Pargeter, A. (2013). The Muslim Brotherhood. From opposition to power.

Londres: Saqi Books

- Despite the fact that the popular uprisings that gripped parts of the Arab world in 2011 were
largely non-ideological in nature, driven largely by youth who came together with no political
agenda other than to oust the authoritarian regimes that had gripped the region more or less
since independence, it was the Brotherhood that was to reap the advantages of the revolutions.
p.5
- The Brotherhood has always been a movement of controversy and contradiction that has
proved near impossible to pin down. Indeed, it has always represented a conundrum to those
trying to fathom it. It is a social movement that also functions as a political entity; it is a
transnational organisation that emphasises the independence of its national branches; it
projects itself as pacific yet some of its branches have been directly involved in violent action;
it broadly rejects the West and Western values yet is increasingly anxious to be seen in
Western eyes as a moderate organisation that upholds progressive inclusive values. It is also a
movement that has been cloaked in ambiguity and that has comprised so many different
strands and currents that it has struggled to articulate a single stance on many key issues
including violence, the role of women and the role of non-Muslim minorities. p.6
- The Brotherhood came within the tradition of the reformist school that emerged in Egypt in
the late nineteenth century through scholars such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abdu who
believed that the only way the Islamic world could meet the challenges posed by
Westernisation and modernisation was to return to the ‘uncorrupted’ values of the Islamic
past. The movement soon gathered momentum and by the 1950s had also developed into a
reaction against the modernising secular forces of Arab nationalism that threatened to unseat
traditional conservative religious values. As a result, the Brotherhood drew much of its
support from the classes that feared change, namely the petty bourgeoisie and the trading and
artisan classes.p.6
- Indeed, since its beginnings, it has been a largely reactionary movement, preoccupied by
issues of public morality and the preservation of traditional values. p. 6-7
- It was able to spread in this way because it offered a simple ideology that corresponded with
the mood of the time and that seemed to represent a reassuring beacon of constancy during a
period of immense upheaval in the region. Indeed, its slogan said it all: ‘Islam is the solution.’
p.7
- Despite the Brotherhood’s being the largest and most established opposition movement in the
country, it was the secular youth who, intoxicated by events in Tunisia, seized the moment
and risked life and limb to try to bring revolution to Egypt. p. 181
- the Brotherhood had never been a revolutionary movement. It had always maintained that it
was not seeking to overturn established order but rather that it preferred to concern itself with
reforming society to prepare it for the eventual establishment of the Islamic state. p. 182
- The Brotherhood’s youth elements were not much enamoured with the willingness of their
leadership to strike deals with the Mubarak regime either. Many Ikhwani young felt as though
the Brotherhood leadership had risked compromising the whole revolution by its willingness
to negotiate. These elements, along with other parts of the opposition, refused to compromise
and continued to insist that they would not leave Tahrir Square until Mubarak had gone from
office. p. 187
- in April 2011 the Brotherhood set up the Freedom and Justice Party. Three members of the
Guidance Office were appointed to lead this new political venture. Mohamed Morsi was
appointed as party head, Issam al-Ariyan as its deputy and Saad al-Katatni as its
secretary-general with all positions valid for a four-year term. p. 193
- Setting up the Freedom and Justice Party was a bold and decisive move for a movement that
had long been riven with internal debates over the rights and wrongs of establishing a political
party. All the more so given that in the years prior to the revolution, the traditionalists, who
advocated shying away from the political arena, had come to dominate. However, after some
heated debates within the movement in which some brothers argued that the Brotherhood
should remain as a jama’a, leaving its members free to join whichever political party they
wanted, the objections to forming a political party, even among the party traditionalists,
seemed to dissipate as quickly as Mubarak himself. p.193
- While this lack of separation was predictable enough, it still frustrated some more
reformist-minded members who had hoped that the revolution would herald a newer, fresher
and more open way of doing politics. Particularly aggrieved at the dominance of the old
leadership over the new party were some Brotherhood youth elements. These young people
tried to stand up to the Brotherhood machinery by holding public conferences at which they
challenged the leadership’s way of doing things. At one such meeting in April 2011, they
demanded that the Brotherhood become an official Islamic society in order for the Freedom
and Justice Party to operate as a truly independent body. They also called for a raft of reforms,
including that the Brotherhood separate itself from the international tanzeem, and, most
boldly, that it select a general controller other than the Supreme Guide. Some of these youth
elements became so frustrated that they broke away and formed their own political parties,
such the Hizb al-Tayyar Al-Masri (the Egyptian Current Party). p. 194
- Whilst much was made of these youth elements in the international media, where there were
even suggestions that the Brotherhood might split apart, the movement proved as robust as
ever. p. 194
- Although An-Nahda is not officially part of the Brotherhood, it was born out of the same
ideological tradition and shares the same broad ideological outlook. Some of An-Nahda’s
leaders are bound to the Brotherhood’s international structures through their membership in
international Brotherhood-oriented organisations such as the International Union of Islamic
Scholars. As such Tunisians proved as susceptible to the pull of reformist political Islam at
the polls as the Egyptians. p. 203
- Although An-Nahda is not officially part of the Brotherhood, it was born out of the same
ideological tradition and shares the same broad ideological outlook. Some of An-Nahda’s
leaders are bound to the Brotherhood’s international structures through their membership in
international Brotherhood-oriented organisations such as the International Union of Islamic
Scholars. As such Tunisians proved as susceptible to the pull of reformist political Islam at
the polls as the Egyptians. p. 203
- Moreover, unlike in Egypt that had always been the cradle of political Islamism and where the
Brotherhood was still able to operate on the ground despite being banned, the Tunisian regime
allowed no space whatsoever for the forces of political Islam. p. 203
- Yet, similarly to the Brotherhood, An-Nahda played the transition phase with extreme skill.
