Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

Failure mode and effect analysis considering the fairness-oriented

consensus of a large group with core-periphery structure
Ming Tang , Huchang Liao *
Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: With the increasing complexity of processes and products, and because of the multi-disciplinary and cross-
Failure mode and effect analysis functional nature, a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) practice may be implemented in a distributed
Large group decision making setting with a large group of FMEA members. In this study, we introduce a large group decision making model for
Core-periphery structure
FMEA considering social relationships of FMEA members. Firstly, a group structure detection method is used to
Delegation mechanism
Fairness-oriented consensus
reduce the dimension of the large group, which can find a core-periphery structure and a community structure
from a meso‑scale perspective. Then, a delegation mechanism is introduced to allocate opinions of periphery
FMEA members into those of core FMEA members. Next, we propose a fairness-oriented consensus approach
considering a fair distribution of changes in the consensus reaching process. An illustrative example regarding
photovoltaic systems is provided to demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of our proposed model. The
key and novel contribution of our paper is to explore how to manage the structure characteristic for FMEA groups
under the social network setting. We provide an insight of efficient decision making for complex reliability
engineering problems.

1. Introduction
With the increasing requirements of security management in modern
industries, reliability analysis techniques have been used in risk
assessment, such as the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) [19]
and fault tree analysis [3]. Group decision making (GDM) is an integral
part of almost all FMEA projects [17]. Researchers indicated that FMEA
is a group decision function implemented by the collaboration of FMEA
members from multiple departments or disciplinaries [5,22,27]. Current
FMEA studies mainly focused on risk evaluation problems involving a
small number of FMEA members (3 to 6 members). However, nowadays,
FMEA practices are usually performed by cross-functional and multi­
disciplinary members in distributed settings such as mail sorting and
offshore outsourcing [19]. In these situations, it is difficult for a small
group to make an effective risk analysis [27] and a large number of
FMEA members should be involved. Nevertheless, in a large group,
FMEA members may have various backgrounds, knowledge, and in­
terests, resulting in discrepant preferences and judgments. Thus, how to
manage consensus for large group decision making (LGDM) is a chal­
lenging issue in FMEA practices.
Scholars have focused on GDM models in applications of FMEA [4,
14,21,28,44]. However, these GDM models assumed that experts are
mutually independent. With the rapid development of social media
platforms, it is a reality that experts participate in decision-making
processes in social network settings. Social network analysis (SNA) has
become a widely used tool in risk management and quality management
[45]. The SNA has been used in LGDM from various perspectives [33].
Measuring the structural characteristics of social networks, such as the
path length, node degree and clustering coefficient, was the research
focus of SNA [46]. Nowadays, the meso‑scale and large-scale structures
of social networks have also been increasingly investigated [13,43]. The
community structure received the lion’s share of attention, in which
nodes were divided into communities through community detection
algorithms . Existing SNA-based LGDM models mainly focused on the
community structure [23,35,39,40]. There is also another kind of
structure, namely, the core-periphery structure, which is ubiquitous in
social network studies [13]. Many networks are identified to divide into
an interconnected core with high density surrounded by a periphery
[46]. In the 1990s, the core-periphery social structure of networks was
found by sociologists, and subsequently, a number of scholars made
contributions to this structure in terms of theoretical and applied re­
searches [30]. Identifying a core-periphery network structure has many

* Corresponding author:
E-mail address: liaohuchang@163.com (H. Liao).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2021.107821
Received 9 February 2021; Received in revised form 9 May 2021; Accepted 22 May 2021
Available online 29 May 2021
0951-8320/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Table 1
The adjacency matrix corresponding to the community network structure in
Fig. 2.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1 – 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 – 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 – 1 1 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 – 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 1 0 – 1 1 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 1 – 1 1 1
7 0 0 0 0 1 1 – 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 – 1
Fig. 1. Two kinds of networks. 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 –

potential uses [46]. As far as we know, however, in the LDGM literature,

2.1. SNA
less is known about how to manage core-periphery network structures.
Taking into account all aforementioned issues, this study introduces
A social network is a platform in which a set of social entities are
an LGDM model based on the core-periphery structure and uses this
connected by a set of socially meaningful relations [31]. This platform
model in FMEA problems. First, we use a group structure detection
provides a tool to research social relationships among entities based on
method to detect the potential core-periphery/community structure of a
the SNA [24,31]. Formally, a social network can be characterized as a
large group. Then, a delegation mechanism is introduced to allocate
graph G(E, R), where E is a set of nodes (FMEA members in this study)
opinions of peripheral FMEA members into those of core FMEA mem­
and R is a set of edges connecting nodes. There are mainly two kinds of
bers. Next, a consensus reaching process (CRP) is introduced to reduce
networks according to whether the edges have directions: undirected
discrepancies among opinions of FMEA members. The main contribu­
networks and directed networks. Fig. 1 presents two kinds of networks.
tions of our study are summarized as follows:
In the network environment, if there is an edge between two nodes,
then these two nodes have a certain kind of relationship such as
1) We detect the structure of the large FMEA group from a meso‑scale
friendship or trust. Because a social relationship is often established
perspective and reduce the dimension and complexity of the group
based on mutual recognition [7], we use undirected networks in this
through considering core FMEA members in the CRP;
study.
2) To prevent information loss and simplify the analysis process, we
Two common images in SNA are the community network structure
introduce a delegation mechanism. Based on this mechanism, the
[8] and core-periphery network structure [34]. These two types of
opinions of peripheral members can be allocated into the opinions of
structures are displayed in Fig. 2.
core members;
We can also use an adjacency matrix to represent the graph. For
3) The consensus model considers the fair distribution of changes in
instance, the adjacency matrix corresponding to the graph on the left
FMEA members when receiving feedback suggestions. Furthermore,
side of Fig. 2 is shown in Table 1.
this model can avoid over-adjustment of opinions.

In summary, the key contribution of our study is to explore how to

2.2. LGDM for FMEA
manage the structure characteristic for FMEA groups under the social
network setting. We provide an insight of efficient decision making for
An LGDM problem for FMEA can be defined as a situation in which a
complex reliability engineering problems.
large group of FMEA members are invited to make a high-quality risk
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Preliminaries are pro­
assessment through identifying serious failure modes among potential
vided in Section 2. Section 3 is the literature review. In Section 4, the
ones [27]. In the following, we formulate an FMEA problem under the
proposed model is characterized in detail. Section 5 adopts an illustra­
social network setting.
tive example to demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of the
For a traditional FMEA, the priority of a failure mode is calculated
model. We conclude the study in Section 6.
according to its risk priority number (RPN), which is the product of risk
factors: occurrence (O), severity (S), and detection (D), namely,
2. Preliminaries
RPN = O × S × D (1)
In this section, we provide preliminaries used in this paper.
Suppose that the potential failure modes are FM = {fm1 ,fm2 ,...,fmn }.
A set of FMEA members E = {e1 , e2 , ..., em } are invited to evaluate these

Fig. 2. Two networks with a community network structure (left) and core-periphery network structure (right).

