Conflict and Terrorism

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U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk

of Civil Conflict
a
Rabia Aslam
a
Forman Christian College, Lahore Cantt, Pakistan
Available online: 05 Feb 2010
To cite this article: Rabia Aslam (2010): U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:3, 246-267
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U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil

Conflict
RABIA ASLAM
Forman Christian College
Lahore Cantt, Pakistan
Downloaded by [University of California, Berkeley] at 16:12 23 October 2011
The historical record of the majority of inter- and intra-state conflicts indicates frequent
third-party interventions in these conflicts. In the decades following World War II, the
United States has been one of the most frequent interveners in third world internal wars.
This study focuses on the repercussions of U.S. military interventions on the intensity of
civil conflict and political violence in the targeted nations. A comprehensive empirical
analysis suggests that in addition to low per capita income, large populations, high reli-
gious fractionalization, and weak governance, the direct and indirect involvement of the
U.S. military may also lead to increased civil strife and political violence in the targeted
nations. U.S. military involvement increases the probability of political instability and
unrest and hence could be one of the many conditions that favor insurgency.
Internal conflicts can pose a threat to the regional or global stability. According to the
Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small 1994), during the period 1816–1992
there have been 152 civil wars compared to 75 interstate wars. The historical record of
the majority of interstate and civil wars indicates frequent overt and covert third party
interventions in these wars. Based on the COW project’s strict definition of overt interven-
tion, 22 percent (33/152) of the civil wars during the period 1816–1992 involved military
intervention by the third parties (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). In the analysis of
ethnic protest and rebellion in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, Gurr (1993) found
that regional and global powers have repeatedly intervened on behalf of communal rebels
or the states that they challenge. Of the 138 intrastate conflicts identified by Regan (1996)
for the post World War II period, 62% (85/138) involved some form of covert economic or
military intervention by a third party.
Outside intervention is often an option available to the third parties who are concerned
about instability if they are geographically proximate or a regional or global power. As
seen in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Africa, and Sri Lanka, uninvolved states first tend to
hesitate to get engaged in these complex conflicts, but then they (sometimes) intervene to
prevent these conflicts from turning into regional catastrophes. The interveners also seek
the help of the United Nations or regional organizations to rebuild these states, promote
stability, and prevent future fragmentation and misery (Hoffmann 2002).
While a growing literature addresses the determinants and duration of civil conflicts,
the political, economic, and social ramifications of unilateral foreign military interventions
Received 22 March 2009; accepted 6 June 2009.

Address correspondence to Rabia Aslam, Ph.D., Forman Christian College, 22/1 B-
Block, Officer’s Colony, Zarar Shaheed Road, Lahore Cantt, 54810, Pakistan. E-mail: rabi-
aaslam@fccollege.edu.pk
246
U.S. Military Interventions and Risk of Civil Conflict 247
in the targeted nations remains an under-explored area in the literature. The purpose of
this study is to assess the impact of superpower military interventions on the intensity
of civil conflict and political violence in the targeted nations using data for the U.S.
military interventions as an example. The outcome of the direct and indirect U.S. military
interventions on the domestic political environments of the targeted nations in the aftermath
of these events is important as there is sufficient evidence to suggest that a relationship
exists between internal political unrest and the outside interveners in the inter- and intra-
state conflicts. Regardless of the political goals and motivations of the U.S. government,
this article simply wishes to determine if the degree of the internal conflict was increased or
decreased after the U.S. armed forces directly invaded some nation or intervened indirectly
in an ongoing conflict.
This article has four sections. The first section presents a detailed review of the exist-
ing literature in the area. The second section outlines a brief history of the U.S. military
interventions and highlights the hypothesis about the relationship between the superpower
military intervention and the occurrence of civil conflict. The third section describes the re-
search design and the details of empirical analysis, respectively. The final section concludes
the study and underscores several policy insights that follow.
Literature Review
In the last two decades a number of studies have been devoted to the assessment and impact
of third-party intervention on the duration and extent of civil war. The literature primarily
suggests that in doing so the third party pursues a range of goals. Regan (1996; 2000a)
argued that third- party interventions are intended, on average, to end an intra-state conflict
as quickly as possible. Regan (2002) and Lemke and Regan (2004) agree that outside
intervention on behalf of the target government tends to shorten civil wars and reduce their
human costs (see also DeRouen and Sobek 2004).
However, other scholars counter that third parties intervene for less benevolent reasons,
including lengthening the duration of a civil war in order to distract or drain the resources
of rival states or simply to plunder the resources of the civil war state itself (Stedman 1993;
1996; Licklider 1995; Zartman 1995; Brown 1996; Mason and Fett 1996; David 1997;
Walter 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Hartzell 1999; Hegre
et al. 1999; Mason, Fett, and Weingarten 1999; Meek 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2000;
Henderson and Singer 2000). According to Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000, 2008) third
parties as strategic actors have incentives to encourage longer civil wars. They argue that
in order to assess the influence of the third parties on civil war duration, it is important to
consider the geopolitical context in which the civil wars occur, rather than focusing solely
on the characteristics internal to these conflicts. They found empirical support for the idea
that the third party interventions generally prolong civil wars.
Explaining the reasons for the third party interventions, Werner (2000) noted that one
important reason for the third-party involvement is often its perception that the attacking
country poses a significant threat to the status quo. The third party worries that changes
wrought by the war will be too extreme and enters the ongoing war in order to defend
the threatened status quo. Gleditsch and Beardsley (2004) analyzed three Central America
conflicts to demonstrate that many third parties often have an interest in the outcome of
a civil war and will shape the outcome even in the absence of direct interaction through
actions, such as threats and promises, that can shape the dynamics of the conflict. Using data
for 106 developing countries from 1960 to 2002, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) found
that large-scale foreign military interventions did not leave a significant imprint on the
248 R. Aslam
governing institutions, economic growth rates, or physical quality of life in the developing
democracies. However, the same cannot be said for non-democratic states in the developing
world.
In the decades following World War II, the United States has been one of the most fre-
quent interveners in third-world internal wars. International relations scholars have adopted
several explanatory frameworks to interpret the underlying motives behind these interven-
tions. In general hegemonic power, structural realism and ideological conflict have guided
interpretations of the U.S. interventions in the Cold War era and immediate post–Cold War
period. A number of studies focusing on the analysis of the U.S. foreign policy (Huntington
1987, 40; Katz 1991; Brzezinski 1988) see the strategic interests and the Soviet Union as
the main determining factor in the U.S. foreign policy. While discussing the U.S. inter-
vention in the Rhodesian conflict (1965–79), Touval and Zartman (1985) argued that U.S.
involvement in the said conflict was, in part, a function of the collapse of the Portuguese
control and the increased involvement of the Soviet Union in Angola. In a study done by
Mi Yung Yoon (1997), a hypothesis emphasizing strategic interests and a hypothesis con-
cerning domestic influences of the U.S. foreign policy were reviewed and tested in relation
to the U.S. interventions in third-world wars. Yoon found out that if strategic interests
such as intervention by a Soviet ally and a communist presence are the impelling factors,
domestic factors such as election year or worsening domestic economic condition serve as
prohibiting factors for the U.S. intervention.
Other analysts, such as Kramer and Bauser (1972) and Art and Jervis (1973), view the
U.S. interventions as motivated by economic rather than strategic interests. They emphasize
that the United States frequently intervenes in the areas where such interests are threatened
and a conflict situation in the area has always been seen as a threat to those interests.
One study shows that the possession of greater military capability has made the U.S.
decision makers more likely to use force and intervene in third-world internal conflicts.
The possession of a very sharp sword in the form of greater military strength serves as a
source of temptation to intervene in inter- and intra-state conflicts (Fordham 2004). The
following section outlines a brief overview of U.S. military interventions and highlights
several reasons for which they have received considerable media attention during the last
several decades.
Overview of U.S. Military Interventions1

