Shih P D 2022

Engineering as Technology of Technology and the Subjugated Practice
Bono Po-Jen Shih
Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
Science and Technology Studies
Gary Downey (Chair)
Janet Abbate
Daniel Breslau
Donna Riley
Ashley Shew
July 28, 2022
Blacksburg, Virginia
Keywords: values in engineering, critique and engagement, techne, philosophy of

engineering and technology, linguistic philosophical approaches
Bono Po-Jen Shih
ACADEMIC ABSTRACT
Two sets of concerns have motivated and sustained the research in my dissertation.
First, modern ideas of technology and engineering have been over-represented by their
dominant forms: that technology is all about progress and the more advanced “high”
technology and that engineering chiefly concerns quantity, efficiency, problem-solving,
and “better” machines. Second, these potent values in technology and engineering, as a
conceptual whole, tend to reinforce each other and create conditions conducive to its
sociocultural reproduction that discounts and subjugates viable alternative practices.
My dissertation draws on both historical and philosophical approaches to the question

of technology and engineering. My historical-linguistic study looks for the historical
meanings of the two words—technology and engineering–in connection with their
modern counterparts and discusses the social values and conditions that shaped the
dynamics of their early development to understand and deconstruct their modern
dominant representation. The analysis of ancient writings locates precedent for
dominant engineering practice in ancient siege engines and military engineering, where
qualities such as quantity, power, superiority, and ingenuity reinforced each other at the
critical times of high-stakes siege warfare. I demonstrate how these interlocking
qualities became the ideological basis for an enduring historical-conceptual structure of
the dominant ideas of engineering that, despite strikingly different social contexts,
continues to the present and limits the diversity of knowledge and participants.
Returning back to the present, I develop a philosophical critique of contemporary

engineering as “technology of technology,” in that modern dominant engineering
practice becomes technically provincial yet socially ambitious for our personal and
institutional technical practice. In this process, certain practices in engineering, including
communication, ethical reasoning, empathy, etc., have been marginalized and become
what I call the “subjugated technical practice.” By identifying the specific criteria and
values that systematically discount and exclude the subjugated technical practice in
different aspects, my analysis highlights and validates the latter’s extraordinary qualities
that contribute no less significantly to the success of engineering practice. Finally, to
explore the possibilities of substantive policy changes, I propose theory and practice
under the heading of “critical reflexive technology” and call for radical changes and
critical participation from within and beyond engineering.
ii
Bono Po-Jen Shih
GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT
The dissertation is an interdisciplinary project seeking to critique and engage with

contemporary engineering practice that predominantly emphasizes certain values—
such as quantity, efficiency, problem-solving, and “better” machines—and narrows the
diversity of knowledge and participants. Toward this end, my research has two parts:
one that concerns the genesis and perpetuation of the dominant ideas of engineering in
history and the other that is grounded in the philosophical critique of contemporary
engineering practice.
My historical analysis carries out etymological studies of words and uncovers the social
context that has shaped their meanings since antiquity. Whereas technology, in the
sense of Ancient Greek techne, denotes effective means toward an end that is diverse in
scope with many possibilities, the idea of engineering has drawn from the concepts of
engines and machines and connoted a tendency for means and goals that can be
evaluated more or less quantitatively. Emphasis on quantity varied in degree and was
not universal. Still, it was most conspicuous in the ancient writing of military engineering
on siege engines, when numbers were correlated with the ideas of power, superiority,
and ingenuity at the critical times of high-stakes siege warfare. I argue that while these
ideas of engineering initially claimed precedence in the context of military conflicts and
war engines, they coalesced into an integrated value system and became the ideological
basis for the narrowed concepts of modern engineering.
My philosophical critique of modern engineering characterizes it as a negative instance

of “technology of technology,” in that widespread practice in engineering becomes
technically provincial yet socially ambitious for our personal and institutional technical
practice. In this process, certain practices in engineering, including communication,
ethical reasoning, empathy, etc., have been marginalized and become what I call the
“subjugated technical practice.” By identifying the criteria and values that render the
subjugated technical practice irrelevant and undesirable in engineering, my analysis calls
attention to the latter’s extraordinary qualities that contribute no less significantly to
the success of engineering practice. Finally, to explore the possibilities of substantive
policy changes, I propose theory and practice under the heading of “critical reflexive
technology” and call for radical changes and critical participation from within and
beyond engineering.
iii
Dedication
I dedicate this dissertation to all who struggle with the dominant values of engineering
and have a hard time fitting in.
iv
Acknowledgments
This dissertation has been nurtured by the input and help from many folks. Fellow
students from the STS community at Virginia Tech, including my cohort, provided
inspiration for the growth of my work. Kristen Koopman and Kari Zacharias, in particular,
generously offered detailed comments on the dissertation and its spinoff publication
along with their enthusiastic, encouraging words.
My writing also deeply benefited from my experience of learning in the Department of

Engineering Education at Virginia Tech, including taking its graduate courses and
working as a graduate teaching assistant (GTA) and an instructor. Specifically, while I
was a GTA, Matthew James provided years of fresh perspective on engineering
education practice and even made possible a parental leave that made my first-time
parenthood much more enjoyable.
My committee members—Gary Downey, Janet Abbate, Daniel Breslau, Donna Riley, and
Ashley Shew—each provided constructive and invaluable feedback that helped me
substantively improve the initial draft of this dissertation in many aspects, by calling
attention to some glaring pitfalls and encouraging me to converse with a wider range of
literature and audience. Indeed, all responsibility for the remaining inadequacies is mine
alone. My additional thanks must go to Gary Downey for his mentorship and friendship
in caring about me as a junior scholar and as a person, and for telling me years ago that
inside my heart lives not only a sociologist and a historian, but also a philosopher.
I would like to acknowledge that my dissertation has received generous support from
two sources that defrayed the living expenses while I worked on my doctoral degree:
the Taiwanese Overseas Pioneers Grants (TOP Grants) from the then the Ministry of
Science and Technology (now the National Science and Technology Council) of Taiwan in
2021–2022, and the Government Scholarship to Study Abroad from the Ministry of
Education of Taiwan between 2017 and 2019. I am particularly grateful for the complete
freedom these agencies allowed me to develop my research.
Last but not least, I want to thank my family in Taiwan for many years of unqualified
support. My wife, Felice Lu, who set out to accompany me in the “final stretch” of grad
school, did not know or expect my actual writing of this dissertation would take more
than two years. (And neither did I.) It is to her unconditional love and support that this
dissertation is also dedicated.
v
Table of Contents
ACADEMIC ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. II

GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT .................................................................................................... III
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................ IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................................V
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. VI
Chapter 1 – Introduction ............................................................................................... 1
DOMINANT TROPES OF “TECHNOLOGY” AND “ENGINEERING” ..............................................................1
THE NORMS OF TECHNOLOGY: THE “LATEST” AND MORE “ADVANCED”..................................................... 1
THE NORMS OF ENGINEERING: SPECIALIZED TECHNOLOGY CONCERNED WITH EFFICIENCY............................. 5
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT .......................................................................8
A REFLECTION ON MY ENGINEERING EDUCATION EXPERIENCES IN COLLEGE ................................................ 8
ENGINEERING EDUCATION RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING STUDIES ........................................................... 11
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF ENGINEERING ........................................................................................ 15
RESEARCH APPROACHES AND QUESTIONS ...................................................................................... 32
PHILOSOPHY INFORMING HISTORY: THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH ........................................ 33
HISTORY INFORMING PHILOSOPHY: ENDURING HISTORICAL-CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES .............................. 36
INTERDISCIPLINARY SYNTHESIS OF MODERN SOURCES: ELUCIDATING AND DEFINING HOW MODERN
ENGINEERING PRACTICE IS TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................... 40
SYNOPSIS OF THE DISSERTATION .................................................................................................. 41
CHAPTER 2: TECHNOLOGY AS META-TECHNE ....................................................................................... 41
CHAPTER 3: TECHNE IN CRITICAL TIMES: MACHINE, QUANTITY AND INGENUITY IN ANCIENT AND PREMODERN
MILITARY ENGINEERING .................................................................................................................... 42
CHAPTER 4: MODERN ENGINEERING AS TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY ................................................... 44
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION: THE SUBJUGATED PRACTICE AND THE NEED FOR CRITICAL REFLEXIVE TECHNOLOGY46
Chapter 2 – Technology as Meta-Techne................................................................... 48
MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS “ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES” .................................................................. 48
TECHNIQUE, TECHNICS, AND TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................................... 54
ANCIENT GREECE: THE EMERGENCE OF TECHNOLOGY AS META-TECHNE ................................................ 59
ANCIENT GREEK TECHNOLOGY IN LATIN EUROPE: A SHORT OVERVIEW BEFORE 1600 ............................... 63
FROM RHETORIC TO PRESENTATION: “TECHNOLOGY” IN 1600–1700 .................................................. 67
FROM GENERAL KNOWLEDGE TO INDUSTRIAL ARTS: ENGLISH “TECHNOLOGY” IN 1700–1950 ................... 80
TECHNOLOGY IN OUR MODERN TIME ........................................................................................... 84
Chapter 3 – Techne in Critical Times: Machine, Quantity and Ingenuity in Ancient
and Premodern Military Engineering ..................................................... 87
HUMAN PREHISTORY AND VISIBLE TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................. 87
vi
TECHNIQUE AS MEANS FOR HUMAN PURPOSES, WORK, AND CHALLENGES ............................................ 90
THE DIFFERENTIATION AND PRIORITIES OF THE CLASSICAL GREEK TECHNE .............................................. 92
XENOPHON AND PLATO: BETWEEN REAL MATTERS OF WAR AND THE IMAGES OF IDEALISM ........................ 92
ARISTOTLE AND THE MATERIAL PRODUCTION OF TECHNE ....................................................................... 95
THE MASTER-ART: A DUTY AND A METAPHOR ................................................................................... 100
CONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTION WORKS OF THE CHIEF-CRAFTSMAN .............................................. 101
ARCHIMEDES AS THE RENOWNED GREEK MECHANIC....................................................................... 104
MACHINE, GENIUS, AND QUANTITY ............................................................................................ 110
INGENUITY AND QUANTITY AT CRITICAL TIMES OF WARFARE ............................................................ 118
THE MILITARY GENESIS OF BINARY IN ENGINEERING ....................................................................... 126
FROM ANCIENT GREEK MACHINE TO THE MODERN GREEK LANGAUGE ................................................ 133
ENDURING HISTORICAL-CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES OF THE IDEAS OF ENGINEERING IN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES
.......................................................................................................................................... 135
Chapter 4 – Modern Engineering as Technology of Technology ........................... 143
ENGINEERING AND MACHINE RENDERED CIVILIAN.......................................................................... 143
MACHINE AS GOD: FROM SIEGE-ENGINES TO CIVILIAN MACHINES ........................................................ 143
THE SILENT ENGINEERS: FROM THE CONFLICTS OF MILITARY ENGINES TO THE COMPETITION OF CIVILIAN
MACHINES .................................................................................................................................... 147
THE PRIESTS OF THE NEW EPOCH AND THEIR SUPERSTITIOUS ENGINES: MACHINE AND MECHANICS AT THE
CENTER OF CIVIL(IAN) ENGINEERING ................................................................................................. 150
THE WARLIKE EVOLUTION OF THE CIVILIAN MACHINE .......................................................................... 157
THE PEACETIME FRENZY OF INGENUITY ........................................................................................ 161
ENGINEERING THE MODERN “CRUNCH TIME” .................................................................................... 161
BINARY, QUANTITY, AND THE DIFFERENTIATION OF TECHNOLOGY .......................................................... 164
ENGINEERING AS AN EXEMPLAR OF “TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY” AND ITS PLACE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE ........................................................................................... 165
TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ITS DOMINANT FORMS ............................................................. 170
THE FIRST SENSE: TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES .......................... 171
THE SECOND SENSE: TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY TO COMPARE DISTINCT TECHNOLOGIES ..................... 172
THE THIRD SENSE: TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY AS REFLEXIVE TECHNICAL PRACTICE ............................. 175
DOMINANT ENGINEERING PRACTICE AS TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY............................................... 178
THE FIRST SENSE: DOMINANT ENGINEERING AS TECHNICAL PROBLEM SOLVING ....................................... 180
THE SECOND SENSE: DOMINANT ENGINEERING PRACTICE AS TECHNOLOGY DIFFERENTIATING OTHER
TECHNOLOGIES .............................................................................................................................. 182
THE THIRD SENSE: DOMINANT ENGINEERING PRACTICE AS UNCRITICAL REFLEXIVE ENGINEERING PRACTICE . 188
Chapter 5 – Conclusion: Toward Critical Reflexivity of Technology and the
Empowerment of Subjugated Practice ................................................ 195
MY NARRATIVE FLOW AND ARGUMENT STRUCTURE: A RECAP TO LOOK AHEAD ................................... 195
THE SUBJUGATED TECHNICAL PRACTICE ....................................................................................... 200
CRITICAL REFLEXIVITY OF TECHNOLOGY ....................................................................................... 203
A PROPOSAL FOR CRITICAL REFLEXIVE TECHNOLOGY ....................................................................... 211
REFERENCE ........................................................................................................................... 216
vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Dominant Tropes of “Technology” and “Engineering”
In our modern time, technology and engineering are closely-relatedly concepts that
often connote progress, innovation, and efficiency. While the confusion between the
two appears common even among historians and philosophers, technology and
engineering are different sets of ideas, and each is value-laden in its own right and has
significance for its participants and interest groups as well as the general public. The
following pages survey dominant themes of technology and engineering separately
before I return to their overlaps and my points of departure.
The Norms of Technology: The “Latest” and More “Advanced”
Certain characterizations of technology that emphasize technological progress and

novelty have become dominant over the past 150 years. In the 1880s, technology
concerned “the science or systematic knowledge of the industrial arts, as spinning,
metal-working, or brewing,” according to the Century Dictionary.1 The 1910s shifted and
upgraded the examples of technology to “textile manufacture” and “metallurgy.”2 The
1930s marked the rise of concern about “technocracy” and “technological
unemployment” when social thinkers observed, in their own language, “improvements
1
Whitney and Smith, ed., The Century Dictionary, 1889-1891, s.v.
2
Smith and Whitney, ed., The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, 1911, s.v.
1
in modern technology are throwing more and more men out of work.”3 In the 1960s,
the idea of technology was associated with the “technological race” and “technical
breakthrough” in terms of space exploration, aircraft, and computing.4 In the meantime,
whereas “high technology” became a popular notion in the talk of investment, critics
and politicians recognized the “perils of technology” and acknowledged that
“[t]echnology … is the ‘Janus’ of our age.”5 The collocation of “new technology” was
most popular in the 1980s and 1990s and slightly declined in the 2000s and 2010s.6 Now
the idea of “new” is connoted and subsumed under “technology.” The Longman
Dictionary of Contemporary English, for example, defines technology as “new machines,
equipment, and ways of doing things that are based on modern knowledge about
science and computers.” The first three collocations provided are “new/modern
technology,” “the latest technology,” and “advanced technology.”7
The limiting modifiers such as “new,” “latest,” and “advanced” manifest an imperative
of quantitative efficiency underlying the concept of technology: that technology ought
to bring forth more efficient performance determined and measured by numeric, the
archetype of which in our times is demonstrated by laptop and smartphone
manufacturers pushing for new products that are “faster” and “better” in engineering
terms. The linkage also mandates a mentality of technical rationality that adopts the
same sorts of efficient technology as the technical manner of carrying out daily,
mundane activities things rationally, including, for example, a practical need for
technology upgrades and “literacy,” whether we are willing or not. By acquiring the
status of a practice and method and by reigning over our means toward achieving the
purposes we desire, the so-called technology takes a reflexive turn, in that our very own
practice to bring about an end is gauged and valuated by ourselves the same way we
benchmark the performance of technology.
Its consequences go far beyond Karl Marx’s astute observation in the nineteenth
century that the laborers became merely a living appendage to the machine.8 As implied
3
Chamberlain, "Several Hours with the Technocratic Pamphleteers," Jan. 29, 1933.
4
Anonymous, "Speaking of Technology," May 11, 1960.
5
Anonymous, "A New Kind of Investment," Nov. 11, 1961; Leonard, "Books of the Times," Jun. 10-12,
1969; Sullivan, "Science: There Is Peril, Too, in Growing Technology," Mar. 24, 1968.
6
My search of “new technology” in ProQuest’s New York Times database yields most results in the 1980s
and 1990s. Specifically, there are 691, 1335, 3502, 3838, 3318 and 1614 results, respectively, from the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010-2018.
7
Anonymous, "Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online," 2021, s.v.
8
Marx, Capital Volumn I, 1909 [1867].
2
by Michael Burawoy's path-breaking study of factory workers (and their involvement in

the game of “making out”), in the technological society, we generate consent to the
rules of technology by actively participating in the game of performing technical
rationality on our practice and behaviors, and thereafter, we become accustomed and
inattentive to its concomitant harm and violence.9
The phenomenon that technology is pervasively associated with technical rationality

and efficiency could not be better formulated and critiqued by French philosopher
Jacques Ellul, who proclaimed that technology (la technique) “is the totality of methods
rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in
every field of human activity.”10 To the extent that technology is “a collective
sociological reality … independent of the individual … itself pre-existent and more or less
determinative,” it is also a “system of [technological] necessity.”11 Similarly, Langdon
Winner held that these “technological systems” have long operated on instrumental
terms of efficiency and that the expectations of working with them from the human side
have become our “second nature.”12 Elsewhere Winner pointed out that the
requirements of making the technological systems work demand a change in their
environments, including the cooperation of humans. He called these requirements “the
technological imperative,” a characteristic that makes technology appear “autonomous”
as if it had its own logic of development.13 Winner referred to the apparently inevitable
requirements and conditions to comply with technology as “the politics of artifacts,” his
most famous example of which being the building of nuclear power plants.14
Ellul and Winner are certainly not alone in their understanding of contemporary
technology. In one way or another, they reflected Max Weber’s “iron cage” metaphor,
Oswald Spengler’s technics as “the tactics of living,” Heidegger’s “challenging revealing”
(des herausfordernden Entbergens) and “enframing” (das Ge-stell), Herbert Marcuse’s
9
Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent, 1979.
10
Ellul, The Technological Society, 1964, xxv. Translator of Ellul’s 1954 title rendered French la technique
as technique in English. The closest and most accurate English translation of Ellul’s la technique should be
technology. See, for example, Winner, Autonomous Technology, 1977, 9; Bensaude Vincent et al., "Is
There a French Philosophy of Technology? General Introduction," 2018, 5.
11
Ellul, The Technological Society, 1964, xxviii, xxxi. Ellul used la nécessité technique in his French book.
For consistency with our understanding of technology in English, I replaced technical in the 1964
translation with technological.
12
Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 1986, 35-36, 11.
13
Winner, Autonomous Technology, 1977, 100.
14
Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 1986, 19-39.
3
“one-dimensional society” and “one-dimension thought,” Lewis Mumford’s

“monotechnics,”and Borgmann’s “device paradigm.”15 However, the major problem of
Ellul and Winner, if I may venture, is the unfortunate conflation of technology and
efficiency which they reinforce, as much as they want to critique and make known its
irony. Likewise, even though early philosophers, such as Andrew G. van Melsen, were
aware that their presentation of technology operated on different understandings and
definitions—notably the broad and narrow senses—of technology, that the idea or
“essence” of technology, by necessity, presupposes “progress,” “evolution,” and
“development” remained overpowering and irresistible.16
The dissertation sets out to disengage such conflation. As I will argue for the rest of my
writing, if technology in the most general sense is an effective (but not necessarily
efficient) means toward an end, then concern over technical efficiency should be
understood as an example of “technology of technology.” I understand technology of
technology as any technical practice (i.e. technology) that concerns or belongs to
technology; the double senses of “concerning” and “belonging to” are best and most
concisely represented by the proposition “of.” Based on this interpretation, assessing or
choosing one technology based on technical efficiency or compatibility with democratic
values is, in either case, a technology of technology. However, the incongruity between
the two priorities lies in the fact that the common association of general technology
with “new,” “latest,” and “advanced” technology implies a choice and disposition
toward efficiency, potentially at the cost of democratic and other human values that
Ellul and Winner would hold very dear.17 I will revisit and develop these points in
Chapter 4.
15
Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 2001 [1930]; Spengler, Man and Technics: A
Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, 1932; Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 1977
[1954]; Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, 2002
[1964]; Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, 1970; Borgmann, Technology and
the Character of Contemporary Life, 1984.
16
E.g. van Melsen, Science and Technology, 1961, 229-237, 254-255.
17
This debunks Emmanuel G. Mesthene’s belief that while particular values may vary among different
times and societies, the activity of valuing does not. His position insists that “the highest value is the act of
valuing itself … the activity of valuing, the act of human choice, will not be essentially affected” by
technology or the material conditions. See Mesthene, "How Technology Will Shape the Future," 1972,
126; Mitcham and Mackey, "Introduction: Technology as a Philosophical Problem," 1972, 9.
4
The Norms of Engineering: Specialized Technology Concerned With Efficiency
On the other hand, the idea of engineering appears to be a parallel to technology.

Nevertheless, engineering has not only been more explicit about efficiency, but also
concerned only a subset of technology specialized in certain activities and artifacts:
engine, which is apparently the etymon of engineering, and, by extension, machine. In
the 1880s, the Century Dictionary defined engineering as concerning “[t]he art of
constructing and using engines or machines” and “the art of executing civil or military
works which require a special knowledge or use of machinery, or of the principles of
mechanics.”18 In the 1910s, the Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia substantively
expanded the entry of engineer, adding that19:
In nearly all fields of modern industry and throughout the whole range of rapidly
increasing municipal activities the engineer is indispensable where the aim is to
secure maximum returns for minimum expenditure, the nicest adaptation of means
to ends.
Whereas technology, an initially general concept, has been increasingly limited to

something that is new, modern, and advanced, engineering followed an apparently
opposite trend. There is now a popular idea that “engineering is everywhere,” in
particular among introductory engineering textbooks (and courses) attempting to give
an impression of the ubiquity of engineering and to establish the general relevance of
engineering to a wide readership.20 Historically, the practical footing of engineering
allowed it to expand dramatically beyond the bondage of machines and engines. While
the dynamic expansion of engineering in the twentieth century falls outside the scope of
my dissertation, a few snapshots should suffice for our purposes. Besides civil
engineering, military engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering,
mining engineering, and naval engineering, which were commonly known in the 1880s,
the 1910s added agricultural engineering, chemical engineering, sanitary engineering,
steam engineering, and topographical engineering.21 In 1997, the American Society for
18
19
Smith and Whitney, ed., The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, 1911, s.v. The above passage had the
following source: Gilman et al., ed., The New International Encyclopæ dia, 1905, 78.
20
E.g. Wright, Introduction to Engineering, 2002; Moaveni, Engineering Fundamentals, 2016.
21
See the supplement for the entry engineering in Smith and Whitney, ed., The Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia, 1911, s.v.
5
Engineering Education (ASEE) included 13 engineering branches in its educational

statistics.22 By 2020, there were 20 engineering disciplines listed.23
Despite the seeming diversification and expansion of engineering—from civil

engineering, mechanical engineering, and electrical engineering to environmental
engineering, industrial engineering, and biomedical engineering—the engineering
discipline as a whole has been plagued by the underrepresentation of women and
ethnic minorities who have been historically disadvantaged. To take an example, their
underrepresentation in the United States reflects lower numbers, or more accurately,
that the numbers are smaller in percentages compared to their share of the national
population, as highlighted in boldface in Table 1.1 based on my calculations from
published statistics. Moreover, on a global scale, underrepresentation also pertains to
periphery countries, as engineering represented in Western talks of research and
development (R&D) and basic research for the most part fails to address their local
needs to alleviate poverty and inequality or to encourage job creation and
sustainability.24
22
American Society for Engineering Education, Aeee 1995-1996 Profiles of Engineering & Engineering
Technology Colleges, 1997, 10. My count excludes “other engineering discipline.”
23
American Society for Engineering Education, Engineering and Engineering Technology by the Numbers
2020, 2021, 3. My count here does not include computer science that is outside colleges of engineering,
general engineering, or other engineering disciplines.
24
Daniels, "Science, Technology, and Innovation in Africa: Conceptualizations, Relevance, and Policy
Directions," 2017; Juma, Redesigning African Economies: The Role of Engineering in International
Development, 2006.
6
Table 1.1 Share of Bachelor’s Engineering Degrees Earned in the US in 2019, Compared
to the National Population (ages 20–34) of the Same Year
Earned Bachelor’s Degrees in US Population

Engineering25 (ages 20–34)26
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Women 23.0% 49.1%
Hispanic or Latino 12.8% 21.3%
Non-Hispanic 87.2% 78.7%
White 63.3% 54.4%
Asian 12.4% 6.65%
Black or African American 4.31% 14.2%
American Indian or Alaska
0.28% 0.83%
Native
Native Hawaiian or Other
0.14% 0.22%
Pacific Islander
More than one race 3.84% 2.51%
Other or unknown race or
2.91% N/A
ethnicity
My dissertation makes an attempt to show that the underrepresentation of certain

populations goes hand in hand with the over-representation of selected values and
activities in engineering. For our present purposes, a non-exhaustive list of predominant
representations of engineers, according to a number of introductory engineering
textbooks that I collected, includes27:
 Problem-solving: an engineer is “someone who is a creative, ingenious person who

finds solutions [for] practical problems” and is “goal-oriented” to “[s]atisfy the
requirements and get the job done on time and within budget.”
25
Bachelor’s degrees in engineering include U.S. citizens or permanent residents only. All percentages in
the column reflected statistics in 2019 and are my calculations based on numbers in Table SHED-5, which
is provided alongside the following source: National Science Board, "Higher Education in Science and
Engineering," 2022.
26
All percentages in the column reflected statistics in 2019 and are my calculations based on numbers in
Table NC-EST2019-ASR6H, which is provided alongside the following source: Unites States Census Bureau,
"2019 Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin," 2020.
27
Glorioso and Hill, Introduction to Engineering, 1975, 3; Kosky et al., Exploring Engineering, 2016, 3-4;
Mazumder, Introduction to Engineering, 2016, 25-26; Moaveni, Engineering Fundamentals, 2016, 3; Eide
et al., Engineering Fundamentals & Problem Solving, 2018, 1, 4; Walesh, Engineering Your Future: The
Professional Practice of Engineering, 2012, 3.
7
 Having a firm background in mathematics and scientific laws and principles.

Specifically, engineering involves mathematical modeling and the communication
of “knowledge in the form of variables, numbers, and units.”
 Designing, developing, and creating new products and systems and being “at the
forefront of cutting-edge technology.”
Note that although the above textbooks may discuss interactive skills, qualitative factors
in systematic thinking, as well as engineering ethics and social responsibility, the items
that I enumerate here are predominant and prioritized in that they are brought up often
earlier than the other qualities in the characterizations of engineers. It is clear that
engineering at present is less likely to make an outright devotion only to quantitative
efficiency, as was articulated by the Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia from the 1910s.
Contemporary engineering, however, by consolidating the above three items—problem-
solving, the superiority of numbers, and the design and creation of new technologies—
into a conceptual and actionable whole, has presumed quantitative efficiency
(“numbers”) to be the ideal type (or role model) of its particular means (“problem-
solving”) for the prescribed goals of measuring and turning out new technologies (“at
the forefront of cutting-edge technology”). To the extent that numbers, problem-
solving, and technological progress are no longer the only focal points of engineering,
and yet continue to assert primacy, they become unspoken institutional norms.
In this regard, whereas the dominant representation of technology as “new,” “latest,”

and “advanced,” as I discussed earlier, implies a technological choice and has been an
indistinct example of technology of technology, the dominant rendering of engineering
often presents a conspicuous case of technology of technology. Dominant practice of
engineering elevates the preference for certain technological choices to a systematic,
methodological undertaking for efficiently maintaining and enforcing such choices and,
in this sense, amounts to a specialized subset of technology concerned with efficiency.
The rest of my dissertation will engage in similar conversations and deconstruct the
dominant ideas of engineering through these lenses.
Research Background and Intellectual Context
A Reflection on My Engineering Education Experiences in College
My project started out as a personal dissatisfaction with how limited and narrowly
focused my own engineering education experiences had been. I spent many sleepless
nights working on solutions to engineering problems that are theoretical and
8
unrealistically simplified. For one notable example, when I was in my senior year of
college, I worked in an emerging subfield of communications engineering called
molecular communications as my undergraduate research. Unlike traditional
communications systems, which utilize electromagnetic waves (e.g. coaxial cables and
Wi-Fi) or light (e.g. optical fibers) to transmit information, molecular communications
employs different numbers or concentrations of molecules to carry data. In my
understanding, molecular communications is most suitable for microscale and
nanoscale artificial devices that need to communicate with each other in a closed, fluid
environment like within human bodies. While applications of molecular communications
were not unimaginable, during my undergraduate research, I doubted that such
technology was at all practical. And even if it could have been practical, I suspected
there was no real need for having a technology like this, not to mention that having tiny
automata implanted into bodies and able to communicate autonomously was to me, at
best, a creepy idea.
However, my concern about the practicality and implications of molecular

communications did not lead me to discontinue my undergraduate research. After
sifting through many papers in molecular communications, I found most research
unacceptably impractical in engineering terms. In particular, many studies I surveyed
explored the theoretically maximum rates of information that can be transmitted
reliably over a given set-up of molecular communications environments.
Communications engineers call such an upper bound of achievable information rates
the “channel capacity” of a communication channel. My reservation was that any
devices that are able to get close to theoretical maximum capacity would be very
complicated. The real problem, in my opinion, was that a nanoscale (or perhaps
microscale) device could not possess the required computational power, so any talk of
channel capacity made no sense to me.28
As it turned out, my concern over molecular communications was translated into an

engineer’s response: I did not question if we really need molecular communications to
be used for hypothetical nanoscale automata to communicate within human bodies, or
question whether the development of such technology is ethically sound. My
undergraduate research ended up proposing creative, low-energy ways to more
realistically transmit data, and yet the environments that I used for molecular
28
My discontent with the researches I wanted to critique were euphemized in Shih et al., "Channel Codes
for Mitigating Intersymbol Interference in Diffusion-Based Molecular Communications," 2012, 4228; Shih
et al., "Channel Codes for Reliability Enhancement in Molecular Communication," 2013, 857.
9
communications had to be unrealistically simplified and set up in order to make reliable

communication by molecules possible.
My design was welcomed and well received by my undergraduate research advisors for
two reasons. First, I proved that my design was far superior to a number of famous
designs—quantitatively better in terms of one single measurement, known as bit error
rates (BERs), for communication performance. Second, I was able to model the design’s
theoretical performance with a close-formed mathematical expression that can predict
BERs. According to one of my advisors, arriving at a close-formed mathematical
expression is generally considered difficult but most desirable in communications
engineering. While my reservations about the practicality of molecular communications
remained, my paper was accepted by a top journal in communications engineering.29
My other advisor happily commented that he would be promoted in his institution if he
had two first-author papers in the same journal under his belt. He also added that my
publications as an undergraduate student were “very powerful” (超威的) and that I
could easily apply to top engineering graduate schools in the United States.
My career transition from communications engineering into science and technology

studies (STS), an interdisciplinary field that has inspired this dissertation, was another
story, but my journey and recognized achievements in engineering at least show that
engineering in college (and arguably beyond) could easily become blind to the purposes
and social responsibilities for the technology it purports to design and create. Moreover,
my experience demonstrates that, by disregarding and circumventing substantive
questions about the ends of technology, engineering gets completely engrossed in the
judgment about technological means and making improvements on technologies. And
the curious thing about these technical judgments and technological improvements is
that their criteria are most conveniently based on quantity. And quantity translates into
superiority and power—in terms of both my molecular communications paper being
accepted by a top journal and myself being considered a “powerful” candidate for top
engineering graduate schools. Associations like this tend to reproduce what I will call the
enduring historical-conceptual structures of engineering, consisting of elements like
quantity and power that have not only dominated the field but also mutually reinforced
each other and made the predominant ideas and practice of engineering more difficult
to challenge.
29
See Shih et al., "Channel Codes for Reliability Enhancement in Molecular Communication," 2013.
10
Engineering Education Research and Engineering Studies
Research seeking to more or less deconstruct and challenge dominant ideas and
practices of engineering, including those in engineering education and the
interdisciplinary area of engineering studies, has recognized a number of individual
elements that dominate contemporary engineering. Drawing from a large pile of
relevant literature, these include, among others:
 Power, hierarchies, and stereotypes that are often associated with masculinity and
are hegemonic and subjugating minorities30
 Machines, computers (and programming), materials (e.g. “nuts and bolts”),
technological innovation, advanced technologies, etc., often disregard people and
communications31
 Problem-solving and fixing: putting the pursuit of technical means above questions
about their ends and purposes, as well as the uncritical pursuit and attainment of
goals and outcomes given by others32
 Quantity and efficiency often serve as metrics for technological progress and the
basis for sociotechnical control33
30
Hacker, "The Culture of Engineering: Woman, Workplace and Machine," 1981; Cockburn, Machinery of
Dominance: Women, Men, and Technical Know-How, 1988; Hacker, Pleasure, Power, and Technology,
1992 [1989]; Hacker et al., Doing It the Hard Way: Investigations of Gender and Technology, 1990;
McIlwee and Robinson, Women in Engineering, 1992; Mellström, Engineering Lives: Technology, Time and
Space in a Male-Centred World, 1995; Faulkner, "Dualisms, Hierarchies and Gender in Engineering," 2000;
Kunda, Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation, 2006; Tonso, On the
Outskirts of Engineering, 2007; Lagesen and Sørensen, "The Enactment of the Social/Technical Binary in
Software Engineering," 2009; Walton et al., "Two Brief Interventions to Mitigate a 'Chilly Climate'
Transform Women’s Experience, Relationships, and Achievement in Engineering," 2015.
31
Hacker, "The Culture of Engineering: Woman, Workplace and Machine," 1981; Cockburn, Machinery of
Dominance: Women, Men, and Technical Know-How, 1988; Mellström, Engineering Lives: Technology,
Time and Space in a Male-Centred World, 1995; Faulkner, "`Nuts and Bolts and People'," 2007;
Ensmenger, The Computer Boys Take Over, 2010; Bix, "Mastering the Hard Stuff: The History of College
Concrete-Canoe Races and the Growth of Engineering Competition Culture," 2019; Vinsel and Russell, The
Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has Disrupted the Work That Matters Most, 2020.
32
Downey, "Are Engineers Losing Control of Technology?," 2005; Riley, "Aiding and Abeting: The
Bankruptcy of Outcomes-Based Education as a Change Strategy," 2012; Riley, "We've Been Framed! Ends,
Means, and the Ethics of the Grand(Iose) Challenges," 2012; Jonassen, "Engineers as Problem Solvers,"
2014; Downey, "Pds: Engineering as Problem Definition and Solution," 2015.
33
Downey, "Low Cost, Mass Use," 2007; Alexander, The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social
Control, 2008; Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, 1995.
11
 Inborn (as opposed to acquired) ability: talent, gifts, endowments, genius,

