Phil 102: Introduction to

Philosophy:
1
“Knowledge & Reality”
A sampler of questions and issues

Professor Amy M. Schmitter,

Department of Philosophy
 2 Philosophy Department Colloquium
Thursday, February 16, 3:30-5:30 (MDT)
Location: Zoom and Philosophy Department seminar room (Assiniboia
Hall 2-02A)
Everyone welcome!
Abstract: In this talk, I provide the first extended discussion in the
philosophical literature of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of
“being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that I argue are
distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United
Nations of the “right to know,” I argue that victims of gross violations and
Jennifer Lackey, injustices not only have the right to know what happened, but also the
right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own
“Epistemic experiences. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to
underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations, one that significantly

Reparations”
(Professor Lackey will present on
Zoom, with the audience in the
Assiniboia Hall 2-02A, or on
Zoom.)
expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are
imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs.
Speaker: Jennifer Lackey is the Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of
Philosophy and Professor of Law (courtesy) at Northwestern University,
Senior Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy
of Science at the University of Johannesburg, Past President of the Central
Division of the American Philosophical Association, and Founding Director of the
Northwestern Prison Education Program. Most of her research is in social
epistemology with a current focus on issues involving credibility assessments
within the American criminal legal system and epistemic reparations. Lackey is Zoom
the winner of the Dr. Martin R. Lebowitz and Eve Lewellis Lebowitz Prize for
Philosophical Achievement and Contribution and she has received grants and ID:
fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Andrew 920 6023 5649
W. Mellon Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Passcode:
National Endowment for the Humanities. 470504
3 Plan for this week

This Week: Introduction to Philosophical skepticism

ü Three examples from different times and places
ü That raise questions about knowledge
ü One is a self-described skeptic; the others . . . ?
ü All are using some kinds of doubt for particular ends.
´ Which makes it interesting to compare them.
Ø Note: we will be looking at varieties of skepticism and its tools
after break too.
Ø So don’t forget what we talk about this week!
4
What is skepticism?
´ Many things (as we will see!)
´ Involves raising deep and systematic doubts
about our ability
´ To gain knowledge
´ To justify beliefs, or
´ To reason
´ “Much of epistemology has arisen either in defense of, or in
opposition to, various forms of skepticism.” Peter Klein,
“Skepticism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
´ On the other hand, much philosophical skepticism arises
in response to philosophical theories about what we do
know.
5 Different kinds of skepticism:
´ Ancient (Greek and Roman) skepticisms:
´ Academic Skepticism
´ Developed from Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.)
´ Pyrrhonism:
´ Much more extreme form of skepticism than Academic
skepticism
´ Attributed to Pyrrho (~365 - ~275 BCE), although developed
over centuries
´ Outlines of Pyrrhonism [Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes] – classic text
for Pyrrhonian skepticism
´ By Sextus Empiricus (~160 – 210 CE?? Very little is
known of his life)
´ Contrast with Medieval and Modern skepticisms:
´ Descartes – uses skepticism
´ Al Ghazali – skeptic, but localized?
´ Hume
Ø Today, we will consider some other folks who have sometimes been
described as skeptical: Zhuangzi and Nāgārjuna
Ø We should consider how appropriate that description is for each.
6 Different questions and targets
for skepticism:
´ “Whereas modern skepticism questions the possibility of knowledge,
Pyrrhonian skepticism questions the rationality of belief.” Benjamin
Morison, "Sextus Empiricus", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
´ There are other issues that may be (or seem) skepticism-adjacent:
´ Whether humans are naturally, or systemically prone to mistakes
about basic matters;
´ Whether knowledge (or even truths) are relative to some
perspective, framework, standpoint, etc.;
´ Whether there are stable objects of knowledge (at least as
knowledge is usually conceived).
 Two figures for today:
7
´ Nāgārjuna (~ 150–250 CE)
´ Buddhist monk, probably lived mostly in south India;
´ Pivotal figure for Indian and Tibetan Buddhism;
´ A number of works attributed to him, most importantly The
Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā).
´ Zhuangzi (“Master Zhuang”), or Chuang-tzu [ 莊子 ] (~ 369 - (298-286?)
B.C.E.)
´ Period of the “hundred philosophers” (551-c.233 BCE), including
Confucius, Laozi, Mozi, Mencius, Xunzi . . .
´ Also the name of the collection of writings (largely based on the
edition by Guo Xiang (d. 312) about 600 years after).
´ Hard to figure out:
´ Translations;
´ Textual corruption, and multiple authorship;
´ “Inner chapters” may be contemporaneous with ‘real’
Zhuangzi.
´ Sly references and style of presentation (e.g., parables);
´ Interest in language and its workings;
´ Refuses to resolve questions and problems it raises.
8 Alternate Translations