The U.S. military has been involved in armed conflicts for a long time. During the last
century it has not only been a direct party to the conflicts (World War I, World War
II, and the Korean War) several times but has also intervened indirectly in the inter-
and intra-state wars (Cyprus Conflict, Gulf War, Bosnia-Herzegovina). Sometimes it got
involved on humanitarian grounds and participated in the peacekeeping operations. On other
occasions the U.S. military defended ideological agendas; such as defending capitalism or
economic agendas; such as protecting oil company investments. Military interventions by
the U.S. in those contexts are often criticized on the grounds that all the post–World War II
interventions that were carried out in the name of “freedom” and “democracy,” in fact
defended dictatorships controlled by the pro-U.S. elites. In the few cases when the U.S.
military forces toppled a dictatorship; such as in Grenada or Panama, they did so in a way
that prevented the country’s people from overthrowing their own dictator first and installing
a new democratic government more to their liking (Grossman 2001).
The same peculiar aspect of the U.S. military interventions was pointed out by Butler
(2003). He suggested that the U.S. policymakers have a propensity to seek harmony between
pragmatic applications of the military might and the U.S. stated belief in peace and stability.
While intervening in inter- and intra-state wars, the United States often portrays itself as
a neutral peacekeeper, with nothing but the purest humanitarian motives. After deploying
forces in a country, however, it quickly divides the country or region into factions and
takes one side against another. This strategy tends to aggravate a war or a civil conflict, as
in the cases of Somalia and Bosnia. Most interventions in those countries were aimed at
defending the lives and rights of civilian populations. Yet the military operations often left
behind massive civilian “collateral damage.” War planners made little distinction between
rebels and the civilians who lived in the rebel zones of control or between the military
assets and civilian infrastructure, such as train lines, water plants, agricultural factories,
medicine supplies, and so on. At present, similar strategy has been adopted for the ongoing
War on Terror in the tribal belt on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border where the U.S. forces
are chasing Al Qaeda and the Taliban in their fight against terrorism.
The historical record of the interventions reveals that the U.S. involvement in World
War II (1941–45) was sparked by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the fear of an
Axis invasion of North America. The atomic bombing of Japan by the United States at the
end of the war, however, was carried out without any kind of advance demonstration or
warning that may have prevented the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. The war in
Korea (1950–53) was marked by widespread atrocities, both by the North Korean/Chinese
forces and the South Korean/U.S. forces. The U.S. troops fired on civilian refugees headed
into South Korea, apparently fearing they were northern infiltrators. Bombers attacked
the North Korean cities, and the United States twice threatened to use nuclear weapons.
During the Vietnam War (1960–75), the U.S. forces fought against North Vietnam, and the
Communist rebels struggling to overthrow the pro-U.S. dictatorships in South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia. The U.S. “carpet-bombing” of the countryside and cities resulted in
over two million deaths in this war, including 55,000 U.S. troops.2 In addition, more than
a dozen U.S. citizens were killed on U.S. soil in the National Guard shootings or antiwar
bombings.
In 1961 U.S. forces tried to invade Cuba in the Caribbean but failed. In 1965 bombing
and marine invasion of the Dominican Republic was carried out by the U.S. military during
an election campaign. The U.S. forces trained and harbored Cuban exile groups in Miami,
which launched terrorist attacks on Cuba, including the 1976 downing of a Cuban civilian
jetliner near Barbados. During the Cold War, the U.S. government also supported the pro-
U.S. dictatorships in Iran, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, and many other countries around
the world (Grossman 2001).
During the 1980s the U.S. government strongly backed the pro-U.S. regime in El
Salvador and the right-wing exile forces fighting the leftist Sandinista government in
Nicaragua. Rightist death squads slaughtered the Salvadoran civilians who questioned the
concentration of power and wealth in a few hands. The U.S. troops also invaded Grenada
in 1983, to oust the new military regime, attacking Cuban civilian workers and accidentally
bombing a hospital. In 1989 the U.S. forces invaded Panama to oust the nationalist regime
of Manuel Noriega. U.S. bombing raids on the Panama City ignited a conflagration in a
civilian neighborhood fed by the stove gas tanks. Over 2,000 civilians were killed in the
endeavor to capture one leader.3
The role played by the U.S. forces in the Middle East has also received considerable
media attention during the last few decades. During the Middle East crisis of 1958, the U.S.
deployed marines to suppress a rebellion in Lebanon. Since then U.S. foreign policy has
been indirectly opposing the Arab nationalists, often in support of the region’s monarchies.
U.S. forces returned to the Middle East in 1980, after the Shi’ite Muslim revolution in Iran
250 R. Aslam
against Shah Pahlevi’s pro-U.S. dictatorship, where the U.S forces launched an unsuccessful
troop and bombing raid to free the U.S. embassy hostages held in downtown Tehran.
After the 1982 Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the U.S. Marines were deployed in
a neutral “peacekeeping” operation. They instead took the side of Lebanon’s pro-Israel
Christian government against the Muslim rebels, and U.S. Navy ships fired enormous
shells on the Muslim civilian villages. Resentful Shi’ite Muslim rebels responded with a
suicide bomb attack on the marine barracks, and for years seized some U.S. hostages in
