Phil 102: Introduction to

Philosophy:
“Knowledge & Reality”
A sampler of questions and issues

Professor Amy M. Schmitter, Department of Philosophy


“Understanding the
Role of Non-
Epistemic Values in
Trusting Scientists”
(Professor Intemann will present
on Zoom, with the audience in the
Assiniboia Hall 2-02A, or on
Zoom)
Tomorrow!
Philosophy Department Colloquium
Thursday, March 9, 3:30-5:30 (MST)
Location: hybrid: Philosophy Department seminar room (Assiniboia
Hall 2-02A) and Zoom
Everyone welcome!
Abstract: Maya Goldenberg (2022) argues that laypersons are more likely to have
epistemic trust in scientific experts when scientists and scientific institutions demonstrate
i) epistemic competency, ii) moral reliability, and iii) a commitment to the public interest.
It is often assumed that public skepticism about particular areas of science (e.g., research
on climate change or on the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 treatments and vaccines) is
the result of false beliefs about the state of scientific evidence or the epistemic
competency of certain methodologies. Thus, scientists and philosophers of science often
focus on defending or improving the actual or perceived epistemic competency of
scientific research to promote public acceptance and trust. Yet the ethical dimensions of
epistemic trust (moral reliability and a commitment to the public interest) are often
neglected and can play more significant roles in public acceptance or rejection of science.
Moral reliability and a commitment to the public interest require researchers to engage
with stakeholders about non-epistemic values and to conduct research in ways that can
promote stakeholder wellbeing. How best to do this is considered, given complex
challenges related to: 1) disagreement among stakeholders about non-epistemic values and
2) concerns that aspects of moral reliability, such as transparency and honesty, may
actually exacerbate unwarranted distrust amongst those whose trust in experts is already
"fragile" (John 2018).
Speaker: Kristen Intemann is a Professor of Philosophy and Director for the Center for
Science, Technology, Ethics & Society at Montana State University in the U.S. Her Zoom
research focuses on values in science, epistemic trust, science communication, and public ID:
engagement with science. She has published in both philosophy and science journals and
her book, co-authored with Inmaculada de Melo-Martin is The Fight Against Doubt: How 920 6023 5649
to Bridge the Gap between Scientists and the Public, (Oxford University Press, 2018) Passcode:
470504
 Plan for today
(and some things for you to think about)

• Where we ended last time -- Hume’s skeptical challenge for causal

reasoning . . .
• Today, we will continue with his arguments for why there is no
rational justification for relying on causal connections.
• Before turning to his skeptical “solution.”
Ø In general, let me urge you to reflect a bit on how much we rely on
there being causal connections – and think about why that is so.
• Then we turn to some thoughts on testimony, both from Hume and from
Jennifer Lackey:
Ø For this too, let me urge you to reflect a bit on how much we rely on
testimony – what other people tell us is so.
Ø Let me also urge you to reflect on how easy it would be for both
kinds of reliance to go wrong . . .
v There’s all sorts of bad causal reasoning out there;
v There are also all sorts of cases of people telling others things that are
false, deceptive, misleading, in bad faith, ill-judged, empty,
unjustified, unjustifiable, etc.
Hume’s Challenge for causal reasoning
(sec. 4, pt. II):
´ Take some example where we form beliefs about what
did, will, or could happen (matters of fact)
´ Reasonings about matters of fact à track relations of
cause & effect.
´ Reasonings about causal relations à Experience.
Ø But . . . what is the foundation of conclusions from
experience?
Ø In other words, what justifies our reliance on past
experience to reason (infer, predict) about causal
relations now and in the future?
v That requires an inference from “I have found that such
an object has always been attended with such an effect,
[to . . . ] I foresee, that other objects, which are, in
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar
effects” (p. 34).
v So, what reason could we have for thinking that past
experience is a guide or standard for the future?
 A distinction for reason (“Hume’s Fork”)
´ Two kinds of reasoning:
´ Demonstrative (based on “relations of ideas”)
´ Can be known a priori:
“That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the
two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between
these figures. . . . Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the
mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is
anywhere existent in the universe.” (ECHU 4.1)
´ The contrary is inconceivable because it would be contradictory
(and thus impossible).
´ Matter-of-fact or “moral” (based on cause-and-effect):
“knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by
Which reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find
doesn’t that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.”
mean that (ECHU 4.6)
they are ´ Hume’s skeptical arguments show that the reliance on experience cannot be
irrational . . . justified by either kind of reasoning.
´ And so there is no rational basis for causal inferences: “our conclusions from .
. . experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the
understanding.” (EHCU 4.15)
The skeptical argument 1: no basis in
demonstrative reason . . .

