1. What does Fukuyama state that we are currently witnessing (presenciando)?

(first
introductory section)

According to Fukuyama, humanity is in the final stage of its ideological development. He refers
to this as the ‘end of history’. He predicts not only the spread of Western liberal democracy as a
universal value, but its long-term continuation as the governing system. He also points out the
distinction between the material world and the ideological one: Western liberal democracy has
been achieved in the ideological realm, but still needs to make great strides in real-world
manifestation.

2. What does he say about Hegel, Marx and Kojeve? (section I)

Marx is best known for promulgating the idea of the ‘end of history’: he believed that history
was the inneration of material forces and that it would come to an end once the communist
utopia was achieved. However, he borrowed several concepts from Hegel, who proposed history
to be a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Hegel believed that mankind
collectively went through a series of stages, and that each of those stages corresponds to a certain
concrete form of social organization. The implication is that there is meant to be a final stage of
consciousness, where mankind finally emerges victorious. He believed that this was to be in the
year 1806. Kojeve, a french interpreter of Hegel, argued that his predecessor was essentially
correct, because with the defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the hands of Napoleon at the Battle
of Jana, the basis of the French revolution was established. The fundamental principles of
democracy ‘could not be improved upon’, even though there was still work to be done in the
social sphere.

3. What is the driving force of history? What does he say about Max Weber in this
section (II)?

To understand history, it is vital to comprehend that the historical process occurs in the realm of
ideas. It is notions that are perpetuated in a culture that become social and political priorities.
Societies that fundamentally think differently will inherently fundamentally act differently.
Actions are the manifestation of the historical process.

In his book, Weber compares the priorities of catholics and protestants. Catholics, he says, sleep
well and protestants eat well. In other words, catholics prioritize their leisure time over their
income, and protestants, vice versa. Because of this, a catholic person is more likely to accept a
lower wage if it means less time spent working, while a protestant is more willing to accept more
work if it means a higher wage. He also compares militaristic Spartans to rich Athenians,
capitalistic entrepreneurs to traditional aristocrats. He means to correct the marxist idea that the
search for profit is the only determining factor in the historical process.
 4. What would count as evidence against the end of history thesis? Why does he reject
them? (III)

In order to disprove the ‘end of history’ thesis, one would need to find an alternative ideology
that works better than liberalism. Fukuyama states that there have been two major threats to
liberalism: facism and communism. However, neither of these systems managed to endure.
Facism was defeated after WWII (the author mentions that the war put an end to both the
material aspect of facism as well as the ideological) and communism, with the fall of the Soviet
Union. A theoretical other system which works in a small, remote part of the world does not
count because it is not relevant to what he calls the ‘ideological heritage of mankind’.

5. What does he say about Fascism? (III)

Facism was based on the idea that modern political challenges could be solved with a strong
central government. Facism was then destroyed after WWII, in both the material and ideological
sense. What destroyed the idea of facism was a collective moral revulsion from the rest of the
world. The author points out that there is no material reason why facism should not recur. Rather,
its fall serves as a reminder. Quite simply, it has lost its appeal. Facism is now largely associated
with its own destruction.

6. What does he say about Marxism? (III)

Marxism was more of a threat to liberalism than facism ever was. Marx claimed that the
contradiction embedded in liberal ideology (between capital and labor) meant that it was
destined to fail, and this argument has become the primary attack on liberalism. However,
Kojeve states that the classless society that Marx envisioned has already come to fruition in the
United States. This does not mean that there are no poor people and no rich people there; rather,
that the root causes for economic inequality come not from a flaw in the system but because of
social and cultural biases that come from historical injustices like slavery. Because class is
becoming less of an issue in the western world, communism is also losing its appeal.

7. What does he say about Japan, China and the USSR? (III)

Like Germany, Japan was a facist nation that lost to the United States. Consequently, the USA
imposed a liberal democracy that has grown and developed into its own branch. The fusion
between Japanese tradition and liberal democracy has transformed Japan into a highly industrial
society with a prevailing system. Additionally, thanks to Japan’s success and dedication to the
consumer culture, it has become a sort of icon and gateway for other Asian nations to follow into
economic liberalism, and by proxy, political liberalism.

Communist China created a threat for the liberal society being promulgated by Japan by simply
existing. However, in recent years, the marxist-lenninist economy has been almost entirely
discredited. Now, the Chinese economic system could be described as liberal. It no longer serves
as a beacon of communism to other nations.

Since Gorbachev came into power in the Soviet Union, there has been a revolutionary attack on
the very basic ideas of Stalinism. The Soviet economic system is (or was, in 1998, when the text
was written) collapsing and the only way for it to recover is to apply liberal aspects to its
functioning.

8. What does he say about religion? (III)

Religion is a potential alternative to liberalism, though not a valid one. The author notes that in
recent years, religious fundamentalism has gained traction. The problem with religion as an
ideology is that religion seeks to satisfy problems that cannot always be fixed in the realm of
politics. Because no religion can appeal to everyone, it can never become a fixed part of any
political system.

9. What does he say about nationalism? (III)

Though nationalism presents a threat to liberalism, there is no proof that it is evidence of a

fundamental flaw at the heart of liberalism. Nationalism is fractured. It is not a single movement,
but a unique attitude in every society which can range from cultural nostalgia to organized
systems. Only systemic nationalism can qualify as an ideology, and even then, nationalists rarely
have a political agenda that goes beyond isolating themselves from a certain group of people.

10. What does his argument tell us about international relations? (IV)

The author believes that though countries like Russia and China are not likely to become liberal
democracies in the foreseeable future, if they were to do so, international relations would not be
too greatly altered. This is because the heart of conflict and competition between nations is not a
difference in ideologies, but a struggle for power and control to protect national interests. He
mentions a particular theory remenicient of Hobbes in which conflict is presented as an inherent
part of any society, not something that is created by historical injustices.

11. What does he claim in the last paragraph? Is it surprising? (V)

He claims that the end of history has already begun, and that it will be a very sad time for
humanity. Fighting for an ideology gave us purpose, he claims, and inspired all the philosophy
and art and courage. The nostalgia for such times will endure, however, and he claims that
perhaps the desire to return to a time like 1945, when the second World War ended, will cause
history to begin again. It is a surprising ending mainly because throughout most of the text, he
defends the permanence of liberalism, presenting it as the only viable option in this new world.
While most of the text has a faintly arrogant tone, the ending is quite maudlin.