the country. Syria and the Muslim rebels emerged victorious in Lebanon and Libya’s Arab
nationalist leader Muammar Qaddafi remained in power. The U.S. Navy also intervened
against Iran during its war against Iraq in 1987–88, sinking Iranian ships and “accidentally”
shooting down an Iranian civilian jetliner.
In 1992 the U.S. deployed forces in the Persian Gulf after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The U.S. once again supported the Kuwaiti monarchy and the Muslim fundamentalist
monarchy in neighboring Saudi Arabia against the secular nationalist Iraqi regime. In
January 1991, the United States and its allies unleashed a massive bombing assault against
the Iraqi government and the military targets. Up to 200,000 Iraqis were killed in the war and
its immediate aftermath of rebellion and disease, including many civilians who died in their
villages, neighborhoods, and bomb shelters.4 The United States posed economic sanctions
that denied health and energy to Iraqi civilians, thousands of whom died, according to
United Nations agencies (Colombo and Loretti 2003).
In the 1990s, the U.S. military also led a series of humanitarian interventions that it
claimed would safeguard civilians. Foremost among them was the 1992 deployment in the
African nation of Somalia, a state torn by famine and a civil war between clan warlords.
Instead of remaining neutral, the U.S. forces took the side of one faction against another and
bombed a Mogadishu neighborhood. Enraged crowds, backed by foreign Arab mercenaries,
killed 18 U.S. soldiers, forcing a withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the country.
Other humanitarian interventions were centered in the Balkan region of Europe when
the federation of Yugoslavia broke up in 1992. The United States waited for three years
as the Serbian forces killed the Muslim civilians in Bosnia, before it launched a decisive
bombing raid in 1995. In 1999, the United States bombed Serbia to force President Slobodan
Milosevic to withdraw forces from the ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo, which was torn
by a brutal ethnic war. The bombing intensified the killing of Albanian civilians and the
Serbian expulsions from Kosovo, and caused the deaths of thousands of Serbian civilians,
even in the cities that had voted strongly against Milosevic. The United States was viewed
as a biased player, even by the Serbian democratic opposition that overthrew Milosevic the
following year.
The U.S. military is also sometimes criticized on the grounds that even when it had
apparently defensive motives, it ended up attacking the wrong targets. After the 1998
bombings of two of the U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States retaliated not only
against Osama bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan, but also against a pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan that was mistakenly said to be a chemical warfare installation. Bin Laden
retaliated by attacking a U.S. Navy ship docked in Yemen in 2000. After the 2001 terror
attacks on the United States, the U.S. military bombed Afghanistan and occupied Iraq
resulting in an outbreak of internal conflict and violence that spread far beyond Iraq’s
borders from Syria to Pakistan, seriously threatening stability in the region.
The direct invasion of Afghanistan and indirect intervention in the neighboring Pakistan
through surgical strikes has once again divided the region into factions. In the Northern
areas of Pakistan violence has become a way of life. Since 11 September 2001 thousands
of innocent civilians have been killed in a series of suicide bombings and terror attacks
that emerged from the War on Terror itself. According to an estimate there have been more
than 500 attacks in Afghanistan out of which at least 100 were carried out directly against
the U.S. government and military installations. In Pakistan more than 250 suicide attacks
have been carried out since 2004 (out of which at least 10 were carried out directly against
the U.S. citizens), which resulted in more than 1,500 civilian deaths.5 The internal violence
and unrest that prevails in Pakistan in particular for the past five years is a direct reaction
to an indirect military intervention by the United States. In essence therefore, U.S. military
intervention in the area has been counterproductive even if one accepts the U.S. goals and
rationales. It seems that rather than solving the political or economic roots of the conflict,
it tends to polarize factions, thus further destabilizing the region.
Hypothesis
The last section presented a brief account of the U.S. military invasions and indirect
interventions in the third world internal and external wars. It is apparent that the majority of
these interventions left the targeted nations in situations of social and political turmoil for
some time to come. The main purpose of this study accordingly is to assess the impact of the
direct and indirect military interventions by the United States on the degree and intensity of
political instability and civil conflict in the targeted nations. There are two main reasons for
choosing the United States for this study. First is the availability of authentic and reliable
data from the United States. Second is the fact that the United States, being the world’s
superpower, has been one of the most frequent and the most widely criticized interveners
in international conflicts. However, regardless of the political goals and motivation of the
U.S. government, the author simply wishes to test the following hypothesis using data from
several different sources.
What are the linkages if any, between the U.S. military presence and the subsequently
increased occurrence of political violence and civil strife in the targeted nations?
If the U.S. military intervention or direct aggression is found to exacerbate internal
conflict and weaken the governance capacity of the targeted nations then, in addition to
a host of other factors such as low per capita income, large populations, high religious
fractionalization, and weak governance, the U.S. military presence would be anticipated as
one of the many conditions that favor insurgency.
Data and Methods

