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8
IflflB ^- _ id«**

Editor:
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Photographic consultant,
this issue:
Robert M . Atwater

5 MARS «76
(^.

"SP*
Military technology five centuries a g o

W h e n the Renaissance artist and all-round genius

Leonardo w a s born in 1 4 5 2 in Vinci, a castello (for-
tified hill village) in the Florentine State, he w a s to
emerge also as the first director of military research
and development in modern times.
Besides his early fascination with architecture and
hydraulics, his interest in civil and mechanical engi-
neering extended to military works and devices as
well. First in the service of Ludovico Sforza and then
Lorenzo dei Medici, Leonardo da Vinci spent consid-
erable time conceiving and; designing the apparatus
of war. B y the early sixteenth century, he w a s chief
engineer to Cesare Borgia w h o also exploited the
artist's creativeness for military as well as civil pur-
poses.
The photographs s h o w (on"the first side of the
preceding sheet), top, sketch of assault vehicle and,
left, a twentieth-century scale model of s a m e ; at
lower right are models of projectable b o m b s . O n the
reverse side, top, a flying machine for penetrating
defences such as that typified by the fortress (centre),
which could also be cannonaded by heavy, multiple
mortars resting o n Leonardo's pedestal mounting
(below). T h e scale models are on display at the
M u s é e Léonard de Vinci, at Amboise (France).
 Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, January-April 1976

Science and war

Comment 3
Sean MacBride
The oblivion that science has m a d e possible for society 11
The Russell-Einstein Manifesto 15
Charles C. Price
W e a p o n s of mass destruction and public policy 17
Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud
Correspondence on war 2 5
John Stares
The strategic nuclear arms race 2 7
Gemot Köhler
Imperialism as a level of analysis in correlates-of-war-research 39
Bernard T. Feld.
H o w an atomic scientist views the prospects for 'the b o m b ' 49
Art Buchwald
The Plowshare Treaty 51
Vasi/iy M. Kulish
Science and warfare 53
Conventional weapons and unnecessary suffering 63
O n science, war and leadership 67
Ali A. Mazrui
Military technology and the masculinity of war: an African perspective 71
K. Erik Solem
Energy resources and global strategic planning 7 7
Miroslav Soukup
The scientific-technical revolution and a comprehensive disarmament programme 91
A tale of two forts 101
Johan Gattung
Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding 103
Letters 117
REMINDER TO READERS
impact of science o n society is published regularly in Spanish by the
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An invitation to readers

Reasoned letters which c o m m e n t , pro or con,

on any of the articles printed in impact
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on any subject discussed in impact
are welcomed. They should b e addressed to
the Editor, impact of science o n society,
Unesco, 7 Place d e Fontenoy, 75700 Paris (France).
Requests for permission to reproduce articles
published in impact should be addressed to
the Editor. © Unesco, 1976.

Published by The Unesco Press,

7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris (France).
Primed in France by Imprimerie Oberthur.
 Comment

Man for the first time has it in his power to destroy man
completely. Previously, one could pray to one's God or
gods in order to avoid one's own responsibility for the
taking of the lives of others. A major war today is unthinkable
for it would mean the end of the natural experiment which
has raised man to the top of the biological ladder-or rather,
the experiment in which man thus sees himself and his
physical, intellectual and social accomplishments.
In dealing with peace as a major social problem in search
of a solution, one of Unesco's specific objectives is the
'promotion of a more enlightened and more effective under-
standing of the causes of war and aggression, of ways and
means of achieving disarmament, and the establishment of
a positive peace'. The quotation is taken from the document
Analysis of Problems and Table of Objectives to be Used
asa Basis for M e d i u m - T e r m Planning ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 2 ) , approved
by the Organization's General Conference at its eighteenth
session, 1974.

The theme of this issue, 'Science and W a r ' , could just as

easily be called 'Science and Madness'. For with the refinement
of our scientific knowledge and its immediate transformation
into usable technology, a disproportionate part of our
endeavour in scientific technology seems inevitably to b e c o m e
converted into the wherewithal of war.
W h y this is so and h o w it has c o m e to be are social factors
serving as the object of extensive study by a large corps of
political and economic scientists, historians, anthropologists,
biologists, psychologists, system analysts and strategic
planners, as well as by sociologists.1 In addition to these
researchers, modern warfare and its base of high technology

1. cf. Impact of Science on Society, T h e Scientific Basis of Peace' (Vol. XVIII, N o . 2 ,

1968); ibid., ' A Forum on Nuclear Disarmament' (Vol. XXII, N o . 3, 1972).

impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976 3

are the cause and mainstay of a significantly large part of
the modern bureaucratic structure: defence ministries and the
military forces themselves; the munitions industry and its
research and development centres; foreign ministries and,
to a certain extent, foreign aid agencies; national security
and intelligence services; arms control and disarmament
specialists; institutes, foundations and 'think tanks' devoted
to strategic analysis and peace research ; and even specialized
branches of the United Nations in addition to the mediating,
cease-fire and observer forces assigned to police demilitarized
zones and assure other types of peace-keeping operations
mounted by the United Nations and its M e m b e r States.
These social structures-highly evolved as they have
b e c o m e - a r e not reserved to the super-powers or the other
industrialized nations, or to countries governed by oligarchic
or dictatorial régimes. Rather, there seems to be virtually n o
State, regardless of its avowed representations in favour of
peace or neutrality or the forsaking of war, which does not
maintain a uniformed and equipped fighting force of s o m e
kind. Since the age of the brandished club and the flung
stone, m a n has not ceased to arm himself for any and all
eventuality. Today s o m e of the standing armies of conscripts
are a m o n g the largest ever maintained in times of comparative
peace. S o m e large military forces are found a m o n g the poorest
of developing countries.
M a n realizes, none the less, that his social evolution has
developed to the point that this state of affairs cannot
continue. Thus he has been able, during our century alone,
to introduce the concepts of disarmament and the limitation
of armaments, of arms control and inspection, and of the
non-proliferation of especially vicious w e a p o n systems. These
are n e w socio-political devices, consciously invented and
(frequently) conscientiously adopted.
The year just past has been an eventful one in this respect,
since it marked the end of combat in the Indo-Chinese
peninsula, the independence of several African areas from
rule by the last great colonial power on that continent, a
marked easing of the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean
region, the significant accords signed at the European Security
Conference, and-coincidentally with these actualities-the
thirtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World W a r .

H o w to proceed w i t h the task

Yet m u c h , very m u c h more, remains to be accomplished. O n e

of the authors writing in the pages which follow indicates

4 Comment
that more than half of the world's trained scientific research
and technical development resources are devoted to military
ends. If w e calculate the constructive, practical good that
could c o m e from the allocation of these resources to h u m a n -
itarian pursuits, w e face another question: W o u l d the liber-
ation of scientists and engineers from military-oriented
vocations really m a k e them available for the work to be done
to feed, house, clothe and educate mankind properly? W o u l d
w e , the planetary fellow-passengers, use these assets to
enhance our culture, capitalize on our leisure time (for those
of us, that is, w h o have it), and generally enhance the
quality of living ? The answer is not, alas, necessarily 'yes'.
But given that the present is time for change, what should
w e d o and h o w should w e set about it? A recent contributor
to this journal suggested, without tongue in cheek, that the
wealthy nations should reduce their war budgets by 5 0 per
cent.1 H e proposed that these savings be used immediately
'for development at both the national and international
levels', pointing out that the so-called developed countries
are as m u c h in need of programmes of social reform as the
poor nations requiring resources for systematic development.
T h e author concluded that subsequent annual cuts of o n e -
half of each nation's arms budget would ' m a k e battle a thing
of the past [and] economic and social development the
motivating force of modern life'.
O n e m a y find fault with this or any other specific procedure
that an individual, a nation or a group of nations might
advance. But if precise steps of this kind are not taken, there
can be no end to the continuous spiralling in the arms races
(a) a m o n g the super-powers and other major nations;
(b) a m o n g newly independent countries w h o s e ideologies
m a y be crystallizing in such a w a y as to antagonize their
neighbours; (c) a m o n g nations guileless, gullible or vain
enough not to resist the blandishments of arms merchants;
or (d) a m o n g those powers that seem to be casting devouring
eyes on neighbours w h o s e possessions or other attributes
might be desirable to acquire. Competition in arms leads to
heightened political tension, sometimes to setting in motion
action which cannot be stopped, and all too often to the
inevitable explosion. It is in this w a y that m a n contrives
cataclysms capable of taking more lives or leaving more
maimed than nature's catastrophes on land, at sea or in
the sky.

1. S . O . Awokoya, T h e Failure to Disarm: Main Obstacle to Development?', Impact

of Science on Society. Vol. XXV, N o . 1,1975, on the theme of 'Science and C o m m o n
Sense'.

Comment 5
 O n e can also find fault with the prospect of large m a n p o w e r
pools remaining after armies and the other bureaucracies of
conflict have been disbanded. Demobilization following a
war is not an u n k n o w n social p h e n o m e n o n ; it is one that
has already been managed intelligently, skilfully and produc-
tively. But the process must represent a progressive disman-
tlement of standing combat forces of airmen, sailors and
soldiers and b e c o m e reality if w e - m a n k i n d - a r e to live in
a civilized environment in an ethical world, if the rich nations
are to help effectively the poor to ameliorate trade and appro-
priate aid, gain access to investment markets, participate
fully in an adjusted international monetary system, and benefit
rationally from modern science and technology.

Putting theory into practice

Is this feasible? Does a community, be it rich or poor, continue

to respond to the impetus of economics as the main justifi-
cation of tooling and re-tooling the instruments and strat-
egies of 'national defence' and'security'? A country's national
security and its potential to m a k e war can no longer be linked
because the development of scientific technology and its
applications to warmaking are the greatest of all threats n o w
imperilling the h u m a n community. They represent the ultimate,
in the literal sense of 'the last', m a n - m a d e danger to the
h u m a n settlement.
That this threat can be identified, measured, discussed and
negotiated internationally has been borne able testimony by
the Strategic A r m s Limitation Talks ( S A L T ) , the first phase
of which w a s commented upon in these pages almost four
years ago. T h e second phase of these vital dialogues and
agreements m a y soon be nearing an equally hopeful stage,
and one can only applaud similar continued efforts elsewhere
in the case of conventional arms, for the settlement of various
bilateral and multilateral disputes, and especially for the
attenuation of persistent irritations a m o n g sovereign nations.
Dismantlement of the apparatus of w a r should m e a n
exactly that, including sharp abatement of excessively costly
and risky (although usually silent) wars between national
security and intelligence services. ' N o outsider can imagine',
recently commented a prominent international n e w s journal,
'the degree to which the [United States of America] and the
Soviet Union are locked in intense competition to gain an
edge, no matter h o w slight... in a whole array of w e a p o n s
systems and intelligence-gathering devices'.

6 Comment
 In the field of 'intelligence wars', efforts expressly under-
taken in the n a m e of national security, the tendentious claim
of useful civil fall-out can seldom (if ever) be made-certainly
less evidently so than in straightforward military research or
space exploration. The open record s h o w s , on the contrary, that
scientific research and engineering development have been
the handmaidens of the continuing clashes between security
and intelligence services. For significant illustration of the
point, w e need only review the action/reaction p h e n o m e n o n
during recent decades in the application of refined mathe-
matics and bigger data processing machinery to the building
and deciphering of cryptographic systems. The circle here is
equally as vicious as with escalating w e a p o n systems, and
contributes nothing to the rationalization of the economic
order between'have'and 'have-not' nations-while siphoning
huge amounts of m o n e y and highly trained personnel. T h e
recklessness of this process has been examined most ably by,
a m o n g others, Seymour M e l m a n in his book. The Permanent
War Economy.

T h e p r o b l e m is deciding to decide

T h e first step towards armament in reverse, then, is to will

decisively to d o so. T h e decision is a social procedure-not
scientific, not technical, not one of mathematical reasoning.
In the process, all our social institutions (beginning with
parliaments or, where these are lacking in sufficient authority,
the real decision-makers in place), all our institutions need
to bring the c o m m o n sense, moral spirit and intellectual intre-
pidity which only humanity possesses. Public opinion can,
as another of our authors remarks, be extremely influential
in this respect. If there were public pressure to reduce our
defence budgets and w a r establishments by 1 5 per cent
annually, liquidation of our arms and armies would be complete
within a h u m a n generation.
Taking the first step means, also, what the original process
of organizing the United Nations signified: each nation
surrenders a little bit of its sovereignty. Unreined national
autonomy today is a luxury, a pretension, an anachronism
which the more than eight score countries sharing the surface
of our orbiting h o m e can n o longer afford.
The time to act is n o w , not only to preserve the planet's
settlement and its total heritage, but so that surviving histo-
rians will not brand ours the A g e of Disenlightenment or
the Extinction of the Quaternary. It can be done.

Comment 7
 The authors contributing to this issue, each a foremost
specialist in his field, describe the situation as they see it and
propose their o w n solutions to halting the conversion of
scientific technology into improved warmaking capability. If
you have ideas that you believe to be better than theirs,
let us k n o w .
impact
TO DELVE M O R E DEEPLY
ALCOCK, N. A forecast of war. Peace res.,
vol. 5, no. 11, November 1973.
The arms race: disarmament and development.
Geneva, Centre for Economic and Social Information,
United Nations, 1973 (pamphlet).
C H A T T E R J E E , P. The equilibrium theory
of arms races: some extensions.
J. Peace res., vol. XI, no. 3 , 1974.
C L A R K E , R. L'espion qui vient du ciel.
Paris, Hachette, 1970.
C O H E N , S . The Indian army: its contribution to
the development of a nation. Berkeley, Calif.,
University of California Press, 1971.
D A Y , S . et al. In arms w e trust Bull, atomic scientists,
vol. XXXI, no. 4 . April 1975.
E N A H O R O , P. East Africa: arms race.
Africa, no. 4 8 , August 1975.
Distinguishes between daring, recklessness
and capacity concerning the making of war.
EPSTEIN, W . The proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Scientific American, vol. 2 3 2 , no. 4 , April 1975.
The fires of war: napalm and other incendiary
weapons. N e w York, N . Y . , Information Service,
United Nations, 1973 (brochure).
G A M S O N , W . ; M O D I G L I A N I , A . Conceptions
of social life. Boston, Mass., Little, Brown & Co., 1974.
cf. especially Chapter 1 2 , ' W h y do people fight wars?'
GEIRT, V . U n e industrie qui ignore la crise:
l'armement Science Er vie, vol. CXXVII,
no. 691, April 1975.
G E N O V Ê S , S . (producer). Pax, 1968.
Directed by Wolf Riller. Colour production,
75 minutes long, concerning agressiveness and
violence in h u m a n . (Film.)
G O T T H E I L , F. A n economic assessment
of the military burden in the Middle East 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 0 .
J. conflict resolution, vol. XVIII, no. 3, September 1974.
G R A Y , C . Predicting arms race behaviour.
Futures, vol. 6, no. 5 , October 1974.
H A R K A B I , Y . Arab attitudes to Israel (trans.
M . Louvish). London, Vallentine, Mitchell, 1972.
Israeli General Harkabi examines Arab motives
concerning Zionism and the Jewish people.
H U S S A I N , F. N o place to hide. New scientist,
15 August 1974.
International repertory of institutions for peace and
conflict research. Paris, Unesco, 1973. (Reports and
papers in the social sciences, no. 28.)
8 Comment
K A H N , D . The codebreakers. N e w York, N . Y . ,
N e w American Library, 1973.
This is the most reliable work on the history
and current condition of cryptologie systems and
cryptographic services; it is a one-volume
condensation of an earlier, three-volume
publication issued by McGraw-Hill.
L A M B E L E T , J. D o arms races lead to war?
J. peace res., vol. XII, no. 2 , 1975.
Balances the Richardsoman view (that unstable
arms races cannot lead directly to anything
but war) with the hypothesis that the two phenomena
are entirely independem.
LEYSIEFFER, H . Radar—die Technik von heute
und ein Blick in die Zukunft Umschau
in Wissenschaft und Technik, vol. 7 5 , no. 8 ,
15 April 1975.
Born of war, radar has become indispensable
to all maritime and aerospace activity.
M c H A L E , J.; M c H A L E , M . Human requirements,
supply levels and outer bounds: a framework
for thinking about the planetary bargain.
N e w York, N . Y . and Aspen, Colo., Aspen
Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1975.
cf. p. 8 2 , The relationship between military
expenditures and developmental aid.
M A G N I E N . C ; de C L O S E T S . F. Le laser
sur le champ de bataille. Sciences & Avenir,
no. 337, March 1975.
M E L M A N , S . The permanent war economy.
N e w York, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1974.
M I D L A R S K Y , M . Power, uncertainty and the onset
of international violence. J. conflict resolution,
vol. XVIII, no. 3, September 1974.
Of science, survival and spying. Science news.
vol. 106, no. 7 , 1 7 August 1 9 7 4 .
P A B S C H , W . The Non-Proliferation Treaty: success
or failure ? NATO review, vol. 23, no. 4 , August 1975.
The cause of non-proliferation was, on the whole,
well served.
Peace and the sciences. Quarterly published by the
International Institute for Peace, Mõllwaldplatz 5,
1040 Wien (Austria).
Publications and studies of the Centre de Sociologie
de la Guerre, Université Libre de Bruxelles,
4 4 Avenue Jeanne, 1050 Bruxelles (Belgium).
S E G A L E N , J. La guerre électronique. La recherche.
no. 46, June 1974.
As shown in the Y o m Kippur War, the tools of electronic
warfare increasingly control the outcome of battle.
S I V A R D , R. World military and social expenditures,
1974. N e w York, N . Y . , Institute for World Order,
1974. Obtainable from W M S E Publications,
Box 1003, Leesburg V A 22075 (United States).
Symposium on the Role of Scientists and their
Organizations in the Struggle for Disarmament,
1 5 - 1 9 July 1975, M o s c o w . A report on this meeting
appears in Scientific world, no. 4 , 1 9 7 5 .
UNITED NATIONS. S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L .
Human rights and scientific and technological
developments (Report of the Secretary-General).
Item 70, provisional agenda. Thirtieth session.
N e w York, N.Y., United Nations, 28 July 1975
(document A / 1 0 1 4 6 ) cf. especially paragraphs 1 5 6 - 7 1 ,
'Increasing destructive power of modern weapons
and existing proposed safeguards', and paragraphs
1 7 2 - 9 , 'Hazards arising from atomic radiation
and existing proposed safeguards'.
V E D D E R , E. The medical aspects of chemical warfare.
Baltimore, M d , Williams Er Wilkins C o . , 1925.
What w a s learned from the use of toxic gases as
military weapons during the First World W a r .
V O L G Y , T . ; Q U I S T G A A R D , J. Learning about the
value of global cooperation: role-taking in the United
Nations as a predictor of world mindedness.
J. conflict resolution, vol. XIX, no. 2 , June 1975.
V O N N E U M A N N , J . ; M O R G E N S T E R N , O . Theory of
games and economic behavior. 3rd ed. Princeton,
N.J., Princeton University Press, 1953.
V O N W E I Z S A C H E R , C . et al. Kriegsfolgen und
Kriegsverhutung [Consequences and prevention
of war]. Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971.
Voyenniye znaniya [Military knowledge] and
Voyenniy vestnik [Military bulletin].
W E I S S , E. Weather control: an instrument for war 7
Survival, vol. XVII, no. 2 , March/April 1975.
Y O R K , H . Armes nucléaires: l'avertissement.
L'Express, 1 4 M a y 1973. (Interview.)
Y O U N G , E. N e w laws for old navies: military
implications of the L a w of the Sea. Survival,
vol. XVI, no. 6, November/December 1974.
Comment 9
Corrigendum
In Vol. 25, N o . 4 / o f impact, there w a s an
inadvertent transposition of t w o of the
illustrations appearing o n the reverse side
of the photographic frontispiece. The photo-
graph at the top right of this page should be
that of the w o m e n mathematical students busy
at their desks in Senegal, whereas the illus-
tration showing a male student at work
with his optical microscope should appear
next to the caption 'Mali'.

10
The oblivion that science
has m a d e possible for society
Sean MacBride

A general deterioration in private morality and public ethics has made it possible
for some States to design, build and deploy nuclear arms and other systems of
mass destruction without fear of moral condemnation or other public reprisal. Yet
a first and simple step towards general and complete disarmament is for all coun-
tries to out/aw nuclear weapons. A matter not to be left solely to governments to
handle, it should also be referred to the ordinary people concerned with their very
survival.

W e are living in a world where brutality,
violence, ever-increasing armament and w a r
dominate the thinking of humanity; regrets
tably, humanity gives the appearance of
having b e c o m e n u m b e d or terrified by its o w n
impotence in the face of disaster.
Little thought seems to have been given to
the effects of the fundamental changes that
have taken place around us in the course of
the last thirty years, and that are still taking
place. Yet the tremendous scientific and
material developments of this period have
altered radically the whole structure of
h u m a n society-and even threatened the
survival of the h u m a n race. Never before has
humanity been presented with so m a n y or
such grave problems. Perhaps as a result of
this scientific revolution, or coincidentally
with it, there has occurred a nearly total
collapse of public and private morality in
practically every sector of h u m a n relationships.
The previous standards of public and private
morality m a y have left m u c h to be desired,
but at least they existed: they were regarded as
standards, and c o m m a n d e d a certain degree
of observance. N o w they have ceased to be
either accepted or observed.
It is a rule of international law that w e a p -
ons and methods of warfare which d o not dis-
criminate between combatants and civilians
should never be used. Aerial bombings from
balloons were outlawed; the use of d u m d u m
bullets w a s outlawed, m a d e a crime o n the
grounds that these inflict unnecessary suffer-
ing. T h e bombing of hospitals and civilian
targets w a s ruled out. But all these principles
and standards have vanished, not even being
mentioned by those w h o s e responsibility it
is to uphold them. T h e use of the most cruel,
terrible and indiscriminate w e a p o n of all
time-the nuclear arm-is not even outlawed.
The manufacture and development of this
doomsday w e a p o n throughout the world
- is regarded as normal and quite respectable
by m a n y .
By his bequest Alfred Nobel presumably
intended that the individual selected to
receive his award would avail himself of the
occasion which Nobel thus created to
propound his suggestions for world peace. If
I have appeared to complain about the existing
complacency of institutional establishments,
governmental and religious, it is to permit m e
to m a k e concrete suggestions.
• T h e imperative of a peaceful ethic
The first one I would like to m a k e deals with
what Nobel properly described as 'the horror
of horrors, and the greatest of all crimes'-war.

Impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976 11

 This is the threat that hangs over all humanity
at the m o m e n t . Would anyone dispute
science's role in making this grotesque situa-
tion possible?
Peace must be, then, the desperate imper-
ative of humanity. M a n y imperatives flow
from this only too obvious conclusion; they
would be comparatively easier of achievement
if those in authority throughout the world
were imbued with an ethic that m a d e world
peace the primary objective, and if they were
inspired by a moral sense of social responsi-
bility.
The practical imperatives for peace are
m a n y and far-reaching. There is no short cut
to their resolution, and each must be tackled
energetically. They are:
General and complete disarmament, nuclear
w e a p o n s included.
Glorification of peace and not of war.
Effective protection of h u m a n rights and of
minorities at national and international
levels.
Automatic, depoliticized mechanism for the
settlement of international and non-inter-
national disputes that cause injustices or m a y
endanger peace.
A n international court of justice and legal
systems with fully automatic jurisdiction to
rectify injustice or abuse of power.
International peacekeeping force and police
force with limited functions.
Ultimately a world parliament and government.
International order to ensure fair distribution
of all essential commodities.
I can already hear m a n y say Utopia I...
impossible of achievement. Of course it will
be difficult, but what is the alternative?
Answer: the nearly certain destruction of the
h u m a n race.
The arsenal of nuclear w e a p o n s is n o w such
that there are enough nuclear missiles to
destroy the world twenty times over. Despite
special conferences and what are euphemis-
tically called 'partial disarmament measures',,
no progress has been m a d e to outlaw nuclear
arms-the arsenal of which is growing day by
day. Nuclear warheads are spread all over the
world in bases, aircraft, ships and submarines
to a greater extent than ever before. T h e
Nuclear Test Ban and Non-Proliferation treaties
have been of little value, although they have
been used to defuse public anxiety.
If any meaningful credibility is to be given
to humanitarian law or to a ban on nuclear
weapons, the first concrete step which
12 Sean MacBride
should be taken is to outlaw the use of nuclear
devices. This first, simple step could be a
convention, or an article in a convention,
outlawing nuclear weapons. Yet this has
not been done. This measure should be
accompanied by provisions outlawing the
manufacture, sale, transfer or stockpiling of
nuclear arms and the destruction of all
existing stocks.
All kinds of problems arise, of course, as to
control by inspection and verification. But
it is often difficult to escape the impression
that m a n y of these issues are raised in order
to find difficulties, and to block or delay
agreements. S o w h y not begin simply b y
outlawing the manufacture, sale, transfer,
stockpiling and use of nuclear w e a p o n s and
their components ? W h y not stop completely,
n o w , the production of all nuclear w e a p o n s ?
• T h e n e w influence of public opinion
For m a n y years s o m e governments sought to
create the impression that they, and only
they, held the secret to making nuclear
devices-and that, so long as it w a s they w h o
possessed this secret, the world w a s safe. It
w a s an idiotic fantasy, of course, to suggest
that the technique of nuclear destruction
could remain the secret of a few, selected,
'trustworthy' p o w e r s . . . or that the particular
nations in question were worthy of such trust.
The conduct of governments in our era does
not encourage one's confidence in their
judgement or in their integrity.
The advent of the mass media of c o m m u n i -
cation (especially radio and television), coupled
with higher standards of literacy and educa-
tion, are giving a m u c h higher degree of
influence to the world's public opinion than
it has ever had in the past. With the public
n o w instantly informed about current events,
governments can no longer keep their policies
and actions secret from the public. There
can n o longer be an impenetrable curtain
which prevents the spread of n e w s and
views.
 It is this development which is leading to a
shift in the centre of gravity of power from
governments to the public, by w a y of the
press and other mass media, an evolution
which neither governments nor the non-govern-
mental sector has yet fully understood. It
will give tremendous n e w power to the media,
so that great vigilance will have to be exercised
to ensure that the media d o not become
controlled by governments or private financial
interests. The non-governmental sector, espe-
cially, will have to use this n e w power construc-
tively.
Never has it been more necessary or more
urgent than n o w to alert public opinion to the
danger of war that exists, and to what I
have called the imperatives of peace.
War and the experts
W a r is too serious a matter to be left
in the hands of the generals.
Variously attributed
to Charles Maurice de Talleyrand,
Georges Clemenceau
and Aristide Briand
W h y d o I think it necessary to inject this
note of urgency? The answer is simple. The
build-up in armament has soared so high and
has b e c o m e so costly that, at any time, the
military general staff of one side or the other
m a y warn its government, ' W e have the
superiority in arms n o w , but w e will not have
it in six months' time; therefore, n o w is the
time to striker It does not matter h o w wrong
the generals w h o give this advice m a y b e ;
it is the kind of counsel which influences
governments and m a y cause a crisis to explode
into a full-blown war.
S o these are the reasons w h y the time has
c o m e for ' W e the peoples' referred to in the
Charter of the United Nations, to assert
ourselves and to d e m a n d the outlawing of
all nuclear weapons and the achievement of
general and complete disarmament It is
essential that the ordinary people of the
world should have a say as to their o w n
survival. A n d the non-governmental sector of
society is just as qualified to m a k e this
judgement as the 'experts' representing those
w h o have a vested interest in armament and
war.
T h e oblivion that science has m a d e possible for society
At the international conference held at
Bradford, United Kingdom, in 1974 by the
International Peace Bureau, 1 there w a s for-
mulated a d e m a n d for representation of
' W e the peoples' at the proposed United
Nations conference on world disarmament; 2
the proposal c a m e from not less than thirty
representatives from the non-governmental
sector present at the meeting in Bradford.
Quite rightly, the International Peace Bureau's
conference pointed out that
It is essential if the Conference is to succeed
that effect be given to the spirit of the Charter
so that ' W e the people' can be heard. In the
absence of direct democratic representation at
the United Nations this must be done through
non-governmental organizations which are
concerned with general and complete disar-
m a m e n t . Otherwise the World Disarmament
Conference will represent in the main the offi-
cial, military and industrial establishments that
have vested interest in maintaining and increas-
ing armaments. It is the governments and the
industrial-military complexes that have failed
so far to achieve disarmament. It is they w h o
have been responsible for the increased mili-
tary establishments and the arms race.
Unless this is done and governments can
be persuaded to take a m u c h more enlight-
ened view as to the urgency of general
and complete disarmament, the proposed
conference will be of little value.
In recent years, non-governmental organiza-
tions have been playing an increasingly
growing role in general, being virtually the
only independent voices that are heard and
that can alert public opinion through the
mass media. In regard to disarmament, the
Society of Friends (Quakers), the W o m a n ' s
International League for Peace and Freedom,
the International Peace Bureau, the Inter-
national Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, and the World Peace Council have
all m a d e valuable contributions.
1. T h e International Peace Bureau is a n o n - g o v e r n m e n -
tal organization, with headquarters at Geneva, Swit-
zerland, affiliated officially with the United Nations.
2 . First proposed in 1 9 7 2 by the Union of Soviet Socia-
list Republics, this international meeting would seek
an international concordat on disarmament, identifica-
tion of those interests opposing disarmament, aban-
donment of nuclear devices as arms of destruction, the
survival of humanity, dissolution of existing military
alliances and establishment of procedures for dispute
settlement and educational reforms to preclude the
glorification of war and reinforce the impact of public
opinion.
13
 Scientific organizations are active, too.
They have realized that they, like other sectors
of the community, are affected and are (in
part) responsible for the arms race. They have
a particular role to play in disarmament
because of their specialized knowledge, and
because of the scientific and technological
basis of modern weapons of mass destruction.
Scientists can help to clarify both the nature
of the problems and the obstacles in the
path of disarmament (see box). Also, they
Scientists and war
Since the Second World W a r , scientists,
engineers and humanists have combined their
knowledge, efforts and other resources to
establish non-violent alternatives to military
defence and, hopefully, to contribute to the
dismantlement of the world's war-making
capacity built on the foundations of advanced
scientific technology. A m o n g the more prom-
inent of these groups are:
Centre for Inter-Group Relations
4 Rue de Chevreuse
75006 Paris (France)
International Peace Bureau
41 Rue de Zürich
1200 Genève (Switzerland)
Mankind 2000 International Secretariat
Friends House, Euston Road
London N C 1 (United Kingdom)
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs •
North Great Russell Mansions
60 Great Russell Street
London W C 1 B 3 B E (United Kingdom)
Scientific Council of the U . S . S . R . for Economic
• Sean MacBride
Sean MacBride, SC, was born on
26 January 1904. Active in the movement
for Irish independence and imprisoned
on several occasions, Mr MacBride
played a leading role in the protection
of human rights in Ireland until 1948.
Since then, he has been involved in the
protection of these rights on the
international level, with strong personal •
interest in the struggle against racialism
14 Sean MacBride
can help to solve these problems and remove
the obstacles in co-operation with the broad
movement for peace and disarmament.
In m y view, then, the role of voluntary
organizations is becoming more and more
essential in the field. The big powers continue
to travel the perilous road of armament along
which the signpost just ahead of us reads
'To Oblivion'. Can the march on this road be
stopped? Yes, it can-if public opinion uses
the power it n o w possesses.
Competition between the T w o Systems
and the Underdeveloped Countries
2 Yaroslavskaya Ulitsa, Korpus 8 .
Moskva 1-243 (U.S.S.R.)
Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute
Sveavãgen 166
113 4 6 Stockholm (Sweden)
Universities and the Quest for Peace
1400 Hermann Drive
Houston T X (United States)
World A c a d e m y of Art and Science
1 Ruppin Street, Box 5 3 4
Rehovoth (Israel)
World Peace through L a w Centre
7 5 Rue de Lyon
1203 Genève (Switzerland)
Note: A complete list of such institutions
will be found in Appendixes 1 - 2 of
International Repertory of Institutions
for Peace and Conflict Research,
Unesco, 1973. (Reports and Papers
in the Social Sciences, no. 28.)
in Africa. He has intervened successfully •
to secure the reprieve or release from
custody of persons sentenced to death
or imprisoned because of their political
or religious views or who were the victims
of racialism. Since 1973, the author .
has served as United Nations Commissioner
for Namibia. In 1974, Commissioner
MacBride was awarded the Nobel •
Prize for Peace. His address:
United Nations, Box 20. New York
NY 10017 (United States of America).
The Russell-Einstein Manifesto
In the tragic situation which confronts h u m a n -
ity, w e feel that scientists should assemble
in conference to appraise the perils that have
arisen as a result of the development of
weapons of mass destruction, and to discuss
a resolution in the spirit of the [following]
draft.
W e are speaking on this occasion, not as
members of this or that nation, continent,
or creed, but as h u m a n beings, members of
the species M a n , w h o s e continued existence
is in doubt. The world is full of conflicts...
Almost everybody w h o is politically con-
scious has strong feeling about one or more
of these issues; but w e want you, if you can,
to set aside such feelings and consider
yourselves only as members of a biological
species which has had a remarkable history,
and w h o s e disappearance none of us can
desire.
W e shall try to say no single word which
should appeal to one group rather than to
another. All. equally, are in peril, and, if the
peril is understood, there is hope that they m a y
collectively avert it.
W e have to learn to think in a n e w w a y .
W e have to learn to ask ourselves, not what
steps can be taken to give military victory
to whatever group w e prefer, for there n o
longer are such steps; the question w e have
to ask ourselves is: what steps can be taken
to prevent a military contest of which the
issue must be disastrous to all parties?
The general public, and even m a n y m e n
in positions of authority, have not realized
what would be involved in a war with nuclear
b o m b s . The general public still thinks in terms
of the obliteration of cities. It is understood
that the n e w b o m b s are more powerful than
the old, and that, while one A - b o m b could
obliterate Hiroshima, o n e H - b o m b could
obliterate the largest cities such as London,
N e w York and M o s c o w .
N o doubt in an H - b o m b war great cities
impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976
would be obliterated. But this is one of the
minor disasters that would have to be faced.
If everybody in London, N e w York and
M o s c o w were exterminated, the world might,
in the course of a few centuries, recover
from the blow. But w e n o w k n o w , especially
since the Bikini test, that nuclear b o m b s can
gradually spread destruction over a very m u c h
wider area than had been supposed.
It is stated on very good authority that a
b o m b can n o w be manufactured which will
be 2,500 times as powerful as that which
destroyed Hiroshima. Such a b o m b , if
exploded near the ground or under water,
sends radio-active particles into the upper air.
They sink gradually and reach the surface
of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or
rain. It w a s this dust which infected the
Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish.
N o one k n o w s h o w widely such lethal
radio-active particles might be diffused, but
the best authorities are unanimous in saying
that a war with H - b o m b s might quite possibly
put an end to the h u m a n race. It is feared
that if m a n y H - b o m b s are used there will be
universal death-sudden only for a minority,
but for the majority a slow torture of disease
and disintegration.
M a n y warnings have been uttered b y
eminent m e n of science and by authorities
in military strategy. N o n e of them will say
that the worst results are certain. W h a t they
do say is that these results are possible, and
no one can b e sure that they will not be
realized. W e have not yet found that the
views of experts on this question depend in
any degree upon their politics or prejudices.
They depend only, so far as our researches
have revealed, upon the extent of the particular
expert's knowledge. W e have found that the
m e n w h o k n o w most are the most gloomy.
Here, then, is the problem which w e present
to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable:
Shall w e put an end to the h u m a n race; or
15
 shall mankind renounce w a r ? 1 People will
not face this alternative because it is so
difficult to abolish war.
The abolition of war will demand distasteful
limitations of national sovereignty.2 But what
perhaps impedes understanding of the situa-
tion more than anything else is that the term
'mankind' feels vague and abstract. People
scarcely realize in imagination that the
danger is to themselves and their children
and their grandchildren, and not only to a
dimly apprehended humanity. They can
scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they,
individually, and those w h o m they love are
in imminent danger of perishing agonizingly.
A n d so they hope that perhaps war m a y be
allowed to continue provided modern weapons
are prohibited.
This hope is illusory. Whatever agreements
not to use H - b o m b s had been reached in
time of peace, they would no longer be
considered binding in time of war, and both
sides would set to work to manufacture
H - b o m b s as soon as w a r broke out, for, if
one side manufactured the b o m b s and the
other did not, the side that manufactured them
would inevitably be victorious.
Although an agreement to renounce nuclear
weapons as part of a general reduction of
armaments* would not afford an ultimate
solution, it would serve certain important.
purposes. First: any agreement between East
and West is to the good in so far as it tends
to diminish tension. Second: the abolition
of thermo-nuclear weapons, if each side
believed that the other had carried it out
sincerely, would lessen the fear of a sudden
attack in the style of Pearl Harbor, which
at present keeps both sides in a state of
nervous apprehension. W e should, therefore,
welcome such an agreement, though only
as a first step.
Most of us are not neutral in feeling, but
as h u m a n beings, w e have to remember that,
if the issues between East and West are to be
decided in any manner that can give any
possible satisfaction to anybody, whether
communist or anti-communist, whether Asian
or European or American, whether white or
black, then these issues must not be decided
by war. W e should wish this to be understood,
both in the East and in the West.
There lies before us, if w e choose, continual
progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom.
Shall w e , instead, choose death, because
w e cannot forget our quarrels? W e appeal, as
16 The Russell-Einstein Manifesto
h u m a n beings, to h u m a n beings: remember
your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can
do so, the w a y lies open to a n e w Paradise;
if you cannot, there lies before you the risk
of universal death.
• Resolution
W e invite this Congress, and through it the
scientists of the world and the general
public, to subscribe to the following resolu-
tion: 'In view of the fact that in any future
world war nuclear weapons will certainly be
employed, and that such w e a p o n s threaten
the continued existence of mankind, w e
urge the governments of the world to realize,
and to acknowledge publicly, that their
purpose cannot be furthered by a world
war, and w e urge them, consequently,
to find peaceful means for the settlement
of all matters of dispute between them.'
Professor M a x Born (Professor of Theoretical
Physics at Berlin, Frankfurt, and Göttingen,
and of Natural Philosophy, Edinburgh;
Nobel Prize in physics).
Professor P. W . Bridgman (Professor of Physics,
Harvard University; Nobel Prize in physics).
Professor Albert Einstein.
Professor L Infeld (Professor of Theoretical
Physics, University of W a r s a w ) .
Professor J. F. Joliot-Curie (Professor of
Physics at the Collège de France; Nobel
Prize in chemistry).
Professor H . J. Müller (Professor of Zoology
at University of Indiana; Nobel Prize in
physiology and medicine).
Professor Linus Pauling (Professor of Chemis-
try, California Institute of Technology; Nobel
Prize in chemistry).
Professor C . F. Powell (Professor of Physics,
Bristol University; Nobel Prize in physics).
Professor J. Rotblat (Professor of Physics,
University of L o n d o n ; Medical College of
St Bartholomew's Hospital).
Bertrand Russell.
Professor Hideki Y u k a w a (Professor of Theore-
tical Physics, Kyoto University; Nobel
Prize in physics).
23 December 1 9 5 4
1. Professor Joliot-Curie wishes to add the words: 'as a
means of settling differences between States'.
2 . Professor Joliot-Curie wishes to add that these limi-
tations are to be agreed by all and in the interests of
all.
3. Professor Müller makes the reservation that this be
taken to m e a n 'a concomitant balanced reduction of
all armaments'.
W e a p o n s of m a s s destruction
and public policy
Charles C . Price

The termination of combat on the Indo-Chinese peninsula has had salubrious

side-effects in limiting the use of certain arms universally. The force of public
opinion is one often underrated in the promotion of limitations on weapon sys-
tems and their uses, and a few examples are cited. This voice should be used to
banish from our social mechanisms the institution known as war for, as a means
of resolving international conflicts, modern warmaking potential is too grave a
threat to human civilization.