2
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Table 2 k
Then, the assessment matrix Dk = (dij )n×y provided by expert ek can be
Scales of occurrence, severity and detection.
represented as:
Occurrence (O) Severity (S) Detection (D) ⎡ ⎤
Very unlikely (1) No or minor effect (1) Always detected (1)
⎢ dk k
d12 ...
k
d1y ⎥
Occasional (3) Low effect (3) Likely detected (3) ⎢ 11 ⎥
⎢ k k ⎥
Moderate (5) Moderate effect (5) Moderate chance (5) ⎢d k
d22 ... d2y ⎥
High (7) High effect (7) Easily not detected (7) Dk = ⎢
⎢
21 ⎥
⎥
Very high (9) Very high effect (9) Nearly always not detected (9) ⎢ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⎥
⎢ k ⎥
Almost inevitable (10) Severe effect (10) No way of detection (10) ⎣d k k
n1 dn2 ... d ⎦
ny

To facilitate the comprehension of our study, Table 3 lists main ac­

Table 3 ronyms and symbols.
List of acronyms and symbols.
Acronym Meaning 3. Literature review
FMEA Failure mode and effect analysis
GDM Group decision making In this section, we review the related studies regarding the applica­
LGDM Large group decision making
tions of GDM methods in solving FMEA problems as well as SNA-based
SNA Social network analysis
CRP Consensus reaching process LGDM models.
RPN Risk priority number
O Occurrence
S Severity 3.1. FMEA applications in GDM
D Detection
RD Region density
LD Link density
As a group decision function, FMEA cannot be implemented based on
CL Level of consensus individual efforts only [9]. An FMEA group usually holds different
ICL Internal level of consensus knowledge and opinions, and produces various types of evaluation in­
GCL Global level of consensus formation because of the multidisciplinary nature. Guerrero and Bradley
Symbol Meaning
[19] demonstrated that the performance of groups is better than in­
FM = {fm1 , fm2 , ..., Potential failure modes
fmn } dividuals when ranking failure modes. Group decision models have been
E = {e1 , e2 , ..., em } FMEA members used in FMEA. For instance, Chin et al. [9] proposed an FMEA using the
RF = {rf1 , rf2 , ..., rfy } Risk factors evidential reasoning approach to capture team members’ divergent
k Assessment matrix of ek assessment information and rank failure modes considering different
Dk =
levels of uncertainties. Chaudhuri et al. [6] developed an approach for
(dij )n×y
U The set to store ranked members
supply chain risk assessment followed by FMEA, so as to control and
E
′
The set to store remaining members
mitigate supply chain-related failures. Foroozesh et al. [15] introduced
c(ek ) Degree of ek
the concepts of mean, variance, and skewness into FMEA and presented
S A subnetwork
their mathematical relations based on interval-valued fuzzy informa­
mS The number of nodes in S
tion. Some scholars took the consensus of a group into consideration and
#LinkS The number of links in S adopted CRP to reduce discrepancies among FMEA members. Fan et al.
α A parameter to control the minimum size of the core for a [14] put forward a consensus measure based on prospect theory and
network
〈k〉 Average degree of the network
provided a feedback mechanism to guide FMEA members to modify
γ Threshold to control LD
their assessment information. With the objective of classifying failure
C = {C1 , C2 , …, CQ } Dividing result
modes into ordinal classes, Zhang et al. [44] introduced a consensus rule
w(ek ) The weight of ek
with minimum adjustment cost to generate the weights of risk factors.
Zhang et al. [45] proposed a consensus model with minimum adjust­
δk The parameter to control the revision magnitude
ment cost to support FMEA members to reach a consensus under social
CL Consensus threshold
network setting. Zhu et al. [47] presented a CRP considering the in­
#TACC Total number of changes required to reach a consensus
Total number of changes required to be made
terdependences of preferences of FMEA members and used it in product
#ACM
developments.
The above literature on GDM problems featured only a few FMEA
potential failure modes according to y risk factors RF = {rf1 , rf2 , ..., rfy }. members. With the increasing complexity of production processes,
Regarding the evaluation scale, we borrow the six-level qualitative lin­ scholars started to pay attention to the FMEA with the participation of a
guistic scale used by the Goddard Space Flight Center when making large group of FMEA members from distributed organizations or de­
severity assessment for spacecraft and instrumentation (see the Appen­ partments. For instance, Liu et al. [27] clustered a large number of
dix). This scale provides the basis for selecting general linguistic scales. FMEA members into subgroups and then aggregated the assessment
Inspired by Guerrero and Bradley [19], the scales for occurrence, information of subgroups considering majority opinions and conflict
severity, and detection can be defined as in Table 2. assessments. Afterwards, the entropy-based method and prospect theory
In Table 2, the breadth of scale is from 1 to 10. Of course, we can also were used to determine the weights of risk factors and rank failure
use other scales, such as the 1–5 scale. Not all scores are provided in modes, respectively. Zhang et al. [44] developed an FMEA method
Table 2. It is assumed that the decision analyst can know the meaning of under the linguistic setting in which members expressed risk opinions
a score without a specific dialog through identifying the relative based on linguistic distribution assessments. These works contributed to
magnitude based on some forms of interpolation. For example, a score of reliability and safety engineering applications regarding how FMEA
8 regarding the first factor means that the occurrence of a failure mode is members coordinate and reach a compromise when identifying and
above high and below very high. In this study, we use the 1–10 scale. evaluating the risks of failure modes of products. As we can see, LGDM
k models considering the interdependences (social relations) among
Let dij be the assessment value provided by ek for failure mode fmi
FMEA members under the social network setting have not received
regarding the risk factor rfj (k = 1, 2, ..., m; i = 1, 2, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ..., y). much attention. This is the focus of our study.

3
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

3.2. LGDM based on SNA

Existing SNA-based LGDM studies mainly focused on the community

network structure. These studies used community network detection
methods or clustering algorithms to divide experts into several com­
munities, so as to reduce the dimension of a large group. Tian et al. [35]
adopted Leicht and Newman’s [25] method to detect communities in a
directed network under the interval type-2 fuzzy environment. Wu et al.
[38] used the Louvain method to cluster experts in two phases: node
partition and partition combination. Similarly, He et al. [20] and Xu
et al. [42] used the Louvain method under Shadow set environment and
interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy environment, respectively. Based on
the similarity of pairs of experts, Kamis et al. [23] partitioned experts
Fig. 3. A network with 16 FMEA members.
into subgroups by means of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering
algorithm. They also developed a α-level group consensus index to
determine the optimal number of clusters, so as to achieve the highest ∑ /
level of consensus. Ureña et al. [36] proposed a novel classification T(k) = rkh + c(ek ) cmax (2)
approach to classify experts into three profiles based on the influence of h∈U