To test the proposed hypothesis regarding the linkage between the U.S. military intervention
and the prevalence and intensity of political unrest and civil violence, the article uses several
different data sets. The first section is simply designed to see if the level of political violence
increased or decreased after the involvement of the U.S. military in the targeted nations.
To measure political instability the study relies on the Arthur Banks Cross National Time
Series Data Archive. These data had been derived from the daily files of the New York
Times. The eight variable definitions (adopted from Rummel 1963) are listed in Table 1.
A conflict index was generated by summing up various available indicators of polit-
ical violence for 93 countries for one and three years pre- and post-intervention periods,
respectively. The increase and decrease in the conflict index can then be observed. Such a
summation is meaningful in this case as each indicator states the number of violent incidents
that occurred in the country under observation in a certain year. Ranging from number of
political assassinations to riots, strikes, and antigovernment demonstrations to revolutions,
the index reflects all sorts of events that could disrupt, at least temporarily, the normal
252 R. Aslam
Table 1
Components of the conflict index
1. Assassinations: Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high

government official or politician.
2. General Strikes: Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves
more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.
3. Guerrilla Warfare: Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.
4. Government Crises: Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the
downfall of the present regime—excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.
5. Purges: Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.

6. Riots: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of
physical force.
7. Revolutions: Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at
such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from the central government.
8. Anti-Government Demonstrations: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people
for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies
or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.
functioning of the government and cause social upheaval in the country. Later models also
focus on separate indicators as dependant variables to derive more valid conclusions.
Use of Force
The use of force data has been taken from James Meernik’s 1996 article titled, “U.S. military
intervention and the promotion of democracy.” U.S. military intervention is considered as
a political use of military force involving ground troops of either the U.S. Army or the
Marine Corps in an active attempt to influence the behavior of other nations. An active
attempt here means the use of fire power or the transportation of arms or foreign armies.
As pointed out by Meernik, not all the events in the data set involved a hostile introduc-
tion of troops. Data identifying interventions was gathered from Meernik (1996), Grossman
(2001), and Siegel (1991). The author decided to analyze all such cases for which political
instability and unrest data was available for the relevant countries.
Determinants of Civil Conflict

To test the hypothesis empirically the author relied on the ethnic conflict data set complied
by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Several determinants of civil conflict have been used as control
variables for internal political violence and unrest. Table 2 depicts summary statistics for
several variables that have been used for the analysis ahead.
The dependant variable here is the standard conflict index; the calculation procedure
for which is explained earlier. Several explanatory variables have been used. “US Used
Force” is a dichotomous variable indicating either a direct aggression or an intervention
by the U.S. military in an ongoing conflict. As mentioned earlier, intervention in this case
involves a political use of the military force involving ground troops of either the U.S.
Table 2
Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Conflict 4627 2.521 4.567 0 53
U.S. Used Force 4627 0.054 0.227 0 1
Prior Use of Force 4627 0.0564 0.2307 0 1
Log GDP/Capita 4454 3.152 4.142 0.05 67
New State 4627 0.021 0.145 0 1
Regime Change 4619 0.165 0.371 0 1
Autocracy 4575 0.229 0.420 0 1
Ethno Linguistic Fraction 4627 0.371 0.295 0.001 0.925
Religious Fraction 4627 0.157 9.121 0.001 0.44

Log Population 4614 9.153 1.505 5.4 14.02
Mountain 4627 2.266 1.274 0 4.32
Non Contiguity 4627 0.141 0.348 0 1
Oil Exporter 4627 0.167 0.373 0 1
Army or the Marine Corps in an active attempt to influence the behavior of other nations.
The variable “Prior Use of Force,” once again a dichotomous variable, indicates the use
of force by the United States within the region under observation during the last twelve
months.
According to the Global Terrorism Database,6 terrorist attacks are executed and in-
surgencies are carried out for three main motives; economic, political, or religious. Civil
conflict and insurgency has been frequently linked with poverty and the standard of living
in general. To account for the standard of living and economic conditions, “Log of per
capita GDP” has been used. Sources are the Penn World Tables (1999) and the World
Development indicators (World Bank 2000).
Political and military technology of insurgency is favored when the political rebels
face or have available a newly independent state that suddenly loses the coerciveness of
a former imperial power. A dichotomous variable—”New State”—has been used where
countries have been marked based on their first and second year of independence. Possible
weak governance has been captured by the variable “Regime Change,” which indicates a
change of government at the center during the last three years.
To incorporate the effects of democracy an autocracy measure from the Polity IV data
set has been included. A regime that mixes democratic and autocratic features is likely to
indicate political contestation among the competing forces and weakens the state capacity.
The variable “Autocracy” marks those regimes for which the score is between –5 and 5
on the difference between Polity IV’s democracy and autocracy measures (the difference
ranges from –10 to 10) (Marshal and Jaggers 2008).
The Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (EFL) index based on the data from Atlas
Naradov Mira (1964)7 has been used to test the relationship with internal political violence
in this case. The index gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country
are from two different ethno-linguistic groups. A “Religious Fractionalization” measure
was constructed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) using data from the CIA Fact Book (2008),
Encyclopedia Britannica (2009), and the Library of Congress (2009). Constructed on
254 R. Aslam
Table 3
Pre and post intervention difference in the Conflict Index
Total Number of Countries: 93 # of Instances 428

3 Year Pre and Post Intervention Difference Conflict Index %
Increased 158 37
Decreased 179 42
Remained Unchanged 91 21
1 Year Pre and Post Intervention Difference
Increased 171 40
Decreased 157 37
Remain Unchanged 99 23
similar grounds, the variable provides the probability that two randomly selected individuals
in a country belong to different religious sects.
A large country population makes it difficult for the center to keep a check on who
is doing what at the local level, and also increases the number of potential recruits to an
insurgency for a given level of income. Log of population lagged one year has been used
from World Development Indicators. “Mountain” indicates the proportion of the country
that is mountainous according to the coding of geographer A. J. Gerard.8 This does not
pick up other sorts of rough terrain that can be favorable to guerrillas such as swamps
and jungles and it takes no account of population distribution or food availability. “Non
Contiguity,” another dichotomous variable, indicates a territorial base separated from the
state’s center by water or distance, for example East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West
Pakistan or Angola from Portugal.
A state whose revenues are derived primarily from oil exports tend to have weaker
state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because rulers have
less need for a socially intrusive and elaborative bureaucratic system to raise revenues
(Chaudhary 1989; Karl 1997; Wantchekon 2000). At the same time oil revenues raise the
prize of controlling state power. Those country years have been marked for which the fuel
exports exceeded one third of the export revenues, using World Bank Data denoted by “Oil
Exporter.”9
Observation of Conflict Index