The end of the United States' participation
in the war in Indo-China, with the extensive
use of chemical weapons involved, has m a d e
possible s o m e significant progress in American
policy on chemical warfare. In December 1974
the United States Senate unanimously ratified
the Geneva protocol of 1924, forbidding the
'first use' in war of chemical (and biological)
weapons. The Senate also ratified the treaty
forbidding the manufacture or possession of
biological arms.
The concern of American military leaders
over possible accusations of war crimes led
to s o m e United States declarations of policy
relative to the Geneva protocol which, in
fact, establish s o m e interesting and important
criteria concerning chemicals which might be
used as weapons. The big argument arose not
about lethal chemical weapons (such as
mustard gas, nitrogen mustard, phosgene and
nerve gases) but about normally non-lethal
yet toxic substances, e.g. herbicides and riot
control agents.
The n e w American policy on the latter
agents asserts that those destined for riot
control will be permitted only in non-combat
uses designed to save lives, such as helping
to save the lives of d o w n e d aviators or for
riot control in non-combat areas (prisoner-of-
war camps, for example). The use of herbicides
will be permitted only in areas controlled by
the United States or within the immediate
perimeter of fixed installations. T h e Con-
gressional Record indicates that most of the
use m a d e of these agents in Indo-China
will not be permissible in the future. The
policy further stipulates that only those herbi-
cides and riot control agents cleared as safe
for domestic use will be permitted in these
limited, wartime applications.
These are, in m y opinion, all useful advances
in United States policy, although there were
arguments m a d e that n o herbicides or riot
control agents (even those approved for
domestic use) should be allowed even in the
limited applications n o w envisaged by the
n e w American policy.
H T h e peril of chemical w e a p o n s
In any event, the next step is clearly to proceed
forthwith to the task of chemical disarmament
an objective agreed upon by the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
at Vladivostok. The American initiative under
President Nixon to abandon biological weapons
unilaterally w a s promptly followed by an
international treaty o n biological w e a p o n
disarmament. Obviously the world's powers
had perceived biological weapons to be indis-

¡mpact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976 17

 criminate arms of mass destruction posing
a serious,- and unnecessary, threat to society.
Hopefully, it will n o w be possible to convince
the same powers that chemical weapons are
also indiscriminate instruments which pose
a serious and unnecessary peril for society.
Consideration is being given by the United
States Congress to a resolution which would
reflect support for such a m o v e by the United
States Government.
In moving towards chemical disarmament,
it m a y be necessary, or even desirable, to limit
the agreement to deadly chemical weapons
having no legitimate domestic uses. These
pose, indeed, the major threat to causing
mass casualties. Furthermore, adequate inspec-
tion to eliminate herbicides and riot control
materials from military arsenals would be
enormously complicated by their legitimate
utility for domestic purposes.
Perhaps it is of interest to c o m m e n t on s o m e ,
of the background to the progress m a d e in
the evolution of the United States position,
one which did not develop from a groundswell
of public opinion but rather from the continuing,
dedicated concern of a few individuals such
as Professor Matthew Meselson of Harvard
University. T h e serious interest exhibited by
the American Chemical Society, which reversed
its o w n resolution against the Geneva protocol
to one favouring it, w a s also a significant and
influential factor. T h e constructive interest in
the issue taken by Congressman Clement
Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Affairs
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
w a s also a factor in stimulating reconsideration
of the issues by the administration. A n d , of
course, the favourable views expressed by
Dr Fred Ikle, director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, helped create a
positive atmosphere for progress.
It m a y be pertinent to note that another
possible factor promoting the action by the
United States w a s the vigorous and emotional'
outcry raised in m y country w h e n the army
proposed to ship outmoded nerve gases, ageing >
and beginning to leak their lethal contents, from
inland Colorado for burial at sea. Communities
situated along the proposed routes of transport
raised such strong objections over the risk
of accidental dispersal of the dangerous loads
that the army eventually w a s forced to
abandon this procedure for disposal. Instead,
there are plans n o w under w a y to build an
expensive and complex plant to destroy
18 Charles C . Price
chemically the gases' toxic materials and
then dispose of the -relatively detoxified
products.
The hue and cry are somewhat reminiscent
of the earlier outcry against the proposed
antiballistic missile system. N o one wanted
such installations, since they would be major,
top-priority targets for a nuclear attack on
the United States, frequently in someone's
immediate neighbourhood. Subsequently the
United States and the U . S . S . R . agreed (1972)
on a limit of t w o A B M sites in each country.
More recently, this agreement has been
amended to restrict the sites to one in each
country.
• T h e nuclear arsenals g r o w
Thus the pressure to limit A B M s and chemical
weapons m a y be ascribed, at least in part,
to the fact that the enormous potential for
mass destruction of these armaments w a s
m a d e evident to the local citizenry in a real
and dramatic w a y . Unfortunately, the huge
threat to civilization posed by the majority
of nuclear weapons has been m a d e to appear
remote and impersonal. W e continue, there-
fore, to pour vast amounts of m o n e y and effort
into increasing continually the great destruc-
tive power of nuclear arsenals. In the United
States alone, an average of three n e w 'atomic'
b o m b s is being produced daily, to add to
the enormous capacity for 'overkill' which
has been deployed already. And the American
urge to lead the nuclear arms race towards
n e w levels of destructive capability continues
unabated.
Compounding the threat of mass extermina-
tion is the rapidly growing possibility of
widespread nuclear proliferation. Brazil, Argen-
tina, Egypt and Israel are only a few of the
more immediate candidates to join the nuclear
weapons 'club' (see box.)
The aspect of this threat to civilization
which has been most discouraging and
disillusioning, to m e , has been the sustained
and effective sabotaging by United States
militarists of the serious efforts which have
been m a d e truly to arrive at a solution to the
problem. I hope that all readers will agree
that the conclusion of the most optimistic
and favourable arms control agreements being
discussed by the United States and the
U . S . S . R . would leave both sides armed with
nuclear weapons capable of almost totally
destroying each nation.
 W h o will be next?
In M a y 1974 India became the sixth country
to explode a nuclear device, ten years
after China became the fifth, and
twenty-nine years after the United States
first let the genie out of the bottle.
W h a t other nations m a y be tempted to follow
India's example, and become the seventh,
eighth, or ninth ? H o w soon ? W h a t would
a world of ten or more nuclear powers
be like?
The fact that eighty-three nations have
n o w b e c o m e parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty obscures the fact that the list
of those which have not includes all the
countries which cause concern. These are
the countries (in addition to China, France,
and India) that have the greatest
technical capabilities and political incentives
to g o nuclear, and the countries
which d o not find that the N P T solves
their security concerns.
At least seven countries-all non-parties
to the N P T - h a v e or soon will have
Thus current and projected negotiations
concerning arms control will leave intact the
war system in international organization;
hopefully, , it will diminish somewhat the
chances of an outbreak of hostilities. But
with more and more nations almost certain
to acquire nuclear weapons, and with the
construction of systems certain to make the
hair-trigger of nuclear doomsday more and
more sensitive, no projection of these negotia-
tions is capable of rescuing us from the ever
more sure threat of nuclear devastation.
I d o not m e a n to belittle or demean the
m a n y efforts m a d e so far to control the arms
race. W e would be far worse off, indeed,
without the existing agreements o n Antarctica,
the ocean bed, outer space, A B M s , the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, to n a m e only a
few examples. Nor d o I m e a n to disparage
the efforts of scientists and others to cope
with the major threats to the quality of life
posed by overpopulation, food shortages, the
exhaustion of natural resources, and the
deterioration of the environment. But none
of these threats can destroy the very fabric
W e a p o n s of mass destruction and public policy
the technical capacity to build nuclear
weapons, and m a y be under s o m e
political pressures to d o so. These include:
Argentina; Brazil; Egypt (though Egypt
has signed the N P T , it is not likely to ratify
it until Israel does so) ; Israel ; Pakistan ;
South Africa; Spain.
Six other countries clearly have the technical '
capacity to g o nuclear, and have not yet
ratified the N P T , but probably have no
present incentive to acquire nuclear weapons:
Belgium; Federal Republic of Germany;
Italy; J a p a n ; Netherlands; Switzerland.
In addition, there are countries n o w party
to the treaty which might reconsider
their support for the N P T and withdraw
at any time, after giving the requisite
three months' notice, if they were
to see n e w threats to their security.
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
M a y 1975
of civilized society during the next thirty
minutes. Nuclear war, with the enormous
'overkill' capacity n o w in place, can.
M y appeal, therefore, is that because this
threat is the one most urgent and most
immediate to society, it demands first priority
consideration and requires top-priority talent,
to deal with it
• B u t d o e s a n y o n e really care?
Yet most citizens, and most scientists, seem
to be remarkably unconcerned by the peril.
W e have all been lulled by the temporary
success of deterrence so as to believe that
deterrence can succeed for ever. Most Ameri-
cans, like m a n y other citizens of the world,
seem to have forgotten that the United States
19
 under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had
assumed an active and vigorous role in
seeking a real solution to the problem of
the nuclear threat. Under both these presidents
a prestigious, top-level effort w a s m a d e to seek
an end to the threat of war-not by the largely
fruitless endeavours at reductions in arms
which leave the war system unchanged, but
by an agreement for general and complete
disarmament ( G C D ) by all nations, involving
all major weapons-leaving a strengthened
United Nations to inspect in order to assure
compliance, and to achieve peaceful resolution
of international disputes.
Strenuous efforts and serious negotiations
from the American side, led by M r Harold
Stassen under President Eisenhower and by
M r John McCloy under President Kennedy
led, in 1 9 6 1 , to a remarkable and in fact
revolutionary agreement in principle on G C D
(see Appendix). B y stages and together
with inspection, this accord w a s to lead to
the complete elimination of all national
military establishments and to the reinforcing
of the United Nations in order to settle
international disputes.
U p to this point, militarists in the United
States had raised no serious objections to the
proposals for G C D ; presumably, they assumed
that the proposals were only propagandistic
in nature and were not to be taken to heart.
But with the conclusion of the Zorin-McCloy
agreement in 1 9 6 1 , the opposition of the
American military to the idea of G C D crystal-
lized. O n e of the leaders of the United States
efforts to further progress in this same direc-
tion has indicated that his negotiations with
the Department of Defense and the Atomic
Energy Commission 1 were far more difficult
than those.with the Soviets.
A s a result the United States w a s never
able to propose a treaty which, in fact, would
have seriously reflected the principles of the
Zorin-McCloy agreement favouring G C D . The
best the United States could offer w a s a
treaty proposing a one-third cut in the arma-
ments of the United States and the Soviet
Union. T h e total lack of commitment of the
United States to the goal of G C D , under
President Johnson, became so evident that
negotiations were discontinued.
W h e n President Nixon took office, the
Soviets proposed that the negotiations o n
G C D be resumed, a suggestion that w a s not
accepted by the Nixon administration. T h e
sad facts are that, for the last ten years, not a
20 Charles C . Price
single employee of the United States has had
even part-time responsibility for thinking
about G C D . T h e dominance of militaristic
thinking is so complete that not even the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is
willing to pay lip-service to the idea, even
though official documents (like the Vladivostok
agreement and the treaty on biological weapons
disarmament) state that G C D is a goal of
American policy.
• C h a n g i n g the course of history
Obviously serious efforts by the United States
alone to attain the goal of G C D cannot
guarantee success but, equally obviously,
this kind of exertion to replace the war
system by a civilized international scheme of
law and order deserves sound American
support. If the United States Government
were willing to make a ten-year commitment
to spend only one-tenth of 1 per cent of the
m o n e y n o w spent on research and develop-
ment (R & D ) in armaments o n R & D
concerning genuine disarmament, the course
of history could be dramatically changed.
O n e of the major lessons, certainly, of the
last few decades has been the remarkable
impact that spending on research and develop-
ment has m a d e . With about half the world's
scientific m a n p o w e r employed in one w a y
or another on arms, the accuracy and destruc-
tive power of weapons has vastly increased.
If even a small fraction of this effort could b e
devoted to studying the long-term impact of
real disarmament (as opposed to continuation
of the arms race, or to nuclear war) on the
world's economy, resources, environment,
political system and social welfare-and o n
the social and political means necessary to
effect a change from the war system-perhaps
equally dramatic, but far more constructive,
results would ensue.
I would hope, at least, that the scientific
community would be able to derive far
greater satisfaction from such a m o v e than
from the major effort thus far on armaments
which has m a d e physically possible the nearly
total destruction of Western civilization, if not
of all life.
Y o u will note that, as an American, I have
taken a particularly critical view of the failure
1. The former Atomic Energy Commission w a s absorbed,
in January 1975, partly by the n e w Energy Research
and Development Administration and partly by the
independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission.-Ed.
 of the United States to continue its earlier
role in leadership towards a real solution to
the problem of modern weapons of mass
destruction. The problem, however, is not
only an American one: Soviet weapons pose
a major and direct threat to Americans, as d o
American arms to the Soviets. Moreover, the
growing probability of nuclear proliferation
does, indeed, spread the threat, as does the
fact that an American-Soviet nuclear exchange
of any magnitude would have dire conse-
quences, especially for all life in the Northern
Hemisphere.
Thus it seems to m e that it is important for
-others, too, to push towards the goal of G C D .
While measures for arms control can be
realistically established through bilateral United
States-U.S.S.R. negotiations, any serious effort
at G C D must involve all major nations in
multinational negotiation. It will be as impor-
tant for Egypt and Israel, furthermore, to
accept the concept of a United Nations
mechanism for reaching non-military solutions
to their disputes as it is for the United States
and the U . S . S . R . It is essential, then, to create
a n e w international atmosphere if negotiations
for genuine disarmament are to have s o m e
hope of flourishing.
Appendix
Report of the United States and the Soviet Union to the
Sixteenth General A s s e m b l y on the Results of the Bilateral Talks:
Agreed Statement of Principles, 2 0 S e p t e m b e r 1961
In accordance with their statements of
3 0 March 1961 at the fifteenth session of the
United Nations General Assembly, the Govern-
ments of the United States and the U . S . S . R .
wish to inform the Members of the General
Assembly of their exchange of views on
questions relating to disarmament and to the
resumption of negotiations in an appropriate
body, whose composition is to be agreed upon.
1. The exchange of views took place in
Washington, D . C . , from 19 June to 3 0 J u n e ;
in M o s c o w from 17 July to 29 July; and
in N e w York from 6 September to 19 Septem-
ber 1961.
2 . A s a result of the exchange of views,
the two Governments submit a joint statement
of agreed principles which they recommend
W e a p o n s of mass destruction and public policy
• Selecting the available options
The traditional activity of scientists, to examine
and pursue concepts and hypotheses to their
logical conclusions, should enable them to see
the consequences of pursuing the war system
or its alternative, a civilized system of law and
order, each to its logical end.
The scientists (and with them, I include
the engineers) are not responsible for making
the decisions of society, but they certainly
should provide as m u c h of a factual basis as
possible which will lead to these decisions.
T o date, an enormous scientific/technical
effort has been put into the study and
'perfection' of the war system, including the
influencing of society to support the system.
S o m e degree of commensurate effort needs
to be m a d e to examine m u c h more seriously
and extensively than before s o m e of the
alternatives that are possible, so that society
can have s o m e more constructive options to.
consider.
A s an American, I can and do undertake
action to overcome military opposition to
American initiatives towards this goal. It is m y
hope that others can find ways to champion
initiatives in other nations as well.
as guidance for disarmament negotiations
w h e n such negotiations are resumed. The
text of these agreed principles [appears
below] in the form of a joint statement of
the two Governments.
3. The two Governments were not able to
reach agreement on the composition of a
negotiating body prior to the sixteenth
General Assembly.
Joint Statement of Agreed Principies for
Disarmament Negotiations
Having conducted an extensive exchange of
views on disarmament pursuant to their
agreement announced in the General Assembly
on 3 0 March 1961,
21
 Noting with concern that the continuing
arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and
is fraught with dangers for the cause of world
peace.
Reaffirming their adhérences to all the
provisions of the General Assembly resolution
1378 (XIV) of 2 0 November 1959,
Affirming that to facilitate the attainment
of general and complete disarmament in a
peaceful world it is important that all States
abide by existing international agreements,
refrain from any actions which might aggravate
international tensions, and that they seek
settlement of all disputes by peaceful means.
The United States and the U . S . S . R . have
agreed to recommend the following principles
as the basis for future multilateral negotiations
on disarmament and to call upon other
States to co-operate in reaching early agree-
ment on general and complete disarmament
in a peaceful world in accordance with these
principles.
1. T h e goal of negotiations is to achieve
agreement o n a programme which will ensure
that (a) disarmament is general and complete
and war is no longer an instrument for settling
international problems, and (b) such disarma-
ment is accompanied by the establishment of
reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement
of disputes and effective arrangements for
the maintenance of peace in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter.
2 . The programme for general and complete
disarmament shall ensure that States will have
at their disposal only those non-nuclear
armaments, forces, facilities, and establish-
ments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain
internal order and protect the personal
security of citizens; and that States shall
support and provide agreed m a n p o w e r for
a United Nations peace force.
3. T o this end, the programme for general
and complete disarmament shall contain the
necessary provisions, with respect to the
military establishment of every nation, for
(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling
of military establishments, including bases,
cessation of the production of armaments
as well as their liquidation or conversion
to peaceful uses;
(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear,
chemical, bacteriological, and other w e a p -
o n s , of mass destruction and cessation
of the production of such w e a p o n s ;
(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of
weapons of mass destruction;
22 Charles C . Price
(d) Abolishment of the organization and insti-
tutions designed to organize the military
effort of States, cessation of military
training, and closing of all military training
institutions;
(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.
4. The disarmament programme should be
implemented in an agreed sequence, by
stages until it is completed, with each measure
and stage carried out within specified time-
limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in
the process of disarmament should take
place upon a review of the implementation
of measures included in the preceding stage
and upon a decision that all such measures
have been implemented and verified and that
any additional verification arrangements re-
quired for measures in the next stage are,
w h e n appropriate, ready to operate.
5. All measures of general and complete
disarmament should be balanced so that at
no stage of the implementation of the treaty
could any State or group of States gain
military advantage and that security is ensured
equally for all.
6. All disarmament measures should be
implemented from beginning to end under
such strict and effective international control
as would provide firm assurance that all
parties are honouring their obligations. During
and after the implementation of general and
complete disarmament the most thorough
control should b e exercised, the nature and
extent of such control depending on the
requirements for verification of the disarma-
ment measures being carried out in each
stage. T o implement control over and inspec-
tion of disarmament, an International Disarma-
ment Organization including all parties to the
agreement should be created within the
framework of the United Nations. This Inter-
national Disarmament Organization and its
inspectors should b e assured unrestricted
access without veto to all places as necessary
for the purpose of effective verification.
7 . Progress in disarmament should b e
accompanied by measures to strengthen
institutions for maintaining peace and the
settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means. During and after the implementation
of the programme of general and complete
disarmament, there should be taken, in
accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter, the necessary measures to
maintain international peace and security,
including the obligation of States to place
at the disposal of the United Nations agreed
manpower necessary for an international
peace force to be equipped with agreed types
of armaments. Arrangements for the use of
this force should ensure that the United
Nations can effectively deter or suppress any
threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
8. States participating in the negotiations
should seek to achieve and implement the
widest possible agreement at the earliest
possible date. Effects should continue without
interruption until agreement upon the total
programme has been achieved, and efforts to
ensure early agreement on and implementation
of measures of disarmament should be under-
taken without prejudicing progress on agree-
ment on the total programme and in such a
w a y that these measures would facilitate and
form part o M h a t programme.

Letter f r o m Presidential Adviser M c C l o y to

D e p u t y Foreign Minister Zorin: Verification
of Retained Forces and A r m a m e n t s , 2 0 S e p t e m b e r 1961 '

Dear M r Zorin: above-mentioned clause is omitted therefrom.

At the 1 8 September 1961 session of our
bilateral discussions o n disarmament y o u
indicated that the draft of a joint statement of
agreed principles which I submitted to you
on behalf of the United States Government
on 1 4 September 1961 would be acceptable
to the Government of the Soviet Union
provided the following clause were omitted
from paragraph 6 : 'Such verification should
ensure that not "only agreed limitations or
reductions take place but also that retained
armed forces and armaments do not exceed
agreed levels at any stage.'
This sentence expresses a key element in
the United States position which w e believe
is implicit in the entire joint statement of
agreed principles that whenever an agreement
stipulates that at a certain point certain levels
of forces and armaments m a y be retained, the
verification machinery must have all the rights
and powers necessary to ensure that those
levels are not exceeded.
It appears from your statements that the
Soviet Union will be unwilling to agree to a
joint statement of agreed principles unless the
M y Government has authorized m e to inform
you that, in the interest of progress toward
resuming disarmament negotiations, it is
willing to remove the above-mentioned sen-
tence from paragraph 6 of the joint statement
of agreed principles since it is an item to
which the Soviet Union has not agreed.
This is done upon the express understanding
that the substantive position of the United
States Government as outlined in the above-
quoted sentence and in our m e m o r a n d u m
of 1 4 September 1961 remains unchanged,
and is in no sense prejudiced by the exclusion
of this sentence from the joint statement of
agreed principles.
The United States continues to adhere to
and will continue to advance the principle
contained in the omitted sentence as a
necessary element in any comprehensive
disarmament negotiations or agreement.
Very truly yours,
John J. McCloy
1. The agreed statement of principles is primed supra.
M r Zorin replied on the same date (infra).

Letter dated 2 0 S e p t e m b e r 1961 f r o m M r V . Zorin, U . S . S . R .

Representative in the U . S . S . R . - U n i t e d States Bilateral
Negotiations o n D i s a r m a m e n t , to M r J o h n J. M c C l o y ,
United States Representative in the Negotiations

I have received your letter of 2 0 Septem-
ber 1961 [A/4880, III], in which you express
a reservation with regard to the position
which the United States of America intends
to adopt in subsequent negotiations o n
disarmament
According to the agreement which w e
reached in the course of a bilateral exchange
of views, the United States agreed not to
include, in the joint statement by the Govern-
ments of the U . S . S . R . and the United States
on the principles for disarmament negotiations,
the proposal with which you are conversant
and the adoption of which would imply
acceptance of the concept of the establishment
of control over armaments instead of control

W e a p o n s of mass destruction and public policy 23

over disarmament. In your letter you say
that this proposal 'expresses a key element in Charles C . Price
the United States position*.
In this connexion I must state that, as you
k n o w , the position of the U . S . S . R . o n the Having long believed that 'the only real
question of control over general and complete way to eliminate the enormous threat
disarmament has been thoroughly and clearly of nuclear destruction is to eliminate
explained in the statements of the Soviet the institution of war itself, the
Government and its leader, M r N. S. Khrushchev. author has been extremely active in
The Soviet Union favours the most thorough movements by professional scientists to
and strict international control over the mitigate the social dynamic of war based
measures of general and complete disarma- on advanced scientific technology.-
ment. While strongly advocating effective An organic chemist, Charles Coa/e Price
control over disarmament and wishing to was named Benjamin Franklin Professor
facilitate as m u c h as possible the achievement of Chemistry at the University of
of agreement on this control, the Soviet Pennsylvania in 1965, the year he also
Union Is at the same time resolutely opposed served as president of the American
to the establishment of control over arma- Chemical Society. Professor Price is editor,
ments. as well, of the Journal of Polymer Science
It appears from your letter that the United and of Organic Syntheses. His address:
States is trying to establish control over the Department of Chemistry, University of
armed forces and armaments retained by Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA 19174
States at any given stage of disarmament. (United States of America).
However, such control, which in fact means
control over armaments, would turn into an
international system of legalized espionage,
which would naturally be unacceptable to
any State concerned for its security and the
Interests of preserving peace throughout
the world. The position of the United States
on this question, if it insists on the proposal
described above, will inevitably complicate
agreement o n a programme of general and
complete disarmament, on the general prin-
ciples of which w e have agreed.
The Soviet Union will continue to m a k e
every effort towards the earliest preparation
of a treaty on general and complete disarma-
ment under effective international control.

(Signed) V . Zorin
Permanent Representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations

T O DELVE M O R E DEEPLY

B R O O K S , H . The military innovation system and the

qualitative arms race. Daedalus, vol. 104, no. 3,
summer 1975.
S C H E L L I M G , T. A framework for the evaluation of
arms-control proposals.
Daedalus, vol. 104, no. 3, summer 1975.
TSIPIS, K. The accuracy of strategic missiles.
Scientific American, vol. 233, no. 1, July 1975.

24 Charles C . Price
Einstein and Freud on
Dear Professor Freud,
T h e proposal of the League of Nations1 and
its International Institute of Intellectual C o -
operation2 at Paris that I should invite a
person, to be chosen by myself, to a frank
exchange of views on any problem that I
might select affords m e a very w e l c o m e
opportunity of conferring with you upon a
question which, as things n o w are, seems
the most insistent of all the problems civiliza-
tion has to face.
This is the problem: Is there any w a y of
delivering mankind from the m e n a c e of w a r ?
It is c o m m o n knowledge that, with the advance
of modern science, this issue has c o m e ' to
m e a n a matter of life and death for civilization
as w e k n o w it; nevertheless, for all the zeal
displayed, every attempt at its solution has
ended in a lamentable b r e a k d o w n . . .
Yours very sincerely,
A . Einstein
Potsdam, 30 July 1932
impact of science on society. Vol. 26, No. 1/2, 1976
war
Dear Professor Einstein, v
. . . Here is the w a y in which I see it. T h e
cultural development of mankind (some,
I k n o w , prefer to call it civilization) has been
in progress since immemorial antiquity. T o
this processus w e o w e all that is best in our
composition, but also m u c h that makes for
h u m a n suffering. Its origins and causes are
obscure, its issue is uncertain, but s o m e of its
characteristics are easy to perceive. It well
m a y lead to the extinction of mankind, for it
impairs the sexual function in more than one
respect... This process m a y , perhaps, b e
likened to the effects of domestication o n
certain animals-it clearly involves physical
changes of structure-but the view that
cultural development is an organic process of
this order has not yet b e c o m e generally
familiar.
The psychic changes which accompany this
process of cultural change are striking, and
not to be gainsaid. They consist in the pro-
gressive rejection of instinctive ends and a
scaling d o w n of instinctive reactions. Sensa-
tions which delighted our forefathers have
b e c o m e neutral or unbearable to u s ; and,
if our ethical and aesthetic ideals have under-
gone a change, the causes of this are ultimately
organic.
O n the psychological side t w o of the most
important phenomena of culture are, firstly, a
strengthening of the intellect, which tends to
master our instinctive life, and, secondly, an
introversion of the aggressive impulse, with
all its consequent benefits and perils. N o w
war runs most emphatically counter to the
psychic disposition imposed on us by the
1. Now the United Nations.-Ed.
2. Now Unesco.-Ed.
25
growth of culture; w e are therefore bound to
resent war, to find it utterly intolerable. With
pacifists like us it is not merely an intellectual
and affective repulsion, but a constitutional
intolerance, an idiosyncrasy in its 'most
drastic form. A n d it would seem that the
aesthetic ignominies of warfare play almost as
large a part in this repugnance as war's
atrocities.
H o w long have w e to wait before the rest
of m e n turn pacifist? Impossible to say, and
yet perhaps our hope that these t w o factors-
m a n ' s cultural disposition and a well-founded
dread of the form that future wars will take-
m a y serve to put an end to war in the near
future is not chimerical. But by what w a y s
or by-ways this will c o m e about, w e cannot
guess. Meanwhile w e m a y rest on the assur-
ance that whatever makes for cultural develop-
ment is working also against w a r . . .
Yours,
Sigmund Freud
Vienna, September 1932

International School on Disarmament

and Research on Conflicts

The sixth course of this school will be held
in Nemi (Italy), from 2 2 June to 7 July 1976.
It will deal with (a) n e w military technologies
and the perception of nuclear deterrence/
strategic arms limitation and (b) the world's
changing economic structure and
the transfer of conventional arms and
nuclear technologies. Guest speakers
will include Dr Frank Barnaby (SIPRI),
Dr Vasiliy Emelyanov (Soviet Commission
on the Scientific Problems of Disarmament),
Professor Hans Morgenthau (City University
of N e w York), Dr Herbert York
(formerly director of United States Defense
Research and Engineering).
I S O D A R C O , as the school is also k n o w n ,
is organized by the Italian Pugwash Group ;
it is supported by the Italian National
Research Council and the Ministries
of Education and Foreign Affairs,
local authorities, and grants from
the Ford Foundation and Unesco.
Proceedings of recent schools have appeared
in book form, notably Disarmament and
Arms Control, The Dynamics of the Arms
Race, and International Terrorism and
World Security. Sessions are intended
for those having a professional interest
in these and related problems or
those desiring to play an active, technically
competent role in the field.
For details, contact: Professor Carlo Schaerf,
Istituto di Fisica, Université degli Studi,
Piazzale delle Scienze 5, 0 0 1 8 5 R o m a (Italy),
telephone: 4958326 and 4951971.

26 Einstein and Freud on war

The strategic nuclear arms race
J o h n Stares

The contemporary nuclear arms race, leading pell-mell to possible total destruction
of the world, was born of complex causes: action-reaction in terms of new arma-
ments, internal national pressures, or bureaucratic survival within different countrie
Agreements to limit arms have led, as an unintended direct effect, to a shift in the
arms race from one for quantity to one for quality. Among the mightiest nations,
weapon systems have been a terror-inspiring triad a/ready for an entire human
generation. To this trio there comes, imminently, a fourth major tool of war. Given
the refinement of the superweapons available to the major powers, it is all the more
impossible to foresee that any aggressor could win an all-out nuclear war: in such
a confrontation, both sides would undoubtedly suffer enormous devastation.

Thirty years ago, one country alone possessed
just a few nuclear w e a p o n s that could only be
delivered by bomber aircraft Today, five
countries maintain nuclear arsenals, one other
country has demonstrated its ability to
explode a nuclear device and several more
are k n o w n to be almost capable of doing the
s a m e . A n d the tens of thousands of nuclear
w e a p o n s possessed by the nuclear-weapon
powers exist in a wide variety of forms,
including intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, m e d i u m -
range ballistic missiles, short-range ballistic
missiles, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, anti-
ballistic missiles, aerial b o m b s , artillery shells,
torpedoes, mines and others. The total explo-
sive power of these arsenals is equivalent to
about fifteen tons of T N T high explosive for
every m a n , w o m a n and child alive today.
The dramatic increase in the variety and
sophistication of w e a p o n s illustrated by this
example is reflected in the large rise in world
military expenditure since the Second World
W a r . In fact, over the post-war period, world
military expenditure has more than trebled
(in constant prices) and for the past seven
years it has been running at about $210,000
million annually. (If you find it difficult, as I do,
to grasp what such a figure means, it might
help to think that in just the t w o or three
seconds that it takes you to say the words
'two hundred and ten thousand million
dollars', the military coffers of the world will
have swallowed another $15,0001) But perhaps
more important than the increase in total
world military expenditure has been the
increase in the share devoted to scientific
research and technical development (R & D ) .
During the inter-war period, R & D accoun-
ted for less than 1 per cent of the military
budgets of the major powers, whereas the
present proportion is about 1 0 per cent. In
other words, world-wide research and devel-
opment of n e w w e a p o n systems absorb more
than $20,000 million annually-some $ 5 5 mil-
lion per day-and employs s o m e $400,000
scientists and technologists, roughly half
of the world's scientific and technical m a n -
power. For comparison, world-wide medical
research absorbs only about a quarter of this
amount annually.
These figures give s o m e idea of the present

Impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976 27

pace of the arms race. A n d since there is n o
sign of any tendency for the current level of
military expenditure-either the total or the
R & D component-to fall, it is likely that
the arms race will continue at this pace, if not
faster, for the foreseeable future. In this article,
s o m e of the pressures that operate to maintain
the m o m e n t u m of the arms race will be descri-
bed briefly; this discussion will be followed
by a survey of s o m e developments in w e a p o n
technology. For the most part, the review will
be limited to the situation in the United States
and the Soviet Union: these are the largest
military powers (accounting between them
for s o m e 6 0 per cent of the world's total
military expenditure). T h e survey is also
limited to strategic nuclear w e a p o n systems,
since it is in this area of the arms race that the
increases in cost, complexity and sophistica-
tion are most dramatic. This is not to suggest
that this account applies to other countries
Reproduced from the cartoon strip B. C, with the permission of Graph-Lit Service.
or to other w e a p o n systems which, in fact,
is generally not the case.
• Driving forces of the a r m s race
It is c o m m o n to think of the arms race as
following a pattern of action and reaction (or
over-reaction), in which the military activities-
for example the development and deployment
of n e w weapons-of o n e participant are
determined and directed mainly by those of
the other. In such a pattern, the development
by one side of a n e w w e a p o n would prompt
the other side to develop a similar w e a p o n , or
a more advanced one, in order to restore the
balance of military strength; and both sides
would feel the need to develop effective
defences in order to protect themselves
against these developments.
During the 'cold w a r ' era, particularly in
28 John Stares
the 1950s, the action/reaction process w a s a
major force behind the arms race but, in its
basic form, it is only a partial explanation of
the factors that influence the strategic nuclear
arms race today. The pattern that is n o w
evident is one in which each side, instead
of trying simply to match or improve on the
capabilities of the other, is more concerned
with exploiting the technology available to
it to the full in developing n e w weapons, and
one in which the present or anticipated mili-
tary activities of one side, instead of providing
the impetus for the development of n e w
weapons by the other, rather provide the
justification for deploying weapons that have
already been developed.
A broad spectrum of influences
S o m e of the factors that act to maintain, or
even increase, the m o m e n t u m of the arms
race were described in a chapter in the 1 9 7 4
edition of the SIPRI yearbook [1].1 First, the
technological process itself seems to have
an in-built m o m e n t u m of its o w n , largely due
to the very complex nature of modern w e a p o n
systems. The development of highly sophisti-
cated w e a p o n systems-from conception to
mass production and deployment-is an
extremely lengthy process: the development
of a n e w missile to the stage of mass produc-
tion and deployment, for example, can take
up to ten years. Thus, in planning its military
development programme, a country is concer-
ned not with what w e a p o n s and military
capabilities an adversary country has n o w ,
but with what it is likely to have in, say,
ten years' time; the country will thus under-
1. Figures in brackets correspond to the references at the
end of the article.
take programmes designed to counter, or or
m o v e ahead of, these anticipated possible
>le
future developments. This sequence in itself
elf
is • not very different from that in a simple
)le
action/reaction pattern, but what is a n e¡w
w the arms race increases all the time. A n d ,
phenomenon is that, as technology advances,
3S,
the range of possible technical developments
its
Bureaucracies and the impulse
to improve technical arms
[A] popular notion not to be taken for
granted suggests that an action/
reaction cycle underlies the arms race.
Such wielders of military power as
Napoleon and Robert M c N a m a r a have said
that States design weapons to counter
those of their adversaries. The truth
contained in this reflection is self-evident
but narrow. The famous action/reaction
cycle is overestimated, misleading,
and, in s o m e cases, irrelevant to the
procurement of various systems. Although
arms development is obviously related
to what other nations do, m u c h of what
the great powers deploy is inspired by
internal politics and by the impulse
of technology. So-called gaps that
generate crash programmes to
catch up are sometimes not gaps at all ;
instead, they are in large part the
product of pessimistic assumptions by
bureaucrats and soldiers of both sides,
w h o find gaps lurking in their extrapolations
of data. It is as if force planners in
Washington and M o s c o w were wedded
to the higher interests of technology
in a silent, unacknowledged compact.
A State Department [official] deeply
Besides these pressures inherent in the
technological process, there are also various
bureaucratic and economic pressures oper-
ating within an economy for the maintenance
becomes wider, and a case can be m a d e for
initiating p r o g r a m m e s to protect oneself
against as m a n y of these remote technological
developments as possible. T h u s the pace of
of course, both sides in a n a r m s race will b e
following exactly the s a m e pattern.
involved in the a r m s limitations talks
has described the action/reaction
cycle as 'very exaggerated', a n d has said,
'In general, w h a t o n e side d o e s is used
to fuel a n d fortify w h a t the other side
wants to do anyway'.
The Soviet Union's passion for secrecy
has also energized American programmes-as
m u c h , perhaps, as the actual weapons
the Russians have deployed. Nor is
spending pressure traceable to a
conspiratorial monolith popularly k n o w n
as 'the military-industrial complex'.
It is m u c h more the consequence of
single-minded bureaucrats' pursuit of
independent organizational interests.
Each military service tends to treat
spending as if the other services didn't
exist, except w h e n it occasionally backs
another's pet project the better to secure
solid backing for its o w n . What is true of
the services is also true of related
departments... In short, each group
seeks to stake out and consolidate its share
of the action with respect to strategic
arms-its lasting role in the g a m e of
deterrence. But the pattern is uneven and
fortuitous, the structure far from monolithic.
From Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.
by John Newhouse, originally published
in The New Yorker. N e w York, N.Y., Holt,
Rinehart & Winston. © 1973 by
John Newhouse.
of the armaments process. Military estab-
lishments, once created, have natural instincts
for survival and self-preservation, and tend to
resist any moves that might threaten their
T h e strategic nuclear a r m s race 29
existence. Thus the R & D components of
military establishments are constantly o n the
look-out for n e w weapons, or even for n e w
inventions and developments that could be
translated into weapons, and that will thereby
justify their continued existence. Similar'
pressures operate in the industrial sphere. In
Western countries at least, the armaments
business is an extremely lucrative one, and so
industrial companies are alert for possible
n e w developments that, once they have been
translated into weapons, can further their
existence and increase their profits.
Finally, there are various internal political
pressures operating to maintain the develop-
ment and production of weapons. For example,
in the United States, political decisions o n the that while this argument is still used in the
future of w e a p o n programmes m a y b e United States, the Soviet Union appears to be
influenced by the prospects of employment
in a local constituency; a politician m a y be, or components of the triad-the strategic bomber.
feel, under pressure not to vote against a
particular programme if its cancellation would
m e a n unemployment for his constituents.
Thus pressures against unemployment b e c o m e
transformed into pressures for the continued
development and production of arms.
These assorted considerations apply to
different extents to different weapons in
different countries. But generally speaking,
there is a broad spectrum of political, bureau-
cratic, economic and technological factors,-
more or less related to military requirements,
that influences the process of developing,
producing and deploying w e a p o n systems.
Discussing s o m e of these factors in an article
in New Scientist [2], A n d r e w M a c k of the
Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace
Research in London said that since the arms
race arises out of domestic pressures rather
than from international tension, it is almost
useless to try to achieve disarmament through
international negotiations before these pres-
sures have been overcome. H e concluded:
'Disarmament-like charity-should begin at
home'.
Developments in strategic nuclear weapons
The strategic nuclear forces of both the
United States and the Soviet Union are
composed of three components-the s o -
called strategic triad of long-range strategic
bombers, strategic-missile-carrying s u b m a -
rines and land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles. In the following sections s o m e of
the developments in these systems, and s o m e
30 J o h n Stares
of the pressures that have been behind them,
will be discussed. O n e general point is
perhaps worth noting at the outset, that there
is an over-riding pressure to maintain the
triad mix. T h e existence of each of the three
components is justified on the grounds that
each is a 'back-up' force that could be
employed if the other components ever became
vulnerable. There is s o m e evidence, however,
losing, or to have lost, interest in one of the
But it also seems that a n e w strategic w e a p o n
system is waiting in the wings, almost cer-
tainly in the United States and possibly also
in the Soviet Union, namely the long-range
cruise missile.
• A d v a n c e d b o m b a r d m e n t aircraft
The appearance in the 1950s of long-range
bomber aircraft capable, with mid-air refuel-
ling, of delivering nuclear w e a p o n s over inter-
continental distances, prompted the develop-
ment of improved air-defence systems. In turn,
these developments resulted in improvements
to the performance of bombers, a process that
is still continuing despite the fact that the
United States, at least, has persistently
reduced its air-defence systems as a response
to the diminishing threat from Soviet bombers.
The latest United States strategic bomber,
the B - 1 , is vastly superior to its predecessor,
the B - 5 2 : it will have longer range, higher
speeds (Mach 2 at high altitude and high
subsonic speeds at low altitude), the ability
to take off from shorter runways and a greater
payload (2.5 times that of the B - 5 2 ) . It
will carry highly advanced electronic and
electro-optical equipment for surveillance,
low-level navigation and electronic jamming.
A n d it can be armed with nuclear missiles
capable of being launched at e n e m y targets
from outside e n e m y air-space, thus giving
it what is called a 'stand-off capability. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the B-1 is an extremely
expensive w e a p o n system. T h e latest esti-
mate of its unit cost is $ 8 5 million, a figure
that although it has trebled since 1970 w h e n
the projected price w a s $ 30 million, m a y well
still understate the final cost: it is possible that
the 2 4 4 aircraft scheduled for production
will cost more than $ 1 0 0 million each.
The B-1 programme has c o m e under
tremendous criticism in the United States. Cost
is an obvious target for criticism, but critics
also argue that any strategic bomber is
obsolete in the so-called missile age. Not
only are aircraft highly vulnerable, both o n
the ground and in the air, but, w h e n it comes
to delivering nuclear weapons, missiles can
d o the job m u c h faster (an I C B M travels at
M a c h 2 5 or more compared with M a c h 2 for
the B-1 ) and at a fraction of the cost. Despite
these arguments of cost and obsolescence,
the B-1 programme continues, forced o n .
according to A n d r e w M a c k [3], by various
bureaucratic and industrial interests in the
United States.
For instance, the Strategic Air C o m m a n d
would cease to exist without bombers, and
is hence pressing fiercely for the B - 1 , although
it could presumably still operate if modified
B-52s were retained instead of B-ls. The
Air Force also argues that the B - 1 , apart from
its primary strategic role, would also m a k e
an ideal conventional (non-nuclear) bomber,
as indeed did the B - 5 2 in Indo-China. This is
doubtless true: but at $ 8 5 million or more, a
B-1 would be a rather expensive conventional
bomber. In the industrial sector. M a c k says
that for the Rockwell Corporation-the prime
contractor for the B-1 -securing this contract
w a s a matter of life or death: in July 1970,
just after the B-1 contract has been awarded.
Fortune magazine quoted the company's
chairman as saying that ' w e k n e w that as a
business w e had just one more chance-the
B-r.
Thus the pressures that have been successful,
at least until n o w , in ensuring the survival
of the B-1 programme appear to be unrelated
to any actual military threat. T h e Soviet Union
is also developing a n e w bomber, the M a c h 2
Backfired this is less sophisticated than the
B - 1 , is incapable of intercontinental ranges
without air-refuelling, and does not appear to
be intended for a strategic role. In fact there
is s o m e evidence that the Soviet Union has
more or less lost interest in a strategic bomber
force [3, 4 ] . Even the American Secretary of
Defense, J a m e s Schlesinger, in his Annual
Defense Department Report. FY 1976 and
FY 197T stated [5]:
The extent to which B A C K F I R E will be assigned
missions against the continental United States,
however, remains an open question. W e must
await evidence from basing, operational and
training patterns, or tanker development before
w e can confidently judge whether the Soviets
intend the B A C K F I R E for intercontinental
missions and, if so, to what extent.
• Strategic nuclear missiles . . .
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
capable of carrying nuclear weapons to
targets more than 11,000 k m a w a y were
first deployed in the early 1960s. They were,
generally, large missiles carrying large warheads
with explosive yields of the order of five
megatons so that although their accuracies
were rather poor by modern standards
(probably having C E P 1 of a few kilometres),
they could cause great destruction over very
wide areas. Predictably, their appearance
prompted the development of defensive
systems-anti-ballistic missiles ( A B M s ) that
were designed to shoot the missiles out of
the sky before they could reach their targets.
Yet the entire concept of A B M w a s ill-founded:
with the radar, tracking systems and missile
technology available at the time, actually
hitting an incoming missile would only have
been a matter of luck. Even one missile result-
ing . in a five-megaton nuclear w e a p o n
reaching and destroying a population centre
would have been one too many.
In fact, the limitations of A B M defences
appear to be well-appreciated by both the
United States and the Soviet Union. Under the
1972 S A L T - 1 A B M treaty; the t w o powers
agreed to limit their A B M defences to 1 0 0
launchers at each of t w o sites-one for
the defence of the national capital and the
other for the defence of an I C B M complex.
Even w h e n this treaty w a s signed, the United
States had no A B M s deployed (although it
w a s constructing t w o systems at the time, both
1. This is part of the coded terminology, established
under the so-called A B C standardization procedure,
whereby brief code-names selected by the American.
British and Canadian defence establishments have
been adopted by the other governments w h o are
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. „
The N A T O code-words beginning with the letter B
signify Soviet bombers. F Soviet fighters, and so
on.-Ed.
2. C E P - circular error probable, a measure of the accu-
racy of weapons. It is defined as the radius of a circle,
centred on the target within which 5 0 per cent of a
large number of weapons aimed at the target will fall.
The strategic nuclear arms race 31
for the defence of I C B M complexes) and the
Soviet Union had only sixty-four launchers
deployed around M o s c o w . A n d in 1974, the
two countries concluded a n e w agreement,
limiting A B M defences to just one of the t w o
sites specified in the 1 9 7 2 treaty. T h e fact
that the t w o powers were able to agree o n
these limitations is s o m e indication that they
recognize the ineffectiveness of present
A B M systems.
Even though A B M s did not constitute a
serious threat to the success of a strategic
missile attack, their existence provided at
least one of the m a n y justifications for improv-
ing offensive missile capabilities. Early ideas
for such improvements included deploying
devices such ' as decoy warheads, radar-
confusing chaff and other 'penetration aids'
designed to confuse the defences, and devel-
oping multiple warheads that would be able to
penetrate missile defences simply by saturat-
ing them. T h e simplest versions of multiple
warheads were called multiple re-entry vehicles
( M R V ) : as the missile reaches the final stage
of its trajectory, the re-entry vehicles housed
in the nose of the missile would be released
and separated from each other by small
springs so that they would continue on course
and would impact, finally, in a pattern more
or less centred on the target T h e first M R V
missiles, carrying three re-entry vehicles each '
with an explosive yield of 2 0 0 kilotons, were
deployed by the United States o n Polaris
nuclear submarines in 1 9 6 4 (the 4,600 k m
range Polaris A - 3 missile).
Within a few years, however, there had been
considerable advances in American A B M
technology. It w a s realized that by the late
1960s, it would be possible, at least in theory,
for a single A B M to intercept and destroy all
three re-entry vehicles in the A - 3 M R V , and
that therefore this missile would be incapable
of defeating any but a first-generation A B M .
The logical conclusion w a s that there w a s a
need to improve offensive missile capabilities
further in order to overcome possible improved
defences. Simply increasing the separation
of the individual re-entry vehicles in order to
avoid the effects of an exploding A B M w a s
not the answer, as this would reduce the
possibility of causing sufficient d a m a g e to a
protected military target; and increasing the
yield of the warheads in order to overcome
this limitation w a s not possible because there
were limits to h o w m u c h weight the missiles
could carry.
32 John Stares
So. another solution w a s required. T h e
facts that (a) these arguments arose as a
result of developments in the United States,
and not as a direct response to actual improved
Soviet A B M capabilities (which did not exist
anyway), and (b) even improved A B M s still
would not pose a serious threat to the success
of a strategic missile attack, did not affect
the final outcome. A n e w missile system w a s
in fact already in the process of development,
and A B M simply provided one of the m a n y
justifications for deploying it..
. . . with more and better warheads
In the next generation of missile systems,
k n o w n n o w as the multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicle ( M I R V ) , the individ-
ual re-entry vehicles can be aimed at sepa-
rate targets-as m a n y targets as there are
re-entry vehicles. T h e re-entry vehicles are
housed in a device c o m m o n l y called a 'bus'
(its more formal title is a post-boost control
system) which has its o w n c o m m a n d , guid-
ance, control and propulsion systems. W h e n
the bus nears the final stage of its trajectory, it
would use these systems to align itself as
accurately as possible towards the first inten-
ded target and would then release one of its
re-entry vehicles to follow the same course
to the target. T h e bus would then realign
itself, along a trajectory leading to the next
target, and release another re-entry vehicle.
The process would be repeated until all of
the re-entry vehicles had been released.
In a paper published by the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
entitled The Origins of MIRV [6], Professor
Herbert York, w h o w a s Director of Defense
Research and Engineering in the U . S . Depart-
ment of Defense from 1958 to 1961, described
h o w the various technologies required for
M I R V arose in the United States from a
'complex w e b of technological developments
and inventions' to which contributions were
m a d e from m a n y independent and often unre-
lated sources. For example, one of the most
important technological requirements of
M I R V - t h e ability to stop and restart rocket
motors during flight, which is necessary for
realigning the bus towards the different
targets-was first developed for the satellite
programme. In fact, m a n y of the systems that
were eventually used in M I R V can be traced
back to the satellite and space programmes, in
particular to programmes w h o s e aim w a s to
be able to launch several satellites with just
one rocket booster.
O n e idea for multiple satellites actually
had missile defence, rather than offence, as
its goal. The plan w a s either (a) to orbit
several hundred armed satellites, each with a
sensing device (infra-red, for example) that
could detect the hot exhaust of an e n e m y
I C B M as it rose through the atmosphere just
after launch, and c o m m a n d , guidance and
control systems that would enable the satellite
to h o m e on and destroy the missile once it
had been detected, or (b) to orbit a 'mother
ship', equipped with similar sensing, c o m m a n d ,
control and guidance systems and containing
m a n y armed satellites that could be launched
against e n e m y I C B M s . Neither system w a s
deployed, but the technologies were studied
and developed, and could therefore be used
elsewhere. MIRV-type technology w a s also
developed for civilian programmes, for example
for launching several satellites into widely
differing orbits with a single rocket booster.
Thus M I R V w a s probably not originally
conceived as an offensive w e a p o n system at
all. But once the technology necessary for
it existed, having been developed for other
reasons, there w a s an inevitable desire to use
it. In his SIPRI report, York concludes that:
'It is unlikely that the development of M I R V
could have been stopped by a conscious
administration decision to d o s o . . . T h e
development sequence would simply have
by-passed any barrier by moving along alter-
native but unpredictable paths'. Only w h e n
it w a s developed and ready w a s a reason
needed for deploying it, and the remote
possibility that A B M systems could be impro-
ved provided one such reason. M I R V w a s
first deployed in the United States on land-
based missiles in June 1970: the 13,000 k m -
range Minuteman-lll I C B M carries three
M I R V s , each with an explosive yield of about
200 kilotons. Less than a year later, in
April 1971, M I R V s were also deployed o n
submarine-launched ballistic missiles: the
4,600 km-range Poseidon missile, the direct
successor to the A - 3 Polaris missile, carries
between ten and fourteen M I R V s (some of
them are d u m m y decoys), each with a yield
of about 50 kilotons. Of the forty-one Polaris
submarines in the American fleet, thirty-one
will be converted to carry Poseidon missiles, a
process that is n o w nearing completion.
Soviet missile development
The Soviet Union has, of course, also been
developing and improving its missile capabil-
ities, but at a pace lagging behind the United
States. The first Soviet MRVs-comprising
three re-entry vehicles with a yield of about
200 kilotons each-were deployed in 1973 on
the 10,000 km-range S S - 1 1 land-based
I C B M . The first report of a successful M I R V
test by the Soviet Union c a m e in the autumn
of the same year [7], and n e w Soviet I C B M s
are n o w being flight-tested with M I R V s .
The S S - 1 9 missile, the successor to the
single-warhead version of the S S - 1 1 , can
carry six M I R V s and the larger S S - 1 8 , the
replacement for the S S - 9 , can have eight.
It is also possible that the Soviet Union will
deploy M I R V s on submarine-launched missiles.
Soviet Y-class submarines carry sixteen
S S - N - 6 missiles (with a range of about
2,400 k m ) which have already been tested
with M R V s , and it will not be surprising if the
more modern 7,700 km-range S S - N - 8 mis-
siles, which will be carried on the n e w D-class
submarines (twelve each on the first version
of this submarine, and more, probably sixteen,
on the next, larger version), will eventually be
fitted with M I R V s [8].
The continuing quest for quality
The development of M I R V , and indeed of M R V
before it, marked a change in the fundamental
nature of the strategic nuclear arms race. In
the early years, the main goal w a s to build up
nuclear arsenals containing as m a n y missiles
and nuclear warheads (large nuclear warheads)
as possible, but it w a s soon realized that the
penetrativity of nuclear weapons w a s more
important than mere numbers. The 1972 S A L T
Interim Agreement, under which the numbers
of missiles that the United States and the
Soviet Union could deploy were restricted,
had the effect of formalizing, even of acceler-
ating, the evolution in w e a p o n technology
that had resulted from this change of attitude.
A s m a n y observers pointed out at the time.
The strategic nuclear arms race 33
 the nuclear arms race w a s not halted, or even
checked, by these agreements; it w a s simply
changed in nature from a race for quantity
to a race for quality. A n d the 1 9 7 4 Vladivostok
guidelines for a n e w S A L T agreement on
offensive arms that would limit both the
numbers of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles
(missiles and bombers) as well as the numbers
of missiles that could be fitted with M I R V s ,
but, like the 1 9 7 2 agreement, would place
no restrictions on qualitative improvements
to missile systems, will have precisely the
same effect.
The characteristics of nuclear w e a p o n s that
are important from the point of view of
qualitative improvements are the explosive
yield of the warhead and the accuracy with
which it can be delivered to the target
Of these t w o factors, accuracy is by far the
more important there is a limit to the weight
. that can be carried by a missile (and hence,
even taking into account the advances that
have been m a d e in recent years in reducing
the sizes of nuclear w e a p o n s , a limit to the
sizes and yields of the individual re-entry
vehicles); and the destructive effect of a
nuclear w e a p o n against a reinforced, or
hardened, military target increases propor-
tionally to the square of the accuracy but
only to the two-thirds power of the yield,
so that doubling the accuracy (that is,
halving the C E P ) increases the destructive
capacity fourfold, while for a similar increase
in destructive effect, the yield must be
increased by a factor of eight It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that both the United States
and the Soviet Union are busily engaged in
improving the accuracy of their nuclear-
w e a p o n delivery systems, and are paying
rather less attention to improving the yield
of their warheads.
But while the Soviet Union is probably still
at the stage of developing M I R V s , and will be
so for a few years to c o m e , the United States
is developing an entirely n e w w e a p o n system,
the manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle ( M A R V ) .
This will incorporate terminal guidance sys-
tems, providing the ability to m a k e small
changes in trajectory during the very final
stages of flight to the target Terminal guidance
m a y be based on terrain-matching systems,
in which sensors earned in the re-entry
vehicle scan the ground below the flight
path collecting data o n , for example, the
heights or sizes of geographical features,
differences in the reflectivity of the ground
34 J o h n Stares
at- different wavelengths, and so o n ; the
sensors build u p a 'picture', that can be
compared with data already stored in an
on-board computer. If the information from
the sensors does not match the data stored
in the computer, then the re-entry vehicle
is off-course, and the computer can instruct
the guidance and propulsion systems carried
in the re-entry vehicle to alter the course
back to the pre-determined path.
With such systems, it will be possible to
achieve C E P s of as little as thirty to fifty metres,
after flights of thousands of kilometres. A n d
since this radius is smaller than the lethal
radius of even a moderate yield nuclear
warhead, the probability of destroying a hard
military target with a M A R V is virtually 100 per
cent In fact the reliability of the missile
will be the only limiting factor. M A R V s are
still in the development stage, and it will be
a few years yet before they are ready for
deployment on Minuteman III land-based
missiles and the n e w submarine-launched mis-
siles, the Tridents.
• Strategic s u b m a r i n e s
The third component of the strategic triad
is the missile force deployed at sea on nuclear-
powered submarines. T h e importance of this
sea-based missile force lies in the fact that
it is far less vulnerable to attack than either
the bombers or the land-based missiles forces,
and hence poses a highly credible threat of
retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack.
Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile-carrying
submarines are invulnerable to attack simply
because they are very difficult to locate.
First deployed in 1 9 6 0 , they introduced a
completely n e w set of technical problems for
underwater detection and defence systems.
Earlier diesel- or electric-powered submarines
had speeds of only about 1 0 to 2 0 k m / h ,
and hence could not easily escape detection
or attack. They were noisy, and could thus be
detected fairly easily by underwater acoustic
systems-either passive listening devices or
active systems (sonars) that detect sound
waves reflected from their hulls; they had
limited underwater endurance-they had to
surface frequently and, w h e n driven b y
diesel engines, had to travel with their snorkels
above the surface-and so could often be
detected by radar or air-observation; finally,
they relied largely o n routine navigation
methods, hence running the risk of detection
by radio direction-finding systems.
Even modern conventionally powered sub-
marines suffer from these limitations to a
greater or lesser extent, but nuclear-powered
submarines are far less susceptible to detection:
they are m u c h faster, m u c h quieter and have
considerably better underwater endurance
(they can remain submerged for months, even
longer if necessary). Nor d o they need to
surface for purposes of navigation. Navigational
systems have advanced to such a degree that
modern computerized inertial navigation sys-
tems, 1 for example, can fix the position of a
submarine to within probably a kilometre
even after a submerged voyage of thousands of
kilometres over periods of m a n y months.
Such accuracy is very important for a strategic-
missile submarine if it is to be able to launch
its missiles with a high degree of accuracy.
Underwater hide-and-seek
The appearance of the nuclear-powered sub-
marine has resulted in enormous efforts to
improve anti-submarine warfare ( A S W ) capa-
bilities. M a n y advances have indeed been
m a d e in this area, and detection equipment
can be deployed on the ocean floor, carried
on surface ships or other submarines or
dangled from helicopters, and anti-submarine
w e a p o n s can be carried on these s a m e plat-
forms as well as on fixed-wing aircraft. But
the extent of the ocean's environment and
its nature-for example, the high level of
background noise (biological and mechanical)
can mask the sound of a submarine, while
ocean currents and temperature differences
in different vertical and horizontal regions of
the water can distort and deflect sound
waves-pose serious, and as yet unsolved,
problems for underwater detection systems.
Thus it is really only a matter of luck if a
nuclear submarine is located in open water.
Moreover, in order to remove the threat
posed by an enemy's submarine force, it is
not enough to find and destroy just one or
even a ' few strategic missile-carrying sub-
marines. It is necessary to locate and destroy
all of them within a short space of time. Since
the United States has forty-one strategic sub-
marines and the Soviet Union almost fifty,
even if only half of them are on station at
any one time, it is clear that a successful
attack against either submarine force is.
with the A S W systems available n o w , simply
not possible.
But in spite of the invulnerability of the
existing strategic nuclear submarines, sub-
marine capabilities are continually being
developed and improved. Apart from the
developments to the missiles they carry
(which were described in the previous
section), the submarines themselves are being
improved. In the Soviet Union, a n e w sub-
marine, the D-class, has already begun
deployment supplementing the older Y-class
vessels, of which thirty-four have been pro-
duced, and yet another submarine, a larger
version of the D-class, is under construc-
tion [9]. A n d the United States is developing
a n e w submarine, the Trident which will be
faster, quieter and twice the size of the present
Polaris/Poseidon submarines.
Planning for the distant future
Like the B - 1 , the Trident programme has
considerable opposition in the United States;
the major argument apart from the cost
(the estimated unit cost of the ten planned
submarines is somewhere in the region of
$1,500 million), is that it is completely
unnecessary. Together with the Trident sub-
marine, n e w Trident missiles are being
developed: the first will have a m u c h longer
range than the present Poseidon missile
(7,400 to 9,000 k m compared with 4,600 k m )
and the next will have an even longer range
of s o m e 11,000 k m . But at least the first of
these missiles could be fitted into the existing
submarines, and in fact the plan is to d o just
that as soon as the second missile is ready
for deployment It would seem, therefore, that
1. Inertial navigation is dead-reckoning performed auto-
matically by a device which gives a continuous indi-
cation of position by integration of accelerations since
leaving a starting-point
The strategic nuclear arms race 35
retaining the present submarine fleet would
satisfy military requirements.
Nor is the Trident needed to counter
improvements in Soviet A S W capability,
which is far behind that of the United States.
In hearings before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in M a y 1 9 7 3 , Rear Admiral
R. Y . Kaufmann, Trident Program Coordinator
in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
stated: 'Right n o w w e don't think w e have a
big problem. The Soviets aren't a match for us
in A S W . However, if you ask us what will
happen in 3 0 years, our foresight isn't too
good [10].'
A similar admission w a s m a d e by Dr
P. Waterman, Acting Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Research and Development) in
testimony given in July 1973 before the
Senate Committee on Appropriations during
hearings o n Department of Defense Appro-
priations for the financial year of 1 9 7 4 ,
w h e n asked, ' D o you have any specific
knowledge that the Trident is needed to
defend against any foreign systems?' H e
replied :
The Trident system is not defensive in nature
and therefore is not designed to defend against
any specific foreign systems.... If the ques-
tion refers to foreign systems that could have
the capability to destroy our existing s u b m a -
rines, there are n o such systems in existence'
today in numbers sufficient to pose a serious
threat [11].
A n d his subsequent remarks are even more
revealing:
The invulnerability of our present day forces
has been achieved by incorporating silencing
and detection features in these submarines
that have enabled them to stay ahead of
potential threats. However, our existing sub-
marines have used up all of the growth room
that has enabled them to accommodate these
improvements. Thus Trident is needed to
insure the continued survivability and credi-
bility for our sea-based deterrent forces in
the face of anticipated more capable e n e m y
forces.
In other words, submarine technology has
advanced to such a stage that in order to use it,
a n e w submarine has to be built. A n d building
this submarine can only be justified o n the
grounds that, sometime in the distant future,
e n e m y antisubmarine capabilities and forces
might just be capable of posing a threat to
the submarines that are deployed today.
36 John Stares
• A n e w strategic nuclear w e a p o n
Until n o w , strategic nuclear forces have
comprised only three components, the stra-
tegic triad of long-range bombers, land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles and sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles. It seems,
however, that in the United States at least,
a fourth component is soon to emerge-the
long-range cruise missile.
Ballistic missiles are powered and guided
by inertial guidance systems for only the
first few minutes of their flight. They then
follow a ballistic trajectory for most of the
rest of the flight, guidance being provided
again only during the very final stages to
impact. Cruise missiles, on the other hand,
travel continuously powered within the
atmosphere, and since their trajectories can
thus be affected, perhaps considerably, by,
for example, local weather conditions, they
must be continuously guided. Cruise, or
guided, missiles are not in fact n e w : laser-
guided, radar-guided or infra-red seeking
missiles have been around for s o m e time.
But accurate guidance requires elaborate
sensing, communication and other electronic
equipment, w h o s e size and complexity in-
crease with increasing operational range
of the missile; until n o w , it has not been
possible to pack enough such equipment into
a missile to provide guidance over any but
short ranges.
Recent advances in electronics technology,
however, have resulted in vast reductions in
the size of electronic components and equip-
ment and have m a d e possible the develop-
ment of an entirely n e w range of micro-
miniaturized electronic devices and sensors of
electromagnetic radiation. Thus ranges of
cruise missiles are n o w independent of
guidance considerations, and are limited
mainly by the efficiency of small turbofan
jet engines ( a problem that will undoubtedly
be solved soon) and by the energy content
of available jet fuel (a constraint that can be
alleviated by the use of improved hydro-
carbon fuels or the more exotic fuels such as
boron hydride).
Two modes for the cruise missile
For most of their flight, cruise missiles will be
guided by inertial guidance systems, but
they m a y also carry terrain-matching guidance
systems of the type described above in

connexion with M A R V . Continuous guidance
by terrain-matching methods would be both
unnecessary and cumbersome, since it would
require very large m e m o r y storage capacity
to store data o n the underlying terrain for
a long flight of thousands of kilometres.
Instead, terrain-matching will be used at
pre-determined intervals during the flight
to correct any errors that might result from
the inertia I guidance systems-in other words,
to m a k e 'mid-course corrections'. Currently
being developed in two versions-for launching
from aircraft or from submarines-they will
probably have accuracies of the same order
as M A R V s , s o m e tens of metres after flights
of thousands of kilometres.
The emergence of long-range cruise missiles
as strategic-nuclear-weapon delivery systems
< is described in s o m e detail in a chapter in the
1975 edition of the SIPRI yearbook [12].
The author, Kosta Tsipis, points out that the
Soviet cruise-missile capability is tactical
rather than strategic and is not an immediate
threat that requires a deterring counter-
deployment of the same type of w e a p o n ,
and concludes that there 'appears to be little
pragmatic need to develop and deploy these
w e a p o n s as a response to Soviet initiatives'.
And he goes on to s h o w that, as with other
w e a p o n systems, technological, bureaucratic
and political factors have had a profound
influence on the development process.
Tsipis notes, for example, that one factor
m a y be rivalry between the U . S . Air Force
and U . S . Navy over future roles and missions.
O n e of the arguments put forward by the
Air Force in favour of strategic bombers is
that they form the only component of the
United States strategic triad capable of a
dual nuclear/conventional role. The fact that
the submarine-launched cruise missile would
provide the navy with a similar capability
m a y have been a factor that has prompted
the decision to develop that w e a p o n . Another
consideration w a s probably that cruise missiles
were not prohibited by the S A L T - 1 agreements
(and probably will not be by the S A L T - 2
agreements either). And of course, the techno-
logy for cruise missiles has already been
developed, and it m a y be expected that the
United States industrial complex will attempt
to use that technology in as m a n y w a y s as
possible, including, of course, w e a p o n s .
• Conclusions
The strategic nuclear forces of both the
United States and the Soviet Union are huge:
with existing forces alone (that is, excluding
undeployed systems such as Trident, M A R V
or cruise missiles) the United States is capable
of delivering about 8,000 nuclear warheads,
and the Soviet Union about 2 , 5 0 0 - e a c h
warhead being larger, even orders of magni-
tude larger, than the atomic b o m b s that were
dropped on Japan in 1945. And these arsenals
will increase: the so-called limits proposed
in the Vladivostok guidelines for a n e w S A L T
agreement on offensive arms will permit each
country to deploy 1,320 missiles fitted with
M I R V warheads, more than either country
has deployed n o w .
It would appear at first glance that, the
United States has a considerable advantage
over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear
strength. But this apparent superiority has no
real meaning. Neither country could win a
nuclear war. Even if one side could succeed
in destroying all of the land-based missiles
and bombers of the other before these
could be launched, there would still remain
m a n y hundreds of missiles carried o n the
invulnerable submarine fleets that could be
used for (or to threaten) retaliation.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee a
situation in which one side would even reach
the position of being able to win a nuclear
war. The arms race is essentially a cyclical
process, so that while w e a p o n systems
become more numerous, complex and sophis-
ticated, any advantage in military strength
gained by one side is only temporary and is
almost certain, sooner or later, to be negated
as a result of military developments in the
other.
The strategic nuclear arms race 37
 Thus neither side in the arms race will be
able to gain any real or fasting advantage
in terms of military strength. O n the other
hand, as nuclear weapons become ever more
numerous and complex, the chances of a
nuclear war being started by accident or as
the result of a miscalculation increase. It is
difficult not to agree with Herbert York's
. view of the arms race, as expressed in the
title of his book published a few years ago.
H e called it a Race to Oblivion.
John Stares
After graduating from the University
of St Andrews (Queen's College. Dundee)
in 1969, the author joined the staff
of the British publication Science Journal.
Following that journal's demise, he spent
a period as a freelance science writer
before being appointed as a research fellow
at the Stockholm. International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). Mr Stares
was editor of the SIPRI Yearbook 1973
and has edited several other books,
and written a number of articles, on arms
control and disarmament issues.
He recently left SIPRI to return to Britain,
and can be reached av
2 Virginia Way, Reading Berks
(United Kingdom).
38 John Stares
REFERENCES
1. The dynamics of world military expenditure.
World armaments and disarmament: SIPRI
yearbook 1974, p. 123-35. Stockholm,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), 1974.
2. M A C K , A . The undercover arms race. New
scientist. 29 November 1973, p. 538.
3. — . Stormclouds ahead for the B-1 bomber.
New scientist. 21 November 1974, p. 562.
4. Congressional quarterly, 15 March 1974, p. 531.
5. Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976
and FY 197 T. p. 11-15.
6. The origins of MIRV. SIPRI, 1973.
7. S P E N C E R , E. Overreacting to the Soviet M I R V .
New scientist. 23 August 1973, p. 426.
8. Annual Defense Department Report, op. cit.,
p. 1 1 . 1 2 , 1 5 .
9. ibid., p. 1 1 - 1 4 .
10. Fiscal year 1974 authorization for military
procurement, research and development,
construction authorization for the Safeguard ABM,
and active duty and selected reserve strengths
(hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate, 93d Congress,
first session). Part 3: Authorizations, p. 1552.
Washington, D . C . , Government Printing
Office. 1973.
11. Department of Defense Appropriations, FY 1974
(hearings before a subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate,
93d Congress, first session). Part 3:
Department of the Navy, p. 1321. Washington,
O . C . , Government Printing Office, 1973.
12. Long-range cruise missiles. World armaments
and disarmament: SIPRI yearbook 1975,
p. 311 - 3 8 . Stockholm, SIPRI, 1975.
T O DELVE M O R E D E E P L Y
BREZET, F. The French navy: n e w raison d'etre.
United States Naval Institute Proceedings.
vol. no. 3/865, March 1975.
S C H N E I D E R , M . Nuclear flexibility and parity.
Air Force Magazine, vol. 57, no. 9,
September 1974, p. 76.
S T O C K H O L M INTERNATIONAL P E A C E R E S E A R C H
INSTITUTE. Disarmament or destruction?
Stockholm, SIPRI, 1975.
. The nuclear age. Stockholm. SIPRI, 1975.
. Safeguards against nuclear proliferation.
Stockholm, SIPRI, 1975.
Imperialism a s a level of analysis
in correlates-of-war research
Gernot Köhler1

It is argued that correlates-of-war research could benefit from paying more attention
to imperialism. Imperialism can be thought of as a level of analysis co-equal to
the individual, national, global and other analytic levels. The imperial level of
analysis has implications for concept formation, selection of explanatory variables,
and the formulation of hypotheses in correlates-of-war research and has, therefore,
important implications for the development of a theory of war and peace. The
argument is buttressed by an empirical investigation which shows that imperial
leader nations become more peaceful after they lose their imperial system. The
empirical part of this investigation thus reinforces the contention that correlates
of-war research at the imperial level is meaningful and worth while.

The level-of-analysis problem is a familiar issue
in research on the causes and correlates of
war as well as in a variety of other areas of
inquiry (e.g. Deutsch and Senghaas, 1 9 7 3 ;
Singer, 1969).* While w e have been studying
the phenomenon of war at the levels of the
individual, the nation, ths global system and
at intermediate levels, it seems that more
consideration could be given to imperialism
as another level of analysis in research on
the correlates of war. The purpose of this
paper is to investigate this level of analysis
with s o m e empirical illustrations.
• T h e need for a n additional level:
C a n a d a a s an e x a m p l e
(First and Second World Wars) and Korea
(1950-53). N o n e of Canada's enemies (Boers,
Germans, North Koreans) had attacked, or
were likely to attack, Canada w h e n she
entered into war against them. Canada had
no c o m m o n borders with her enemies nor
any serious long-term grievances toward them.
Thus, neither a threat to Canadian national
survival nor a threat to direct and evident
Canadian national interests led to those
Canadian war involvements; nor w a s Canada
in an expansionist m o o d - s h e did not seek
conquests and annexations. Canada had no
treaty obligations to fight the Boers on the
British side, the Germans on the Allied side,
or to defend South Korea against an attack

Canada is a country which does not preside
over an empire, which is neither a leader of
an alliance nor imperialist (if 'imperialist' is to
mean something other than 'capitalist').
However, in the twentieth century Canada
w a s fighting in far and distant lands (in
limited or full commitments), namely in
South Africa (Boer W a r , 1899-1902), Europe
1. A n earlier version of this paper w a s presented at the
Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science
Association. Toronto, June 1 9 7 4 . M a n y thanks are
due to William Eckhardt Harald von Riekhoff and
J. David Singer for their criticism and suggestions.
© 1975. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Reproduced
here from Vol. 1 9 , N o . 1 (March 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 4 8 - 6 2 of
that journal, by permission of the publisher. Sage
Publications Inc., Beverly Hills, Calif., and L o n d o n .
2 . T h e bibliography is'at the end of the article.

impact of science on society. Vol. 2 6 , N o . 1 / 2 , 1 9 7 6 39

 ( N A T O commitments did not apply to an
Asian situation). W h y , then, did Canada
enter these wars?
It seems that one has to transcend the
nation-state as a level of analysis in order .
to deal with this phenomenon. In the first
three instances (1899, 1 9 1 4 and 1939),
Canada acted as a m e m b e r of the British
Empire/Commonwealth; in the Korean case,
Canada acted as a loyal m e m b e r of the
American imperial system ('the West','the Free
World'). If the United States had decided not
to resist aggression in Korea, Canada would
not have fought there. Thus, the United States
with her lesser allies, and Britain with her
colonies and dominions, acted as hierarchically
structured groups to defend or extend 'their'
group territory, analogous to certain animal
species, such as ants, certain fish, hordes of
monkeys and the like. In the four mentioned
wars, Canada went to w a r as a m e m b e r
of t w o such international groupings, taking
her cues from one or the other of her imperial
leaders of the time (Britain, United States).
Without her membership in the t w o imperial
systems, Canada would conceivably have
stayed neutral and aloof in those four wars,
just like Switzerland and S w e d e n , which were
actually m u c h closer to the scene of fighting
in t w o of the wars.
• Defining 'imperial s y s t e m '
A n imperial system will be conceived as a
political system which (a) is composed of
one leader State ('metropolitan country',
'centre', 'mother country') and one or more
follower States or follower units ('colonies',
'dominions', 'satellites', 'vassals', 'lesser allies',
'dependencies'); and (b) occupies a certain
territory (contiguous or not), which is the
s u m of territories occupied by the leader and
follower units. In addition, the leader State
demands and enforces obedience by the
follower units o n certain policy issues which
would lie within the follower's competency
if the follower were completely independent
and sovereign (e.g. military and foreign policy,
economic policies). This general definition,
it appears, covers diverse imperial systems,
such as: (a) the Ottoman empire; (b) the
European colonial empires (Portuguese,
Spanish, Dutch, British, French, Belgian,
German and Italian) ; (c) regional hegemonia!
systems, such as Prussia leading North
German States (prior to 1870), Piedmont
40 G e m o t Köhler
leading smaller Italian States (prior to 1860),
present China and India; (d) modern ' c a m p s ' ,
'blocs' (the 'West', the 'East'-i.e. American
and Soviet hegemonial systems) ; and (e) s o m e
transient imperial systems which were built
and destroyed in world-wide wars (Napoleon's
continental system. Hitler's Lebensraum sys-
tem; the Japanese 'Greater Asian C o -
Prosperity Sphere').
Several attributes, aspects and phenomena,
which are usually associated with the national
political system, have parallels at the imperial
level, such as the following.
1. Self-image and perception by others-em-
pires and other imperial systems are usually
perceived by others and by themselves
in terms of a 'we-they' imagery.
2 . Borders-the territory occupied by imperial
systems has borders which, in m a n y
instances, are clearly identified (e.g. the
'Iron Curtain' in post-Second World W a r
Europe).
3. Imperial systems frequently develop govern-
mental structures (military, administration
and taxation) which are heavily controlled
by the leader nation (e.g. the French
Foreign Legion, the British Colonial Office,
the Soviet-controlled C O M I N T E R N , N A T O ) .
4 . Doctrines, symbols and education sup-
porting imperialist control (socialist brother-
hood, free Western world, white m a n ' s
burden, and so forth; teaching Russian in
Soviet-dominated areas, French in French-
dominated areas, and so forth).
5. Sense of loyalty toward or opposition
against the imperial system and its leader
(e.g. pro-British and anti-British attitudes
in the dominions, colonies and the like).
6. C o m m o n currencies (Franc zone. Sterling
bloc and so o n ) , economic centralization
and other aspects of economic imperialism,
including unequal trade, exploitation and
the like.
• T h e use of the imperial level of
analysis in correlates-of-war research
The use of one analytical level does not
preclude the use of alternative levels. Thus, the
imperial level cannot be a substitute for the
national and global levels, but should be a
fruitful complement. The imperial level seems
to provide s o m e descriptive and explanatory
capabilities not available at s o m e other
analytic levels.
Descriptive value
The descriptive value of the imperial level of
analysis derives from the limitations of the
national level of analysis; in other words,
w h e n w e wish to describe what happens
w h e n a war occurs, the imagery of 'nation-
state A fights nation-state B ' (or 'nation-
states A , B . C . . . fight nation-states P, Q , R')
can be quite restrictive. Singer and Small (1972,
p. 38) identified ninety-three international
wars for the period 1 8 1 6 - 1 9 6 5 . Almost half
of those wars-the forty-three 'extra-systemic
wars'-cannot be adequately described with
the use of the nation A versus nation B image,
since one party to the war does not even
qualify as a nation-state (i.e. colonies and
so on). Furthermore, in historiography, concepts
such as 'empire', 'imperialism', 'hegemony',
'spheres of influence' and the like are widely
used to describe what happened. T h e tradi-
tional peace researcher w h o investigates the
causes and conditions of war ought not to
disregard the testimony to the descriptive value
of the imperial level of analysis implied in a
large body of literature.
Value for theory-building
The general function of conceptual models for
theory-building consists of their capacity to
focus attention on a few central phenomena,
provide s o m e major concepts and stimulate
questioning about relationships otherwise
ignored. T h e value of the imperial level of
analysis is of a similar kind. T o give s o m e
examples, four of the c o m m o n l y used levels
of analysis in research on the causes and
correlates of war generated research questions
such as s h o w n in Table 1. T h e imperial
Table 2 . Imperial systems at war
Nations
Date N a m e of war
involved1
1914-18 First World W a r 15
1939-45 Second World W a r 28
1950-53 Korean 16
1. J. Singer and IUI. Small, The Wages of War, 1S16- 7965: a Statistical Handbook, p. 6 0 - 7 5 , N e w York, N.Y., J. Wiley, 1972.
Imperialism as a level of analysis in correlates-of-war research-
Table 1. Levels and questions
Level Sample of query
A . Global W h a t is the relationship b e -
tween global polarization and
the amount of war in the
international system?
B. National W h a t attributes of nation-states
(size, wealth, national char-
acter and so on) predict
national war proneness or
war involvement?
C . Domestic W h a t is the impact of the
defence industry on the for-
mulation of national foreign
policy, including decisions
to g o to war?
D . Individual W h a t factors determine aggres-
sion in individuals?
level-interjected between national and global
levels-conceptualizes international realities
in w a y s distinct from conceptualization at
both the national and global levels.
Conceptualizing 'war'
At the national level, w e conceptualize war as
behaviour of nations, as the outcome of a
foreign-policy-making process, or as inter-
actions between nations. At the global level,
war is conceptualized as a phase, state, or
performance of the system (e.g. 'amounts of
war' in the system, (Singer and Small, 1 9 7 2 ,
chapter 8 ) . At the imperial level, war can be
conceptualized in t w o ways-either as the
Imperial systems involved
Several imperial systems on each side plus indepen-
dent nations
Several imperial systems plus independent nations
against German and Japanese .efforts to build
imperial systems
United States leading the 'West' versus a partially
mobilized 'East' (North Korea, China)
41
behaviour of members of an imperial system
(i.e. the war experience of the leader nation,
follower nation, colony and so on) or, alter-
natively, as the behaviour of the imperial
system itself. In certain cases virtually the
entire imperial system went to war (Table 2 ) .
In s o m e cases, the imperial system w a s only
partially mobilized; in other words, only a
sector of the imperial system went to war
(see Table 3 ) .
In m a n y cases the leader nation by itself
went to war on behalf of the imperial system
(see Table 4 ) .
Explanatory variables
The imperial level of analysis focuses attention
on a variety of variables which should be e x a m -
ined as correlates or causes of war, such as:
1. Size, power, wealth and age of the imperial
system.
2 . Maritime versus continental pattern of
imperial territory (e.g. continental: Russian,
Prussian, Austrian, Ottoman; maritime:
British, American).
3. The imperial border situation.
4 . Degree of cohesion of the imperial system.
5. Methods of control used by the imperial
leader; military, economic and administra-
tive structure of the imperial system (e.g.
closed imperial system versus open imperial
system).
6. Roles that units play within the imperial
system and their bearing on war proneness
and aggression behaviour-e.g. leader ;
loyal, satisfied follower; dissatisfied to
rebellious follower; big versus small
follower; guardian of the imperial border
(e.g. South Korea, South Viet-Nam, Federal
Republic of Germany, Turkey for the
'West') ; providers of raw materials and of
markets.
It seems that the topdog-underdog or centre-
periphery conceptualization with a strong
socio-economic emphasis, as familiar in the
imperialism literature, misses several interesting
roles imperial members can play.
Hypotheses and observations
The above concepts and variables (which
exemplify, rather than exhaust, the possibilities

Table 3 . Partially mobilized imperial systems

Date N a m e of war Imperial systems (partially mobilized)

1961-73 Third Viet-Nam W a r United States leading South Viet-Nam, etc., versus
North Viet-Nam et al.
1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia U . S . S . R . leading Poland, East Germany and Hungary
(staying below the level versus Czechoslovakia
of a war)
1831-32 First Syrian1 Turkey leading Syrians versus Egyptians
1. Singer and Small, o p . cit. p. 8 7 .

Table 4 . Imperial leader fighting without allies

Imperial leader's
Date N a m e of w a r Participants Underdog's interest
interest

1831 First Polish Russia, Poland Maintain control Gain liberation

1863 Second Polish Russia, Poland Maintain control Gain liberation
1939 Russo-Finnish U . S . S . R . , Finland Enlarge control Maintain independence
1956 Russo-Hungarian U . S . S . R . , Hungary Maintain control Gain independence
Source: Singer and Small, o p . cit, p. 8 2 - 1 2 7 .

42 Gernot Köhler
opened up by the imperial level of analysis)
can be used for generating a variety of research
questions and hypotheses which cannot be
raised if one thinks solely in terms of the
nation-state and the systemic levels. In order
to s h o w that effect, I a m n o w probing a bit
into an aspect of Singer's Correlates-of-War
Project, namely the concept of the 'major
power', which can be approached both from
the nation-state level of analysis and from
the imperial level. Depending o n the level
chosen, one tends to raise different sets of
questions.
• A n illustration of analysis at t h e
imperial level: major p o w e r s , imperial
leaders, a n d w a r
The major power is a category that finds
consideration in several places in the correlates-
of-war investigations-'all students of world
politics use, or appreciate the relevance of,
the concept of 'major power' (Singer and Small,
1972, p. 2 3 ) . In their typology of territorial
units, major power is one category in a set
which comprises: (a) major power; (b) central
power; (c) system m e m b e r (nation-state) ;
and (d) extra-systemic 'entity' (i.e. colonies
and the like). These concepts imply a yiew
of a stratified international system with the
following strata (Table 5 ) .
The five major powers listed for 1965 are:
the United States, [Great Britain], France,
[Soviet Union], and China (Singer and Small,
1972, p. 2 4 - 6 ) . I classify the s a m e five
nations (in 1965) as imperial leaders according
to an operational definition to be discussed
shortly. However, the concepts of major
power and imperial leader place the nations
they denote into different theoretical contexts.
Conceptualizing these five nations as major
powers implies that one stays at the nation-
state level of analysis. The set of major powers
is simply a subset of all nation-states; the
questions raised concerning major powers are
the same as those raised for all nations-namely
questions such as: H o w m u c h war experience
do they exhibit (using various indicators) ?
W h a t is the relationship between alliance and
war experience (e.g. in Singer and Small,
1966)? and the like. In contrast, as soon as
w e conceptualize the same nations as imperial
leaders, w e start raising questions in the
context of the imperial level of analysis, such
as: Are the war indicators for these imperial
leaders (number of war experiences, battle
deaths, time and place of fighting and so
forth) related to their roles as leader states
of imperial systems? If so, h o w are their
war experiences related to: (a) the war
experiences of their imperial followers; (b) the
structure of their imperial system; (c) the
economic and military base of their imperial
leaderships; (d) the age, size and geographical
situation of their imperial system; (e) the .
situation of their imperial system within the
international system-and with regard to other
imperial systems; and (f) the degree of
freedom/suppression and satisfaction/dissatis-
faction of their imperial followers?
Moreover, whereas the concepts of major
power and imperial leader are related, the

Table 5. International stratification as implied in Singer and Small (1972, p. 2 4 - 3 0 )

Number present in the system in

Power / status 1816 1900 1965

High Major powers 5 8 5

Central
powers
System Central powers 8 12 Category
members except majors not applied
System members 10 22 119
except central
and major powers
Low Extra-systemic entities N u m b e r not specified

Total system members 23 42 124

Imperialism as a level of analysis in correlates-of-war research 43

 sets of major powers and of imperial leaders
are not identical. In some rare cases, a nation-
state m a y qualify as a major power, without
being an imperial leader, as perhaps Prussia in
1820. O n the other hand, there are a number
of imperial leaders w h o do not make it into
the class of major powers, e.g. Portugal
during the period 1816-1974-Portugal w a s
controlling several colonies during that period,
but is not rated as a major power by Singer
and Small (1972, p. 2 4 - 6 ) . While the finer
points concerning the operationalization of
imperial leadership and imperial membership
remain to be solved, w e can tentatively
operationalize the concept of an imperial
leader as follows: an imperial leader is a
State which has full or partial control of
colonies, dominions, dependencies, and/or has
full or partial control of nation-states via
stationing of military forces, the loyalty of
ruling parties, or substantial control of the
economy of those nation-states. (This opera-
tionalization still lacks, among other things,
a specification of certain minimal values for
size of controlled area, 'partial control of and
so on.) Using these criteria, the following
tentative list of imperial leaders can be
suggested (Table 6).
This list of imperial leaders can be used for
testing hypotheses generated at the imperial
level of analysis, such as the following:
nations which are imperial leaders (at time tx)
become more peaceful after losing their
imperial following (at time t2).
An empirical test
In order to test this hypothesis, the following
data were used: the list of imperial leaders
as shown in Table 6, war data from Singer
and Small (1972, p. 60-75), and some addi-
tions-two wars for Portugal (in Angola and
Mozambique, up to 1974); one war for
[Great Britain] (in Northern Ireland, on-going
in 1974); one war for India (with Pakistan,
1971); and one war for the United States
(in Indo-China, 1961-73). These additions
were made because the time period went
beyond the time limit of the Singer and Small
data collection.
The number of wars were counted which
involved the fifteen imperial leaders, first
during the existence of their imperial systems,
and then following the decline of these
systems. The results of these calculations are
shown in Table 7 .

Table 6. Imperial leaders and major powers

Singer and Small

Imperial leader
classification as
Nation during the period
a 'major power'
1816-1974
from 1816 to 1965»

Austria-Hungary 1816-1918 1816-1918 Same

Belgium 1885-1960
China 1950-1974 1950-1965 Similar
England 1816-1974 1816-1965 Similar
France 1816-1974 1816-1965 Similar
Germany/Prussia 1816-1918 1816-1918 Similar
1933-1945 1925-1945
Italy/Sardinia 1860-1943 1860-1943 Same
India 1947-1974
Japan 1895-1945 1895-1945 Same
Netherlands 1816-1963
Portugal 1816-1974
Russia/U.S.S.R. 1816-1917 1816-1917 Similar
1922-1974 1922-1965
Spain 1816-1974
Turkey 1816-1918
United States 1899-1974 1899-1965 Similar
1. Singer and Small, op. cit., p. 2 4 - 6 .

44 Gernot Köhler
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Imperialism as a level of analysis in correlates-of-war research 45
 O n the basis of the figures s h o w n in columns
(2) and (3) in Table 7 , the number of wars
per decade were calculated in column (4).
The average number of wars per decade for
each imperial leader w a s 0.81, as s h o w n in
the last column.
Of the fifteen imperial leaders, the first seven
lost their imperial following s o m e time between
1918 and 1963, while the imperial leadership
of the other eight nations w a s on-going in
1974. T h e average number of wars per decade
for the first group w a s 0.75, while the average
number of wars for the second group w a s 0.84.
This would suggest not great difference in
the war proneness of these t w o groups during
the time of imperial leadership.
O n the other hand, there w a s a great
difference in the w a r proneness for the first
group during the period of their imperial
leadership, compared with the period following
the decline of their imperial systems. Columns
(4) and (8) for Group I s h o w that the average
proneness during the imperial period w a s
almost ten times what it w a s after this period
(0.75 and 0.08). These results support the
hypothesis that nations which are imperial
leaders b e c o m e more peaceful after losing
their imperial following.
• S u m m a r y a n d conclusions
The central point of the article w a s the
contention that research o n the causes and
correlates of war could benefit from using
imperialism as a level of analysis in addition
to the analytic levels which are already being
used (individual, national, global and other
46 G e m o t Köhler
levels). At the outset Canada's war involve-
ments were used to exemplify the need for
the imperial level of analysis in this domain
of research. The article then defined the term
imperial system and pointed out h o w analysis
at the imperial system level differs from analysis
at s o m e other levels. The imperial level of
analysis has implications for concept formation,
selection of explanatory variables and the
formulation of hypotheses in correlates-of-war
research, and has, therefore, important implica-
tions for the development of a theory of war
and peace. After discussing the imperial level
of analysis in general terms, the article gave
an illustration of analysis at that level b y
focusing o n imperial leader nations and
suggesting a hypothesis about their war
proneness. It w a s hypothesized that imperial
leaders become more peaceful after they lose
their imperial systems. Empirical evidence w a s
presented which strongly supported the hypo-
thesis. The empirical part of this investigation
thus reinforces the contention that correlates-
of-war research at the imperial level- is
meaningful and worth while.
The one empirical finding of the study is
admittedly only a facet of the complex
relationships between imperialism and violence.
Even so, it is impressive h o w closely a single
structural variable-imperial leadership-is
related to war. Further research will have to
investigate other aspects of imperial systems
and their bearing o n the occurrence of war.
In the process of doing so, one will perhaps
discover that the imperial level of analysis
has a capacity for tying together a variety of
findings and theorems from both traditional
and radical peace research.
REFERENCES
D E U T S C H , K . ; S E N G H A A S , D . 1973. The steps to
war. a survey of system levels, decision stages
and research results. In : P. J. M c G o w a n (ed.).
Sage international yearbook of foreign policy studies,
vol. 1, p. 2 7 5 - 3 3 2 . Beverly Hills.
Calif., Sage Publications.
S I N G E R , J. 1969. The tevel-of-analysis problem in
international relations. In: J. Rosenau (ed.),
International politics and foreign policy: a reader in
research and theory, p. 2 0 - 9 . N e w York, N . Y . ,
Free Press. (Originally published in 1961.)
S I N G E R , J . ; S M A L L , M . 1966. National alliance
commitments and war involvement 1818-1945.
Peace Research Society (International). (Papers, 5.)
— . 1972. The wages of war. 1816-1965:
a statistical handbook. N e w York, N.Y., J. Wiley.
 TO DELVE M O R E DEEPLY

ALCOCK, N. Imperialism. Peace Research.