From the Chinese text project: https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/adjustment-of-controversies

 Zhuangzi’s
9 Butterfly
Some
translations use
Dream
the 1st person,
“I”. “Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt he
Think of this as was a butterfly, a butterfly
illustrating a flitting and fluttering around,
kind of happy with himself and doing
swapping of as he pleased. He didn’t know
perspectives. he was Zhuang Zhou.
Suddenly he woke up and
there he was, solid and
unmistakable Zhuang Zhou.
But he didn’t know if he was
Zhuang Zhou who had dreamt
he was a butterfly, or a
butterfly dreaming he was
Zhuang Zhou. Between
Zhuang Zhou and a butterfly
there must be some distinction!
This is called the
Transformation of Things.
(Basic Writings, p. 44)
 Main themes in Zhuangzi
10
´ “The central theme of the Zhuangzi may be summed up in a single word: freedom.”
Burton Watson (“Introduction,” Basic Writings, p. 3)
´ “We are one among many natural creatures with different capacities choosing paths
“Dàos can be from their indexed point in space and time. The skeptical theme is the wide range of
social or natural our different perspectives. We are limited mainly in the sense that there is no behavior
structures that from the point of view of the whole—there is no omniscient perspective on the path
guide us in structure.” Chad Hansen, “Zuangzi,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
answering ´ Values, distinctions, and determinations (that we know) are human-made impositions:
practical things are bad or good because we conceive of them as such.
questions: what
´ But that does not mean that they are false – only that there are other ways of
to do or how to
conceiving (or not conceiving) of things.
do it.” (Chad
Hansen, ´ No absolute distinction between human-made and natural
“Zuangzi,” ´ All of these are ways that exist within the course of the universe (multiple ways,
Stanford dàos).
Encyclopedia ´ “Dào” – perspective, point-of-view, interpretation . . . but also natural pattern or law,
of Philosophy standard . . . but also social practice, custom.
´ There is no overarching, authoritative way (no governor, or ruler) that will decide
among the multiplicity of dàos.
“But I do not know what makes them the way they are. It would seem as though
they have some True Master, and yet I find no trace of him. He can act—that is
certain. Yet I cannot see his form. He has identity but no form.” (p. 33)
11 Methods
v Various devices to awaken the reader to the relativity of
values and distinctions:
v Using dialogues and parables, with paradoxes and “the
pseudo-logical” discussion that seems to start out as
meaningful and then undermines itself.
´ “The torch of chaos and doubt – this is what the sage
steers by.” (p. 38)
´ “The Great Way is not named; Great Discriminations are
not spoken; Great Benevolence is not benevolent; Great
Modesty is not humble; Great Daring does not attack. If
the Way is made clear, it is not the Way. . . .
´ Therefore understanding that rests in what it does not
understand is the finest. Who can understand
discriminations that are not spoken, the Way that is not a
way?” (pp. 39-40)
12 Pluralism of (linguistic) ways
´ “Words are not just wind. Words have something to say. But if
what they have to say is not fixed, then do they really say
something? Or do they say nothing? People suppose that words
are different from the peeps of baby birds, but is there any
difference, or isn’t there? What does the Way rely upon, that we
have true and false?” (p. 34)
´ “The way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy.
But because of [the recognition of] a ‘this,’ there came to be
Shì-fēi 是非 boundaries.” (p. 39)
(This way
not that) ´ Everything has its “that,” everything has its “this.” From the point
of view of “that” you cannot see it, but through understanding
you can know it. So I say, “that” comes out of “this” and “this”
depends on “that”—which is to say that “this” and “that” give
birth to each other . . . (p. 35).
 Determinations are relative . . .
13
´ . . . But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be
birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability; where there is
unacceptability there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of right
there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recognition of wrong there
must be recognition of right. Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way,
but illuminates all in the light of Heaven. He too recognizes a “this,” but a “this”
which is also “that,” a “that” which is also “this.” His “that” has both a right and a
wrong in it; his “this” too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he
still have a “this” and “that”? Or does he in fact no longer have a “this” and
“that”? A state in which “this” and “that” no longer find their opposites is called
the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond
endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness and its wrong too is a single
endlessness. (p. 35).
´ The understanding of the men of ancient times went a long way. How far did it go?
To the point where some of them believed that things have never existed—so far,
to the end, where nothing can be added. Those at the next stage thought that things
exist but recognized no boundaries among them. Those at the next stage thought
there were boundaries but recognized no right and wrong. Because right and
wrong appeared, the Way was injured, and because the Way was injured, love
became complete. But do such things as completion and injury really exist, or do
they not?
14
Human and non-human ways
“Nie Que asked Wang Ni, “Do you know what all things agree in calling right?”
“How would I know that?” said Wang Ni. “Do you know that you don’t know it?”
“How would I know that?” “Then do things know nothing?” “How would I know
that? However, suppose I try saying something. What way do I have of knowing
that if I say I know something I don’t really not know it? Or what way do I have
of knowing that if I say I don’t know something I don’t really in fact know it?
Now let me ask you some questions. If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back
aches and he ends up half paralyzed, but is this true of a loach? If he lives in a
tree, he is terrified and shakes with fright, but is this true of a monkey? Of these
three creatures, then, which one knows the proper place to live? Men eat the flesh
of grass-fed and grain-fed animals, deer eat grass, centipedes find snakes tasty,
and hawks and falcons relish mice. Of these four, which knows how food ought to
taste? Monkeys pair with monkeys, deer go out with deer, and fish play around
with fish. Men claim that Maoqiang and Lady Li were beautiful, but if fish saw
them they would dive to the bottom of the stream, if birds saw them they would
fly away, and if deer saw them they would break into a run. Of these four, which
knows how to fix the standard of beauty for the world?”
15 No neutral arbiter?
“Suppose you and I have had an argument. If you have beaten me
instead of my beating you, then are you necessarily right and am I
necessarily wrong? If I have beaten you instead of your beating me,
then am I necessarily right and are you necessarily wrong? Is one of us
right and the other wrong? Are both of us right or are both of us
wrong? If you and I don’t know the answer, then other people are
bound to be even more in the dark. Whom shall we get to decide what
is right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to decide? But if
he already agrees with you, how can he decide fairly? Shall we get
someone who agrees with me? But if he already agrees with me, how
can he decide? Shall we get someone who disagrees with both of us?
But if he already disagrees with both of us, how can he decide? Shall
we get someone who agrees with both of us? But if he already agrees
with both of us, how can he decide? Obviously, then, neither you nor I
nor anyone else can know the answer. Shall we wait for still another
person?” (p. 43)
16 Is Zhuangzi a skeptic?