Table 3 shows the position of the conflict index described in the previous section in 93
countries for whom the data was available. A total of 428 instances of military intervention
have been analyzed. The level of force used ranges from zero to five, with zero being the
political pressure only and five being actual war. First the numerical value of the conflict
index was compared for each target nation three years prior to the year of intervention with
the value recorded in the third year post the year of intervention. The pre-intervention rating
is subtracted from the post-intervention rating to obtain the final score. If positive the number
indicates that the level of conflict increased during the time period under consideration.
If negative, it indicates that the level of internal conflict was reduced compared to the
pre-intervention period.
Similarly, the one year pre-intervention index number is subtracted from the one year
post-intervention number. This difference indicates whether the level of conflict rose or
reduced in the given time period. Table 3 reveals the percentages of the countries where
the conflict index increased, decreased, or remained constant, during the three year pre-
and post-intervention periods. It shows that the index fell down in a higher percentage
of countries three year post-intervention period. It indicates that internal violence was
aggravated and the intensity of conflict was increased only in 37 percent of the countries,
whereas the situation was improved in about 42 percent of the countries. This situation,
however, is reversed when one examines the one year pre- and post-intervention difference.
It seems that the conflict intensified in a larger percentage of countries during one year
post-U.S. intervention period. The difference, however, is trivial so no conclusion can be
drawn based on this observation alone.
Multivariate Regressions
As a standard analytical procedure the data was subjected to several tests to check for any
anomalies in it. The results of the White test7 and the Breuch-Pagan tests for heteroskedas-
ticity are negative at the 5 percent level of significance. The Wooldridge test8 does not
indicate the existence of any first order autocorrelation in the data. The variance inflation
factors9 do not look worrisome either, indicating the absence of any serious multi-co lin-
earity in the data. The Kernel density plots and augmented component plus residual plots
do indicate the presence of some non-normality and nonlinearity in the data. The model
specification tests were also done and the results indicated that the basic model is correctly
specified.10
Table 4 shows three different models using different techniques depending on the nature
of the dependant variable. The first model uses the standard conflict index as the dependant
variable. The index states the degree of conflict in the year of intervention. Breusch-Pagan
Lagrangian multiplier and Hausman specification tests indicated that Random Effects is
a superior fit in this case. Accordingly the same was used for the first model.11 At first
glance the variables “Regime Change,” “Autocracy,” and “EFL” appear highly significant.
The presence of an autocratic regime increases, whereas an increase in Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalization decreases the chances of political strife in the sample under observation.
This result is consistent with some previous studies that have been done on ethnic conflicts
(Reynal-Querol 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The variable “U.S. used force” indicating
the use of force by the United States also appears to be significantly positively correlated
with the degree of conflict. However, causality needs to be traced between the two variables
in this case, since bi-directional causality is expected. As expected, a one standard deviation
increase in population (about 32 people) can increase the conflict index by about 0.7 standard
deviations (approximately 3 points). “Mountain,” “Oil,” and “New State” are not significant
at the 5 percent level. “Non contiguity” is significantly positively correlated with the degree
of violence, indicating that the separation of one part of a country by a huge body of water
might nurture circumstances that favor insurgency and conflict.
Model 2 (Table 4) uses the change in conflict index one year post the year of intervention
as a dependant variable. For simplicity the increase in index has been recorded as “1” and
decrease or no change in the degree of conflict has been recorded as “0.” The random effects
logistic regression coefficients generate almost similar insights as model 1. In addition to
“Population,” “Regime Change,” and “Autocracy,” increase in religious fractionalization
also turns out to be significantly positively related with the growth of conflict. This result
is consistent with evidence of sectoral violence and unrest in countries like India and some
parts of the Middle East and Africa where the degree of religious fractionalization is high.
Log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is also shown to be significantly negatively
256
Table 4
Multivariate regression analysis
U.S. used Regime Religious Non
Dependant variable force GDP/Capita New state change Autocracy EFL fraction Population Mountain contiguity Oil
Conflict Index 1.393 −0.0266 0.081 1.113 0.79 −1.28 2.95 0.71 0.08 1.81 −0.461
(4.92) (−0.96) (0.18) (6.18) (4.52) ( − 2.01) (1.71) (6.33) (0.57) (3.75) (−1.57)
Conflict growth 1∗ 0.402 −0.034 1.695 0.069 0.3013 −0.512 1.555 0.174 0.018 0.29 −0.062
(2.78) ( − 2.64) (6.86) (0.74) (3.46) ( − 3.30) (3.79) (5.84) (0.54) (2.36) (−0.58)
Conflict growth 3 0.606 −0.031 4.19 0.056 0.367 −0.533 1.615 0.125 0.045 0.228 −0.101
(4.21) ( − 2.51) (7.05) (0.62) (4.3) ( − 3.63) (4.17) (4.42) (1.39) (1.93) (−0.97)
Technique: Random Effects GLS and Random Effects Logistic Regressions
R Square Between: 0.475 Observations: 4421
Log Likelihood(1): −2655.784
Log Likelihood(2): −2707.518
∗
Shows increase in conflict 1 year post intervention period. Coefficients have been reported. Figures in parenthesis are Z scores.
∗∗
Numbers in bold indicate that the variable is statistically significant at α = 0.05.
correlated with the growth in conflict. It seems that a one standard deviation increase in GDP
per capita decreases the log odds of being in the high conflict group by about 8 percent.
The use of force by the United States once again appears to be significantly positively
correlated with the growth in conflict indicating that odds in favor of increase in conflict
growth are about 50 percent higher when the United States intervenes in the situation.
Moreover, non-contiguity also almost doubles the chances of insurgency and violence by
separatist or terrorist groups.
Model 3 (Table 4) uses a three year post-intervention difference in similar fashion as a
dependant variable. The log odds of the U.S. intervention here are 0.606. Conversely, one
can say that the odds in favor of growth in conflict over a three year period increase by
about 83 percent with the presence of the U.S. military on the national soil. The chances
of civil conflict also increase many-fold if the state under consideration is a new state.
Autocracy and EFL indicate similar influence as models 2 and 3. In all three models, the
use of force by the United States appears to be one of many factors that correlate with the
rise in insurgency. The correlation also tends to grow stronger with increase in the duration
of conflict.
In the next step the conflict index is disintegrated and the individual components have
been used as dependant variables to trace the linkage between intervention and insurgency.
Table 5 depicts the results of four relevant models. Models in this table include “prior use of
force” by the United States as an independent variable. Out of eight components of conflict,
only “Guerrilla Warfare” and “Revolutions” are significantly positively correlated with the
“Prior use of Force” by the United States. As expected, “Guerrilla War” is also significantly
positively correlated with “Mountainous Terrain” and “Non-Contiguity.” It is, however,
negatively correlated with “oil.” The presence of an autocratic regime, a high degree of
religious fractionalization, and regime change at the center are also some of the factors that
are positively linked with the existence of guerrilla war. All the aforementioned variables
have similar impact on revolutions. Revolutions are also highly positively correlated with
prior use of force by the United States in the region. The model indicates that log odds of
going through a revolution increase by about 45 percent when the country is experiencing
some form of military intervention by the United States. As mentioned earlier, however,
causality needs to be traced between the use of force and the growth in conflict, since a
bi-directional causality is expected. Moreover, the results could be somewhat biased due
to the presence of non-normality in the data. Perhaps a more sophisticated conflict index
along with the level of force used combined with superior analytical techniques would help
achieve more refined results in this case. The exploration of techniques required to address
such issues is beyond the scope of this article and invites further research on the subject.
Conclusion and Policy Implications