6 July 1974, p. 75-83.
A Z A R , E. Probe for peace: small-state hostilities.
Minneapolis, Minn., Burgess, 1973.
D E U T S C H , K. Theories of imperialism and
neocolonialism: a challenge to peace research.
Paper read at the eleventh North American Conference
of the Peace Science Society (International),
November 1973, Cambridge, Mass.
. The analysis of international relations.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968.
E C K H A R D T , W . ; Y O U N G , C . Psychology of imperialism.
Oakville. Ontario, Canadian Peace Research
Institute, 1974. (Mimeo.)
. Civil conflict, imperialism and inequality.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian
Peace Research and Education Association,
Toronto. M a y 1974.
E I S E N S T A D T , S . The political systems of empires.
N e w York, N . Y . , Free Press, 1963.
G A L T U N G , J. A structural theory of imperialism.
J. peace research, vol. 2 , 1 9 7 1 , p. 81 - 1 1 8 .
G A N T Z E L , J. Dependency structures as the dominant
pattern in world society. J. peace research.
vol. 3, 1973, p. 2 0 3 - 1 6 .
G R O W , R. Soviet economic penetration of China,
1945-1960: imperialism as a level of analysis problem.
Paper presented at the eleventh North American
Conference of the Peace Science Society
, (International), Cambridge, Mass., November 1973.
K Ö H L E R , G . The imperialism ¡war hypothesis revisited.
Paper presented at the fifteenth Annual
Convention of the International Studies
Association, St Louis. Missouri, March 1974.
. Events research and war/peace prediction.
Oakville, Ontario, Canadian Peace Research
Institute Press, 1974.
S E N G H A A S , D . (ed.). Imperialismus und
strukturelle Gewalt: Analysen über abhängige
Reproduktion. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1972.
V A L E N Z U E L A , J. U.S. manufacturing investment,
political instability and pattern of international
cooperation and conflict, in Argentina
end Chile, 1955-1971. University of North Carolina,
Durham, N . C . , 1973. (Dissertation.)

Imperialism as a level of analysis in correlates-of-war research 47

H o w an atomic scientist views
the prospects for 'the bomb' 1
Bernard T . Feld
I a m here concerned with the escalation of
a nuclear conflict, should one break out. Certain
fire-breaks against nuclear escalation have
been built into the international system in
recent years-most notably the multiplicity of
'hot lines' that have been established between
the major nuclear powers. Beyond this, w e
are dependent on the mutual acceptance of
a relatively high threshold of conflict, before
nuclear w e a p o n s would be used. In the case
of the t w o super-powers, in so far as there is
mutual acceptance of the doctrine of deterrence,
this threshold is mercifully very high, being
essentially at the level of retaliation only
against the first use of a nuclear b o m b ' by the
other side. In the case of the East/West
confrontation in Europe, and in other regions
of possible conflict, the threshold is m u c h
too low.
W h a t is even more dangerous is the fact
that this deterrent threshold, as between
N A T O and the W a r s a w Pact countries, has
b e c o m e fuzzy and ill-defined. Furthermore,
there has been a very strong tendency in
recent years to reduce and erode the threshold
even further, through the dangerous military
doctrines that permit counter-force and
counter-value m o d e s of use of nuclear
w e a p o n s in a limited strategic exchange, and
through the technical development of high-
accuracy guidance-the smart b o m b - a n d of
mini-nuclear w e a p o n s . Unless firm steps are
taken to resist these tendencies, there is the
gravest danger that present threshold will be
completely eroded.
This danger is exacerbated by a widespread
belief that it is precisely the uncertainty, in
the threshold for introduction of nuclear w e a p -
ons into a conventional conflict, that inhibits
the other side from pursuing policies which
could lead to a military confrontation. Whether
impact of science on society. Vol. 2 6 , N o . 1 / 2 , 1976
or not this form of deterrence is psychologically
sound, it seems to m e to be equivalent, on the
international level, to permitting children to
play with loaded guns in order to teach them
about their dangers . . .
• T h e n a r r o w military vision
The erosion of thresholds against the use of
n e w technological methods of mass-destruc-
tion is unfortunately one of the characteristics
of our age. In m y view, this is primarily a
consequence of unthinking adherence to the
nineteenth-century military doctrine that w a r
is merely an extension of politics by other
means, coupled with a naive faith in n e w
technology on the part of military leaders.
I could cite m a n y examples of this narrow
military light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel vision:
the continued adherence by modern air forces
to discredited strategic bombing doctrines,
despite all the evidence o n the ineffectiveness
of bombing accumulated in the Second World
W a r , in Korea and most recently in V i e t - N a m ;
the great reluctance to give u p chemical
w e a p o n s in the face of almost universal
expressions of abhorrence.
The belief in limited war, either nuclear or
conventional, represents the perpetuation of
a myth ; the fact is that the intensity of even
conventional wars, as measured by the rate
of use of high explosives-that is, the total
amount of conventional explosives used
divided by the time span of the conflict-has
been increasing exponentially since the end
1. Bernard T . Feld, upon his acceptance of the Leo
Szilard Award for Physics in the Public Interest, in an
address before the American Physical Society,
29 April 1975. The full text of the address appeared In
Physics Today (July 1 9 7 5 , p. 2 3 - 9 ) . Reproduced
with permission.
49
of the last century, from the Boer to the Y o m
Kippur war, with the same doubling time, of
roughly ten years, as. most other m o d e s of
technological pollution.
Nor can w e have m u c h faith in the ability,
let alone the will, of political leaders to limit
the growth of nuclear war. I leave aside the
arguments, still raging, over whether or not
the Hiroshima b o m b w a s appropriate or even
necessary. But I believe that the example of
the second b o m b , the w e a p o n used against
Nagasaki, is unequivocal and highly relevant:
the inexcusable, militarily irrelevant destruction
of a city and its population, w h e n the war
w a s effectively over and the Japanese were
already suing for peace, for no military purpose
other than the testing of a n e w type of w e a p o n
and the demonstration of its effectiveness,
should serve as a striking reminder of the
dangers of giving to the military carte blanche
in the choice of means for waging w a r in
this technological age.

• Bernard T . Feld

Professor Feld, as a graduate student

in 1941, joined the research team
of the noted Hungarian-born theoretical
physicist Leo Szilard at Columbia University,
and was later one of Szilard's
principal assistants at the Metallurgical
Laboratory of the University of Chicago.
The work of these and other
researchers led, less than four years later,
to the successful explosion
of the first nuclear fission (or 'atomic') bomb.
Professor of physics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
since 1953, Professor Feld spent
the period 1973-75 in London
as Secretary-General of the Pugwash
Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

50 Bernard T . Feld
The Plowshare Treaty
Art Buchwald
It is written in the book of the prophet Isaiah
that the Lord promised the people, ' . . . They
shall beat their swords into plowshares, and
their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall
not lift up sword against nation, neither shall
they learn war any more.'
It never really happened, and I have in m y
possession a Dead Sea scroll which tells w h y .
At one time the Philistines and Judah signed
a disarmament pact limiting the number of
swords and spears. W h e n the king of Judah
brought the treaty back to his people, there
w a s joy in the land.
' D o e s this m e a n w e will not have to- spend
gold for arms ?' they asked.
'It means no such thing,' the king replied.
* W e will, in fact, have to spend more gold
than ever'.
'But,' a scribe asked the king, 'if w e have
a treaty with the Philistines, w h y d o w e have
to spend more gold for armaments?'
'Because if w e have to beat our swords
into plowshares and our spears into pruning
hooks, w e must develop n e w weapons to
oppose the Philistines,' the king of Judah
replied. This will involve a sizeable investment
in research of rock-throwing machines and
armoured donkeys, which as you k n o w are
not covered by the treaty. W e cannot allow
our agreement with the Philistines to put us
at a military disadvantage.'
'Sire,' another scribe said, 'does the agree-
ment mean that all swords will be beaten
into plowshares and all spears into pruning
hooks ?'
' N o , it doesn't. It means that both sides m a y
keep the swords they n o w have and increase
their spear carriers to 2,400. The Philistines,
as you k n o w , have superiority in the weight
of their spears, but our throwers are twice as
accurate. W e have more than enough to
impact of science on society. Vol. 26, No. 1/2, 1976
repulse any first-strike attack, but we're still
w e a k in conventional weapons such as sticks
and large stones.'
' H o w can w e be sure that the Philistines
will not put more than one head o n their
spears?' a scribe asked.
'While the treaty does not limit the number
of heads you can put on a spear/ the king
replied, 'it does limit the number of carriers
to throw them. This is the first time the Philis-
tines have even been willing to discuss putting
a stop to the spear race.'
'What is to prevent the Philistines from
beating their swords into plowshares and
then attacking us with the plowshares?'
'At this time w e have a three-to-one plow-
share advantage over the Philistines.
'Our defense people have asked for an
extra ton of gold to finance an anti-plowshare
system which could detect the deployment
of any n e w plowshares by the Philistines.
They also are asking in their budget for a n e w
sailing vessel capable of launching fire-balls
against a Philistine boat at thirty feet. This
will m a k e up for any loss w e will suffer in
not being permitted to make n e w swords.
I shall m a k e three requests to the council in
m y State of the Kingdom message next week.'
'Sire, forgive m e for saying this, but w e
don't seem any closer to peace with the
Philistines than w e were before the plowshare
treaty . . .'
51
• Art Buchwald

Humorist and journalist, Mr Buchwald

prepares a regular column appearing
several times weekly in several languages
in many parts of the world.
The article above is reproduced with
the kind permission of the Los Angeles
Times Syndicate. © Los Angeles Times.

52 Art Buchwald
Science and warfare
Vasiliy M . Kulish

The invention of gunpowder enabled whole armies to be equipped with firearms

and gave rise to a new branch of warfare—the use of explosives. The development
of telegraphy at a later stage made it possible for military commanders to direct
their forces overa wide field of operations, enabling them to control their movement
at one and the same time on a broad front and in great depth. The appearance
on the battlefield of the steam engine, and even more dramatically of the internal
combustion engine, resulted in a marked increase in the mobility of armed forces
and in the area which they could cover, which soon included the air and the depths
of the sea. The application to warfare of the latest discoveries in chemistry, metal-
lurgy and physics has contributed to the emergence of long-distance, rapid-firing
weapons—artillery, machine guns, sub-machine guns, aeroplanes, tanks, armoured
cars and so on.

Thus, in every period of history, science and
technology have given rise to n e w means of
armed combat, affording greater possibilities
for waging war. N e w types of military equip-
ment, whether in the form of weapons, n e w
means of transport and communications or
n e w techniques, have always had the effect
of revolutionizing the approach to warfare.
The splitting of the atom and the discovery
of nuclear chain reactions and of the laws of
jet propulsion have been a m o n g the out-
standing achievements of modern science.
Their application to warfare has brought about
a further revolution in this sphere, leading to
the manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons and intercontinental and other kinds
of ballistic missiles which have m a d e the
whole world a potential battlefield. A s if this
were not enough, there is n o w a real danger
of militarization of the cosmos, of the depths
of the oceans and seas and of the sea bed
itself.
The development of armaments and of
military technology has increased the power
of war to kill and lay waste as dramatically
as it has extended the theatre of its operations.
There is no need to quote figures for loss of
life in a long succession of wars to m a k e
this point clear. The figures for the last t w o
world wars are quite sufficient. Ten million
people were killed. in the First World W a r
and 50 million in the Second. T h e Second
World W a r left vast areas of densely populated
territory in Europe, Asia and Africa in ruins.
N o one could feel safe, whether fighting on
the front or living hundreds of miles behind
the lines.
But after the Second World W a r yet more
deadly weapons were invented. The produc-
tion and accumulation of instruments of mass
destruction-nuclear chemical and biological-
and of the means of delivering them to their
objectives, including rockets of all kinds and
the latest types of combat aircraft, m e a n that

impact of science on society, Vol. 26, N o . 1 / 2 , 1976 53

there is no town or village on the earth's
surface which could not be m a d e the target
of a rocket-borne nuclear device.
. The destructiveness of modern w e a p o n s
can best be appreciated by reference to the
following facts. During the Second World
W a r the most powerful air-borne b o m b w a s
an American b o m b with an explosive power
equal to ten tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
The explosive power of the atomic b o m b
dropped on Hiroshima w a s equivalent to
15,000 tons of T N T , in other words, it w a s
1,500 times as powerful. The explosive power
of a thermonuclear b o m b is measured in
millions of tons of T N T .
• T h e p r o b l e m of g r o w i n g reserves
According to published information, the
United States' reserves of nuclear weapons
n o w amount to 8,000 megatons distributed
a m o n g 30,000 individual weapons held in
various places scattered over the North A m e r -
ican continent, the oceans, Europe and Asia.
These stocks represent more than 600,000
times the force of the b o m b dropped on
Hiroshima and could kill 12 times the entire
population of the earth.1 Total supplies of
nuclear w e a p o n s contain approximately ten
tons of explosives for each m a n , w o m a n and
child in the world. These reserves are continu-
ing to grow. Another very disquieting trend
is the work n o w being carried out on a n e w
type of 'miniature' nuclear w e a p o n which
carries a comparatively small amount of fissile
material but which can h o m e on to its target
with the greatest precision.
Chemical weapons were first used on a large
scale in the trenches in the First World W a r ,
and inflicted serious losses on the troops
against w h o m they were used. After the
Second World W a r chemical weapons were
used in so-called focal wars not only and not
so m u c h against personnel as for their effect
on the natural environment. It is no secret
that the American forces in South Viet-Nam
used herbicides and defoliants which destroyed
almost half the country's forest cover and
devastated wide areas under cultivation. In
this w a y m a n y civilians died of poisoning.
From 1967 to 1972 the American forces
carried out special operations to increase arti-
ficially the amount of rainfall over a network
of earth tracks in South Viet-Nam. The
leaders of the Pentagon felt that this artificially
induced rain added to the transport problems
54 Vasiliy M . Kulish
of the patriotic forces as well as impeded
agricultural production.
This w a s the first example of large-scale
'ecological' action being taken on the biosphere
over a long period for military purposes. The
cryptic reports published in the United States
press on the creation of 'meteorological' and
'ecological' weapons, taken together with
these initial experiments carried out by the
American forces in Viet-Nam, indicate that
m a n ' s new-found ability to influence the
environment for military purposes constitutes
a threat which must be taken very seriously.
W h e n science and technology, which by
their nature and social purpose are essentially
humanitarian, are put to military use, their
effect can be the exact opposite. They provide
the means of exterminating a sizeable propor-
tion, if not the majority, of the h u m a n race
and of destroying all that the h u m a n spirit,
science and technology have created in the
course of centuries, even including the very
basis of h u m a n existence-nature.
• Military d e m a n d s o n science
W a r has always been an insatiable consumer
of armaments and military technology, con-
stantly making n e w demands on science and
technology. Hostile or warring forces continu-
ally strive to gain a material or strategic
advantage over their opponent, with the result
that the most sophisticated weapons and
technology are soon out- of date. In our time
one generation of weapons is superseded by
another in ten to fifteen years, a more rapid
changeover than from one h u m a n generation
to the next. In fact the demands m a d e by the
military on science and technology almost
outstrip their capabilities and in s o m e sense
stimulate them to n e w achievements, partic-
ularly on the applied, military side.
S o m e very one-sided conclusions have been
drawn from this interdependence between
science and war. During the 'cold war' it w a s
a widely held view in the West, and particu-
larly in the United States, that the arms race
and military preparations in general could be
seen as in a certain sense useful, indeed
1. It is useful to add that both the United States and the
U . S . S R . have and m a y continue to have the certain
capacity to riposte, 'more than enough strategic forces
to absorb even an all-out nuclear attack by the other
side and still be able to retaliate...', cf. B. Carter,
'Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear W e a p o n s ' , Scientific
American. Vol. 2 3 0 , N o . 5, M a y 1 9 7 4 , p. 21 . - E d .
beneficial, to mankind as they provided if not
the main spur, then at least a very substantial
one to scientific and technological progress.
Reference w a s often m a d e to scientific discov-
eries and technical improvements which had
been m a d e in connexion with military activ-
ities and subsequently applied in the civilian
sector. For example, nuclear energy, which had
first been developed for military purposes,
later c a m e to be widely used in the power-
supply industry. A somewhat similar sequence
of events occurred in connexion with c o m p u -
ters which, after originally being used to w a g e
war more efficiently, were introduced with
great success into the e c o n o m y as a whole.
These and similar examples are quoted as
arguments against repudiating militarism and
halting the military build-up.
Akin to this type of one-sided argument are
the various theories and doctrines which
justify the arms race and glorify war as a
necessary evil which makes it possible to con-
solidate good (such theories are, in fact, pro-
mulgated by certain Western scholars). All
this serves as ideological and ethical justifi-
cation for the numerous scientists and techni-
cians w h o are seconded to take part in the
arms race and armaments industry, creating
and perfecting w e a p o n s of mass destruction
and the means of conveying them to their
destination.
The arms race begins with scientific research
and the development of prototype w e a p o n s
and other military technology. This then leads
to the trial and definitive adoption of a w e a p o n
as part of the existing arsenal, its industrial
production and storage. The time spent in
laboratory tests and on the drawing board is
a major component in the arms race, and
scientists and technicians engaged in this
work are not only taking an active part in the
arms race but are in a sense one of the prime
movers of the whole process.
The development of modern weapons is a
lengthy business. M a n y years m a y pass be-
tween the initial design and final deployment;
in the case of a n e w bomber or fighter this
period of 'gestation' m a y be ten years or even
longer. Those in charge of military prepara-
tions must therefore concentrate their atten-
tion both on what has already been produced
and can be used in the event of w a r and on
what is underdevelopment and m a y be used
in future. The second aspect of the problem
is no less important than the first. For example,
the work done by American and British océano-
graphie experts with a view to the development
of a means of combating nuclear submarines
(anti-submarine warfare or A S W ) has already
started a n e w 'round' in the arms race, involving
military mastery of the ocean depths and the
sea bed.
B Effects o n foreign policy
Along with other military preparations, the
act of creating and perfecting weapons of
mass destruction, w h o s e strategic nature is
evident from their characteristics and manner
of use, cannot fail to have an effect on the
foreign policy of States and on the whole
system of international relations. This will be
true both of States producing such w e a p o n s
and also of States w h o feel themselves threat-
ened or, on the other hand, w h o stand to
gain from their manufacture. Thus the produc-
tion and the first use of an atomic w e a p o n by
the United States at the end of the Second
World W a r and the attempts towards the end
of the 1940s and the 1950s and 1960s to
use it for the purposes of blackmail and threats
in international relations resulted in correspond-
ing action being taken in response by the
U . S . S . R . and other socialist States. This
consisted of the production of similar w e a p o n s
and certain foreign policy measures which
neutralized the danger that the United States'
possession of nuclear arms represented for
the U . S . S . R . and all other countries belonging
to the socialist community. This whole
sequence of events-the invention of a n e w
w e a p o n and the ensuing political activity-has
had a major influence on the foreign policy
of a large number of States.
The whole system of arms production and
military technology, which in practical terms
means the transfer of scientific and techno-
logical research to the military sector, swallows
up vast amounts of m o n e y and material
resources, laying a heavy burden o n the
economy of every country. A group of consul-
tant experts which examined the whole ques-
tion of military spending throughout the world
for the United Nations estimated in its report
published o n 1 4 October 1974 that the
world's military budget in 1973 amounted to
$205,000 million to $235,000 million at
constant (1970) prices, or 5240,000 million to
$275,000 million at current (1973) prices.
This w a s more than the estimated gross
national product of all the developing countries
of South Asia, East Asia and Africa put together.
Science and warfare 55
The report drew attention to the fact that
military expenditure occupied a m u c h smaller
place in the budgets of countries with a planned
economy than in those of countries with a
developed capitalist economy.
The average rate of increase in military
expenditure from 1961 to 1973 w a s , according
to the information contained in the report,
3 per cent per a n n u m , which is the equivalent
of $7,000 million to $8,000 million. At the
beginning of the 1960s expenditure by the
N A T O and W a r s a w Pact countries accounted
for 9 0 per cent of the world's total military
budget, but for the 1970s the figure is approxi-
mately 8 0 per cent. In recent years there has
been a marked tendency for developing nations
to increase their military budgets. Their share
of world military expenditure w a s 5.5. per
cent in the 1960s but is reaching the 11 per
cent mark in the 1970s.
Behind these figures lie the consumption
of millions of tons of the rarest and most
precious raw materials and the transfer from
civilian branches of industry of millions of
highly qualified workers and hundreds of
thousands of scientists, technicians and admin-
istrative staff. In the United States, for
example, every tenth salaried or wage-earning
worker is employed by the Department of
Defense.
In recent years those w h o advocate contin-
ued high expenditure o n arms in the devel-
oped capitalist countries, and particularly in
the United States, have quoted in support of
their view the fact that military expenditure as
a proportion of gross national product in
these countries is supposedly decreasing.
They refer to figures for the United States
(14.9 per cent in 1952 and an average of
7.4 per cent in 1 9 7 0 - 7 2 ) , the United Kingdom
(11.2 and 5 per cent), the Federal Republic of
Germany (6.2 and 3 per cent), and so o n .
Such arguments, however, carry very little
weight. T h e proportion of total expenditure
devoted to military ends diminished during
the period w h e n these countries were expe-
riencing an economic b o o m . In fact, quantita-
tively, this expenditure continued to increase.
N o w that the major capitalist countries are
going through a period of economic crisis, the
opposite trend is beginning to manifest itself.
In the last analysis, and this is a most impor-
tant point, a relative decrease in military expen-
diture does not m e a n that the arms race has
ended.
56 Vasiliy M . Kulish
• T h e pace of the a r m s race
It is in fact in the sphere of science and tech-
nology that the rhythm of the arms race is
quickening most rapidly-indeed a special
term, 'the technological arms race', has n o w
been coined. In developed capitalist coun-
tries, considerable financial resources are
devoted to scientific research and technolo-
gical development. T h e proportion of the
military budget spent on R 8- D in countries
with a developed market e c o n o m y w a s b e -
tween 1 0 and 15 per cent in the early 1950s,
and has since remained at the same level.
According to a United Nations group of con-
sultant experts, in the 1970s world expendi-
ture on w e a p o n research and development is
running at the rate of about $20,000 million
annually.
W e a p o n systems are becoming increasingly
complicated and ever-more efficient and, as
their power to destroy increases, so does
their cost. For example a fighter aircraft costs
130 times more in 1 9 7 5 than it cost the A m e r -
ican forces at the end of the Second World
W a r , although the level of prices has only
doubled in the United States over the s a m e
period.
The technological arms race attracts a consid-
erable number of scientists, laboratory work-
ers, engineers, technicians and highly qualified
workers a w a y from work in non-military sec-
tors. According to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there are
approximately 400,000 scientists and engineers
employed throughout the world on military
assignments. They are divided into groups
engaging in research, development and indus-
trial production. O n c e such groups have been
formed they are never disbanded, for, as soon
as one project ends, another is started. The
work of scientific and technical preparation
for w a r is thus a self-perpetuating process.
These groups of scientific workers consti-
tute an important and the most highly trained
part of the military/industrial complex in devel-
oped capitalist countries. B y virtue of their
specialization they have a vested interest in
the continuance of the technological arms
race, which they regard as essential to the
safeguarding of their o w n position. In fact the
moral fibre of m a n y scientists is affected by
their work in the military sector. The lavishness
of the rewards offered turns their heads and
s o m e of them begin to look on work in this
field as an easy w a y of making m o n e y , and
above all as a means of ensuring their o w n
material well-being.
Here the interests of scientists and scientific
workers coincide completely or almost c o m -
pletely with the aims of those in charge of the
military/industrial complexes, for w h o m the
continuance of the arms race has material
advantages as well as serving a class and polit-
ical purpose.
In combination with the military/industrial
corporations, groups of scientific and tech-
nical experts working for the military exert an
influence on the military strategy of their
government by saying what is possible from a
scientific or technological point of view.
• Effects o n the structure of science
It is worth noting that large firms in America
which are deeply involved in arms production
generally employ a number of specialists on
social problems and foreign affairs as well as
scientific and technical experts. They also
m a k e extensive use of charitable funds of all
kinds to finance military-oriented research in
universities and so-called non-profit-making
scientific research institutions. In this w a y the
number of scientific workers drawn into the
arms race is significantly increased.
The technological arms race is even affect-
ing the structure of science itself. This can be
seen in the changing relationship between
basic and applied research which, particularly
in the military sector, are often combined at the
expense of the former. T o take R & D expen-
diture by the Pentagon in the 1960s as an
example, the relative proportions of the various
categories were as follows: theoretical research,
5 - 6 per cent; applied research, 1 2 - 1 8 per
cent; long-term development projects, 9 - 1 6
per cent; engineering development and the
development of operational systems, 4 5 - 5 4
per cent. A n d in the 1970s the pattern has
remained m u c h the s a m e .
In view of the fact that military research
and development absorbs the most highly
qualified scientific workers, it can safely be
affirmed that militarism is draining m a n y
branches of science of their life-blood and
thus ensuring that a brake is put on progress
in these areas. Moreover the emphasis on
applied research and development is curtailing
and inhibiting the fundamental, basic research
which science needs. Lastly, the widespread
practice of attracting the most gifted academic
staff from universities and other higher educa-
tional establishments into the military sector
will inevitably lead to a lowering of teaching
standards and to a distortion of the subjects
taught; this cannot fail to affect the training
of scientists and, in the last analysis, the devel-
opment of science.
A s regards the possibility of putting the
fruits of military R & D to use in civilian
branches of science and industry, the outlook
is exceedingly bleak. John Foster, a former
Assistant Secretary for Research and Devel-
opment at the United States Department of
Defense, admitted at one stage that of the
$981 million spent on research and develop-
ment for military aviation in 1 9 6 9 , $ 8 4 3 million
or 8 6 per cent went into programmes which
could not be of any use to civilian branches of
industry.1 A s w e a p o n s and military techniques
in general have b e c o m e more complicated and
consequently more expensive, as R & D costs
have soared, it has b e c o m e less and . less
economically advantageous to apply to civilian
branches of industry even military discoveries
which, technically speaking, would have been
wholly suited for this purpose.
• Science a n d practice
T h e facts to which w e have referred give s o m e
idea of the complexity, the contradictions and
also the dangers of the interrelationship b e -
tween w a r and science at international level.
But at the s a m e time there is no justification
for the view that this relationship is inevitably
bound to develop in a dangerous manner.
Science is concerned with objective truths.
The discoveries of science open the w a y to
knowledge of the objective world. But the
practical use which is m a d e of scientific dis-
coveries and their technical application depend
not only on the world of science but also on
that of politics. It would, for example, be
difficult to overemphasize the significance for
mankind of such major discoveries as that of
the splitting of the nucleus and nuclear chain
reactions. They have s h o w n mankind the w a y
to solve the problem of energy supplies once
and for all. T h e ability to control thermo-
nuclear reactions would for ever relieve m a n -
kind of the need to seek w a y s of developing
other sources of energy. These surpassing dis-
coveries have, however, been applied in the
military sphere more than in any other.
1. cf. M . Berkowitz, The Conversion of Military-oriented
Research and Development to Civilian Uses, p. 110,
N e w York, N . Y . , Praeger, 1970.
Science and warfare 57
 Again, it w a s only w h e n the pressing needs
of the military had been satisfied that use
began to be m a d e of jet propulsion in the
e c o n o m y as a whole-in civilian aviation, for
other types of transport, for power and for
the peaceful conquest of outer space.
It is clear from these examples that the
interconnexion between science and war is
not direct, but takes place through the m e d i u m
of politics which determines the use of scien-
tific discoveries in the military field.
The political sphere serves as the over-all
controller and organizer of all work involving
military research and development. For e x a m -
ple, in the United States until the middle of
1973 the responsibility for federal measures
to develop the country's scientific and techno-
logical potential lay directly with the President.
T o help him discharge this duty he had a
special adviser on science and technology and
a special advisory committee which m a d e
recommendations to the supreme authority on
such questions as the development of stra-
tegic w e a p o n systems, military and space re-
search, the collection of information by recon-
naissance, anti-submarine warfare, and the like.
Subsequently, general responsibility for mili-
tary research and development w a s transferred
to the National Security Council. The practical
management of military-oriented scientific
activity in the Department of Defense is in the
hands of a special section headed by an
Assistant Secretary of Defense. A group spe-
cializing in the evaluation of w e a p o n systems
also reports directly to the Assistant Secretary.
Apart from this, there is a complicated network
of bodies and institutions in charge of scien-
tific work being carried out for the A r m y ,
Navy and Air Force Departments.
The United States Government thus deter-
mines the policy governing the use m a d e of
scientific research by the military and supervises
its implementation. T h e government submits
its proposals for the allocation of resources
for military research and development to
Congress, which decides whether or not the
proposed expenditure is justified and in the
best interests of the nation, and frequently
makes its o w n amendments. It thus shares,
with the government in the determination of
policy regarding the technological arms race.
Other countries with developed market econo-
mies have similar networks of governmental
bodies and institutions supervising the use of
science for military purposes, although the
form which they take m a y differ.
58 Vasiliy M . Kulish
• A n aftermath of w a r
This highly complex network of bodies involved
in the militarization of science is the outcome
of the policy adopted by the Western powers
after the Second World W a r . In their opposi-
tion to socialism, the countries belonging to
the socialist group and the m o v e m e n t for
national liberation, they relied mainly on mili-
tary might. Whatever form their policy might
take, it invariably remained based on the use
of armed force.
In the second half of the 1940s and at the
beginning of the 1950s the Western nations,
led by the United States, s a w military force as
a decisive means of preserving the war-worn
fabric of the capitalist system and re-establish-
ing their tottering colonial empires. The policy
of rejection of c o m m u n i s m , which w a s expres-
sed in various doctrines-of 'containment',
'brinkmanship', 'preventive w a r ' - g a v e birth to
and continually heated up the arms race: this
fierce competition, in regard to military prepa-
rations, in which all nations are n o w engaged.
Before long an extensive network of military
bases had been established and military
alliances, such as N A T O , the Baghdad Pact
(which later became C E N T O ) and S E A T O ,
knocked together. In the post-war period the
United States alone signed military alliances
with no fewer than forty-two States.
The Western powers' reliance on military
force for the purposes of foreign policy w a s
also one of the main reasons w h y all the
outstanding scientific discoveries and technical
achievements were m a d e primarily in the mili-
tary field. Their governments and parliaments
never counted the cost w h e n it c a m e to
financing military projects. They were not even
deterred by the thought that, in adopting this
attitude, they were holding back scientific
progress. All efforts were directed towards one
goal-military superiority over the socialist
States. Proposals by the latter for a policy of
peaceful coexistence between States with
different structures were rejected outright.
The Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries responded to this challenge by
taking exceptional measures to ensure their
o w n safety and bring their armed forces u p to
date, equipping them with the most modern
w e a p o n s and military techniques. T h e hosti-
lity between the t w o systems gradually envel-
oped the whole world. At the s a m e time
armed conflict w a s becoming more and more
lethal, the highly sophisticated w e a p o n sys-
 tems on both sides, which included rocket-
borne nuclear warheads, being kept in a state
of war alert enabling any conflict to escalate
almost uncontrollably into a global nuclear
holocaust.
The relaxation of international tension which
' has n o w begun, however, offers a favourable
opportunity to restrict and curtail the arms
race, to avert wars and to create a collective
system for the preservation of peace and the
safeguarding of international security. The
most important consequence of this relaxation
of international tension is the strengthening
S o m e international efforts to contain w a r
Over the last fifteen years the following
international agreements have been
concluded and have entered into force for the
signatories: the treaty banning nuclear
w e a p o n tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water, of 5 August 1 9 6 3 ; the
treaty on outer space of 2 7 January 1967
in which the States party to the treaty
undertake 'not to place in orbit around the-
earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, or station w e a p o n s in
outer space in any other manner'; the treaty on
the non-proliferation of nuclear w e a p o n s of
I July 1 9 6 8 ; the treaty on the sea bed of
II February 1971 in which the signatories
undertake 'not to emplant or emplace
on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof beyond the twelve-mile
territorial .limit any nuclear w e a p o n s or
any other types of w e a p o n s of mass
destruction as well as launching installations
or any other facilities specifically
• S o m e recent accords . . .
Exceptional importance should be ascribed to
the bilateral agreements between the U . S . S . R .
and the United States on the prevention of
world-wide thermonuclear warfare and the
limitation of certain kinds of strategic w e a p o n ,
and also to their discussions o n w a y s of
of the trend towards establishing international
control over the arms race. Practical measures
taken by the various States and nations for
this purpose will make it possible to arrest the
spontaneous development of this process and
work out the necessary conditions for the
reduction of armed forces and armaments and
for disarmament. Attention should be drawn
in this connexion to the valuable long-term
prospects held out by multilateral and bilateral
treaties and agreements designed to avert
world-wide thermonuclear war and limit the
arms race (see box).
designed for storing, testing or using such
w e a p o n s ' ; and finally the first real
agreement on arms limitation, the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxic W e a p o n s and
on their Destruction, of 10 April 1 9 7 2 .
T o these should be added earlier agreements
which still apply, such as the general
principle laid d o w n in Article 2 3 of The Hague
Convention on the conduct of land
warfare of 1 8 October 1907 which bans the
use of weapons, bullets, projectiles and any
other object which causes unnecessary
suffering; the banning of so-called
d u m d u m bullets by The Hague declaration
of 2 9 July 1 8 9 9 ; the Geneva protocol
banning the use of asphyxiating, poisonous
and similar gases and of bacteriological
instruments in warfare, of 17 June 1 9 2 5 ;
and the Treaty on Antaratica of
1 December 1959, declaring the whole of the
Antarctic to be a completely demilitarized zone.
See also pages 65 and 7 2 of this issue.
reducing the burden of armaments and limiting
and ending the arms race. In their respective
statements the leaders of both countries have
stressed that the ultimate aim of all measures
taken in this sphere is general and complete
disarmament, under strict international super-
vision.
Science and warfare 59
The following Soviet-American agreements
are also relevant to the questions raised in this
article: the agreement on the prevention of the
risk of accidental outbreak of thermonuclear
warfare, of 3 0 September 1971 ; the treaty o n
the limitation of anti-ballistic missile defence
systems of 2 6 M a y 1 9 7 2 ; the provisional
agreement o n certain measures connected
with the limitation of strategic offensive w e a p -
ons, of 2 6 M a y 1 9 7 2 ; the agreement on the
prevention of incidents o n the open sea of
2 5 M a y 1 9 7 2 ; the agreement on the preven-
tion of thermonuclear warfare of 2 2 June
1973.
There are also the agreement on the principles
of negotiations on the further limitation of stra-
The position which these countries occupy
in the world, their international obligations and
their economic, technological and military
potential are such that the significance of
agreements or negotiations signed or engaged
in extends far beyond the interests of the
two countries concerned.
The successfully completed Conference o n
European Security and Co-operation (August
1975) has an outstandingly important role to
play in creating conditions in which war can
be averted and a collective system of security
established in Europe. Thirty-three European
States in addition to the United States and
Canada worked out the basic principles for
mutual relations between them and examined
various questions involved in putting these
principles into practice, w a y s of increasing
their confidence in each other, and certain
aspects of disarmament. They laid d o w n basic
guidelines and specific recommendations
regarding co-operation in the spheres of eco-
nomics, science and technology a n d ' the
environment, and co-operation in humanita-
rian and other domains. They also considered
questions connected with security and co-oper-
ation in the Mediterranean.
The practical application of the principles
and obligations contained in bilateral and mul-
tilateral treaties and agreements which are
already in force, in unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral declarations by governments o n
peace and security and in United Nations
documents, and their extension to the whole
60 Vasiliy M . Kulish
tegic offensive weapons of 21 June 1 9 7 3 ;
the agreement on scientific and technical
co-operation for the peaceful use of atomic
energy, of 21 June 1 9 7 3 ; the protocol to the
treaty between the United States and the
U . S . S . R . o n the limitation of anti-ballistic-
missile defence systems, of 3 July 1 9 7 4 ; the
treaty between the U . S . S . R . and the United
States o n the limitation of underground
nuclear w e a p o n tests, of 3 July 1 9 7 4 ; the
protocol to the treaty between the U . S . S . R .
and the United States on the limitation of
underground nuclear w e a p o n tests, of 3 July
1 9 7 4 ; and the joint Soviet-American declara-
tion o n the limitation of strategic offensive
weapons, of 2 4 November 1974.
system of international relations-all this taken
together creates favourable conditions for
further progress in the relaxation of interna-
tional tension and for making this process
irreversible.
• . . . a n d further détente
In order fully to guarantee international secur-
ity and strengthen peaceful relations between
nations it is essential that military détente follow
the political relaxation of tension. The follow-
ing could all play a part in achieving this end:
the limitation and discontinuance of the arms
race, the limitation and subsequent curtailment
of strategic nuclear w e a p o n s and rocketry,
the limitation and reduction of conventional
w e a p o n s and forces, a reduction in the level of
military confrontation throughout the world
and particularly in regions where military ten-
sion is greatest (for example, in Central
Europe), the extirpation of breeding-grounds
of war, and other measures designed ulti-
mately to bring about general and complete
disarmament and m a k e war a thing of the
past.
The current relaxation of tension in interna-
tional affairs, and the tendency to progress
further irf the same direction, are opening u p
fresh opportunities for the establishment of a
n e w relationship between science and w a r .
It should n o w be possible to get a w a y from
the age-old o n e - w a y link between them, where-
by science and technology were to a consid-
érable extent subordinated to the interests
of war, constantly providing the warmakers
with n e w weapons and technology and so
increasing their ability to kill and lay waste. In
our day, science has a purely noble and
humanitarian goal-to promote with all its
strength the abolition of war.
Science has the ability to m a k e a correct
appraisal of the arms race, determining the
risks it involves and the harm it does not only
to relations between States and peoples, but
also to the economic development of the
various countries; it has also the means to
bring its conclusions promptly to the k n o w -
ledge of society. In this w a y it can support and
reinforce the anti-militarist feelings of the mass
of the population, and help in mobilizing the
peace m o v e m e n t and defining its specific aims
and objectives.
Scientific workers are well placed to assess
the significance of partial measures, agree-
ments and treaties concluded between States
and to point to n e w w a y s of solving problems
connected with the safeguarding of peace and
security; by so doing they can, o n the one
hand, assist governments in their efforts in
this sphere and, on the other, enable the mass
of the population and all peace-loving forces
to have more effective control both over, their
o w n work and over the observance by States
of international treaties and agreements that
have c o m e into force.
Wider horizons have n o w opened u p for
science in regard to international co-operation
in solving economic, scientific and technolo-
gical problems and those involved in preser-
vation of the natural environment. T h e first
tentative steps that have been m a d e in co-oper-
ation in these spheres between States with
different social structures, and especially such
an outstanding example of international
co-operation as the joint launching of the
Soviet spaceship Soyuz and the American
Apollo space-craft, prove that it is possible
together to overcome m a n y complex technical
problems successfully and help to strengthen
the feeling of mutual trust between nations.
• Reducing military R & D
O n e effective step towards halting the arms
race would be for all countries to reduce their
military budgets, including the appropriations
for military research and development It can
confidently be asserted that the transfer to
other sectors of even part of the s u m s devoted
to this purpose each year would enable enor-
m o u s scientific progress to be m a d e .
To the extent that military research and
development provide the arms race with most
of its impetus, a significant reduction in the
resources devoted to this work would place
severe restrictions on the process as a whole
and particularly on the qualitative side. This in
itself would reduce the menace of w a r and
contribute to solving the problems of disar-
mament.
Scientific progress can thus be used within
the context of the relaxation of international
tension to free mankind from the threat of war.
'Ijlllllf'1
-rrrttjT
•"JJTTOT
"lllUlli'l
I Vasiliy Mikhailovich Kulish
Born in 1919 and a graduate of
M. V. Frunze Military Academy, the author is
now a colonel of the reserve. He holds a
doctorate in historical science and is
currently a senior research worker at the
Institute of the Economics of the International
Socialist System, Academy of Sciences
of the U.S.S.R. Col. Kulish is also the author
of Istoriya Vtorogo Fronta (History of the
Second Front), Voyennaya Sua i
Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya (Military
Might and International Relations) and other
works. Address: c/o Institute of the
Economics of the International Socialist
System, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.,
Moscow (U.S.S.R.).
Science and warfare 61
Conventional weapons
and unnecessary suffering
Man has devised weapons of 'overkill', now a primary effect of the nuclear bomb.
He has also devised arms capable of 'overwound', the excruciating aftermath of
which can be known only to the individual soldier or civilian who is the victim of
these diabolical anti-personnel weapons.
The 'Geneva Conventions', negotiated through
the good offices of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (an entirely Swiss organiza-
tion), have been recognized since 1 8 6 4 as one
of the sincerest efforts m a d e on the inter-
national level to inject an element of humanitar-
ianism into an otherwise inhumane endeavour.
The original convention of 2 2 August 1 8 6 4
w a s followed by the Hague Conferences
held at the turn of the century. The later
Geneva Conventions followed partly from the
use m a d e by several great powers during the
First World W a r of newly developed and
highly toxic military technology. This included
phosgene and other gases which-if they
did not asphyxiate outright-often left those
injured maimed for life, while overloading an
enemy's facilities for medical evacuation and
treatment; and blistering or 'mustard' reagents,
which caused severe and painful burns any-
where on the body including the eyes.
In comparatively simple w e a p o n s such as
the rifle or carbine, the projectile used today
travels over its trajectory at about 8 0 0 metres
per second, or roughly one-tenth the speed
of a siderite (a meteorite consisting of iron
and nickel alloys). The relatively uncompli-
cated bullet of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, projected at lower velocities, w a s
already k n o w n for its unpredictable perfor-
m a n c e yet potential destructiveness and
anguishing pain. The famed d u m d u m bullet,
so called after the t o w n near Calcutta where
impact of science on society. Vol. 2 6 , N o . 1 / 2 , 1976
it w a s first manufactured for the small arms
of the Bengal Artillery late in the eighteenth
century, w a s finally outlawed by all but t w o
of the nations participating " in the Second
Hague Conference (1907). This agreement
w a s brought about by charges, never proved,
that units of the British and Russian armies
had used the hollow-point missile respectively
during the Boer W a r and the Russo-Japanese
conflict of 1 9 0 4 - 0 5 .
• T h e Lucerne C o n f e r e n c e
More recently, the Red Cross organization
played host in Lucerne to experts in small
weapons, military medicine and law w h o
represented forty-nine governments, s o m e
national liberation movements, peace groups
and veterans' organizations, as well as the
United Nations and the World Health Orga-
nization. These were able to agree that the
utilization of incendiary and certain other
devices in modern warfare causes 'unnecessary'
suffering and should be curtailed.
Read, for example, what the conference's
final report1 had to say about the wounding
characteristics of the fairly primitive (techno-
logically speaking) rifle bullet:
1. International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference
of government experts on the use of certain conven-
tional weapons (Lucerne, 24.9-18.10.1974).
Report. Geneva. ICRC, 1975. (Published also in
French, German and Spanish.)
63
 330 RIFLE
slide and bed arrangement of the British " short "rifle.
e. T h e special I to lhe change of leverage, power at the commencement and rapids
feature of the Belgian Mauser is a thin steel casing for
' the barrel, | at the end oí the pull. T h e weapon is a clip loader. T h e Uutct

Fie. 9.—Belgian Mauser. {Text Book of Small A rms,

by permission.).
F Í G . 13.—Mannlicher» 1895.
Rumanian and other Mannlïchers have not straight-pull bolt!
but the usual turn-over levers and locking-lugs.