brilliance, etc.34
 Competition, meritocracy, selectivity, rigor, performance, the individuality of work,
etc.35
However, I have not been aware of any research or writing that identifies all these
dominant elements in engineering and at the same time attempts to investigate how
they are all interrelated and mutually reinforcing and form a coherent structure of
pervasive concepts and forceful activities, making dominant engineering practice as a
whole more difficult to challenge and deconstruct and more liable to restrict changes,
reforms, and other possibilities.36 For example, Sally Hacker’s various works provided
first-hand feminist insights and critical lenses into how oppressive and disempowering
engineering was being taught and assessed in college. While her path-breaking works
remain influential in encouraging and inspiring my own writing, many phenomena she
identified (and many of them anecdotal) were parallel and yet lacked substantive
accounts of their connections or interactions.37
A significant part of my dissertation aims to fill this gap and build upon former works by
weaving together isolated pieces identified by previous authors and by showing how
34
McGee and Martin, "Stereotype Management among Academically Successful Black Mathematics and
Engineering Students," 2011; Meyer et al., "Women Are Underrepresented in Fields Where Success Is
Believed to Require Brilliance," 2015; Storage et al., "The Frequency of “Brilliant” and “Genius” in
Teaching Evaluations Predicts the Representation of Women and African Americans across Fields," 2016;
Canning et al., "Stem Faculty Who Believe Ability Is Fixed Have Larger Racial Achievement Gaps and
Inspire Less Student Motivation in Their Classes," 2019.
35
Reed et al., "Engineering as Lifestyle and a Meritocracy of Difficulty: Two Pervasive Beliefs among
Engineering Students and Their Possible Effects," 2007; Slaton, Race, Rigor, and Selectivity in U.S.
Engineering, 2010; Riley, "Rigor/Us: Building Boundaries and Disciplining Diversity with Standards of
Merit," 2017; Seron et al., "“I Am Not a Feminist, But. . .”: Hegemony of a Meritocratic Ideology and the
Limits of Critique among Women in Engineering," 2018; Bix, "Mastering the Hard Stuff: The History of
College Concrete-Canoe Races and the Growth of Engineering Competition Culture," 2019; Chandra Anne
et al., "Examining How Engineering Educators Produce, Reproduce, or Challenge Meritocracy and
Technocracy in Pedagogical Reasoning," 2019; Rohde et al., "Anyone, but Not Everyone: Undergraduate
Engineering Students’ Claims of Who Can Do Engineering," 2020.
36
The closest works that I think have identified all these elements and pointed to some connections and
interactions include: Riley, Engineering and Social Justice, 2008; Slaton, Race, Rigor, and Selectivity in U.S.
Engineering, 2010; Seron et al., "“I Am Not a Feminist, But. . .”: Hegemony of a Meritocratic Ideology and
the Limits of Critique among Women in Engineering," 2018.
37
E.g. Hacker, "The Culture of Engineering: Woman, Workplace and Machine," 1981; Hacker, "Doing It the
Hard Way," 1985; Hacker, Pleasure, Power, and Technology, 1992 [1989]; Hacker, "Discipline and Pleasure
in Engineering," 1992.
12
these individual elements nevertheless coproduce the structure of dominant

engineering practice that they knew of and critiqued in parts. My point of departure
from early feminism-inspired works and, more recently, from studies that interrogate
whiteness and blackness in engineering is to propose a social theory of how dominant
systems of engineering reproduce and endure with their interlocking material and
ideological components: critical times, machine, quantitative power, visible (and often
binary) superiority, and ingenuity (and genius), etc. Note that in my analysis, these
elements are concurrent, and none of them is necessarily the precursor to the others—a
position that is somewhat different from the realist assumption that technical
superiority antecedes social authority in technical practice.38 Since correlations among
these mutually-reinforcing elements provide a firm basis for the overall system to be
provincial, uncritical, exclusionary, and self-aggrandizing, dominant engineering not only
is prone to prevail, expand, and exert influence on other non-technical areas, but may
also hinder alternatives of knowledge and practice and limit wider and more diverse
participation.39
Equally significantly, I attempt to demonstrate that systems of dominant engineering

can persist without masculinity or whiteness. This statement can be understood on two
different levels. First, while some elements in engineering, such as power, machine,
competition, and genius, may be traditionally masculine, others like rigor, efficiency,
38
For example, while Ann Johnson observed that social and technical authority of technological
knowledge were “two sides of the same coin,” technical authority appears to be the precursor to the
social one, as superiority is “socially constructed, within [technical] constraints.” On the one hand,
technology that works is the upmost criteria to establish its reliability and hence technical authority. On
the other hand, such authority on technological superiority exerts hegemonic control over other
knowledge claims and, with power struggles and a confluences of interests, produce social authority.
Ontologically, this position suggests that authority of technology has a technical origin before social
authority is acquired. Similarly, in Habermas’s social theory, purposive “knowhow” measured by efficacy
was the earliest kind of rationality in human history, a source of power for individuals to induce another
person’s readiness to follow without brute force. See Johnson, "Revisiting Technology as Knowledge,"
2005, 569-570; Habermas, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 1987, 181-182, 193-
194.
39
For example, it is unsurprising to realize that despite the seeming broadening of the engineering
curriculum, at its core is still technical problem solving (usually through mathematics), suggesting that the
growing breadth of engineering education fails to challenge the demarcation between core and
periphery, and that concerns over engineering’s functions to serve humanity become merely a public
relations exercise. See critiques from Downey, "Pds: Engineering as Problem Definition and Solution,"
2015, 442-444; Riley, Engineering and Social Justice, 2008, v-vi.
13
quantity, and problem-solving appear less so.40 Second, the relationships and
interactions among these elements, which reinforce one another and strengthen their
ties to the exclusion of other potential elements and relationships, are not
fundamentally masculine or whiteness. The contextual, seemingly value-neutral way of
accumulating and consolidating resources is favorable to and characteristic of
sociotechnical systems that are closed, powerful, and self-reproducing and is therefore
susceptible to any political power grabs, including but not limited to those historically
obtained by men, white people, (post-)colonialism, etc. Take my aforementioned
“achievement” in molecular communications as an example. It follows that in order to
introduce infrastructural reform and change, in addition to challenging the ways in
which quantitative superiority and power each individually constitute and contribute to
the system of dominant engineering, we must call into question their network effects
and partisanship—e.g. how quantitative superiority leads to power and vice versa—that
sustain and argument the system.
My second point of departure from most works in engineering education research (and
from some works in engineering studies) is that the presentation of their research
findings appears timeless and devoid of context, much like research outcomes typically
from engineering and science. Not only do quantitative methods dominate engineering
education research41 and derive deductive numerical relations and models that evaluate
a theory of (significant) correlations and describe what things generally are in a law-like
manner based on a spatiotemporal section of an ongoing historical process. Moreover,
many of the subfields of engineering education research—quantitative and qualitative
alike—aim to deliver “theories,” “frameworks,” “approaches,” “method(ologie)s,”
“ways,” “(best) practices,” “use,” “science,” “nature,” “models,” and “current states” of
certain topics.42 Despite varying contexts of education, these keywords give the
impression that knowledge and techniques in engineering education may be universal
and apply indistinctively.
40
Note how terms like brilliance and genius are associated with males and masculine: Leslie et al.,
"Expectations of Brilliance Underlie Gender Distributions across Academic Disciplines," 2015; Meyer et al.,
"Women Are Underrepresented in Fields Where Success Is Believed to Require Brilliance," 2015; Storage
et al., "The Frequency of “Brilliant” and “Genius” in Teaching Evaluations Predicts the Representation of
Women and African Americans across Fields," 2016.
41
Borrego et al., "Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Research Methods in Engineering Education,"
2009; Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas, "State of Qualitative Research in Engineering Education: Meta-Analysis
of Jee Articles, 2005-2006," 2008.
42
These keywords are taken (and when applicable, put in plural forms) from the chapter titles of Johri and
Olds, ed., Cambridge Handbook of Engineering Education Research, 2014.
14
The tendency of engineering education research to apply the state-of-the-art techniques

and knowledge to better understand and teach engineering education, in effect, serves
the status quo and hinders more radical changes from within, as long as it does not
consider the sociohistorical context and philosophical questions that shape the very
activities of engineering and its education, and as a result, becomes a closed system
uncritical of its own sociotechnical and ideological foundations. One desirable remedy
and starting point for critical engagement, as shown by scholars including Gary Downey,
Donna Riley, and Matthew Wisnioski, is to draw from or carry out works in social
science, history, and philosophy in order to deconstruct dominant engineering practice,
identify alternatives, and formulate effective strategies for reform.43 My dissertation
sets out to propose theories and practice and contribute to these bodies of literature to
ultimately engage with engineering and engineering education.
History and Philosophy of Engineering
While my dissertation has a practical end geared toward discourse and policy changes
for better engineering practice and education, its inner cores nonetheless address
simultaneously the shortcomings and difficulties of the existing literature on the history
and philosophy of technology and engineering.
1. From a Material History to the History of Ideas
My dissertation shifts the focus of historical research from the material achievements
and the specific ideas about inventions to the general concepts and normative content
of technology and engineering. Historical accounts of evidence of early “engineering”
have predominantly been on extant constructions—cities, temples, aqueducts, canals,
tombs (e.g. pyramids and the Treasury of Atreus), and defense works (e.g. the Great
Wall of China)—that are “visible technology” in nature and ascribed them to the
43
E.g. Downey, "Are Engineers Losing Control of Technology?," 2005; Downey, "The Normative Contents
of Engineering Formation," 2014; Downey, "Pds: Engineering as Problem Definition and Solution," 2015;
Riley, Engineering and Social Justice, 2008; Wisnioski, "What's the Use? History and Engineering Education
Research," 2015.
15
contribution of “engineers.” This is common for engineer-historians44 and engineering

textbook authors45 but is also notable in writings from the humanities.46 However, as
pointed out by classical scholars, it amounts to an anachronism to call these ancient
builders “engineers” or “architects.”47 Calling these activities “engineering” is something
that should be explained and established rather than taken for granted.48
My research, on the other hand, builds multiple connections between all these linguistic
references through linguistic philosophy and etymological studies on the ancient text.
By looking for linguistic evidence as reflections of ideas, the fruit of my inquiries through
languages is to be able to portray evolving lineages of ideas about engineering. The
dissertation, in effect, attempts to significantly extend our known history of ideas of
engineering, including what we refer to as “engineering cultures” and the “normative
contents of engineering formation,”49 to Ancient Greek and Roman times. It goes
beyond a sketch of engineering to be etymologically “the Latin ingenera, meaning to
implant, generate or produce” or saying that “[i]n the late Middle Ages it was linked to
the making and operating of military hardware.”50 Returning the voice to ancient
authors, the dissertation debunks that early engineering was simply “plain know-how,”
“imperial civil service,” and “value-neutral,” or that its practitioners “[were] not
responsible for the organization or use of [their] work.”51
Unbeknownst to me until I plowed through much of this dissertation, the line of my

inquiries both resembles and complements Eric Schatzberg’s recent book Technology:
Critical History of a Concept in 2018. While much can be said about our similarities,
there are substantial differences that set us apart. Most apparently, Schatzberg’s work
revolves around technology, and mine is centered on engineering. But the concepts of
technology and engineering are evidently connected in our present time. Untangling
44
E.g. Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876; Watkins, "The Beginnings of Engineering," 1891;
Forbes, Man the Maker: A History of Technology and Engineering, 1950; Finch, Engineering and Western
Civilization, 1951; Garrison, A History of Engineering and Technology: Artful Methods, 1999.
45
E.g. Wright, Introduction to Engineering, 2002; Oakes and Leone, Engineering Your Future, 2018.
46
E.g. Armytage, A Social History of Engineering, 1961; Landels, Engineering in the Ancient World, 1978.
47
Procopius, Procopius Vol. 7: Buildings, 1971, xiv.
48
See, for example, a comparable question about conflating chemistry and alchemy: Newman and
Principe, "Alchemy Vs. Chemistry: The Etymological Origins of a Historiographic Mistake," 1998.
49
Downey, "Location, Knowledge, and Desire," 2011; Downey, "The Normative Contents of Engineering
Formation," 2014.
50
Meijers, "General Introduction," 2009, 3.
51
Goodman, New Reformation: Notes of a Neolithic Conservative, 2010, 63.
16
each of them and clarifying their relations prove necessary for my project.52 For the part
of technology, I insist on etymological linkages to establish interchangeability between
referents of different words. Whereas Schatzberg included arts (and Latin ars) in his
treatise on technology and, as a matter of course, incorporated art in general and
mechanical arts from the Middle Ages into the lineage of the concept of technology, my
approach has been fixated on the word technology and its Ancient Greek etymons
techne (τέχνη), technologos (τεχνολόγος), and technologia (τεχνολογία).
There are certain advantages of paying close attention to technology. Schatzberg took
the position that “there is no direct path from ancient ideas about techne to our
modern concept of technology.” He insisted that “[c]oncepts have no origins for
historians to uncover, nor do they contain essences to be revealed.”53 I respectfully
disagree. If concepts are more or less reflected in the use of languages, then extant text
on technology from Ancient Greece to our modern time gives us invaluable clues as to
several paths in which an idea or concept has probably developed as well as their
credible, documented origins; to deny these is to reject the whole project of any
etymology.
My research complements Schatzberg’s work by addressing his observation that

“[t]here was no concept of technology before the nineteenth century, despite the
existence of things, institutions, and forms of knowledge that were clearly technological
under present-day definitions.” Such a statement is only paradoxically true—by today’s
narrow definition of technology, there was hardly a notion in the past that was
comparable in scope and depth to that of technology at present. But was there “no
concept of technology,” if we return the voice of what technology actually meant to the
actors in the past since Ancient Greece? Chapter 2 of the dissertation dedicates to a
linguistic-conceptual history of technology as what I call “meta-techne” from Ancient
Greece up until the late nineteenth century. Despite several ways to employ technology,
for religious and secular proposes alike, there was an underlying theme that they all
interrogated the meanings of technology as meta-techne, until the term was
increasingly appropriated to refer to industrial arts in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
52
For Schatzberg, engineering appears nothing more than a vehicle for understanding the dynamics of
technology. This is further corroborated by the fact that engineering is not a keyword in the index.
53
Schatzberg, Technology: Critical History of a Concept, 2018, 16.
17
On the other hand, I discuss Ancient Greek techne in a similar way in Chapter 3 and
remedy Schatzberg’s treatment of the same subject, which I think is both linguistically
and philosophically insufficient.54 For example, he correctly recognized the significance
of Heidegger’s reworking of classical Greek techne for contemporary discourse on
technology and, through citing others’ works, pointed out Heidegger’s pitfalls for
neglecting important parts of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.55 A first-hand knowledge
and close reading of Ancient Greek philosophers would, however, profitably contribute
to that conversation by questioning what Heidegger may have concealed in his
purported appreciation of Greek techne.56
2. Bringing Military Engineering to the History of Technology
My dissertation sets out to trace the historical ideas of engineering back to antiquity as
far as linguistic evidence I have may allow. Whereas concepts may not have definite
origins in the sense that such origins “determined” or “begot” subsequent
developments (e.g. think about the “origin” of species), uncovering the origins of a
concept is nothing more than discovering an archeological site or finding an early use of
a word. My ultimate interest resides in their anthropological import and what it means
to the present.
As will be demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, my findings of the dominance of military

engineering and the accompanying concepts of quantity and binary in the choice of
technology in ancient times rectify two bodies of scholarly literature. The first one
concerns the anthropological meanings of technology in relation to nature. On the one
hand, philosophers from Ancient Greece to modern times have repeatedly presented
the genesis of technology (and techniques) as a turning point when humanity began to
pit its wits against nature.57 On the other, authors in line with ecofeminism and
environmental movements recounted the persistent, irreversible damages to nature as
a result of the rationality and mentality of science, technology, and engineering that
54
Compare my discussion of techne in Chapter 3 with Schatzberg, Technology: Critical History of a
Concept, 2018, 16-26.
55
Schatzberg, Technology: Critical History of a Concept, 2018, 17, 23.
56
See my discussion of Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” in footnote 295 of Chapter 3.
57
E.g. Mesthene, "Technology and Wisdom," 1972, 109-110; Simon, "Pursuit of Happiness and Lust for
Power in Technological Society," 1972, 173. Ancient authors who shared similar views include Demades of
Athens (c. 380–c. 318 BCE) and Aristotle. See footnotes 394 and 395 and corresponding passages in
between in Chapter 3.
18
exploited the environment and marked the Anthropocene.58 To these works, my writing
wishes to add that throughout history, there have also been paralleling techniques and
inventions whose nature is to inflict violence on or bring trouble to fellow humans. Such
are the topics in Chapter 3.
The second body of the literature that my work converses with pertains to the grand
narrative of technological change whose bottom-line is often to relive our recent
memory and common experience that modern technology poses a threat to humanity,
often paradoxically. In pondering over similar questions, a few notable philosophers and
historians, to a large extent, assumed that technology of an oppressive, authoritarian,
and narrow-minded nature is a recent development belonging distinctly to our age and,
either directly or indirectly, may run the risk of eulogizing ancient technology as “more
humane.” For example, when Hannah Arendt spoke of machines, she was referring to
modern machinery that “demand[s] that the laborer serve them … [and] has replaced
the rhythm of the human body” since “the beginning of the modern age.”59 Nathan
Rotenstreich presumed it is a modern phenomenon that military and bureaucratic
technology is “in the service of death and power” because of the emergence of the
mutual shaping of technology and politics in modern times. His stance implied his
“constitutive logic” of technology and its “technical-utilitarian yardstick” were once
separated from politics and governance in antiquity.60
Moreover, when Lewis Mumford introduced his concept of “monotechnics,” a stand-in

for technology that “boasts of effacing … the technical achievements of earlier periods,”
he qualified the notion by saying that it is the “the modern mode of monotechnics”
drawing from “scientific intelligence and quantitative production.”61 In contrast,
Mumford also suggested that “technics has never till our own age dissociated itself from
the larger cultural whole in which man, as man, has always functioned” and that “[a]t its
point of origin, technics [or Greek techne] was related to the whole nature of man …
58
E.g. Merchant, The Death of Nature, 1980; Marine, America the Raped: The Engineering Mentality and
the Devastation of a Continent, 1969.
59
Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, 144-153, esp. 147-148.
60
Rotenstreich, "Technology and Politics," 1967, 212, 200. Rotenstreich’s understanding of the
relationship of technology and politics was largely influenced by how he defined the prototypes of
technology and politics and categorized them as separate realms: technology concerns the use and
conquest of the nature and represents relations between human and nature, while politics concerns
social organization and belongs purely to the human domain.
61
Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, 1970, 140, 155.
19
was broadly life-centered, not work-centered or power-centered.”62 Similarly, Albert

Borgmann said, “[t]he availability of mere means is itself a remarkable and
consequential fact. Historically, it is just in modern technology that such devices become
available.”63 And lastly, Carl Mitcham noted that “[t]raditional or premodern
technologies seldom if ever place much stress on efficiency of operation, not only
because there is seldom a method for calculating efficiency in any systematic manner,
but also because the technical activity is taken as having some inherent value.”64
My dissertation demonstrates that, throughout the corpus of Ancient Greek and Latin
writings, there were countless references to technology and machines that were cast in
a sinister light. The idea of technology was not altogether innocent. As early as in
Homer’s Odyssey (ca. the 8th or 7th century BCE), Greek techne was associated with
crafty wile (δολίης τέχνης, 4.455) and tricks (τέχνας and τέχνῃσι, 8.327 and 8.332). In the
works of Xenophon and Plato, techne was also connected with war, flattery, and
deception.65 Similar technologies which created controversies called for reasoning about
their moral consequences and the conditions for their use to reconcile and navigate
their discordant and sometimes conflicting social functions. For example, when it comes
to warfare, western classical philosophers, like their Eastern contemporaries, took a
stance on when to rightfully employ military forces.66 The divergence in the
technologies and the goals they served went hand in hand with collective judgments
and actions on technology that were inherently political in character. Power and
authority, therefore, permeated even some of the most primitive techniques, so long as
62
Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development, 1967, 9. It is curious that
Mumford used another term “megamachine” to denote metaphorically any top-down, all-encompassing
sociopolitical order (e.g. that created by kingship) that enables its (often ancient) ruler to impose
regimented social control and coordinate resources and labor to build large-scale infrastructure and
public works. Megamachine has the sense of our present “state apparatus.” The technics derived from a
megamachine is called “megatechnics,” which is more narrowly-focused than “the more modest and
diversified modes of technology” (p. 189) but what he conveyed here was certainly not monotechnics.
Underling all these distinctions reveals that Mumford did not include military technology, authoritarian
social organizations, or monotechnics in ancient technics (or technology).
63
Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 1984, 10.
64
Mitcham, Thinking through Technology, 1994, 259.
65
See footnote 680.
66
For example, Plato. See Hobbs, "Plato on War," 2007, 177-180; Syse, "Plato: The Necessity of War, the
Quest for Peace," 2002, 39-40. Somewhat in contrast, Chinese classical philosophers, including Laozi,
Confucius, and Mengzi, either opposed the use of military forces altogether or described that divine
retribution may fall on the communities and commanders that use military force. See Confucius,
Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, 1960, 254; Laozi, Tao Te Ching, 1989,
32-33; Mencius, Mencius, 1970, 80, 194-195.
20
such techniques entail the coordination of social activities, as in the cases of hunting,
fishing, and sailing.67
On the other hand, the idea of machine is etymologically derived from Ancient Greek
μηχανή and Latin machina. Modern machinery found to be demoralizing has its
counterpart in antiquity: military machines and siege engines whose primary purpose
was to storm a city by force and wreak havoc on other human beings. Machine, in these
senses, was a technology of the most devastating kind. Ancient military authors who
narrowly focused on belligerent machines and neglected the human cost of warfare
would boast about the power and efficiency of their military inventions, often in binary
and quantitative terms, and present them as “mere means” (in Borgmann’s words) that
were useful in instrumental terms and easily transferable to the hands of anyone else.
As we will see in the passages about Archimedes’s unusual achievements in military

inventions (in Chapter 3), the extraordinary accolades given to the genius of Archimedes
by Ancient Greek and Latin authors present an anthropologically meaningful case,
where the conflicts among human communities and the binary life-or-death brought by
warfare provided grounds for the merit-based, narrowly-focused disposition of
technology that was precedent for today’s high technology and dominant engineering
practice. I will show sociotechnical backgrounds like these—in terms of what Borgmann
called “the antecedent and enabling conditions of thought, discourse, and argument”—
were (and still are) conducive to power-hungry technical development. Philosophy that
undertakes social analysis and critique of technology, in Borgmann’s view, “is not
concerned with theory in the sense of a steady view of the world but with metatheory,
the conditions of visibility” for certain worldviews and formal normativity of
technological practice.68 In addressing the questions of Carl Mitcham and Robert
Mackey decades ago regarding the “historical origin of [what Mumford called]
monotechnics,” my line of inquiry is not how could diversified, life-oriented
technologies “ever have degenerated into monotechnics.”69 The evidence I accumulated
shows that monotechnics have coexisted with humane technologies since antiquity and
that its origin might well be owing to high-stake human conflict in warfare.
67
Udy, Organization of Work, 1959, 67-68, 87-88, 91; Engels, "On Authority," 1978 [1874], 732.
68
Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 1984, 6-7.
69
Mitcham and Mackey, "Introduction: Technology as a Philosophical Problem," 1972, 6.
21
3. Engineering and Technology Relationships
Philosophers and historians of technology have long engaged with the relationships
between science and technology. The frequent target they zeroed in on was the
characterization of technology as “applied science.”70 Early critics of this view presented
a spectrum of responses. For Andrew G. van Melsen, a corollary of the mutual
dependence between knowing and doing is that there is “no physical science which is a
purely cognitive activity, just as there is no technique which is purely a manipulation of
reality.” It is therefore inaccurate (and paradoxically correct and incorrect) to say
technology is applied science.71 James K. Feibleman argued that whereas applied
science is theories oriented toward practical ends, technology is the concrete way of
specifically applying theories and is distinct from applied science.72 Joseph Agassi and
Henryk Skolimowski made similar distinctions between applied science and technology,
though their points of reference for technology were different. Agassi considered
technology to be invention that is measured by “practical success” in the complexity of
the material world. While applied science is “an exercise in deduction,” invention is like
“finding a needle in a haystack” by design, implementation, and testing.73 Skolimowski,
on the other hand, represented technology as procedures of technical problem solving
that are “extremely selective” about what is useful for a specific problem situation. In
terms of “progress,” if science expands our knowledge base through devising better
theories, technology increase “effectiveness in at least one [objectively-measurable]
aspect” through the creation of new means or artifacts.74
Contemporary philosophers also took up and elaborated on the question of science and
technology relationships. To pinpoint what technology is, Borgmann turned to the
underlying patterns of modern technology that enlist scientific knowledge as “a
necessary condition” for technological progress. His view is not dissimilar to van
Melsen’s conceptualization of “technological order,” or the collective, large stores of
technical possibilities that draw on the applications of science and repurpose them for
70
For an early philosophical perspective on how technology is applied science, see Mario Bunge’s articles:
Bunge, "Technology as Applied Science," 1966; Bunge, "Toward a Philosophy of Technology," 1972.
71
van Melsen, Science and Technology, 1961, 84.
72
Feibleman, "Pure Science, Applied Science, and Technology: An Attempt at Definitions," 1972.
73
Agassi, "The Confusion between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science," 1966,
348.
74
Skolimowski, "The Structure of Thinking in Technology," 1966, 373, 377.
22
novel goals.75 Joseph Pitt, in a pragmatic, community-based approach to knowledge,

posited that “what is to count as knowledge is determined by our [collective] ability to
act successfully on that knowledge,” and since the purpose of knowledge is action,
science is in a sense a technology for such goal.76 Considering historical evidence, Pitt
adopted a dialectical approach that blurred the boundary of science and technology and
deconstructed their common definitions, an undertaking that echoed what Otto Mayr
did two decades ago in history of technology.77 Perhaps one final nail in the coffin of the
science and technology distinctions was Ronald Kline’s painstaking historical work on
the dynamic construction of “technology” as “applied science.” Through the voices of
scientists and engineers, he showed that the increasingly-popular designation before
1945 was a product of “boundary work” and status-seeking from participants.78
Generally, among all existing literature on science and technology relationships, most
works implicitly conflate engineering and technology and, in particular, inattentively
designate engineering (and its related concept, industry) to represent technology. For
example, Otto Mayr partly located the relationship between science and technology in
“scientists and engineers, who have a personal stake in the interpretation of the
relationship” as well as the “interactions between the theoretical understanding of
nature and the inventions and techniques of the industry.”79 When Edwin Layton
described “the scientific revolution in technology” and “the communities of science and
technology,” the technology his paper focused on was “civil, mechanical, and electrical
engineering” in relation to physical sciences.80 Similarly, Ronald Kline, in clarifying the
dynamic relationships between science and technology, relied on engineers to speak
about the conceptualization of technology.81 Paul Forman, in particular, picked up
75
Cf. Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 1984, 33-37; van Melsen, Science
and Technology, 1961, 261-262.
76
Pitt, Thinking About Technology, 2000, 1-9.
77
Cf. Pitt, Thinking About Technology, 2000, 5-6; Mayr, "The Science-Technology Relationship as a
Historiographic Problem," 1976, 664-669.
78
Ronald, "Construing "Technology" as "Applied Science": Public Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in
the United States, 1880-1945," 1995.
79
Mayr, "The Science-Technology Relationship as a Historiographic Problem," 1976, 663-664.
80
Layton, "Mirror-Image Twins," 1971, 562. In the same page, Layton was aware that there are other
“technologies” corresponding to “chemistry, biology, geology, and other sciences,” and clearly these
technologies do not need to be engineering. Still, his view of technology was limited to the counterpart of
natural science and his paper about technology did not go beyond engineering.
81
Ronald, "Construing "Technology" as "Applied Science": Public Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in
the United States, 1880-1945," 1995.
23
Layton and Kline on their presentation of primary sources. He argued that their
evidence decisively showed—not that engineers were self-interested or status-seeking
when presenting their fields as “applied science” like Layton or Kline asserted—but that,
unequivocally, engineers believed in “technology’s subordinate rank and role relative to
science.” In this particular move, Forman, again, reinforced the well-trodden path that
engineering and technology are synonyms.82
While questions on “the relation between technology and engineering” were posed by
Mitcham and Mackey, now five decades ago,83 there is still a lamentable lack of
substantive discussion about the relationships between technology and engineering.
Even in such an ambitious edited book like Philosophy of Technology and Engineering
Sciences, the focus on engineering sciences seemed to exclude premodern or non-
scientific engineering practice—an inadequacy acknowledged openly by the book’s
editor, Anthonie Meijers.84 There is a general tendency among the book’s contributors
to conflate engineering and engineering science.85 The missed opportunity to distinguish
between engineering and technology further contributed to a babel of parallel
discussion about either engineering or technology. What relationships between
engineering and technology may we learn, when one leading philosopher characterizes
technology as “a (type of) artifactual, functional system with a certain degree of stability
and reproducibility” while another philosopher defines engineering as “the art of
organizing and negotiating the design, production, operation and decommissioning of
artifacts, devices, systems and processes that fulfil useful functions by transforming the
world to solve recognized problems?”86
Wherever relationships of engineering and technology are dealt with, most genres
readily portray engineers as the main contributors to (and sometimes perpetrators of)
technology. These can be taken either uncritically as a reality to celebrate or critically as
82
Forman, "The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the
History of Technology," 2007, 64-65. On this ground, Eric Schatzberg’s assessment that “Forman
simplistically equates technology and engineering” was on point, but it should also be noted that one of
Forman’s main theses—specifically, that there had been the primacy of science relative to technology
until around 1980—drew equally on accounts of social theorists and philosophers. The scope and depth of
Forman’s evidence was not limited to what engineers and industrialists said. Cf. Schatzberg, Technology:
Critical History of a Concept, 2018, 70-71.
83
Mitcham and Mackey, "Introduction: Technology as a Philosophical Problem," 1972, 7.
84
Meijers, "General Introduction," 2009, 4-5.
85
E.g. Mitcham and Schatzberg, "Defining Technology and the Engineering Sciences," 2009.
86
Meijers, "General Introduction," 2009, 5.
24
a theme to deconstruct, as in the striking difference between Samuel Florman’s The