Studies focusing on the causes and consequences of civil war have indicated that a rela-
tionship often exists between civil wars and the outside interveners in inter- and intra-state
conflicts. Research on military intervention as a particular type of conflict has accelerated in
recent years, primarily due to the changing nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War.
In the decades following World War II the United States has been one of the most frequent
interveners in third-world internal wars. The consequences of the direct and indirect U.S.
military interventions on the domestic political and social environments of the targeted na-
tions in the aftermath of these events is an under-explored area in this literature. Although
the recent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. forces is not a classic example
of third-party intervention and is more of a direct occupation, the resulting outbreak of
258
Table 5
Prior use of force and conflict growth
Prior use of Regime Religious Non
Dependant variable force GDP/Capita New state change Autocracy EFL fraction Population Mountain contiguity Oil
Guerrilla warfare 0.226 −0.008 0.036 0.213 0.087 −0.047 0.606 0.025 0.037 0.327 −0.1
(3.54) (−1.93) (0.35) (5.30) (2.36) (−0.82) (3.92) (2.26) (2.93) (6.99) ( − 2.52)
Government crises 0.027 0.006 −0.068 0.072 0.204 −0.141 0.258 0.019 0.008 0.214 −0.047
(0.67) (2.51) (−1.02) (2.81) (8.68) ( − 3.84) (2.62) (2.73) (1.04) (7.18) (−1.86)
Riots 0.061 −0.001 −0.030 0.034 0.240 0.002 0.269 0.231 −0.009 0.907 −0.166
(0.51) (−0.25) (−0.16) (0.46) (3.46) (0.02) (0.92) (10.91) (−0.38) (10.30) (−2.22)
Revolutions 0.161 −0.007 −0.005 0.168 0.176 0.107 0.189 0.005 0.026 0.056 0.027
(4.49) ( − 3.13) (−0.94) (7.41) (8.45) (3.28) (2.17) (0.82) (3.61) (2.12) (1.23)
Technique: Random Effects GLS Regression
Log Likelihood −5991.54 −3994.85 −8786.78 −3469.6
internal conflict and violence that spread far beyond Iraq’s borders from Syria to Pakistan
has gained considerable attention since 2002.
This study focuses on the linkage between direct and indirect military interventions by
the United States and the prevalence of political instability and civil strife in the targeted
nations. The correlation was tested using data from several different sources. An index
of conflict was generated to measure the level of political unrest and civil violence in the
targeted nations. Several control variables from armed conflict data sets were then combined
with the use of force data to be used as explanatory variables in the study. The empirical
analysis finds some support for the hypothesis that, in addition to low per capita income,
large populations, low ethnic and high religious fractionalization, and weak governance,
the direct and indirect involvement of the U.S. military is also somewhat correlated with the
growth of civil unrest and political violence in the targeted nations. The degree of violence
may increase as the U.S. forces invade a region or indirectly intervene in an ongoing
conflict at least for some time to come. However, more research needs to be done before
any definitive conclusions can be drawn in this regard.
One policy implication that this study has is with regard to the execution of the
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the recent past, the U.S. military has
governed its operations in Iraq by a counterinsurgency strategy known as operation Phantom
Thunder. This operation was launched to strike the insurgents in almost all of their major
bases at once with full force. Such an operation implying heavy ordinance was required
in the ongoing wave of insurgency as the political progress by itself failed to reduce the
violence in and around the Iraqi capital. Consequently, in a series of operations led by the
U.S. Army a majority of the Iraqi cities were cleared from insurgents without destroying
the infrastructure or excessively alienating the local population. The U.S. military focused
on the disruption of car bomb and suicide bomb networks from Baghdad to Falluja that
were supporting Al Qaeda since 2004. The operation was highly successful and the level
of violence was dramatically reduced in Baghdad.
Counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq require the close integration of
civil and military efforts in freeing the population from intimidation by the insurgents, and
that requires military action. The study, however, indicates that if such an action is entirely
U.S. led, produces large-scale collateral damage, and inflicts numerous innocent casualties,
such an effort might not only perpetuate the internal violence but would most likely end
up creating more terrorists and fueling the hatred that sustains them. When insurgents
have the cooperation and support of the local populations, the level of violence is bound
to increase as the military operations progress (Dobbins 2005). To counter violence, top
priority therefore should be given to securing the civilian population before hunting down
insurgents. Such a strategy provides a long-term solution to the insurgency problem by
denying both refuge and recruits to the insurgents from among the local populations. The
intensity of conflict hence might be reduced and ongoing violence might be controlled more
effectively in the Middle East and South Asia.
This argument is also in line with the perspective developed in the counterinsurgency
manual that was developed by the Army and Marine Corps and was released by the Pen-
tagon during December 2006 (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). In addition to providing
guidance for current operations, the manual discusses historical approaches to counterinsur-
gency taken by American forces and provides guidelines for evaluating the circumstances
of a counterinsurgency campaign so forces can adapt their actions. It emphasizes that sol-
diers and Marines today are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must
be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding
infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local gover-
260 R. Aslam
Table 6
U.S. military interventions (1945–2002)
Dates of
Country intervention Forces Comments
IRAN 1946 Nuclear threat Soviet troops told to leave north.
YUGOSLAVIA 1946 Nuclear threat, Response to shoot-down of U.S.
naval plane.
URUGUAY 1947 Nuclear threat Bombers deployed as show of
strength.
GREECE 1947–49 Command U.S. directs extreme-right in civil
operation war.
GERMANY 1948 Nuclear Threat Atomic-capable bombers guard