spreading opinions and the received feedback opinions from others. Wu

et al. [39] extended the traditional k-means clustering algorithm into the
interval type-2 setting considering internal preference information and
external social relationship information. Lu et al. [29] used the k-means
clustering algorithm in a minimum cost-based LGDM process. Based on
the max-min method and the centrality degrees of what, Ren et al. [32]
first identified clustering centroids in a network and then adopted the
m-ary adjacency relation approach to cluster experts. Ding et al. [11]
presented a sparse representation-based clustering method under the
intuitionistic fuzzy environment. Du et al. [12] developed a
trust-similarity based clustering method considering two measurement
attributes: opinion similarity and trust relationship. Gao et al. [16]
developed an alternative ranking-based clustering method and a k-core
decomposition approach to select opinion leaders in a network.
Existing models assumed that a large group can be divided into
mutually exclusive cohesive communities or subgroups by means of
community detection methods or clustering algorithms. As the other
common image in SNA, namely, the core-periphery network structure,
has not been fully investigated in LGDM.
4. An LGDM model with a core-periphery structure for FMEA
In this section, we propose an LGDM model with a core-periphery
structure for FMEA, which is composed of three parts: 1) group struc­
ture detection, 2) delegation mechanism, and 3) CRP.
4.1. Group structure detection
Inspired by Xiang et al. [41], we propose a method to detect the
structure of a large group. This method has three steps: 1) re-order nodes
(FMEA members) in a new sequence, 2) calculate region density (RD) and
draw the RD curve, and 3) detect the meso‑scale structure.
1) Re-order FMEA members in a new sequence
Since the edges between core members are dense, we first order all
members to make the members with common links closer to each other
in the new sequence. To do so, we use the set U to store ranked members
and E = E\U to store remaining ones. Initially, U = ∅ and E = E. At the
′ ′
where rkh is the value in the adjacency matrix. c(ek ) and cmax are the
degree of ek and the maximum degree of all nodes, respectively. Based
on the above process, we can obtain the re-ordered result: U = {u1 ,u2 ,...,
um }.
2) Calculate the region density of each node
In a subnetwork S, the density of links can be characterized by the
link density (LD) indicator:
2⋅#LinkS
LD(S) = (3)
mS ⋅(mS − 1)
where mS and #LinkS are the number of nodes and number of links in S,
respectively.
Here, we use a parameter α to control the minimum size of the core
for a network. For ek , its RD is calculated based on the LD of the sub­
network consisting of members from uk− α+1 to itself:
{
LD({u1 , u2 , ..., uk }), k ≤ α
RD(uk ) = (4)
LD({uk− α+1 , uk− α+2 , ..., uk }), k > α
It is critical to determine the value of α. In this study, α is defined as:
α = ⌊.〈k〉⌋ (5)
where ⌊.⌋ is an integral function and 〈k〉 is the average degree of the
network.
After computing RDs for all members, we can make a RD curve,
where the horizontal coordinate refers to the member sequence and the
vertical coordinate denotes the values of RDs.
3) Detect the meso‑scale structure
A subnetwork can be regarded as a core if its LD is larger than a
threshold γ. A smaller value of γ corresponds to a larger size of the core.
We can find the meso‑scale structure of the group based on the RD curve
by comparing the number of peaks whose RDs are greater or equal to γ.
We can merge two regions into one if the values of RDs of two or more
consecutive sequences of members are equal to or greater than γ. The
core can be constructed based on these peak member(s) and the α nodes
before the peak member(s).

If there are multiple pairs of core-periphery structures (multiple

beginning, we choose the member whose node has the largest degree
cores), we need to allocate the peripheral members into the corre­
and add this member to the set U. For convenience, we denote this
sponding core, so as to form multiple communities. At the beginning,
member as u1 , i.e., U = {u1 }. Next, from E , we choose the node with the
′

each sub-core-periphery structure which only consists of core members

maximum number of connections with the member in U and add the
node to U. If more than one member has the maximum number of
connections, then choose the member with the highest degree. If more
than one member’s node has the same highest degree, then choose one
randomly. We can use an equation to describe this process, namely,
is denoted as Class 0. Then, the peripheral members who have direct
links with core members are denoted as Class 1. These nodes will be
assigned to the corresponding core. Next, the remaining neighboring
nodes which have direct links with nodes in Class 1 are valued as Class 2.
Note that the members in Class 2 have no direct relationship with any
core member. These nodes will be allocated to the sub-core-periphery
structure that has the most links with them. Continue this process

4
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

more authorities and influences than peripheral FMEA members. Sec­

Fig. 4. The RD curve for the FMEA members in the example.
ond, the dividing result is obtained based on social relationships instead
of assessment opinions. It is not convenient to aggregate all FMEA
members’ assessments directly since their assessments may be
discrepant. Measuring consensus based on the assessments of core FMEA
members can reduce the complexity and bias. However, the assessments
of peripheral FMEA members cannot be ignored with the consideration
of preventing information loss. In this section, we introduce a delegation
mechanism.
Suppose that e0k is an FMEA member in Class 0 (in the core) and
{e11 ↔ k , e12 ↔ k , ..., e1#k1 ↔ k } is the set of FMEA members in Class 1 who have
direct connections with e0k . #k1 is the number of FMEA members in Class
1 who have direct connections with e0k . In {e11 ↔ k , e12 ↔ k , ..., e1#k1 ↔ k }, the
weight of an FMEA member is determined according to its degree, i.e.,
( )
( ) c e1p ↔ k
w e1p ↔ k = 1 ( ) (6)
∑
#k
c e1p ↔ k
p=1

k,0 0 k,0
The assessment value of dij in Dk = (dij )n×y provided by e0k can be
modified by Eq. (7) based on the delegation mechanism:
( )δk ( ∑
#k1 (
)
) p,1 1− δk

(7)
k,0
dijk,0 = dij ⋅ w e1p ↔ k ⋅dij
p=1

where δk is a parameter that controls the amount of new opinion (dk,0

Fig. 5. The divided result of the FMEA group.
until all nodes are allocated. Suppose that the final dividing result is C =
{C1 ,C2 ,…,CQ }. Cq (q = 1, 2, …, Q) is called a core-periphery structure or
a community.
Example. Let us use an example to present the whole process. Fig. 3
provides a network with 16 FMEA members (nodes) and 30 links. Ac­
cording to the re-ordering method, we first put FMEA member 1 into U
since the degree of its corresponding node is the highest (i.e., u1 = 1).
Then, we find that there are many members who have a connection with
1. In these connected members, the node corresponding to member 2 has
the maximum degree (c(2) = 8). Thus, u2 = 2. Next, member 2 is added
into U. Repeat this step until E = ∅ and we can obtain the re-ordering
′
ij )
k,0
from its own opinion dij . As shown in Eq. (7), each new assessment
value of e0k consists of two parts: its own original assessment value and
the aggregated assessment value of FMEA members in Class 1 who have
direct connections with e0k .
By Eq. (7), the opinions of FMEA members in Class 1 can be dele­
gated to core FMEA members. Similarly, we can also delegate the
opinions of FMEA members in Class 2 to the members in Class 1. Note
that the delegation process from Class 2 to Class 1 is before the dele­
gation process from Class 1 to Class 0. Albert and Barabási [2] demon­
strated that most real-world networks are small-world networks. The
average length of paths of these networks is short. Hence, the whole
delegation mechanism can be finished in few steps.
It is important to determine δk since it reflects the proportion of
opinion reservation for e0k . We can set δk in advance or determine it
adaptively. In this study, δk is set adaptively according to the weights of
core FMEA members. In Class 0, the weight of a core expert is also
determined according to the degree of his/her associated node, i.e.,