Most notably, it positioned itself to appeal to as wide a spectrum of voters as possible.
Drawing on its reputation for moderation, engendered by the more progressive teachings of its
leader Sheikh Rashid al-Ghannouchi who had long insisted that Islam and democracy were
compatible, An-Nahda moved into the middle ground. p. 203
- It purposefully sought to reassure women, for example, asserting that it had no intention of
modifying the personal status code or of imposing the hijab. It even went as far as to field a
female candidate, Souad Abdul Rahim, who chooses not the wear the veil. Indeed, An-Nahda
prioritised compromise giving the impression that it would be a reasonable and inclusive
political player. p. 204
 - Displaying similar pragmatism, when it became apparent that some of the more ideologically
rigid elements within the party could not conceal their more conservative thinking, the party
kept them away from the media. 56 An-Nahda was thus able to present itself as a unified body
with a single cultural message despite the frictions and factions within the party between the
radical and more moderate strands. p. 204
- An-Nahda positioned itself as the party that would restore traditional values and that would
bring Islam and Arabism back to the heart of Tunisian society. In doing so it was careful to
make it clear that it wanted to build a modern society, but also stressed that this society should
be rooted in the country’s ‘authentic’ identity. To this end, rather than raise controversial
issues such as polygamy, party members focused on how to deal with social phenomena such
as people being forced to marry late due to financial hardship and high divorce rates. 57
While such messages may not have appealed to all of the urban middle class, they certainly
attracted enough Tunisians who felt alienated and troubled by the overt secularism of previous
regimes p. 204

Antes de establecer la importancia y los resultados de las elecciones egipcias de 2010,

es relevante entender las dinámicas políticas, los partidos y los movimientos sociales
inspirados en una demanda de diversos cambios. En primera instancia, el partido Hermandad
Musulmana se sitúa como oposición, debido a que es el segundo partido con más escaños en
la Asamblea Popular, ocupando un quinto de los mismos (Hamzawy, 2007b). La Hermandad,
desde sus inicios, fue un movimiento plagado de controversia y contradicción, un enigma
para quienes intentan definirlo: se proyecta como pacífico, pero algunas de sus ramas han
estado involucradas en actos violentos; y, rechaza ampliamente Occidente y sus valores, pero
busca constantemente su aprobación como organización moderada que defiende valores
inclusivos y progresistas. Es un movimiento envuelto en la ambigüedad por su asociación con
diversas corrientes al intentar articular una única postura sobre los temas
importantes—incluida la violencia, el papel de la mujer y el papel de las minorías no
musulmanas— (Pargeter, 2013: p. 6)
Durante la última década el partido no prioriza la religión como un elemento central
dentro de la política, sin embargo, se cambió el discurso a uno amparado en la ley islámica
(sharía) como la fuente primaria de la legislación en Egipto (Hamzawy, 2007b). Los
elementos juveniles de la Hermandad no estaban entusiasmados con las decisiones del
partido, pues, además de desacuerdos con definiciones ideológicas, también les afectaba la
disposición que los altos mandos tenían para negociar con el régimen (Pargeter, 2013: p.