Existential Pleasures of Engineering and Edwin Layton’s The Revolt of the Engineers.87
Even so, apparently, that engineering is believed to have molded, favorably or
unfavorably, the contours of contemporary technology continue to present an
inexhaustible stock of research questions, as in such distinct titles from Matthew
Wisnioski’s Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America to
David Channell’s The Rise of Engineering Science: How Technology Became Scientific.88
All these attest to the widespread phenomenon that engineering is a powerful

enterprise—in practice and in ideas—with regard to technology and eventually to this
world, from its influential participation in technological development and the material
world to the engineering concepts that shape (if not simply reflect) the wider discourse
on technology and our worldviews. In particular, the latter, conceptual influence of
engineering over technology and over the collective ways of social thinking was
succinctly put by Mitcham, respectively, in his coinage of “engineering philosophy of
technology” and that “[e]ngineers are the unacknowledged philosophers of the
postmodern world.”89 The conceptual contribution of technical work to philosophy, in
general, should come as no surprise. Ancient Greek philosophers, including Plato and
Aristotle, drew inspiration from the works of artisans and chief-craftsmen to provide
powerful metaphors and arguments in forming their systems of philosophy.90
My dissertation title, which suggests “engineering as technology of technology,” is no

exception to similar testimonies that engineering shapes both our technology and our
non-technical worldview. However, a significant difference inherent in my approach and
position is that rather than treating engineering and technology as separate (if not
overlapping) entities, I seek to dissect engineering practice by thinking it not as
representing technology in essence, but to be a category of technology that gains and
maintains dominance over the broad spectrum of technological practice and appears to
be both the exemplar and the prime mover of technology by and only by certain criteria
87
Compare, in particular, Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, 1976, x; Layton, The Revolt of
the Engineers, 1971, 56.
88
Cf. Wisnioski, Engineers for Change, 2012, 5-9; Channell, The Rise of Engineering Science: How
Technology Became Scientific, 2019, 3-9.
89
See, in particular, Mitcham, Thinking through Technology, 1994, 14; Mitcham, "The Importance of
Philosophy to Engineering," 1998, 42-43. Mitcham’s earliest reference to “engineering philosophy of
technology” appears to be on Mitcham, "Philosophy of Technology," 1980, 292.
90
For example, Plato’s theory of ideas (or forms) drew on woodworking of carpenters (Cratylus 389a–
390b). See also Hannah Arendt’s discussion on Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, 142-143..
Furthermore, Plato and Aristotle compared the commanding knowledge of a political ruler to the master-
art of a chief-craftsman. See footnotes 315–317 and the relevant passages.
25
and social values at work. My revisionist approach to the engineering and technology
relationship is necessarily a sociotechnical critique and provides theoretical foundations
for the first two parts of this section, “Research Background and Intellectual Context,”
where many others in engineering like me were once confounded by the narrow-
mindedness of engineering practice. The dissertation is a companion dedicated to those
who look for theoretical underpinnings to understand and deconstruct the normative
content of engineering and take action on discourse and policy changes for better
engineering practice and education.
Coincidentally, a position, such as mine, that engineering is a part or subset of

technology tends to be a critique in its own right. Let us consider the following three
examples from Steven Goldman, Ann Johnson, and Ashley Shew. For Steven Goldman,
technology is social and political in character. Technology, so to speak, is “a decision-
dominated rather than a (technical) knowledge-dominated process” that entails
“institution-specific executive decisions that apply technical knowledge selectively to
the accomplishment of managerial agendas.”91 Engineering, in comparison, is
simultaneously an element of technology and a technological action that contributes,
self-referentially, to technology. Because engineering, “through technology, is directly
implicated in changing the world,” engineering as a part of technology is similarly
subject to any influences and decisions that shape technological process.92
Goldman’s conceptual frameworks and insights allow us to identify that engineering, in

particular, is93
captive to social determinants of technological action that selectively exploit

engineering expertise, define the problems engineers are to address as well as
the terms of acceptable solutions, and shape the technical knowledge available
at any time by influencing educational curricula and the direction of research
and development initiatives.
The engineering profession is nothing more than one of the many players in technology.
As Goldman indicated paradoxically, “[t]echnological action is a social process in which
engineers participate rather than something that engineers do.”94 On the one hand, his
position implied that while engineering is shaped by institutional context, the relation is
91
Goldman, "The Social Captivity of Engineering," 1991, 122; Goldman, "Philosophy, Engineering, and
Western Culture," 1990, 125.
92
Goldman, "Philosophy, Engineering, and Western Culture," 1990, 145.
93
Goldman, "The Social Captivity of Engineering," 1991, 121.
94
26
only contingent on and secondary to the arbitrary, managerial policy that directly
impacts and coordinates technological actions, which engineering is a part of. On the
other hand, Goldman did not pull any punches in his critique and high expectations of
engineering. He recognized that engineering practice “always takes place in action
contexts” and represents a sociopolitical rationality that “includes a range of synthetic,
personal, and social volitional elements.”95 Ultimately, he advanced an ethics of
engineering that is distinct from that of science. Engineering, unlike science, cannot
circumvent “questions of right action,” because “engineering entails action on a world,”
and accordingly, engineering “intrinsically and inescapably raises moral, political, and
aesthetic questions that traditionally remain outside the conduct of science.”96
Unfortunately, Goldman did not tell us about the other technologies that are not
engineering practice. Ann Johnson, in her reviews of a number of books by women
scholars, filled this gap when she redressed the imbalance in which philosophy of
technology had predominantly gravitated to “the epistemological dimensions of
engineering.”97 She provided evidence showing that communities of technological
knowledge are not and shall not be limited to engineers and technologists. Technology
includes, as a matter of course, knowledge of many other participants, including that of
entrepreneurs, product manufacturers, local stakeholders, instrument makers, technical
and non-technical workers (sometimes without university credentials), and users and
non-users. The decentering of technology from engineering problematizes the privilege
of “objective” knowledge and the very nature of objectivity. The politics of whose
knowledge represents technological knowledge highlights the ethical dimension and
situatedness of technology, and inquiries along these lines are all the more important
when technology in question is widespread commercial commodities steered by
conflicting social interests.98
Lastly, Ashley Shew, echoing Johnson’s appreciation of technological knowledge that

includes non-engineers, expanded technology to include animal artifacts and behaviors.
For example, even though a spider may not have what we call “technological
knowledge” and spider web construction is “on one far [i.e. the least complex] end of a
spectrum of technological behaviors,” the spider webs as artifacts live up to all the
95
96
97
Johnson, "Revisiting Technology as Knowledge," 2005, 555.
98
Johnson, "Revisiting Technology as Knowledge," 2005.
27
ideals for Davis Baird’s “thing knowledge.”99 On the other hand, intelligent behaviors of
crows, chimpanzees, octopuses, dolphins, and whales clearly demonstrate technological
knowledge in terms of know-how.100 Overall, animal constructions are not
fundamentally different from human-constructed artifacts, and animal behaviors that
intelligently respond to the environment also highlight what human sapiens have shared
with most non-human animals, including a struggle for survival.
To conclude, Shew argued that we should not let our “human bias” rule out non-human
animal constructions and behaviors as technology. A broader understanding of
technology that accommodates technology of animals not only furthers an
“appreciation of what animals do” and “others who are not ‘like us’ in the ways we take
as important.” It also “helps us see how our narratives about technology are biased in a
way that impedes both our philosophical projects on technology and our greater
appreciation of humanity in its animality.”101 It is to this discourse concerning our social,
philosophical imaginary of technology that my dissertation is also dedicated to.
4. The Differentiation of Technology and Our Existential Matters at Stake
99
Shew, Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge, 2017, 32, 99. In terms of (successful)
functions for artifacts, the five ideals for thing knowledge—detachment, efficacy, longevity, connection,
and objectivity—are interchangeable and comparable to criteria for scientific knowledge (and truth).
David Baird feared that granting thing knowledge to “the creations of biological evolution” and “naturally
occurring phenomena bear knowledge” may go down the rabbit hole of acknowledging that “spiderwebs
bear knowledge of insect catching” and that “our solar system bear knowledge of gravity.” His argument
for “the differences between a riverbed, a spiderweb, and [what he terms] thing knowledge” appeared
forced in order to “insist on these differences.” On the one hand, the ideals of thing knowledge are
modeled after “mathematical functions rather than biological or more broadly teleological functions,”
which he called “a ‘thinner’ notion of function” in favor of the characteristics of objective knowledge that
are independent of subjective human experiences. On the other, his quotations of Ian Hacking’s idea of
“phenomena” (which excludes biological and naturally-occurring phenomena) and of Karl Popper’s failure
to include animal behaviors and constructions in “World 3” (a “minimal criterion” for inclusion is “capable
of being grasped (or deciphered, or understood, or ‘known’) by somebody” according to Popper) reveal
value judgements at work from humans. Baird’s thing knowledge is, therefore, an anthropocentric vision
of technology, as he contended that human “material creations, through our various acts of calibration,
connecting them with one another and with what we say, have a greater depth of justification than do
animal phenomena.” All quotes here are taken from Baird, Thing Knowledge, 2004, 122-124, 131-132,
142-143.
100
For a diagram that summarizes two dimensions of technological knowledge, see the figure in Shew,
Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge, 2017, 118.
101
Shew, Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge, 2017, 121.
28
My point of departure from the above engineering and technology relationships is the
differentiation of technology. By differentiation, I mean not only the classification of
technologies, but also discrimination against some of them (as suggested in the works of
Johnson and Shew). It is my belief that if we must identify one single entity that most
notably differentiates technology in a large-scale, habitual manner, it would be modern
engineering. In thinking about the relations between engineering and technology, I have
been inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “taste.” In particular, Bourdieu articulated
that taste not only classifies, but also “classifies the classifier,” where “[s]ocial subjects,
classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they
make….”102 Apparently, when engineering proffers specific ways to sort out different
technologies in terms of quantitative power, efficiency, or economic value, it is, ipso
facto, a classifier of technology. And when engineering embodies mannerisms of, say,
technocracy, and bears upon other non-technical values, engineering could also be a
taste—to rephrase Bourdieu, a classifier of classifier, that distinguishes itself based on
the technical distinction and judgment it makes on other types of distinctions and
judgments.
Yet for the most part, engineering is not a taste. Engineers are often invisible and
anonymous, working behind the scenes of the rise and fall of big corporations and their
human delegates and material representatives. Engineering is practical and goal-
oriented and is by itself a technology—a means, way, method, etc.—in a broad sense.
Engineering is a technology that concerns technology. Moreover, its knowledge is also
specific to a particular practice; a semiconductor process engineer is distinct from a
petroleum production engineer because they belong to a completely different
sociotechnical system.
Engineering, on this account, is a “technology of technology” in the fullest sense this

phrase may imply. Just as the strong programme of the sociology of scientific knowledge
(SSK) is a “science of science” that reflexively analyzes and understands itself based on
the same body of the knowledge, so too engineering as a “technology of technology”
has also recursively enhanced and (re)produced the same category of technical
practices.103 While the parallels and contrasts between science of science and
technology of technology are a matter of interest (which I will explore briefly at the
beginning of Chapter 4), engineering as technology of technology deserves a treatise of
102
Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, 1984, 6.
103
Reflexivity is one of the tenets of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge. See, in
particular, Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 1991, 7. For “science of science,” see note 554 in
Chapter 4.
29
its own. Clarifying the relations between engineering and technology helps us to
understand both concepts that are each significant for our present existence.
Such existence is by no means just a material existence; if so, agriculture, craftsmanship,

and medicine alone are ready to meet most of the basic human needs. By existence, I
am addressing a few interrelated existential matters related to representation and
conditions in engineering and technology:
1. Over-representation and the prioritization of certain values, qualities or activities

within engineering, including: machine, quantity, efficiency, power and control,
material, problem-solving and fixing, innovation, visible merit and performance,
the individuality of work, genius and ingenuity, “selectivity” in admissions, rigor of
science, “technical” work, end products and outcomes, etc. Their counterparts are
often neglected, including, respectively, in the same order: people, non-
quantifiable quality, efficacy, autonomy and empowerment, body, problem
definition and questioning, renovation and maintenance, invisible and
underappreciated contributions, community of practice, accumulation of
experiences, substantive inclusion and diversity, empathetic understanding,
communication, ethical consideration and process, etc.
2. Under-representation of women, underserved ethnic groups, residents of

periphery countries, and other minorities in the fields of engineering and
technology. Their underrepresentation is not due to a lack of aspiration or talent to
meaningfully participate in and engage with engineering and technology. Nor does
it merely arise from lower participation or a lack of role models that further leads
to persistently low participation. I argue that the dominant values and activities
that I identified above are interdependent and exhibit a coherent structure. As a
whole, they impede and discount the kinds of knowledge, practice, agendas, and
achievements that are relevant within engineering and yet are historically
characteristic of the identities of the minorities. Therefore, the
underrepresentation of minorities can be attributed, at least in part, to the social
and historical reproduction of the symbolic capital of ideas and values that serve in
the capacity of “technology of technology” and categorize and distinguish different
practices and knowledge. These sociocultural ideas, through their arms in the
educational and professional institutions, have been able to reproduce the
sociotechnical configuration favorable for similar conglomerates of sociocultural
ideas and institutions. I will provide an account of how ideas and institutions
reproduce each other at the end of Chapter 4.
30
3. The dominant values and activities in engineering and technology have

repercussions beyond diversity and inclusion in the fields; they also shape the work
conditions of humans who interface with technology that prioritizes efficiency and
quantity. Whereas deskilling, underpayment, and fragmented work processes are
mostly caused by the technological changes introduced by the management, the
intense pace of work and “overwork” can sometimes be ascribed to the norms also
embraced by the participants themselves. Participants include, among others,
machine and equipment operators (e.g. of a manufacturing factory), warehouse
workers (e.g. of Amazon), rideshare drivers (e.g. of Uber), etc. I use “participant,”
and not “worker,” because unpaid work should also be considered. For example, an
engineering student and a tech-savvy homemaker who work with computers,
machines, and smartphones are equally relevant.
4. The values prevalent in engineering and technology put a limit on the kinds of
critical participation from within and outside the community. When I was an
instructor of record for a first-year introductory engineering course between 2017
and 2018, as a humanities scholar (and a former engineer student), I needed to
constantly engage with the prescriptive language and the narrow perspectives of
the template assignments and slides I saw, take a step back, and develop more
thorough ways to address fundamental questions of what values and skills students
should learn that better reflect my identities as an engineer-philosopher and
aspiring engineering educator. Sometimes my critical participation met with very
limited success (an example provided in the footnote).104
104
For example, during the spring of 2018, I tried to convince my senior colleagues that we should no
longer require students to name their files for assignment submission as “#_PID.pdf”, where # denoted
the assignment’s designated number such as “N1” and PID was the ID of their university email account.
Submissions that did not meet this expectation were marked down by one point. I made my argument in
the language of usability, maintaining that “[i]deally a file name should reflect its content like a few words
about an assignment. The assignment number lose [sic] meanings over time. A semester later, ‘ENGE-
1215 Cell Phone Holistic Issues.pdf’ make more sense than something like ‘N12_bonoshi.pdf’.” Then I
articulated my point with a mixture of educational philosophy and practicality, that “The format
‘#_PID.pdf’ seems to come from the time when we used [the previous course management system (CMS)]
and the requirement was grading/instructor-centered rather student-centered. Now that we are on [the
current CMS], we can … grade assignments online and file names are no longer important (my grader
always graded online and told me the naming system made no difference to him).” My senior colleagues
met me halfway. Now the file name required for every assignment submission became
31
Research Approaches and Questions
Underlying ideas about technology, engineering, and their relations are the central
concerns of this dissertation. At the heart of my approach is a philosophical
investigation inflected with a historical dimension that examines the developing ideas of
technology. While a contemporary philosophical study of the dynamics of the two
concepts will certainly help to unravel how they are socially constructed, connected,
and embodied in our social and technological life, it has been my belief that historical
approaches add weight to these accounts and analyses. Just as the idea of technology
has concerned “the new,” “the latest,” and “advanced” technology for at least more
than a century, as documented at the beginning of the dissertation, “engineering” as
“technology of technology” is likely to be a historically-enduring phenomenon. Despite
the dynamics of conceptual changes in the understanding of technology and
engineering in history, it remains the responsibility of a philosopher (and a sociologist)
to identify any enduring structures which more or less resisted and survived the
challenges facing them and which, more importantly, are still relevant to the problems
and issues of engineering and technology of our time. The historical-philosophical
approach, so to speak, displays simultaneously ideas that are historically entrenched in
our society and potential ways for change given the knowledge of their social formation.
On a methodological level, here is how historical and philosophical approaches may

practically work in tandem: because there is no historical reason to believe that
technology and engineering have been invariably conceptualized since the inception of
their ideas, there is no philosophical warrant for believing that these concepts, in
essence, are what they prevalently are now. And vice versa: because there is no
philosophical justification for why things cannot be otherwise, at many points in history,
there must have been different views and competing interpretations of the concepts.
And whereas a philosophical inquiry into the past uncovers historical ideas and struggles
that are precedents for modern concepts and experiences, a historical research project
attentive to the present elucidates the kinds of sociotechnical systems that have been
enduring and powerful for a long period, and are therefore more formidable to defy,
challenge, deconstruct, and modify in our times.
“#_PID_optionalDescription”, while the penalty for noncompliance remains in force for the entire
semester. Compare this with Sally Hacker’s experience of a calculus class in the early 1980s, when her
grade was reduced by 10% only because she did not staple the pages of her paperwork together. See
Hacker, Pleasure, Power, and Technology, 1992 [1989], 41.
32
But even so, either a contemporary philosophical study of one concept in our times or a
contextualizing historical research on the developments of an idea in a given period,
constitutes a daunting task on its own. Doing both is akin to exploring two dimensions in
breadth. Moreover, any thorough research will need to be aware of the variance of a
concept across different geological locations, cultures, and dialects.
Philosophy Informing History: The Linguistic Philosophical Approach
One way to practically resolve the above methodological difficulties is to turn to the
language—more specifically, to a linguistic approach centered on the etymology of
words and their referents. Words are known to often have different, competing
meanings that are settled in a context familiar to their interpreters. But diverse
meanings may still be reconciled and encompassed within a more general category of
purposes and intentions, indicating that any enactment of a specific meaning is a choice
that has a motive. This is evident even in words that have contradictory meanings. For
example, sanction, as a noun, signifies permission and penalty. The two seeming
opposites are united in their Latin etymon sanctio (law, decree, etc.) that may give
permission or a penalty. Their difference lies in whether a law is to empower or to
deprive. Literally, as an adverb, may express actually or virtually (the latter used in the
spoken language). The contrary senses are subsumed in the same action trying to lend
credence to the extent to which a subject matter is described. The discrepancies are
whether a speaker or writer intends to represent an exact truth or leave a metaphorical
impression.
Such analysis lends itself well to the historical analysis of polysemous words like
engineering and technology, echoing insights from the linguistic philosophical approach.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “language game,” for example, sets out to “bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of
life.” What is at stake is that word usage is bounded by rules. For Wittgenstein, rules of
languages work like a sign-post, which ideally dictates a direction without room for
doubt. But it becomes more of a reality that a sign-post “sometimes leaves room for
doubt and sometimes not.” To the extent that how well a sign-post or a rule of a
language works “is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one,” we turn
to the analysis of the actual use of the language.105
105
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations, 1953, 11e, 40e.
33
My dissertation sets out to conduct a two-pronged linguistic analysis of technology and

engineering separately, and in the end attempts to shed light on their fundamental
relations. Take technology as an example. Just as sanction and literally each has
contrasting usage that can be reconciled and subsumed in higher-order connotations
that can further explain the rationales and assumptions that set apart their contrasting
meanings, contemporary understanding of technology as ordinary technology and as
high technology may be treated similarly. A linguistic philosophical approach not only
shows that different definitions and meanings of technology have formal consequences
for technical practice.106 It also highlights the underlying rationality and developments
that gave rise to their tension and other relations at many points in history. All this is not
possible if our definition of technology resides uncritically in contemporary high
technology or if we expect no “paradox, obscurity, and opacity” in the presentation of
ideas of technology.107
On the other hand, it takes a more winding course for us to carry out a parallel
treatment of engineering. Carl Mitcham and his colleague referred to Wittgenstein’s
notion of the language game and suggested a linguistic philosophical approach to the
study of engineering. Their approach investigates different meanings of a word and its
relations with associated terms and cognates for a better understanding of the
underlying philosophical problems. It engages not “with our experiences of engineering
but with the words we use to talk about such experiences,” and pays attention,
simultaneously, to the colloquial and professional use of the word.108 My work
published elsewhere learned from their experiences and made two tweaks for my
research: I traced the etymology of a word from its first known use to what is now its
most prevalent form, and conducted a comparative analysis between languages.
Through linguistic analysis, I carried out a comparative study between engineering in
English and its Chinese rendering gong cheng (工程). I demonstrated that what
106
This is a view I adapted from A. J. Ayer’s as discussed in Rorty, "Introduction," 1992, 5.
107
Early linguistic philosophers like Richard Rorty concluded that “prelinguistic philosophy is marked by
‘paradox, obscurity, and opacity.’” I disagree. Wherever paradoxes and obscurity arise, there are
underlying assumptions and linguistic and social context to be discerned that make them less
troublesome and more interesting. Rorty and his colleagues would therefore miss out on the
opportunities to understand and reconcile paradoxes. See Rorty, "Introduction," 1992, 9.
108
Mitcham and Mackey, "Comparing Approaches to the Philosophy of Engineering: Including the
Linguistic Philosophical Approach," 2010, 55. Their approach differs sharply from some earlier variants of
linguistic philosophy that “forces us to attend to words alone, instead of the concepts or universals which
words signify, and to which we must eventually return to check up on our words.” See Rorty,
"Introduction," 1992, 9.
34
engineering means is fundamentally different between English and Chinese, and that
their differences correlate with distinct ways practitioners formulate and enact
engineering ethics in the United States and in Taiwan.109
Specifically, the dissertation as a whole mirrors my former work and utilizes etymology
as a center of inquiry, but leaves out the comparative linguistic part and instead focuses
on historical analysis of technology and engineering in the English language. Technology
is etymologically a rare word technologos (τεχνολόγος) in Ancient Greek, bringing
together two keywords—techne (τέχνη) and logos (λόγος)—that have been pregnant
with philosophical meanings since early usage, notably, from the writings of Greek
philosophers. The first half of Chapter 2 will be dedicated to an analysis showing how
techne and logos, as a whole, contributed to an early expression of technology based in
Ancient Greek. Engineering, on the other hand, derives from Latin ingenium, Old French
engin and engigneor, and Italian ingegniere. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the ideas
of engineering have at least four aspects, including qualifications (e.g. ingenuity, genius,
and natural endowment), artifacts (e.g. an engine and machine), professional identities
(e.g. an engineer as an architect or a mechanic), and knowledge (e.g. engineering as
architecture or mechanics). All these words, notably, date back to Ancient Greek and
Roman times.
Therefore, a historical analysis of the ideas of technology and engineering may start with
their corresponding words in Ancient Greek and Latin and their usage in the literature.
While English translations of Ancient Greek and Latin works are helpful to some extent,
original words that were used in the text are often rendered inconsistently, if not lost, in
translation. For example, while a translator may liberally render techne as art or craft as
they wish, readers who rely exclusively on English translations may not know art and
craft are based on the same word, thus missing out on the use of techne in different
contexts. Sometimes, additional words are added in translations that do not appear in
the original text at all. For example, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, πολιτικὴ as an
adjective-noun refers, in general, to political matters. Different translators, however,
rendered the word in the same passage as “the science of Politics” and “the political
art,” presenting obstacles to understanding whether Aristotle thought politics was a
science (ἐπιστήμη or episteme) or an art.110
109
Shih, "Towards an Engineering Ethics with Non-Engineers," 2021.
110
Compare translated texts at line 1094a.29 in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2011, 2; Aristotle, The
Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 6.
35
To reliably read and interpret Ancient Greek and Latin text, I taught myself grammar and
used dictionaries and scholarly English translations to fully understand each word,
before producing annotated English translations of full sentences and paragraphs. To
find out relevant text, authoritative dictionaries such as A Greek-English Lexicon (known
as Liddell–Scott–Jones, or LSJ) provided usage examples and citation information,
making it easier to locate key usage of a word like techne in important philosophical
works from Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. The Perseus Project at Tufts University
(http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/) and its parallel project, PhiloLogic, at the University of
Chicago (https://perseus.uchicago.edu/), were also reliable digital resources that
provided Greek and Latin text and dictionary functions in one place for my research.
I also utilized the search engine of the online Loeb Classical Library to locate all
appearances of a given Greek or Latin word in the series of printed books from the
publisher. On the one hand, it helped to identify key texts that repeatedly employed a
particular word and concept. On the other, by reading through all the usage of a word
from the corpus, I am able to discover recurring themes that are somewhat
representative in the literature, and at the same time, identify contrasting
representations and develop narratives and arguments about their dynamics.
History Informing Philosophy: Enduring Historical-Conceptual Structures
Overall, my use of linguistic philosophy in history is more of a tool (or “technology”)

than a theory (or “science”), and its success may be judged by the insights it brings out
as a consequence in at least two ways.111 First, since I am more sympathetic toward a
more inclusive understanding of technology as ordinary technology, it may be said that I
am engaging in “reformation and … a stipulation as to what the terms in question are to
mean.”112 The burden of proof is on me to make a compelling and constructive case that
technology as an effective (but not necessarily efficient) means toward an end serves as
a basis for clarifying several conceptual categories and unraveling, for example, the
coexistence of general technology as technical means and the modern, high technology
and at the same time clarify their relations. It also enables us to build other concepts
like “technology of technology” to explicate how high technology, as a subset of
111
Richard Rorty observed some linguistic philosophers having the pragmatic tendency “to ask to be
judged solely by their fruits” in Rorty, "Introduction," 1992, 3.
112
Rorty, "Introduction," 1992, 20.
36
technology, may productively be dubbed this way, and if the latter concept holds, then
how it helps to situate dominant engineering practice in technology and bring to light
the marginalized or subjugated alternatives within engineering.113 I will take on these
tasks mainly in Chapters 4 and 5.
Second, my use of linguistic philosophy makes an effort to generalize from empirical

evidence in history fundamental tensions within the concepts of technology and
engineering and at the same time recognize the dominance of any privileged variant in
development,114 and this is what I will now illustrate in this subsection (and more details
throughout Chapter 2, 3 and 4). Eventually, my historical analysis will inform a
philosophical treatment of contemporary issues in engineering and technology, by
linking the past to the present and revealing both the longevity and qualitative changes
of ideas behind the present phenomenon that technology and engineering are,
respectively, high technology and “technology of technology.” Ancient concepts of
technology and engineering did not become their modern counterparts overnight; in the
middle, there must be many periods of transitions and numerous instances of adoption
and resistance. The real, practical question here is where to find at least a couple of
representative examples and see their gestation at work.
The sheer breadth of all relevant literature entails that one needs to rely on sources that
are more or less representative, in addition to a modicum of “digital humanities” for
identifying common themes. When I wrote about the development of the word
technology, I relied on two different, complementary tools: early English dictionaries
and databases of early English books. For early English dictionaries, I searched on
Google Books and ensured that the coverage of my research included, at the minimum,
twenty-one dictionaries included in The English Dictionary from Cawdrey to Johnson,
1604-1755.115 My access to early English books was made possible by Google Books,
HathiTrust Digital Library, Internet Archive, and ProQuest’s Early English Books Online
(EEBO). ProQuest’s EEBO was particularly instrumental, because its high-quality
113
My statements here address, in part, the following question posed by Carl Mitcham and Robert
Mackey, now five decades ago: “Can a concept [of technology] which is broad enough to include such
diverse activities as mechanical engineering, making love, and contemplation really tell us anything
significant about these actions or about the nature of man?” See Mitcham and Mackey, "Introduction:
Technology as a Philosophical Problem," 1972, 6.
114
Rorty saw a tension between linguistic philosophy as discovery (or description) of truth (partially in the
sense of empirical findings) and as proposals (and reform) for better ways of talking about a concept and
how things should be. I nevertheless do not think there is any fundamental conflict between the two
camps, and my dissertation tries to fill the gap and build a synergy. Compare Rorty, "Introduction," 1992,
38.
115
Starnes and Noyes, The English Dictionary from Cawdrey to Johnson, 1604-1755, 1991.
37
reflowable text and search engine enabled me to search a keyword and sort the results
in chronological order. These sources will become the centerpiece of the second half of
Chapter 2 to finish off my treatment of Ancient Greek technology.
In comparison, my study of historical ideas of modern engineering was less systematic.

While I also took advantage of ProQuest’s EEBO, most of the results were not much
different from historical examples from the Oxford English Dictionary. As a
consequence, I turned to how early engineers presented (and very frequently,
celebrated) their profession’s history and expressed ideas about progress, technology
advancement, and society-technology relations. Such works were often seen in
presidential addresses at the annual conventions of professional engineering societies. I
selected a number of them from the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) and the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), covering the duration when civil engineering was, for
the most part, the counterpart of military engineering and was an umbrella term that
encompassed all the engineering branches as long as its applications did not concern
military affairs.
I also referenced writings from a selection of earlier authors who wrote about machines
and engines. Whether they were inventors, mathematicians, engineers, historians, or
philosophers was not as important as their first-hand positions and beliefs on the topics.
Consequently, I treated primary and secondary sources alike as primary sources, as long
as their authors evinced their attitudes toward a certain theme of interest to my work.
My dissertation includes insights and quotes from Charles Babbage (1791–1871),
Samuel Butler (1835–1902), and Henry Adams (1838–1918) in places where their works
complement and are relevant to my accounts and arguments. Analysis of the earlier
authors, in addition to presidential addresses of professional societies, constitutes the
first half of Chapter 4. The collection of these works up to the early twentieth century
intends to capture a transitional period that connected preliminary forms of dominant
engineering practice from ancient times (Chapter 3) to how modern engineering is now
dominantly carried out (second half of Chapter 4).
All the above linguistic and historical materials (from Chapter 2 to the first half of
Chapter 4), when working together, help to recognize and corroborate what I call
enduring historical-conceptual structures of engineering that are significant for
contemporary philosophy. According to philosopher of technology Philip Brey, classical
philosophy of technology before the 1980s had for the most part been overbearingly
negative about technology (e.g. Jacques Ellul), embraced a deterministic view about
what modern technology can do (e.g. autonomous and out-of-control technology), and
38
over-generalized and lumped technology together as an abstract whole (e.g. Heidegger,

Jacques Ellul, etc.).116 To address the weakness that classical philosophy of technology
often bears no substantive relation to the substantive reality of modern technologies,
“the empirical turn” of philosophy of technology, or an empirically oriented philosophy
of technology, has been averse to abstract characterization and evaluative judgment
about technology, in favor of the empirical and descriptive study of specific
technologies.117
But the empirical turn of philosophy of technology did have a cost, by throwing out with
the bathwater the useful progeny from former generations of philosophers and
historians. For example, despite Lewis Mumford being categorized among the “classical”
philosophers of technology,118 I have not seen any discussion about how Mumford’s
approaches and contributions were at cross purposes with the empirical turn.119 Shall
we exclude historical approaches from empirical methods of philosophy? Shall empirical
studies be limited to contemporary empirical studies, so that historical accounts of ideas
and experiences may not count as empirical or as a companion of the empirical turn?
Even though Mumford’s works, such as Technics and Civilization, were devoid of proper
in-text citations that we would normally expect from more recent historical or
philosophical writings, he had a bibliography and his work was more empirical
throughout than the opposite, whether it be theoretical or speculative.
Looking to the future of philosophy of technology after the empirical turn, scholars have
called for greater attention to descriptive analysis of values and how a normative stance
on technology may contribute to a better technological society. Peter Kroes and
Anthonie W.M. Meijers, for example, proposed “a normative axiological turn” as “a
departure from the empirical turn.”120 But pinpointing the norms and dominant
knowledge and practice in engineering and technology requires empirical study. It
follows that what are the norms in a professional field is an empirical question subject
116
Brey, "Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn," 2010.
117
Brey, "Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn," 2010; Kroes and Meijers, ed., The Empirical
Turn in the Philosophy of Technology, 2000.
118
E.g. Brey, "Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn," 2010, 36; Ihde, "Foreword," 2001, vii.
119
I am referring to the following works: Achterhuis, ed., American Philosophy of Technology: The
Empirical Turn, 2001; Kroes and Meijers, ed., The Empirical Turn in the Philosophy of Technology, 2000;
Brey, "Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn," 2010.
120
Kroes and Meijers, "Toward an Axiological Turn in the Philosophy of Technology," 2016, 21.
39
to debate and revisiting, such as in the study of norms in science.121 More importantly,
identifying normative content and commitment of technology and engineering from
empirical studies is entirely compatible with critical participation, such as in the works of
Gary Downey.122 And as argued specifically by Matthew Wisnioski in his guest editorial
in the Journal of Engineering Education, history can contribute to modern research of
engineering education in many ways, including shedding light on normative visions,
showing predominant images of engineering and their alternative paths, and serving as
empirical research tools.123
My dissertation joins these efforts and seeks to bridge the gaps between such duplets as
empirical and theoretical studies, descriptive and normative statements, history and
philosophy, and representation and value judgment. One contribution of my
dissertation to the philosophy of technology and engineering is to identify enduring
structures of ideas and practices in engineering, and show how they became
sociotechnical systems entrenched in the tradition of Western civilization and were
functionally similar to the ways in which modern technology and engineering are now
dominated by high technology and “technology of technology.” My goal is to build a
sociology and philosophy of engineering as “technology of technology” based on my
historical research—that is, to develop a theoretical characterization and evaluative
critique of how modern engineering has been dominantly carried out, with the supply of
empirical evidence that classical philosophers like Heidegger missed.
Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Modern Sources: Elucidating and Defining How Modern