( )
result: U = {1, 2, 4, 3, 12, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 6, 7, 5, 9, 13, 10}. ( 0) c e0k
Then, we calculate RD of each node and draw the RD curve, which is w ek = #core (8)
∑
shown in Fig. 4. c(e0k )
Next, the number of peaks in Fig. 4 is used to detect the group
k=1

structure. We have 〈k〉 = 4.125. Hence, α = ⌊.〈k〉⌋. = 4. We set γ = 1. As where #core is the number of core members.
depicted in Fig. 4, RD(2) = RD(4) = RD(3) = RD(12) = 1. However, In the delegation mechanism, it is reasonable that the members with
member 2 and member 4 are invalid since they cannot form a core. Two higher influence (weights) in the network need to make less changes
cores formed by member 3 and member 12 are {1, 2, 4, 3} and {2, 4, 3, than those members with smaller influence (weights). Therefore, the
12}, respectively. In addition, member 3 and member 12 are merged delegation mechanism provides an adaptive δk changing according to
since they are consecutive in the sequence. Therefore, the core is {1,2,4, the weights of members, such that
3, 12}. ( )
After finding the core, we need to allocate the remaining nodes. The 1 − w e0k
δk = 1 − #core (9)
set {1, 2, 4, 3, 12} is regarded as Class 0. Members that have direct links ∑
(1 − w(e0k ))
with the core are 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16. Therefore, Class 1 is {5, 6, 7, k=1
8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16}. Member 13 forms Class 2 (see Fig. 5).
If w(e0k )
> w(e0h ), then δk > δh . This denotes that if a member has a
larger weight, then less changes should be made in its opinions.
4.2. Delegation mechanism

In this study, we measure the consensus of a community based on its

core for two reasons. First, FMEA members in the core are likely to have

5
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

4.3. A fairness-oriented consensus model ( )

( ) 1 − CL e0k
#ACM e0k = #TACC⋅#core (17)
After the group detection process and delegating process, the next ∑( ( ))
1 − CL e0u
task is to measure the level of consensus of FMEA members. If the level u=1

of consensus does not reach a predetermined threshold, then the CRP For an FMEA member, he/she updates his/her assessment value with
will be applied to improve the level of group consensus. To do this, we
the granularity of 1. Therefore, if #ACM(e0k ) − [#ACM(e0k )]〈0.5, then a
introduce a consensus measure to compute the degree of consensus of a ⌊ ⌋
community and the global group. rounding operation is added to Eq. (10), i.e., #ACM(e0k ) = #ACM(e0k ) ;
⌊ ⌋
Let Dc = (dcij )n×y be the assessment matrix through aggregating if #ACM(e0k ) − [#ACM(e0k )] ≥ 0.5, then #ACM(e0k ) = #ACM(e0k ) +1.
assessment matrices of core FMEA members in a community. dcij is the
To find out the set of assessment values that should be modified, the
collective assessment value for failure mode fmi regarding the risk factor following search strategy is introduced:
rfj , which can be calculated by
For e0k , the assessment values are first ordered according to their
∑
#core
( ) degrees of consensus in an ascending order: {cp1 , cp2 , ..., cpn⋅y }. Then, in
dijc = w e0k ⋅dijk,0 (10) the sequence {cp1 , cp2 , ..., cpn⋅y }, the first value #ACM(e0k ) is identified.
k=1
The generation of advice.
Then, the level of consensus (CL) of a core member e0k in a community Once the assessment values that should be modified are identified,
can be defined as: the following direction rules are generated to provide suggestions:
( ) (
CL e0k = 1 − dis D0k , Dc
)
(11) DR1. If dk,0 c 0
ij < dij , then ek should increase his/her assessment for
failure mode fmi regarding the risk factor rfj ;
where dis(Dc , D0k ) is the distance between Dc and D0k . In this study, we use DR2. If dk,0 c 0
ij > dij , then ek should decrease his/her assessment for
the Hamming distance [1], such that failure mode fmi regarding the risk factor rfj .
y n ⃒ ⃒ If there is only one core-periphery structure (community), then the
( ) 1 ∑∑ ⃒ k,0 ⃒
dis D0k , Dc = ⃒dij − dijc ⃒ (12) consensus of a community is also the consensus of the global group.
n⋅y j=1 i=1
However, if there are multiple core-periphery structures (communities),
The level of consensus of core FMEA members (CL(Cq )) in a com­ we need to improve the level of consensus among communities. Note
munity Cq can be obtained as: that the inter consensus among communities has the same calculation
method as the inner consensus among the core FMEA members within a
( )
#core(Cq )
∑ ( ) community. We can obtain the global level of consensus (GCL) among
CL Cq = CL e0k (13) communities through extending Eqs. (5) and (6) (within a community).
g
Let dij be the global assessment value for failure mode fmi regarding
k=1

It is easy to obtain that CL(Cq ) ∈ [0, 1]. A larger CL(Cq ) denotes a the risk factor rfj , which can be calculated by
higher level of consensus of the core FMEA members in Cq . Here, a
∑
Q
threshold CL should be defined. If CL(Cq ) ≥ CL, then the group proceeds dijg =
( ) C
w Cq ⋅dij q (18)
to the selection process; if CL(Cq ) < CL, then the CRP is applied to q=1

improve the level of consensus of the group.

To find the assessment values that contribute less to a high level of where w(Cq ) is the weight of Cq . w(Cq ) is defined as:
consensus, we define the consensus measure regarding a position in an ∑ ( 0)
( ) e0 ∈Cq c ek
assessment matrix, such that w Cq = Q k (19)
⃒ ⃒ ∑∑ 0
( ) ⃒ ⃒ e0 ∈Cq c(ek )
cpij e0k = 1 − ⃒dijk,0 − dijc ⃒ (14) q=1 k

At the beginning of the CRP, FMEA members’ opinions are usually Then, the inter level of consensus (ICL) of a community Cq is defined
far away from each other. In this situation, many changes are required to as:
reduce these discrepancies. To do this, we need to search the set of ( ) (
ICL Cq = 1 − dis DCq , Dg
)
(20)
assessment values required to be modified. One limitation of existing
consensus models is that they did not consider the fair distribution of The global level of consensus (GCL) of the global group is defined as:
changes among experts. An expert may modify preferences much more
∑
Q
( )
than another. Bearing this in mind, we propose a feedback mechanism GCL = ICL Cq (21)
considering the fair distribution of changes. q=1

The total number of changes from the original assessment matrices to

Here, the threshold GCL is used to judge whether the global group
the collective matrix is calculated by
reaches a defined consensus. The feedback mechanism of the global
∑
#core ∑ n ⃒
y ∑
⃒ k,0
⃒
⃒ group is similar to the mechanism regarding a separate community.
⃒dij − dijc ⃒ (15) Once identifying the assessment values that should be modified, all
FMEA members in a community are supposed to make corresponding
k=1 j=1 i=1

The total number of changes required to reach a consensus, #TACC, adjustments.

is estimated as:
y ∑ n ⃒ ⃒ CL − CL( C ) 4.4. The procedure of the proposed model
∑ ∑
#core
⃒ k,0 ⃒
(16)
q
#TACC = ⃒dij − dijc ⃒⋅ ( )
k=1 j=1 i=1
1 − CL C q To facilitate the understanding and application, we provided the
steps of the proposed model as follows.
For e0k , the number of changes required to make, #ACM, is estimated k
as: Input: Original assessment matrices Dk = (dij )n×y (k = 1,2,...,m), the
social graph, and consensus thresholds CL, GCL.
Output: The risk ordering of failure modes.