´ Reasoning must be either demonstrative or matter-of-fact:

´ There can be no demonstration (proof) that the future will conform to
the past:
“That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident;
since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change,
and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced,
may be attended with different or contrary effects” (ECHU 4.18)
ü We can even imagine such changes.

´ What about matter-of-fact (causal) arguments?

´ These are arguments about what is likely . . .
´ Somebody might say ‘well, I have always found that my experience
of causal relations serves me well in new situations . . . ’
´ Or perhaps, ‘we have always found that people who learn from
experience do better than those who don’t.’
 The skeptical argument 2: no basis in
matter-of-fact reason
´ These are arguments that rely on past experience and assume that the future
will resemble the past.
´ So too does: ‘In all past experience, the future has resembled the past,
therefore the future will continue to resemble the past.”
´ This assumes that nature will remain uniform (with the future resembling the
past).
• “all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the
future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined
Indeed with similar sensible qualities.
this would • If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that
be the
the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless,
fallacy of
“begging
and can give rise to no inference or conclusion.
the • It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can
question” prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these
(assuming arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance.” (ECHU
what you 4.19).
seek to ´ Trying to use them to justify relying on experience for the future is circular.
prove).
 Hume’s “skeptical solution of these
doubts”
´ Note that Hume identifies himself as a skeptic (an “Academic”)
´ Because he thinks that moderate skepticism is a corrective for our
tendencies both to be intellectually lazy and to think far too highly
of our own abilities.
´ An appropriate skepticism leads us to conclude “that, in all reasonings
from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported
by any argument or process of the understanding . . . “
´ Still “there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all
knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery.”
(ECHU 5.2).
´ Instead something besides reason (“some other principle”) induces the
mind to move from its past experience (of causation) to expecting the
same patterns in the future.
v “This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any
particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or
operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the
understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of
Custom.” (ECHU 5.5)
So, an Why is this a “skeptical solution of these
indispensable
kind of
doubts”?
reasoning v “This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any
cannot itself be particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act
rationally or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the
grounded and understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of
relies on Custom.” (ECHU 5.5)
something we ´ What makes this a skeptical solution?
don’t really ´ Citing custom does not provide “the ultimate reason” – or any
understand! reason at all.
´ It is only because the patterns of past experience have shaped our
minds that we come to expect the same patterns when we think
about the future:
We don’t
have ´ “This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the
experience difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference
(or any real which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no
idea) of respect, different from them. . . . All inferences from experience,
how causes therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.” (ECHU 5.5)
ultimately ´ This is a causal account itself – but it gives a cause for our reasoning,
produce not a reason.
effects. ´ What’s more, all we have from the past is experience of patterns –
patterns of one kind of thing following another kind of thing, which
Hume calls “constant conjunction.”
 Testimony & Knowledge
´ What is testimony?
´ Statement(s) conveying information that are supposed to serve as
evidence for it.
´ As such, testimony can be a source of beliefs and (we hope) knowledge.
“ The central
focus in the ´ Indeed, a very important source of knowledge:
epistemology “ Virtually everything we know depends in some way or other on the
of testimony testimony of others—. . . We do not, after all, perceive firsthand the
is . . . on how preparation of the ingredients in many of our meals, or the construction
justified of the devices we use to get around the world, or the layout of our
belief or planet, or our own births and familial histories. These are all things we
knowledge is are told.” (Lackey, p. 71).
acquired on
the basis of ´ For this reason, we can ask what would justify relying on (some)
what other testimony.
people tell ´ In particular, what would give a hearer a good reason to “form a
us.” (Lackey, given belief on the basis of the content of a speaker’s testimony”
p. 71). (Lackey, p. 73)?
 Miracles, Testimony & Probabilities
´ This is why I asked you to read Hume’s (skeptical) piece on miracles.
´ How does he connect miracles to epistemological questions about testimony?
´ Beliefs in miracles are based on testimony . . .
´ of some supposed eyewitness
´ E.g., the Christian apostles.
´ Or the prophets of Islam . . .
´ But “[a] miracle is a violation of the laws of nature” (ECHU, 10.12)
´ That is, it is a violation of the causal patterns that have always been
observed.
´ On this basis, Hume argues that it is almost always irrational to trust
testimony about miracles.
´ Why?
´ A hint: Hume thinks that when we consider what is probable, we are
always thinking about causal connections.
´ But a miracle, which violates all known causal connections, cannot be
probable.
 Hume’s argument against trust in
reports of miracles
´ Why would it be irrational to trust testimony about miracles?
´ Hume agrees with Lackey about the importance of testimony:
“we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more
useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the
testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.” (ECHU, p.
111)
´ But we still need some reason to trust testimony:
“our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle
than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual
conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses.“ (p. 111)
´ That is, when we trust testimony, we are basically assuming that there is a
certain causal relation between the testimony and the facts it reports.
´ And sometimes there isn’t (when people lie, memory fails, etc.)
v The result: “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony
be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact,
which it endeavours to establish“ (pp. 115-6).
v It will always be more likely that testimony is false than that a miracle occurred.
 Lackey’s challenge
to the causal approach
´ But is our trust in testimony just a matter of causal reasoning?
´ Lackey calls this a “reductionist” account:
“for instance, hearers observe a general conformity between
reports and the corresponding facts and, with the assistance of
memory and reason, inductively infer that certain speakers,
contexts, or types of reports are reliable sources of information. In
this way, the justification of testimony is reduced to the
justification for sense perception, memory, and inductive
inference.” (p. 74).
´ And she suggests that it is impossible that we could perform all
these checks for every single person whose testimony we trust . . .
´ especially if we are children,
´ or if we are asking strangers for information.
Questions raised by Lackey’s challenge
´ So either we are completely unjustified in trusting almost any testimony,
or there’s something else going on (that is, relying on testimony is not like
relying on inductive inference.)
´ Lackey argues that there are reasons for trusting testimony (when it’s
trustworthy) other than that we have already established that the
testifier has the right causal relation to the facts she reports.
Ø But that does raise questions about how we decide whose testimony to
trust or distrust (in the absence of other evidence).
Ø This is a matter of who is granted “credence,” or found credible, or
authoritative (in the absence of other evidence).
Ø Miranda Fricker (among others) argues that there are social structures and
relations that can distort who is found credible or authoritative, and who is
not, and that such distortions can constitute a kind of epistemic injustice.
v Can you think of examples?
 Some puzzles and challenges to
think about . . .
´ If Al Ghazali and Hume are right
• and we never observe, or reason our way to the necessary connection of
cause and effect,
• But have to rely on experience of one event following another (constant
conjunction)
• To say that one is a cause and the other the effect, . . .
Ø Then how will we distinguish between a mere coincidence and a genuine
causal relation?
Ø How will we distinguish between mere post hoc and propter hoc?
Ø Can we?