Engineering Practice is Technology of Technology
Lastly, the dissertation carries out a critique of modern engineering practice by

empirically demonstrating how it is dominantly a technology of technology. To define
what “technology of technology” is and to illustrate to what extent engineering is
technology of technology, I drew from published modern writings for ideas and
examples, used such works as secondary sources, and gave an appraisal of our modern
engineering built upon their contemporary accounts and analyses. These works are
mainly the sorts of sociology, philosophy, history, engineering studies, engineering
121
See, for example, Merton, "The Normative Structure of Science," 1973 [1942]; Mulkay, "Norms and
Ideology in Science," 1976.
122
E.g. Downey, "Are Engineers Losing Control of Technology?," 2005; Downey, "The Normative Contents
of Engineering Formation," 2014.
123
Wisnioski, "What's the Use? History and Engineering Education Research," 2015.
40
education literature that did formal research on, or had sporadic description or
discussion of, subjects that are related to my project. Relevant topics include
engineering work, engineering design research, engineering workplaces, engineering
classrooms, the use of technology and technique in engineering practice and in learning
engineering, etc. These sources accumulated as needed mainly to broaden my
perspectives, refine my accounts and sharpen my arguments on relevant topics that
comprise, as a whole, a coherent and organized treatment of engineering as technology
of technology. The interdisciplinary synthesis of modern sources constitutes the second
half of Chapter 4.
Synopsis of the Dissertation
Chapter 2: Technology as Meta-Techne
The chapter develops a conceptual history of Ancient Greek technology (τεχνολογία and
τεχνολόγος) from Ancient Greece to the early twentieth century. Its primary role in the
dissertation is to lay the groundwork for later chapters in two ways: for distinguishing
between “machine” and “techne” in Chapter 3 and for defining “technology of
technology” in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, in its own right, the chapter carries out,
somewhat painstakingly, a linguistic history of the ideas of technology. It attempts to
provide an account of how seemingly divergent meanings of technology, at many points
in history, were in fact closely related, and how its concerns with knowledge in general
eventually turned into an undivided focus on industrial arts.
The chapter has two main parts. First, the chapter traces the etymology of Ancient
Greek technology to Aristotle’s philosophical writings and demonstrates how the
expression manifests both the art of rhetoric (techne of logos) and the rule of art (logos
of techne), and that between the two combinations imply the systematic investigation
of a subject matter. I categorize three senses of logos and discuss how the former two
senses—reasoning and verbal expression—may conceptually converge into the last
sense, i.e. discussion, discourse, and dialogue that formally address a topic. I provide a
brief cultural history that makes sense of Ancient Greek technology in the context of the
sociocultural need for instructions and writings that systematized techne for the
retention of knowledge, so that even Plato, who objected to writing treatises about
philosophy, would eventually come around.
Second, the chapter also argues that even though English technology was a rare word
until the nineteenth century, its concept, as the explanation and discussion of techne,
41
has had a socio-material foundation in terms of writing and communication about

techne since Ancient Greece. English technology—as logos of techne—used to be a
branch of knowledge that explained or discussed techne. Through early books in the
seventeenth century, I trace how the meanings of Ancient Greek technology, in terms of
both the art of rhetoric (techne of logos) and the rule of art (logos of techne), were
superseded, respectively, by the undesirable use of rhetoric and by the systematic
representation of useful knowledge. The latter, more favorable interpretation of
technology later got the upper hand, but its subject of useful knowledge, in general, was
specialized and limited to the explanation and discussion of individual useful arts. The
chapter traces these developments up until the early twentieth century and concludes
that all these senses of Ancient Greek technology have now been rendered obsolete by
the subject of technology, that is, techne—or the art itself—with a thematic twist that
prioritizes the state of the art instead of the techne in general.
Chapter 3: Techne in Critical Times: Machine, Quantity and Ingenuity in Ancient and
Premodern Military Engineering
The chapter accounts for how Greek techne, an idea distinct from Greek technology and
representing, very broadly and generally, means to an end, became differentiated in
terms of its usefulness for human survival in critical times. Mechanical arts in ancient
military engineering, as a narrowed branch of techne, was a useful techne as such. Its
relevance to human survival, nevertheless, was not so much a civilian enterprise
enabling humans to prevail over the capriciousness of nature than a military project to
defend and attack cities in the face of human enemies that were more destructive in
killing than natural forces.
The chapter’s primary role in the dissertation is to recount the ascent of military
mechanical arts as a dominant engineering practice overshadowing other types of
techne in ancient times, and articulate how the performance and reconstruction of such
practice in siege warfare exercised a coherent, circular structure of ideas consisting of
the following interacting elements: critical times, machine (or engine), quantitative
power, binary (and visible) superiority, and ingenuity (and genius). I argue that the
confluence of these concepts set precedents for premodern and modern engineering.
Through linguistic evidence, I show how these elements from the military context have
been more or less embedded etymologically in what most European languages now call
an “engineer,” and hence they, as a coherent whole, exhibit an enduring historical-
conceptual structure of ideas of engineering that is entrenched in modern Western
42
civilization. My narratives and arguments here pave the way for, and are corroborated
further by, Chapter 4, where I discuss how themes in ancient military engineering
correspond to civilian activities of modern engineering in the late nineteenth century
and the early twentieth century, leading to my characterization of engineering as
“technology of technology.”
The chapter consists of four parts of narratives and arguments. First, it shows that,
unlike modern high technology, Greek techne denotes means to accomplish diverse
purposes. Despite its breadth, in the Ancient Greek writings of Xenophon, Plato, and
Aristotle, there arose the question of the morality of techne and hence the
differentiation of different categories of techne. Xenophon’s and Aristotle’s
prioritization of military-related techne and master-art (ἀρχιτεκτονικός), respectively,
set precedents for giving primacy to certain techne that is considered crucial in a
sociocultural context.
Second, the chapter traces the ideas of master-art to the art of a chief-craftsman
(ἀρχιτέκτων, or architect) and describes their civilian and military duties drawing from
the ancient text. My discussion turns to Archimedes as the renowned Greek mechanic. A
number of ancient texts described how Archimedes drew from his mathematical talent,
deployed military engines, and defended Syracuse in the siege during 213–212 BCE. I
argue that several engineering-related concepts emerged in these accounts, including
the construction of critical times, the primacy of soul and talent over body and labor,
the performativity and demonstrability of visible power, and the propensity for
meritocracy and elitism.
Third, the confluence of these concepts, I further demonstrate, was embodied in a

particular, specialized branch of techne called “machine” (μηχανή) or “mechanics”
(μηχανικός) in the military context. Drawing from military texts written in Ancient Greek
and Latin, I explain how these concepts converged in the idea of machine by recounting
how binary, performative outcomes led to bifurcating, irredeemable consequences in
ancient siege wars, and how critical moments in siege warfare, in turn, placed in the
foreground the talent of military engineers and the quantitative and binary power of
their war engines. These dominant accounts from military writings prevailed, despite
counterstatements, such as in Vitruvius’s On Architecture, which maintained that
accumulated experience and qualitative judgments were equally important as innate
talent and quantitative measurement. The various comparisons I draw demonstrate
how civilian architecture and military mechanics in ancient times employed distinct
ways to determine and evaluate technological means and goals and embodied a
43
preliminary differentiation between quality and quantity. I also show how even within
the writings of military subjects, whereas treatises on generalship and stratagems
focused on qualitative ways to achieve a goal, works on siege engines prioritized
quantitative means to a binary victory.
Fourth and lastly, the chapter attempts to show that the aforementioned interrelated
concepts originating in military mechanics—the construction of critical times, the
primacy of soul and talent over body and labor, the performativity and demonstrability
of visible power, and the propensity for meritocracy and elitism—laid the foundation for
the etymology of English engineer, engine, and many of their European equivalents.
Based on my etymological study, I argue that these concepts were prevalent in modern
European languages and, as a whole, exhibited an enduring historical-conceptual
structure of ideas of engineering in Western civilization, and paved the way for our
modern, dominant concept of engineering.
Chapter 4: Modern Engineering as Technology of Technology
The chapter builds upon the last chapter and shows how the former military engineering
was rendered civil(ian), while preserving in the civilian, non-combative rivalries the
systematic propensity for quantity, genius, binary performance, and the construction of
critical times. While civil engineering and mechanical engineering each developed a
philosophy of engineering in terms of ideas about progress, technology advancement,
and society-technology relations, it became evident that machines were considered the
exemplar of engineering and dominated the ideas of engineering. Engineering in this
sense displayed the initial qualities of “technology of technology.” I then return my
discussion back to the present day and evaluate and critique the social functions of
modern engineering, compare it with other kinds of knowledge and practice, and argue
that modern, dominant engineering practice is an exemplar of technology of
technology. I define what technology of technology entails with examples, and discuss in
what senses dominant engineering practice counts as an exemplar of technology of
technology.
The chapter consists of four parts of narratives and arguments. First, the machine in the
nineteenth century became a civilian one—the steam engine and, later, the dynamo—
and at once bore the hallmark of social and technological progress and dominated the
ideas of engineering under domestic and international economic competition. In the
late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, in contrast with civil engineers
44
who slowly transformed and replaced old buildings and infrastructure, mechanical
engineers like George S. Morison readily drew from the idea of the machine progress
and were more prone to manifest a touch of hubris in their claim that engineering based
on physical laws were the benchmark of other less systematized knowledge. I argue that
this was an early instance of engineering as “technology of technology,” a concept I will
revisit and expound on later. Despite the demilitarization of mechanics, my evidence
shows that the civilian machines continued to draw from military metaphors, including
the life-and-death competition among machines and how making a civilian machine was
similar to mobilizing and orchestrating warfare.
Second, I then turn my attention temporarily beyond engineering, to a broader

perspective that discusses how ingenuity and critical moments of binary success have
been mobilized in the modern institutionalized competition after World War II. I seek to
put engineering in this bigger picture and evaluate its roles in the existential survival of
the human race, and conclude that despite the fact that the contribution of engineering
lies ideally in the progress of new technology, engineering serves mostly for private
interests, and their visibility is most prominent in the big tech companies. Their social
functions and responsibility are constructively linked with the life and death of a
national economy, a corporate entity, and a technological product, even though there is
no evidence to believe that engineers have played an exclusive or primary role in these
activities. In a conceptual move, I also critically analyze non-corporate settings of
engineering and argue that similar phenomena of competition and “winner takes all”
are similarly prevalent in engineering education from K-12 to university.
Third, the chapter builds upon the conceptual categories accumulated in the previous
chapters and discusses the general concept of technology of technology, in a way that is
not necessarily connected with engineering. In light of a broader understanding of
technology as the means in the use of knowledge and resources to meet specific needs
or goals in context, I understand technology of technology as any technical practice (i.e.
technology) that concerns or belongs to technology. I provided a working definition of
the concept by describing three senses in this expression—improving existing
technologies, comparing distinct technologies, and reflexive technical practice. I
illustrate each with examples that center largely on their more dominant, undesirable
forms.
Fourth and finally, I turn to engineering as technology of technology. I clarify how

modern engineering is often mistaken for “dominant engineering,” in a similar way in
which engineering was once thought to be military engineering or mechanical
45
engineering. I reformulate my goal to be a critique of dominant engineering practice, in

order not to essentialize what engineering can be. I draw from the three senses of
technology of technology that I defined formerly, and give specific examples as to how
dominant engineering practice is technology of technology. The three senses of
dominant engineering as technology of technology include technical problem solving,
technology differentiating other technologies, and uncritical reflexive engineering
practice. Their implications for and limitations to engineering and technical practice in
general are discussed throughout.
Chapter 5: Conclusion: The Subjugated Practice and the Need for Critical Reflexive
Technology
The conclusory chapter aims to look beyond my critique and outline a proposal for
theory and practice to engage with how modern engineering and technology are
predominantly carried out, making them emancipatory from their dominant forms and,
in this way, become more desirable and sensible for humanity. The chapter tentatively
consists of two parts of conceptualization: one on the subjugated technical practice and
another that I call critical reflexive technology.
First, based on my previous analysis of dominant engineering practice, I formulate the

concept of the “subjugated technical practice.” My differentiation of technical practices
delineates how subjugated technical practices are germane to qualitative approaches
and the so-called “soft” skills in engineering, such as communication, ethical reasoning,
empathy, etc., and how they are trivialized by the dominant technical practice that is
based on numbers, certainty, and technological superiority. While the ideas of dominant
and subjugated technical practices are designated as “ideal types” of technologies in the
Weberian sense, I draw contrasts between them, showing they are distinct in terms of a
number of dimensions, such as matters of interest, criteria of success, etc.
Second, in a conceptual move, I seek to rescue and mobilize the general concept of
technology of technology in the quest for counteracting its most dominant, conspicuous
form, which I have shown to be modern engineering practice. I maintain that just as
there are invaluable aspects of modernity and technology that we do not want to
relinquish altogether to the relentless pursuit of high technology, so too it is essential to
identify ideas of technology of technology that are liberating humanity from their
suppressive forms that impose limits on the subjected technical practice.
46
One of the unfulfilled potentials of technology of technology lies in a certain critical

reflexive way of technical practice. I call it critical reflexive technology to represent
pragmatic ways of improving, evaluating, comparing, and critiquing technologies, as well
as the sensible and responsible manners to critically reflexively personalize,
institutionalize, embody, and enact technology. Approaches and practices in philosophy
of technology that are able to critically assess and compare different technologies in
terms of their compatibility with democracy, equality, sustainability, humanity, ethics,
public goods, justice, fairness, quality of life, etc., are rightfully critical reflexive
technology. In the last analysis, my conceptualization of critical reflexive technology may
be considered a technology complementary to other attempts to make similar critique
and engagement an essential component of our personal and institutional technical
practice.
47
CHAPTER 2: TECHNOLOGY AS META-TECHNE
CHAPTER 2
Technology as Meta-Techne
Modern Technology as “Advanced Technologies”
Our present time witnesses the deep embeddedness of technology in the life we live.
Looking around the artifacts surrounding us, we would find that our existence very
much depends on, and could not be more mediated by, various new and “old”
technologies in the form of materials: computers, phones, keys, IDs, houses, heating,
refrigerators, clothing, medications, and transportation. Losing access to any of these
will cause temporary disruption, if not immediate dangers, to our life. Without
technology, we are nothing but omnivorous animals—a Robinson Crusoe, weak and
helpless, lurking and hiding in the desert island and wilderness.
Technology, as I referred to in the above context, largely denotes a collection of human

construction and artifacts that are useful. These material technologies, employed as
means for accomplishing a desired end, are often embedded in ways of doing things
that cannot be achieved without the help of artifacts. In this sense, technology is an
essential part of many techniques. We cannot speak of technique in painting, cooking,
photography, or surgery without referring to the tools and instruments that are needed.
Conversely, technique, as ways of accomplishing tasks in an effective manner, is also
instrumental in the making of useful technologies. “Craftsmanship” and “manufacturing
process” connote the reliability of technique—in terms of skills and methods—for
turning out artifacts that meet high standards. From here, we may posit that technology
and technique go hand in hand, not merely because of the affinity between the two
concepts. They have also evolved from and grown out of each other.
48
However, technology and technique are not equal. Technology is predominantly

identified with “high technology,” or the most advanced technology in an absolute,
superlative form. This is evident in a search for “technology” in many image search
engines, including Google Images, Getty Images, and Shutterstock. At the time of writing
(November 2021), the idea of technology in these platforms immediately conjures up
images of the most advanced technologies, often with a tinge of futurism: abstract data
flow (in waves and/or particles), advanced electronic devices and their applications,
computer programming, and virtual reality. Technique, by contrast, is represented as
technology and technique on the more ordinary side and sometimes includes skills
stereotypically possessed by women: techniques that are based on social interaction
(e.g. customer service, discussion in business settings, teamwork, small group ideation,
etc.) or connected with “lower” tech (milling machines, light bulbs, stationary, alarm
clocks, hand knitting, etc.). As an example, see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 for the lists of
most popular stock photos of “technology” and “technique,” respectively, on Getty
Images.124
124
The two tables were compiled in November 2021 from Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com). At the
time of writing, Getty Images offers two types of stock images: creative and editorial. Unlike creative
images, editorial images are more limited and can only be used in circumstances that are of public
interest, such as newspapers, magazines, blogs, and social media posts. Methodologically speaking, the
search results I compiled were based on the database of creative stock “photos,” by excluding
“illustrations” and “vectors” by setting the result types to “photos” only. Results were sorted by “most
popular” through the search engine interface.
49
Table 2.1 Search Results of Photos of Technology on Getty Images, Sorted by Popularity
# Image Title by Getty Images My Image Description

An image of layered grids and colorful glowing particles, symbolizing data moving in the
1 Technology Abstract
high-speed network infrastructure
Aerial View of Crowd Connected
2 Aerial view of a crowd of people, connected by lines that represent social networks
by Lines
3 Colorful Background An image of waves of particles symbolizing groups of data flows
Overtime Is Something All A close-up of a young businessman working late with a digital tablet in the office. The title
4
Successful People Must Do says, “overtime is something all successful people must do.”
5 Abstract Data Background An image of wires and glowing particles, symbolizing data moving in Internet connections
A close-up of a young woman holding a pan and contemplating a set of transparent
6 Close Up Watching
computer screens displaying text and data
A computer-generated image of a cityscape with groups of similarly colored dots. The
7 Cityscape Data
image looks like a circuit board with many soldering joints.
Genetic Research, Computer
A close-up of a human face, with computer reflections of colorful dots in the eyeglasses.
8 Screen Reflection in Spectacles of
The title says the subject is doing genetic research.
DNA Profile, Close Up of Face
Computer Programmer Working Male programmer sitting at his office desk and working on computer programs with a
9
on New Software Program laptop and a desktop monitor
Blue and Purple Technology
10 A computer-generated image of a circuit board in cyan, blue and purple
Background Circuit Board
Making a Few Adjustments to the A close-up of a young female programmer while working late in her office with her digital
11
Code tablet and laptop. The title says she is “making a few adjustments to the code.”
Futuristic City VR Wire Frame Businesswoman walking in the virtual reality of a futurist city surrounded by frames of
12
with Businesswoman Walking wires
50
Table 2.2 Search Results of Photos of Technique on Getty Images, Sorted by Popularity
# Image Title by Getty Images My Image Description

A high-angle shot of a man assisting his female colleague in a call center by pointing to a corner
Quality Customer Service Is a
1 of her computer screen, with two other colleagues (one male and one female) looking at the
Team Effort
same screen. The title says, “quality customer service is a team effort.”
Business People Discussing
2 A photo of business people discussing plans on a glass wall, with a female at the center.
Plans
A close-up of a female programmer looking through data. The title says, “she’s a genius
3 She’s a Genius Programmer
programmer.”
Female Apprentice Using A close-up of a female wearing protective glasses and operating a milling machine. The subtitle
4
Yoke Machine in Factory suggests she is an apprentice engineer working in a manufacturing factory.
A photo of two designers working on a computer in an office. The female sits on her chair and
5 They Know Design
talks, while the male bends and looks at the screen. The title says, “they know design.”
Explaing [sic] Her Ideas in A photo of businesspeople having a meeting in a room, with a woman at the center. The title
6
Detail says she is explaining her ideas in detail.
An image featuring an assortment of stationery and an alarm clock on a white table,
7 Learning and Development representing the learning and development of skills and knowledge through training and
coaching
Glowing Light Bulb Standing A computer-generated image of a glowing light bulb standing out in a crowd of light bulbs. The
8
Out From the Crowd subtitle says this image highlights “leadership, innovation and individuality.”
They Share a Great Working An image of a Black male sitting at the center and talking to his White female colleague. The title
9
Relationship says, “they share a great working relationship.”
Close Up on Woman’s Hands
10 A close-up of a woman’s hands working on knitting. Also, there are rings on her ring fingers.
Knitting
A photo of five people having a discussion over a laptop in an office. The title and subtitle
11 Getting into the Nitty Gritty
suggest they are “office workers” who are “getting into the nitty gritty.”
This Is Where Are Greatest A photo of five people discussing over a laptop. The title and subtitle suggest they are “a
12
Ideas Come From cheerful motivated group of businesspeople” and “this is where greatest ideas come from.”
51
It follows that technology, at our present time, has an internal schism that is rarely
recognized. On the one hand, it represents everyday artifacts, most of which are
instances of “ordinary” technology, including what philosophers and sociologists of
technology may call “mundane artifacts,” as speed bumps, subway benches, and door
closers.125 But in general, historians are more likely to confer the title of technology to
ordinary objects, such as bikes, lamps, and corsets.126 In her famous and path-breaking
study of the cultural history of household technology, Ruth Cowan did not restrict
household technology to what were once the “advanced” and “new” technologies of
some distant past. She correctly predicted, now almost four decades ago, that “there
will still be at least functional equivalents of cooking stoves and refrigerators,
telephones and automobiles, washing machines and dishwashers” in the repertoire of
household technologies, and she implore future generations of readers, that “we can
begin to control household technology instead of letting it control us.”127 In fact, all
these technologies she mentioned are alive and well, and most of these ordinary
technologies (save telephones and automobiles) do not undergo significant changes.
The present Wikipedia entry of “domestic technology” even includes non-mechanical
artifacts like brooms, mops, windows, and cans.
On the other hand, mainstream English dictionaries prescribe that technology is all
about advancements and new developments in industry, commerce, or engineering
through the application of science, as shown in Table 2.3.128 In fact, none of the five
dictionaries I selected had a place for ordinary, mundane technology, throughout all its
125
Philosopher of technology Robert Rosenberger discussed the case of subway benches with seat
dividers in his critique of hostile technologies (or objects, artifacts, etc.) against the homeless population.
Bruno Latour used examples of seat belts, door closers, and speed bumps to illustrate that artifacts may
work like actors and have been imparted values, duties, and ethics by their designers. See Rosenberger,
"Multistability and the Agency of Mundane Artifacts: From Speed Bumps to Subway Benches," 2014;
Latour, "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts," 1992.
126
See Bijker et al., ed., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology
and History of Technology, 1987, 3-4; Oldenziel, Making Technology Masculine: Men, Women and Modern
Machines in America, 1870-1945, 1999.
127
Cowan, More Work for Mother, 1983, 213-214, 219.
128
Stevenson, ed., Oxford Dictionary of English, Third Edition, 2010; Merriam-Webster, "Merriam-
Webster.Com Dictionary," 2021; Anonymous, "Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online,"
2021; Anonymous, "The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition," 2020;
Anonymous, "Collins Online English Dictionary," 2021.
52
entries for technology. Equally astonishingly, the definitive historical dictionary of the
English language, the Oxford English Dictionary, fails to bridge this gap.129
Table 2.3 Top Explanations of Technology and Their Examples and Collocations
Dictionary Source Top explanation Selected Examples and Collocations

the application of scientific
Oxford Dictionary of advances in computer technology;
knowledge for practical
English, Third Edition recycling technologies
purposes, especially in industry
the use of science in industry,
Recent advances in medical
Merriam-
engineering, etc., to invent technology have saved countless lives;
Webster.com
useful things or to solve The company is on the cutting edge of
Dictionary
problems technology
new/modern technology; the latest
new machines, equipment, and
Longman Dictionary technology; advanced technology;
ways of doing things that are
of Contemporary computer technology; digital
based on modern knowledge
English Online technology; advances/developments
about science and computers
in technology
The American
The application of science,
Heritage Dictionary of
especially to industrial or N/A
the English Language,
commercial objectives.
Fifth Edition
Technology refers to methods,
systems, and devices which are Technology is changing fast; They
Collins Online English
the result of scientific should be allowed to wait for cheaper
Dictionary
knowledge being used for technologies to be developed.
practical purposes.
However, as a word or expression, technology, in either of the current, often

irreconcilable dual senses—either the useful artifact or technique in general (including
ones that are mundane) or its predominant reference to new progress and most
advanced artifacts in industrial and commercial applications—is a relatively new
phenomenon throughout the history since the etymological genesis of the word
technology in Ancient Greece. The main task in this chapter is to trace out the semantic
developments of Greek “technology” as “meta-techne” before the first half of the
twentieth century and demonstrate that meta-techne is a sense that our modern
129
The closest explanation that only remotely accommodates “low” technology is the last explanation,
which says “A particular practical or industrial art; a branch of the mechanical arts or applied sciences; a
technological discipline.” However, none of the historical examples is meaningfully related to ordinary
technology. See "Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022, s.v.
53
technology no longer denotes. Our modern technology, so to speak, is a close equivalent

of Greek techne. The next chapter, or Chapter 3, will formally take on Greek “techne,”
the ancient equivalent of our modern technology, and show that a specialized branch of
techne, known as machine, prioritized binary performance and quantity in the field of
military “engineering” and set ideological precedents for our modern engineering, which
will be the topic of Chapter 4.
Technique, Technics, and Technology
Both technique and technology have Greek origins. Technique, as a noun in English, is
etymologically derived from the Ancient Greek techne (τέχνη, as a noun, often
translated as art) and its derived term technikos (τεχνικός, as adjective). Technique,
however, was not commonly used until the French technique became circulated in
English. As far as I am aware of, technique was not formally recognized as a word in the
English language until the late nineteenth century, when The Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia (1889–1891) had an entry that says, “Same as technic: used especially in
criticism of music and art.”130 The reference to technic here suggests that technique also
has its root in German technik in addition to French technique.
In English, the adjective technical predated technique by about two centuries. A

plausible explanation is that, unlike the dissimilarity between technique and τέχνη,
technical resembles in spelling and draws straight from the Greek adjective τεχνικός and
its Latin adjective derivative technicus. The word technical appeared in England in the
early seventeen century and gained currency no later than the opening years of the
1700s. Its adjective cognate technic, emerging about the same time, was not as
popular.131 While technic as a noun, representing “a technical term” no later than 1764,
130
Whitney and Smith, ed., The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia Volume Vi (Part Xxi), 1891, 6209.
According to the authoritative Oxford English Dictionary (OED), “technique” appeared in text no later than
1817. See "Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022, s.v.
131
The OED dates the earliest reference of “technical” and “technic,” both in the sense of adjective in
English, to 1617 and 1612, respectively. However, only “technical” was included in early dictionaries.
Edward Phillips’s The New World of English Words (1658, first edition) and Thomas Blount's Glossographia
(1656, first edition) only have the entry “technical,” which is, verbatim, “(Greek) artificiall, done by Art”
and “(technicus) artificial, cunning, done like a workman,” respectively. In the preface of John Harris's
Lexicon Technicum (1704, first edition), the author promised “the Reader may not only find here an
Explication of the Technical Words … but also those Arts Themselves [all emphasis in original].” Samuel
Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (1755, first edition) links the etymologies of “technical” to
54
was likely derived from the German Technik, its plural technics, in its earliest sense of
“the branch of knowledge” and “a subject of study” dealing with “mechanical and
applied arts,” was probably after German technologie.132 The last major author who
preferred this taxonomical sense of knowledge is Lewis Mumford, with his monumental
book Technics and Civilization of 1934. Mumford described technics as “the field [of
practical arts], that part of human activity wherein, by an energetic organization of the
process of work, man controls and directs the forces of nature for his own purposes.”
“Technics,” he continued, “began when man first used his fingers for pincers or a stone
for a projectile.”133 In comparison, contemporary philosopher Don Ihde uses technics to
conjure up both the senses of artifact and action of technology: artifacts that are
instrumental in human purposive actions, and conversely, the human actions that use
the artifacts to attain goals.134
Technology, on the other hand, originates from the Ancient Greek τεχνολόγος
(technologos) and τεχνολογία (technologia). Both terms are prefixed by τεχνο– (techno),
a cognate of techne to form compound words. Τεχνολογία, closer to English technology
in spelling (and also how modern Greeks call technology), represents “systematic
the Greek τεχνικός and the French technique and explains “Belonging to arts; not in common or popular
use” with an example sentence from John Locke (1632–1704). The first dictionary that has “technic” (as
adjective) is Noah Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language (1828, first edition). “Technic”
and “technical,” as two equivalents placed side by side under the same entry, means first, “Pertaining to
art or the arts,” and second, “Belonging to a particular profession.” But Webster himself did not prefer to
use “technic.” The fields Webster thought could be called “technical” included metallurgy, law and
theology. In the preface, Webster praised there had been “composition … [of] technical precision [in the
United States, comparable to England]” and in the introduction he said he had included “technical terms”
from botany. See "Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022; Phillips, The New World of English Words,
1658; Blount, Glossographia, or a Dictionary, 1656; Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 1755;
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, 1828; Harris, Lexicon Technicum: Or, an
Universal English Dictionary of Arts and Sciences., 1704.
132
See the entry technic, technics and technology in "Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022. According
to the OED, “technic” as noun and its plural “technics” appeared in text no later than 1764 and 1839,
respectively. The OED noted that “technic” as noun was chiefly an American word. The plural form
“technics” can be found in Noah Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language (1828, first
edition), which has both “technic” (as adjective, see footnote 131.) and “technics” (as noun). “Technics,”
to Webster, was “The doctrine of arts in general; such branches of learning as respect the arts.” I conclude
that this sense of technics in the 19th century arose from German technologie.
133
Mumford, Art and Technics, 1952, 15. Langdon Winner appeared to appropriate the expression
technics and used it extensively in his writing in early times, and ended up eschewing this expression
except in the context of Mumford’s works. Compare the following two works: Winner, Autonomous
Technology, 1977; Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 1986.
134
See, inter alia, Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, 1990, 12; Ihde, Technics and
Praxis, 1979, 36, 40; Ihde, Existential Technics, 1983, 1.
55
treatment, of grammar, etc.”135 The same roots –logy and –λογία are found in modern
academic terms like sociology and biology in contemporary English and Greek. Other
terms like γενεαλογία (genealogy) and αστρολογία (astronomy) have been used in the
Greek language since the time of Plato and Socrates.136 Technologie in German and
French still keeps a strong sense of an academic field of study dedicated to knowledge
about German Technik, French technique or technologie, or English technology, with a
caveat that they are not entirely compatible.137 The other Ancient Greek word
τεχνολόγος consists of a prefix τεχνο- (techno) and λόγος (logos), meaning “writer on
the art of rhetoric,” or more generally, “treating by rules of art.”138 Both the two Greek
nouns were used no later than the first century BCE, and they were initially concerned
only with the use of rhetoric.139
135
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 1785.
136
For example, ἀστρολογίας as in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 4.7.4, and γενεαλογία as in Plato’s Cratylus
396c.
137
See Wikipedia entries of “Technologie (Deutsch),” “Technologie (Français),” and “Technology
(English).” There is no better way to probe the full scope of their most present meanings other than
looking into and comparing their corresponding Wikipedia pages. The German page on technologie starts
by saying “Technologie im heutigen Sinne ist die Wissenschaft und Lehre von der Technik zur Planung und
Herstellung von Industrieprodukten.” (Technologie in today's sense is the science and teaching of
technology for planning and manufacturing industrial products.) The page is not available in any other
language, indicating that the Wikipedia community cannot find a foreign term suitable for German
technologie. Technologie, pioneered and made popular by Johann Beckmann (1739–1811), arose out of
the context of teaching of Technik by university. It is clear that the educational component of “teaching”
makes it difficult for any single foreign word to emulate. The sense of technical education once dominated
the limited use of technology in the English language during the nineteenth century, and yet it has been
lost except in the formal names of educational institutes like Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The
French entry on technologie opens with “La technologie est l'étude des outils et des techniques.”
(Technologie is the study of tools and techniques.) The entry corresponds to a brief German entry of
Allgemeine Technologie (General Technologie), an academic field which researches on Technik and which
was established by Beckmann, and to the English entry of technology. English technology begins with
“Technology … is the sum of techniques, skills, methods, and processes used in the production of goods or
services or in the accomplishment of objectives, such as scientific investigation.” As Schatzberg succinctly
concluded, “the American concept of technology, shifting its meaning from a field of study to the object
of study.” Schatzberg, "Technik Comes to America," 2006, 489, 519; Frison, "Some German and Austrian
Ideas on Technologie and Technik between the End of the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the
Twentieth," 1998, 108.
138
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 1785. Earlier editions of Greek–English dictionaries
explained it as “treating by rules of art” based on more general, later use of the word. Cf. Liddell and
Scott, An Intermediate Greek English Lexicon, 1888, 804; Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940,
1785.
139
The authoritative lexicographical text on Ancient Greek, A Greek-English Lexicon, known as Liddell-
Scott-Jones by the last name of the three authors, has documented a number of examples of τεχνολόγος
56
An earlier use, nevertheless, was their verb cognate, τεχνολογέω, dating at least to
Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE) Rhetoric (hereafter Rh.) in the fourth century BCE. In this text,
Aristotle spoke of rhetoric (ῥητορική) and one of its activities being to uphold an
argument (λόγον, the accusative and singular of λόγος, Rh. 1.1.1–1.1.2). He went on and
said these (rhetoric) activities could be brought into a system of guides (ὁδοποιεῖν or
ὁδῷ ποιεῖν) because we can inquire (θεωρεῖν, or speculate, theorize, etc.) the reason
(αἰτίαν) why people succeed in reaching their goal (of persuasion). This inquiry is
basically the proper business of art (τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι). Aristotle referred to people
who devoted themselves to this kind of investigation as those who systematize the arts
of arguments and rhetoric (οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες, Rh. 1.1.3). Soon he
would combine τέχνας (the accusative plural of τέχνη) and λόγων (the genitive plural of
λόγος) into a single verb τεχνολογοῦσιν, which means using rules (or methods) of
rhetoric art for treating a subject matter (Rh. 1.1.9).140 Later, the verbs were used as the
Ancient Greek participles (which are τεχνολογούντων and τεχνολογοῦντας, Rh. 1.2.4
and 1.2.5)141 and its semantic use was accordingly changed. Along with a grammatical
article, they mean “those who systematically inquire the art of rhetoric,” thereby
inverting the two words’ attributive relation, i.e. from techne of logos (i.e. rhetoric art)
to the logos of techne (i.e. reasoning about (rhetoric) art), as a consequence of
incorporating the two Greek words which convey systematize, inquire and system of
guides (from Rh. 1.1.1–3) in the single verb neologism.142 The changes of their semantic
relationship are summarized in Table 2.4. For its derivative τεχνολόγος (technologos),
many translators would opt for “writers of (rhetorical) treatises,” presuming that the
only way to systematize the rhetoric art was through writing.143
and τεχνολογία, spanning the works of Philodemus (ca. 110 BCE–ca. 35 BCE), Cicero (106 BCE–43 BCE),
Anonymus Londinensis (ca. the first century CE), Plutarch (45–120 CE), Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160–ca. 210
CE) and Iamblichus (ca. 245–ca. 325). Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 1785.
140
The word τεχνολογοῦσιν is the present active indicative of τεχνολογέω. Lexicographers translate
τεχνολογέω as “to bring under rules of art, to systematize” or “prescribe as a rule of art” Liddell et al., ed.,
A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 1785; Liddell and Scott, ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1897, 1548.
141
Both the two words are the present active participle of τεχνολογέω. Greek τεχνολογούντων is its
genitive case while τεχνολογοῦντας the accusative case.
142
All translation in the paragraphs are my own, based on the Greek text in Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric,
1982, 2, 6, 16. Note that in Rh. 1.1.3, the genitive λόγων modifies τέχνας, hence techne of logos. The
accusative τέχνας is the direct object of the verb συντιθέντες, which means “put together constructively,”
“set in order organize,” and “narrate in writing,” according to Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon,
1940, 1727. While translators may interpret it as “compile,” for example, in John Henry Freese’s (1982)
translation, I think “systematize” better captures Aristotle’s intention throughout the whole context. To a
certain extent, the sense of systematize was incorporated into logos by Aristotle shift of focus toward a
system of knowledge, thereby rendering the compound word logos of techne.
143
For example, translations of 1.2.4 and 1.2.5 as in Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1982, 17.
57
Table 2.4: Changes in Semantic Relations Between τεχνο and λόγος
Appearance Greek Text Meanings