6
M. Tang and H. Liao
Fig. 6. The flowchart of the proposed model.
Step 1. Establish the FMEA team and collect the assessment infor­
mation of team members.
Step 2. Construct the social graph.
Step 3. Detect the structure of the large group and obtain one or
more core-periphery structures {C1 , ..., CQ }.
Step 4. Adopt the delegation mechanism to allocate opinions of pe­
ripheral FMEA members to core FMEA members.
Step 5. Use Eq. (13) to calculate the degree of consensus of the core
FMEA members in a community.
Step 6. If CL(Cq ) ≥ CL and Q = 1, then go to Step 7; if CL(Cq ) ≥ CL
and Q > 1 for any q = 1,...,Q, then go to Step 6. If CL(Cq ) < CL for a
q ∈ 1,...,Q, then use the feedback mechanism to provide suggestions
and return to Step 3.
Step 7. Use Eq. (21) to calculate the degree of consensus of the global
group.
Step 8. If GCL ≥ GCL, then go to Step 7; if GCL < GCL, then use the
feedback mechanism to provide suggestions and return to Step 5.
7
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821
Step 9. Derive the risk ranking of failure modes according to Eq. (1).
Fig. 6 presents the flowchart of our model.
Note that our model can be extended to more general application
scenarios. Based on such a solving procedure, we can find that the main
novelty is that we introduce a group structure detection process, which
can reduce the complexity of the decision-making procedure for a large
group. Furthermore, the delegation mechanism can retain the influence
of periphery members.
5. Case study
In this section, we apply the proposed LGDM model to the problem
adopted from Villarini et al. [37] regarding the risk analysis of new
photovoltaic systems.
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Table 4 proposed model to analyze of risks in PV systems.

FMEA of PV systems. In Villarini et al. [37], 17 failure modes in all necessary and auxiliary
No. Failure mode Cause Effect components are identified based on the computerized maintenance
management system (CMMS). For ease of illustration, 6 main failure
1 Inverter block/Fault Overload due to the No energy output, fire
on earth lack of insulation and safety risk modes (fm1 , fm2 , ..., fm6 ) with RPNs greater than 150 were selected for
2 Damage lighting and Lighting, storm Protection stop further analysis. These 6 failure modes and their causes and effects are
grounding presented in Table 4.
protection
3 Inverter overheating Possible faults in a Reduce energy output
ventilation system because of the danger to
Step 1. A multidisciplinary FMEA group with 20 members (e1 , e2 , ...
temperature-sensitive , e20 ) is invited to evaluate these 6 failure modes regarding three risk
parts and insulations factors O, S, and D. To save space, the 20 assessment matrices are
4 Cabin overheating Extractor or Possible interrupted provided in the Appendix.
and inverter stop conditioner failure energy output
Step 2. The social graph that connects 20 experts with trust re­
with excessive
temperature lationships is visualized in Fig. 7. Note that in Fig. 7, an FMEA
5 Danger to insulation Failure of air Reduced energy output, member is represented using its subscript. Furthermore, CL = GCL =
and heat-sensitive conditioning and fire and safety risk 0.9.
components ventilation with
excessive temperature
6 Different Transformer cabin Dispersion, loss, and Next, we adopt our model to solve this problem for risk analysis with
performances than with excessive damage to the device detailed steps.
plate data temperature
5.2. Problem solving
5.1. Problem description
Note that Step 1 and Step 2 have been provided in Section 5.1. Thus,
this section starts with Step 3.
According to IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency), in
Step 3. Detect the structure of the large group and obtain one or
2019, the new installed capacity of photovoltaic (PV) is 97.1 GW glob­
more core-periphery structures {C1 , ..., CQ }.
ally, and the total capacity is 586.4 GW (https://www.irena.org/). In the
Using the group structure detection method, we first re-order the 20
last several decades, there is a significant increase in the use of renew­
members and obtain the re-ordering result:
able energies, especially PV [37]. The large size of the power capacity
{e12 ,e14 ,e15 ,e19 ,e13 ,e17 ,e16 ,e18 ,e20 ,e5 ,e1 ,e2 ,e3 ,e4 ,e7 ,e6 ,e8 ,e9 ,e10 ,e11 }.
needs functioning power plants which have a huge impact on the energy
Then, we calculate the value of RD corresponding to each FMEA member
balance in the world. The long-term performance of PV systems ex­
and draw the RD curve, which is shown in Fig. 8.
pected to operate for 20–25 years is one of the most valuable aspects of
We have 〈k〉 = 4.3. Hence, α = ⌊.〈k〉⌋. = 4. We set γ = 1. As illus­
such energy systems [18]. Therefore, the reliability of PV systems has
trated in Fig. 8, RD(e14 ) = RD(e15 ) = RD(e19 ) = RD(e4 ) = RD(e7 ) = 1.
become a matter of increasing importance. In this study, we use the
However, e14 and e15 are invalid since they cannot form a core.

Fig. 7. A social graph with 20 FMEA members.

Fig. 8. The RD curve of 20 FMEA members.

8
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Fig. 9. A core-periphery network structure with two cores.

Table 5 Table 6
The modified assessment matrices of the core FMEA members in C1 . The global assessment matrix and the RPN values.
FMEA Risk Failure modes Risk Failure modes
members factors fm1 fm2 fm3 fm4 fm5 fm6 factors fm1 fm2 fm3 fm4 fm5 fm6