FlG. 9a.—Spanish Mauser.\ {Text Book of Small Arms,

by permission.)

which is supposed to act as a hand-guard or cooler and to free the

barrel from disturbing influences due to its connexion with the
fore-end ; but it is expensive, and if strongadds unduly to the weight
FlG. 10.—German Mauser, 1898. {Text Boot of Small Arms»
by permission.)
of the weapon. T h e older G e r m a n magazine
rifle, pattern 188S, had a barrel casing, but this
was given u p w h e n the n e w 1898 pattern w a s
introduced. T h e bayonets of the Belgian and
Spanish patterns are very short knives.
T h e Mannlicher rifle, -which is extensively
used for sporting and target work, has been
adopted for military purposes b y various states,
notably Austria-Hungary. Both the 1690 and
F I G . 14.—Austrian Mannlicher Carbine. (Text Booh of Small Aim%.
by permission.)
France.-—The breech mechanism of this rifle (sec fig. 15) calls for
no special remark. Its bolt is very similar to that of the British
rifle. Its special peculiarity is the once popular tube ma^zirt
under the fore-end. This has m a n y defects as compared with the
box magazine. It is more cumbrous for the same number of can*
ridges; its feed and cut-off mechanism is very complicated; tv .
balance of the rifle is altered as .the magazine empties; the placirç
of the cartridges base to point, even whrn the bullet has a flat point,
is not unattended with danger, especially when the magazine n
full and the spiral spring strongly compressed; lastly, loading ty
any form of charger is practically impossible.
F I G . 15.—Lebel Rifle.

F I G . 11.—Austrian Mannlicner, 1895. (Text Book of Small Arms,

b y permission.)
1S95 patterns of Austrian Mannlicher have ** straïght-pull **
bolts; that is, bolts which are not turned for locking. T h e

F I G . 16.—Lebel Rifle.

United States.—Up to 1004 the VS. army had the Krag-Jörgen*

rifle, in which, as shown in fig. 17, the magazine w a s placed b°*
F I G . 12.—Mannlicher, 1890. zontally under the breech action. At this time most of the stew*
line troops had still the old-fashioned (black powder) SprinrtJ*
bolts are in t w o parts vhich "telescope** into each other. In rifle, a single loader with a hinged block similar to theriflesci *f
thea X890 pattern (see fig. 12), w h e n the bolt I# is h o m e **sixties" in Europe, such as the Snider, the Tabatière ano¡ jg
against the cartridge and the " lever cylinder ** 1', which carries W e m d L 1 Since 1904, however, the regular a r m y has been re-aro**
the bolt knob, is further pushed forward, the hinged block R with a shortrifle(fig. 18) which in its action has a general rcf*
is caused to drop in front of the resistance-piece Q , and so locks blance to a Mauser. A s atfirstissued, the n e w Springfield had a ^
the bolt I against the cartridge. In the 1895 pattern (see bayonet which, when not in use, lay within the fore-end of the stof
fifc*. 13)» the final pushing forward of the lever cylinder causesand when required was run forward and fastened by a catch. ?
the head of the bolt I to turn and projections o n its head to lock novelty was, however, soon discarded in favour of a sword ha>"i*^
into recesses S S just in rear of the breech. T h e turning is due to 16 in long. T h e United States navy had until about | O 0 0 j L
helical feathers (20) on the inside of the lever cylinder 1' working Lee " straight-pull " rifle. T h e Russian " 3-line " and the JoP^
m crooves in the rear of the bolt ï. T h e 1890 pattern has a double
l
pultoff. It will be seen from thefigurethat as the trigger is pulled m T h e Springfield was, however, a m u c h improved model c*
the bearing is takenfirstat (8) and then at (9)-. This gives, owing kind of weapon, dating from 1884 only.

Reproduced with the permission of Encyclopaedia

Britannica; taken from Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Vol. 23-24,11th ed., 1911.

64 Vasiliy M . Kulish
 and assessed the characteristics of other
extant conventional weapons capable of
inflicting excessive suffering w h e n used as
anti-personnel instruments. These encompass
blast and fragmentation munitions (including
those loosing the tiny, fin-bearing arrows
k n o w n as fléchettes), and delayed action and
treacherous weapons (e.g. land mines used as
booby traps).

• W e a p o n s yet to c o m e

A r m s still in the experimental or developmental

... In addition to projectile velocity, such other
physical parameters as angle of y a w , angle of
incidence, projectile geometry and projectile
spin-rate were also likely to have a significant
influence on w o u n d severity. Their relative
importance w a s discussed primarily in terms
of their contribution to those phenomena
which . . . were held to be responsible for
the characteristic features of high-velocity
w o u n d s . Apart from penetration, there were
three such phenomena: projectile tumbling,
projectile break-up, and cavitation. There w a s
also discussion of the process of energy
deposit, which . . . w a s considered primarily
as an integration of the other phenomena.
Besides examining the military and medical
aspects of small-calibre projectiles and incen-
diary weapons, the specialists convened in
Lucerne (September-October 1974) described
stages-but considered to have especially
perilous possibilities for the individual in
time of war-include the laser b e a m (perhaps
ultimately unfeasible because of. technical
complexity), microwave radiation generated
by masers, 'infrasound' or inaudible sonic
waves (also of dubious efficacity), light-
flash b o m b s (pyrotechnic flares) to induce
blindness, and geophysical warfare. T h e last
would include, besides weather modification,
the provocation of earthquakes.
Also scrutinized w a s the future potential of
environmental warfare, already developed
extensively during the recent w a r in Indo-
China: an e n e m y is denied access to a given
zone of operations by eliminating the plant
cover so useful for the concealment of troops
and materiel. A n d finally, although electronic
sensors are instruments incapable of inflicting
direct suffering, detectors failing to distinguish

If you could see the blood

If you could see, at every jolt, the blood
C o m e belching black and frothy from the lung.
A n d think h o w once his face w a s like a bud.
Fresh as a country rose, and clear, and young.
You would not g o on telling with such zest.
T o children ardent for s o m e desperate glory.
The old lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.
Wilfred O w e n
w h o died as a soldier
in the First World W a r . 1

1. From C . Day Lewis (ed.). The Collected Poems of

Wilfred Owen. © 1946, © 1963. Reprinted by per-
mission. N e w Directions Publishing Corp.

Conventional w e a p o n s and unnecessary suffering 65

 between active foe and innocent passer-by explained that the distinction between u n -
were studied for the possible harm they might necessary and other suffering w a s not meant
ultimately bring to non-combatants. to condone the infliction of suffering of any
kind, but merely w a s aimed at precluding
The findings of this special conference,
certain forms or degrees of suffering in [armed
after their publication last year, have been
conflict] where the infliction of suffering
submitted to the governments concerned and could never be wholly avoided.
- the United Nations. The governments are to
decide whether there should be further inter- Science m a y consist essentially of ungovern-
national agreements to ban or limit the use able natural phenomena, in other words, but
of any of the types of weapons analysed. its application to w a r through technological
processes is controllable if m a n so wills it
• T h e limits of a g o n y
impact
The Hague agreement concluded early in our
century had specified that 'it is particularly
forbidden... to employ arms, projectiles or
material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering'.
Concerned that the expression 'unnecessary
suffering' might imply that other suffering
would be considered to be necessary as
opposed to what is superfluous, one of the
conferees at Lucerne

66 Vasiliy M . Kulish
 On science, war and leadership

All rulership has its original and its most legitimate source in m a n ' s wish
to emancipate himself from life's necessity, and m e n achieved such
liberation by means of violence, by forcing others to bear the burden of
life for them. This w a s the core of slavery, and it is only the rise of techno-
logy, and not the rise of modern political ideas as such, which has
refuted the old and terrible truth that only violence and rule over others
could make s o m e m e n Uee.-Hannah Arendt (1963) 1

Y o u cannot d o anything against a unanimous p e o p l e . . . . The idea

of patriotism is an incentive to which nobody has found the equal.
—General Marcel Bigeard (1975)*

In the present time, a régime that rests only on foreign bayonets is

utterly unviable.- Tass (1975)*

. . . W e spake and thought enough together ere Zarathustra c a m e h o m e

to his cave to teach m e that w e are different..
W e seek different things..., ye and I. For I seek more security, and
therefore a m I c o m e to Zarathustra. For he is the strongest fortress and
will-
- T o d a y w h e n all is shaken, w h e n the whole earth trembleth. But ye,
w h e n I see what is in your eyes, I could think you sought more insecurity-
More terror, more danger, more earthquakes. I could think almost that
ye lusted-forgive m y presumption, ye Higher M e n -
That ye lusted for the worst, most dangerous life, that causeth m e
most fear...
A n d ye love best not them that lead you out of danger, but them that
lead you aside from all paths, the misleaders. But if such a desire be
indeed within you, to m e nevertheless it seemeth impossible.
For fear-it is m a n ' s hereditary and fundamental emotion; by fear
all is explained, original sin and original virtue. From fear hath grown
also my virtue, which is called Science.-Friedrich W. Nietzsche (1891) 3

1. On Revolution. Harmondsworth, Pelican. 3. Thus Spake Zarathustra, London, Everyman's Library,

2. Quoted in [The New York Times, 1 M a y 1975. 1958,1970.

impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1 / 2 , 1976 67

 In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to
attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve
oneself. T o the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the
spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine gun, the long-range
gun, and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid
shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification and the gas mask
are developments of the shield. The tank is a n e w weapon combining
the functions of both spear and shield.-Mao Tse-tung (1938) 1

S o long as, in a given branch of industry, the factory system extends

itself at the expense of the old handicrafts or of manufacture, the result
is as sure as is the result of an encounter between an army furnished with
breech-loaders and one armed with b o w s and anows.-Karl Marx (1867)*

. . . The world has grown too big, and wars too technical and too scienti-
fically barbaric for a military empire to be possible and pleasing. . . .
-Salvador de Madariaga (1928) 3

The military emphasis h a s . . . shifted from big wars to little o n e s . . . .

The changes are there for all to see. They have occurred mainly through
the development and spread of n e w technologies, which in their w a k e
have brought n e w problems to press on the world. These can and will
be solved, but only by a conscious determination on the part of all
nations to use science as future generations would c o m m e n d .
-Lord (then Sir Solly) Zuckerman (1967) 4

Science c a n . . . content m a n y appetites. It enables m a n y more millions

of lives to exist than would be possible without it. Also it enables m a n y
more millions of lives to be destroyed than w a s possible without it.
-J. W. N. Sullivan (1933) 6

The growth of electronic warfare in recent years has been stimulated

by another surge of the technological revolution and its demonstration
in three k e y . . . conflicts-the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the
U . S . B - 5 2 offensive against Hanoi and the October, 1973, Mideastern
Yiar.-Aviation Week & Space Technology (27 January 1975).

There is a one-in-three chance of a nuclear weapon being used in a

war before 1984. Military 'hawks' can work together, but doves are
divided.-Bernard T. Feld (1974)«

Despite all the centuries that generals have been losing wars, no one
yet, as far as I can see, has succeeded in getting rid of the generals.
-Jacques Ellul (1975)»

1. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. II. p. 1S6.
Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1967.
2. Capital. N e w York. N.Y., Charles H . Kerr & Co., 1906.
Republished by The Modern Library, undated.
3. Englishmen. Frenchmen and Spaniards. London,
Oxford University Press, 1928.
4. Scientists and War. N e w York. N.Y., Harper & R o w ,
1967.
5. The Limitations of Science. Clifton. N.J., Augustus
M . Kelley (Viking Reprint Editions), 1 9 3 3 . 1 9 7 3 .
6. In New Scientist. 26 December 1974.
7. Writing in Le Monde. 23 M a y 1975.

68 O n science, war and leadership

 The professional army constitutes a... risk for reactionary intervention
in the internal life of a country by a military group which is isolated from
the people.-A. Joxe (1975) 1

Detente is... obviously hindered by the pressure of the military-industrial

complexes both in the U . S . A . and in the U.S.SM.-fíoy Medvedev (1974) 2

The care of h u m a n life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the
first and only legitimate object of good government.- Thomas Jefferson
(1809)

Every rational creature, finding itself on the brink of a disaster, first tries
to get a w a y from the brink and only then does it think about the satisfac-
tion of its other needs. If mankind is to get away from the brink, it must
overcome its divisions. A vital step would be a review of the traditional
method of international affairs, which m a y be termed 'empirical-compe-
titive'. In the simplest definition, this is a method aiming at m a x i m u m
development of one's position everywhere possible and, simultaneously,
a method of causing m a x i m u m unpleasantness to opposing forces without
consideration of c o m m o n welfare and c o m m o n interests.-Andrei
D.Sakharov (1968)»

In ancient times the opulent and civilized nations found it difficult to

defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern
times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves
against the opulent and civilized.-ylefe/n Smith (1776) 1

W e shall propose a general reduction of armaments based on those

theses w e have established with the Revolutionary Military Council of
the Republic; developing the traditions of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, w e shall propose adding a number of prohibitions to the
rules of war-the abolition of submarines, chemical gases, mortars,
flame-throwers and armed air battles.-Georgiy V. Chichería (1922) s

The real problem is the prevention of war.-J. Robert Oppenheimer (1955)*

A n agency is needed [within the United Nations] to disseminate arms

information and verify arms agreements.-Gu/j/w Myrdal (1974) 7

1. Writing in Peace and the Sciences. N o . 1 , 1 9 7 5 .
2. In New Left Review, Nos. 8 7 - 8 , September-Decem-
ber 1974.
3. In Progress. Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom.
N e w York. N.Y., Norton. 1968.
4. The Wealth of Nations.
5. In a letter to Lenin, in V . I. Lenin. On Peaceful Co-
existence, p. 2 3 2 , M o s c o w , Foreign Languages
Publishing House, undated.
6. In The Open Mind, N e w York, N.Y., Simon & Schuster,
1955.
7. Writing in Scientific American, October 1974.

O n science, war and leadership 69

Disarmament, arms control
and the United Nations
Within the terms of the Charter of the
United Nations, the General Assembly
and the Security Council have specific
responsibilities concerning disarmament
and the establishment of a system for the
regulation of arms.
In 1946, the Assembly organized the
International Atomic Energy Agency
and, in the following year, the Council
created the Commission for Conventional
Armaments. B y 1952, the Assembly had
formed a single Disarmament Commission
to carry on the work of disarmament
assigned to the first t w o units. The n e w
commission w a s enlarged in membership.
70 O n science, war and leadership
effective in 1959, and the Ten-Nation
Committee w a s set up the same year. The
Eighteen-Nation Committee w a s
formed in December 1961.
Since then, the work of disarmament and
arms control specialists has led to
limited suspension of the testing of nuclear
devices (specifically, the Partial Test Ban
Treaty), control of the use of nuclear weapons
in outer space and on the sea bed, and the
other measures and international agreements
referred to elsewhere in this issue of impact.
impact
Military technology and the
masculinity of war:
an African perspective
Ali A . Mazrui

At the annua/ meeting of the Organization of African Unity held in Kampala in

July 1975, President Field Marshal Idi Amin drew attention to the presence of
women in a special 'suicide squad' of the Ugandan armed forces. Immediately
the question arose whether women were to play a larger role than before in African
military establishments. If this were to happen, how would the change affect the
status of women in African societies ? And how does modern military technology
relate to the process ? An African interpretation is presented.

In most cultures, which are otherwise vastly

different one from the other, the role of
warrior has been reserved to the m e n . ' O u r
sons are our warriors'. This is virtually uni-
versal. (And Israel is no exception, in spite of
contrary appearances.) Again, in cultures
which are greatly different crimes of violence
have been committed disproportionately by
m e n . T h e jails of the world bear solemn
testimony to the basic masculinity of violent
crime.
Is there a connexion between this maleness
of crimes of violence and the preponderant
masculinity of the military profession? T h e
barracks and the prisons house mostly m e n , But as military technology advanced, pure
so is this link between warriorhood and muscle power became less pertinent. T h e
Mafiahood accidental? Or are there organic preponderance of m e n in the vocation of
interrelationships between the t w o ? fighting became less justifiable in terms of the
In the evolution of the history of military muscular technique of combat. T o press a
technology, no doubt there w a s a time w h e n button aboard a B - 5 2 aircraft while on a
muscle w a s directly relevant to combat bombing mission over the northern Indo-
effectiveness. H o w effectively a fighter wielded chinese peninsula w a s an assignment which
his rungu1 or his axe, h o w far he threw his did not require the intervention of a man's
boomerang or spear, h o w thoroughly he finger. Yet the great majority of those partici-
dislocated the jaw of his opponent-all these pating in that war were m e n .
were determined partly by the physical
strength and physiological prowess of the
fighter. 1. A rungu is a knobbed stick, in Swahili.

impact of science on society. Vol. 2 6 , N o . 1 / 2 , 1976 71

 Joan of Arc: soldier and leader
W e m a y accept and admire Joan [of Arc]
as a sane and shrewd country girl of
extraordinary strength of mind and
hardihood of body. Everything she did w a s
thoroughly calculated; and though the
process w a s so rapid that she w a s hardly
conscious of it, and ascribed it all to her
voices, she w a s a w o m a n of policy and
not of blind impulse. In war she w a s as
m u c h a realist as Napoleon: she had his
eye for artillery and his knowledge of
what it could d o . . . Like Wellington,
[she] adapted her methods of attack
to the peculiarities of defence... She w a s
never for a m o m e n t what so m a n y romancers
and playwrights have pretended: a romantic
young lady. She w a s a thorough daughter
• T h e acquisition of p o w e r
Technology m a y be capable of changing m a n y
aspects of culture, but so far it has not yet
fundamentally modified that part of culture
which assigns the role of warrior dispropor-
tionately to m e n . Is the explanation biological,
then, or cultural ? Are m e n more violent than
w o m e n because of their upbringing and sociali-
zation or because of a higher level of biolo-
gical aggressivity in their nature?1 Experiments
have indicated that there is a pronounced
difference in the levels of aggressivity between
the males and females of creatures other than
man.
A m o n g humans, the political power of m e n
can perhaps be traced to the predominance of
m e n in the military crafts, since even, the
earliest times. Recently, w o m e n have attained
high public office in a few countries. But
here one must distinguish between (a) politi-
cal power by delegation ; (b) political power
by derivation; and (c) direct political power.
W h e n Elizabeth Bagaya held the post of
foreign minister of Uganda, this w a s clearly
a case of delegated power; the real authority
resided in President Amin.
But what about Indira Gandhi? W a s her
original accession to high office based
partly on her credentials as the daughter of
Nehru? W a s M s Bandaranaike's original
72 Ali A . Mazrui
of the soil in her peasant-like matter-of-
factness and doggedness, and her
acceptance of great lords and kings
and prelates as such without idolatry
or snobbery, seeing at a glance h o w m u c h
they were individually good for... She
talked to and dealt with people of all
classes, from laborers to kings, without
embarrassment or affectation, and got
them to do what she wanted w h e n they
were not afraid or corrupt. She could coax
and she could hustle, her tongue having
a soft side and a sharp edge. She w a s very
capable: a born boss.
Bernard S h a w , in the preface to Saint Joan
[Reproduced with permission, Penguin Books]
ascent to power m a d e possible, in part, by her
status as the w i d o w of an assassinated male
prime minister? Does Señora Perón's position
emanate from that of her late, legendary
husband? If the answer to the questions is
'yes', then each of these three impressive
female heads of government derives power
partly from the stature of the m a n to w h o m she
w a s related.
In the recent history of w o m e n risen to
power, perhaps only M s Golda Meir achieved
supreme authority without the support of the
prestige possessed by a towering male rela-
tive. While it lasted, her authority w a s neither
delegated (like that of M s Bagaya) nor deri-
vative (like that of M s Gandhi, M s Bandara-
naike, or Isabel Perón), but direct.
• A n experiment with the warrior's
husband
A major reason for the relative powerlessness
of w o m e n in political life m a y lie in their
military impotence. Sexual division of labour
has reserved the role of the warrior to the
male of the species, and disproportionately so.
And in so doing, sexual division of labour has
1. For a treatment of this question, see the article 'Psy-
chological Research on H u m a n Aggressiveness', by
D . Hamburg and K. Brodie. impact of science on
society, vol. XXIII., no 3 , 1 9 7 3 .
also helped to reserve the role of ruler to the
male sex.
During the era of the African colonies, it is
m y view that a great experimental opportunity
w a s missed, possibly as late as during the
present century. W h y did not the British,
French and other imperial governments create
colonial armies m a d e u p of African w o m e n ?
The experiment could have been of immense
value to the h u m a n race as a whole. Since the
imperial powers were already disrupting local
cultures in other ways, it might have m a d e
sense also to attempt to disrupt one of the
most perennial and obstinate characteristics
of h u m a n culture: the masculinity of soldiery.
Such an endeavour of empire might not
have worked in every African country. But if it
had succeeded in any one of them, the conse-
quences for African politics after indepen-
dence could have been epoch-making. The
military w h o took power after independence
would have been, in s o m e cases, w o m e n . S o m e
of the presidents in uniform w h o attend
meetings of the African Organization of
Unity would have c o m e , therefore, from the
female half of Africa's humanity. African
w o m e n in control of armies could have begun
a unique experiment in the sharing of power.
Democracy and the tools of battle
This brings us to the connexion between
democracy and military technology. T o the
present day, there are African societies in
which military skills are still assessed in
terms of handling spears and use of the b o w
and arrow. The simplicity of this technology
has m a d e it accessible to almost everyone.
In the words of the British anthropologist,
Jack Goody:
The b o w and arrow is essentially a democratic
w e a p o n ; every m a n k n o w s h o w to construct
o n e ; the materials are readily available, the
techniques uncomplicated, the missiles easy
to replace (though more difficult with the
introduction of iron that affected even hunting
people like the Hadza of Tanzania and the
B u s h m e n of the Kalahari). With the techno-
logies of the b o w and stone-tipped arrow any
kind of centralisation is almost impossible.
But with the introduction of metals, kingdoms
are on the cards.1
In the case of the originalJjWest African
kingdoms it w a s , according to G o o d y , the
uneven distribution of raw materials which
Military technology and the masculinity of w a r : an African perspective
involved systems of exchange and brought
about long-distance trade. This necessitated,
in turn, systems of control and security.
With the coming of the rifle in colonial
Africa, and later the tank in newly independent
Africa, military elitism began to s h o w itself.
The old days of native military democracy
w h e n everyone passed through the stage of
the warrior, and w h e n weapons were simple
arms capable of being manufactured by the
warrior himself, n o w were replaced by the
era of professional military specialists, employ-
ing weapons [requiring high technical skill
to construct and specialized training to use.
Yet even in the days of the comparatively
more democratic b o w and arrow, w o m e n in
almost all African societies were left out of
combat. It would have been only an imperial
nation, possessing higher military technology,
that could have started quickly enough a
process of militarizing w o m a n h o o d . African
w o m e n in charge of tanks and artillery under
the colonial régimes would have b e c o m e , as
I have already speculated, wielders of political
power after independence.
The good soldier Illiterate
It so happens, however, that the colonial
armies often were recruited from s o m e of the
least privileged ethnic communities o n the
African continent-and from s o m e of the
most peripheral regions. There w a s a belief
a m o n g colonial administrators that illiterate
or semi-literate Africans m a d e better soldiers
than the educated. Those with an education
were sometimes distrusted, considered to be
'cheeky' and not adequately obedient.
1. J. Goody, Technology. Tradition and the State in
Africa, p. 4 3 - 6 , London, Oxford University Press,
1971.
73
 Women of war

There have, until recently, been few w o m e n contenders for the 1 0 great guerrilla captains of w a r .
W e [rule] out both Joan of Arc and Boadicea because, w h e n in c o m m a n d , they resorted to gladia-
torial male strategy of direct attack rather than using feminine wile and guile. T h e Irish girl, Eliza
Lynch, mistress of Francisco Lopez-the great dictator of Paraguay w h o fought Argentina, Bolivia
and Uruguay for 1 0 years, 1 8 6 0 - 7 0 - w a s a m u c h more characteristic leader.... Lopez w a s killed
in action eventually but Eliza escaped to France with his jewels. The Paraguayans lost 220,000
in battle, 320,000 died from disease and hunger, leaving a population of 221,000 of which only
28,000 were m e n .

Michael Calvert, ' S o m e Characteristics of Guerrillas',

Mars et Minerva (published by the Association of the
Special Air Services Regiment, London), June 1975.

The better educated young m e n , in any
case, had other ambitions. A job as soldier in a
modern uniform, armed with a g u n rather
than a spear or a b o w and arrow, w a s seldom
the most attractive option for an ambitious
African youth. White-collar work often ranked
m u c h higher.
The British and French (among others),
therefore, bequeathed to their former colonies
military establishments manned primarily by
people recruited from s o m a of the poorest and
least influential sections of the native popula-
tion. W h e n these finally took the reins of
power after independence, balance w a s
partially restored in their societies. T h e
intelligentsia and the former bourgeoisie
remained influential, but no longer paramount
The lumpen-mWtariat successfully (and s o m e -
times brutally) claimed a share of the power.
Unfortunately this lumpen-mWtariat w a s
m a d e up, almost exclusively, of m e n . O n the
basis of ethnic balance in the sharing of
political power, their triumph in countries such
as Nigeria and Uganda had s o m e democratic
consequences. Previously deprived c o m m u -
nities were able to enter the mainstream of
national life. But from the point of view of
establishing a balance between m e n and
w o m e n , the lumpen-mWtariat (which colonia-
lism had created) contributed nothing to the
resolution of sexual injustice. T h e very fact
that colonial recruiting officers had insisted
on physical height, usually of 172.5 c m
(5 ft 8 in), as a qualification for joining the
army aggravated the discrimination against
female applicants.
• T h e militarization of w o m e n
But, given that a great experimental oppor-
tunity w a s lost in Africa, are there signs of
change in the future? Field Marshal Idi
Amin's female 'suicide squad' is at least
symbolic of s o m e basic rethinking concerning
the role of w o m e n in war. This rethinking m a y
have begun, also, a m o n g otherwise relatively
traditionalist groups in Africa.
Less traditionalist circles include the n e w
rulers of independent Mozambique and the
experimentation in the military recruitment of
females which F R E L I M O 1 inaugurated while
it w a s still fighting Portuguese colonial rule.
It is unlikely that male political dominance
will end, in the world as a whole, during this
century; but a step in this direction must
include the increasing militarization of woman-
hood. While this m a y be a sad reflection on
the condition of the h u m a n race, it is certainly
a reflection of the historical linkage joining
statehood and the control of physical force,
of that between politics and the instruments of
coercion, and of that connecting power to
warriorhood.
Military technology n o w is too complex to
leave the soldier as democratic as he w a s in
1. F R E L I M O is the Mozambique Liberation Front
(Frente de Libertação de Moçambique).

74 • Ali A . Mazrui
the days of the b o w and arrow, but it is at gradually not only to the politicization of their
least sophisticated enough to m a k e physical w o m e n , but also to their militarization. W h a t
height and muscular force no longer relevant is clear is that momentous changes are about
in recruiting for the armed services. Military to occur. H o w these will affect the interaction
technology has become elitist in terms of the between sex and war, between technology
skills it requires but, at the s a m e time, its and social stratification, are questions w h o s e
character is more sexually neutral than ever answers lie in the w o m b of future history.
before. The primaeval war of the sexes m a y be
about to enter its most fundamental stage.
S o m e steps have already been taken in a
number of countries to deal with this potential
social crisis. The promotion of w o m e n in the
armed forces of the United States has been
accelerated. The Soviet Union and Israel have
attempted to consolidate their policies of
relative 'equal opportunity' for m e n and
w o m e n . T h e Egyptian army is using more
w o m e n than ever before.

• Momentous changes are imminent

But there is no room for complacency. O n the

contrary, s o m e of the shifts of power in the
world m a y be aggravating the issue. T h e
energy crisis which began in 1 9 7 3 aroused
m a n y of the hopes of the people inhabiting the
Third World. The Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) demonstrated
h o w primary producers of materials, while
technologically underdeveloped themselves,
could put pressure on the industrial giants of
the world. Since then, the movement for the
creation of a n e w international economic order
has gathered m o m e n t u m , led partly by
member-nations of O P E C .
If the politics of oil s h o w a shift of power in fa-
vour of at least s o m e of the countries of theThird • Ali A . Mazrui
World, this same re-arrangement is also in
favour of nations that are still more male-
dominated than average. Saudi Arabia, the Professor Mazrui, a Kenyan, holds a doctorate
most influential of the O P E C countries, has a in philosophy from the University of Oxford.
social system in which w o m e n are not only The author, formerly a professor in political
demilitarized but depoliticized. Most of the science and public administration at Makerere
States around the Persian Gulf have basically University, Kampala (Uganda), has written
similar social situations. This includes Iran, by extensively on issues of violence and conflict.
and large. His books include Towards a Pax Africana
The Third World has good reason to cele- (1967), Violence and Thought (1969),
brate the emergence of O P E C and the power Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda (1970). He
of petroleum. But d o the w o m e n of the world is co-editor of Protest and Power in Black
have similar reasons to rejoice? Is not the Africa (1970) and has served as consulting
balance of influence actually shifting in favour editor on the staff of the Journal of Conflict
of even greater masculinity (i.e. male domi- Resolution. His current position and address:
nance), as illustrated by the social structures Professor of Political Science, 5601 Haven
of the O P E C countries? Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
It is too early to be sure, of course. The n e w Ml 48104 (United States of America).
prosperity of the oil-exporting States m a y lead

Military technology and the masculinity of w a r : an African perspective 75

 Energy resources
and global strategic planning
K. Erik Solem
The world's stability, that is the absence
is related to stability in both the developing and developed countries. One of the
major problem areas and a source of potentially serious conflict lies in the field of
energy resources: their availability, development
strategy for the world, sorely needed,
policies and appropriate long-term planning in order to avoid the 'inevitabilities'
which seem so evident today. Several forecasting techniques are examined
In order to understand the importance of
energy within the general context of the
problems of growth and its limitations, it is
necessary to bear in mind the close relationship
between energy, other resources (and their
depletion), science and technology, and the
formulation of public policy. The last includes,
of necessity, the setting of values and of.
complementary or competing norms. Analyses
of these can be undertaken at, inter alia, the
regional, national, group and individual levels.
M y paper is limited to a presentation of general
problems and trends; I sketch an over-all
picture of the global situation, which is
followed by an attempt to suggest major
consequences seeming to flow from parti-
cular choices-which m a y or m a y not be m a d e .
Energy has become an important commodity.
The factors affecting both its supply and
consumption are so varied and far-reaching
that important questions concerning inter-
national energy policies ought to be examined
within a wider theoretical framework than
that of the nation. The global consequences
are such that the whole matter should be
given, where appropriate, high priority and
(ideally) considered in an appropriately broad
perspective, such as that provided by the
United Nations.
impact of science on society. Vol. 2 6 , N o . 1 / 2 , 1 9 7 6
of war and hence international security,
and distribution. A proper energy
presupposes both sane national energy
here.
• T h e global situation
The world's energy situation during the last
couple of decades can be summarized as
follows [I]:1
during the past twenty years the rate of increase
in the world's energy consumption has
averaged 5 per cent per year; of this increase,
approximately 60 per cent w a s consumed by'
countries belonging to the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development
( O E C D ) , including North America, Western
Europe and Japan; the U . S . A . consumed 36
per cent of the world's total in 1958, 3 3 per
cent in 1969, and about the same in 1 9 7 2 ;
the increased energy consumed has been
almost entirely petroleum, rising from 855
million tonnes 'coal-equivalent' (CE) to 2 5 0 0
million tonnes C E in 1 9 6 9 ; coal and oil
together accounted for 7 7 per cent of the
world's total energy consumption in 1969, the
remainder consisting of hydroelectric power,
natural gas and nuclear energy.
Although there have been changes in the
pattern of demand for energy during the
past t w o decades and differences in the
1. Figures in brackets refer to the notes at the end of
this article.
77
character of development, there are certain
c o m m o n features discernible. First, there has
been a fairly steady upward trend in the total
demand for energy: threefold during the
period 1950-70, with the annual rate increase
of 5.1 per cent already mentioned. Secondly,
a review of the global energy situation reveals
a further imbalance in that the share of the
demand by developing countries (with two-
thirds of the planet's population) accounted
for about 15 per cent of the energy consumed
by 1970. Taken as a group, however, these
countries had a surplus of 'primary energy'
production, outstripping their aggregate requi-
rements.
The great majority of the developing coun-
tries have remained net importers of energy
resources-petroleum, in particular. In 1970,
for example, the total imported amounted
to nearly 98 million tonnes C E of crude
petroleum and 34 million tonnes of petroleum
products. The expenditure, therefore, w a s
$2,000 million in net foreign exchange. The
industrialized market economies, taken as a
whole, showed an energy deficit which had
risen to 30 per cent in 1970 from approxima-
tely 18 per cent in 1960. Since then, partly
because of the events of 1973-74, the situa-
tion has changed considerably [2]. The
consumption of crude oil and all other
sources of energy in 1973 is shown in Table 1.
Thirdly, there has been a marked shift in
energy consumption from solid fuels to liquid
combustibles and natural gas during the last
few years; the trend has been c o m m o n to
nearly all regions.

Table 1. World consumption of energy in selected years (expressed in millions of metric tonnes
except as indicated otherwise)

Year and Solid Liquid Natural Hydro and Grand Per capita
measure fuels fuels gas nuclear total consumption
electricity (in kg)

1950
By weight 1,569 636 273 41 2,519 1,054
Percentage 62.3 25.3 10.3 1.6 100
1960
By weight 2,204 1,323 620 86 4,233 1,403
Percentage 52.1 31.3 14.6 2.0 100
1970
By weight 2,400 2,940 1,366 156 6,864 1,905
Percentage 35.0 42.8 19.9 2.3 100
1971
By weight 2,395 3,109 1,463 167 7,134 1,945
Percentage 33.6 43.6 20.5 2.3 100
1972
By weight 2,413 3,342 1,555 171 7,481 2,005
Percentage 32.3 44.7 20.8 2.3 100
1973
By weight 2,485 3,593 1,618 189 7,885 2,074
Percentage 31.5 45.6 20.5 2.4 100

Growth rates (per cent per ,annum)

1950-60 3.5 7.6 8.5 7.7 5.3 2.9

1960-70 0.9 8.0 8.6 6.2 4.9 3.0
1950-70 2.2 7.8 8.6 6.9 5.1 3.0
1970-73 1.1 7.4 6.1 7.1 5.0 3.0

Sources: United Nations, World Energy Supplies (Statistical Papers, Series J, Nos.,, 4 . 8) ; United Nations Statistical
Yearbook. 1973: private conversations with United Nations officials.

78 K. Erik Solem

A s shown in Table 1, the world's consump-
tion of solid fuels during the years 1950-70
rose at the rate of 2.2 per cent annually while
that of liquid fuels grew at the rate of about
7.8 per cent By 1970, the share of solid
fuels consumed had fallen from 6 2 per cent
(the figure for 1950) to 3 5 per cent, whereas
liquid fuels had risen from 2 5 per cent (1950)
to 4 2 per cent.
• M o r e rises in energy d e m a n d s
There have been even more pronounced
changes in the rates of consumption on the
regional (plurinational) level. In the developed
market economies, consumption rates for
solid fuels remained nearly stationary over the
twenty-year period, while liquid fuel consump-
tion rose by about 7.5 per cent a n n u m . The
demand for natural gas rose at the rate of
7.1 per cent and for energy from hydro-
electric and nuclear sources (combined)
at 5.9 per cent.
The proportion of solid fuels burned in the
centrally planned economies declined from
more than 8 2 per cent in 1950 to about
60 per cent by 1 9 7 0 ; the figure for liquid fuels
increased by approximately 8 per cent (from
15 to 23 per cent) during the same bidecennial
period. In comparison, the consumption of
natural gas grew at the rate of 17.9 per cent
per annum [3].
In the developing countries, w h e n taken as
a whole, solid fuels fell in consumption from
around 4 0 per cent to about 21 per cent in
1970. Liquid fuels and natural gas together
increased from approximately 58 per cent in
1950 to 7 6 per cent twenty years later.
A s the authors of The Limits to Growth have
argued, whereas the nations of the world
consume greatly varying amounts of energy
per capita, the consumption of energy corre-
lates fairly well with the total economic
output per capita (indicated by the gross
national product, or G N P , per head). The
Energy resources and global strategic planning
picture which emerges from this study indi-
cates a generally linear relationship; see
Figure 1.
A major problem is that of increasing the
availability of energy in order to benefit the
half of humanity which enjoys a standard of
living at present far below that of the indus-
trialized world. This means that considerable
increase must be m a d e in the generation of
energy and its efficiencies of conversion (into
heat, light, motive force and the like). It
means, also, that problems connected with
the transmission and distribution of energy
must be solved.
If a comparison is m a d e between (a) the
areas where world tensions exist and (b)
those having a low conversion of energy, a
dense population, and food shortages, it will
be seen that there exists a correlation. This
would indicate that the key to many of our
present problems lies in the global energy
pattern. Solutions m a y involve a swift increase
in the use of energy sources other than
fossil fuels, one which m a y be particularly
applicable to the developing regions. These
areas are often poor in fossil fuel resources
but correspondingly rich in their access to
solar, hydro or tidal power. Hydro and tidal
power m a y prove to be the most applicable
to systems of large-scale electricity generation
required for industrialization. ,
Energy is n o w a key element in the expan-
sion of food production, itself a matter of
major and immediate importance to the
densely populated regions of the developing
world. In addition, energy is crucial to the
improvement of transport, communication
and distribution facilities in the same areas.
• T h e need for standard forecasting
methods
A s to the needs to meet the energy
consumption demands of the future, a series
of different forecasts can be m a d e , depen-
ding on varying underlying assumptions:
there are available different methodologies
for use in 'energy forecasting'. The simplest
method for projecting short-term periods
(to five years, or so) is that of direct extrapola-
tion, whereby historical, time-series data on,
consumption are simply extended into the
future [4]. A further extension of the time-
series approach m a y be more appropriate for
medium-term forecasts of ten to fifteen years.
This method consists of studying the ways in
79
 Kilograms per person per year (coal equivalent)
/
/
/
United States
10,000

/
9.000 • /
/
•
f
Canada /
8,000
/ /
t
/•
7,000
/
/
/
6,000 /
•
• / •
5,000 • •/ Sweden

4,000 . • / •
/
/
/ • •
3,000 •
• /i • •
/
/ Switzerland
2,000

1,000 t • •

••/<•.'• •
!'••'
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
G N P per capita
(1968 U . S . dollars per person per year)

Fig. 1. Energy consumption and GNP per capita. Source: D. Meadows et a/.. The Limits to Growth.
N e w York, N.Y., Universe Books, 1972.

which tendencies in two series (e.g. two suffer from inherent shortcomings. What is
historical series) are related to one another; needed, therefore, among other things, is the
it would include examples such as the correla- development of supplementary standard metho-
tion between energy consumption and G N P dologies or the improvement of current
or gross domestic product [5], (Gross domestic methodology; this is especially so in regard to
product, or G D P , is defined by economists as medium- and long-term predictions.
the G N P less the value of the services gene- The world's total energy consumption has
rated in a domestic economy). been growing at a compounded annual rate,
As for long-term forecasts (twenty years as I said earlier, of 5.1 per cent. If the same
or more), it is necessary to incorporate addi- trend in consumption continues in the years
tional factors such as changes in technology, ahead, the application of a simple extrapo-
prices and demography. There are additional lation by exponential trend would show that
methods or their variations, some of which the world's total consumption of energy

80 K. Erik Solem
Table 2 . Global energy forecasts and projected consumption in year 2000

Energy consumption
Forecasts (with
specified assumptions) estimate by year 2000
(million tonnes C E )

Forecast 1: world's population increases steadily at 2 per cent;

energy consumption per head grows linearly from 1 9 5 8 - 6 9 trend 19,500
Forecast 2 : total energy consumption rises at continuous 5 per
cent per a n n u m from 1 9 5 8 - 6 8 trend 20,500
Forecast 3 : population increases steadily at 2 per cent yearly;
by year 2000, whole world enjoys European standard of living 41,000
Forecast 4 : population increases steadily at 2 per cent annually and
by year 2 0 0 0 whole world enjoys North American standard of
living 141,000

would be 11,253 million tonnes coal equiva-
lent (CE) in 1980 (compared to 6,843 millions
in 1970) [6]. T w o other, related methods have
produced similar figures [7]. These were
based on the use of (a) regression analysis,
correlating energy consumption per capita
with income per capita, which provided a
forecast of 11,872 million tonnes C E for 1980,
and (b) geographical analogies of inter-
country comparisons, where the corresponding
figure w a s 11,429 million tonnes. Irr both
cases, the projections were based on the trend
for the period 1960-80 [8].
A recent study of forecasts of the globe's
total energy needs by the end of the century
yielded the four previsions here above [9],
based on different, clearly specified assump-
tions.
• Is energy c o n s u m p t i o n b o u n d to rise?
Each of these different methods of projecting
total energy consumption twenty-four years
hence possesses its o w n possibility of error.
Forecasts 3 and 4 would impose a great
strain o n not only the world's economic
resources (as they are k n o w n today) but also
on mankind's organizational ability. Further-
more, the implicit assumption that North
America will maintain the current, very rapid
increase in energy consumption per capita
also m a y be open to question. Forecasts 1
and 2 translate into a consumption of energy
by the year 2000 equalling 3 to 4.5 times the
energy consumed in 1969. A s has been
pointed out by several specialists, if the
consumption of electrical energy continues
to grow at 8 per cent per year, it would rise
to 20,500 million tonnes C E in 2000. This
would equal 8 0 per cent of the total energy
figure predicted in Forecast 2 , which had
assumed a growth rate of 5 per cent.
Electrical energy used in the industrialized
countries, n o w representing approximately
3 0 per cent of all the energy consumed on the
planet, would probably constitute 5 0 per cent
of the total figure in the year 2000. Similarly,
given that the world's energy consumption
will rise linearly to accompany a population
growth of 2 per cent annually, the consumption
of electricity must grow at a rate of 5 per cent
per year [10]. Pursuing this line of analysis,
the capital investment required for the neces-
sary power stations during the next thirty
years would be from U . S . $ 7 0 0 to U . S . § 1,000
million.
The United Nations have been able, by
means of methodologies developed for
medium-range forecasting, to arrive at appro-
ximate figures in s o m e instances. In one
study [11]/ energy consumption per capita
w a s related to gross domestic product; and
by using demographic forecasts for the year
2000, the future total consumption of energy
w a s projected [12]. This approach makes
the assumption, however, that the present
relationships between energy consumption,
G D P and population will continue; this m a y
be open to question.
Based upon an exponential trend, the world's
total energy need w a s estimated to be
30,216 million tonnes C E , whereas a logistical
trend gave a consumption figure of 28,086 mil-
lion tonnes. In both cases, the projected