[οἱ] τὰς τέχνας τῶν [those who systematize] the arts of
Rh. 1.1.3
λόγων [συντιθέντες] arguments and rhetoric
τεχνολογοῦσιν treating (a subject matter) through rules
Rh. 1.1.9
(τεχνολογέω) (or methods) of (rhetoric) art
τεχνολογούντων and
Rh. 1.2.4 and (systematically) inquire about the art of
τεχνολογοῦντας
1.2.5 rhetoric
(τεχνολογέω)
Assuming that logos corresponds exclusively to writing and treatise proves to be a

limited perspective, however. This brings us to the word logos, which is at stake. In
Ancient Greek, depending on the context, logos have different meanings in three main
categories:144
1. Thinking (and reasoning), reason (and ground), inward debate of the soul,
computation (and reckoning), reason (as a faculty), etc.
2. Verbal expression, utterance, mentioning, thing spoken of (and subject-matter),
phrase, complex term, etc.
3. Discussion, debate, deliberation, discourse and reflection (on reality),
explanation (in general), statement of a theory, argument (and discourse), law
(and rule, principle, etc.), thesis (and hypothesis), narrative (in general), speech
(as delivered in court), fable, legend, tale, etc.
Since logos is a term with diverse meanings and since there were few instances of the
use of τεχνολόγος in Ancient Greek, it remains unclear what made techne distinct from
technology to the Greeks.145 From the work of philosopher of technology Carl Mitcham,
it seems that technology in Greek can only be grasped as “words about techne” or
“systematic thought concerning an art,” where the art or techne is most commonly the
art of rhetoric.146 Any attempt to demarcate between techne and technology along the
line of the presence of Greek logos would likely fail, as techne already entails a selected
144
All explanations here are reorganized based on Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 1057-
1059.
145
See my next chapter. Refer also to Schatzberg, Technology: Critical History of a Concept, 2018, 75-76.
146
Mitcham, Thinking through Technology, 1994, 129.
58
sense of logos in terms of technical reason and rationality.147 Even the logos hereby
implied in techne is ambiguous, if we try to integrate Plato’s interpretation of logos into
the context of Aristotle’s text.148 As we will see shortly, Aristotle considered techne
(τέχνη) as an acquired habit (or trained skill, ἕξις) of making (or production, ποιητική) in
tandem with true logos (ἀληθοῦς λόγου), and it is clear that logos (λόγος) must have a
central role and be implied in techne.149 It is for this reason that logos, in the limited
sense of reason and rationality, cannot be the decisive factor that separates τέχνη from
τεχνολόγος or τεχνολογία.
Ancient Greece: The Emergence of Technology as Meta-techne
I argue that despite a bewildering variety of meanings and references of logos, and as a
corollary, of technology, from the Ancient Greek τεχνολογία (and τεχνολόγος) and to the
early twentieth century English technology (but not our modern sense of technology),
the idea of technology nevertheless had a common, meaningful structure. That is,
technology had been an attempt, as it were, to formalize and systematize techne,
making the otherwise tacit, unformulated art and craft into knowledge that is not only
communicable, replicable, and teachable, but also more effective and oriented to the
achievement of the very end and function that defines, ipso facto, a techne. Technology
had always been efforts (whether they are logos or techne or both) in and over a techne,
or what I call meta-techne, in the same way that meta– modifies meta-analysis and
meta-cognition. As activities, meta-techne is any effort to formalize and systematize
techne. Knowledge about the rules and skills of techne is its outcome and purpose. In
this respect, technology, as meta-techne, can still be a techne, though on a different
level.
What counts as meta-techne, indeed, depends on its historical context. The above
etymologies of technology dating back to Ancient Greece show that the Greeks were
engaging in treating a subject of art by its rules, primarily in the study of grammar (with
the implied rules of language, see below). All these activities not only reveal an attempt
to establish the techne of a techne that is central to the understanding of Ancient Greek
technology. They also suggest there is knowledge about effective rules and techniques
147
See my following text. Refer also to Mitcham, Thinking through Technology, 1994, 117-130.
148
See my next chapter.
149
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 334-335 (1140a.20-25).
59
of arts (techne) discovered by the meta-techne proper. For example, in Xenophon’s (ca.
431–354 BCE) dialogue Oeconomicus, Ischomachus shows Socrates how easy
agricultural techne (γεωργική τέχνη) is, if one learns “how things ought to be done” by
either “watching men at work” or “by just being told, well enough to teach another.”150
(Oeconomicus 15.2, 15.10, 18.10, hereafter Oeco.) “Ought” here suggests there are
rules to follow. Xenophon utilized a significant number of passages in which
Ischomachus showed Socrates the rules of agricultural arts, such as the need to weed,
and persuaded him that agriculture as a whole, including the casting of seeds (ῥίπτειν τὸ
σπέρμα), is not an intricate and complex art (ποικίλη τέχνη) like he thought.151 (Oeco.
17.7) The emphasis on the effective ways of carrying out art was also present in non-
Western civilizations. For example, Shuowen Jiezi, a second-century Chinese dictionary
(ca. 121 CE), noted that measuring instruments and time-tested procedures must be
followed to be skillful in craft work.152
The dialogue of Oeconomicus shows that communication plays a primary role in meta-
techne, where Ischomachus engaged Socrates in a dialogue and taught him agricultural
arts. Since first-hand knowledge about the rules of techne is intrinsically inductive,
ancient humans, as gregarious animals, must have been able to disseminate knowledge
that is personal in nature to other folks through a lively combination of utterance and
body language, because social units of various sorts and scales were the only medium by
which skills of techne could be passed within and between communities and from
generation to generation. Teaching techne by in-person communication necessitates a
contemplation and reasoning of one’s own techne, of how things are done in a
particular way that is supposed to be effective. Rendering techne communicable,
teachable, and transferable is undoubtedly the earliest kind of meta-techne in human
history, if techne in question is of a collective nature. Presumably, techne grew in
sophistication with effective and accurate means of communication, and the increased
complexity of spoken languages was in tandem with the circulation and development of
techne in civilization.153
150
Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923, 479, 481, 483, 500
151
Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923, 490.
152
In the entry for gong (工), which means artful work and skills, Shuowen Jiezi further explicated the
ideal conditions for craft work, “rules and laws [such as the use of measuring instruments and time-tested
procedures] must be followed to be skillful and do work in gong [as artisans and craftsmen]. Otherwise,
one would need to have a keen sense of vision [in order not to make mistakes].” The facsimile of Shuowen
Jiezi and its text reflow are widely available on the Internet.
153
Compare my treatment of the interplay between language and techne with Mumford, "Technics and
Human Development," 1986, 309-310.
60
Writing, a form of communication more durable and portable than verbal expression,
marked a milestone of meta-techne, albeit applied not in techne in general (such as in
craft work), but in the techne of the language of communication (e.g. rhetoric) itself.
Take Ancient Greece as an example. Writing, as a way to preserve memory and
document knowledge, was relatively widespread in Attica during 750–480 BCE.
Epigraphical evidence and literary evidence together suggest that writing existed in the
form of dedications and inscriptions, in addition to manuscripts of poetry and prose.
While formal writing was frequently employed by craftsmen, it was not used to teach,
communicate and circulate the techne of their craft (though with few debatable
exceptions), but to decorate vases and engrave inscriptions in order to carry the
prestige of the others.154 This position is not as asserting that craftsmen did not produce
any inscriptions for communication or circulation, but that such “writing” (γρᾰφή) was
not comparable in formality, durability, length, or esteem to manuscripts and
handbooks.155 It is noteworthy that both Socrates and Plato were outright against
writing treatises about philosophy (and knowledge in general), as they believed that
engaging in a lively Socratic dialogue in person was the only true way to knowledge of
the truth. Writing was thought to be a pretension to the attainment of truth, and its
authors were unanswerable to inquiries and challenges.156
Before the introduction of any writing systems, young children could learn a language
simply by speaking with and learning from adults. Given that speaking of a language
antedated its written form, the writing system is itself an invention, an artifact, and a
technology. Plato, for example, indicated in his dialogue Cratylus (408a–409d) that
wording (λόγος) is a contrivance (μηχανήν).157 The need to be able to write must have
been a human construct, in that the invention of writing, therefore, constituted a formal
attempt to represent spoken words of communication and to codify its rules. Inventing,
154
Ceccarelli, Ancient Greek Letter Writing, 2013, 27-32, esp. fn. 36; Thomas, "The Origins of Western
Literacy: Literacy in Ancient Greece and Rome," 2009, 349-353; Harris, "Speech and Writing," 2009, 49.
Indeed, there were serious writings on “techne,” such as Xenophon’s works on hunting (Cynegeticus),
horsemanship (Hipparchicus and On Horsemanship), and on agriculture and household management
(Oeconomicus). As a military leader and joining his teacher Socrates, his goals and interests may well have
been of a political and rhetoric nature.
155
Ancient Greek verb γράφω may mean drawing signs, representing by lines, inscribing and writing. Its
noun γρᾰφή denotes both the activities and their products. Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon,
1940, 359-360. The two words in Modern Greek only keep the dimension of writing. English words graph,
though etymologically derived from γρᾰφή and similar to it in spelling (“graphe”), represent drawings.
156
Harris, "Speech and Writing," 2009, 47-49.
157
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 6, 1953, 86-91.
61
formalizing, and maintaining a system of writing was therefore a meta-techne of a

language. While a history of writing is beyond the scope of my research, it is at least
illuminating to point out that it was a collective and divergent invention that could only
be standardized through manifest efforts and dominance.158 First brought out of spoken
languages, knowledge of the linguistic rules and techniques formulated in the
development of writing (and reading) would conversely become the foundation and
benchmark of proficiency in a language, as the concept of “literacy” readily suggests.
By the fourth century BC, Classical Athens formally introduced a spelling reform and
adopted the Ionic alphabet.159 Greek γράμμα, which parallels English grammar in
spelling (but not in meanings), has referred to alphabetic letters since Ancient Greece. In
Plato’s (ca. 428/427 BCE–348/347 BCE) Cratylus (432a), the interlocutor Cratylus, in
speaking to Socrates, referred to alpha and beta as γράμματα (i.e. letters, plural of
γράμμα) and represented the art of correctly spelling words (ὄνομᾰ) by γραμματικῇ
τέχνῃ. Elsewhere (431b), Socrates implied that sentences, or “a combination of verbs
and nouns,” had similar rules of arrangement, which today we would call grammar.160 In
Plato’s time, letters (and presumably “grammar”) that were necessary for basic reading
and writing were taught to small children by “grammatists” (γραμματιστής, or “one who
teaches γράμματα [letters]”). Advanced skills, such as “exposition, interpretation, and
criticism,” were taught to pupils (at the age about 7–14) by the “grammarian”
(γραμματικός), who not only knows letters, but is also more professional and scholarly
with regard to “literary texts” and “textual criticism.”161
There were also poets and logographers, who were professional writers who employed
the art of rhetoric in writing. Homer, for example, was accorded “the inventor of
rhetoric,” who not only manifested mastery of arranging narratives, but also exemplified
and sometimes also taught the principles of “effective speaking” through his rhetorical
158
For example, in modern history, standardization of spelling was often enforced by a government or a
national language academy that had the authority over national languages and education. In the case of
the English-speaking world, spelling standards were by renowned publishers such as Oxford University
Press and Merriam-Webster and by notable lexicographers like Noah Webster and Samuel Johnson. See
Daniels, "Grammatology," 2009, 26., which cites Neijt, "Spelling Reform," 2006.
159
Adrados, A History of the Greek Language: From Its Origins to the Present, 2005, 177; Harris, "Speech
and Writing," 2009, 50.
160
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 6, 1953, 161.
161
Enos, "Ancient Greek Writing Instruction," 2001, 27. See also the entries of γραμματιστής and
γραμματικός in Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 359.
62
epic heroes.162 Lysias (445 – 380 BCE), a logographer, was known to have given a speech
in Plato's Phaedrus and was said to be one of the Canon of the Ten Attic Orators by later
generations. His rhetorical skill benefited from his teachers, the sophist Protagoras
(c. 490 – c. 420 BCE) on the one hand, and the notable rhetorician Tisias (fl. 5th century
BCE). Tisias’s teacher, Corax (fl. 5th century BCE), was said to “invent” rhetoric around
476 BCE through “devis[ing] a systematic approach to argument when it became
necessary to settle lawsuits over property confiscated by tyrants.”163 These rhetoricians
and sophists, as Xenophon accused, had produced books (γράμματα) that were teaching
no virtue but instead empty (ματαίων) subjects and a search for “words for their own
sake” (ῥήματα αὐτοῖς).164
Common in all the preceding examples, we may conclude that technology, if we can call
it at all, formalized and systematized techne in Greek through the use of words, whether
spoken words or writing, to systematize, communicate and teach the knowledge of
techne from agriculture to rhetoric. There was no more effective way to turn memory
and knowledge into a systematized way of knowing than through organized words. I
posit that the connection between knowledge and words is the reason why among the
various meanings of Greek λόγος, thinking and reasoning (cognitive process) are
coexistent with speech and verbal expression (utterance), and these two categories
blend together in harmony in the last sense of λόγος: thesis, narrative, statement,
argument, discourse, etc. With these broad senses of λόγος, the Ancient Greek
technology as meta-techne was an effort to describe or discuss techne, through spoken
or written words, for informal teaching or systematic treatment of techne. In Ancient
Greece, the epitome of λόγος must be the live performance of a Socratic dialogue
(Σωκρατικὸς λόγος).165
Ancient Greek Technology in Latin Europe: A Short Overview before 1600
As “logos of techne,” the Greek neologism of “technology” never caught on as a word or

as an apparent idea for practitioners of arts and crafts until the eighteenth century, for
162
Garrison, Persuasion, Rhetoric and Roman Poetry, 2019, 137-138.
163
Katula and Murphy, "The Sophists and Rhetorical Consciousness," 2003, 24, 48.
164
My translation of Xenophon’s On Hunting (13.1–13.3) based on Xenophon, Scripta Minora, 1946, 450-
451.
165
The modern dialogue in Greek is διάλογος, where διά is through. In Ancient Greek, διάλογος was used
by Plato and Aristotle to represent conversation and debating arguments. Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-
English Lexicon, 1940, 402.
63
apparently there was no need for scholars to systematically spell out the rules of art in
formal writing to circulate beyond a particular location and time, before practitioners
were able to learn and carry out their trade. For one thing, clear-cut and formalized
rules might not have been established for a trade, while trial and error and embodied
skills were the primary avenues to true knowledge. Well-thought-out plans and detailed
designs, as in today’s large engineering projects, could be non-existent or unheard of.
These are evidenced by the construction of Chartres Cathedral during the thirteenth
century, when the master builders, masons, and carpenters relied chiefly on on-site
communication and patterns or molds of artifacts in the live tradition of a community of
practice. There was unlikely written communication between practitioners. Visual
communication, when present, was through drawings on parchment or paper that were
tentative in nature.166
For another, the “tacit, embodied skills” of crafts that were not amenable to written or
spoken words could only be transmitted through years of training under contracts of
apprentices managed by medieval guilds.167 A survey of apprenticeship contracts in
thirteenth-century Genoa (now a city of Italy), for example, showed that some masters
in carpentry did not even bother to lay out in the apprenticeship contracts the skills they
would teach to apprentices. Phrases like “as is the custom” and a promise to “teach
diligently the art of working wood as best [they] knew” would suffice.168 In some trades,
writing and drawings, as an instrument for private records and memory, were the
personal property of trade secrets and strictly protected by their owners. According to
the economic historian Francesca Trivellato, private “recipe books” for glassmaking
were so precious in Murano that they “were included in women’s dowries, and theft
from rival furnaces was not unknown.” Furthermore, glassmaking guilds in early modern
Italy never prescribed production processes in detail, allowing for experimentation and
competition.169 Since these documents were similar to modern experiment logs
166
Turnbull, "Talk, Templates and Tradition: How the Masons Built Chartres Cathedral without Plans,"
2000.
167
Epstein, "Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe," 1998, 688.
According to Epstein, apprentices would need to acquire not only “a range of different production
methods and technologies,” but also knowledge about “markets, competitive standards, and negotiation
with other artisans, labourers, and merchants.” See ibid, fn. 13.
168
Epstein, Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe, 1991.
169
Trivellato, "Guilds, Technology, and Economic Change in Early Modern Venice," 2008, 223-224, fn. 95.
The author did not specifically date these glassmaking recipe books in her work. I rely on the two Italian
recipe books she cited and establish the rough timeline to be the sixteenth and seventieth centuries.
64
intended for personal use and record, instead of publication or communication, they
were lacking in formal, systematic treatment of knowledge.170
It will, however, be an anachronism to say there had been no similar concept of Greek
“technology”—systematization or writing of rules of arts—at all. Greek episteme, Latin
scientia, and English practice all had included this sense of technology long before it
became a world-renowned word. Ancient Greek ἐπιστήμη, corresponding to modern
Greek επιστήμη (“episteme”), is often translated by modern lexicographers as
“understanding,” “skill,” “knowledge,” or “science.”171 Aristotle, for example, defined
“science” as conclusive knowledge deduced from first principles that are inductive.
Systematic knowledge of arts was implied when he spoke of “arts” (τεχνῶν) together
with “sciences” (ἐπιστημῶν) or “investigation” (μέθοδος, applicable to a method,
system, etc.).172 Furthermore, the parts of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus on agricultural
techne (γεωργική τέχνη), as well as his other works on hunting and horsemanship,
would count as Greek “technology,” namely, writings that systematically discuss rules of
arts.173 When John Locke (1632–1704) spoke of “practice” (πρακτική), his second
division of “sciences,” it is what a person “ought to do, as a rational and voluntary
Agent, for the Attainment of any Ends,” which indicates that art and techne are clearly a
part of the sciences practice he spoke of.174
Similarly, Latin scientia, the etymological source of modern science, suggests an

understanding of an art or science and its expert knowledge. Expert knowledge of an art
implies being familiar with its rules, embodied in skills.175 English scholar Thomas Elyot
170
Trivellato described these receipt books as a medium where “glass masters annotated the quantity and
types of raw materials that they mixed together in their day to day work.” Glassmakers who acquired a
recipe book from others would need to “experiment with” the recipes before being able to go into
production. Trivellato, "Murano Glass, Continuity and Transformation (1400-1800)," 2006, 149, 154.
171
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 660.
172
See Nicomachean Ethics 1094a.1–10. Aristotle considered “science” as the knowledge concluded
through deduction from first principles (or “universals”), the latter of which are derived from induction.
To possess scientific knowledge would require a person to be able to demonstrate through a series of
deduction that their “conviction” can be “arrived at in a certain way.” See Nicomachean Ethics 1139b.15–
35 as in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 332-333.
173
See also footnote 154.
174
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1970 [1690], 361. To him, skill of practice entails
“[rightly] applying our own Powers and Actions.” The most important of practical skills, he went on, is
ethics, “which is the seeking out those Rules, and Measures of humane Actions, which lead to Happinese,
and the Means to practise them.”
175
See the entries of sciens, scienter and scientia in Glare, ed., Oxford Latin Dictionary, Second Edition,
2012.
65
(ca. 1490–1546) translated scientia into “counnynge” (cunning), which, in Middle

English, represented practical wisdom.176 And indeed, the list would also include Middle
French science (1571), Italian scienza (1598), and Old Spanish sciencia (1599, now
ciencia). Their translations in English in the sixteenth century all included “skill” and
“knowledge.” Italian scienza also added “wit,” and Old Spanish sciencia had “cunning,”
in their respective entries.177 It follows that the ideas of technology, in the sense of rules
of techne to achieve an effect, had long been embedded and rendered necessary in the
complex of the practices of techne and science.
Strictly speaking, unlike Ancient Greek techne, which has a transliterated counterpart
techna in Latin, there is no Latin word for technology. While Latin technologia is
somewhat recognized according to the English-language Wiktionary (and other Internet-
based dictionaries), modern printed Latin-English dictionaries skip it and all its
equivalents.178 When European scholars compiled Greek-Latin dictionaries in the
sixteenth century, while techne corresponded to Latin techna, Greek technology
(including all its variances and declensions) was left out of Latinization.179
Lexicographers, for example, explained in Latin that τεχνολογία is “discussion and
reasoning about art, artful/artificial oration, rule/method of art.”180
One of the earliest sources we have regarding the use of technology in Greek alongside
Latin text is a letter of the Roman statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) to
Atticus in 54 BCE, where technology means a technical discussion.181 Long after the time
176
See both the entries of scientia and Plato in Elyot, The Dictionary of Syr Thomas Eliot Knyght, 1538.
177
Florio, Worlde of Wordes [Dictionarie in Italian and English], 1598, s.v; Hollyband, A Dictionarie French
and English, 1571, s.v; Perceval, A Dictionarie in Spanish and English, 1599, s.v. The authorship of A
Dictionarie French and English is subject to debate, but it is likely to be Claudius Hollyband, according to
research of Porter, "Authorship of a Dictionarie French and English (London, 1571)," 2001. For the
historical and linguistic difficulty of attributing “technology” to knowledge of art in early modern Europe,
see Klein and Spary, ed., Materials and Expertise in Early Modern Europe, 2010, 3-4.
178
Anonymous, "Wiktionary," 2021; Glare, ed., Oxford Latin Dictionary, Second Edition, 2012; Glare, ed.,
Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
179
Gessner, Lexicon Graecolatinum, 1537; Budé et al., Lexicon Graecolatinum, 1530; Toussain, Lexicon
Graecolatinum, 1552; Gilles, Lexicon Graecolatinum, 1532; Junius, Lexicon Graecolatinum Per Hadrianum
Iunium Novissime Auctum, 1548. All the above dictionaries included techna in the entry for τέχνη. Some
dictionary rejected the practice of including techna in τέχνη, but would employ it when explaining other
words or translating Greek sentences. For example, Budé, Lexicon Graeco-Latinum, 1554.
180
In Latin, “sermo & ratiocinatio de arte, artificiosa oratio, artis formula.” Toussain, Lexicon
Graecolatinum, 1552, s.v.
181
Cicero wrote “reliqui libri τεχνολογίαν habent” (i.e. the remaining books have τεχνολογίαν), where
τεχνολογίαν means a systematic treatment or “a technical discussion,” as in 4.16 of Cicero, Letters to
66
of Cicero, by the sixteenth century, European classical scholars had been familiar with its
idea. Still, writers in Latin often needed to switch to Greek and include the foreign word
in the middle text of their native languages when referring to technology.182 In the
seventeenth century, when writers began to employ technologia in Roman script and
assemble the full scope of its meanings, they clearly had the Greek source in mind, and
their interpretation was not free from its legacy.
Ancient Greek technology, concerning the art of rhetoric, was often associated by earlier
writers with the employment of sophist instruments of persuasion and verbalism to get
the upper hand in religious debates through techniques of arguments and obscuring the
essence of God’s words.183 For example, Basil of Caesarea (330–379) separated the
heretics who employed the technical arrangements of words (τεχνολογεῖν) from those
who engaged in true discourse on God (θεολογεῖν).184 Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 335–ca.
395) named the persuasive devices of the former as a “system of blasphemy”
(τεχνολογία τῆς βλασφημίας).185 Theodoret of Cyrus (ca. 393–ca. 458/466) accused his
adversary of presenting technology as theology (τὴν θεολογίαν τεχνολογίαν
ἀπέφηνε).186 It is noteworthy that in two of these examples, Ancient Greek technology
(τεχνολογία) was explicitly contrasted with theology (θεολογία), by playing with the
prefixes τεχνο- and θεο-.
From Rhetoric to Presentation: “Technology” in 1600–1700
Atticus, with an English Translation Vol. 1, 1912, 314-315. Scholars have said it was Cicero who imported
this word into Latin from Greek. See Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 1958, 353 fn. 4;
Wolfe, Humanism, Machinery, and Renaissance Literature, 2004, 3. I would argue that the “importation”
was an incomplete one.
182
For example, Petrus Ramus (1515–1572), a French philosopher and rhetorician, used Ancient Greek
τεχνολογίαν in two prefaces written in Latin for his collection of work. The prefaced were dated 1559.
Ramus, Collectaneae Praefationes, Epistolae, Orationes, 1577, 2, 90. Cited in Ong, Ramus, Method, and
the Decay of Dialogue, 1958, 353 fn. 4. Another example is Pierre Martini (1530–1594), a French scholar
writing on Hebrew grammar. In a rather awkward manner, he told readers in the subtitle of his book that
“accessit hac edition τεχνολογία” (τεχνολογίαν has been added to this edition). Martinez, Grammatica
Hebrae: Accessit Hac Editione Τεχνολογία, 1590.
183
Ludlow, "Contra Eunomium Iii 10—Who Is Eunomius?," 2014, 459.
184
Escribano Paño, "Heretical Texts and Maleficium," 2010, 128 fn. 105.
185
Brugarolas, "Divine Attributes and God's Unity in the Ce I," 2018, 416 fn. 20.
186
My translation of the Greek text, with a reference to the Latin translation “Hic artis argūtiās theologiae
adhibuit,” which means rendering the cunning of eloquence as divinity. Note that the Latin phrase artis
argūtiās in lieu of a term like technologiae misses the contrast drawn between θεολογίαν and
τεχνολογίαν. See Theodoretus Cyrensis Episcopus, "Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium," 1864, ch. 4.3
or col. 419-420.
67
By the dawn of the seventeenth century, Ancient Greek technology had long been laden
with rhetoric in religion and was thrown into a new context amidst sharp exchanges
between Protestants and Catholics. The debates were not new, but they were elevated
to a new level to the extent that discourse was now carried out and written in the
mother tongues of Europeans, instead of Latin or Greek.
It was against this backdrop that technology (and its spelling variants) emerged, brought
out first by continental authors. The earliest instance of use I can find in the existent
publication is in 1604, when Daniel Tilenus (1563–1633), a Germen-French Protestant
theologian, was concerned that the art of rhetoric and verbalism was employed for
corrupt purposes. In native French, he drew a distinction between “theologie” and
“technologie.” His work was translated into English in 1606. In defending “the
sufficiency and perfection of the holy scriptures” against the sacred tradition of the
Roman Catholic Church, Tilenus launched into a tirade, declaring that “the ministers of
the Pope’s Gospell … cannot better [e]nrich themselves … in converting Divinitie into
such a Technologie, in cutting of and clipping the Gospell of Jesus Christ,” where French
theologie was rendered English divinity and the tensions between theologie and
technologie in French was accordingly lost in the translation.187 The 1606 text in English
preceded the earliest record of the appearance of technology provided by the Oxford
English Dictionary.188
In a parallel movement, Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614), a French classical scholar and

polymath, was also disturbed about rhetorical art. But in a manner different from
Tilenus, he was more concerned that secular sciences and arts, with their typical mode
of inquiry and discourse, had become emulated in the Christian community. When
translating his Latin title into English (both published in 1612), he lamented in the
newly-added book dedication:
[M]en, void of God’s spirit, commonly and promiscuously did dispute of spirituall
things, and convert Theologie into technology, that is, make no other use of
187
Tilenus, Defense De La Suffisance Et Perfection De L'escriture Saincte, 1604; Tilenus, A Defence of the
Suffiency and Perfection of the Holy Scripture, 1606. Some obsolete spelling has been discreetly fixed to
reduce unambiguity for contemporary readers, here and hereafter. The French source is the second
edition after the 1602 first edition, to which I have no access. I cannot determine if the translation into
English was by Tilenus himself or other people.
188
As of this writing, the online version of the authoritative Oxford English Dictionary indicated that the
word “technology” appeared first in 1612 based on existent English text it found. See "Oxford English
Dictionary Online," 2022, s.v.
68
Divinity but as a matter of learned, or artificiall discourse, as they talke of other

arts and sciences out of humane reason. From this licence, which now almost
every where [bears] sway, rise so many new [terms], and such diversitie of
formes of speech, and sentences which daily more and more breed dissention in
the Church of God.189
Casaubon explained in Greek, in the marginal notes, that “so the humans’ discoursing
on [secular] arts [shall] not [be the mode of] discoursing on God” (τεχνολογοῦσι λοιπόν
οἱ άνθρωποι οὐ θεολογοῦσι). His reference to Greek logos conjured up both the senses
of discourse and words, as manifested in the quoted passage, and evidently, the Greek
legacy was carried into technology, which signifies not only an artificial invention, but
also a secular enterprise.190 He was ready to agree that “all Christians” believe “the
divine nature is united in the same person [i.e. Jesus Christ] with the humane [flesh].”
However, he warned that Christians should not probe further into “the sacred mysteries
of Christian religion” or try to find an explanation of these masteries with mortal
sciences, because “faith in matters of Theologie is one thing, and humane science is
another.”191
The kind of continental arguments that juxtaposed theology and technology was later
picked up by a few English writers, who were more moderate in arguments and carefully
distanced themselves from controversies. English preacher Edward Willan (fl. 1651), in
one of the dedications in his collection of sermons, alluded with customary modesty
that he was short of the devices of rhetoric and oratory:
Indeed I ever intended θεολογείν in composing of this Sermon for the Pulpit, but
τεχνολογείν, I never studyed, never intended, and therefore cannot but admire,
that any in that Auditory should admire it for Technologie [originally emphasized
in italics]. Surely the common abuses of the Pulpit in these Times beneath the
189
Casaubon, The Ansvvere of Master Isaac Casaubon to the Epistle of the Most Reuerend Cardinall Peron,
1612, unpaged. Note that the Latin original text does not have this dedication.
190
Whereas in English Casaubon compared Theologie with humane science, in Latin text (p. 35)
Theologiam (accusative singular of theologia) with humanam scientiam were juxtaposed. There is not a
word of technologia in the Latin text: Casaubon, Isaaci Casauboni Ad Epistolam Cardinalis Perronii,
Responsio, 1612.
191
Casaubon, The Ansvvere of Master Isaac Casaubon to the Epistle of the Most Reuerend Cardinall Peron,
1612, 28-29.
69
Majesty of it, have caused those Sermons to [be] Christened Neate, which are
not too too slovenly. With [me] to Preach honestly is to Preach elegantly.192
In a similarly discreet manner, Joseph Mede (1586–1639), an English scholar, wrote in a