e1 O 3.086 3.293 3.086 4.970 5.088 4.838 O 3.086 3.293 3.086 4.970 5.088 4.838
S 8.001 6.875 7.908 5.294 5.733 5.170 S 8.001 6.875 7.908 5.294 5.733 5.170
D 8.061 7.515 6.875 5.971 5.170 5.907 D 8.061 7.515 6.875 5.971 5.170 5.907
e2 O 3.961 3.279 4.596 5.073 5.882 3.225 RPN 199.035 170.135 167.778 157.104 150.806 147.749
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6
S 7.110 6.841 6.305 5.208 5.706 5.175
D 7.179 6.000 4.422 5.108 5.208 7.320
e3 O 5.421 6.245 5.209 2.411 6.000 3.330
S 3.835 3.566 4.608 7.544 5.000 6.000 Table 7
D 7.193 7.269 6.192 6.536 4.186 7.269 Comparisons with related FMEA methods.
e4 O 6.029 7.167 3.125 2.304 3.456 3.239
S 3.835 7.000 7.067 9.387 6.536 6.783 FMEA Decision Consensus Social Weights of FMEA
D 8.132 3.283 7.544 6.705 6.536 6.783 methods context relations members
e7 O 6.000 4.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 6.000 Fan et al. Small Considered Not Not considered
S 6.000 8.000 7.000 7.000 10.000 8.000 [14] group considered
D 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 3.000 Zhang et al. Small Considered Not Subject
[44] group considered determination by
authors
Furthermore, e4 and e7 are sequentially located in Fig. 8, so these two Li et al. [26] Small Considered Not Knowledge
group considered structures and
members are merged into one core. Therefore, we can obtain two cores:
domain experiences
{e12 , e14 , e15 , e19 } and {e1 ,e2 ,e3 ,e4 ,e7 }. After finding the cores, we need to Zhu et al. Small Considered Not Subject
allocate the remaining nodes. The allocating result is presented in Fig. 9. [47] group considered determination by
Step 4. Adopt the delegation mechanism to allocate the opinions of authors
peripheral members to core members. We use C1 as an example to Liu et al. Large Not Not Equal weight
[27] group considered considered
present the calculation process. After the delegating process, the modi­
The Large Considered Considered Degree of experts
fied assessment matrices of the core FMEA members in C1 are shown in proposed group
Table 5. model
Step 5. Use Eq. (13) to calculate the degree of consensus of the core
FMEA members in a community. We have CL(e1 ) = 0.913, CL(e2 ) =
0.924, CL(e3 ) = 0.888, CL(e4 ) = 0.868, CL(e7 ) = 0.868. Hence, CL(C1 ) e4 should decrease the assessment value regarding d24 and increase
= 0.892. the assessment value regarding d32 ;
e7 should decrease the assessment value regarding d25 and increase
Step 6. Since CL(C1 ) < CL, then we use the feedback mechanism to
the assessment value regarding d36 .
provide suggestions.
Re-calculate the degree of consensus and we have CL(C1 ) = 0.900.
According to Eq. (15), the total number of changes from the original
Hence, C1 reaches the consensus threshold. Similarly, we have CL(C2 ) =
assessment matrices to the collective matrix is 96.937. According to Eq.
0.944, and there is no need to adopt the feedback mechanism for C2 .
(16), the total number of changes required to reach a consensus is
Step 7. Use Eq. (21) to calculate the degree of consensus of the global
estimated as #TACC= 7.181. According to Eq. (17), the numbers of
group.
changes required to make for core experts are: #ACM(e1 ) = 1, #
According to Eq. (19), we have w(C1 ) = 0.569 and w(C2 ) = 0.431.
ACM(e2 ) = 1, #ACM(e3 ) = 1, #ACM(e4 ) = 2, #ACM(e7 ) = 2. The
According to Eq. (20), we have ICL(C1 )= 0.943 and ICL(C2 ) = 0.925.
assessment values that should be modified by these experts are: d21 for
Then, we can obtain GCL = 0.934.
e1 , d33 for e2 , d22 for e3 , d24 and d32 for e4 , d25 and d36 for e7 .
Generation of advice. Step 8. Since GCL > GCL, we go to Step 9.
e1 should decrease the assessment value regarding d21 ;
e2 should increase the assessment value regarding d33 ; Step 9. The global assessment matrix and the RPN values of failure
e3 should increase the assessment value regarding d22 ; modes are provided in Table 6.

9
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Table 8
Comparisons with related SNA-based LGDM models.
SNA-based LGDM Dimension reduction Type of group structure Weights of subgroups Consensus
models

Wu et al. [39] K-means clustering Community Extended centrality indexes Not considered
Ren et al. [32] M-ary adjacency relation-based Community Majority principle Centrality-oriented method
method
Wu et al. [38] Louvain method Community Distance between community and the Not considered
entire network
Chu et al. [10] Fuzzy equivalence relation-based Community Group closeness centrality Centrality-oriented method with a two-
method stage process
Xu et al. [42] Louvain method Community Sum of weights of experts Centrality-oriented method
The proposed model Meso-scale structure-based Community and core- Sum of weights of experts Centrality-oriented method considering
method periphery fairness

Therefore, the ranking of risks of 6 failure modes is fm1 > fm2 > fm3
> fm4 > fm5 > fm6 . Table 9
The global assessment matrix and the RPN values based on the original data.
Risk Failure modes
5.3. Comparisons and discussions factors fm1 fm2 fm3 fm4 fm5 fm6

O 4.942 5.081 4.000 3.849 4.605 5.256

To further validate the features and effectiveness of our proposed
model, we conduct comparative analyses with several methods.
1) Comparisons with related FMEA methods
The theoretical comparisons with existing FMEA methods are
demonstrated in Table 7. Compared with Fan et al. [14], Zhang et al.
[44], Li et al. [26], and Zhu et al. [47], our decision context is under a
large group setting. With the increasing complexity of processes and
products, FMEA practices are often carried out under distributed settings
with interdisciplinary and cross-organizational experts [27]. In such
situations, it is likely that the results made by a small group are hard to
reflect real situations. Therefore, it is necessary to involve a large group
of experts from different fields and organizations for complex processes
and products. Furthermore, in a large group, experts usually have
various backgrounds, professional skills and levels of experience. It is a
critical issue to reach a unanimous agreement for a large group of ex­
perts. Therefore, it is of great value to develop an effective consensus
model for risk ranking problems with a large number of FMEA members.
Compared with Liu et al. [27]’s method, we consider the social relations
of FMEA members and adopt the SNA to analyze the group structure and
trust relationships between FMEA members. Note that different models
have their own interests and emphasis. It is hard to say which one is the
best.
2) Comparisons with related SNA-based LGDM models
The theoretical comparisons with related SNA-based LGDM models
are demonstrated in Table 8. Compared with existing SNA-based LGDM
models, our proposed model considers the core-periphery structure and
community structure simultaneously. From a meso‑scale perspective,
these two kinds of structures are common images in social networks.
Furthermore, we introduce a fairness-oriented consensus model. Based
on the illustrative example, we can find two main advantages of this
consensus approach. First, the number of assessment values required to
be modified for each expert is determined and is approximately pro­
portional to his/her degree of consensus. This ensures that every expert
can participate in the CRP and the experts with low degree of consensus
make more contributions to reach an agreement. Second, Eq. (16) can
avoid over-adjustment because the number of changes is calculated
based on the relative distance between the current consensus level and
the consensus threshold. For instance, in the illustrative example, the
initial degree of consensus of C1 is 0.892. Then, we identify 7 modified
assessment values in the first iterative round and CL(C1 ) reaches 0.9002
which is approximately equal to CL. If we use the CRP method without
considering fairness, then the 24 assessment values are required to be
modified and CL(C1 ) reaches 0.9179. The over-adjustment will distort
original opinions and cannot reflect the real willingness of experts.
3) On the RPN values
The RPN values in Table 6 are compromise results. Each RPN value is
S 6.384 5.674 5.849 7.209 5.733 5.170
D 7.128 6.535 7.523 6.395 6.523 5.651
RPN 224.887 188.401 176.008 177.445 172.210 153.558
Ranking 1 2 4 3 5 6
calculated based on Eq. (18). If we use the original data of all FMEA
members without the CRP, the global assessment matrix is provided in
Table 9. Note that we still use Eq. (6) to determine the weights of FMEA
members.
As we can see from Table 8, the ranking of these failure modes is
fm1 > fm2 > fm4 > fm3 > fm5 > fm6 . Compared with the ranking ob­
tained in Section 5.2, the ranks of the pair fm3 and fm4 have been
changed. This shows that compared with core members, peripheral
members paid more emphasis on the risk of fm4 .
6. Conclusions
In this study, we developed an LGDM model based on the group
structure detection from a meso‑scale perspective and fairness-oriented
consensus approach. First, the structure of a large group was detected
based on a three-step method. Two main types of structures in social
networks, namely, core-periphery structure and community structure,
can be detected simultaneously. Then, a delegation mechanism was
introduced to allocate assessment information of peripheral FMEA
members to core members. Next, a consensus approach was developed
to reduce discrepancies. Such a consensus approach considered the fair
distribution of revisions when receiving feedback suggestions and can
avoid over-adjustment. The applicability of the model was verified using
an illustrative example regarding the risk evaluation of PV systems, and
the advances of the proposed method to the state of the art were
demonstrated through comparative analyses.
In the near future, we will extend our model to investigate FMEA
problems that members use other uncertain qualitative forms. Further­
more, in this study we assume that all members are cooperative and will
accept feedback suggestions. It is necessary to manage noncooperative
behaviors of FMEA members.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Ming Tang: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis,
Writing - original draft. Huchang Liao: Conceptualization, Funding
acquisition, Supervision, Writing - review & editing.