Energy resources and global strategic planning 81

levels for the year were more than four times
that of 1970 (6,845 million tonnes).
Although the assumptions underlying such
global forecasts should be subjected to close
scrutiny, it is important to note that the picture
of the future which emerges is not simply one
of gloom and inevitability. Rather, it is an
image which portrays a set of different options.
I suggest that this argument can be broadened
so as to be applicable to other sectors where
the problem of growth and its limitation are
m e t If the basic assumption is correct and the
matter at hand is one of options rather than
inevitability, it is clear that the question
becomes one of organizational and adminis-
trative reform and the concomitant setting of
social and economic priorities.
• T h e sources of energy
The industrialized countries-most of North
America, Western Europe, Israel, Japan,
Australasia and the Republic of South Africa,
but excluding the U . S . S . R . and the countries
of Eastern Europe-produce more than o n e -
half the world's electricity; yet they contain
only about 2 9 per cent of its population. The
average consumption per head in the deve-
loping countries is 116 k W h , compared with
2,683 k W h in the industrialized countries.
Part of the problem seems to be, to a large
extent, one of investment. In order to secure
the resources required to raise the level of
consumption per capita in the Third World
to that of the industrialized countries by the
year 2000, it will take an enormous amount
of capital.
Petroleum
N o universally accepted, fully reliable proce-
dure for the estimation of individual oil
deposits exists. Rough estimates of the world's
total reserves of petroleum (including proved,
probable and possible quantities) have been
given as 346,336 millions tonnes C E [13]. N o
physical shortage of petroleum on a global
scale has been anticipated for the immediate
future, but the world's supply m a y be inade-
quate by the mid-1980s [14]. Although
there are indications of substantial deposits of
both petroleum and gas reserves offshore, it is
hard to m a k e a close estimate of their nature
and extent, not to speak of the costs of future
production (because this is subject to econo-
mic changes of different kinds).
82 ' K . Erik Solem
At present, the percentage distribution of
the world's proven oil reserves is as >
follows [15].
Table 3. Regional percentage distribution of
the world's proven petroleum reserves
Middle East • 55.4
U . S . S . R . , People's Republic of China,
Eastern Europe 16.3
Africa 10.4
United States 6.3
Central and South America 5.1
Western Europe 2.6
Indonesia and South-East Asia 2.5
Canada 1.4
Natural gas reserves
These have been estimated at 233,000 million
tonnes C E , of which about 20,000 million
tonnes had been produced by 1 9 7 1 , leaving
the net current figure in the neighbourhood
of 215,000 million tonnes [16]. These esti-
mates d o not include the possibilities repre-
sented by additional reserves which m a y
lie beneath the ocean's floor; these could
change, substantially, the over-all projection
of natural gas reserves.
Coal and lignite reserves
These form the second largest source of the
total available energy. This share has been in
decline, as I have indicated on page 78, from
the level of 62.3 per cent of the total energy
produced in 1 9 5 0 to that of 3 5 . 4 per cent in
1970. Estimated reserves of the coal and
lignite solid fuels amount to 7.64 • 1 0 " metric
tonnes (of which about 3.4 per cent has
already been consumed).
Technology m a y be able to provide better
and less costly methods of recovery, of course,
and improved w a y s of processing coal in
order to obtain petroleum or gas m a y substan-
tially increase consumption of coal in the
future [17]. But both cost factors and other
economic change, as well as environmental
conditions, will have to be taken into account
in such eventualities.
Magnetohydrodynamic power
Recently attention has been paid to the
problem of cleaning up coal-burning power
plants. Magnetohydrodynamic ( M H D ) gene-
rators, which convert heat derived from the
combustion of gases directly into electricity,
m a y prove to be a feasible alternative source
of useful energy. In addition to aiding reduc-
tion in the consumption of fossil fuels-and,
consequently, a markedly diminished level
of thermal pollution-it appears that M H D
generators could offer one of the best methods
to eliminate sulphur dioxide as a by-product
of combustion and reduce emissions of nitro-
gen oxide from coal-fired plants. The techno-
logy of M H D has yet to be demonstrated as
being practical, so its economic prospects
are still uncertain. World-wide research on
M H D is currently being carried out, however,
with the most active current efforts being
found in Japan and several European coun-
tries. Perhaps the most promising aspect of
the generation of M H D power is that which
is related to our concerns with the environ-
ment.
Tar sand and oil shale reserves
The following estimates have been m a d e of
these resources, expressed in tonnes of coal
equivalent: developed market economies,
186,000 million; centrally planned econo-
mies, 89,000 million; developing countries,
346,000 million [18]. T h e quantity of oil
shale is calculated to be of such magnitude
that it is equivalent to-in terms of energy
p r o d u c e d - 1 8 0 times the world's total output
of energy in 1 9 7 0 [19]. B y 1 9 8 0 as m u c h as
1 million barrels of shale oil m a y be produced
daily, an amount equivalent to 178,000 tonnes
C E . Progress in this direction will depend,
naturally, on both economic development and
technological advance in mining and pro-
cessing, as well as on the abatement of
adverse environmental effects accompanying
such exploitation.
The United States Geological Survey esti-
mates, as an order of magnitude of the total
of the world's resources in oil shale, a putative
yield of 1 6 8 million million barrels of crude oil.
The survey's estimates are based, however,
on resources amenable to short- or m e d i u m -
term development (rather than the basis of
total resources). These resources are, in
essence, the Green River Formation deposits
in the states of Colorado, Utah and W y o m i n g ,
of relatively high grade and comparatively
accessible [20].
Energy resources and global strategic planning
A project is being inaugurated, in Lower
Saxony, to study techniques for the recovery
of shale deposits in the Federal Republic of
Germany. Shale oil resources in that country
are estimated to be of the order of 140 million
tonnes. At an expected price for crude oil of
S9, freight on board, a potential production of
20,000 barrels per day might be maintained
by 1985 [21].
Nuclear power
This has been m u c h emphasized as the prin-
cipal fuel source for the future. A s it is
currently power based mainly on fuel provided
by uranium ores, this could be termed a capi-
tal source of energy. Theoretically, however,
since both fission and fusion processes could
be extended to a wide range of chemical
elements, nuclear power m a y be closer than
w e think to being a source of income utilizing
a broad range of natural materials. O n e pound
of fissionable uranium is equivalent in energy
to 6 5 0 tonnes of coal, meaning that its
efficiency is several orders of magnitude
greater than equivalent fossil fuel. The current
limitations of uranium are attributable, in part,
to the fact that the reactor cannot generate
electricity directly but must rely on interme-
diary use of a steam-raising plant. In spite
of such limitations in their development, the
successful economic operation of nuclear
reactors has increased considerably.
Nuclear energy would seem to have, prima
facie, certain advantages for the developing
regions of the world: independence of geo-
graphy, climate and the general cultural level
of the area. Upkeep of installations and equip-
ment, for example, is minimal, and the needed
amounts of nuclear fuel are easily transported.
Prerequisites, economically speaking, in order
to benefit from this source of energy, are a
certain scale as well as a particular level of
development with regard to technical infra-
structure. Below given levels, profitable
utilization would be very difficult, if not
impossible.
The total installed capacity of nuclear power
stations rose from 8 6 0 megawatts in 1 9 6 0 to
19,060 M W in 1 9 7 0 ; if the trend persists,
the total installed capacity will probably
exceed 320,000 M W by 1 9 8 0 [22]. Present
reactor systems depend upon the use of
either natural or slightly enriched uranium as
fuel, and the substantial construction pro-
g r a m m e anticipated during the next few years
83
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84 K . Erik S o l e m
m a y result in a d e m a n d for1 large quantities
of uranium. It has been estimated [23] that
reserves of 700,000 tonnes of uranium are
recoverable at less than $ 2 0 per kilogramme of
uranium oxide ( U , O g ) , while an additional
700,000 tonnes of U s O s could b e m a d e
available at less than $ 3 0 per kg.
T o forecast the exact generating capacity
provided by nuclear power is difficult; it is
even risky, because national governments
continually revise their reactor strategy. S o m e
generally accepted figures, however, are
600,000 megawatts by 1 9 8 5 and s o m e
2,700,00 by the year 2000.
The next generation of nuclear reactors m a y
be based o n the 'breeders', currently being
developed and expected to m a k e a modest
contribution to power generation during the
current decade [24]. T h e advent of the fast-
breeder reactor could change the picture
radically in terms of nuclear energy supply [25],
Nuclear fusion
The specific process of fusion, the wedding
of the nuclei from t w o small atoms into a
larger one, normally takes place within the
core of a star. This reaction releases even more
energy than the action of fission, or the
splitting of large atoms. If it were possible
to control on earth the fusion of hydrogen
which takes place 'inside' the sun, for example,
then sea-water alone, containing hydrogen,
could produce fuel for the world for a million
years or more. Following the Soviet demonstra-
tion m a d e in 1 9 6 8 that a laser could initiate
a fusion reaction, several countries have
expanded their programmes of research on
lasers. Today, research o n laser fusion is
proceeding along t w o parallel paths, with
little interaction as yet. Theoretical efforts in
this field consist of computer simulations of
the physical effects that take place w h e n a
laser interacts with a pellet of nuclear fuel.
Experimental efforts have been concentrated
on the development of lasers capable of
delivering energy in less than a nanosecond
(a nanosecond is, let m e remind you, a
thousand millionth of a second).
A few years ago, w h e n the idea of laser
fusion w a s still n e w , R & D expenditure in
this field in the United States w a s about
$1 million; today, the figure for research is
estimated at $ 3 0 million or more. Japan has
begun a crash programme to catch up with the
'West' in the domain of laser pulsing; France
Energy resources and global strategic planning
and the Federal Republic of Germany are
conducting experiments in interactions bet-
w e e n lasers and matter. These are believed
to be critical in the estimation of what happens
w h e n the systems involved proceed to higher
energies and shorter pulses. T h e Soviet
Union has the largest existing programme in
laser fusion, believed to be twice the size
of the programme being conducted by the
United States.
Although the implosion concept of laser
fusion is very attractive, there are immense
technical problems to be solved even if its
'physics' is found to be favourable. M o r e
than one major breakthrough per year m a y be
necessary before scientists can m a k e hydrogen
in a reactor hotter and denser than the
sun [26]. T h e process, should it be successful,
means that long-term utilization of nuclear
power will be assured without the possibility
of shortages in fuel.
Reserves of geothermal energy
At the present time, geothermal energy is
being developed for both the generation of
electrical power and direct use in the form
of heat. Thermal energy in that part of the
earth's crust which is accessible by drilling
m a y well exceed all reserves of fossil fuel and
fissionable nuclear material by several orders
of magnitude. Estimates indicate that stored
thermal energy, in the main geothermally active
zones, amounts to about 3 million megawatt-
years [27].
Solar energy
Energy from the sun constitutes, by far, the
largest possible source of energy. Successful
application of this energy to heating has been
done in Australia, France, Israel, Japan and
the United States and in s o m e of the deve-
loping countries [28]. Possibilities exist for
the development of solar cells that are of
large capacity and capable of producing
85
electrical energy at competitive cost per
kilowatt-hour [29], Conversion in space of
solar energy to electricity would involve the
use of satellite collectors, converting the
sun's radiation in space, then beaming it to
earth [30].
• Improving energy strategies, planning
The different w a y s of projecting total energy
consumption in the future each have, as w e
have seen, their o w n possibilities of error.
Several of the forecasts imply great strain o n
the world's economic resources-as w e k n o w
them today-as well as o n m a n ' s present
capacity for organization. The assumptions
noted in Table 2 need further to be spelt out
clearly and examined critically.
• Previous forecasting indicated a continually
changing position for both supply and d e m a n d .
Growth, industrial expansion and the rise
of living standards push upward the quantity
of energy w e require. Forecasts of future
developments, however, are quite likely to
prove fallible to s o m e extent This is because
of several factors. Technological advance-
ments, price levels and other economic
changes, for example, have to be taken into
account. Systematic methodologies for long-
term prediction are not readily available.
Equally (if not more) important is the fact
that these developments will proceed not
only according to their o w n inner logic but
against the background, too, of rapid political
and social change.
There is thus a clearly established link
between energy resources and development.
Although the industrialized countries have
determined, by and large, their o w n potentials
and have developed their natural resources,
this is by n o means the case with developing
nations. Since energy is going to be a major
limiting factor in the industrial development
of the latter category, there is a need for
continuing surveys and probes for n e w sources
of energy, n e w areas of production.
This clarification of options must include
consideration of h o w to use capital resources
as efficiently, as possible. Serious thought
must be given to the possible use of solar,
geothermal, tidal, hydro-electric, wind and
other energy sources. Several of these have
been ignored, considered impractical or too
costly, even ridiculed, but in s o m e cases they
m a y be more practical than nuclear energy.
There should also be reflection on the need
86 K. Erik Solem
for strict control over the use to which
different fuels are put, as well as rethinking
of the position of fossil fuels as raw materials.
The energy debate and the United Nations
Global and regional estimates of d e m a n d and
supply are primarily statistical expressions
forming a useful stop in the provision of
guidelines for policy issues at the national
level. B y themselves, these computations have
a limited relationship to practical energy
policies and programmes as evolved b y
various governments. It m a y be wrong to
assume that long-term global forecasts will
tally with the pragmatic policy decisions
m a d e b y individual governments. Action is
warranted in this area, however, and the
United Nations have a crucial role to play
both as (a) forum for world debate on the
issues involved; and (b) co-ordinator of
individual programmes concerning global
energy problems.
Experience in the formulation of energy
policy has s h o w n that its effective implemen-
tation depends, to a large extent, on institutions
and organizations working at the national
level. The importance of an integrated approach
to energy matters, for instance, must be
emphasized continuously, followed b y the
necessary steps to co-ordinate sectoral acti-
vities. Attention must be paid to the fact that,
in a number of countries, there exist n o
unified energy agencies; departments or
ministries engaged in energy activities fre-
quently take a sectoral approach to energy
development and management. S o it is
essential that every effort be m a d e to establish
a unified policy and that, in the elaboration
of energy development programmes, first
priority be given to the objectives of a national
energy policy. Integrated policy and unified
authority regarding energy are imperative for
developing as well as industrially developing
countries.
Sound managerial machinery
Energy policy should be based, needless to
say, on solid administrative structures which
will provide a country with the machinery for
proper management and implementation. Such
a plan requires, first and foremost, as a base
the sound build-up of technical and scientific
m a n p o w e r in developing countries. Existing
governmental or regional (e.g. under the
auspices of the Organization of African"Unity)
would be needed, and training institutions
established or expanded where necessary
(including energy resource institutes). Ex-
panded on-the-job training schemes as well as
fellowship programmes should be under-
taken and, as in other areas of research, efforts
should be m a d e to avoid duplicative, costly
activities.
The United Nations, working through the
Specialized Agencies, can play a vital role
in the planned development of technical
m a n p o w e r resources and physical facili-
ties [31], The availability of capital is of
crucial importance. Projections of requirements
for expense and investment must be m a d e ,
bearing in mind the need to consider a host
of additional ecological impacts and problems
impinging o n the question of energy (for
example, the depletion of resources).
It is essential in the planning and m a n a g e -
ment of an energy e c o n o m y to consider
multiple choices. Different energy sources,
conversion processes, m o d e s of transport,
and the final applications of energy are often
associated with both identifiable costs and
benefits (or disadvantages) in terms of
environmental d a m a g e . Since a good deal
of work has already been undertaken to
identify these; full use should be m a d e of
existing and forthcoming findings [32].
Thorough consideration should be given
to the substitution of n e w , relatively pollution-
free sources of energy for the conventional
sources; this is an area to which the United
Nations has, already, rightly turned its atten-
tion. It is a problem, however, which is part
of a larger, thornier issue: the relationship
between economic growth and the increased
use of energy. Assuming that for an energy-
deficient country the relationship between
energy d e m a n d and its local production will
remain constant during the next decade, it
follows that, in absolute terms, imports will
rise. The financial consequence will be an
ever-increasing expenditure of foreign e x -
change to pay for these-a situation which
m a n y countries can ill afford.
The role the United Nations could play in this
respect needs to be both direct and indirect
O n the basis of information available and
continuing research, as well as other inputs
bearing on the total question of energy, the
U . N . could attempt to describe total global
Energy resources and global strategic planning
needs, expectations and perceived results
concerning energy production, consumption,
and their effects and consequences;
Careful scrutiny should be given to the
assumptions underlying these various elements
of the energy picture, the assumptions being
described clearly and studied criticially;
Consistencies and inconsistencies should be
identified and analysed;
The nature and types of consensus, where
such exist, should be examined carefully and
systematically [33].
O n this basis, the United Nations could
proceed to set u p general and detailed
standards for use as both global and regional
yardsticks. Although the United Nations
cannot tell individual governments what to
do or not to d o , it has the ability to present
forcefully issues that have been carefully
researched and convincingly argued. Institu-
tional formats for subsequent action could be
those of the task force, expert group, c o m m i s -
sion, conference, or of conventions and
treaties. Wherever appropriate, innovative
instrumentalities should be designed and used
to translate regional and world-wide aims into
social (political) action.
Within the framework of such standards,
close attention should be paid to the use of
regionally based efforts as well as to integrated
management techniques applied to the exploi-
tation of energy resources. By the latter, I m e a n
expanding the planning process where the
e c o n o m y is, or could be, suitably organized;
this would require a high degree of c o -
ordination in the management of sectoral
activities. The use of expertise, furthermore, is
central to this process, ranging from initial
surveys and feasibility studies, investment
control and management of the organized
project, to subsequent evaluation procedures
including follow-up and impact assessment.
This approach need not d e m a n d massive
re-organization of existing structures. In m a n y
cases, mechanisms of co-ordination and
promotion of co-operation between existing
institutions m a y offer the most practical
courses of action. In certain instances, such
as those involving n e w or increased hazards,
or perhaps over-all control and regulation,
n e w organizational structures m a y have to be
established.
• Some problems to be faced
T h e question of energy deals not only with
87

supply-demand and shortage and develop-
m e n t ; it is intimately linked to additional
hazards. Let us take one example. Nuclear
power plants-although they have been
subjected to greater scrutiny than any techno-
logy in the past and offer s o m e environmental
advantages over conventional thermal plants-
must remain under continuous careful sur-
veillance. This is because of the perils of the
escape of radioactive matter.
Certain issues must be drawn to the i m m e -
diate attention of national and international
decision-makers:
1. Measures should be taken to prevent the
possibility of particular types of accidents
to happen-especially where there appears
to be n o assurance at present that emer-
gency cooling systems will prevent a major
discharge of radioactive material into the
environment.
2 . It is vital that large-scale, long-lasting
contamination of the world's oceans be
avoided-poisoning which would result
from the accidental release of fission
products from proposed nuclear plants
to be situated offshore.
There is the further problem that the use of
nuclear materials m a y include the assembly
of nuclear weapons: arms m a d e of material
diverted from civil nuclear power plants. (The
fuel cycle of a nuclear reactor involves
basically the s a m e facilities as those for a
military reactor producing plutonium.) Although
s o m e inspection and surveillance have already
been undertaken under the auspices of the
United Nations, the problem is so important
that continuous attention needs to be paid to it.
Since our notions of control and regulation
have been (so far) dissuasive or negative
in connotation, it is essential that every effort
be m a d e to establish a series of positive
incentives. I refer to the conservation and
economical use of resources, the health and
safety of the community, and industrial
quality control and profit optimization (or
similar inducements).
88 K. Erik Solem
Towards these ends, the avoidance of
potential d a m a g e should be given top priority.
But emphasis must be given also to general
management of nuclear materials, radio-
active wastes coming from reprocessing plants,
and excellent control throughout the fuel
cycle. This applies to materials in storage, in
transit, and while being processed. If w e are
in fact moving towards an urgent need for
transnational regulatory programmes, it is
crucial that the United Nations play a major
role in this development.
• An ¡deal strategy works 'backwards'
The matter of h o w M e m b e r States of the
United Nations respond institutionally to
control and regulation is especially important.
It should be m a d e the subject of a comprehen-
sive survey of the pre-occupations and other
concerns of official organizations, non-official
institutions and individuals w h o are concerned
about the uses of scientific technology for
military purposes [34].
A n ideal global strategy, as A m o r y Lovins
(among others) has pointed out, work back-
wards, in a certain sense: W h a t must w e not
d o n o w if w e are to retain the options w e
shall need to have available later [35] ? B y
posing the question this w a y , it becomes quite
evident to us that, on the national level at
least-possibly internationally, also-most of
our decisions regarding energy are based
on rather unsound assumptions. They seem
to lead us along roads w e cannot follow.
The main reason for this is that energy
studies traditionally have been built almost
exclusively, round surveys of physical inven-
tories. Little or no stress has been placed on
the constraints of production. But energy
constraints are dictated not primarily by
physical scarcity; they are ordered, instead,
by geopolitical, environmental and socio-
technical problems [36].
If w e take into account the ideas and pro-
posals iterated above, it m a y still be possible
to keep global problems concerning energy
availability and strategy outside the realm of
inevitabilities. This is a province of negative
implications, affecting international security
and stability in the world. W e must, instead,
treat these problems as they deserve. That is,
by recognizing that their solutions comprise
a set of alternative options, open to rational
h u m a n choice.
NOTES
1. cf. R. BAILEY, Traditional energy resources: present
stage and future development Futures. June 1972.
2 . Until the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the world's
consumption of crude petroleum w a s increasing at
7.5 per cent annum, having reached 2,766 million
tonnes in that year.
3. This is based on information obtained from the
United Nations Division of Transport, Energy and
Resources, and from private interviews held in
October 1972.
4 . World energy requirements and resources in the
year 2000. Paper submitted to the Fourth Confe-
rence on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva,
1971. (A/Cpnf. 49/A(420).)
5. ibid.
6. See note 4.
7. Projections in natural resources. Report to the
Secretary-General's Committee on Natural
Resources, second session, Nairobi, January 1972.
(Doc. EE/C.7/20/Add.3.)
8. See note 3.
9. See note 7.
10. ibid. cf. also Electrical world. 1 November 1975.
11. See note 4 .
12. See note 2 .
13. See note 4 .
14. This was anticipated by the United Nations prior
to the oil embargo of 1973. cf. Working Paper
ESA/RT/Meeting II/2, 8 February 1971,
submitted to the United Nations. Ad Hoc Panel of
Experts on Projections of Supply and Demand
of Crude Petroleum and Products.
15. See BP statistical review of the world oil
industry. 1933.
16. See note 4 .
17. See note 1.
18. cf. P. PHIZACHERLEY and L S C O T in:
Proceedings. Seventh World Petroleum Congress.
19. Utilization of oil shale progress and prospects.
N e w York, N.Y., United Nations, 1967.
(Sales no. 67 II.B.20.)
20. Energy prospects to 1985: an assessment of long
term energy developments and related policies.
Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1974.
21. ¡bid.
2 2 . Report of Group of Experts on the Contributions
of Nuclear Technology to the Economic and
Scientific Advancement of the Developing
Countries. N e w York, N.Y., United Nations,
24 July 1969. (Doc. A/7568.)
23. See R. K R Y M M , Economic aspects of nuclear
power, presented at symposium organized by the
Society for Education in Application of
Science and sponsored by the Pugwash Conference
on Science and World Affairs.
24. cf. Nature, vol. 255, 5 June 1975, p. 441.
Energy resources and global strategic planning
25. cf. A . N E L L E S T Y N , The impact of energy on
strategy: nuclear energy. Ottawa, Department of
Defence. ( O R A E / D Strat A Staff Note 74/18,
July 1974.)
26. Science, vol. 177, no. 4055,
29 September 1972.
27. cf. K. S O L E M , The impact of energy on
strategy: geothermal energy. Ottawa,
Department of Defence. ( O R A E / D Strat A Staff
Note 7 4 / 2 1 , October 1974.)
28. B E H R M A N , D . Solar energy and the awakening
of science. Boston, Mass., Little,
Brown (in press).
PALZ, W . Solar electricity: energy source of the
future. Paris, Unesco Press (in press).
29. cf. K. S O L E M , The impact of energy on strategy:
solar power. Ottawa, Department of Defence.
( O R A E / D Strat A Staff Note 7 4 / 2 2 ,
October 1974.)
30. See note 4.
31. There are, for example, the M a n and the
Biosphere Programme (managed by Unesco) and the
growing activities of the United Nations
Environmental Programme and of the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization.
32. For example: Environmental aspects of natural
resources management (paper in subject area II).
United Nations. Conference on the H u m a n
Environment (A/Conf. 48/7.)
33. This includes a host of rarely used (internationally
speaking) methodologies and techniques of
inquiry and research in social science and
survey analysis.
34. I a m currently preparing an analysis of the need for
such a survey.
35. LOVINS, A . World energy strategies: facts,
issues and options for policies that transcend
today's 'ad-hocracy'. Bulletin of the atomic
scientists. M a y 1974.
36. ¡bid.
T O DELVE M O R E DEEPLY
B A R N E T T , C . The war that never was.
Futures, vol. 7, no. 4 , August 1975.
The pre-1914 military managers failed to warn
their governments that international social problems
could not be solved by military means.
B O O T H , W . W a r by 'other means'. Army. January 1975.
A chronicle concerning the regulation
of petroleum supplies to and through Spain
during the Second World War.
Daedalus, fall 1975. Entire issue devoted
to the theme 'The oil crisis: in perspective'.
M A D D O X , J. Beyond the energy crisis.
London, Hutchinson, 1975.
NAILL, R . ; M E A D O W S , D . ; S T A N L E Y - M I L L E R , J.
The transition to coal. Technology review,
vol. 78, no. 1, October/November 1975.
89
• K. Erik Solem

Knut Erik So/em, a native of Norway,

has studied political science, economics
and social sciences and holds degree
from the universities of Oslo, Manitoba,
Leicester and Oxford. Dr Solem has taught
at Kansas State University and conducted
research on problems associated with
the international management of strategic
nuclear materials. He has also carried out
work at the United Nations Institute
for Training and Research, on social
and political forecasting, on measures
to enhance the efficiency of the United Nations,
and on the rational use of resources.
The author is currently with the Directorate
of Strategic Analysis, Operational Research
and Analysis Establishment,
Department of National Defence
Headquarters, Ottawa K1A 0K2 (Canada).

90 K. Erik Solem
The scientific-technical revolution
and a comprehensive
disarmament programme
Miroslav Soukup

The human social system, viewed in global terms, has acquired a number of new
features during our era: in their entirety, these bear out the epoch-making character
of our times, a period unique in the evolution of society. Within a process of pro-
foundly revolutionary transformation-unprecedented in both its dynamics and
scope of the social conflicts prevailing-a new socio-economic formation with a
qualitatively new structure and laws of social development is emerging. Mili-
tarism, using the new tools of the scientific and technical revolution to develop
the greatest annihilation machine in the history of mankind, collided for the first
time in capitalism's history with the practical possibilities of its effective use. New
stages in this revolution may lead to attempts to destabilize the strategic equilibrium.
The task of humanity now is to use all the possibilities of detente to (a) stop the
armaments race, (b) thwart the production of new weapon systems, and (c) begin
a process of converting the resources of war into those required for the development
of humanity.

Socialism has b e c o m e , in the context of the
introduction, a major factor in the acceleration
of mankind's progressive development; a
number of n e w phenomena have b e c o m e
apparent in state monopoly capitalism; and
an ever-growing section of peoples in the
developing countries are being drawn into
political activity. A universal interlinkage of
all the major subsystems of h u m a n society has
been taking place; a mutual interaction of
socio-economic, scientific, technological, and
ecological factors has gained marked intensity
within the framework of individual States,
between antagonistic social systems, and
especially o n a global dimension.
For the first time in the history of h u m a n
civilization, conditions have b e c o m e ripe on
the planet that allow the liberation of all
nations from famine and poverty, from epide-
mics and subjugation, and from the fear of
war. At the s a m e time, though, a thermo-
nuclear world w a r m a y result in a disaster
fatal to the very existence of our civilization.
The conclusion is justified in the light of an
analysis of contemporary society, in particular
of the multifaceted scientific and technolo-
gical revolution.
S o a correct understanding of the nature of
the contemporary problem of w a r and peace,
armament and disarmament, presupposes a
system analysis of the current revolutionary
world process and its most significant dis-
tinctive quality: social development based on
the mutual interaction and advance of the
developing scientific and technological revo-
lution.
The nature of the scientific and technological
revolution and its social role-the clarification
of which has b e c o m e one of the most relevant
theoretical and political achievements of

impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976 91

 Marxism within the second half of the
twentieth century-consists of a thorough-
going, qualitative restructuration of the system
of productive forces, a decisive transformation
of science, technology and production, and
the interconnexion of all these within the
framework of a single system. It consists also
of a qualitative change in the social function
of this particular complex; this leads, in turn,
towards a universal breakthrough in the
dynamic structure of society, with qualitative
changes in the functioning of m a n within
the system of productive forces (on the basis
of a comprehensive application of science as
an immediate production force pervading all
components of production and transforming
all aspects of h u m a n life) [1].1
• T h e socio-ecological interaction
A socio-ecological complex embracing the
entire planet c a m e into being as m a n ' s produc-
tive activity acquired a qualitatively n e w
dimension, as the 'man-nature' exchange of
matter acquired a global dimension and as
soon as m a n began to interfere with the
biosphere on a scale comparable to the
operation of a geological, cosmic force. T h e
emergence of the 'production-environment' or
-in broader terms-the 'society-biosphere'
complex, characterized by a universal globaliza-
tion of the socio-ecological complex of the
world, has created a situation whereby m a n ' s
intervention into any component within any
of the major subcomplexes can have far-
reaching implications. These affect not only
the component in question but also the entire
complex of the world.
The present-day situation is thus entirely
different from the situation existing at the
beginning of the twentieth century. W h a t is
at issue is no longer m a n ' s immediate exploita-
tion and control over specific areas of nature.
The problem today is in fact the problem of
h o w to bring under control the entire process
of transforming nature, h o w to utilize regulated
natural forces as means conducive to the
development of m a n and society. A number
of non-Marxist scholars focus their attention
on individual harmful aspects of the scientific
and technological revolution which remain,
so far, outside h u m a n control.
The crux of the problem, however, is the
fact that today each n e w major discovery can
contribute substantially not only towards a
positive development of h u m a n society but
92 Miroslav Soukup
also towards its destruction. A n y of the
scientific discoveries to be m a d e in the next
few decades (in any area of research responsi-
bility) m a y develop into a world-wide problem
and vice versa, and yet none m a y be fraught
with such consequences [2],
It is a fact that the scientific and technological
revolution and one of its integral components
-the revolution in the military sphere-have
broadened m a n ' s potential. It is a fact, too,
that the use of this revolution for possibly
constructive or destructive purposes has
underscored equally the urgency of the utiliza-
tion of such a capacity and the following
question. W h o m , and for what purposes, should
serve this gigantic power which continues
to develop exponentially? Will it be used to
promote mankind's advancement or to suit
the interests of self-contained groups of
monopoly capital, namely representatives of
the military-industrial complex?
• Seeking m a s t e r y and control
Control over the process of utilization of
natural forces and control over social develop-
ment are inextricably linked. The development
of society is thus conditioned by control over
the development of nature and the release of
n e w material power and of information
resources. Similarly, a further mastery of
nature is conditioned by the creation of a
social organization, a system of social rela-
tions, that would allow for the mastery and
control of this process-the immense, m a n -
m a d e and man-operated power that displays
an intrinsic tendency towards further qualita-
tive growth [3].
The fundamental subsystems of h u m a n
society d o not comprise simply more than a
hundred States or ten major international areas
(the socialist community being one of
these) [4], but in reality t w o opposed social
formations, each possessing a different social
structure and having a different 'target
function'. While energizing the development
of socialist society, the scientific and technical
revolution aggravates the fundamental contra-
dictions and disproportions of the capitalist
formation ; it is here that the drive towards an
energization of production forces fails to
materialize because of the existence of an
obsolete system of social relations.
1. Figures ¡n brackets correspond to the references at
the end of the article.
 O n e of the substantial features of contempo-
rary h u m a n society is the close coherence or
the strong mutual bond which involves
social, class and all other h u m a n relationships.
The qualitatively n e w dynamic structure of
social tasks puts its stamp o n the dynamic
system of international relations, primarily
upon the interrelationships between States
with different social systems, relations charac-
terized by dialectic coherence, the organic
synthesis of struggle and co-operation.
Struggle is rooted in the substantially different
systems of ownership of the means of produc-
tion, co-operation in the fact that the pre-
condition for the settlement of all-human tasks
is a co-ordinated co-operation by all nations
on the basis of a democratic programme for
the progressive development of civilization.
Apart from the civilization-wide tasks of
harmonizing the relationship between society
and nature (the central responsibility today),
one that is in the interests of all nations,
classes and social strata is to prevent a new
world war. T h e achievement of this is an
indispensable prerequisite to the survival and
further development of h u m a n society. Revolu-
tion in the w a y s and m e a n s of warfare-one
of the key features of the scientific and
technical revolution, as I have said-and in
particular the emergence of rockets ° and
nuclear arms, have turned Clausewitz' classical
formula upside-down. A m e a n s , that is to
say, has ceased to be instrumental in the
process of attaining the political goals of
war since the goal envisaging destruction
of the e n e m y cannot be reached without
self-annihilation.
Peaceful co-operation between the t w o
world systems has become, indeed, an absolute
necessity. This does not eliminate the basic
struggle between the t w o systems; it channels
this struggle in a different direction, along
the lines of socio-economic, scientific and
technological competition and within the area
of ideological contest, since the struggle of
ideas cannot be halted.
The scientific and technical revolution, or
the n e w degree of complexity of a number
of processes, is a special factor adding to the
professional debt of scientists and scientific
organizations; it accentuates their profound
responsibility before mankind, the responsi-
bility to perform all these tasks advantageously,
to eliminate the misuse of the results of
science in order to destroy m e n .
Analysis of this problem w a s the main
The scientific-technical revolution and a comprehensive disarmament programme
point on the agenda of the symposium on
'The Role of Scientists and Scientific Organiza-
tions in the Struggle for Disarmament', held
last July in M o s c o w . This extensive and so
far most important forum on the history of
science specifically concerned with the prob-
lem of disarmament-with 5 0 0 scientists
from different areas of research w h o c a m e
from m a n y parts of the world-this forum
issued an appeal to scientists and scientific
organizations throughout the world to join
forces in the c o m m o n endeavour towards
peace and security.
• A n unquestioned responsibility
The role of scientists acquires primary relevance
in the sphere of research concerned with the
comprehensive problem of war and peace,
i.e. the problem of armament and disarmament
under the conditions of the scientific and
technical revolution. Research on this whole
problem can be done only through the
complex of all sciences, but with the social
sciences playing the most important role
since the causes and resolution of the problem
are clearly social in character. Scientists share
an unshirkable responsibility for the elabora-
tion and implementation of a comprehensive
socio-economic programme of disarmament
closely allied to a programme of long-term
social development; the latter should proceed
from a theoretical elaboration of alternatives
in the utilization of the resources released as
a result of cuts in military expenditures. First
and foremost a m o n g the needs in this cate-
gory are the liquidation of poverty and the
promotion of social progress in the developing
countries.
The analysis and synthesis of a programme
designed to transform h u m a n society from its
present form into a civilization free of wars
and armaments, as well as the optimal m o d e
of implementing the programme, constitute a
problem of first-line importance and consider-
able complexity. T h e major pertinent goal,
within this long-term process, is the reduction
and elimination of the danger of a world w a r
involving the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
The programme's sub-goals include the
achievement of stability in the course of
political détente, the extension of this process
throughout the world while establishing its
irreversibility, broadening the relaxation of
tension in the military sphere, curbing the
93
arms race, and evolving a transition towards
subsequent disarmament on a world-wide
scale-with the ultimate goal of general and
complete disarmament.
The extraordinary complexity of the task
to optimize h o w to end the arms race stems
from the concatenation of a number of socio-
political, economic, psychological, scientific
and technological factors. Precision in optimiza-
tion, an adequate specification of the pro-
g r a m m e ' s structure, delimitation of its objective
(the attainment of which will influence posi-
tively settlement of the problem), all these are
dependent o n the precision of the research
concerned with the real processes at work
along a gamut of formative factors.
Apart from difficulties specific to the analysis
of social forces, there exist objective difficulties
arising from the complexity of the technical
aspects of international armament: the elabo-
ration of adequate criteria for comparing
military power with (concurrently) observance
of the principle of equal security, definition
and delimitation of specific types of weapons,
and so on. This aspect too, is largely depen-
dent o n the quality of the expertise available.
The real potential of military technology
T h e scientific-technological revolution implies
marked changes in the building of w e a p o n s
and in the structure of the means of warfare;
it raises with renewed urgency the question
of what ' is a ' m e a n s of conducting war'.
Understandably the focus of attention-and
this applies to science and society alike-is
the systematically revolutionizing growth of
the destructive potential of military technology.
These sweeping changes are the result
not only of the existence of radically n e w
•energy resources which raised the amount
of accumulated destructive potential to nearly
twenty tonnes of trinitrotoluol equivalent per
population unit. (The power of current
nuclear arms is the millionth order greater
than that of the atomic b o m b dropped on
Hiroshima.) Equally germane is the impact
of the products of automation or cybernation:
the evolution of automatic systems of destruc-
tion with an efficiency which depends on
information processing done by computer
.systems and servo mechanisms working at
incredible speeds-machines at the techno-
logical core of the scientific-technical revolu-
tion.
The precision with which a ballistic missile
.94 Miroslav Soukup
hits its target today ra nges f rom 3 0 to 300 metres.
The logic underlying- the development of
armament systems led to the evolution of
automated systems of anti-missile defence ;
these, in turn, generate the development of
qualitatively n e w systems designed to breach
the n e w systems by w a y of the M I R V and
M A R V weapons. [See the article by J o h n
Stares, beginning o n page 27.] T h e logic
behind these technical aspects stimulates a
process of self-reinforcement, meaning the
creation of n e w generations of armament
systems.
This cycle has entered, during the mid-1970s,
a qualitatively n e w stage and one particularly
dangerous: for the first time in twenty years,
the strategy of a preventive attack has b e c o m e ,
technologically, once again possible. This time
the possibility is, of course, at a qualitatively
superior level of possible mass destruction by
nuclear w e a p o n s .
• Twenty times more weapons
The tremendous expenditure in armaments
which, in 1 9 1 3 (a year of escalation in arms)
represented between 3 and 3.5 per cent of the
gross world product ( G W P ) , amounted for the
period 1 9 5 0 - 7 0 to a s u m representing 7 per
cent of the G W P . T h e volume of the world's
resources earmarked for military use is twenty
times greater. This spells an indirectly serious
threat to h u m a n civilization in that vast
resources essential to the solution of other
fundamental problems besetting the develop-
ment of society (e.g. that of ensuring further
harmonization of the society-nature relation-
ship) are drained a w a y [5].
The principal facet of this problem is the
hitherto unparalleled destructive potential of
 current and future armament systems. But
the second, and n o less significant, aspect of
the problem is the continuing deterioration
which is observable in the arena of a possibly
centralized control over the production of
specific types of w e a p o n s of mass destruction
in different parts of the world. Looming large
is the threat inherent in the extensive prolifera-
tion of such w e a p o n s a m o n g various govern-
ments and a m o n g guerrilla units as well as
the proliferation of material suitable for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons of the
plutonium-239 type in an ever-growing
number of countries.1
The revolutionizing substance of the current
stage of development is implicit, likewise, in
the relevant expert judgement according to
which mankind-only three decades a g o - h a d
reached the threshold of a n e w era in major
scientific discoveries applicable to both mili-
tary and peaceful uses. T h e chemical, biolo-
gical and environmental w e a p o n s evolved so
far-and this applies to weapons concentrating
on the h u m a n organism, on supra-individual
organisms, entire populations and ecosystems
alike-are fraught with far-reaching, uncon-
trollable consequences affecting the biological
and social life of our planet.
The use of chemical substances is an inter-
vention in the ecosystem which results in
grave disturbance to its balance. Applied at
higher rates, such substances are bound to
produce a crisis in the genetic system of
embryonic cells. T h e danger looming on the
horizon concerns the induction of irreversible
processes defying h u m a n control and affecting
a considerable proportion of mankind-unless
efficient m e a n s of counteraction can b e
advanced to avert this grave peril.
• R e m o v i n g the conditions of life
In keeping with the general developmental
trends of the scientific-technical revolution,
substantial changes are observable likewise
in the operational range of contemporary
warfare. This scope encompasses, on the one
hand, gradually the entire biosphere and the
space beyond which is accessible to m a n ;
it portends, on the other hand, the imminent
threat of penetrating the microcosm, i.e.
m a n ' s genetic code. T h e discovery and devel-
opment, during the first half of the present
decade, of techniques permitting the transfer
of genes from one organism to another opened
one of the most promising areas of biological
The scientific-technical revolution and a comprehensive disarmament programme
research; they have brought into focus the
broad perspective of revolutionary changes
in molecular biology, as well as the qualitative
progress in a number of other disciplines,
that have far-reaching implications for m a n ' s
development. At the same time, these advances
have laid bare the possibility of misusing
comparable progress in what I call trans-
genosis (gene transplantation) to build a n e w
type of biological w e a p o n .
The grave threat arising from development
of entirely n e w means of warfare (for example,
manipulation of the ionosphere), based o n
principles totally different from those under-
lying conventional systems, signifies that
these means are designed to annihilate not
only h u m a n life but the actual conditions of
life. This is implicit in (a) the fact that in the
foreseeable future there will be n o effective
systems of counter-defence and (b) the
difficulty surrounding the definition of these
means in international conventions.
N e w means such as these need not necessar-
ily involve a specific kind of ' w e a p o n ' .
Equally possible could be the application of a
substance that proves to be fatal in specific
conditions, while remaining harmless in other
contingencies. 'Contemporary science and
technology', to quote the words of Leonid
Brezhnev, 'has reached a stage fraught with
a grave danger that other, more terrible
w e a p o n s will be evolved than' nuclear
weapons. C o m m o n sense and mankind's
consciousness m a k e it imperative to obstruct
and contain the development of such weapons'. '
• Reaching the m i n d of the public
The role of scientists and their organizations
cannot be confined, however, to mere cogni-
tion and identification of n e w threats. Scientists
and scientific organizations must also m a k e
use of their influence in the field of shaping
public opinion. O n e of the crucial problems
regarding the efficiency of such action is
that of a clear understanding of the causes
of military conflicts. T h e impact of the infor-
mation process, substantially intensified by
the current methods of mass communication,
1. Current and anticipated production of plutonium, of
which a few kilograms are sufficient to produce
a nuclear b o m b , can be characterized as follows:
production in 1 9 6 4 , 1.5 tonnes; in 1 9 7 4 , 1 8 tonnes.
The expected figure for 1 9 8 5 is 2 4 0 tonnes. T h e
world's resources available in the same years: 2.60
and 1,175 tonnes, respectively [6].
95
gives rise to a special danger: the demobiliza-
tion of public opinion-or its orientation towards
mistaken goals-can result from incorrect,
fallacious or downright unsubstantiated
'scientific' assertions. S o m e scientists offer
their services in justification of the arms race;
the results of research carried out by others,
w h o have proceeded along inconsistent
methodological approaches, are dispropor-
tional and insufficiently productive w h e n
compared to the magnitude of s o m e of
today's research tasks [7].
The technical and organizational aspects of
the revolutionary changes in the military
sector are presented in absolute terms, terms
which underlie for example explanations of
the present-day arms race as these are
presented in various schools of technological
determinism. This is a trend of thought that
seems to prevail a m o n g non-Marxist scholars.
This dominant tendency brings, in its w a k e ,
the relatively less conspicuous development
of neurobiological theories of war which
postulate m a n ' s biological nature and accen-
tuate h u m a n aggressiveness.1
Similarly deceptive and fallacious are the
inadequate applications of the 'general theory
of conflict', loaded as they are with the
inherent danger of superficial analogies:
inquiries into the process of escalation, in
which a scuffle between children is compared
to a conflict involving several States [9, 1 0 ] .
Just as non-Marxist science has failed to
elaborate a coherent and reliable theory of
the scientific and technological revolution,
attempts to propound a reliable theory of w a r
and peace have yielded largely untenable
results. I refer, as well, to the trends to establish
theories that merit serious attention (those
which seize the fact that the problems of the
source of wars and the w a y s and m e a n s of
settling them are firmly rooted in the socio-
economic sphere).
Approaches false or formalistic
S o m e of these theories relate the cause of
wars to 'general h u m a n interests', and 'the
interaction of a number of factors' with an
inadequate differentiation of the determining
features of social life [11] or in the 'political
immaturity of the developing countries',
claimed to provide a source of military tension
(the theory of Walt W . Rostow). Causes are
also found in the 'inertia of the military institu-
tion', presented as the primary source of war
96 Miroslav Soukup
by the economist J o h n K. Galbraith and the
mathematical psychologist Anatol Rapoport,
and in the 'non-existence of a world state' as
contended by Bertrand Russell and Arnold
Toynbee.
There are also formalistic approaches, basing
their models on an incorrect classification
which simplifies inadequately existing systems,
e.g. the four-component dichotomy, 'big
powers-small countries; economically devel-
oped society-insufficiently developed society'
(Johan Galtung). There are studies originating
in sections of the developing world which fail
to analyse such determining features as the
structure of economic dependence and n o n -
equivalent exchange; examples are the studies
directed by Amilcar Herera at the Bariloche
Foundation (Argentina). That m a n y of these
scholars are significantly engaged in the
struggle for peace should not preclude the
problems of adequacy of description of the
world as it is advanced in their theories or
that the effectiveness of their research and
recommendations.
Despite the variety of trends and the hetero-
geneity of non-Marxist theories, they have a
c o m m o n methodological guideline. It is reduc-
tionism in the sense of abstracting, in their
models, from the essential properties of the
real object. There is also evident a n e o -
mechanicism in conceiving social systems as
if they develop without making qualitative and
revolutionary leaps.
1. O n e of the prominent proponents of the zoological
approach to the analysis of laws governing the h u m a n
population and social life is the ethologist Konrad
Lorenz. His mechanical extrapolation of findings
obtained in his research on animal behaviour in terms
of h u m a n conduct can b e expressed briefly as
'aggression - a factor of progress*. T h e logical
conclusion of his failure to grasp the complexity of
h u m a n society is accompanied by a corresponding
inability to grasp the complexity of the social task of
disarmament Of the eight dangers listed by Lorenz
as threatening mankind, he describes the elimination,
of nuclear weapons as the most easily soluble problem.
The animal behaviourist admits, however, that in
view of 'mankind's incredible collective stupidity'
even this goal is to be reached with difficulty [8].
 W a r as a specific form of political coercion
History has witnessed, in recent centuries,
a number of ventures launched by great
thinkers in quest of a road leading
to the end of wars and 'eternal peace'.
These ideals were not matched, however,
in the reality of the conditions that would be
conducive to their materialization.
History estimates that in the last 5,500 years
mankind has been afflicted with s o m e
14,000 wars which have brought death
to about 4,000 million people.
Marx and Engels provided a framework for
the scientific explanation of the p h e n o m e n o n
of war, in terms of the theory of historical
materialism and scientific socialism.
Lenin devoted increasing attention to the
elaboration of a theory of w a r within
the framework of his theory of imperialism.
W a r , he believed, is a specific form
of political coercion interlinked with specific
social conditions-a specific instrument
employed under conditions of class-based
antagonistic societies and rivalry between
States in their pursuit of specific
political and economic objectives.
The instrument is used by the ruling classes
1. For the views of another specialist on the roles of 'State capitalism' and 'State bourgeoisie', within communist society,
cf. C . Bettelheim. Les Luttes des Classes en URSS 1917-1923 (Class struggle in the U . S . S . R . , 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 3 ) , Paris,
Maspéro/Seuil, 1974.—Ed.
• Militarism a n d the militarization of
science
M o d e r n militarism c a m e into being as a tool
employed by a capitalist State to ensure-and
this is its external function-the preparation
and use of military power for the protection
of the external goals of capital; the inner
function consists of the creation of a special
material and ideological basis, i.e. the appa-
ratus of coercion capable of maintaining the
social stability of a system based o n the
organization of production as o n e of private
property and the related form of the class
structure and the State.
During the present stage of the social
process, the system of militarism progressed
towards a qualitatively n e w level. This o n e
The scientific-technical revolution and a comprehensive disarmament programme
w h o s e interests determine and shape
the specific political course.1
The central idea of Lenin's thesis is the
organic unity of domestic and foreign policy, '
the t w o major components of the general
pattern of a policy specific to the class
ruling a given State. The criterion for analysis
of the content of a specific w a r is the
objective role of this w a r in the historical
process of social progress. A system
of criteria specifying social progress
thus implies a system of classificatory
criteria applied to wars.
The socio-economic roots of international
conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century,
resulting in t w o world wars, lay
in the economic and political aggressiveness
of the imperialist p o w e r s ; they lay also
in the drive towards a re-division of the world
and its domination backed by far-reaching
developments in the military, economic,
political and ideological spheres.
'Briefly', summarized Lenin,
' "world domination" forms the actual
•content of imperialist policy with imperialist
war as its continuation'.
has n o more than a faint resemblance to
militarism in the preceding stages. I refer to
the n e w level's scope of operations, its status
within the State and the entire p o w e r structure
(armed forces, the military-industrial base,
centres of military research, other executive
bodies, and even military-political concepts).
The most powerful machinery for annihilation
in the history of mankind thus c a m e into
being, a machinery operated largely by the
most aggressive and most reactionary forces.
The latter are outside the control of even
those governments of capitalist States that
follow a realistic policy but are unable never-
theless to contain the mounting p o w e r of
such forces. The latter are therefore a permanent
and possibly fatal threat to society, since the
forces of militarism are able to offer not only
97
n e w systems ' of w e a p o n s to the financial
oligarchy but also, if the need arises, political
adventures of a neo-fascist type [12].
During the period of pre-monopoly capi-
talism, armament concerns constituted inde-
pendent branches of industrial production.
By the 1920s and 1930s, following a w a v e
of stimuli provided by the State, this sector of
production attained a specially privileged posi-
tion. Until the 1950s, firms of this type were
transformed into autonomous and stable
capitalist monopolies. Over the past twenty
years, they, have developed into one of the
most powerful areas of capitalist production.
The resulting economic power of national and
international corporations providing arms,
ammunition and extended technical services
to the armed forces enables them to affect
the political strategies of governments and
aggravate the international situation by w a y
of material preparation for war. These corpo-
rations are a main driving force behind the
militarization of science, as promoted by the
capitalist State.
The militarization of science, a multifaceted
process of considerable complexity reaching
far beyond the volume of resources earmarked
for military purposes, is the most extensive
attempt by capital to use against mankind
the achievements of the h u m a n intellect
A n d of grave pertinence are the manifold
consequences of the ideology of militarism.
• C o n t e m p o r a r y equalization of forces
A prime aspect of this ideology is the thesis
of the more or less equal responsibility shared
by capitalist and socialist countries for the
arms race. Understandably the Soviet Union
and the socialist countries were faced with
the need to counteract, in due form, armament
by capitalist countries. They had to increase
their defence potential, but they continued
to utilize this potential for the implementation
of a peace programme. Even w h e n the Soviet
Union gained supremacy in specific areas of
military technology, it incorporated such
advances into definite proposals within the
peace programme-but never used them as
deterrents to peace. T h e socialist countries
are compelled to have this recourse, despite
the fact that in their o w n economic develop-
ment they could use these resources positively,
for the promotion of socialist e c o n o m y and
a socialist w a y of life, and as aid to developing
countries.
98 Miroslav. Soukup
S o changes in the balance of forces,
including modifications in the structure of
military power in favour of the socialist
countries, represent the only possible w a y
of realizing the transformation of the world
into one free of w e a p o n s and wars. T h e
M o s c o w Agreement, signed by the Soviet
Union and the United States in 1972, is the most
important international accord reached so far
in the long-term strategic effort to create a
demilitarized world. It w a s only in face of the
mounting power of the socialist community
and a world-wide upsurge of anti-militaristic
forces that the diplomacy of Western political
power acquired a n e w feature: the willingness
to participate in serious and constructive talks
on such matters.1
Analysis and prognosis concerning funda-
mental changes in the balance of the forces
of peace and w a r at the present stage of
h u m a n history lead to o n e of the main
achievements of Marxism: the theoretical
conclusion that mankind must resolve a
historical task in the prevention of nuclear
war, with the ultimate. objective of creating
a civilization unfearful of wars, one without
arms. This is not only objective necessity,
it is a real possibility.
• T h e duty of scientists
There is nothing automatic in the process,
however, and unity of both objective and
subjective factors is the pre-condition. Success-
ful resolution of the problem will depend o n ,
first an optimal degree of the structure of a
comprehensive programme for disarmament
and, second, the degree of mobilization of
social forces whereby scientists and their
organizations can assume the extremely great
responsibility of implementing this programme.
The Soyuz-Apollo project last s u m m e r ,
symbolized the tremendous possibilities for
international scientific and technological c o -
operation, especially if these proliferated into
all spheres of social and economic life. It is
the duty of scientists to turn this possibility
into an irreversible reality.
1. 'From the start [of the S A L T - 1 negotiations], the
t w o sides have engaged in a frank, open, non-pole-
mical dialogue on the weapons most vital to their
security. That is itself a watershed. Certainly it is not
to be taken lightly or taken forgranted.'—J. N e w h o u s e ,
•Salt V - a t the Summit', The New Yorker, 2June 1973,
p. 101.
 To accomplish this, a n e w level of synthesis
of the natural and social sciences is n e e d e d - a s
well as a n e w level of co-operation between
scientists from countries with different social
systems. Major international scientific pro-
grammes launched, for instance, by Unesco,
are important factors in the development of
science, of course; they are also important
in the growth of mutual confidence a m o n g
nations.
REFERENCES
1. Man—science—technology: a Marxist analysis
of the scientific-technological revolution.
Prague, Academia Praha, 1973.
2 . R I C H T A , R. Vedeckotechnická revoluce
a perspektivy rozvoje Spolecnosti.
Sociologicky casopis, no. 6 , 1974.
3. K U T T A . F.; S O U K U P , M . et al. Rizenl v obdobl
vedeckotechnické revoluce: principy
socloekonómického rizenl. Prague. Svoboda, 1973.
4 . M E S A R O V I C . M . ; PESTEL, E. Mankind •
at the turning point: second report of the Club
of Rome. N e w York. N . Y . .
Reader's Digest Press, 1974.
5. S O U K U P , M . Princip mirnogo suscestvovanija
v strukture strategiceskoj programmy
rozvitija celoveceskogo obscestva.
Referat predneseny na vedecké konferenci
Principy mlrového souzitf v dejinách
mezinárodnlch vztahu. M o s c o w , 1975.
6. P R I M A K O V , E. Problems of ending the arms
race and eliminating the danger of nuclear war
and the contribution of scientists to the solution
of these problems. Report presented
at an international symposium on 'The Role
of Scientists and of their Organizations
in the Struggle for Disarmament'. M o s c o w .
July 1975.
7 . F E D O S E Y E V , P. Kommunlsm i filosofiya.
M o s c o w , Nauka, 1971.
8. L O R E N Z , K. Die acht Todsünden der zivilisierten
Menschheit. Munich, Piper Verlag, 1973.
9. G A N T M A N . V . Typen. Inhalt, Struktur
und Entwicklungsphasen internationaler Konflikte.
. In: W . von Bredow (ed.). Zum Charakter
internationaler Konflikte Studien aus West-
und Osteuropa. Cologne, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1973.
10. K R Y S M A N S K I , H . Soziologie des Konflikts.
Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt 1972.
11. W R I G H T , Q . A study of war. Chicago, III.,
University of Chicago Press, 1 9 4 2 .
12. K U Z M I N , G . Voenno-promyslennye koncerny.
Moscow, Mysl., 1974.
The scientific-technical revolution and a comprehensive disarmament programme
TO DELVE M O R E DEEPLY
A B O L T I N , V . Strategiya imperializma iborba SSSR
za mir I razoruzeniye. M o s c o w , Nauka, 1974.
A R B A T O V, G . The war of ideas in contemporary
International relations. M o s c o w , Progress Publishers,
1973.
V O N B R E D O V , W . Ökonomische und soziale Folgen
der Abrüstung. Texte aus West - und Osteuropa.
Köln, Pahl-Rugenstein-Verlag, 1974.
H O L L I T S C H E R , W . (ed.) Aggressionstrieb und Krieg.
Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlage-Anstalt, 1973.
I N O Z E M T Z E V , N . Contemporary capitalism:
new developments and contradictions.
M o s c o w , Progress Publishers, 1974.
K A R A , K. ; R E H A K , J. Postaveni valky a miru ve
vedomi lidi [War and peace in the consciousness
of people.
Results of international comparative research].
Sociologicky casopis. no. 5 , 1 9 7 1 .
M A R X , K . ; E N G E L S , F.; LENIN, V. On scientific
communism. M o s c o w , Progress Publishers, 1967.
R I C H T A , R. The social nature of 'global problems'
of contemporary civilization. Peace and the sciences.
no. 2 , 1 9 7 4 . Scientific and technological revolution
and prospects of social development
(Plenary session I). VIII World Congress of Sociology.
SCHILLER, H . ; PHILLIPS, J. Super-state:readings
in the military-Industrial complex. University
of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London, 1970.
Symposium : The scientific and technological
revolution and the social sciences, to be held
6-10 September 1976 in Prague (Czechoslovakia).
Principal papers to be delivered by E. Mendelsohn
and R. Richta. For details, contact Programme
Specialist, Division for International Development
of the Social Sciences, Unesco, 7 Place de Fontenoy,
75700 Paris (France).
• Miroslav Soukup
The author, associate professor of international
relations and senior scientific worker
at the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences'
Institute for Philosophy and Sociology.
is a leading specialist in development planning
and the sociology of international relations.
Professor Soukup is co-author of
Rlzeni v Obdobl Vedeckotechnické Revoluce:
Principy Socioekonómického Rlzenf
(Management in the age of scientific
and technical revolution: principles
of socio-economic management),
Prague, Svoboda, 1973, and co-editor of
Sociálnl Efektivnost a Sociálnl Plánování
(Social efficiency and social planning),
Prague, Ustav pro Filosofii a Sosiologii
CSAV, 1975. Address:
Ustav pro Filosofii a Sociologii CSAV,
Jilskâ 1,110 00 Praha 1 (Czechoslovakia).
99
A tale of t w o forts
Strasbourg, the capital of Alsace (in France),
¡s a community which has been heavily
fortified for most of the more than t w o
millennia of its existence.
Situated on a fertile plain only three kilo-
metres west of the Rhine River, the t o w n w a s a
Celtic settlement a little more than 2,000 years
ago. During the R o m a n occupation of Europe,
the town (then k n o w n as Argentoratum)
served as headquarters, for the Eighth Legion
of the R o m a n A r m y . It w a s here that the
Alamanni-forerunners, with the Franks, of
today's German race-met defeat in the year
357 at the hands of Julian, later Emperor of
Rome.
W h e n the town w a s conquered, in turn,
by the Franks during the fifth century, it w a s
named Strassburg. In 9 2 3 , it became part of
the Germanic empire under Heinrich I. B y
the 1330s, the community had been declared
impact of science on society, Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976
a 'free imperial city', a status it maintained
until the French Revolution.
During a period of peace, Louis XIV seized
Strasbourg in 1681 and immediately assigned
his commissioner-general of fortifications,
Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, to integrate
n e w with old defences of the Alsatian capital.
Marshal Vauban (1633-1707) is perhaps the
foremost military engineer of all time. H e
contributed to the building or reconstruction
of 160 forts and fortresses, elaborated France's
'first and second', and later, 'third' systems
of physical defence, developed the use of
mining as a tactic of attack, rearmed French
infantry forces with the flintlock musket and
socket bayonet and took part personally in
more than 3 0 0 battle engagements. (Vauban w a s
also seriously concerned by the social condition
of European peasants, and accurately foresaw
h o w the Revolution of 1789 would unfold.)
101
• Hydraulics for defence
The view portrayed in Figure 1 shows an
application of hydraulics and hydrology to
the needs of military technology. The viewer
is standing atop sluices forming a d a m
capable of regulating the flow of water north-
eastward into the three branches of the III
River, between which most of the old city
w a s built on islands. Cutting off the supply
of water would deny to invaders fluvial access
to this part of Strasbourg, forcing the marauders
to m a k e an approach by land against the
easily defensible high ramparts of masonry
which surrounded the city (until a century
ago). T h e hydraulic works were an added
technical measure to reinforce the fourteenth-
century square towers in which were later
installed large-calibre guns-visible in the
sketch within the casemates at the waterline
of the stone piers surmounted by t w o of the
four original towers.
The brownstone towers were once connected
by w o o d e n bridges, to facilitate communication
between the town's islands in time of peace
or war. Near by, a satellite defensive installation
called Fort Kehl buttressed the eastern safe-
guards against attack from that direction.
Today, Kehl is the frontier point of entry to
the Federal Republic of Germany from the
French side of the Rhine; daily, thousands
of French workers cross the river to regular
jobs in German manufacturing plants.
102 A tale of t w o forts
• F r o m w a r to p e a c e , but gradually
Vauban's fixed fortifications lost their useful-
ness as military technology evolved and armies
modernized themselves, both offensively and
defensively. The French Army's garrison of
17,000 troops surrendered Strasbourg on
2 8 September 1871 during the closing stages
of the Franco-Prussian W a r . A highly mobile
and determined German field force had simply
surrounded the 'impregnable' old citadel and
held it under siege for seven weeks.
Strassburg, as it w a s once again called,
served as headquarters for the Fifteenth
Corps of the German Imperial Army, until the
beginning of the First World W a r . After the
defeat of Germany, retrocession of Alsace to
French rule w a s confirmed by the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919-but the area w a s to change
hands twice more in our century.
Today, few remnants of the military techno-
logy of ages past can be seen in the Rhenish
city of 250,000 inhabitants. Still an important
industrial and university centre, Strasbourg'
has become the seat of the interparliamentary
Council of Europe, a peaceful forum representing
eighteen nations and two observer States.
impact
Three realistic approaches
to peace:
peacekeeping, peacemaking,
peacebuilding
Johan Galtung

The neurophysiology of technological war may find its mirror-image in the scien-
tific anatomy of peace as a social structure. This structure traditionally has been
a process of conflict between interest groups, spreading vertically or horizontally.
Conflict translates itself into either 'structural' or 'direct' violence. Maintenance
of peace can be undertaken via a dissociative approach, or one of conflict resolution,
or again by an associative approach. The three methods are analysed in detail.

• Peacekeeping: the dissociative there can be no exploitation. If there is

approach
The classical approach to the assurance of
peace has often suggested the balance of
power. This approach is basically dissociative:
the antagonists are kept apart under mutual
threats of considerable punishment should
they transgress, especially into another's
territory [I].1 Balance of power often is
accompanied by other dissociative social
measures, such as mutual prejudice (or social
distance), not to mention such Classical
recourse as the use of geography in the form
of distance (an ocean, a desert) or impedi-
ments (a river, a mountain range).
If the social forces of threat of destructive
behaviour and an attitude of hatred or contempt
are insufficient to keep the antagonists apart,
third parties m a y be called in (or call them-
selves in) to exercise peacekeeping operations,
e.g. patrol of a border. Should the two geogra-
phical deterrents already mentioned prove to be
inadequate, technology m a y be used to
supplement natural topography: explosive
mines, electromagnetic fences, and the like [2].
The dissociative approach has s o m e merits.
It is equitable-if not egalitarian-since it
prescribes a social vacuum or. near-vacuum
between the antagonists, and in a vacuum
inequality, it is not because one antagonist
exploits the other.
But the demerits are more conspicuous.
First, in this situation, arms are targeted.
There must be not only the capacity to destroy,
but also s o m e credibility that this capacity
will be used and n o doubt as to w h o the
enemy is. The impact of this in terms of
creating a garrison state within, and a world
of fear without, is well k n o w n . There is power
but little balance, or, at the m o s t s o m e
precarious dynamic balance. Dynamism in
an arms race is contagious. Because of the
coupling of the world's conflicts, the dyna-
mism spreads to other parts of the world,
through vertical and horizontal proliferation [3],
or simply through imitation.
Second, the world n o longer fits this
approach, geography having become largely
irrelevant There is n o geographical distance
or impediment which technology cannot
outbid. Technology can then be met with
n e w technology, a m o v e which is tantamount
to a n e w kind of arms race. Prejudice can be
counted upon in crises, but not in general
conditions because people n o w circulate
1. Figures in brackets refer to the notes at the end of
the article.

impact of science on society. Vol. 2 6 , N o . 1 / 2 . . 1 9 7 6 103

considerably and k n o w other peoples too
well. W e a p o n s are becoming increasingly too
dangerous to be used, leading to a proliferation
of small-scale, 'outdated' w e a p o n s . But the
argument holds, to a great extent.
It is in this context that the call c o m e s for
third parties to supplement the dangerous
dissociative strategies followed by first and
second parties. W h e n w a r breaks out between
t w o groups, the status quo ante bellum has
been disrupted. O n e approach to solving the
problem is to re-establish the status quo;
this is an actor-oriented approach since it
seeks to prevent actors from engaging in
'evil actions'. T h e question is not immediately
asked whether the status quo is worth pre-
serving (or re-establishing) or if possibly
it w a s even inferior to a violent encounter
because of the structural violence built into it.
Questions such as these lie outside the scope
of the approach: the intention is to 'keep the
peace', which means maintaining the absence
of direct violence. It is often said that this
method permits time to be gained, that
peacemaking and peacebuilding can proceed
in parallel to the keeping of the peace. T h e
problem w e must explore here is w h y this
seems to be so difficult [4],
The typology of war
If the t w o parties at w a r can disentangle
themselves from their deadly embrace and
return to the status quo (sometimes they can),
the question of third parties will not arise.
But let us assume that peacekeeping is carried
out by third parties. This immediately raises
three questions: W h a t kinds of first and second
parties are there? W h a t kinds of third parties
are possible ? W h a t are the means at the
disposal of third parties to bring about a
status quo!
T o discuss these questions, w e need to
examine a typology of wars and their underlying
conflicts.
The dilemma of peacekeeping is not h o w
to find a third party, legitimize its actions
under s o m e form of collective security, and
m a k e it capable of performing its roles
adequately-problems which, characteristically,
have attracted the most attention [5]. T h e
dilemma seems to be, rather, h o w peace-
keeping can differentiate between horizontal,
vertical and 'diagonal' wars [6], not treating
them all naively as 'wars', 'trouble', 'shooting
in the streets', and so on.
104 Johan Gattung
A good case can be m a d e for peacekeeping
in a horizontal conflict, in one between equals
neither of w h o m is dominant. If associative
mechanisms (see page III) have not been tried
or have been found inadequate to preserve
peace, the next approach-unless o n e wants
w a r - m u s t be dissociation. That is, w h e n
geography proves to be insufficient improve
the situation with technology; and if the
forces of social distance and balance of
power are inadequate [7], the assistance of
third parties might be tried in order to keep
the belligerents apart.
The difficulty is that only a fraction of wars
are horizontal. If they are few in number,
they can be none the less large in scope, e.g.
s o m e aspects of the First and Second World
W a r s , but unlike the wars of liberation since
1945 [8]. In these cases, peacekeeping
cannot (deliberately or otherwise) be a means
to maintain a structure of dominance. It is
truly a third element; if peacekeeping inter-
venes and freezes vertical conflict into status
quo between 'centre' and 'periphery' [9]
then, whether intentionally or not the function
itself becomes party to the conflict: 'peace-
keeping' sides objectively with the side
showing the most interest in preserving the
status quo. Although elementary, this fact is
too often forgotten.
The novelty of international peacekeeping
W e need to distinguish next between intra-
national, intraregional and international peace-
keeping efforts. T h e first is nothing n e w : it is
what the State is supposed to d o , one of its
major functions. The State intervenes in
both vertical and horizontal internal conflicts.
It is unnecessary here to explore further h o w
 State intervention in vertical disputes, such as
those of striking workers, traditionally turn the
State into a second (rather than a third)
party [10].
Nor. is intraregional peacekeeping, n e w .
Within its sphere of influence the country
possessing the monopoly of power-the
hegemonical p o w e r - h a s always engaged in
horizontal and vertical peacekeeping. It has
kept the peace a m o n g States of the periphery
as well as stopping the periphery from
launching attacks against the centre. W h a t
I have said above about intranational peace
preservation applies here, also [11],
W h a t is n e w is international peacekeeping,
as foreseen in the Charter of the United
Nations or envisaged earlier in the Covenant
of the League of Nations [12], Given the
present world 'order', this kind of peace-
keeping must be limited in scope, one usually
unable to intervene in the t w o types of
internal disorders mentioned. Pursuant to the
doctrine of non-intervention in internal affairs,
the nation-state holds a monopoly on keeping
the peace within its area of jurisdiction. T h e
same State cannot intervene, furthermore, in
intraregional wars-whether they be between
two periphery nations within one 'empire', or
simply imperialistic wars. Based on doctrines
of regional peacekeeping (such as the M o n r o e
and Brezhnev doctrines, both standing in
opposition to Chapter 8 of the United Nations
Charter), the region itself has a near-monopoly
on peacekeeping within its o w n domain of
influence [13].
This rules out m a n y types of wars, e.g. the
whole gamut of historical wars on the Indo-
Chinese peninsula [14]. It rules out various
types of subversive wars as well as inter-
nationalized 'class' wars, because of the highly
conspicuous internal character of these:
although internal in nature, they also possess an
element of international assistance or c o -
ordination. While there m a y be a case for the
patrolling of c o m m o n waterways, for forcing
non-intervention and things of that kind,
these are not to be confused with peace-
keeping operations.
This leaves us with wars between centre
nations and those between periphery countries
as candidates for truly international peace-
keeping. Even here, there remains one more
filter, the third dilemma of international peace-
keeping: it is intended for the w e a k , not the
strong. Elements of the instrument (keeping
the peace) are used in the conflict between
Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding
Israel and the Arab States, between Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, between India
and Pakistan, and so o n . But not between
the United States and the Soviet Union, or
between the Soviet Union and China. This is
not only because the United Nations is w e a k
but because, if peacekeeping could be
imposed, the big powers would no longer be
big, certainly not super-powers.
It is true that the rationalization of the
situation m a y well be expressed in terms of
quality and quantity of the respective military
machinery which could be brought to bear
on the problem. ' N o one else is strong and
sophisticated enough to keep peace between
us'. But the other interpretation I have
proffered is deeper, and more in accordance
with the facts [15].
Extrication from the dilemma
T o be a big power and, a fortiori, a super-
power is to have the right to be one's o w n
peacekeeper. O n e is fully autonomous and
responsible, according to this view, and not
in need of being looked after. If one never-
theless goes to war, it is because such a m o v e
is unavoidable. There m a y be a small probability
of miscalculation, of technical error, yes; but
that can be smoothed out by the mathematical
technique of system analysis and through
direct, centre-centre negotiation leading to
arms control.
This is nothing for lesser powers to meddle
with. T o be a lesser power, continues this
m o d e of thinking, connotes a lower level of
technical rationality, a lack of experience in
handling the tools of war, a certain volatility
-all factors making most periphery-periphery
wars less than necessary and more evitable
than centre-centre conflicts. Conclusion: the
target of peacekeeping is reduced to wars
between periphery nations from different
regions [16].
Let us n o w retrace our steps and.try to
indicate s o m e measures to extricate ourselves
from these three dilemmas. T h e world cannot
do without a peacekeeping instrument, but
neither can it accept one having so m a n y
constraints and weaknesses. I shall take the
dilemmas in the reverse order of their presen-
tation above.
First, horizontal peacekeeping must be
made more symmetric. If there is to be peace-
keeping in the periphery by the big powers
(even by the super-powers) or condoned
105
 by them in terms of a United Nations formula,
then there must also be provision for peace-
keeping in the centre by the periphery. T h e
idea is less impractical or Utopian than it m a y
. sound. M a n y scenarios for the initial phase of
a major war in Europe are based o n trans-
1
gression across the East-West borderline
running north-south between the Norwegian-
Soviet frontier to the boundary between
Bulgaria and Greece-Turkey. T o station
United Nations troops along this border, or
at s o m e of its critical points, would be an
extremely important symbol of symmetry and
of the global sharing of major problems. T h e
s a m e applies to the positioning of United
Nations forces along the Ussuri River or
other sections of the 10,000 km-long frontier
between China and the Soviet Union.
But this kind of symmetry, which m a n y
would find to be artificial, is not the only
possibility. Symmetry can also be obtained by
locking out the traditional centre from peace-
keeping in the periphery. This is what w a s
done by the Organization of African Unity,
for example, in the Moroccan-Algerian conflict;
it ~ is what a future Organization of Latin
American States in all likelihood will d o ,
what the Arab League might d o within its
domains, what India might aspire to d o in
south Asia.
A s I shall argue later, I find this regionaliza-
tion suboptimal for, if peace is indivisible,
peacekeeping should be even more so. W h a t ,
for example, would prevent the peacekeeping
machineries from turning against each other?
Very little. Hence, I would prefer symmetry
through exchange to symmetry through
dissociation. [17].
Second, there is the problem of extending
the sphere of applicability of international
peacekeeping. This means, unequivocally,
breaking through the artificial walls called
regions and States which mankind has built
round itself. T h e unconditional doctrine of
non-intervention will have to go, in any case;
this will be an extremely painful, drawn-out
process.
That the doctrine must be abandoned
cannot be more evident than in the case of
Bangladesh. According to the thesis of n o n -
intervention, genocide of a nation aspiring
to s o m e form of statehood-whether fully
autonomous or autonomous within a confede-
ration [ 1 8 ] - w a s able to occur unimpeded by
anyone's 'peacekeeping' efforts, until finally
India stepped in [19]. Or, to take a contrived
106 Johan Galtung
example: imagine that Hitler had said in 1936
that he had n o territorial ambitions at all,
that all he wished w a s to kill all the J e w s on
w h o m he could lay hands. Would this consti-
tute a case for intervention? T h e point is
simply that with internal wars becoming more
(not less) important, the unlimited doctrine
of non-intervention will become increasingly
anachronistic. A search for more discriminating
criteria must begin.
The same can be said about the monopoly
on peacekeeping held by regions dominated
by the hegemonical powers. These regions,
like the United States-dominated O A S and
the Soviet-dominated W a r s a w Pact are
merely empires badly disguised. Their nature
w a s revealed clearly w h e n they were used
to uphold structures of domination in the
Dominican Republic (1965) and in Czecho-
slovakia (1968) with the assistance, of course,
of s o m e of their respective satellites [20].
In both cases intervention took place under
the pretext that the 'other side' w a s launching
subversive warfare, the evidence therefor
being extremely slim in each case [21].
The fight against intra-bloc monopoly o n
peacekeeping is easier than the struggle
against intra-national monopoly o n peace-
keeping. Today, all over the world, there is
a certain sentiment against blocs dominated
by one power. B y the end of the century,
there m a y be no such blocs left after having
shared the fate of the systems of pax britannica
and pax gallica (although s o m e of their
'residuals' linger o n ) [22].
If one imagines a general horizontalization
of regions, then regional peacekeeping, such
as for the O A U , would obviously be different
from the examples mentioned. Yet peace-
keeping should continue to be authorized by
the United Nations; it should be decen-
tralized in execution, rather than regionalized
in authority [23]. In the regions international
wars would then be horizontal, n o longer
vertical.
W h e r e the entrenched intta-national'mono-
poly o n peacekeeping reigns, w e find a
traditional and sophisticated system. S o the
world must find an institutional w a y to
represent Bangladesh, Basque Euzkadi and
Ulster to world authority instead of limiting
their voices to Pakistan, Spain and the
United Kingdom. Intergovernmental authority
cannot be relied upon o n such issues; the
prestige lost by the United Nations in south
Asia because of its inability to deal with the
 Bangladesh Situation can hardly b e over-
estimated.
Third, there is the role of peacekeeping
in regard to vertical conflict, that conflict
arising from structural violence. O n e .can
imagine three positions on this issue.
The formalistic stand. Trouble is trouble, and
any w a r can be handled in the same w a y .
Besides, there will be no agreement as to
the kind of w a r being w a g e d . Conclusion:
third-party intervention.
The 'let it work itself out' stand. A vertical w a r
is the acting out of internal contradictions
which have to work themselves out.
Because the progressive forces will win, the
rest of the world should stay out. Conclu-
' sion: no third-party intervention, because it
would support the second party.
The 'use peacekeeping on the side of peace'
stand. T o keep peace, in the sense of
absence of direct violence being inadequate,
one should m a k e peace in the sense of
abolishing structural violence. Conclusion:
third-party intervention, on the side of the
first party.
I reject the first position as mechanistic and,
in practice, counterproductive to the cause
of peace because it preserves structural
violence and thereby ultimately promotes
direct violence. I refute the second position
because, a m o n g other reasons, it is cynical
to tell freedom fighters in southern Africa
to 'work it out' themselves, using simple
firearms against fighter-bombers and napalm;
this can lead to extended wars, with n o
guarantee as to result
The third stand is also problematical,
because of the difficulty in deciding whether
there is a clear case of domination and h o w
this operates. In s o m e cases this is simple; I
think that the United Nations should have
intervened, for example, on the side of the
freedom fighters in southern Africa. (That
this diagnosis is simple is revealed by the
near-unanimity of the United Nations resolu-
tion o n the issue.)
Reducing built-in servility
The modern w a r of liberation proceeds by
freeing territories and turning them into models
of what the future State will be once it has
been liberated from structural violence. Inter-
national peacekeeping should consist not
only of giving funds and k n o w - h o w of various
kinds to these lands but, as the very m i n i m u m .
Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding
of helping protect them. A peacekeeping
operation in a horizontal conflict should be a
t w o - w a y wall separating the parties ; that in a
vertical conflict should be a o n e - w a y filter,
permitting the freedom fighters to enter
liberated territory while preventing access to
the oppressors. Peacekeeping could thus
b e c o m e a valuable implement, responding
with less built-in servility to the status quo
than found in recent operations of the kind.
The problem of third-party intervention to
prevent structural violence, not only direct
violence, is bound to rise higher o n the
world's political agenda. I mentioned the case
of Hitler bent on killing J e w s , yet protected
by the doctrine of non-intervention. W h a t if
Hitler had said, 'I do not want to kill them
suddenly, but slowly: exposing them to
malnutrition and protein deficiency, slum
conditions, no health facilities, no education,
the most menial and dangerous w o r k ' ?
H e would have put into words what m a n y
societies actually practice. T h e plight sounds
worse w h e n intended and verbalized, but the
consequences for the victims are about the
same [24].
W h y should not this be a case for inter-
vention ? Are w e bound to wait for the legisla-
tive assembly or the élite of a given country to
react, to be sufficiently aroused by compassion
or self-interest to change conditions [25] ?
Does structural violence have to be converted
into direct violence that can be seen as a
threat to the outside world as well [26] ?
W o u l d such a conversion be in the interest
of mankind w h e n clear indicators of structural
violence could also be established [27] ? Or
is this only one more expression of the exces-
sive weight given to actor-oriented perspec-
tive, as opposed to the structure-oriented
view? Sooner or later this instrument will
have to be m a d e less biased-directed not
only against the destruction of h u m a n life
but also against its destruction in, for example,
urban slums.
Let m e take another problem. S o far, the
United Nations peacekeeping forces seem to
have been able to draw o n considerable
goodwill and enthusiasm in nations such as
Canada and those of the Nordic world [28].
To what extent are these sentiments condi-
tioned by the improbability that these forces
will ever be used on their o w n territory ?
Finally there is the question of whether
the police or the military c o m e closest to
filling third-party roles. T h e experience of
police forces in s o m e countries, keeping a low
profile and using soft forms of power, are
said by s o m e to be more compatible with
peacekeeping functions than that of the
armed forces (focused as these are on first-
and second-party activities) [29]. N o w turn
the argument round: a pattern of police bruta-
lity developed through confrontation, in s o m e
countries, m a y have b e c o m e counterproductive
w h e n taken in the context of peacekeeping.
Military units m a y have less habit-forming
traditions in this case, simply because of
inactivity (as in Latin America) [30].
• Peacemaking: the approach through
conflict resolution
This is the approach which sounds obvious:
get rid of the sources of tension (the under-
lying conflict), and the rest will take care of
itself. Not only will war then wither a w a y , so
will the machinery for war and the arms race.
But in fact even if a conflict is resolved (or
about to be), there can still be w a r - o u t of
old hatreds, or as a projection of internal
conflict Even without war, the arms race
m a y continue: partly because of the threat of
other theatres of w a r , partly because of the
other factors which sustain an arms race. A n d
even with this race stopped, the war machi-
nery itself does not disappear quite so simply.
The resolution of conflict should always
be attempted, because the world has seen too
m a n y serious disagreements frozen into
protraction b y the dissociative approach
(whether used by the parties concerned or
with the aid of third parties)-without m e n -
tioning the disputes which have resulted in
devastating, open wars [31]. Conflict resolu-
tion should be seen not only as a w a y to
avoid w a r but as a w a y for mankind's progress,
a w a y for mankind to transcend the contradic-
tions and incompatibilities stifling progress. I
a m thinking not only of the diversion of major
proportions of the gross national product into
the military sector; I a m thinking of the impact
that unresolved conflict has on the minds of
m e n , becoming an obsession which blocks
creative thinking in other directions.
T o explore this approach, s o m e perspectives
on both conflict and conflict resolution are
indispensable. A conflict of goals exists w h e n
the actors involved are pursuing incompatible
goals, or least objectives which they d e e m
to be incompatible. Conflict of interest lies
more deeply, but let us begin by assuming that
108 Johan Galtung
conflicts of interest have been transformed into
conflicts of goals, that interests have been
consciously crystallized in goals, and the
parties concerned m a d e into actors through
consciousness-formation, mobilization and
organization. W e assume, in other words, that
the conflict is essentially horizontal in this
sense (although the parties m a y be unequal
in capacity).
It is in this conflict system that conflict
resolution must operate. Conflict itself should
not b e confused with its manifestations in
terms of attitude or behaviour, usually of a
negative or destructive kind. Although they
are only expressions of conflict, hatred and
violence m a y linger on after the conflict has
been resolved. Similarly, the conflict m a y
remain at the latent level, as an incompatibility,
without attitudinal or behavioural manifesta-
tions. T o try to attack conflict by regulating
attitude and comportment has about the s a m e
relation to conflict resolution as curing only
medical symptoms has to true therapy.
W h a t then, are the principal options to
resolve conflict? Because I have not the
space here to treat conflict theory extensi-
vely [32], let m e simply say that there are
t w o main choices.
Incompatibility and the actor system
There is, first the possibility of eliminating the
incompatibility; in a sense, this is the ideal
approach. But there are also forms of conflict
resolution which preserve the incompatibility,
because resolution is the negation of conflict
It is the condition in which actors are not
pursuing incompatible goals, e.g. they m a y
stop pursuing the goals because they are
suddenly busy with other things.
T h e second choice concerns the actor
system and the conflict system. Are these to be
preserved or changed ? The actor system being
part of the conflict system, there are three
further possibilities: preserve the actor system -
preserve the conflict system ; preserve the actor
system-change the conflict system; change
the actor system-(by implication) change the
conflict system.
At this stage, w e can draw the important
conclusion that conflict resolution m a y b e
more or less radical, i.e. more or less respectful
of the status quo (the list above tracing
increasingly radical approaches). This is
important since one's view of conflict resolu-
tion depends o n h o w m u c h one wishes to
Table 1. Twelve approaches to conflict resolution

Actor system Conflict system Incompatibility eliminated Incompatibility preserved

Preserved 1. Incompatibility 7 . A d d positive

resolved intra-action
Preserved 2. Compromise 8. A d d positive interaction

Changed (expanded) 3 . Trading 9. A d d negative interaction

Expansion 4 . Multilateralization 10. Interaction with,other

(more actors) actors
Changed Changing relations 5. Disintegration 11. Domination
Contraction 6. Integration 1 2 . Elimination
(to o n e actor)

preserve status quo. N o w w e combine the t w o
dimensions of choice and complete the
typology with a variety of approaches to
conflict resolution (Table 1 ) .
T o resolve the incompatibility, showing that
there is no real conflict, merely a perception of
same, this (item 1 in Table 1 ) can be done: (a)
empirically, w h e n sufficient funds, time or
energy are m a d e available to attain both
competing goals; (b) logically, w h e n any
incompatibility is 'interpreted away'. In either
case, what is acceptable is m a d e compatible,
which is the opposite of item 2 , the formula of
compromise (i.e. what is compatible is m a d e
acceptable to both parties).
W h e n trading (3), the actors are the s a m e
but the conflict system expands to include
more conflicts, one being traded against the
other. In multilateralization (4), the opposite
occurs: more actors enter the scene, esta-
blishing cycles of conflict which can b e
cancelled against each other. Both approaches
are crucial to the associative approach to peace.
There are also the possibilities of fission and
fusion: disintegration and integration (5) and
(6). In the last case, t w o actors fuse into one.
Their goals are harmonized so that there can
no longer be incompatibility. In disintegration,
t w o actors decouple so that they are free to
pursue goals without conflicting with o n e
another.
From intra-action to elimination
There is another set of approaches (right-hand
column of Table 1 ) in which it is assumed that
there is, for the time being, no incompatibility.
The first four of these are merely specifications
of the major approach to conflict, that of
protraction. T h e actors, engaging in other
kinds of activities, m a y turn inward (intra-
action (7)), or in positive interaction (8) like,
elsewhere, spouses in a protracted marital
conflict Or they m a y add more conflict (9) to
the existing situation by engaging in still
more negative interaction: 'If I steal your car
today and m a k e you angry, the chances are
you will forget this if tomorrow I burn d o w n
your house I' Then there c o m e s the possibility
of expanding the system by turning one's
attention towards outsiders (10), an obvious
strategy in a cold-war stalemate [33].
At the end of the list c o m e the dramatic
possibilities that few would describe as
resolution, because this term is usually taken
in too narrow a sense. The first of these is
structural violence, appearing in the table as
domination (11), in which the growingly
frustrated actor construes his inability to
formulate and pursue goals as psychological
capitulation. The second, elimination (12),
m e a n s direct violence: it is impossible for one
of the actors to pursue his goals any longer.
Methods include physical (killing, maiming),
social (seclusion or confinement), geogra-
phical (escape, expulsion) elimination; n o
matter which method is used, it is all violence.
Elimination is not a radical approach; it is
dishonest because it tries to resolve a conflict
the easy w a y , by extirpating o n e of the actors.

Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding 109

 It is dramatic, however, and this is where the
third-party approach is operable-where appear
the mediators, arbitrators, conciliators and
other go-betweens. These are called in not
so m u c h by first parties suffering from struc-
tural violence in the form of domination as by
second parties fearing direct violence in the
form of elimination. T h e invited third parties
usually have high standing in domestic or
global society and are, consequently, more
visible and accessible to the strong than the
w e a k , to the centre more than the periphery.
The third-party approach will be actor-
oriented almost by definition, for the tertiary
' element is supposed to constitute a h u m a n
link between the adversaries. Within the
optional communications possible, the third
party m a y meet the first and second one at a
time (or both together) in a setting of carefully
'controlled communication' [34], or in free
association. T h e purpose of the communica-
tion process m a y be to increase the parties'
awareness of the situation, to search for or
arrive at a solution, or even to implement an
agreed-upon decision.
Tactics will include ingenious, imaginative
efforts to resolve incompatibility, or perhaps
gentle persuasion leading towards c o m p r o -
mise; these are honest, but preserve the
system. Trading and multilateralization m a y be
added, although these g o somewhat further
in their structural implications. Protraction m a y
be tried with a genuine desire to gain time.
The processing of conflict
All this does not amount to a rejection of the
third-party instrument, one indispensable in
resolving horizontal conflicts, i.e. peacemaking
added to peacekeeping. T h e t w o adversaries
m a y be unable themselves, partly because of
the polarization of the conflict to work things
out This m a y lead to a call for third parties,
even to the right of third parties to intervene
lest the dispute spread and escalate [35]-a
'right' normally acceptable in horizontal
conflict This might be done by reaching for
highly unrepresentative 'representatives' of
the periphery, pretending even that they are
the periphery only because they are willing
to work inside the model.
Third parties m a y thus be regarded as the
processers of someone else's conflict (much
as a factory processes raw materials), develop-
ing solutions, and growing themselves as a
result of the process. This growth can take
110 Johan Gattung
the form of added experience, concentrated
insight into h u m a n affairs, accumulation of
prestige as 'conflict managers', and ultimately
power: all these attributes can be converted
into innate power, power of resources, and
structural power [36]. Co-operation a m o n g
third parties m a y b e c o m e the basis for a n e w
structure of dominance involving a n e w élite
of conflict managers. This has been evident in
the race between the United Nations and the
major powers to become the third party in the
Middle East, one able to bring 'peace' to the
region [37],
The general level of conflict-consciousness
should be raised throughout the world b y
better development of insight about conflict
This can b e done by promoting insight
through participation in active conflict and its
resolution-from early childhood, in the family,
at school, at work. Our conflicts have been
resolved traditionally by our hierarchical
superiors: parents, teachers, employers. T o o
often, the admission of conflict has been
seen as a kind of capitulation, as the negation
of harmony or efficiency. Y e t 'conflict parti-
cipation' is one of the most effective w a y s by
which a dominated periphery can gain
autonomy.
The major objection to the peacemaking
approach is that it often grows from an
unrealistic conception of conflict resolution,
according to which resolution is accomplished
w h e n an agreement has been negotiated that
can be ratified by both sides [38]. Conflict
resolution, in other words, is seen as something
resting in the minds of the conflicting parties,
the actors.
The concept is narrow and elitist because the
actors m a y disappear (disintegrate) and be
superseded b y n e w actors o n w h o m the
agreement is no longer binding. A n agreement
reached, often under third-party pressure, is
also not necessarily self-supporting. S o a sense
of moral commitment is not enough, and w e
must turn to factors lying more deeply in the
relations between various parties to establish
h o w to find self-supporting conflict resolution.
• Peacebuilding: the associative
approach
I have tried systematically to relate direct
violence to structural violence-or war to
dominance, to use another word-pair. Perhaps
most wars are vertical wars, in which the
dominated groups try to liberate themselves
from another's domination while the d o m i -
nants attempt to maintain their hold. W e
have examined horizontal conflicts, between
centres a n d between peripheries, wars that
cannot be explained in terms of domination.
There is a third type of struggle, the w a r
in a v a c u u m , the w a r across a zero relationship.
The first colonial wars were of this kind,
whereas today this category has diminished in
importance: w e n o w have a world system of
closed interaction, in w h i c h everyone has
something to d o with everyone else. But if
w e look at the total matrix of interaction
a m o n g territorial actors, a small percentage of
its cells accounts for close to 1 0 0 per cent of
the total interaction. S o if the remaining cells
of the matrix d o not stand for a relationship
of exactly zero, they are not far from it,
something like this:
Actors
+ + + = very m u c h interaction
0 = n o interaction
— = m u c h negative interaction
It is within this system of horizontal, vertical
and zero relations that both the classical and
the newest technical m e a n s of destruction are
accumulating. Although a healthy b o d y can
tolerate m a n y germs, the world's social
structure is not healthy. W e a p o n s already
produced a n d in position are likely to be
used, for there are g o o d reasons to put t h e m
to use. H e n c e , it m a k e s sense to ask w h a t a
healthy world ' b o d y ' w o u l d look like. W h a t
structure would reduce the likelihood of
peace? Or w h a t is the structure of peace?
Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding
In phrasing the question this w a y , the:
implicit hypothesis is that peace has a struc-
ture [39] different from peacekeeping and ad
hoc peacemaking. Given this, w h a t w o u l d w e
w a n t from a peace structure ? W e w o u l d not
w a n t it to have peacekeeping built in, since
w e w o u l d view the dissociative approach as a
sign of capitulation. But peacemaking should
be built in, yet not as an ad hoc effort to
resolve a conflict which has suddenly sur-
faced in the form of hatred or destructive
behaviour. S o structures must b e found to
remove the causes of w a r and to offer alter-
natives in situations in which w a r might
occur.
A n immediate example (but o n e to reject)
is the vertical bloc of big power/small p o w e r ,
with the stronger country assuming the role of
policeman. T h e trouble with the model is
that the big p o w e r tends to arrogate to itself
additional roles: those of judge. State's
witness, juryman, executioner, manager, presi-
dent, field marshal. While the net result m a y b e
the avoidance of direct violence, it is bought
at the expense of a frightening a m o u n t of
structural violence.
Establishing norms of equity
T o find better structures, let us take as a point
of departure the division of interaction in
vertical, horizontal and zero relations. W h a t
can be d o n e with these relations in order to
build a peace structure is presented in Table 2 .
Table 2 . T h e structure of peace: a suggestion
Social relations Structures
Vertical 1. Equity
Infr astruc;ture
2 . Entropy
Zero 3 . Symbiosis
Horizontal 4 . Broad scope
5. Large d o m a i n
6. Superstructure
To illustrate the rationale employed in this
proposition, let us take the examples provided
by the Nordic countries and by the European
Economic Community (EEC), or ' C o m m o n
Market'. In both cases there is a norm of
equity (1), with no party exploited [40].
111
Relations are entropie (2), meaning that
not only governments (élites, centres) parti-
cipate but that a great variety of people-to-
people interactions are involved. There is
symbiosis (3), or a high level of interdepen-
dence; the exchange within the system is a
substantial portion of the total production of
its members.
There is also broad scope (4), meaning that
there are economic as well as other types of
exchange. A n d there is large domain (5),
meaning that there are more than t w o or
three parties to the exchange (indeed, there
are five or nine). Incidentally, in the parlance
of the E E C , increasing scope and domain is
referred to as 'deepening' and 'extension'.
Finally, there is superstructure (6). It is w e a k
in the case of the Nordic countries, with an
annual conference rotating a m o n g the capi-
tals, administered by a feeble secretariat. It is
very strong in the case of the E E C , to the
point that the C o m m o n Market's 'Eurocrats'
have b e c o m e transnational rather than inter-
national.
But in both cases there has been obtained
what Karl Deutsch would call a security
area [41], where large-scale international
violence is extremely improbable. These m a y
be the only regions of their kind in the world.
If these six principles were applied a m o n g
non-territorial groups such as socio-economic
classes, the classes would vanish because of
the norm of equity (1). Without elaborating
on this, I should note only that the theory
behind Table 2 says nothing about our actors-
only that if they desire a peace structure, one
free from structural and direct violence, then
they should respect the six principles. I
refer to them as the conditions of association,
with integration (go back to Table 1, point 6)
as the extreme case. Most of m y thinking is
based, however, on the notion that the actors
are States. T h e rationale depicted in Table 2
derives from development theory (the first
three points) and conflict theory (the last
three).
The cultivation of diversity
Equity, entropy and symbiosis are simply the
negation of the anti-human conditions of
exploitation, elitism and isolation. Equity
negates exploitation between nations; it
m e a n s horizontal interaction and symmetrical
patterns and their implied ramifications. Entro-
py takes the idea further, asking h o w w e can
112 Johan Gattung
prevent international interaction from being
monopolized by centre-centre interaction, h o w
can equal weight be given to the non-élites
in nations A and B : workers with workers,
feminine liberationists with their opposite
numbers, architects with theirs, and so on [42].
For this pairing off, a measure of homology is
needed [43], in effect democracy in the real
sense of the term.
Symbiosis negates mutual isolation. Nations
need each other as m u c h as m a n needs m a n ;
so they should cultivate diversity. But diver-
sity becomes meaningless without exchange,
and symbiosis m e a n s that exchange becomes
so important to t w o countries that they both
realize they will only hurt themselves in
striking at one another. Thus, through symbio-
sis, peace becomes tied to self-interest. O n e
engages in truly horizontal division of effort:
'You m a k e transistors, I m a k e tractors'.
(Not 'You m a k e oil, I m a k e tractors'.) Decision-
making is thereby shared [44].
While avoiding the details of conflict theory,
w e should note t w o basic tenets emerging
from that multidisciplinar/ branch of social
science on which w e lean in regard to broad
scope and large domain, points 4 and 5 of
Table 2 :
Proposition 1. The broader the scope, the more
conflicts m a y t w o actors have in c o m m o n ;
with more conflicts, there is more possibility
of conflict resolution by trading one of
them against another.
Proposition 2 . T h e larger the domain, the more
the possibility of cyclical conflict; with
more cyclical conflicts, there is more
possibility of multilateral clearing of disputes.
Both these principles are well-known in
political science. It is often said that w h e n the
three European communities ( C o m m o n M a r -
ket, Coal and Steel, and Euratom) merged,
s o m e conflicts were resolved through the
broadened scope for trading: 'If you vote with
m e on this point today, I'll support you
tomorrow on that one'. It is also k n o w n as the
principle of 'widening agendas' [45], and the
method of multilateral clearing is also funda-
mental in international commerce. It is only
on the basis of this type of infrastructure that a
superstructure should be built
A s to the role of armaments in regard to this
structure, disarmament debates to date have
been characterized by misplaced concreteness.
There has been an emphasis on military
hardware and software, and on their reduction
or abolition. T h e distinction is insufficiently
m a d e between war machinery targeted against
a chosen e n e m y and that which is usable
against a potential foe: the difference between
a missile in storage and one ready to be
launched m a y be as significant as the diffe-
rence between a w e a p o n in storage and no
missile at all.
A n associative peace structure can, in m y
view, accommodate m u c h of the machinery
of war without adding tension; I need only
repeat here the example of the Nordic coun-
tries, security areas in which there are n o w
sufficient armaments to guarantee total obli-
teration of an e n e m y but arms which are not
poised against specific targets. After all,
our pharmacies and sporting-goods shops
normally stock enough lethal material for an
enterprising gang to organize massacres. But
urban peace structures protect the citizen, as a
rule, against such eventualities and are good
approximations of the ideal I have sketched,
above.
tally. The principles of the associative
approach should be applied to interregional
relations.
3. W h a t about relations between classes ?
Answer: Classes exist in peacelessness,
non-peace; this is determined by the condi-
tion of equity. The struggle for peace has
numerous fronts; these include class rela-
tions, as well as those between local asso-
ciations, districts, regions and nations.
W h a t I have said can serve only as general
guidelines. The test of m y three-pronged
theory of peace lies in its applicability to
concrete cases, but that is a subject to be
treated at another time.

Applying theory to concrete cases

T o conclude, then, w e have seen that the

multilevel structure of peace-to be of any
value in the combating of violence-must be
built within nations as well as between
different countries. It is to be noted that if
political liberals tend to focus only o n the
international aspect of the structure, Marxists
tend to concentrate on its intranational aspect.
The liberals seem to believe that as long as
good, egalitarian international institutions can
be built, then the building blocks (the States)
can be of any kind. T h e Marxists seem to
entertain the complementary belief that as
long as States are of the right kind (or 'socia-
list'), then the interstate system will take care
of itself. • Johan Gattung
I have tried to combine both points of
view, but m y synthesis has raised as m a n y
problems as it sought to solve. These were: Norwegian-born author Gattung, who holds
1. W h a t about nations at very different levels doctorates in mathematical statistics
of development? Answer: They should not and in sociology, divides his working year
join together in the kind of structure indicated between his two main functions of
unless the most developed are willing to Director-General of the Inter-University
relate horizontally. Otherwise, nations at Centre at Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) and
roughly the s a m e level of development professor at the University of Oslo.
should group themselves as I have indi- At Oslo, Prof. Gattung occupies the chair
cated. in conflict and peace research. He is
2 . W h a t will be the relations between these co-editor, with Dr Kjell Sk/elsbask, of the
groups ? Answer: The less developed nations Journal of Peace Research. Address:
would appear on a larger scale and could Blindem, Postboks 1070, Oslo 3 (Norway).
more easily force or be accepted horizon-

Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding 113

NOTES
1. The Lorenz tradition focuses on territorial zones,
whereas the division of power theory
for modern States dwells on power zones,
caste and guild theories, modern management
theory would concentrate on functional zones,
and even linguistic zones probably
aid in the establishment of patterns of power.
2. The 'McNamara line' in the former Republic
of Viet-Nam and electromagnetic fences
in Israel have been high-technology enclaves,
but geography may be a better defence
against conventional attacks
than against paramilitary (guerrilla) raids.
3. By vertical proliferation, I mean the diffusion
of arms to client States; by horizontal proliferation,
diffusion to States at an equal level
(even to the antagonist).
4. The argument which follows was inspired
by discussions at the International Peace Academy
during its summer sessions in Vienna 1970.
I a m particularly grateful to Björn Egge,
Michael Harbottle and Ingar Jit Rikhye
for making their experience in international
peacekeeping available to outsiders.
5. The literature available in the field
is virtually concentrated on these aspects.
6. T o understand the distinction, see J. Galtung,
The true worlds, a transnational perspective.
chapter V , North-Holland. (In press.)
7. By definition, social distance and balance
of power have proved to be insufficient
as restraints and have led to 'trouble'.
8. cf. the n o w classical article by I. Kende,
Twenty-five years of local wars',
J. peace res., 1971, p. 5.
9. Regarding the centre-periphery word-pair:
in terms of distribution of resources,
the centre has more in capital goods,
higher education and research capacity
than the periphery. In terms of structural position,
with the focus on patterns of interactive
exchange, the centre leads in the most enriching,
personality-expanding, society-
developing tasks; the periphery trails behind.
The archetypical structural example
would contrast the society which processes
raw materials with one which simply extracts
these materials.
10. The State can also intervene in horizontal,
intranational conflicts. In these,
one district may dominate others economically
or culturally as in the case, for example,
of post-independence Uganda.
11. Typical examples would be the intervention
by the United States in the Dominican
Republic (1965) and that of the Soviet Union
in Czechoslovakia (1968).
For a comparison of the two cases,
see J. Galtung, 'Big powers and the world
feudal structure'. Essays in peace research.
vol. IV, Copenhagen, Chr. Ejlers, • 1975.
12. The idea is, of course, much older than this,
having been an element in many of the peace
plans originated in the West; it has often
supplemented balance of power between equals.
114 Johan Galtung
13. cf. the article by A . Eide, 'Peacekeeping '
and enforcement by regional organizations'
J. peace res., 1966, p. 125.
14. If one accepts the principle of intraregional
monopoly on peacekeeping by the hegemónica!
power, this would refer to France rather
than the United States. Quite another matter
is that the United States seems
to have conceived of Indo-China,
and of South-East Asia in general, as a region
it 'has' or could 'lose'. The historical roots
are not difficult to find: the United States
stepped into the shoes of crumbling
Spanish colonialism via two wars at the turn
of the century (in Cuba and the Philippines),
thereby acquiring bridgeheads for
regional penetration.
15. The parallels with feudal systems
in mediaeval Europe and Tokugawa Japan
are obvious.
16. This refers only to international, institutionalized
peacekeeping of the type associated
with the United Nations.
17. Symmetry through dissociation only strengthens
the relative power of the biggest countries
in today's periphery (Brazil, Nigeria,
Egypt and India). Symmetry through exchange
is different, providing for peacekeeping
in the centre by the periphery in addition
to the current pattern of peacekeeping
in the periphery by the centre.
18. Pre-1971 Pakistan was nominally a State;
in practice, it w a s a region with a centre (Punjab)
and a periphery consisting of East Pakistan
(today's Bangladesh) and various parts
of West Pakistan. The tremendous violence of 1971,
with the world merely looking on, testifies
tellingly to the inadequacy of the present system.
19. This is not incompatible with the idea
that India, in doing so, established patterns
of dominance on the subcontinent that later
could take the form of an empire
with an inner periphery within today's
Indian Union and an outer periphery of client States.
20. I refer to the Fuerza Interamericana
de la Paz (FIP), operating in the Dominican
Republic, and the truncated Warsaw Treaty
Organization (lacking Romania's participation),
operating in Czechoslovakia.
21. There are parallels between the 'evidence'
used in the Dominican Republic to demonstrate
the advent of communism
and in Czechoslovakia of capitalism.
2 2 . I refer to the British operation in Ulster
and French activity in Chad. 'Residual',
used by AN Mazrui, seems appropriate.
23. See Galtung, op. cit., chapter 6,
and J. Galtung, Co-operation in Europe.
Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1970.
2 4 . Only when there is a clear intention -
to commit violence will peacekeeping be called for.
Structural violence falls outside,
in terms of h o w this grid is currently constructed
in the Western, liberal mind.
25. The machineries for changing conditions,
whether Western European parliaments
or Eastern European party bureaucracies.
 are considerably sluggish. This is probably
more the result of the size of the modern State
and the indirect nature of communication
than a consequence of the system itself.
26. This pattern of reasoning is reflected
in the United Nations Charter;
it can be seen as a kind of reductionism
to international peace rather than freedom
of repression as a supreme value.
27. cf. J. Galtung, The true worlds
a transnational perspective, op. cit.. chapter 4 .
Consult also the World Indicators Programme,
conducted by the chair in conflict
and peace research at the University of Oslo.
2 8 . I a m indebted to Yash Tandon for this point.
29. The counter-argument that police forces
do not have logistical equipment
and experience is not valid. The military
could manage the hardware while police
forces could master the utilization of software.
30. I a m indebted to Chad Alger for this point.
3 1 . Technology serves as a multiplier here,
obliterating distinctions between the military
. and civil populations.
32. See J. Galtung, Theories of conflict. (In press.)
33. Needless to say, China has played
this role in the East-West conflict.
3 4 . See J. Burton, Conflict and communication,
Macmillan, 1 9 6 9 ; and the debate on the issue
in Journal of peace research, 1973.
35. cf. note 2 6 : this would be a typical example
of anchoring legitimate peacekeeping
in legitimate self-interest
Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding
36. cf. J. Galtung, The European community:
a super-power in the making, chapter 3,
London, George Allen & Unwin, 1972.
37. Kissinger's initiatives should be seen
as strategy which is anti-Soviet (not to mention
anti-Palestinian), and anti-United Nations as well.
38. The classical definition of the diplomat
is that of a negotiator of ratifiable documents.
39. By saying 'peace has a structure',
the aim is to focus attention
on the self-supporting conditions of peace,
those robust enough (for instance) to survive
the demise of elite personalities.
40. For a definition of exploitation, see J. Galtung,
' A structural theory of imperialism',
J. peace res., 1971, p. 8 1 .
41. Deutsch means an area where the likelihood
of direct violence is very low. His theories
lack equal focus on structural violence.
4 2 . cf. J. Galtung, 'Peace as a profession
and n e w peace action roles'. Essays, vol. 1, no. 18.
43. Homology obtains w h e n each party in nation A
has an opposite number in nation B .
Particularly homologous are parties dealing
with international relations:
diplomats, the military and businessmen.
4 4 . At this point, conflicts of goals may appear.
Mechanisms for conflict resolution
m a y be built into the structure on a permanent
(not ad hoc) basis; they will be
meaningful only if the infrastructure shown
in Table 2 permits conflict resolution.
45. I a m particularly indebted
to Chad Alger for this point.
115
Letters
• Fine science?
The author of the following letter, a faithful
reader of this journal, is an educator and
academic administrator who has long
been interested in the philosophy and
sociology of science as well as the
relationships between science, technology,
the humanities and society. He is Professor
James A. Goldman, Division of Continuing
Education, New York City Community
College of the City University of New York,
Brooklyn NY 11201 (United States of
America).
The following reflections are prompted by the
issue devoted to art and science {impact of
science on society. Vol. XXIV, N o . 1, January-
March 1974) and subsequent comments by
Lincoln Rothschild {impact of science on
society. Vol. XXIV, N o . 4 , October-December
1974, p. 3 7 3 ) .
M y professional provenance being that
of the sciences, I have often remarked o n the
contemporary propensity to label so m a n y
subjects, at least in academic institutions, as
sciences. For example, in the United States,
students m a y specialize in commercial science,
library science, secretarial science, m a n a g e -
ment science, etc. In s o m e instances, such as
in management or library studies, the designa-
tion 'science' might be legitimately justified
as the relevant principles are formulated,
clarified and elaborated and, indeed, even as
what is conventionally considered as scien-
tific methodology is introduced into the prac-
tices of the corresponding field of endeavour.
M y impression that perhaps the word
'science' often is being applied too broadly
w a s unexpectedly tempered by perusing the
impact of science on society. Vol. 26, N o . 1/2, 1976
1974 edition of Books in Print: on more than
four pages under 'Art o f one finds such titles
as Art of Achieving Success, Art of Invest-
ment, Art of Mixing Drinks, Art of Purchasing;
Art of Living, Art of Study, Art of Money
Making, Art of Making Sense, Art of Being an
Intellectual, Art of Teaching, Art of Learning,
cum multis aliis. Acknowledging compara-
tively broad connotations of 'art',- s o m e of
these are more reasonably warranted than
others. Not unexpectedly, then, in a page of
titles 'Science of, one finds as well Science
of English Verse, Science of Fairy Tales;
Science of Money, and Science of Successful
Living.
This rather free use of 'art' and 'science' is
the obverse of the semantic practices which
motivated Piet Hein's comments about the
constraints imposed u p o n . our thoughts by
words {impact of science on society. Vol. XXIV,
N o . 1 ) . Clearly words, particularly those such
as 'science' or 'art', can be used with such
laxity that they lose meaningful significance;
alternatively, they can be used with such
inflexibility that they fetter our thoughts. In
either case, the word-world distorts the
experience-world, in consonance with Hein's
sentiments.
• Advancing the 'art'
N o n e the less, I believe it worth while to
remark on the striking, and I believe meaningful,
use of the word 'art' in discussions of science
qua science. For example, a c o m m o n phrase
a m o n g scientists and engineers is 'state-of-
the-art', by which is signified the level
of scientific or technological development
117
 reached at any particular time, usually as a
result of modern methods. (I have yet to hear
anyone speak of the 'state-of-the-science'.)
Hence its usé not only in fields such as
computer, solid state, materials, space, and
nuclear reactor technologies, but also in
theoretical physics or abstract mathematics.
' That is, even in what is conventionally consid-
ered as pure science or basic science, profes-
sional practitioners are apt to speak of a
n e w theory, as well as a newly devised piece
of experimental apparatus, as a contribution
to-or advancement of-the art.
There are s o m e markedly significant uses
of 'art' in m a n y published inquiries into the
nature of the scientific process. For example,
W . l_ Beveridge in The Art of Scientific
Investigation (rev. ed. N e w York, N . Y . ,
Norton, 1957) uses an epigraph attributed
to W . H . George: 'Scientific research is not
itself a science; it is still an art or craft.'
Although presenting a moderately analytical
approach (e.g. equations and curves to
represent knowledge) to the principles and
practices of research by H o m o investigam.
B . E. Noltingk entitles his book: The Art of
Research (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1965). M o r e
widely k n o w n perhaps is Nobel biologist
Sir Peter Medawar's The Art of the Soluble
(London, Methuen, 1967), in which he remarks
that '...research surely, is the art of the
soluble' (p. 7 ) .
W h a t is recognized in all these instances is
the aspect of science which is primarily
intuitive and not completely, if at all, reducible
to logic. In this respect I find Frank J. Malina's
designation {impact of science on society.
Vol. XXIV, N o . 1) of fine art as having ' n o
other utilitarian purpose than to affect h u m a n
emotions' particularly suggestive with regard
to the seemingly enduring dialogue about the
differences between fundamental, basic or
pure research or science and applied research
or science.
Immediately recognizing that distinctions
are to s o m e degree arbitrary and ever-mindful
of Hein's caveat with respect to 'drawing
lines', I still would venture to propose, in an
altogether scientific spirit of regarding it as a
highly provisional notion, that 'fine science'
is the analogue of fine art. In other words, fine
science has no other utilitarian purpose than
to affect intellectual and rational understanding.
Dr Malina writes: T h e chief purposes of
fine art are to stimulate and satisfy h u m a n
emotions, to help the mind emotionally to
118 Letters
grasp knowledge and conceptions of the
universe and of the world of h u m a n beings and
widen and deepen affective perception of
portions of the environment selected by an
artist.' Consider h o w equally valid this
statement would be if 'art' is replaced by
'science', 'emotion' by 'intellect', and so o n .
In other words, there is an evidently marked
complementarity between art and science. Of
course, as in respect to art, it must always be
borne in mind that 'fine' is not an ascription of
value. Parallel to the distinction between the
fine and the useful arts would be that between
the fine and useful sciences. A s arts are both
useful and fine (e.g. architecture) so are
there sciences (e.g. mathematics-a formal
deductive system of postulates, axioms, and
theorems, as well as a heuristic device used in
science).
• Science: o n e of the arts?
From the foregoing, alternatively, the formula-
tion of science as an art is also legitimately
conceivable by rephrasing Malina's statement
to: T h e chief purposes of fine art [that is,
pure science] are to stimulate and satisfy
h u m a n intellect...', and so on, mutatis
mutandis. In this perspective, science is truly
one of the fine arts.
B e that as it m a y , it is of interest to compare
Hein's 'Art is the solving of problems that
cannot be stated clearly before they have
been solved', with M e d a w a r ' s (op. cit.) that
'good scientists study the most important
problems they can solve; their professional
business is to solve, not merely grapple with
problems'. Hein's definition of art, as he notes,
is equally valid for the art of science as well
as conventional art I think M e d a w a r would
agree and further admit that his statement is
not intrinsically antithetical to Hein's because
M e d a w a r ' s is actually a retrospective account
of science. Indeed throughout his book,
M e d a w a r stresses-and legitimately so-the
inaccuracy of substituting the retrospective
perspective for the actual historical sequence.
'Unsuccessful' science is not c o m m o n l y
reported, although the usefulness of reporting
such has been suggested by J. B . Conant w h o
proposed a Journal of Negative Results
(vide B . J. Luberoff, Chemical Technology.
Vol. 1, N o . 8 , August 1971, p. 4 5 3 ) .
Precisely because art and science, although
manifestly different, share a c o m m o n impetus
of intuition and are complementary in s o m e
other significant aspects, it is imperative thathat
neither their similarities nor their differences be
crudely distorted. Myron A . Coler {Leonardo, do,
Vol. 7 . N o . 4 (1974) p. 3 8 1 - 2 ) recently itly
counselled against the facileness with which ich
similarities are often seemingly discerned led
a m o n g dyads such as 'art-science', 'art-play',
ay',
and 'science-play'. Heedful of this, it is s still
till
worth while to m a k e comparisons which ich
provoke continued thought Hein would uld
probably say that these comparisons , and ind
distinctions are the m a n - m a d e lines over ver
which m a n is destined to stumble.
tan
J a m e s A . Goldman
Author Frank Malina replies:
I sympathize with J a m e s A . Goldman's m's
unhappiness with the ambiguity of the terms ms
'art' and 'science'. Ambiguity is a curse of of
natural languages for rational discourse and d aa
blessing for works of art But it seems to m me e
that Professor Goldman is making matters ters
worse w h e n he tries to introduce the notion ion
of 'fine science' (basic, pure or undirected) asas
ted
an analogue of 'fine art'. I believe, as I stated
on p. 1 9 of the English-language version of of
m y essay, that the objects of fine art 'have ave
no other utilitarian purpose than to affect ect
h u m a n emotions'. Correspondent Goldman's m's
notion, however, that 'fine science' has no no
ec-
other utilitarian purpose than to affect intellec-
tual and rational understanding' is fallacious 3US
• Education, the feedback of human heritage
The author of the following letter,
Dr A. Kannan, is a biochemist and chemical
analyst by training and experience.
His interest during the past ten years has
been research on 'the integration of
scientific knowledge and achievements with
the spiritual needs of man'. Dr Kannan,
who is also Secretary of The Theosophy
Science Study Group as we/las author of
the books Impact of Theosophy and
Science and The O n e Life and Functional
Forms, writes in connexion with impact's
twenty-fifth anniversary theme of
'Science and Common Sense'. The author's
address: The Theosophical Society,
Adyar. Madras 600020 (India).
because the purpose of 'fine science' is to
provide, rather than to affect, intellectual and
rational comprehension,
In the natural sciences, the results of
'fine science' must meet the test of the facts
of nature. There is no such restriction on the
content of a work of fine art since art, in
general, is part of the world of fiction which
provides emotional satisfaction to m a n y
people. Perhaps one of the main reasons for
the disarray in our world is the confusion in
people's minds between what is fiction and
what is fact
O n e might make a better case for the fine
arts being in s o m e ways analogous to the
applied sciences, in the sense that s o m e artists
also m a k e use of the intellectual and rational
understanding provided by those w h o apply
scientific methods to, as Sir Peter M e d a w a r
is quoted to have said, 'the most important
problems they can solve*,
A s regards Professor Goldman's statement,
'art and science... share a c o m m o n impetus
of intuition', m y experience (as one w h o has
worked both in engineering research and the
visual fine arts) is that in s o m e circumstances
this is true. If by 'intuition' he m e a n s jumping
to conclusions through a poorly understood
mental process, then m y experience indicates
that the process leads most of the time to
error. It is very difficult to cope with those
w h o have decided that something is true
solely on the basis that they 'intuitively* are
convinced that it is so.
Frank J. Malina
The impact of technology has produced a
shock to society from which it is hard for the
latter to recover, especially in view of its
diverse cultural backgrounds. Recovery from
this shock requires an educational effort suited
to these different backgrounds, feeding back
the s u m of h u m a n heritage in cultural values.
But the present system of education is
concerned more with the feedback of infor-
mation pertaining to increased knowledge
than with deep-rooted traditional values and
universal principles which should help the
individual face the hard facts of life by drawing
from him n e w faculties and n e w understanding.
Modern evolutionists, spearheaded by the
late Sir Julian Huxley, have s h o w n that the
Letters 1 1 9
socio-cultural advance of humanity during the
relatively short period of a few thousand
years between nomadic m a n and his present
state of civilization, is of such a phenomenal
nature that this phase is considered to be a
parallel evolution to that of his physico-
biological change. This is of primary signifi-
cance to m a n because socio-cultural evolution
has proceeded as a feedback process utilizing
m a n ' s intellectual capacity, but this feedback -
phenomenon has been used relatively more
thoroughly during peak periods in the evolu-
tion of civilization-and only at random
during the rest of history, leaving us with
m a n y cultural artefacts and an imbalance in
h u m a n ecology. S o this imbalance has to be
corrected through education, which can
turn over the fruits of h u m a n heritage to
m a n by giving n e w meanings and added
values to what w e teach.
Experience of such universal truths as ethics
and morals, penetrating into the unseen
kingdoms of nature, has found expression
in the lives and works of great religious
teachers. W e have sufficient religious liter-
120 Letters
ature on record to provide a core of essential
truths c o m m o n to all faiths, a principal idea
of which is love and sacrifice to which m a n
has responded with devotion and reverence.
The scope of teaching physiology and the
other sciences relating to m a n should be
understood, however, within the deeper
meaning of personal existence. Broad concepts
such as the immortality of the soul, the purpose
of birth and death, and the universal laws of
karma and reincarnation, have to be integrated
with scientific knowledge so that the individ-
ual will be confident of pursuing life with a
clear purpose and end in view. Detailed
knowledge of history and sociology can be
s h o w n to merge in understanding the meaning
of corporeal existence, whereas evolution
and ecology exemplify the principles of unity
of life as s h o w n in m a n ' s relation with the
universe.
Only under these conditions can the indi-
vidual stand squarely upon his wholesome
understanding and be a source of. spiritual
strength to humanity as a whole.
A . Kannan
See the next special issue of impact on

Science and
the Islamic World

Majeed Ahmad, Islamabad

The Organization of Science: Orient and Occident

G. Anawatl, Cairo
Moslem Science: a Theosophic-historical View

A. M. Badran, Amman
Science and Educational Needs

Ali Kettani, Dhahran

The Scientific Heritage of Islam

Hassan El-Yacoubi, Boulder

A Systemic Approach to National Development

El Sammani A. Yacoub, Khartoum

Sudan's 5-year Plan for Research/Development

Nap A. Kadir, Baghdad

A Unified Research Council for the Arab States

Mohamed Abdel Had/', Cairo

Remote-sensing Goes to Work in Arab Deserts

These and other specialists examine the significance of scientific and

technical evolution in today's Islamic regions.

in Vol. 26, No. 2/3 of impact of science orfsociety

Training for agriculture
and rural development
(Joint FAO/Unesco/ILO publication, 1975 issue)

A joint authorship publication of F A O , I L O and Unesco, this journal is an annual review of

current opinions and experience in agricultural education and extension and their contribution to
rural development.

Contents

1. Training and the Green Revolution, F . M . Ragheb.

2. Integrated Approach to Agricultural and Rural Development: Asia and the Far East,
Cameron Clark.
3. Training for Small-farmer Credit Projects, Peter Bagshaw.
4. Education and Training for Rural Workers' Organizations, D . F . Hodsdon.
5. _ Rural Development: the Chinese Approach, Sartaj Aziz.
6. Schooling, Social Problems and Rural Development, G . L . McClymont.
7. International W o m e n ' s Year: Important Considerations for the Rural Sector, Natalie Hahn
and Clio Presvelou.
8. Training and Development—a Pictorial Review.
9. Population Education in Rural Extension, Shawki M . Barghouti.
10. Agricultural Education in Developing Countries: Some Considerations, Marc A . Trouillot.
11. Integrated Rural Development and Planning for Rural Communities, Jean Fauchon.
12. , Communication and Agricultural Research, L . E . Virone.
13. The Fogo Process in Communication, H . Anthony Williamson.
14. Extension Studies in Paraguay and Ecuador, John Higgs.
15. In-service Training for Agriculture in Malaysia, William I. Lindley.
16. Intermediate Agricultural Education for Rural Development, B . J. Sestan.
17. Training Dliterate Youth for Rural Handicrafts.
18. Reflections on Ten Years in the African Continent, Pierre S a m .
A copy of this publication can be obtained free of charge from:
Unesco: Division of Education for Rural Development; F A O : Agricultural Education and
Training Service, H u m a n Resources and Institutions Division, F A O , Via délie Terme di Caracalla,
00100 R o m e (Italy); ILO: Vocational Training and Counselling Branch, H u m a n Resources
Department, ILO, 154 Rue de Lausanne, C H 1211-Geneva 22 (Switzerland).
 INTERNATIONAL
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
JOURNAL
T w o issues of particular interest to readers of impact

Vol. XXVIll, No. 1,1976, Interactions between science as a social activity and
Science in Policy and society's control over its organization and findings.
Policy for Science
Four national case studies of science policies:
Nigeria (R. A . Akindele); United States of America
(G. M . Lyons); Belgium (A. Philippart); Australia
(J. Ronayne) ; and T h e Social Sciences in the U . S . S . R . :
Status, Policy, Structures and Achievements
( M . Gapotchka and S . Smirnov).

Also includes Richard Rose on 'Disciplined Research

and Undisciplined Problems', discussing transmission
mechanisms from the scientific community to policy-
makers and Maurice Line's and Stephen Roberts'
survey 'The Size, Growth, Composition of Social Science
Literature', the most comprehensive compilation to date.

Vol. XXVIll, N o 2 , 1976, A fresh look at a persistent problem ; concrete elements

The Quest for about one of the most inconclusive debates of our time.
Disarmament Articles on the factual aspects of armament dynamics;
armament developments in the Third World; the classi-
fication and analysis of arms-control treaties; the effects
of arms transfer to Third World countries; antipersonal
w e a p o n s ; the theory of collective goods as applied to
arms races; the correlation between disarmament, peace
research and peaceful coexistence.
SPINES: Data exchange system
on science and technology policies

Within the framework of the S P I N E S Pro-
g r a m m e , Unesco is publishing during the first
semester of 1976 the English source version
of the SP/NES Thesaurus. The Thesaurus,
constructed with the assistance of numerous
consultants and according to UNISIST guide-
lines, is a major achievement in the field of
information relating to science and technology
policy-making, as well as to the management,
transfer and assessment of science and techno-
logy, and their application to development. It
contains s o m e 12,000 terms, 9,000 of which
are authorized descriptors, and more than
100,000 relations. It will be published in three
forms: (a) an alphabetically structured list;
(b) thirty-four terminological graphic displays;
and (c) a series of subjects facets. Its general
coverage is s h o w n below in the form of a
Global Graph of Graphic Displays.
The Thesaurus will be available on sale only,
either In printed form or on microfiches. Orders
m a y be sent to the sales department of Unesco
publications at Unesco Headquarters or to the
sales agents listed at the back of this journal.
Further information on the SPINES Programme
m a y be obtained from the Director, Division
of Science and Technology Policies, Unesco,
7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris (France),
or bytelephoning (Paris) 577.16.10, extension
3 4 - 5 7 . Telex 27.602 Paris.

UNESCO 10 M
PHYSICAL '
EDUCATION DEMOGRAPHY
SPINES THESAURUS ENVIRONMENT

20 OS
MATHEMATICS FINANCE

19
STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS 04
06 IP SOCIOLOGY*
PLANNING PSYCHOLOGY

05 03
ECONOMICS KNOWLEDGE*
PHILOSOPHY

07
01 DECISION
POLITICS MAKING
z^=ii
JURIDICAL
SCIENCES
33 16 TECHNOLOGY r
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER *
ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

30
HISTORY.
TIME * SPACE
31 32
COUNTRIES
GLOBAL GRAPH OF
GEOGRAPHY
GRAPHIC DISPLAYS
 blhKl
T h e Stockholm International P e a c e Research Institute (SIPRI)
w a s set u p in 1966. It is wholly independent of governmental in-
terests in its operations. These are the responsibility of an in-
ternational Governing B o a r d of eight scientists. T h e Institute's
Staff, which includes 1 5 - 2 0 researchers from a n u m b e r of
countries and disciplines, study problems related to internatio-
nal p e a c e and security. The Director of the Institute has, under
the Board, the main responsibility for SIPRI's w o r k p r o g r a m m e .
T h e Institute also has a consultative Scientific Council, consis-
ting of 2 4 outstanding scholars, statesmen and international ci-
vil servants.

T h e results of the research d o n e at SIPRI are normally publish-

ed as b o o k s or reports, which are given a wide distribution all
over the world. S o m e of them
are listed below.

SIPRI is located in the Wenner-Gren Center In Stockholm.

World A r m a m e n t s and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1 9 7 5

1975. 618 pp. 115 tables and charts. Cloth bound Swkr. 106.00 (ISBN 0-262-19140-7).
This is the sixth SIPRI Yearbook. The aim is to bring together information on world armaments and military expenditure
and developments in efforts m a d e to limit or reduce them. Special topic«: Nuclear-weapon proliferation; the prohibition
of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons; the Indian Ocean; long-range cruise missiles; drones and remotely piloted ve-
hicles; and reconnaissance satellites.
T h e Nuclear A g e
1975.148 pp. 3 7 tables, 8 figures, glossary. Cloth bound Sw.kr. 49.50 (ISBN 0-262-19136-9)
A number of states have, through peaceful nuclear programmes, n o w accumulated the technical expertise and know-
ledge, and the fissile material necessary to produce weapons. This book outlines the risks involved in this development

Incendiary W e a p o n s
197a 255 pp. 3 0 tables, 5 figures. Cloth bound Sw.kr. 72.00 (ISBN 0-262-19139-3)
This book describes the development of incendiary weapons, their medical effects, their toxicology, and the uses to which
they have been put It also discusses the efforts m a d e to prohibit them
All prices are a p p r o x i m a t e

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Contents
of the preceding issues
Vol. X X V , N o . 2 , 1975 Vol. X X V . N o . 4 , 1975.
W o m e n in science: a m a n ' s world Youth confronts science
Comment, by Dolly Ghosh. Comment, by Dharamjit Singh.
W o m a n ' s scientific creativity, Young people's image of the scientist,
by Lucia Tosi. by Michael Shallis and Philip Hills.
Obstacles to w o m e n in science, Dialogue and continuation in science,
by Deborah Shapley. by Román de Vicente.
The savant and the midwife, The younger generation
by Jacqueline Feldman. and the 'crisis of science',
W o m e n in the workforce-the general picture, by Lech Witkowski.
by the International Labour Office. Science and technology: liberation
H o w a w o m a n scientist deals professionally or oppression?, by Dorothy Griffiths.
with m e n , by Monique de Meuron-Landolt. The impact of technology on the youth
W o m e n academics 'publish less than m e n ' , of developing countries, by Namik Kemal Pak.
by Annabel Ferriman. Science and youth in the U.S.S.R.,
Distribution by sex by Vladimir A . Zubkov.
of principal scientific awards Equipping youth to deal
and membership in academies of science. with the world's hunger crisis,
The professional w o m a n in modern Poland, by Amin S . El N a w a w y .
by Halina Lewicka (interview). Environmental education:
The popularization of science: dynamics of the Unesco-UNEP programme,
a n e w profession being developed by William B . Stapp.
by both m e n and w o m e n ,
by Jacqueline Juillard.
Vol. X X V . N o . 3 , 1975
Rational use of health resources 1
Comment, by Siegfried Haussler.
Health planning in developing countries,
by Frank Schofield/WHO.
The medical school in modern society,
by G . _
l Monekosso.
Research in clinical medical physiology:
its meaning and management
in developing nations,
by Daniel J. Goldstein.
Manpower for national health:
needs, planning, implementation,
by Tamas F ü l ö p / W H O and associates.
Adolescent medicine, the Sri Lanka way,
by Buddhadasa Bodhinayake.
Orthomolecular medicine: what is it,
h o w does it work?,
by Abram Hoffer.
Curative research for 'anti-economic' disease
by Silvio Garattini.
Modern medical engineering
and health information systems,
by John F. Davis.
Traditional and modern medicine in China,
by Frederik F. Kao and John J. Kao.
ISSN 0019-2872