letter to his friend in 1637, that “[s]ome men have such an unhappiness of Logick, that
by an affected following their methods and Technological artifices they make things
more obscure and intricate, which in the true use of Logick should be made more easie
and perspicuous.” Mede specifically linked the failing of technology to both the misuse
of words and logic. He identified, through the help of including Greek words, that the
disputes among many contemporary theologians were not only a fight about words
(λογομαχία), but also disputes over logic (λογικομαχία).193
The antithesis between theology and technology apparently prompted some efforts to
reconcile the two. Caspar Streso (1603–1664), a German academician, strived carefully
to both systematize theology and make it an applicable knowledge. His success seemed
to be recognized by the English Church, and he tried to formalize what others had said
about Christianity rather than joining personally in the dispute over contested divine
matters, thus avoiding “turning theology into technology” and being well-received.194
On the title page of his Technologia Theologica (1633), Streso meticulously and
confidently laid out his topics, including, among others (“inter alia”):
The doctrine of logical analysis and genesis, more particularly elaborated, toward
an applied Theology. The most special Theological method and study, being
prescribed [here]. Forms of speeches have exactly been completed according to
the precepts of Logic. Also according to the custom that has been closely
adopted within the Church of England, [all] being described [here]. Finally,
toward the establishment of a kind of restoring and deliberating, on Theological
192
Willan, Six Sermons, 1651, 28. Both θεολογείν and τεχνολογείν are the present active infinitive of the
verbs of theology and technology.
193
The letter was dated July 24 in 1637, and was posthumously collected and published by his student
John Worthington (1618–1671). Mede, The Works of the Pious and Profoundly-Learned Joseph Mede,
B.D., 1672, 871.
194
Streso was an important model for Samuel Hartlib (ca. 1600-1662), a German-English polymath, and
was recognized on his list of reformers. Streso’s works were circulated by Hartlib to his colleagues and
discussed in his personal notes. Keller, Knowledge and the Public Interest, 1575–1725, 2015, 171. John
Wilkins (1614-1672), an English clergyman and natural philosopher, listed Streso’s Technologia Theologica
among “some of the most eminent, and common” references that have “laid down such various helps and
rules.” Wilkins, Ecclesiastes, or, a Discourse Concerning the Gift of Preaching, 1651, 3.
70
matters that have been written, being given [here]. With the example that
follows afterward, being delivered [here].195
Significantly, Streso’s ambitious theological project revived the aspect of Ancient Greek
technology different from rhetoric or oration that had provoked controversies:
systematic treatment of knowledge, with a contrived quality of neutrality. As discussed
earlier, arising from the Greek tradition of rhetoric, the idea of reasoning and systematic
treatment in relation to Greek logos and technology had been the deliberate
arrangement of words or the instruments of rhetorical languages to express ideas and
thoughts, and, accordingly, rarely escaped the ill-fated portrayal of being persuasive and
manipulative. An exception had been Latin technologia. Unlike English technologie or
technology, Latin technologia was often limited to the systematization of grammar. An
example is Pierre Martini’s (1530–1594) Grammatica Hebraea Technologia, a grammar
book on the Hebrew language, acclaimed by an English schoolmaster in 1612 to be “the
most used of all the learned, as most methodicall and perfect.”196 Streso’s appropriation
of Latin technologia in the context of theology was an anomaly.
The confluence of unfavorable interpretations of Ancient Greek technology as the art of

words and the use of discourse—the emphasis on the sides of words and discourse
rooted in Ancient Greek logos—would eventually be overshadowed by the dimension of
reasoning and systematic treatment.197 By the 1630s, scholars had expanded the scope
of Ancient Greek technology, now under the new look of Latin technologia, to useful
knowledge other than grammar, rhetoric, or theology. Tobias Venner (1577–1660), an
English physician, said on the title page of his book The Baths of Bathe (1628) that it is “a
necessary compendious treatise concerning the nature, use, and efficacy of those
famous hot waters.” Elsewhere, he would “lay open [his] Baths Technologie,” or his
195
“Doctrina analyseos & geneseos Logicae particularius elaboratur, & ad Theologiam applicatur,
methodus studij Theologici specialissime praescribitur, concionum formae exacte secundum praecepta
logicae, nec non secundum morem in Anglicana Ecclesia fere receptum, describuntur, & denique ad
instituendam Theologicorum Scriptorum quandam reductionem consilium datur, & exemplo mox
sequuturo praemittitur,” as on the title page of Streso, Technologia Theologica, 1633.
196
Brinsley, Ludus Literarius, 1612, 245. The grammar book John Brinsley the Elder (fl. 1581–1624)
commented on was a posthumous edition in 1612 (or 1611): Martinez, Grammatica Hebraea, Accessit
Hac Editione Technologia, 1612. Instead of Latin Technologia, the book Martinez managed to publish
during his lifetime used Greek τεχνολογία in the title: Martinez, Grammatica Hebrae: Accessit Hac
Editione Τεχνολογία, 1590. See also footnote 182.
197
Refer to the three main categories of the meanings of logos, in text that follows footnote 144.
71
“Bath-guides,” to the hot springs the English town Bath was known for, hoping that
more people, “for their infirmities, [would] finde remedie at the Baths.”198
The most ambitious project of broadening Ancient Greek technology was a more
general effort at techne—not to write in a particular technical subject, but to establish a
general taxonomy and system of arts. An example is William Ames (1576–1633), an
English Protestant theologian and philosopher inspired by Streso, his friend. Ames
decided that a term he and his colleagues had long used, technometria, could also be
dubbed technologia. Drawing from Greek, technometria, as a combination of techno
and metria, is the survey or measurement of art.199 According to Ames and his followers,
technometria is to “adequately (and precisely) circumscribe (and prescribe) the
boundaries and purposes of all the arts and each of the individual arts.”200 Under the
taxonomy of technometria, on the one hand, art in general “is the idea of [good
practice, or εὐπραξίας] methodically delineated by universal rules” and theology, as the
divine teaching, is the art of living well.” On the other, Ames maintained that theology
should better be called “a ‘doctrine’ rather than an art because it arises out of
revelation, ‘not from nature and human inquiry like others’.”201 Though the terminology
he sought to define was technometria, not technologia, he nonetheless used the two
terms interchangeably in text, thus expanding the idea of technologia in the sense of
systematic treatment to arts in general.202
Similar attempts at general taxonomy of knowledge included Johann Heinrich Alsted

(1588– 1638), a German Calvinist and compiler of encyclopedias. In the introductory
pages of his voluminous encyclopedia, Alsted identified Technologia as the second of
the four praecognita, where praecognita means “fundamental elements of instruction,
198
Venner, The Baths of Bathe, 1628, title page, 9-10.
199
Gibbs, "William Ames's Technometry," 1972, 616.
200
My translation draws from two sources. First, “Technometria, omnium & singularum artium fines
adaequate circumscribens” as in the cover of Ames, Technometria, Omnium & Singularum Artium Fines
Adaequate Circumscribens, 1633. Latin fines has both the senses of boundaries and purposes. Second,
“Technometriam, qua utraque omnium disciplinarum ac facultatum limites ac fines accurate
praescribuntur” as in “ad lectorem” (to the reader) of Ames, Magni Theologi Ac Philosophi Acutissimi,
Philosophemata, 1643, unpaged. The posthumous source added limites to fines, confirming the twofold
meanings of fines in the earlier, 1633 edition.
I refer to Ames, Technometria, Omnium & Singularum Artium Fines Adaequate Circumscribens, 1633.
201
Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William Ames: Dutch Backgrounds of English and American Puritanism,
2016 [1972], 115; Gibbs, "William Ames's Technometry," 1972, 621.
202
Ames, Technometria, Omnium & Singularum Artium Fines Adaequate Circumscribens, 1633, 34; Ames,
Magni Theologi Ac Philosophi Acutissimi, Philosophemata, 1643, 37.
72
expected to prepare [one's] learning intellect for easier understanding of [all]

disciplines.”203 The encyclopedia aimed to educate its readers on an enormous scope of
knowledge. Technologia, as preliminary key knowledge to all the systems of knowledge,
is concerned with “the learning about the properties (qualities), order and quantity of
disciplines.”204 Known as the first modern encyclopedia, Alsted’s compendium is “the
methodical comprehension of all things to be taught to man in this life” and prolifically
spanned seventy-nine disciplines.205 Alsted’s younger contemporary, Christoph
Scheibler (1589–1653), a German philosopher and Lutheran theologian, adapted a
similar approach to categorizing knowledge. Yet he elevated technologia to a
methodical undertaking to categorize both sciences and arts, as he defined
Technologia [originally emphasized in italics, here and hereafter] is the

methodical Description of Arts and Sciences to inform mind, whereby a human is
guided by the love of wisdom, divine, and humane things are understood, [a
human] knows the very God, and [a human] mediates upon better death. And to
such a degree, to live and die, or [a human] learns somewhat through nature's
very light.206
The methodology (and technologia) of describing art, as an instance of systematizing

techne, reflected another effort often buried in the commitment to knowledge in
history, that is, the advancement of the art of memory. Scholars had long grappled with
the retention of knowledge. Even Greek classical philosophers like Socrates and Plato,
though adamantly against writing to record knowledge, would in some cases make
compromises and transform knowledge into the written form; ironically, if not, how
were their words passed down through generations? In Plato's dialogue Phaedrus, for
example, Socrates allows and recognizes the use of writing for the sake of one’s “own
203
My translation of the text “Praecognita omnium disciplinarum sunt institutio anticipata, praeparans
animum discentis ad faciliorem disciplinarum intelligentiam.” Alsted, Encyclopaedia Septem Tomis
Distincta, 1630, 49.
204
My translation of the text “Technologiam, id est, doctrinam de proprietatibus, ordine, & numero
disciplinarum.” Alsted, Encyclopaedia Septem Tomis Distincta, 1630, 61.
205
Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William Ames: Dutch Backgrounds of English and American Puritanism,
2016 [1972], 121. Another source said his encyclopedia “[treated] thirty-seven disciplines in some five
thousand folio columns.” Hotson, Johann Heinrich Alsted 1588-1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation,
and Universal Reform, 2000, 9.
206
My translation of the text “Technologia est Artium & Scientiarum methodica Descriptio ad mentem
informandam, qua Homo Amore Sapientia[e] ductus, Res Divinas & Humanas intelligendo, Deum &
Seipsum cognoscat, & Mortem rectius meditetur; & sic, & Vivere & Mori, vel ex ipso Natura[e] Lumine
aliquantulum discat.” Scheibler, Philosophia Compendiosa ... Compendium Methodicum, 1639, 2.
73
amusement or as a private aid to recollecting truths already recognized.” Plato’s

“distaste for writing” might be linked to his presbyopia, forcing him “to rely on dictation
to secretaries,” and his later works no longer favored dialogue as the privileged form of
composition.207
By the seventeenth century, European academicians had conflated memorization and

learning and equated memory with “intellect” and “sense.” As a consequence, finding
an effective “method of teaching and learning most conducive to memory” became a
concern.208 There were some self-help books on general mnemonics circulated in the
market as “the art of memory.”209 But these were far surpassed in quantities by books
about divinity. These books promoted in the title pages the value of organizing the
content “for the helpe of memorie.” Some said their book had been “… [m]ethodically
composed, for the helpe of weake memories.”210 Still, others assured that their books
are concise and “short for memory.”211
In this dynamic context, it became clear that technologia was not only a method to
systematize knowledge. In a perspicuous, systematic way to delineate and organize
knowledge, technologia also facilitated an improvement in learning, as Alsted
mentioned in the previously-quoted text the components of “easier understanding”
(faciliorem … intelligentiam), and likewise, Scheibler with his goal to “inform mind”
(mentem informandam).212 Breaking loose from rhetoric as an augmentative way of
persuasion, technologia now attained the appearance of not only an objective, scientific
way of presentation, but also a straightforward rendering of concepts for easier reads.
207
Harris, "Speech and Writing," 2009, 48-49. Most of works commonly attributed to Plato are dialogues.
Exceptions included his series of letters. But even the authenticity of the Seventh Letter, which is widely
considered the letter that was mostly likely to actually belong to Plato, has been questioned. My position
is that the authenticity of Plato’s non-dialogue works is a moot point for my overall argument.
208
Hotson, Johann Heinrich Alsted 1588-1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation, and Universal Reform,
2000, 41.
209
Petrus, The Art of Memory, That Otherwyse Is Called the Phenix, 1545. In Middle English, it was also
called “the arte of memorye” as on the title page of Gossuin of Metz, The Myrrour & Dyscrypcyon of the
Worlde, 1527.
210
“… for the helpe of memorie…” in both Allen, An Alphabet of the Holy Proverbs of King Salomon, 1596;
Burton, An Abstract of the Doctrine of the Sabbaoth, 1606. “…for some helpe of memorie…” in Aylett, A
Briefe Chronologie of the Holie Scriptures, 1600. “…Methodically composed, for the helpe of weake
memories…” in Bridges, Gods Treasurie Displayed, 1630.
211
For example a book that consists of catechisms: Hieron, The Doctrine of the Beginning of Christ, 1617.
212
The Latin facilior (of which faciliorem is the accusative), meaning easier, forms the semantic basis of
modern English facilitate.
74
Alsted and Scheibler, for example, both carefully organized the structures of their
writing and generously provided at the beginning of their books many pages of synopses
and diagrams of the book outlines.213 For the first time, the term technology, as meta-
techne, broke off its exclusive ties with rhetorical words, a central component of Greek
logos as a way of organizing knowledge, and went on to embrace other forms of
expression.214
The semantic shift of technology from rhetoric to presentation, and from persuasion to
representation, was significant and influential. When philosopher and theologian Henry
More (1614–1687), in his late years, wrote a book for expositions of the Apocalypse of
Saint John, technology no longer had the negative connotation of rhetoric or argument
that was contrary to theology. At the close of the book’s preface, he told his readers
that he included an “epilogue.” The epilogue features diagrams and tables, among many
others, that will “refresh thy memory after thy reading my Exposition.” “This Harmony
[of all of the elements],” he confidently delivered, “is so admirable and surprizing, that
unless thou hast a Genius [i.e. intellect] dead or stupid to matters of this nature, thou
canst not fail to be enravished [i.e. enraptured] with the consideration.” He concluded
that his epilogue “may go for a kind of Technology to our Exposition.”215
In some exceptional cases, the art of memory went hand in hand with the memory of
art. Sir George Buc (ca. 1560–1622), an English scholar and historian, used “general
Technologie” to denote the collection of knowledge of every possible art, which in its
English form in 1612 appeared an anachronistic expression ahead of his time, because it
appeared earlier than most of my above other references. Buc enthusiastically
celebrated London, the city itself, to be “the third university in England,” in addition to
Oxford and Cambridge. He observed and exclaimed that there were “so many arts,
213
See Alsted, Encyclopaedia Septem Tomis Distincta, 1630, 1-46; Scheibler, Philosophia Compendiosa ...
Compendium Methodicum, 1639, 1-8. In the title page of the new, 1639 edition, Scheibler advertised as
“Huic Editioni … Praefigitur Technologia Prooemialis” (this edition is prefaced with introductory
technologia), a feature unseen in an older version: Scheibler, Philosophia Compendiosa, Seu Philosophia,
1631.
214
Note also that written words had been rendered insufficient to express ideas by the middle of the
seventeenth century. “Devise” (with its obsolete meaning of an “emblematic figure”), as a “connexion of
figures and words, so strictly united together,” was argued to be superior to pictures or words alone.
Devise is “nothing else, but a rare and particular way of expressing [one’s] self; the most compendious,
most noble, most pleasing, and most efficacious of all other that humane wit can invent.” Where the
French said devise, the Italian called it imprese. Estienne, The Art of Making Devises, 1646, 10, 13.
215
More, Apocalypsis Apocalypseos, or, the Revelation of St. John the Divine Unveiled, 1680, xxx-xxxi.
75
faculties, and Sciences” being “read, taught, studied, and professed” and practiced in
the city by “[diverse] Professors … residing in this Universitie.” He concluded that “the
Art of Memorie is taught within this Universitie of London” to the extent that the city, as
a whole, was able to “[attain … any] of these arts, sciences, and faculties, and to retaine
their principles, and rules, in minde and remembrance” and to “serve for an apt close of
this general Technologie.”216 Buc must have the Ancient Greek technology in mind, and
in a comprehensive manner, he manifested in the above passages the contribution of
the collective, lived memory of London’s citizens to the circulation and upkeep of the
knowledge of sciences and arts.
The ambitious generality of technology, as an umbrella term for either methodical

descriptions of all knowledge or abstract collections of all their rules and principles,
would end up yielding to the specificity of certain arts (and sciences). The fusion of the
revamped technology as presentation, representation, and instruction, on the one hand,
and being selective and discriminatory about knowledge, on the other, gave birth to a
limited sense of technology as an initiative for describing, explaining, and teaching of
terminology and “technical terms” for specific arts and sciences. For example, when
Gerardus Mercator’s (1512–1594) atlas was translated into English in 1635, the book
was appended with a table of “technologicall words” with definitions and
explanations.217 John Brinsley (1600–1665), an English clergyman, in a book on the
schism of the church in 1646, spent one page or so explaining “schism,” including its
etymology, and concluded the word is “an Ecclesiastical, or Techno-Logical term … a
term of art”218 Sir Thomas Browne (1605–1682), an English polymath, in his famous
1658 book on funerary urns and burial customs of ancient Roman Norfolk, explained in
one place that “the mother of Life and Fountain of souls in Cabalisticall Technology is
called Binah.”219
216
Text was reorganized and Middle English words were replaced in quotes for contemporary reading.
See Buc, "The Third Universitie of England," 1615, 988. Buc’s article was appended at the end of the
posthumous edition of John Stow’s (1525–1605) chronicles of English history expanded by Edmund Howes
(fl. 1607–1631). Buc dated his dedication of article on August 24, 1612, appearing on ibid, 961.
217
Mercator, Historia Mundi: Or Mercator's Atlas, 1635. The table of technological words was an
invention in the English edition, which earlier Latin editions did not have. The table was likely added by
the translator Wye Saltonstall (fl. 1630–1640). Cf. Mercator, Atlas Sive Cosmographicae Meditationes,
1609.
218
Emphasis in original, Brinsley, The Araignment of the Present Schism of New Separation in Old England,
1646, 13.
219
Browne, Hydriotaphia, Urne-Buriall, 1658, 192.
76
An outgrowth of the need to define and explain terminology was a general interest in
compiling glossaries for “technical terms.” In fact, many earliest single-language
“dictionaries” were for hard words only, before comprehensive dictionaries became
available.220 In English, for example, the earliest dictionaries were nothing more than
glossaries for difficult words and foreign terms, such as A Table Alphabeticall (1604), An
English Expositor (1616), and The English Dictionarie (1623).221 But technical terms were
not collected and included in a glossary book until a few decades later. The earliest
glossary for technical terminology in the English language was Thomas Blount’s (1618–
1679) Glossographia (1656). The voluminous book, close to 700 pages, included foreign
terms from nine other languages “as are now used in our refined English Tongue,” and
also “the Terms of divinity, law, physick, mathematicks, heraldry, anatomy, war, musick,
architecture, and of several other arts and sciences explicated.”222 The volume also
provided very brief etymologies with selected historical developments.
A parallel work was authored by German statesman and educator Johann Michael
Moscherosch (1601–1669). Remarkable for technology, the German-French glossary
was titled “Technologie allemande & françoise,” which the author meant in French to be
a German-French “technologie.”223 The book was dedicated mostly to arts, in addition
to sciences and divinity. In the preface, Moscherosch set out that the book is:
about the terms of arts and works, as the scholars speak / about that [sort of]
word exercise / so [that] one [has] the most precise term of each and all the
matters / To talk about tool and work of the artisans and handicraftsmen / and
220
Parenthetically, comprehensive dictionaries were initially complied for foreign speakers, and consisted
of a mapping of words in two languages, without further explication.
221
These were made most apparent on their title pages. A Table Alphabeticall is about “[containing] and
teaching the true writing, and understanding of hard usuall English wordes, borrowed from the Hebrew.”
An English Expositor concerns “teaching the interpretation of the hardest words used in our language.”
The English Dictionarie is “An interpreter of hard English [w]ords … already printed in our language.”
Cawdry, A Table Alphabeticall, 1604; Bullokar, An English Expositor, 1616; Cockeram, The English
Dictionarie, 1623.
222
Quoted from the title page of Blount, Glossographia, or a Dictionary, 1656.
223
The 1656 wordbook Technologie allemande & françoise was recognized as the earliest source of French
technologie, according to the authoritative French etymology dictionary Rey, Dictionnaire Historique De La
Langue FrançAise, 2010.
77
know how to speak of each / as the customary-art of necessity and of

embellishment requires.224
Soon Thomas Blount would include the word technology. His second edition of
Glossographia (1661) became the earliest dictionary in English that has a dedicated
entry for technology. The enlarged volume of Glossographia, subtitled “a dictionary
interpreting the hard words of whatsoever language, now used in our refined English
tongue,” describes technology as, verbatim, “(Gr.) a treating or description of Crafts,
Arts or Workmanship.”225 Put in a play on words, technology now had an entry for
technology, the meta-techne now being able to explain (“treat of”) itself!
In Blount’s definition, what exactly do “arts” refer to in technology? While Blount did
not give it a formal definition, references to “arts” in the context of 1661 Glossographia
showed that the concept of arts was understood by the author as knowledge that has
rules to be understood and followed, and essentially, there was hardly any knowledge
that cannot be called an art. Blount created entries for “mechanical arts” and “liberal
sciences” and included seven fields for each, as if there had been a distinction between
arts and sciences.226 However, in each entry for four of the liberal “sciences”—logic,
rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic—he explained each to be an “art.” For the rest of three—
grammar, music, and astrology—rules for grammar and music were introduced and
implied the status of art,227 and astrology was the only one to be called science in the
entry, as “a Science which tells the Reasons of the Stars and Planets motions.”
Nonetheless, in “mathematics,” we were told that mathematics is “Sciences or Arts
taught by demonstration, and comprehend four of the Liberal Sciences,” consisting of
arithmetic, geometry, music, and “astronomy” (which were confused with astrology). All
the seven liberal sciences, along with mathematics, were therefore deemed as “arts” as
224
“von den terminis Artium & opificiorum, wie die Gelehrten reden / von der jenigen Wortübung / da
man die genaueste benamsung aller und jeder stücke / Werckzeug und Arbeit der Handwercker und
Handthierungen zu sagen / und mit einem jeden zu reden weiß / wie es die Kunst-übliche Zierde und
Nohtdurfft erfordert.” Moscherosch, Technologie Allemande & FrançOise, 1656, sig. ):(2r-v. Note this
German passage contains a couple of words in obsolete spellings.
225
Blount, Glossographia, or a Dictionary [Second Edition], 1661.
226
Blount listed what he called the “seven Mechanical Arts”: agriculture (or husbandry), clothing,
navigation, hunting, architecture, medicine and military discipline. And the “seven Liberal Sciences”:
grammar, logic, rhetorick, astrology, geometry, arithmetic and music. See entries for mechanical arts and
for liberal sciences in Blount, Glossographia, or a Dictionary [Second Edition], 1661.
227
Glossographia has several entries that are related to their rules. For example, “parisyllabical,”
“concord,”
78
well with rules to follow.228 Even theology, for its mysterious component, was said to
have “certain Rules, by the practice … a vertuous Christian may attain to a nearer, a
more familiar, and beyond all expression comfortable conversation with God.”229
In terms of “treating by rules of art,” Blount’s definition validated the Greek meanings of
technology with the newly established interest in useful arts. But there was another
quality change of technology as meta-techne from Ancient Greece to seventeenth-
century England: the use of publication as the medium of knowledge circulation. With
scribes and printing becoming widely available, in describing or treating a subject, no
medium was more durable for the recording of knowledge than through publications.
Now in Blount’s time, any serious description of arts was recognized in written forms,
and predominantly, in printed books, as books offered ample place for the systematic
treatment of knowledge and art. Within its own intertextual references, the above
“treating … of” in Blount’s definition of technology means treating a subject. Wherever
treating of was referred to in Glossographia, in most cases, books were involved. The
fields these books were “treating of,” as appears in the entries, were extraordinarily
wide-ranging, from hunting, fishing, medicine, and water engines, to military tactics,
war, ethics, politics, astrology, and prognostication.230 These diverse subjects and
knowledge, which were generally understood as arts (and/or sciences), encompassed
the full scope of the subjects of contemporary technology.
228
The same conclusion can be drawn from the dictionary of Edward Phillips (1630–ca. 1696), a
contemporary lexicographer who plagiarized Blount’s 1656 Glossographia and published his own in 1658.
Where Blount called liberal sciences, Phillips used “liberal arts,” a phrase now familiar to us. In the title
page, Phillips spoke of arts and sciences simultaneously, as he advertised that the words he compiled
spanned “throughout the Arts and Sciences, Liberal; and Mechanick.” See Phillips, The New World of
English Words, 1658.
229
In “Mystical Theology” of Blount, Glossographia, or a Dictionary [Second Edition], 1661.
230
A more comprehensive list of instances include (note, from the second example on, an ellipsis always
stands for “books treating”): “books treating of Navigation or shipping” (Argonauticks), “… of Chronology”
(Chronologicks), “… of hunting” (Cynegetica, or the Latin Cynegetica), “… of moral Philosophy and
manners” (Ethicks), “… of [fortunes of men based on the time of birth]” (Genethliaques), “… of
[agriculture]” (Georgicks), “… of Exercise” (Gymnasticks), “… of fishes or fishing” (Halicuticks), “… of the
Liver” (Hepatiques), “… of horses” (Hippiaticks), “writing of, or describing Clocks or Dyals”
(Horologiography), “… of water, or of water Engins” (Hydriatiques), “… of Physick [i.e. Medicine] and or
natural phylosophy" (Physicks), “… of Spirits or the winds” (Pneumaticks), “verses treating of war, or
treatises of war” (Polemicks), “… of the Government of a City or Commonwealth” (Politicks), “… of many
Disciplines” (Polymathicks), “… of Prognostication” (Prognosticks), “a writing, treating, or describing of
Pyramids” (Pyramidography), “a Book treating of syllables, or teaching the use or knowledge of syllables”
(Syllabary), and “… of Feasts and Banquets” (Symposiaques), “they whose office is to set an Army in array;
also … of that subject” (Tacticks), and “… that speak or entreat of places of invention” (Topicks).
79
From General Knowledge to Industrial Arts: English “Technology” in 1700–1950
Limited by the space of this chapter, I cannot do justice to more comprehensive

historical developments of the idea of the word technology.231 But it should be sufficient
to point out, with a broad brush, one aspect of technology’s development in the English
language, that is, the development of its referent from general knowledge to industrial
arts. In order to effectively and briefly address this development, I resort to a selection
of English dictionaries published between the wide periods of 1700–1950 to be my
sample of semantic changes through the vantage points of lexicographers.
Since Thomas Blount’s second edition of Glossographia (1661) was published, there had
been very few developments of technology in dictionary text until the close of the
seventeenth century. Not distinct from Blount’s, Elisha Coles’s (ca. 1640–1680) An
English Dictionary (1676), a glossary in nature, defined technology as “a treating of arts
or workmanship.”232 Edward Phillips (1630–ca. 1696), who plagiarized Glossographia
(1656) in many instances in his own glossary, The New World of English Words (1658),
had not included technology throughout his lifetime in the subsequent second to fifth
editions (1662, 1671, 1678 and 1696).233 Blount himself and his successor(s) did not
amend his take on technology, either, as in the subsequent third to fifth editions (1670,
1674, and 1681).
Significant changes did not take place until Abel Boyer (ca. 1667–1729), a French-English
lexicographer, explained bilingually in The Royal Dictionary (1699) that English
231
This task proves to be an extremely difficult one, as it spawns a couple of methodological questions.
For example, should we focus only on the sematic use of the word “technology” or the concept of
technology (and useful, industrial arts) in general? Should we include the use of all spelling equivalents of
English “technology,” as in French, German, Italian, Spanish, Greek, etc. too? And what social groups will
be our focus to study the use, for example, journalists, politicians, scientists, engineers, philosophers,
educators or the general public? While Eric Schatzberg’s works are the very few ones that were able to
touch on these dimensions, he acknowledged that his analysis “is necessarily limited,” because his
approach was to “focus on the scholarly use of a single term [of technology and its close variants],
primarily within the social sciences.” See Schatzberg, "Technik Comes to America," 2006, 488.
232
Coles, An English Dictionary, 1676, s.v.
233
The fifth edition even leaved out technical, which all the previous editions had. Phillips, The New World
of Words [Fifth Edition], 1696, s.v. The series claimed to be a “General English Dictionary,” but was in fact
close to a glossary, as simpler words like “art” was not included.
80
technology is, “a Description of Mechanick Arts.”234 Later lexicographers followed suit,

confirming that technology should be qualified with a tint of mechanical arts. John
Kersey (fl. 1720), who took up the work of Edward Phillips in the sixth edition of New
World of Words (1706), made revisions to technology, rendering it “a Description of
Arts, especially the Mechanical.”235 Blount’s successor(s), similarly, updated its
explanation: “a Description of Arts, chiefly Mechanical.”236 Nathan Bailey’s Dictionarium
Britannicum (1730) said technology is “a Description of Arts, especially mechanical
ones.”237 Thomas Dyche’s A New General English Dictionary (1735) provided “A written
Description of Arts and practical Sciences.”238 Benjamin Martin’s Lingua Britannica
Reformata (1749) presented exactly the same text as Bailey’s.239
It appeared, however, that technology did not acquire a mainstream audience

throughout the eighteenth century. John Kersey, though revising the entry of
technology in Phillips’s 1706 New World of Words, did not include it in his own A New
English Dictionary in 1713, which was claimed to be “a compleat collection of the most
proper and significant words, and terms of art commonly used in the language.”240
Technology was also excluded from Benjamin Norton Defoe’s A New English Dictionary
(1735), which announced it was “containing the true meaning of all words in the English
Language.”241 John Wesley’s The Complete English Dictionary (1753), said to explain
“most of those hard words,” omitted technology.242 Even more significantly, Samuel
Johnson’s (1709–1784) path-breaking general dictionary, A Dictionary of the English
Language (1755), did not include technology, even though Nathan Bailey’s 1730
dictionary was a primary source for his own work, and Johnson had acknowledged many
definitions from Bailey.243 Technology was left out of later editions of John’s dictionaries
published in England in the seventeenth century, as well as the first American edition
234
The full entry is “subst, (a Description of Mechanick Arts) Technologie, Description des arts
Mécaniques.” Boyer, The Royal Dictionary, 1699, s.v.
235
Phillips and Kersey, The New World of Words [Sixth Edition], 1706, s.v.
236
Blount, Glossographia Anglicana Nova, 1707, s.v. The edition was revised and published by an
anonymous author, but the authorship is still generally attributed to late Blount.
237
Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum, 1730, s.v.
238
Dyche and Pardon, A New General English Dictionary, 1735, s.v.
239
Martin, Lingua Britannica Reformata, 1749, s.v.
240
Kersey, A New English Dictionary [Second Edition], 1713, title page.
241
Defoe, A New English Dictionary, 1735, title page.
242
Wesley, The Complete English Dictionary, 1753, title page.
243
Shapiro, ed., Fixing Babel, 2017, 143, 216.
81
based on the 11th London edition.244 John Walker’s renowned and popular A Critical
Pronouncing Dictionary (1791) skipped technology too.245
The causes of the unpopularity of technology were twofold. First, there were always
other more common expressions to account for a description of arts; simpler words,
such as book or writing, would suffice. Second, the word technical appeared to play an
important role. Unlike technology, which does not have a Latin precedent, technical was
developed from Latin technicus, a word that had been known by English speakers
writing in Latin. As early as 1538, Latin–English dictionaries contained technicus, saying
it is “artificiall, inventive.”246 Most English dictionaries in the eighteenth century actually
included technical, and calling an unusual word a technical term or word was common.
To some extent, technical could easily replace technology. For example, Benjamin
Norton Defoe (1735) had technical, explaining it as “Artificial, belonging to the Terms
and Rules of Arts and Sciences.” John Wesley (1753) created an entry for “technical
words,” which is “terms of art.” 247 Samuel Johnson (1755) said technical was “Belonging
to arts; not in common or popular use” and cited an example from John Locke (1632–
1704) related to the proper use of “technical words.”248 And John Walker (1791)
welcomed technical in his pronouncing dictionary, indicating that the word was
frequently used at least among the learned.
It was on the other side of the Atlantic that English technology gained traction in
mainstream dictionaries for the general public during the first half of the nineteenth
century, initially without connotations of mechanical arts. The landmark publication of
Noah Webster’s (1758–1843) American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)
marked the first time in an English dictionary that technology was given more than one
sense: first, “A description of arts; or a treatise on the arts,” and second, “An
explanation of the terms of the arts.”249 Webster’s dictionary thus formally summarized
two aspects of technology—systematic treatment of arts as well as terminology
explanations—that had gathered momentum for the last two centuries in the English-
244
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language First American, from the Eleventh London Edition, 1819.
245
Walker, A Critical Pronouncing Dictionary and Expositor of the English Language, 1791.
246
Elyot, The Dictionary of Syr Thomas Eliot Knyght, 1538, s.v.
247
Wesley, The Complete English Dictionary, 1753.
248
See also footnote 131.
249
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, 1828, s.v.
82
speaking world. Joseph Emerson Worcester (1784–1865), former assistant of Webster,

included technology, as “A description or discourse upon arts.”250
Both sources show that the two iconic American lexicographers preferred the general
senses of technology, setting aside its connotation of mechanical arts. Their
considerations must have been weighted against George Crabb’s Universal
Technological Dictionary (1823), an English source Webster cited for his second sense of
technology as the explanation of the terms of arts. Indeed, Crabb’s dictionary as a
whole, advertising itself as the “familiar explanation of the terms used in all arts and
sciences,” was itself a vivid example of “technology.”251 Crabb’s dictionary defined
technology as “a description of arts, especially those which are mechanical,” which
Webster was very likely aware of, because he cited Crabb’s text when he defined a
number of technical terms. It must be a thoughtful decision to generalize technology,
rather than ignorance of its connection with industrial developments on the other side
of the Atlantic.
From the 1860s on, American technology would start associating itself with mechanical
arts. Despite many editions that were published after the first 1828 edition of
Websters’, no significant changes were made to the definition until Noah Porter’s
(1811–1892) revised edition was published in 1864 (or 1865). In a remarkable move for
both breadth and accuracy, Porter defined technology with the following three senses,
which, as a set of definitions, none of the previous dictionaries could rival252:
1. A description of, or a treatise on, the useful arts.