10
M. Tang and H. Liao Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821

Declaration of Competing Interest Table A (continued )

FMEA members Risk factors Failure modes
We wish to confirm that there are no known conflicts of interest fm1 fm2 fm3 fm4 fm5 fm6
associated with this publication and there has been no significant
e11 O 9 4 7 2 6 6
financial support for this work that could have influenced its outcome.
S 7 7 4 9 3 7
We confirm that the manuscript has been read and approved by all
D 3 8 8 9 6 3
named authors and that there are no other persons who satisfied the e12 O 4 5 3 2 3 7
criteria for authorship but are not listed. We further confirm that the S 7 5 5 10 6 5
order of authors listed in the manuscript has been approved by all of us. D 7 7 10 7 10 4
We confirm that we have given due consideration to the protection of e13 O 6 4 7 4 6 9
intellectual property associated with this work and that there are no S 6 7 3 3 6 2
D 5 5 8 10 3 6
impediments to publication, including the timing of publication, with
e14 O 5 5 2 3 3 8
respect to intellectual property. In so doing we confirm that we have
S 6 4 7 9 6 4
followed the regulations of our institutions concerning intellectual D 7 8 10 6 10 4
property. e15 O 6 5 4 3 4 6
We understand that the Corresponding Author is the sole contact for S 6 7 4 10 5 3
the Editorial process (including Editorial Manager and direct commu­ D 6 5 10 5 9 8
nications with the office). He/she is responsible for communicating with e16 O 2 6 5 3 6 3
the other authors about progress, submissions of revisions and final S 10 5 6 7 7 6
D 10 6 4 7 3 6
approval of proofs. We confirm that we have provided a current, correct
e17 O 7 9 4 10 5 5
email address which is accessible by the Corresponding Author and
S 5 3 5 2 6 5
which has been configured to accept email from liaohuchang@163.com. D 7 7 7 7 5 5
e18 O 4 5 4 3 6 7
Acknowledgments S 7 4 4 5 5 4
D 7 8 10 10 5 5
The work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation e19 O 4 5 4 3 3 7

of China (71771156, 71971145). S 7 4 4 10 6 5

D 7 8 10 5 10 4
e20 O 8 7 6 5 4 6
Appendix
S 4 3 2 5 6 4
D 6 8 10 7 7 7
Table A
B. Six-level qualitative linguistic scale of the Goddard Space Flight Center.
a. Category 1 (Catastrophic): serious casualty or loss of life, or great damage to
the launch vehicle.
Table A b. Category 1R (Catastrophic): identical redundant hardware items that could
Assessment matrices of 20 FMEA members. result in the effects of Category 1 if all failed.
FMEA members Risk factors Failure modes c. Category 2 (Critical): loss of one or more mission objectives defined by the
fm1 fm2 fm3 fm4 fm5 fm6 project office of the Goddard Space Flight Center.
d. Category 2R (Critical): identical redundant hardware items that could result
e1 O 3 3 3 5 5 5 in the effects of Category 2 if all failed.
S 8 7 8 5 6 5 e. Category 3 (Significant): degradation to mission objectives.
D 8 8 7 6 5 6 f. Category 4 (Minor): no less or insignificant to mission objectives.
e2 O 4 3 5 5 6 3
S 7 7 6 5 6 5
D 7 6 4 5 5 8 References
e3 O 7 7 6 2 6 3
[1] Abdel-Ghaffar KAS. Sets of binary sequences with small total Hamming distances.
S 3 3 4 8 5 6
Inf Process Lett 2019;142:27–9.
D 7 8 6 7 4 8
[2] Albert R, Barabási AL. Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Rev Mod Phys
e4 O 8 8 3 2 3 3 2002;74(1):47–97.
S 3 7 7 10 7 7 [3] Bhattacharyya SK, Cheliyan AS. Optimization of a subsea production system for
D 8 3 8 7 7 7 cost and reliability using its fault tree model. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2019;185:213–9.
e5 O 3 3 4 5 6 4 [4] Boral S, Howard I, Chaturvedi SK, McKee K, Naikan VNA. A novel hybrid multi-
criteria group decision making approach for failure mode and effect analysis: an
S 7 8 7 5 5 7
essential requirement for sustainable manufacturing. Sustain Prod Consum 2020;
D 9 7 6 6 5 4
21:14–32.
e6 O 2 4 3 5 6 5
[5] Carpitella S, Certa A, Izquierdo J, La Fata CM. A combined multi-criteria approach
S 10 7 8 6 5 6 to support FMECA analyses: a real-world case. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2018;169:
D 8 5 7 5 5 5 394–402.
e7 O 6 4 5 4 4 6 [6] Chaudhuri A, Mohanty BK, Singh KN. Supply chain risk assessment during new
S 6 8 7 7 10 8 product development: a group decision making approach using numeric and
linguistic data. Int J Prod Res 2013;51(10):2790–804.
D 5 5 5 5 4 3
[7] Cheng D, Cheng FX, Zhou ZL, Wu Y. Reaching a minimum adjustment consensus in
e8 O 2 6 5 2 6 3
social network group decision-making. Inf Fusion 2020;59:30–43.
S 10 7 6 10 5 6 [8] Cherifi H, Palla G, Szymanski BK, Lu XY. On community structure in complex
D 10 4 4 7 5 8 networks: challenges and opportunities. Appl Netw Sci 2017;4:117.
e9 O 3 7 2 3 5 5 [9] Chin KS, Wang YM, Poon GKK, Yang JB. Failure mode and effects analysis using a
S 8 3 9 5 4 5 group-based evidential reasoning approach. Comput Oper Res 2009;36(6):
D 8 8 9 10 8 6 1768–79.
[10] Chu JF, Wang YM, Liu XW, Liu YC. Social network community analysis based
e10 O 9 6 4 9 4 3
large-scale group decision making approach with incomplete fuzzy preference
S 3 6 7 9 4 6 relations. Inf Fusion 2020;60:98–120.
D 7 5 5 2 8 5 [11] Ding RX, Wang XQ, Shang K, Liu BS, Herrera F. Sparse representation-based
intuitionistic fuzzy clustering approach to find the group intra-relations and group
leaders for large-scale decision making. IEEE Trans Fuzzy Syst 2019;27(3):559–73.