´ When we come to believe something because other people told us so . . .

• Is this just a kind of causal reasoning?
• Or is it a special kind of evidence?
Ø How can we decide whose testimony to trust?
Challenging Hume: is it true that all we have
is experience of patterns (constant
conjunctions)?
´ “. . . having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects—
flame and heat, snow and cold—have always been conjoined together; if
flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by
custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist,
and will discover itself upon a nearer approach.” (ECHU 5.8)
´ “But no man, having seen only one body move after being
impelled by another, could infer that every other body will
move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience,
therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning” (ECHU
5.5).
´ Don’t the natural sciences (particularly physics) give us
explanations of causal connections?
Ø Do they explain why things are causally connected?
Ø Consider this account of laws of collision and momentum.
v If you are really interested in this challenge, look at what
Hume says at ECHU 4.12 about the “ultimate causes and
principles” that natural science can give us.
 Next time:
´ Change of subject
´ We will begin by looking at an argument from Ibn Sina and
Descartes’s arguments in Meditation II, which are continued
in Meditation VI
v Where he argues that there is something we can know
with certainty.
´ And we will look at how he develops this thought in
Meditation VI and in his correspondence with Elisabeth of
Bohemia
´ But we are leaving aside questions of knowledge and skepticism
and turning to . . .
Ø . . . philosophy of mind.