2. An explanation of technical terms, especially of such terms as are employed in
the mechanic or useful arts.
3. A collection and explanation of terms peculiar to an art or science.
250
Worcester, A Comprehensive Pronouncing and Explanatory Dictionary of the English Language with
Pronouncing Vocabularies, 1830. Unlike Webster, Worcester’s definition was far from original. He took
the definition from Henry Todd’s (1763–1845) revision of Johnson's dictionary, to which Todd had added
many new words. The example Todd used was technology in the sense of art of grammar, taken from
Schoolmaster: Grammatica Reformata, or a general examination of the Art of Grammar by John Twells
(1683). See Johnson and Todd, A Dictionary of the English Language, 1818, s.v.
251
Crabb, Universal Technological Dictionary, 1823, title page.
252
Noah’s revised edition was published in 1864. The definition I quoted below was taken from a 1865
edition, as in Webster et al., An American Dictionary of the English Language, 1865, s.v.
83
Eventually, the first half of the twentieth century saw technology predominantly fixed to
industrial arts. The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia (1889–1891), for example,
described technology as “That branch of knowledge which deals with the various
industrial arts; the science or systematic knowledge of the industrial arts, as spinning,
metal-working, or brewing.”253 The 1911 edition added crafts and technologically
“upgraded” its examples, “… of the industrial arts and crafts, as in textile manufacture,
metallurgy, etc.”254 In 1942, the entire entry got rid of examples of crafts altogether and
became “The branch of knowledge that deals with the industrial arts; the science of the
industrial arts; also, the terminology of an art, science, etc.; technical nomenclature.”255
The first explanation from Webster's New International Dictionary of the English
Language (1942), likewise, attached technology to industrial arts: “Industrial science;
the science or systematic knowledge of the industrial arts, esp. of the more important
manufactures, as spinning, weaving, metallurgy, etc.”256
Technology in Our Modern Time
Despite the above earlier interpretations, our present understanding of technology in

the English language, nevertheless, ceases to be meta-techne, or an effort to formalize
and systematize techne. On the one hand, technology is similar to technique, as ways of
doing things predominantly in the sense of useful knowledge. As Eric Schatzberg
succinctly summarized, the idea of technology “shift[ed] its meaning from a field of
study to the object of study—that is, from the study of the industrial arts to the
industrial arts themselves.”257 On the other hand, our technology for the most part
represents cutting-edge artifacts that are the products of the industrial arts. And instead
of enumerating a list of relatively new techniques bounded by the present time,
technology gazes into the future and is committed to a timeless pursuit of, if not
imperative for, newer techniques, making “old technology” almost sound like an
oxymoron. David Edgerton, in his The Shock of the Old, repeatedly added scare quotes
to “old” when he referred to “old” technology throughout the text.258 This is despite the
253
254
Smith and Whitney, ed., The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, 1911, s.v.
255
Emery and Brewster, ed., The New Century Dictionary of the English Language, 1942.
256
Neilson et al., ed., Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 1942, s.v.
257
Schatzberg, "Technik Comes to America," 2006, 511. The development of technology (as meta-techne)
into techne is outside the scope of the dissertation and has been competently researched by Schatzberg in
the afore-cited article and his book Technology: Critical History of a Concept.
258
Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900, 2006.
84
fact that technology can be old and mundane, as discussed at the beginning of the
chapter.
These developments of technology largely conclude that technology itself, initially logos
of techne from Ancient Greece, is no longer inclusively science of techne as a branch of
knowledge. Rather, technology is now a close equivalent of techne. Even though
colloquially speaking, techne can be common and mundane, in popular culture,
technology is significantly narrowed to mean the more advanced techniques and
artifacts and connote technological progress.259 In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I would use
high technology to denote the latter, more advanced technology that is restricted to the
state-of-the-art. And when I speak of technology (or technique) without a modifier, I am
referring to the former sense that is broader in scope. In this way, I intend to salvage
technology from the bondage of high technology through what French linguists call a
restoration or reformation (réfection), by bringing it closer to its Ancient Greek etymon
techne (τέχνη).
Evidently, the internal tension within the same word between the common-sense
interpretation of ordinary technology and the endless pursuit of high technology
revolves around the multiple senses techne, the Ancient Greek equivalent of the
present-day technology in English, may refer to. It would be instructive to investigate
linguistically what techne means, its scope and moral characters, by tracing the genesis
of techne to Ancient Greece in light of the tension between the two aspects of
technology. Of various possible arts, techniques, and forms of knowledge, how did
techne get differentiated? How did technology, as meta-techne that inclusively covers
the knowledge and study of a variety of techniques, end up being limited to that of the
industrial arts? And what took the place of Ancient Greek technology and became our
present-day state-of-the-art meta-techne?
As I will investigate in the next chapter, or Chapter 3, a key intermediate of these

developments lies in the binary performance and quantitative assessment of a limited
type of techne, known as machine, or war engine, in ancient military engineering. It is
within the critical junctures of siege operations that privilege binary and quantity of
machine that the preliminary form of modern engineering emerged. In the chapter that
follows, or Chapter 4, I will argue that the notion of the efficient and ever-evolving
machine dominated the ideas of engineering in the nineteenth century when engines—
259
The tension between the two senses is well capture by historians of technology through a “thought
experiment” in Vinsel and Russell, The Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has
Disrupted the Work That Matters Most, 2020, 37-41.
85
first steam engines, and later dynamos—became the exemplars of “means” and “tools”
that excluded other slower-improving technologies, such as buildings. Our modern
engineering, in its dominant form drawing from this tradition, is not precisely
technology or technique. Nor is modern engineering a meta-techne (i.e. Greek
“technology” or “science of technology”), as it is far narrower in scope and limited to
industrial arts, and at the same time, it also goes beyond even the most pronounced
systematic compilation and discussion of industrial arts. Instead, modern engineering
should better be called “technology of technology” (or techne of techne), because of
the ways in which it ventures into other technologies and techniques that are rarely
subject to systematic improvement and control based on quantity and objectification.
86
CHAPTER 3: TECHNE IN CRITICAL TIMES
CHAPTER 3
Techne in Critical Times: Machine,

Quantity and Ingenuity in Ancient and
Premodern Military Engineering
Human Prehistory and Visible Technology
Far long before Thomas Hobbes concluded in the seventeenth century that the “natural
condition of mankind” is abhorrent because the “war of every man against every man”
is bound to throw all aspects of civilization into chaos,260 humans in prehistory must
have dealt not only with threats from the competition and violence of the other
humankind, but also with the dangers and troubles posed incessantly by and within the
natural conditions of nature: wild animals, means of subsistence, shelters, weather,
fertility, and illness.261 The former category on the threats posed by other humankind
concerns social systems about the governance of human affairs and society. Information
about how these social systems work is lost beyond what can be retained in writing like
the monumental Code of Hammurabi. Prehistorical social structures that have passed
into oblivion can only be established through archeological inference. Paintings and
260
Hobbes, Leviathan, 1909, 94, 96.
261
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels distinguished “physical nature of man” from and “the natural conditions
in which man finds himself.” The former concerned the biological elements of humans and the latter
referred to the conditions of geology, orohydrography (the drainage affected by mountains) and climate.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 1998, 37.
87
animal remains in excavated caves gave us hints that ancient humans were gregarious,
lived in caves, and coordinated the hunting of large game.262 One significant source for
understanding these social systems is through archaeological mortuary, where the
formalities of burial practice and the nature of human remains indicate, for example,
stature and nutrition within a larger community.263
The latter category, namely, that of defending humans against idiosyncrasies and
irregularities of nature, often concerns technique and technology that only survived in
material forms and can still be inspected by us modern humans. The hand axes made of
pebble stones are the earliest surviving tools made by humans. These general tools are
like modern pocket knives, and with reasonable certainty, they were used for killing
game, chopping meat, digging up roots, and scraping hides for clothing.264 The materials
of artifacts and tools, more visible and durable than memory, legends, and thought that
are ephemeral, are conveniently used to define human prehistory: the Stone Age (ca.
2.5 million years ago–3000 BCE), the Bronze Age (ca. 3000–1000 BCE), and the Iron Age
(ca. 1000 BCE–500 CE).265
I call the collection of these more or less durable technologies, whose scope spans from
prehistory to our present time, visible technology. Visible technology consists of at least
two categories: those means that are visibly effective in creating or securing tangible
(and sometimes durable) resources and products, as well as the material means of
production that are durably visible tools surviving throughout history.266 We can see
further that small timelines of prehistory are far more often characterized by visible
technology—by means of securing food, places of living, built structures and
technological tools in general—than by the human activities that are social and
communicative in nature. For example, in the Stone Age, the Mesolithic (ca. 10,000–
8000 BCE) saw an increase in gathering plants (such as wild grains), fishing (thanks to
the construction of primitive nets, hooks, and boats), and more or less permanent
settlements. The Neolithic (ca. 8000–3000 BCE) had the development of agriculture,
262
Humphrey, Ancient Technology, 2006, 2.
263
Arnold and Jeske, "The Archaeology of Death: Mortuary Archaeology in the United States and Europe
1990-2013," 2014.
264
Hodges, Technology in the Ancient World, 1970, 22-23; Humphrey, Ancient Technology, 2006, 2, 19.
265
Humphrey, Ancient Technology, 2006, xix-xxi.
266
Visible technology is not incompatible with the idea that indispensable, visible technology might be
invisible to a social actor, especially when visible technology becomes an infrastructure. The phrase “fade
into the woodwork,” which in English means being unnoticed and seeming to have disappeared, attests to
this phenomenon of a visible technology (i.e. woodwork) becoming an unimportant background.
88
permanent agrarian villages, irrigation systems, and preliminary specialization of labor.

Urbanization, growing volumes of trade, and the emergence of writing would mark the
first two thousand years (ca. 3000–1000 BCE) of the Bronze Age, followed by the
invention of the wheel in the Middle East (ca. 3000 BCE), the construction of the
pyramids at Giza (ca. 2700) and the first palace on the site of Knossos (ca. 2200 BCE,
now in Crete of Greece).267
Visible technology and the transformative power it brought to civilization amidst

uncertainties of nature continued to dominate the ways humans interpreted the
conditions of life and history.268 On the ground that working toward these effective
means of survival must have been necessary for human nature, Thorstein Veblen, at the
end of the nineteenth century, went on and argued that humans were inherently
gregarious, peaceful animals carrying “the instinct of workmanship” by nature because
of natural selection and necessity for survival. Veblen attested to the idea that humans
would have been wiped out if it were not for craftwork, hence the intrinsic attribute of a
making culture sitting inherently inside modern humans.269
The fear of death and the desire for effective means of survival, in their most primitive
forms, were best reflected in early mythology. The tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus
in Greek mythology was recounted in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras. The legend went that
after Epimetheus had given strength and power to every animal, humans were left weak
and helpless. Sympathetic toward the feeble mankind, Prometheus stole fire from the
gods and bestowed it on humans. The story came to represent the powers of technical
skills and the growing human-technology relationships.270 Similarly, in Chinese
mythology, Youchao (有巢) was credited for pioneering the making of wooden houses;
Suiren (燧人) for discovering the employment of fire for cooking; Fuxi (伏羲) for
teaching his fellows to fish with nets, hunt with weapons, and domesticate animals;
267
Humphrey, Ancient Technology, 2006, xix-xxi, 2-3.
268
Whereas I use visible technology to emphasize what is still extant and tangible from a present
standpoint of history and archaeology and imply durability, Hannah Arendt referred to “durability,”
“objectivity,” and “permanence” of artifacts (and the “man-made world”) to underscore the condition
and process that allowed humans to gain independence from both “the sublime indifference of an
untouched nature” and the “ever-changing nature” of humans who created the artifacts. See Arendt, The
Human Condition, 1958, 136-138.
269
In such an analytic move, Veblen disapproved the exercise of “sportsmanship” and “the conventional
aversion to labor” that seemed to be prevalent in his time. Veblen, "The Instinct of Workmanship and the
Irksomeness of Labor," 1898, 189, 192-195.
270
Mayor, Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology, 2018, 61-62.
89
Shennong (神農, also known as Agriculture God) for agriculture and the use of herbal
drugs.271
Technique as Means for Human Purposes, Work, and Challenges
It would, however, be ignorant to presume that techniques, so to speak, were only

visible technology, that is to say, only relevant in material means and the pursuit of
material cultures. In mythology and legend where allegories were present, knowledge
and moral lessons went hand in hand with the construction of legitimacy of social order
and values. The penalty Prometheus received for stealing technical power and giving it
to mortals, as well as Icarus’s fatal wings made of wax, suggest the hubris of power and
empowerment.272 Fables believed to have been told by Aesop (ca. 620–564 BCE), an
Ancient Greek storyteller, were another example of instruments of moral lessons and
wisdom.273 The techniques of social order were no less important than, and many times
connected with, those of securing subsistence and surviving in the face of nature.274
As a consequence, I define technique inclusively as the use of knowledge and resources

to meet specific human needs and purposes and do not limit it to either productive or
social techniques. Ideally speaking, techniques are means serving a purpose that should
271
Youchao and Suiren were esteemed as sages and their contributions were briefly documented as early
as in the book Han Feizi of Han Fei (ca. 280–233 BCE). The Book of Changes (I Ching, ca. 825–800 BCE)
described Fuxi and Shennong as ancient rulers. For English translations of the related passages and the
approximated dates of The Book of Changes circulation, see Han, Han Feizi: Basic Writings, 2003, 97; Rutt,
The Book of Changes (Zhouyi): A Bronze Age Document, 2002, 33, 421.
272
Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, 1932, 13-14.
273
Fable was defined by Aelius Theon, an rhetorician in the first century CE, as “a fictitious story picturing
a truth” (λόγος ψευδής , είκονίζων αλήθειαν). Aesop was known to Aristotle (384–322 BCE), as shown in
his Rhetoric (2.20). The fables’ modern surviving text was collected and preserved by Babrius in Greek and
by Phaedrus in Latin around the first and second centuries CE. See Babrius and Phaedrus, 1965, xix-xxii,
xlvii, lxxiv.
274
The same applies to early natural philosophy too. For example, in the contentions between Robert
Boyle and Thomas Hobbes over proper ways to perform experiments, solutions to problems of knowledge
were simultaneously the solutions to the problem of social order. For Hobbes, the experiments performed
by Boyle and his adherents in the Royal Society became the illegitimate sources of private and personal
knowledge that would undermine the authority of the state. For Boyle, on the other hand, experiments of
the air-pump were a safe place in which certain philosophical dissent was manageable and could be
decisively and peacefully settled by instruments. Religious disagreements were clearly outside this scope
as Boyle carefully denied that his vacuum experiment could decide if there is angel or any immaterial
creature in the vacuum. See Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 1985.
90
align with the betterment of humanity, with contents and goals that can be diversely
defined. Technique is broad: just as utilizing material resources is only one form of
techniques to achieve a purpose, so creating materials is not exclusively the only
purpose of technique nor the only need or goal for humankind. The technologies that
we commonly refer to, in plural and material forms, are both the condition and result of
human endeavor for achieving the aims in the service of morally justified purposes.
However, when the ends become fixed and institutionalized, techniques as means of
doing things are detached from the selection of the ends. In Max Weber’s terminology,
the ideal type of technology and technique (both senses included in German Technik275)
concern themselves not with the end (Sinn) nor the meaning (Zweck) attached to it, but
with the selection of means for the ends. Pure “technology” (reine "Technik"), Weber
went on, is epitomized in selecting the means “which, with equal quality, certainty, and
permanence [or endurance, Dauerhaftigkeit] of the result [or success, Erfolges], are
comparatively most economical of effort in the attainment of a given end.”276
Technology, however, is not always an ideal type because its success is not necessarily
well defined and predictable, and the ends are manifold and not limited to economic
gains where costs and benefits are quantitatively assessable. For Weber, the various
types of purposes and desires generate many forms of distinct techniques, including
techniques “of prayer, of asceticism, of thought and research, of memorizing, of
education, of exercising political or hierocratic domination, of administration, of making
love, of making war, of musical performances, of sculpture and painting, of arriving at
legal decisions.”277 In the text that follows, I will speak of technique and technology
interchangeably, but will in the end refer solely to technology for convenience.
But the great breadth of technology is bounded by an essential modifier: technique is

closely related to the challenges of doing “work.” Work in ordinary language—paid or
unpaid in the most common sense of a job, a duty, or an activity—entails practical
purposes and dedicated efforts as the two necessary conditions for what I understand
275
For the full scope of Weber’s understanding of Technik, see Frison, "Some German and Austrian Ideas
on Technologie and Technik between the End of the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the
Twentieth," 1998, 120-122.
276
Weber, Economy and Society, 1978 [1921], 66.
277
Weber, Economy and Society, 1978 [1921], 65. For Carl Mitcham, the great deal of variation among
technologies arise from “[t]he protean character of volition …with diverse types of will, drive, motive,
aspiration, intention, and choice.” Mitcham, Thinking through Technology, 1994, 247-248.
91
as work. Indeed, work is a relative notion and always has a subjective component.
Taking a brief walk to relax after dinner is not work for me most of the time because it
involves only minimum, unnoticeable effort. But if my legs were injured and taking
walks regularly in my neighborhood became part of rehabilitation as recommended by
my doctor, heading out would become work (and “workout”), and I would need to find
out some ways (i.e. techniques) to reduce the pain and effort of moving. For those who
are physically challenged, tacit or formal technique is employed to improve, for
example, the efficiency of gait or speech.278
It becomes clear that technique is the means of dealing with challenges that go against
our desire and will, with a caveat that techniques and the challenges they address are
not universal. Some challenges may equally apply to people in all areas where learning a
technique takes time and experience as an entry into a craft. Some other challenges
may be specific to those who are disadvantaged by disability or due to a lack of
endowment, interest, or luck in a given field. Our common experiences readily tell us
there are activities that humans’ natural capability does not allow without any training.
There are also realms where having talent and interest in technique only helps us
marginally with limited success. However, even though the availability of technique
does not necessarily guarantee success, its underlying rationale, as Joseph Pitt puts it, is
“the best shot at arriving at the best result,” for lack of a guarantee of success, and at
least gives us best of luck in handling life issues and challenges.279
The Differentiation and Priorities of the Classical Greek Techne
Xenophon and Plato: Between Real Matters of War and the Images of Idealism
All the knowledge, so long as it offers means or guidance to meet specific human needs
and purposes, is technique to these needs and purposes. In contrast with today’s
materialist conceptualization of technology as “high tech,” the scope of knowledge that
had been granted the status of techniques by Weber (or the status of art by Blount’s
1658 Glossographia280) need not baffle or surprise us. In the days of Xenophon (ca. 430–
354 BCE) and Socrates (ca. 470–399 BCE), the Greek τέχνη could be connected with a
278
Alexander, The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social Control, 2008, xi.
279
Pitt, Thinking About Technology, 2000, 21. On the same page, Joseph Pitt also supplemented that “the
right choice is supposed to lead to the best possible results. A rational decision is one that puts the actor
on the road to success—or so it is supposed.”
280
See footnote 230 from the previous chapter.
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similarly wild scope of art. Usage of τέχνη and its variants includes reference to the art
of words (Memorabilia 1.2.31–34, hereafter Mem.), of flute-playing (Mem. 1.7.2), of
kingship (Mem. 2.1.17), of war (Mem. 2.1.28; Oeco. 4.4), of cooking (Mem. 3.14.5–6), of
medicine (Mem. 4.2.5), of the management of the household and properties
(οἰκονομία, Oeco. 1.1), of smithing and carpentry (Oeco. 1.1), of breeding and keeping
sheep (προβατευτική τέχνη, Oeco. 5.3), of agriculture and farming (γεωργία, sometimes
inaccurately translated as husbandry, Oeco. 5.8, 15.3, 15.10 and 18.10), of landsmen
and mariners (Oeco. 5.17), and of casting the seed and sowing related to agriculture
(Oeco. 17.6–7).281
In Plato’s dialogues, in a similar way, τέχνη represented a diverse range of activities,

including the art of barter (έμπορική, i.e. trade) between gods and men (Euthyphro 14e,
hereafter Euth.), of speaking and of persuasion (Phaedrus 260d–e and The Sophist
222c–d, hereafter Phae. and Soph.), of rhetoric and of speaking and writing (Euth. 261a–
b), of angling (ἀσπαλιευτικήν, i.e. fishing sport, Soph. 219c–d), amatory art (ἐρωτικῆς
τέχνης) and art of flattery (Soph. 222e–223a), of hunting (Soph. 223b), of gymnastics
and medicine (Soph. 228e–229a), of a painter (Soph. 234b), of image-making (Soph.
235b), of making appearances (Soph. 239d), of deception (ἀπατητικήν τέχνην, Soph.
240d and 264d), of grammar and of music (Soph. 253a), of building and painting (Soph.
266c), and of citizens (Protagoras 319a, hereafter Prot.).282
But the bewildering array of techne does not entail that all techniques are created equal
or considered the same in priority. In the context of the above examples, the discourse
of Greek philosophers on techne raised questions about the ends of art and the moral
values it would serve. In this process, they not merely redefine the ends of techne but
also the techne, which is limited by the ends. In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates, for example,
in thinking about the art of rhetoric, proposed that “he who knows not the truth, but
pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an
art at all,” and such art is merely unartistic practice or routine (ἄτεχνος τριβή, Phae 262c
and 260e).283 Socrates associated the Sophists with “an art … of making appearances …
twisting our words to the opposite meaning” and called it “an art of deception”
281
Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923.
282
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 1, 1913; Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 2,
1921.
283
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 1, 1913, 517, 523.
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(ἀπατητικήν τέχνην).284 And since Plato privileged ideas and forms over images and
replication, he did not think highly of sculpture and painting. Because these arts are not
even the “likeness-making art” that truthfully copies the size and proportion of the
original, they are “fantastic art.”285
However, wherever arts are for subsistence and survival and when their results are
visible and apparent, the ends of techne and the values of techne themselves were left
mostly unquestioned. These arts include the production and transformation of materials
that visibly define, ipso facto, the techne, as in agriculture and carpentry. Because the
techne and the purpose it serves are defined interdependently, challenging the ends of
those kinds of techne that produce materials is futile, if not impossible. For carpenters
and cobblers, the ends of their techne are making woodworks and shoes. If these ends
are thrown under question and dismissed, the techne ceases to be techne because of
self-contradiction. This is because means of techne and the ends it serves mutually
define each other in the same linguistic structure and sometimes in a tautological
manner. When we say a carpenter is doing carpentry through the art of carpentry, the
art of carpentry (as means) and doing carpentry (as action and purpose) are an
inseparable whole. Note that both the words carpenter and carpentry share the same
form.286
Another notable art for subsistence and survival is the art of war whose success and
failure have far-reaching consequences and can be somewhat objectively determined.
Xenophon, in the voice of his Socrates, spoke first of the art of agriculture as “the
mother and nurse of the other arts” because when it flourishes, “all the other arts are in
good fettle.”287 (Oeco. 5.17) “The whole art and mystery of agriculture,” he continued, is
something to be taught because it is “helpful, pleasant, honourable, dear to gods and
men in the highest degree” and its products are “beautiful, great and helpful, and yet
gentle towards men.”288 (Oeco. 5.17) But the art of war is no less important than the art
284
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 2, 1921, 346-349. In other context, Plato thought rhetoric
is “made art” (ποιῆσαι τέχνην) and not art at all, and rhetoric and cookery are merely “habitude … of
producing a kind of gratification and pleasure.” To him, the true art of rhetoric “is to be used for …
pointing to what is just.” Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 3, 1967 [1925], 310-313, 531.
285
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 2, 1921, 332-335.
286
Relatedly, Plato asked “if a carpenter [τέκτων] were furnished with all his tools and a good supply of
wood, but did no carpentry [τεκταίνομαι], is it possible he could be benefited by what he had got?”
(Euthydemus 280c) See Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 4, 1952 [1937], 410-411.
287
288
Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923, 479-481.
94
of agriculture, “because it is useless to have broad acres under tillage unless there are
men to defend them.”289 (Oeco. 4.15) Cyrus the Great (ca. 600–530 BCE) was said by
Xenophon to maintain that the art of war and agriculture alone is “the noblest and most
necessary pursuits” (Oeco. 4.4) and that he “never yet sat down to dinner when in
sound health, without first working hard at some task of war or agriculture.”290 (Oeco.
4.24)
The “necessary pursuits,” as called by Xenophon, thus define the worthiness of arts like
agriculture and war. These arts are practical and useful because they are in the service
of fundamental human needs for subsistence and survival. There are no more moral
values within the techne itself than its usefulness for some larger purposes in an
instrumental sense. War, for example, is justified by Plato when it is not to provoke the
enemy but to defend a city under attack.291 And despite Xenophon’s profuse praises for
agriculture’s goodness to produce athletes (“runners, throwers and jumpers”), reward
the laborer, and even entertain a stranger with the coziness of country life, the
“necessary pursuits” are clearly its usefulness to produce food and train the body of
warriors (Oeco. 5.1–17). Xenophon, himself also a notable soldier and commander in his
time, implored young men to get involved in hunting because it is “good not only in war
but in all else of which the issue is perfection in thought, word, and deed,” apparently
advancing political and military interests.292 Out of the same concerns, elsewhere
Xenophon similarly debunked that (the timing of) casting the seed is an intricate art
(ποικίλη τέχνη, sometimes translated as complicated problems, Oeco. 17.6-7), and
instead encouraged that “farming is the noblest art … because it is the easiest to
learn.”293 (Oeco. 18.10)
Aristotle and the Material Production of Techne
289
290
Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923, 391, 401. Socrates also seemed to identify the art of
kingship with happiness. (Mem. 2.1.17) See Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923, 91.
291
Hobbs, "Plato on War," 2007, 177-180; Syse, "Plato: The Necessity of War, the Quest for Peace," 2002,
39-40.
292
Xenophon opened his treatise Cynegeticus, known as On Hunting, with the story of Artemis, the Greek
goddess of the hunt, who bestowed the technique of hunting with hounds to Cheiron, the wise centaur.
Cheiron, according to Xenophon, “taught the mystery of hunting and of chivalry” to twenty-one heroes,
including the young Achilles. See Xenophon, "On Hunting," 1897, 73-77.
293
95
Unlike Socrates, Xenophon and Plato, Aristotle limited techne (τέχνῃ) to the technical
skills of material production. Aristotle understood that “all Art [τέχνη] deals with
bringing something into existence” and “to pursue an art means to study how to bring
into existence a thing,” where the “efficient cause … lies in the maker.”294 (Nicomachean
Ethics 1140a.10–15, hereafter N.E.) He considered that techne is an acquired habit (or
trained skill, ἕξις) of making (or production, ποιητική) in tandem with true logos
(ἀληθοῦς λόγου), while its opposite, lack of techne (ἀτεχνία), is an acquired habit of
making in tandem with false logos (ψευδοῦς λόγου).295 Here logos signifies reasoning.
As long as one is concerned with production, an acquired habit of making must be
needed, with only true reasoning leading to successful techne.296 Unlike unreasoning (or
being irrational, ἄλογον) in Plato’s Timaeus 51e, false logos of Aristotle implies an
attempt at reasoning, albeit in a false manner.297
294
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 335. In the same passage, Aristotle clarified that regarding
art, the “efficient cause” must lie in the maker because he wanted to demarcate art against “things that
exist or come into existence of necessity, or according to nature,” which are natural laws and the natural
changes they govern.
295
My translation based on Ancient Greek text of 1140a1-25 in The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 334-337.
Here ἀληθοῦς (or its main form ἀληθής) derives from ἀ- (un-) and λήθη (forgetfulness, oblivion, etc.). It
signifies “unconcealed” etymologically and, by extension, true, real, genuine, truthful, honest, unerring,
etc. See Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, s.v. Heidegger, in his famous piece “The Question
Concerning Technology” may have obtained the sense of “revealing” (das Entbergen) to be his essence of
technology from this particular passage of Aristotle on techne, but he neither revealed its connections nor
gave credit to Aristotle even though he must have read this passage from Nicomachean Ethics. If
Heidegger had started his thesis from Aristotle’s accounts of techne and the linguistic significance of
Ancient Greek ἀληθής (as true and uncovering), rather than spuriously and tortuously presenting the
latter to be the result and conclusion of his loose ways of reasoning, the developments of his main
concept would have been far less obscure and far more intelligible. See Heidegger, "The Question
Concerning Technology," 1977 [1954], 11-12; Heidegger, "Die Frage Nach Der Technik, Vol. 1," 1967, 11-
12.
296
In Plato’s Gorgias (450b). The dialogue’s leading interlocutor Socrates proclaims that each techne is
concerned with those speeches (λόγους) that meets with (or hits upon, τυγχάνουσιν) and concerns the
subject matter (πρᾶγμα) which the particular art belongs to. The sense of speech in logos (and also its
implied treatment of matter through discussion and discourse) that Mitcham cited is, however, not the
primary concern of this chapter, which focuses more on surviving meanings of English technology.
Aristotle’s true logos concerns reasoning, not speech as in Plato’s works. For example, compare in context
Aristotle’s true reasoning (ἀληθοῦς λόγου) and false reasoning (ψευδοῦς λόγου) in Nicomachean Ethics
with Plato’s Cratylus 408c, where Socrates argues that speech (λόγος) signifies all things, always making
them travel and circulate, and is twofold, both truthful (ἀληθὲς) and deceiving (ψευδής).
297
Harris Rackham, for example, rendered the same passage on techne and lack of techne as “a rational
quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly” and “a rational quality, concerned with making, that
reasons falsely.” See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 334-337.
96
Furthermore, Aristotle made an attempt to argue that the productive activity (τῆς
ποιητικῆς) of making is embedded in larger means-ends relations and purposive actions,
and that humans do not make things for the sake of the material-based end-product
that is being made. To Aristotle, the thing to be made cannot be the purpose of a
technical action of making, as a person “who makes something always has some further
end in view … the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means [relative to
something else], and [a means which] belongs to something [or someone] else [in
particular].”298 (N.E. 1139b.1) By “further end,” Aristotle, therefore, did not deny that
the thing being made can be one of the ends considered by the maker. However, there
must be some further end, as the technical action is only a means relative and belonging
to “something else” that is more meaningful. In other words, even as an end, the
products that are made are embedded in a further relationship of means and ends in
context, and they are always the means for some other, higher ends which are
themselves the true end of a productive action.
The last reference to “something else” means that the productive activity, limited by the
Aristotelian sense, is subsumed in a larger, purposive, and social action of doing, as
“thought [διάνοια] directed to an end, and [also] dealing with action [πρακτική] … is the
moving cause of productive activity.”299 (N.E. 1139a.35–1139b.1) In establishing the
distinction between art (τέχνη) and prudence (φρόνησις, or practical wisdom), and
between making (ποίησις, or poiesis) and doing (πρᾶξις, or praxis), Aristotle clarified
how “making” is different from “doing” and insisted that “making aims at an end distinct
from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself:
doing well is in itself the end.”300 (N.E. 1140b.1–5) Whereas Aristotle would “speak of
people as prudent or wise in some particular thing, when they calculate well with a view
to attaining some particular end of [moral] value [τέλος τι σπουδαῖον],” he commented
that the end of moral values is “other than those ends which are the object of an art.”301
(N.E. 1140a.25–30) The immediate production goal of techne, therefore, does not have
298
The text quoted here, without the words I added in square brackets, is taken in its entirety from
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 331. Because of the ellipsis of a few clarifying words in the
Ancient Greek passage, translators could not agree on its accurate meanings and instead intersperse with
their own interpretation. The additional words I introduce here relies on several translation sources,
including Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 1954, 139; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1962,
149; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2011, 117.
299
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 330-331.
300
301
97
moral values under consideration. In contrast, prudence, oriented to doing rather than
to making, is “an acquired habit, in tandem with true logos, that concerns the doing
(πρακτικήν, or action) that is good for human beings.”302 (N.E. 1140b.20) The act of
doing, seeking something good for humans, is by itself moral virtue and excellence
(ἀρετή). Aristotle said he would “speak of [moral] excellence in Prudence,” but not
“[moral] excellence in Art”303 It follows that while techne and its material product can
be parts of an act of doing that serves moral goodness, techne itself cannot have any
morality.
While we do not need to agree with Aristotle’s philosophical system and his
conceptualization of techne, several elements he articulated—the association of techne
with productive arts, the embeddedness of techne in a network of means-ends
relations, and the absence of morality in techne—remain important historical concepts
of technology in reference to the modern understanding of technology. Take the lack of
morality in technology as an example. One comparable stripe of thoughts in our times is
the neutrality of (moral) values in technology (and science), that technology is “merely
passive instruments to be used at will for morally good or bad purposes.”304 In addition
to Aristotle, both Plato and Socrates seemed to also believe that techniques are neutral:
the techne of cooking cannot be responsible for someone else’s zest for a binge, and the
genuine art of rhetoric depends on its use for truth and justice.305 Again, in the context
of warfare and human conflicts, the young hero Heracles “must learn the arts of war
from those who know them and must practise their right use.” (Mem. 2.1.28) And one
can learn “boxing or wrestling or fighting in armour so well as to vanquish friend and foe
302
My translation based on the Ancient Greek sentence “ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα
ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.”
303
The translator of my primary Greek source, Harris Rackham, commented here that “τέχνη, Art, is
here … used in a neutral sense, of a systematic procedure for making something, or a body of principles
for such a procedure— one may be good at it or bad; whereas φρόνησις, Prudence or practical wisdom,
itself denotes an excellence, not a neutral sphere in which one may excel or the reverse.” See Aristotle,
The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 338-339.
304
Kroes and Verbeek, "Introduction: The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts," 2014, 1. See the same
edited book for diverse positions and more nuanced interpretations of morality and values in technology:
Kroes and Verbeek, ed., The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts, 2014.. While in technology, the question
of value-neutrality often centers on the materiality (i.e. technology as artifacts), corresponding debates in
science surround logic and scientific method. See Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, 1986, 39-52.
305
For cookery, cooks and food, compare Gorgias 462d–465e and Memorabilia 2.1.21–31. For the true art
of rhetoric and its sarcastic “no great use” for justice, see Gorgias 481a–c. Xenophon, Memorabilia and
Oeconomicus, 1923; Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 3, 1967 [1925], 379.
98
alike.” The techne is not to blame when some others “have perverted their strength
(ἰσχύϊ) and art (τέχνῃ) to an improper use.”306 (Gorgias 456d–457a)
Just as how the “necessary pursuits” were justified by Xenophon and Plato, so
Aristotle’s reference to the lack of morality in technology could also be analyzed in its
own sociocultural context by referencing the deployment of various forms of slavery in
Ancient Greece in the activities of techne, the most apparent of which was in
agriculture.307 In Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, the art of agriculture as one of the noblest
pursuits is belied by the nature of farm work that relied on slavery. Elsewhere, in
Memorabilia, while the interlocutors agreed that carpenters, smiths, and cobblers are
not ignorant, “those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish.”308
(Mem. 4.2.22) Similarly, that Cyrus the Great would personally work on agriculture as
well as horticulture309 was likely a symbolic gesture to approve and encourage what is
necessary for the upkeep of a state.
To put the instrumentalist view of the Greek techne into perspective, one also needs to
consider its role in the hierarchy of a social structure. On the one hand, Max Weber’s
work on the society and economy of Ancient Greece showed that slavery curtailed both
the prestige and opportunities of free craftsmen and workers. In large public works,
slaves were just as productive as free workers. For purposes of efficiency, foremen and
the slaves they owned (or hired) were the same workforce supervised by construction
leaders. It was possible for slaves to run a workshop and, owing to their skills and
craftsmanship, accrued extra payment (ἀποφορά) for their owners. Weber maintained
that free craftsmen were almost interchangeable with skilled industrial slaves, except
for their legal status. Weber concluded that the craft industries in Greece were at best
“amorphous,” before they became “articulated” in the Middle Ages.310
306
Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 3, 1967 [1925], 293.
307
Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, 1981, 99-100.
308
309
Xenophon wrote that when Cyrus brought Lysander to his paradise at Sardis, “Lysander admired the
beauty of the trees in it, the accuracy of the spacing, the straightness of the rows, the regularity of the
angles and the multitude of the sweet scents” and said “I am far more impressed with [Cyrus’s] agent’s
skill in measuring and arranging everything so exactly,” to which Cyrus proudly responded, “Well,
Lysander, the whole of the measurement and arrangement is my own work, and I did some of the
planting myself.” (Oeco. 4.20–22) Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, 1923, 399.
310
Weber, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, 1976, 202-211.
99
Overall, Greek thinkers like Plato did not think material-based techne such as sculpture
and painting is truth-attaining activity, as they merely turn out simulacrums of ideas and
forms, and Socrates and Xenophon seemed to consider the usefulness of techne for the
state as its main merit. But even more importantly, Aristotle, in limiting techne
exclusively to material production, gave the first enunciation of techne to be technical
skills and knowledge always subordinate to their larger social purposes. In this way, he
differentiated techne based on their position in the chain of means-ends dependencies.
In the opening pages of Nicomachean Ethics, the first annotation he gave was: for
“those doings (πράξεις) whose ends (τέλη) are something other than the doings
themselves, the ends [as the products of doings] are better than the doings.”311
Accordingly, the art of bridle-making and that of making other horses’ instruments are
subordinate to warfare doings (πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις, an example of which being
horsemanship), and warfare doings are subordinate to the generalship (στρατηγικήν).
Aristotle assumed that there must be the ends of master-art (τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν
τέλη), which other endeavors of techne are all aiming for.
The Master-art: A Duty and a Metaphor
Master-art here suggests the highest techne. Its source ἀρχιτέκτων means “chief-
artificer, master-builder, director of works,” whose knowledge includes not only art
(τέχνη) but also investigation (ἐπιστήμη, or episteme, knowledge, “science”, etc.).312 The
prefix ἀρχι– is equivalent to English archi–, denoting chief, primary, highest, most
important, etc., while τέκτων means craftsman, builder, etc.313 The master-art of
Ancient Greece was the sort of art and knowledge that coordinated large public works in
311
My translation of the Greek text “ὧν δ᾽ εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν
ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα.” (N.E. 1094a.1–5)
312
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 253. Another term related to master-art that
incorporates both art and investigation is wisdom (σοφία or sophia). Note that wisdom before Aristotle
and Plato also means “practical wisdom” or “cleverness or skill in handicraft and art” according to Liddell
et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, 1621. While wisdom in the Aristotelian sense is “the most
perfect of the modes of knowledge” (ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν), it means also “the arts to denote
those men who are the most perfect masters of their art” (ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις, N.E. 1141a.5–
15, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 341, 343.) Note that both “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) and art
“τέχνη” play their roles in wisdom. The difference between the two categories, and their relationship with
other rational qualities, though beyond the scope of my discussion, can be seen in N.E. 1139b.15 and
after.
313
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940.
100
Democratic Athens, which “paid such higher wages” and were “partly connected with
military and political interests, partly state directed,” as noted by Weber.314
Both Plato and Aristotle compared master-art with the knowledge of a political ruler
who gives commands, albeit with differences. Plato insisted that “[the art of]
commanding from a ruler’s knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) is assuredly not [something like the
art of commanding of] an architect (ἀρχιτεκτονικόν), who looks after and is in charge of
lifeless objects (ἀψύχων). A ruler’s art of command is nobler one, because it has
acquired the [knowledge's] power (δύναμιν) among and over the living beings
(ζῴοις).”315 On the other hand, at the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle used
the adjective form of master-art (i.e. ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς) to tentatively refer to “the most
authoritative” (κυριωτάτης) of sciences (ἐπιστημῶν), and revealed the latter to be “the
politics [knowledge]” (ἡ πολιτική).316
Even though Aristotle knew the highest techne ought to be subordinate to political
science, the idea of master-art and its personified agent—chief-craftsman
(ἀρχιτέκτων)—apparently appealed to him, and he was willing to apply the concept
elsewhere. Later he wrote, “the political philosopher (πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος) is the
chief-craftsman (ἀρχιτέκτων) of the end (τέλους, or telos, purpose, etc.) toward which
we are looking to declare [each thing] good or bad absolutely.”317 While Aristotle at one
time limited techne conceptually to material production—perhaps an ideal type of
techne—in reality, techne acquires a more general sense that applies to non-material
types of art like politics.
Construction and Destruction Works of the Chief-craftsman
The above ancient Greek word chief-craftsman, or ἀρχιτέκτων, would become the
etymology of architect in English, carrying the connotations of the first rank, authority,
314
Weber, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, 1976, 203, 208.
315
My translation based on The Statesman 261c–d, as in Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 8,
1975 [1925], 20.
316
Nicomachean Ethics Book 1.2.4–6.
317
My translation based on Nicomachean Ethics Book 7.11.1 in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934,
428.. The highest status he accorded to "political knowledge" not merely reflected that the participation
of politics in Ancient Greece was limited to citizens. It was also a hegemonic move to subordinate all art
whose purposes are always for the sake of the others, the highest forms of knowledge, such as politics,
whose ends always lie in the activities themselves and in the moral virtue they embody in the actions.
101
and leadership into whatever its modern successors might functionally inherit. Many
modern Classics translators render the word as “architect” in addition to “engineer.”318
As classics scholar Glanville Downey critically pointed out, these modern occupational
terms “impute to ancient workers methods and resources which, however great their
skill, they did not possess.”319 Still, through the ancient word and its synonyms, we may
use the “family” of these keywords to potentially investigate how ancient authors
thought of the highest possible class of technical workers, including the nature of their
duties and knowledge, the roles they played in the division of labor, and what separated
them from the rest of the technical workforce and non-technical people. In this section,
we will look briefly at the Greek chief-craftsman in general, before we focus specifically
on Archimedes as a military “engineer.”
An early ἀρχιτέκτων (hereafter chief-craftsman, a gendered word by Greek) worked on