Berlin Airlift.
CHINA 1948–49 Troops/Marines Evacuate Americans before
Communist victory.
PHILIPPINES 1948–54 Command CIA directs war against Huk
operation Rebellion.
PUERTO RICO 1950 Command Independence rebellion crushed in
operation Ponce.
KOREA 1951–53 Troops, naval, U.S./So. Korea fights China/No.
bombing, Korea. A-bomb threat in 1950, and
nuclear against China in 1953. Still have
threats bases.
IRAN 1953 Command CIA overthrows democracy, installs
operation shah.
VIETNAM 1954 Nuclear threat French offered bombs to use against
siege.
GUATEMALA 1954 Command CIA directs exile invasion after new
operation, government nationalized
bombing,
nuclear
threat
U.S. company lands; bombers based
in Nicaragua.
EGYPT 1956 Nuclear threat, Soviets told to keep out of Suez
troops crisis; Marines evacuate foreigners.
LEBANON l958 Troops, naval Marine occupation against rebels.
IRAQ 1958 Nuclear threat Iraq warned against invading Kuwait.
CHINA l958 Nuclear threat China told not to move on Taiwan
isles.
PANAMA 1958 Troops Flag protests erupt into confrontation.
VIETNAM l960–75 Troops, naval, Fought South Vietnam revolt and
bombing, North Vietnam; one million killed.
nuclear
threats
CUBA l961 Command CIA-directed exile invasion fails.
operation
GERMANY l961 Nuclear threat Alert during Berlin Wall crisis.
Table 6
U.S. military interventions (1945–2002) (Continued)
Dates of
LAOS 1962 Command Military buildup during guerrilla war.
operation
CUBA l962 Nuclear threat, Blockade during missile crisis;
naval near-war with Soviet Union.
IRAQ 1963 Command CIA organizes coup that killed
operation president, brings Ba’ath Party to
power, and Saddam Hussein back
from exile to be head of the secret

service.
PANAMA l964 Troops Panamanians shot for urging canal’s
return.
INDONESIA l965 Command Million killed in CIA-assisted army
operation coup.
DOMINICAN 1965–66 Troops, Marines land during election
REPUBLIC bombing campaign.
GUATEMALA l966–67 Command Green Berets intervene against
operation rebels.
DETROIT l967 Troops Army battles African Americans, 43
killed.
UNITED STATES l968 Troops After King is shot; over 21,000
soldiers in cities.
CAMBODIA l969–75 Bombing, Up to 2 million killed in decade of
troops, naval bombing, starvation, and political
chaos.
OMAN l970 Command U.S. directs Iranian marine invasion.
operation
LAOS l971–73 Command U.S. directs South Vietnamese
operation, invasion; “carpet-bombs”
bombing Countryside.
SOUTH DAKOTA l973 Command Army directs Wounded Knee siege of
operation Lakotas.
MIDEAST 1973 Nuclear threat Worldwide alert during Mideast War.
CHILE 1973 Command CIA-backed coup ousts elected
operation marxist president.
CAMBODIA l975 Troops, Gas captured ship, 28 die in copter
bombing crash.
ANGOLA l976–92 Command CIA assists South African-backed
operation rebels.
IRAN l980 Troops, Raid to rescue Embassy hostages; 8
nuclear troops die in copter-plane crash.
threat, Soviets warned not to get involved
aborted in revolution.
bombing
262 R. Aslam
Table 6
Dates of
LIBYA l981 Naval jets Two Libyan jets shot down in
maneuvers.
EL SALVADOR l981–92 Command Advisors, over flights aid anti-rebel
operation, war, soldiers briefly involved in
troops hostage clash.
NICARAGUA l981–90 Command CIA directs exile (Contra) invasions,
operation, plants harbor mines against
naval revolution.
LEBANON l982–84 Naval, Marines expel PLO and back
bombing, Phalanges, Navy bombs and shells
troops Muslim positions.
GRENADA l983–84 Troops, Invasion four years after revolution.
bombing
HONDURAS l983–89 Troops Maneuvers help build bases near
borders.
IRAN l984 Jets Two Iranian jets shot down over
Persian Gulf.
LIBYA l986 Bombing, Air strikes to topple nationalist
naval government.
BOLIVIA 1986 Troops Army assists raids on cocaine region.
IRAN l987–88 Naval, U.S. intervenes on side of Iraq in war.
bombing
LIBYA 1989 Naval jetsTwo Libyan jets shot down.
VIRGIN ISLANDS 1989 Troops St. Croix Black unrest after storm.
PHILIPPINES 1989 Jets Air cover provided for government
against coup.
PANAMA 1989 Troops, Nationalist government ousted by
bombing 27,000 soldiers, leaders arrested,
2000+ killed.
LIBERIA 1990 Troops Foreigners evacuated during civil
war.
SAUDI ARABIA 1990–91 Troops, jets Iraq countered after invading Kuwait.
540,000 troops also stationed in
Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Israel.
IRAQ 1990–2009 Bombing, Blockade of Iraqi and Jordanian
troops, naval ports, air strikes; 200,000+ killed
in invasion of Iraq and Kuwait;
no-fly zone over Kurdish north,
Shi’ite south, large-scale
destruction.
KUWAIT 1991 Naval, Kuwait royal family returned to
bombing, throne.
troops
Table 6
Dates of
LOS ANGELES 1992 Troops Army, Marines deployed against
anti-police uprising.
SOMALIA 1992–94 Troops, naval, U.S.-led United Nations occupation
bombing during civil war; raids against one
Mogadishu faction.
YUGOSLAVIA 1992–94 Naval NATO blockade of Serbia and
Montenegro.
BOSNIA 1993–99 Jets, bombing No-fly zone patrolled in civil war;