187). La medida generó quebrantamientos dentro de la Hermandad Musulmana, la división
ideológica se acentúa y ocasiona disputas entre la facción más conservadora y la más
progresista (Hamzawy, 2007b), la juventud universitaria, que está vinculada con la
Hermandad Musulmana y que rechaza la jerarquización interna en lo que concierne a la
elección de cargos. La misma entiende el Islam como una vivencia personal, y, en principio,
este ideal es compatible con un sistema multipartidista, incluso en un Estado cuyas bases sean
seculares. Este es el principal desafío dentro de las facciones del partido, debido a que
establecen una brecha generacional (Algora, 2012: 202). Esta situación se vuelve más
compleja cuando, en 2011, la Hermandad crea el Partido de Libertad y Justicia, una jugada
audaz para un movimiento con un contexto de divisiones por debates internos, que terminó
por disparar más objeciones. La juventud buscaba reformas, una nueva, fresca y abierta forma
de hacer política, e intentan hacer frente a los dirigentes mediante la celebración de
conferencias públicas que desafían el operar de los mismos; por la falta de respuesta, algunos
se sienten tan frustrados que terminan separándose y formando sus propios partidos políticos,
una situación que, para los medios y la opinión pública, demostraba una desconexión en el
partido tan arraigada que hasta sugirieron su separación (Pargeter, 2013: p. 193-194)
En el caso de Túnez los islamistas se inspiraron en el partido de la Hermandad
Musulmana creado en Egipto, para establecer el suyo propio—el ya mencionado—Ennahda,
cuyos líderes fueron mayormente encarcelados por el presidente Ben Ali. Este nace de la
misma tradición ideológica y comparte la misma perspectiva, motivo por el cual sorprende su
ascenso al poder, pues, contrario a Egipto, cuna del islamismo político, el régimen tunecino
no permitía espacio alguno para este tipo de fuerzas; aún así, se demostró habil para atraer un
espectro amplio de votantes, al basarse en la moderación, para demostrar que su líder, el
jeque Rashid al-Ghannouchi, tenía razón al decir que la democracia y el Islam eran
compatibles (Pargeter, 2013: p. 203).
Uno de los elementos que diferenció a Túnez de la región, fue que los movimientos
sociales, particularmente los sindicatos, hicieron que Ennahda se mantuviera conectada y
comprometida (Dunay, 2017: 39-41). Es relevante observar la transición de los países
islamistas, donde el rol de la religión ha sido y es un componente de gran relevancia en todos
los extractos sociales; incluso en Ennahda se establecieron divisiones entre los miembros
sobre cómo abarcar la política y la religión. Entonces, por un lado, los jóvenes lo ven como
un partido político al servicio de la sociedad con una política de gobernabilidad democrática.
Por el otro, la otra corriente lo percibe como un movimiento islámico que tiene una misión
global, cultural y educacional, basada en la predicación: un proyecto islámico no puede
reducirse a su componente político (Hernández-Gutiérrez, 2023: 45). Pero esta deliberación
se mantuvo interna y cuando se hizo evidente que algunos de los elementos ideológicamente
más rígidos del partido no podían ocultar su pensamiento conservdor, el partido los mantuvo
alejados de los medios, presentándose así como un cuerpo unificado con un único mensaje
cultural, a pesar de las fricciones y facciones dentro del partido (Pargeter, 2013: p. 204).
En 2005, Ennahda participó en la coalición de oposición promovida por el Partido
Demócrata Progresista. La alianza estableció, a fines de 2007, una visión conjunta de los
principios que debía establecer Túnez tras lograr democratizarse. Los miembros concordaron
en ciertos principios en lo que concierne a “[...] la libertad de organización política, libertad
de prensa, libertad de conciencia, los derechos de la mujer, liberación y amnistía de presos
políticos y afirmación del lugar del islam en la cultura y la sociedad tunecinas”
(Hernández-Gutiérrez, 2023: 45). Finalmente, la alianza se disolvió, pero Ennahda anexó
gran parte de estas demandas para las elecciones que sucederían en 2011
(Hernández-Gutiérrez, 2023: 45). Cuando, en agosto de 2012 se debió redactar una
Constitución, aún habiendo elementos polémicos y de gran debate, en general, se logró un
consenso entre los diversos grupos seculares e islamistas (Landolt y Kubicek, 2013). Ennahda
fue el partido mejor organizado, con una participación del electorado de alrededor del 70%, el
partido anteriormente mencionado, adquirió noventa escaños en la Asamblea Constituyente
(Britannica, 2023a).
Tras este análisis, se puede concluir, que el rol de Ennahda, como oposición política al
régimen de Ben Alí en Túnez, tuvo resultados fructíferos en el momento de alcanzar la
transformación democrática debido a su interés por democratizarse, pero además, por su
presentación ante el mundo, como una unidad, que buscaba restaurar los valores
tradicionales, para mantener la identidad del país, en la construcción de una sociedad
moderna. En cambio, Egipto, que contaba con una oposición dividida, no lograba alcanzar un
acuerdo en cuanto a qué alianzas realizar para lograr una mejora sustancial o una
transformación del régimen, las fuerzas internas contrapuestas eran tan evidentes, que su
política no podía seguir un sólo rumbo y se volvieron impredecibles e incapaces de ser
definidos (Pargeter, 2013: p. 5-6, 204).