11
M. Tang and H. Liao
[12] Du ZJ, Luo HY, Lin XD, Yu SM. A trust-similarity analysis-based clustering method
for large-scale group decision-making under a social network. Inf Fusion 2020;63:
13–29.
[13] Elliott A, Chiu A, Bazzi M, Reinert G, Cucuringu M. Core-periphery structure in
directed networks. Proc R Soc A 2020;476(2241):20190783.
[14] Fan CH, Zhu Y, Li W, Zhang HJ. Consensus building in linguistic failure mode and
effect analysis: a perspective based on prospect theory. Qual Reliab Eng Int 2020;
36(7):2521–46.
[15] Foroozesh N, Tavakkoli-Moghaddam R, Mousavi SM. Sustainable-supplier
selection for manufacturing services: a failure mode and effects analysis model
based on interval-valued fuzzy group decision-making. Int J Adv Manuf Technol
2018;95:3609–29.
[16] Gao PQ, Huang J, Xu YJ. A k-core decomposition-based opinion leaders identifying
method and clustering-based consensus model for large-scale group decision
making. Comput Ind Eng 2020;150:106842.
[17] Geramian A, Abraham A, Nozari MA. Fuzzy logic-based FMEA robust design: a
quantitative approach for robustness against groupthink in group/team decision-
making. Int J Prod Res 2019;57(5):1331–44.
[18] Golnas A. PV system reliability: an operator’s perspective. IEEE J Photovolt 2013;3
(1):416–21.
[19] Guerrero HH, Bradley JR. Failure modes and effects analysis: an evaluation of
group versus individual performance. Prod Oper Manage 2013;22(6):1524–9.
[20] He SF, Pan XH, Wang YM. A shadowed set-based TODIM method and its
application to large-scale group decision making. Inf Sci 2021;544:135–54.
[21] Huang J, Liu HC, Duan CY, Song MS. An improved reliability model for FMEA
using probabilistic linguistic term sets and TODIM method. Ann Oper Res 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03447-0.
[22] Huang J, You JX, Liu HC, Song MS. Failure mode and effect analysis improvement:
a systematic literature review and future research agenda. Reliab Eng Syst Saf
2020;199:106885.
[23] Kamis NH, Chiclana F, Levesley J. Preference similarity network structural
equivalence clustering based consensus group decision making model. Appl Soft
Comput 2018;67:706–20.
[24] Kim Y, Choi TY, Yan TT, Dooley K. Structural investigation of supply networks: a
social network analysis approach. J Oper Manage 2011;29(3):194–211.
[25] Leicht EA, Newman ME. Community structure in directed networks. Phys Rev E
2008;100:118703.
[26] Li YL, Wang R, Chin KS. New failure mode and effect analysis approach considering
consensus under interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy environment. Soft Comput
2019;23:11611–26.
[27] Liu HC, You XY, Tsung F, Ji P. An improved approach for failure mode and effect
analysis involving large group of FMEA members: an application to the healthcare
field. Qual Eng 2018;30(4):762–75.
[28] Lo HW, Liao JJH, Huang CN, Chuang YC. A novel failure mode and effect analysis
model for machine tool risk analysis. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2019;183:173–83.
[29] Lu YL, Xu YJ, Herrera-Viedma E, Han YF. Consensus of large-scale group decision
making in social network: the minimum cost model based on robust optimization.
Inf Sci 2021;547:910–30.
[30] Martignoni D, Keil T, Lang M. Focus in searching core-periphery structures. Org Sci
2020;31(2):266–86.
12
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 215 (2021) 107821
[31] Peng SC, Zhou YM, Cao LH, et al. Influence analysis in social networks: a survey.
J Netw Comput Appl 2018;106:17–32.
[32] Ren RX, Tang M, Liao HC. Managing minority opinions in micro-grid planning by a
social network analysis-based large scale group decision making method with
hesitant fuzzy linguistic information. Knowl Based Syst 2020;189:105060.
[33] Tang M, Liao HC. From conventional group decision making to large-scale group
decision making: what are the challenges and how to meet them in big data era? A
state-of-the-art survey. Omega 2021;100:102141.
[34] Tang WL, Zhao LT, Liu W, Liu YP, Yan B. Recent advance on detecting core-
periphery structure: a survey. CCF Trans Pervasive Comput Interact 2019;1:
175–89.
[35] Tian ZP, Nie RX, Wang JQ. Social network analysis-based consensus-supporting
framework for large-scale group decision-making with incomplete interval type-2
fuzzy information. Inf Sci 2019;502:446–71.
[36] Ureña R, Chiclana F, Melançon G, Herrera-Viedma E. A social network based
approach for consensus achievement in multiperson decision making. Inf. Fusion
2019;47:72–87.
[37] Villarini M, Cesarotti V, Alfonsi L, Introna V. Optimization of photovoltaic
maintenance plan by means of a FMEA approach based on real data. Energy
Convers Manage 2017;152:1–12.
[38] Wu T, Liu XW, Liu F. An interval type-2 fuzzy TOPSIS model for large scale group
decision making problems with social network information. Inf Sci 2018;432:
392–410.
[39] Wu T, Liu XW, Liu F. The solution for fuzzy large-scale group decision making
problems combining internal preference information and external social network
structures. Soft Comput 2019;23(18):9025–43.
[40] Wu T, Zhang K, Liu XW, Cao CY. A two-stage social trust network partition model
for large-scale group decision-making problems. Knowl.-Based Syst. 2019;163:
632–43.
[41] Xiang BB, Bao ZK, Ma C, et al. A unified method of detecting core-periphery
structure and community structure in networks. Chaos 2018;28:013122.
[42] Xu XH, Zhang QH, Chen XH. Consensus-based non-cooperative behaviors
management in large-group emergency decision-making considering experts’ trust
relations and preference risks. Knowl Based Syst. 2020;190:105108.
[43] Yang JF, Zhang M, Shen KN, Ju XF, Guo XT. Structural correlation between
communities and core-periphery structures in social networks: evidence from
Twitter data. Expert Syst Appl 2018;111:91–9.
[44] Zhang HJ, Dong YC, Palomares-Carrascosa I, Zhou HW. Failure mode and effect
analysis in a linguistic context: a consensus-based multiattribute group decision-
making approach. IEEE Trans Reliab 2020;68(2):566–82.
[45] Zhang HJ, Dong YC, Xiao J, Chiclana F, Herrera-Viedma E. Consensus and opinion
evolution-based failure mode and effect analysis approach for reliability
management in social network and uncertainty contexts. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2021;
208:107425.
[46] Zhang X, Martin T, Newman MEJ. Identification of core-periphery structure in
networks. Phys Rev E 2015;91(3):032803.
[47] Zhu JH, Wang R, Li YL. Failure mode and effects analysis considering consensus
and preferences interdependence. Algorithms 2018;11(4):34.