downed jets, bombed Serbs.
HAITI 1994 Troops, naval Blockade against military
government; troops restore
President Aristide to office three
years after coup.
ZAIRE (CONGO) 1996–97 Troops Marines at Rwandan Hutu refugee
camps, in area where Congo
revolution begins.
LIBERIA 1997 Troops Soldiers under fire during evacuation
of foreigners.
ALBANIA 1997 Troops Soldiers under fire during evacuation
of foreigners.
SUDAN 1998 Missiles Attack on pharmaceutical plant
alleged to be “terrorist” nerve gas
plant.
AFGHANISTAN 1998 Missiles Attack on former CIA training camps
used by Islamic Fundamentalist
groups alleged to have attacked
embassies.
IRAQ 1998–2009 Bombing, Four days of intensive air strikes.
missiles
YUGOSLAVIA 1999 Bombing, Heavy NATO air strikes after Serbia
missiles declines to withdraw from Kosovo.
NATO occupation of Kosovo.
YEMEN 2000 Naval U.S.S. Cole, docked in Aden,
bombed.
MACEDONIA 2001 Troops NATO forces deployed to move and
disarm Albanian rebels.
UNITED STATES 2001 Jets, naval Reaction to hijacker attacks on New
York, Washington, D.C.
AFGHANISTAN 2001–09 Troops, Massive U.S. mobilization to
bombing, overthrow Taliban, install Karzai
missiles regime, and battle Taliban
insurgency.
YEMEN 2002 Missiles Predator drone missile attack on Al
Qaeda, including a U.S. citizen.
264 R. Aslam
Table 6
Dates of
PHILIPPINES 2002–09 Troops, naval Training mission for Philippine
military fighting Abu Sayyaf rebels
evolves into combat missions in
Sulu Archipelago, west of
Mindanao.
COLOMBIA 2003–09 Troops U.S. special forces sent to rebel zone
to back up Colombian military
protecting oil pipeline.

IRAQ 2003–09 Troops, naval, Saddam regime toppled in Baghdad.
bombing, More than 250,000 U.S. personnel
missiles participate in invasion. U.S. and
U.K. forces occupy country and
battle Sunni and Shi’ite
insurgencies.
LIBERIA 2003 Troops Brief involvement in peacekeeping
force as rebels drove out leader.
HAITI 2004–05 Troops, naval Marines land after right-wing rebels
oust elected President Aristide,
who was advised to leave by
Washington.
PAKISTAN 2005–09 Missiles, CIA missile and air strikes and
bombing, Special Forces raids on alleged Al
covert Qaeda and Taliban refuge villages
operation in Tribal belt on Pak–Afghan
border and kill multiple civilians.
SOMALIA 2006–09 Missiles, Special Forces advise Ethiopian
naval, covert invasion that topples Islamist
operation government; AC-130 strikes and
Cruise missile attacks against
Islamist rebels; naval blockade
against “pirates” and insurgents.
SYRIA 2008 Troops Special Forces in helicopter raid 5
miles from Iraq kill 8 Syrian
civilians.
Source: Grossman (2001).
nance and the rule of law. It also suggests that the counterinsurgency operations are a mix of
offensive, defensive, and stability operations and in order to be successful, U.S. forces need
to be adaptive and flexible. Ultimately, peace, stability, territorial integrity, and respect for
national sovereignty are the themes on which a compelling regional strategy can be built in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Notes
1. For a list of U.S. military interventions since World War II see Table 6.
2. Militarized Interstate Disputes Database (2005).
3. Panama: Background and Buildup of Invasion of 1989 by Jane Franklin. Available at
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/∼hbf/panama.htm
4. Militarized Interstate Disputes Database.
5. Global Terrorism Database (A project of START, University of Maryland).
6. Global Terrorism Database is a project of START (National consortium for the study of
terrorism and response to terrorism) University of Maryland.
7. See Fearon and Laitin 2003.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. White’s general test statistic: 597.4093 Chi-sq(144) p-value = 1.6e-56.

11. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Ho: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 94) = 25.809 Prob > F = 0.0000.
12. Mean VIF: 1.44.
13. Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of conflict Ho: model has no omitted
variables: F(3, 4401) = 26.25 Probability > F = 0.0000.
14. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects: chi2(1) = 1530.48 Prob-
ability > chi2 = 0.0000.
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Conflict and Terrorism

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Conflict and Terrorism

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This article was downloaded by: [University of California, Berkeley]

On: 23 October 2011, At: 16:12

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk

Available online: 05 Feb 2010

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U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil

Received 22 March 2009; accepted 6 June 2009.

Overview of U.S. Military Interventions1

Data and Methods

1. Assassinations: Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high

within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.

Determinants of Civil Conflict

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Religious Fraction 4627 0.157 9.121 0.001 0.44

Total Number of Countries: 93 # of Instances 428

Observation of Conflict Index

Conclusion and Policy Implications

GERMANY 1948 Nuclear Threat Atomic-capable bombers guard

from exile to be head of the secret

BOSNIA 1993–99 Jets, bombing No-fly zone patrolled in civil war;

protecting oil pipeline.

10. White’s general test statistic: 597.4093 Chi-sq(144) p-value = 1.6e-56.

Peace Research 37(3): 275–299.

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