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The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State: by Elizabeth C.
Economy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, 360 pp., $27.95.

Article  in  Comparative Strategy · September 2020

DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2020.1803714

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 Comparative Strategy

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The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New

Chinese State
by Elizabeth C. Economy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, 360 pp.,
$27.95.

C. Dale Walton

To cite this article: C. Dale Walton (2020) The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese
State, Comparative Strategy, 39:5, 505-506, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2020.1803714

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COMPARATIVE STRATEGY
2020, VOL. 39, NO. 5, 505–506

BOOK REVIEW

The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, by Elizabeth C.
Economy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, 360 pp., $27.95.

Before the Covid-19 epidemic, Xi Jinping appeared to be a near-unstoppable force in Chinese

politics. In recent years he has dexterously consolidated power, systematically sidelining or out-
right crushing his most dangerous opponents. His dominance over the Communist Party of
China (CPC) was so imposing that he even dared to craft a personal cult.
Mao, however, had demanded fanatical obedience and repeatedly launched deranged policy
initiatives, resulting in tens of millions of deaths and incalculable human misery—all in service of
his plan to, in effect, destroy China’s culture completely and replace it with new one of his own
devising. Xi seemingly offered a continuation of the far more attractive bargain between rulers
and ruled which had developed during the post-Mao period. In exchange for obedience to the
CPC, citizens would be allowed to more-or-less do as they liked in their everyday lives. They
would be able to travel abroad, accumulate wealth, and, if they wished, retire into private life and
have nothing to do with politics beyond the occasional perfunctory demonstration of nationalism
and loyalty to the governing authorities. In short, if they obeyed the state and engaged in no
crimes (especially of a political character), they would be left in peace.
In practice, this trade was always unevenly applied—for example, most members of suspect
ethnic groups such as Uyghurs and Tibetans never received the same degree of practical freedom
that a typical ethnic Chinese citizen enjoyed. Moreover, it was never explicitly spelled out as offi-
cial policy, much less guaranteed constitutionally. Yet China clearly was on the road to becoming
a “light authoritarian” country, and perhaps, in time, even a full electoral democracy. As he con-
solidated power, however, Xi altered the bargain bit by bit.
Most notoriously, huge numbers of Uyghurs clearly are victims of ongoing crimes against
humanity—a reality that most international organizations have responded to either with studied
inattention or shameless licking of CPC boots. The great majority of China’s citizens, thankfully,
are not suffering such extreme repression, but they are subject to a social experiment as ambi-
tious, in its own way, as Mao’s audacious, but comparatively, crude efforts; an attempt to use
advanced technology to develop a near-perfect panopticon state. If matters progress as Xi hopes,
the social credit system will soon be entirely standardized and its bugs progressively whittled
away, enabling it to serve as the center of an all-pervasive surveillance system. The CPC will be
able to constantly monitor, assess, and render judgment on the country’s citizens; each individual
will be a mere node in a network of about 1.4 billion such nodes. When nodes begin to “go bad,”
they will be corrected if possible, neutralized in one manner or another if not.
In The Third Revolution, Elizabeth C. Economy, the Director of Asia Studies and C.V. Starr Senior
Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, offers exceptional insight into how Xi rose to his present
position and wielded power during his early years as general secretary and president. Her portrait of
Xi is detailed and nuanced, and The Third Revolution offers a deeply knowledgeable, carefully even-
handed discussion of a complex figure, the CPC, and Chinese politics in general. Indeed, the book is
so subtle in its analysis as to be a bit cagey; at times, the reader must engage in a quasi-Straussian ana-
lysis of the text, trying to ascertain the author’s precise views by carefully reading between the lines.
This is not ideal, but certainly is understandable, given the CPC’s readiness to bar foreign schol-
ars who are viewed as “hostile to China.” In actuality, this most often simply means “hostile to the
CPC,” but the latter is extremely firm in its refusal to acknowledge any distinction between its own
interests and those of China as a country. This general attitude is ubiquitous; regimes of all kinds,
including the US government, respond to similar criticisms with great hostility. Most governments,
however, are constrained by history, law, and/or other factors from altogether shutting out noisome
506 C. DALE WALTON

foreign critics en masse. The CPC, however, has no qualms about doing so, and possesses the sheer
muscle to do as it likes. Even distinguished Western scholars thus face a dilemma; they must write
with caution, or face loss of access not only to China itself, but also to their sources within main-
land China (and now even Hong Kong). Continued contact with blacklisted foreign writers is dan-
gerous for all Chinese citizens, and career-sabotaging (if not worse) for government officials.
The Covid-19 epidemic has, obviously, enormously complicated Xi’s plans. Instead of the smooth
rollout of an unbreakable technocratic neo-totalitarianism, Xi is presently is engaged in desperate
counterattacks against any accusation of CPC wrongdoing in allowing the epidemic to escape beyond
Wuhan. (Any speculation that the disease escaped from a medical research facility, most plausibly
because of an entirely unintentional but globally devastating personal error by a staff member, of
course is treated as an outrageous lie that, if made by a foreigner, proves hatred of China.)
At the same time, however, Xi has reacted with nimble audacity. Most notably, he is in the
process of “conquering” Hong Kong. Formerly one of the overall freest polities on earth, Hong
Kong is rapidly transitioning into just another Chinese province. (Although, for financial and pol-
itical reasons the fiction that Hong Kong remains autonomous will be kept in place, at least for a
time). Even while he battles the greatest crisis of his reign, Xi refuses to cede ground, and coun-
terattacks. Thus far, his risky strategy has paid off.
The major events of 2019–20 have not dated The Third Revolution—indeed, it now is even more
valuable to readers in some respects. When published, the book offered readers valuable insight into
Xi’s personal priorities and his intraparty struggles, but the “Third Revolution” (the first two being
those of Mao and Deng Xiaoping) was moving forward at a comparatively steady pace. Today, Xi’s
Third Revolution has the momentum of a cannonball, but this is no guarantee that it will succeed.
The many traumas inflicted by Covid-19—particularly the crushing damage inflicted on China’s
export-driven economy—might well overmatch even the clever and indefatigable political maneuvering
of the general secretary. In five years, Xi may indeed be the undisputed autocrat of an even more
powerful China—or, he may have long since fled the country to live in exile. At present, either of these
outcomes, and a panoply of others, are plausible; current conditions, both within China and through-
out the world, are so dynamic as to make overly precise predictions even more hazardous then useful.
In the meantime, however, The Third Revolution offers a impressive guide to the man who may suc-
cessfully launch a new system of governance—a blandly efficient technocratic “totalitarianism 2.0”—
that will prove far more enduring than Mao’s gruesome, fantasy-based totalitarianism ever could
have been.

C. Dale Walton
Lindenwood University, St. Charles, MO, USA
DWalton@lindenwood.edu

# 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1803714

Notes on contributor
C. Dale Walton (DWalton@lindenwood.edu) is a professor of international relations and Hammond Institute senior
fellow at Lindenwood University. His is the author of numerous works, including the books The Myth of Inevitable US
Defeat in Vietnam (2002); Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century (2007); and Grand Strategy and
the Presidency (2012). He also is one of the coauthors of Understanding Modern Warfare, 2nd ed. (2016).

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