Ø Suggests there may be irreconcilable disputes

Ø Judgments relative to perspectives, or viewpoints
Ø Emphasis on alternative viewpoints
Ø Even on ones not available to humans.
´ Those look like skeptical tools –
´ that work to undermine claims to knowledge, . . .
´ or at least to definitive knowledge (that would settle all
disputes).
´ But what are his main aims?
 Interpreting Zhuangzi:
17
´ Chad Hansen’s interpretation, ”Zhuangzi,” Stanford Encycl. of Phil.
´ … the “Inner Chapter” Zhuangists accept that social dàos are
continuous with natural ones, but they do not endorse any
imagined or alleged, comprehensive judgments from everywhere,
from all natural points of view. . . . They are skeptical of any claim
of special access to contextless guiding knowledge by alleged or
self-styled sages, “ideal observers” or perfect exemplars of
epistemic virtues.
´ Neither [nature] nor the cosmos can play the role of an authority,
far less of an anthropomorphic authority commanding or dictating
Bear this in our choice among the network of naturally existing dàos. Dàos are
mind for later chosen from those found in nature, but none represents nature’s
choice for us—none of the dàos in nature is the dào of nature.
...
´ Mild skepticism in the service of limiting claims to knowledge.
´ A kind of relativism about our values, distinctions, and judgments.
18
A quick look at Nāgārjuna
´ Selections from The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way
[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]
´ Typically, Nāgārjuna’s thought is understood to revolve around the notion of
emptiness [śūnyatā].
´ A kind of denial that things have svabhāva:
´ “essence” in our translation, but also “intrinsic nature,” “substance,” . . .
´ Svabhāva has both metaphysical and an epistemological senses:
´ Fundamental (“irreducible”) furniture of the world (primary existents);
´ and what we try to cognize in thinking about things and how they are
different from other things.
´ So emptiness is emptiness of svabhāva: things have no intrinsic natures, or
fundamental being that makes them what they are and differentiates them
from other things – no fixed, permanent metaphysical anchors.
´ But emptiness is not itself a kind of svabhāva. Nāgārjuna insists on the
emptiness of emptiness.
´ In this respect, the middle way is a matter of steering between eternalism
(grasping for “permanence”) and nihilism, the assertion of some kind of
nothingness.
19 Compare Chap. XV, 10, and Chap.
XXVII, 30.

• To say "it is" is to grasp for permanence.

• To say "it is not" is to adopt the view of nihilism.
• Therefore a wise person
• Does not say "exists" or "does not exist.”

• I prostrate to Gautama
• Who through compassion
• Taught the true doctrine,
• Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.
20 Think about what the main issues are
for both Zhuangzi and Nāgārjuna

´ To compare them to Sextus Empiricus

´ Both for the ends and the tools that they use . . .