov. 7, 2021).
3. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
“Chemical Reaction, Hydrogen Release, Explosion and Fire
at AB Specialty Silicones,” Report No. 2019-03-I-IL, www.csb.
gov/ab-specialty-silicones-llc (Sept. 24, 2021).
4. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
“Tesoro Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire: Catastrophic Rupture
of Heat Exchanger, Investigation Report,” https://www.csb.gov/
tesoro-refinery-fatal-explosion-and-fire (Apr. 2, 2010).
5. Hydrogen Tools, “Lessons Learned,” Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory Through Support with U.S. Dept. of Energy’s Office
of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), https://
h2tools.org/lessons (accessed Aug. 13, 2021).
6. Factory Mutual, “FM Global Hydrogen Datasheets (online):
Hydrogen, Data Sheet ID# 7-91,” www.fmglobal.com/research-
and-resources/fm-global-data-sheets (Apr. 2021).
7. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “U.S.
Department of Labor’s OSHA Cites Magnablend for Serious
Violations Following Chemical Fire at Waxahachie, Texas,
Facility,” OSHA News Release – Region 6, 12-557-DAL,
https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region6/03302012
(Mar. 30, 2012).
8. Hydrogen Tools, “Codes and Standards,” Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory Through Support with U.S. Dept. of Ener-
gy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE),
https://h2tools.org/fuel-cell-codes-and-standards?search_api_full-
text= (accessed Aug. 13, 2021).
9. National Fire Protection Association, “NFPA 69: Standard on
Explosion Prevention Systems, 2019 Edition,” www.nfpa.org/69
(accessed Nov. 10, 2021).
CEP  December 2021  aiche.org/cep  41