many civil projects. In The Histories, Herodotus (ca. 484–ca. 425 BCE) used chief-
craftsman mostly in the singular forms (ἀρχιτέκτων or ἀρχιτέκτονα) and in all instances
the one person was associated with a civil project: most frequently a bridge, and in one
case a double-mouthed underground channel and in another a temple.320 Chief-
craftsmen are “the makers [ἐξεργασμένα] of … greatest works,” and by implication of
the word “maker,” they not only complete work, but also bring it to perfection.321 Other
authors like Diodorus of Sicily (ca. 80–20 BCE) connected chief-craftsmen with the tasks
of building walls, moles, monuments, and even a city.322 Founding a city has been a
recurring theme in the corpus, as seen in Strabo’s (64 BCE–25 CE) Geography, Philo of
Alexandria’s (20 BCE–50 CE) On the Creation, and Plutarch’s (45–120 CE) Life of
Alexander.323 The duty appears to be no small one. According to Strabo, the chief-
craftsman needs to select a site for a city with an eye on the location’s geographical and
astronomical factors, including terrain, climates, and earthquake activities.324 Then they
can start measuring off and enclosing an area for the site and mark the foundation of
318
Many translators opt for architect, instead of engineer, because of the etymological proximity to the
former. A notable example where we see both instances is Strabo, The Geography of Strabo Vol. 6, 1960.
Other examples that translate the word as engineer include Lucian, Lucian Vol. 6, 1959; Diodorus of Sicily,
Diodorus of Sicily Vol. 6: Books Xiv-Xv, 1954; Burtt, Minor Attic Orators Vol. 2, 1959.
319
Procopius, Procopius Vol. 7: Buildings, 1971, xiv.
320
The Histories of Herodotus Book 2.175, 3.60, 4.87, 4.88 and 7.36.
321
The Histories of Herodotus Book 3.60. Quote is from Herodotus, Herodotus Vol. 2, 1928, 77.
Interpretations of the word ἐξεργασμένα is based on Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940.
322
Diodorus of Sicily Book 1.64.12, 2.7.2, 14.18.5 and 14.48.3.
323
Geography Book 1.1.3 and 14.2.9; On the Creation 24; and Life of Alexander 26.2.
324
Geography Book 1.1.13, 2.5.1 and 12.8.18.
102
the city and its structures.325 Planning a city also involves extra care with underground
drainage systems.326 On the ground, chief-craftsmen would also plan for “temples,
gymnasia, town-halls, market-places, harbours, docks, streets, walls” and set up
“dwellinghouses as well as public buildings.”327
Challenging as it may seem, the civil duties of chief-craftsmen were often rivaled by the
importance of their military duties. It was not only because building walls and cities
went hand in hand with the protection and defensive works needed to prepare for wars
and invasion. Construction and destruction were two sides of the same coin: at times,
the same chief-craftsmen for civil constructions also needed to be familiar with ways to
break into a city’s wall, in particular, by the use of engines of war. Strabo wrote of an
ancient city called Cyzicus (now in Turkey), where “three chief-craftsmen were
commissioned to take charge of and manage public buildings and engines of war. Other
three chief-craftsmen each held (or took charge of) different treasure houses: for arms
(or armor, weapons, etc.), for engines of war, and for grain.”328 Procopius of Caesarea
(ca. 500–ca. 565 CE) also spoke of chief-craftsmen of public buildings (οἰκοδομιῶν
ἀρχιτέκτοσι) who gave opinions on their commander’s strategies to break through their
enemies’ fortifications during a siege.329 Sometimes chief-craftsmen were made
exclusively available for military needs. For example, Onasander’s (fl. 1st century CE)
military treatise identified chief-craftsmen “who accompany the army for the purpose of
building engines.”330 And in Polyaenus’s (fl. 2nd century CE) Stratagems of War, chief-
craftsmen (and craftsmen) were assigned to build ships and engines used during a
siege.331
The military sense of the Ancient Greek ἀρχιτέκτων was captured by Latin author Aulus
Gellius (ca. 123–170 CE), when he used an unusual bilingual term “magister
ἀρχιτεκτόνων” to refer to a particular military official and chief-craftsman who had
control over large wood to make battering-rams. The position of a magister
325
Geography Book 17.1.6 and Life of Alexander 26.2.
326
Geography Book 14.1.37.
327
Quoted from Philo of Alexandria On the Creation 24 as in Philo of Alexandria, Philo Vol. 1, 1981, 17.
328
My translation based on Book 12.8.11 in Strabo, The Geography of Strabo Vol. 5, 1961, 500.
329
History of the Wars Book 2.6.13. The Greek text is based on Procopius, Procopius Vol. 1: History of the
Wars Book I and Ii, 1964, 308.
330
The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English Translation, 1923,
509, 511.
331
Stratagems of War Book 7.21.2. Ancient Greek and English text is available in Polyaenus, Stratagems of
War Vol. 2, 1994, 666-667.
103
ἀρχιτεκτόνων was equivalent to praefectus fabrum in Latin, a chief officer of military

engineering in Roman times.332 The position was often an honorific title as an aide-de-
camp (or secretary) to the commander and not connected much with what a “faber”
really does.333 Latin fabrum or faber is associated with a craftsman (τέκτων) and does
not suggest the status of a master or chief like the Greek ἀρχιτέκτων. Like how the
Greek chief-craftsman is associated with “engineer,” translators often render praefectus
fabrum as “chief engineer,” “commander of engineers,” or “prefect of engineers.”334 An
example is Julius Caesar’s “chief engineer” Lucius Cornelius Balbus (fl. 1st century BCE)
in 61 BCE. Nominally, as “chief officer of the engineers,” he might have assumed the
duty to lead “engineers” or “expert workmen” (fabri) who “repaired armour, built
bridges, looked after siege-material, and performed or superintended other mechanical
labours.”335
Archimedes as the Renowned Greek Mechanic
The epitome of Ancient Greek military chief-craftsmen is arguably Archimedes (ca. 287–

ca. 212 BCE), who, according to various Greek sources, was able to prevail dramatically
over greater numbers of men and forces by his genius and mechanical devices. Classics
translators often said he was an “engineer” in the footnotes,336 and some others
rendered him an “engineer” in the actual translated text.337 As an exemplar of an early
“engineer” in the sense of a maker of war engines, the case of Archimedes therefore
provides invaluable insights into the nature of engineers and engineering work as
understood by ancient authors between the 2nd century BCE and the 3rd century CE.
Whether or not the following colorful descriptions about Archimedes are historically
accurate is less important to us than the image they established for an “engineer”: those
who have an unrivaled genius for mathematics and theory and accordingly be able to
332
Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights Vol. 1, 1961, 68-69.
333
Cicero, Letters to Friends Vol. 3, 2001, 435; Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Vegetius: Epitome of Military
Science, 2001, 43, fn. 1.
334
For example, Cicero, Letters to Friends Vol. 1, 1958, 193, 205; Cicero, Letters to Friends Vol. 3, 2001,
435; Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 514; Julius Caesar, The Civil Wars, 2006, 37, 209.
335
Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, Xiv fn. 2, 514 fn. 1, 600-601.
336
Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 1, 1931, 12 fn. 3; Silius Italicus, Punica Vol. 2, 1961, 294 fn. b.
337
Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters Vol. 2, 2006, 493; Lucian, Lucian Vol. 1, 1913, 37.
104
design and employ mechanical devices that are overwhelming and formidable to the
enemies.
Archimedes was described by Plutarch (45–120 CE) as a mathematician who never

contrived mechanical devices with serious effort and genuine interest, because
inventions were only incidental and subordinate (πάρεργα) to his geometry.338 He was
said to “dedicate his aspiration only to studies and activities whose elegance and
exceptionality are not mixed with the necessities of life.”339 The two domains, as
Plutarch understood, are distinct in terms of the criteria of success. The former, in
particular the intellectual activities of demonstrating a geometry proof, offer “loftiness
(μέγεθος) and beauty (κάλλος),” whereas the latter, as in working manually on material
inventions, provide “[mechanical] precision (ἀκρίβειαν) and extraordinary capacity
(δύναμιν ὑπερφυῆ).”340 According to Plutarch, Archimedes did not leave any writing on
useful arts because he “considered any treatise on mechanics (μηχανικά) and any art
bound by necessity to be low-status and vulgar.”341 Archimedes was nonetheless
convinced by Hiero II of Syracuse (ca. 308–ca. 215 BCE) “to turn his skill (τέχνης) away
from the conceptual (νοητῶν) toward the concrete (σωματικά), and to join his reasoning
(λόγον or logos) somewhat to the needs, making it more visible (ἐμφανέστερον) to the
common people.”342 The king, “knowing the capability (δύναμιν) of his skill (τέχνης),”
persuaded Archimedes to “prepare (or construct) for him war-engines to defend and
attack in every kind of siege warfare.”343
Archimedes’ skill and genius were often highlighted with a tinge of meritocracy and
elitism by comparing and overwhelming the others in quantity. Archimedes alone was
able to surpass the forces of many men through his ingenious contrivances. He was said
to easily and smoothly move a ship full of passengers and freight that was formerly
drawn forcefully by a multitude of laborers.344 During the Siege of Syracuse (213–212
BCE), defensive engines contrived by Archimedes were extremely effective in warding
off and counterattacking every assault from the Romans, to the point that the Romans
338
Marcellus 14.4 of Plutarch’s Lives.
339
My translation based on Marcellus 17.4 in Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives Vol. 5, 1961, 478, 480.
340
My translation based on Marcellus 17.4 in Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives Vol. 5, 1961, 480.
341
342
343
344
Marcellus 14.8 of Plutarch's Lives. For a similar but less drastic account, see Athenaeus’s (fl. 200 CE)
The Learned Banqueters 207a–b as in Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters Vol. 2, 2006, 492-495.
105
were said to fight against the “gods” (which were Archimedes’ war engines).345 Roman
commander Marcellus (ca. 270–208 BCE) reportedly exclaimed: “Let us stop … fighting
against this geometrical Briareus, who uses our ships like cups to ladle water from the
sea … and with the many missiles which he shoots against us all at once, outdoes the
hundred-handed monsters of mythology.”346 Archimedes’ engines also surpassed all his
compatriots’ endeavors, as his weapons alone were used by the city while all other
weapons were set aside. Plutarch wrote that, in effect, “all the fellows of Archimedes
were the living body (σῶμα) of his prepared armaments (παρασκευῆς), while
Archimedes’ single soul (ψυχή) was moving and engaging in everything.”347
The achievements of all these inventions accorded Archimedes “a name and reputation
for possessing some unhuman, divine intelligence (συνέσεως).”348 Archimedes’ capacity
to turn out powerful engines of war was nonetheless credited to his genius in
mathematics and geometry. According to Plutarch, while the task of working out a
geometry proof could get “difficult, painful and dangerous” (χαλεπωτέρας) and
“grievous and overbearing” (βαρυτέρας), Archimedes was able to find a proof on his
own very smoothly and quickly when no one else could do it.349 Archimedes’
achievements, Plutarch wondered, were due to a combination of “a man’s [natural]
endowments (εὐφυΐα)” and “excessive hard work.”350
Similar accounts also abound in writing from other Greek authors. Polybius (ca. 200–118
BCE), an author only within a hundred years after Archimedes’ passing, also emphasized
the role of the soul (ψυχή). According to Polybius, Marcellus marshaled armaments and
his multitude of hands (πολυχειρίαν, implying men) and expected to overtake Syracuse
by storm. But they failed to reckon with the faculty (δύναμιν) of Archimedes and
foresee that “at some critical moments, the single soul (εἷς ψυχή) [from one person] is
more effective than (ἀνυστικός) any number of workmen’s hands (τῆς ἁπάσης
345
Marcellus 16.2 of Plutarch's Lives. The verb θεομαχοῦσιν (or θεομαχέω) is ambiguous on whether they
were fighting a god or gods. That the translator adopted gods may reflect the Roman’s polytheism. But
god may also be possible, because we may say the Romans were fighting against Archimedes as some of a
god. This interpretation, however, does not coincide with the later passage that suggested Archimedes
was a “geometrical Briareus.”
346
These translations are quoted from Marcellus 17.1 of Plutarch's Lives.
347
348
349
Marcellus 17.5 of Plutarch's Lives.
350
106
πολυχειρίας).”351 In some passages, Polybius used singular and masculine verbs to

describe what Archimedes did, such as “prepare” (παρεσκευασμένος), “employ”
(χρώμενος), and “place beside” (παρίστημι), while in real reality, defending a siege could
never be one man’s efforts against the odds.352 “The man [male] and the soul (εἷς ἀνὴρ
καὶ μία ψυχὴ),” Polybius went on, “when [applied] properly and in harmony toward
certain circumstances, prove to be such a great and extraordinary thing.”353 Essentially,
the fate of the Romans depended on “one senior man of Syracuse” (τις πρεσβύτην ἕνα
Συρακοσίων).354
Likewise, Pappus of Alexandria (ca. 290–ca. 350 CE), in the preface to his book on

mechanics (μηχανική), wrote, “[the man] having engaged [himself] in sciences
(ἐπιστήμαις) since the childhood and having acquired the skill and habit (ἕξιν) in the
practice of arts (τέχναις), [and] moreover having an agile genius (φύσιν εὐκίνητον),
would be the best inventor (εὑρετὴν) and architect (ἀρχιτέκτονά) of mechanical works
(μηχανικῶν ἔργων).”355 He conceived Archimedes as an exemplar, and reported that
“Archimedes of Syracuse has recognized the cause and reason (λόγον) of all [the
mechanical arts], because he alone has employed [his] genius (φύσει) and inventiveness
(ἐπινοίᾳ) for all kinds of things.”356 The reason (logos) of art (techne), in the last
example, readily evokes technology we formerly discussed as theory and discourse of
techne. Archimedes was able to master techne because he knew the reason behind it.
But how do we understand the reason? If Aristotle was correct about true logos
(ἀληθοῦς λόγου) as a condition of successful techne, the true logos as understood by
later Greek authors would be a mastery of geometry and mathematics.
In fact, the case of Archimedes as a mathematician took up a contentious turf of a chief-

craftsman’s qualification. It was not merely a coincidence that Vitruvius (fl. 1st century
351
My translation based on Polybius’s The Histories 8.3.3 in Polybius, The Histories Vol. 3, 1966, 452.
352
See, in particular, The Histories 8.5.1–10.
353
354
355
My translation based on Pappus's Collection Book 8.1 in Pappi Alexandrini and Hultsch, Pappi
Alexandrini Collectionis Vol. 3, 1878, 1024; Thomas, Selections Illustrating the History of Greek
Mathematics Vol. 2, 1957, 614.
356
My translation based on Pappus's Collection Book 8.3 in Pappi Alexandrini and Hultsch, Pappi
Mathematics Vol. 2, 1957, 618. I insert “mechanical arts” because Pappus of Alexandria used
“aforementioned arts” (τέχνας παραγγέλλουσι) to reference his discussion on “mechanics” (μηχανική) at
the end of Book 8.1. Apparently, the referent could not be anything other than “mechanical arts.”
107
BCE), a Roman author and military engineer who was familiar with Greek literature,
ventured that Archimedes was overachieving as far as an architect goes. In his
magisterial treatise On Architecture (De architectura), consisting of ten short books,
Vitruvius demarcated a proper scope of skills for his ideal chief-craftsmen and shielded
it from mathematics. He argued, in Latin, that “those whom nature (natura) has truly
granted so much (tantum) ingenuity (sollertiae), acumen (acuminis), and good memory
(memoriae), so that [they are] able to learn and possess thoroughly [the knowledge of]
geometry, astronomy, music, and other studies, go beyond the duties of chief-craftsmen
(architectorum, or architects) and become mathematicians.” Mathematicians thus “are
able to easily discourse against [these] studies, because they are equipped with the
weapons (telis) of [their] studies.”357 He nevertheless did not think mathematics alone
would be ideal for an aspiring chief-craftsman. He eclectically included literature (littera)
and philosophy (physiologia) in the proper training of a chief-craftsman. On the flip side,
Vitruvius alerted that those who are unconcerned with manual work (manus) and labor,
and instead “have relied on theory (ratiocinationibus) and literature alone, appear to
follow a shadow, not reality.”358
While it is unclear if Archimedes was versed in philosophy and literature and lived up to
the expectations of being a full-blown chief-craftsman, we can be confident that the
duties and skills of Archimedes were far less than those of a chief-craftsman. Whereas
the ten books of Vitruvius’s On Architecture describe all the divisions (membra) of
“architecture,” topics of mechanical devices and military engines, areas Archimedes was
known for, constitute only the last two books of the corpus.359 Works and discoveries of
Archimedes only took a small space in the treatise, making Archimedes anything but a
full chief-craftsman. It follows that a military “engineer” like Archimedes may not be a
chief-craftsman in the strictest sense. He was more appropriately recognized as a
mechanic (μηχανικός) by some Greek authors like Lucian (ca. 120–190 CE) and
Athenaeus (fl. 200 CE) because of his involvement in making mechanical devices.
Athenaeus, for example, assigned the title chief-craftsman (ἀρχιτέκτονα) to a leading
ship builder, while he said the mechanic (μηχανικός) Archimedes invented and built a
screw-windlass to move a ship down to the sea.360 Lucian listed Archimedes to be an
357
My translation based on On Architecture Book 1.1.17 in Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 1, 1931, 20, 22.
358
My translation based on On Architecture Book 1.1.2 in Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 1, 1931, 6.
359
On Architecture Book 10.16.12 in Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 2, 1934, 368.
360
Athenaeus’s The Learned Banqueters 207b as in Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters Vol. 2, 2006, 492,
494.
108
exemplar of mechanics (μηχανικῶν) who did not leave behind writing on mechanics.361
Plutarch spoke about Archimedes as a maker (δημιουργός, or contriver).362 Polybius also
called him a maker (δημιουργοῦ, in the genitive case), in addition to a chief-craftsman
(ἀρχιτέκτονος).363
As far as I am aware, Latin authors never called Archimedes a chief-craftsman. On the

one hand, since Latin architectus derived from the Greek chief-craftsman, Latin authors
who used the word were often acquainted with the Greek literature and referred to
traditional chief-craftsmen of Greek origin whose duties were broader than inventing
mechanical devices.364 On the other hand, for the Romans, Archimedes was better
known as a mechanic and inventor of military engines instead of a mathematician or a
philosopher. Roman historian Livy (59 BCE–17 CE), when accounting for the significance
of Archimedes with a view to the Siege of Syracuse, remarked that although
“Archimedes was an unparalleled observer of the sky and stars … [he was nonetheless]
more extraordinary [as] an inventor (inventor) and designer (machinator) of military
artillery and war engines (bellicorum tormentorum operumque) by which whatever the
enemies could initiate [with] enormous labor would be defeated [by] him with a very
slight movement.”365 Furthermore, prominent writer Cicero did not think Archimedes
would belong to the class of Archytas (fl. 400–350 BCE, mathematician and
philosopher).366
That Archimedes was not identified mainly as a qualified chief-craftsman,

mathematician, or philosopher in Latin literature is likely because Archimedes had
neither capability in philosophy and politics nor far-reaching influence in mathematics
and mechanics through teaching and writing. After all, he seemed to be a person
indifferent to any worldly concerns but geometry proofs and mechanical problems. The
legend goes that he had a record of neglecting the care of his body and forgetting to eat
food,367 not to mention the famous folklore that, after hitting upon what we now call
“Archimedes’ principle” in a bath, he rushed home naked on the street while shouting
361
Lucian’s Hippias, or The Bath 2 in Lucian, Lucian Vol. 1, 1913, 34-37.
362
363
Polybius’s The Histories 8.7.2.
364
The authors include, among others, Cicero, Vitruvius, Pliny the Younger (61 – ca. 113), Apuleius (ca.
124 – ca. 170) and Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 330–ca. 395).
365
My translation based on Book 24.34.6 of Livy, with an English Translation Vol. 6, 1940, 282-283.
366
Cicero’s Disputations 5.23.64 or Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1966, 490-491.
367
Marcellus 17.6 of Plutarch’s Lives.
109
“Eureka!”368 The striking images he left on the Roman commanders and their
descendants had been his legendary, unworldly genius as well as his formidable war
engines and machines of terror. A millennium after his death, he would be dubbed by
Byzantine-Greek scholar John Tzetzes (ca. 1110–ca. 1180) as a maker of war engines
(μηχανητής).369
Machine, Genius, and Quantity
The study of how Ancient Greek and Latin authors presented Archimedes gave us a clue
as to the enduring ideas and perceptions about the nature of engineer and engineering.
First, “genius” and natural endowments were considered essential to the intellectual
capacity needed to master mathematics and theories and to make and design
mechanical devices. Greek words such as soul (ψυχή), genius (φύσις), inventiveness
(ἐπίνοια), endowment (εὐφυία), faculty (δύναμις) and intelligence (σῠ́νεσῐς) from the
above Greek text that describe Archimedes more or less pointed to these linkages.370
Latin authors, likewise, attested to similar qualities. Vitruvius said Archimedes was one
of the very few who possessed “so much ingenuity (tantum … sollertiae) and acumen
(acuminis) granted by nature (natura).”371 Cicero called Archimedes “a man of highest
genius and greatest learning (summo ingenio … disciplina)”372 and “the single most
acute-minded (acutissimi) citizen (of Syracuse).”373 Valerius Maximus (fl. 1st century)
described him as “a man with extraordinary skill (eximia … prudentia),”374 and Apuleius
(c. 124–c. 170 AD), “a man, [with his] finesse (subtilitate), admirable in … every [branch
of] geometry far above all the other men.”375 Here from the Latin literature, we add
genius (ingenium), ingenuity (both ingenium and sollertiae), acumen (acuminis), acute-
368
The story was first told to us by Vitruvius in the preface of On Architecture Book 9.
369
Thomas, Selections Illustrating the History of Greek Mathematics Vol. 2, 1957, 18-19.
370
Other Greek words like φιλότεχνος (fund of art, ingenious) and εὐμήχανος (ingenious) are excluded
from the research.
371
My translation from On Architecture Book 1.1.17.
372
My translation from Cicero’s Against Verres Book 4.58.131 as in Cicero, The Verrine Orations Vol. 2,
1967, 440.
373
My translation from Cicero’s Disputations 5.23.64 as in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1966, 492.
374
My translation from Valerius Maximus’s Memorable Doings and Sayings Book 8.7 ext. 7 as in Valerius
Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings Vol. 2, 2000, 234.
375
My translation from Apuleius’s Apologia 16.6 as in Apuleius, Apologia. Florida. De Deo Socratis., 2017,
48.
110
minded (acutus), skillfulness (prudentia) and finesse (subtilitas) to the assemblage of the
Greek words.
Nevertheless, the acclaim for genius, as well as the implied prerequisite of genius for
being an extraordinary mechanic or chief-craftsman, must be taken with a grain of salt.
Vitruvius’s On Architecture, in a move to establish architecture as an eclectic profession,
offered a preliminary objection to the sheer importance of genius: “[a man] must be
[both] gifted with genius (ingeniosum) and amenable to learning (disciplinam docilem),
because neither genius without learning nor learning without genius can make an
accomplished craftsman (perfectum artificem).”376 Indeed, exceptional natural
endowments had been known by the ancient to be instrumental in producing skilled
mathematicians. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics acknowledges that there are prodigies
in geometry and mathematics. Aristotle, however, maintained that the gifted young
men could not be natural philosophers or have wisdom or prudence because these
qualities take many years of practical experience to grow.377 His position implied that in
ancient times (and in our times, too), a talented person who demonstrates prowess in
mathematics but lacks experience (e.g. its social context, political and philosophical
implications, etc.) is not prepared for more comprehensive tasks and duties entailed by
the work of an chief-craftsman (or engineer).
Still, the curious part in the preceding accounts is an affirmation that “genius” is an
important quality for mathematic and “engineering” works. The beliefs that innate
talent is key to success in certain selective fields like mathematics, physics, and
engineering are all the more pervasive in our times.378 However, as Augustine Brannigan
rightly points out in his The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, evidence of the role of
“genius” is often used to explain a discovery that also defines the very quality and
uniqueness of genius. In this manner, the role of genius in scientific discoveries not only
pans out tautologically, but also makes the discovery itself an objective outcome of a
natural process.379
376
My translation based on On Architecture Book 1.1.3 in Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 1, 1931, 6, 8. See
also Book 5.6.7.
377
Nicomachean Ethics Book 6.8.5–6 as in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1934, 350-353.
378
Mundy, "Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women?," 2017, 67; Leslie et al., "Expectations of Brilliance
Underlie Gender Distributions across Academic Disciplines," 2015.
379
Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, 1981, 153-158.
111
Brannigan’s assessment is relevant: the genius of Archimedes is not so much a

prerequisite for his discoveries of physics laws and geometry proofs as both the cultural
product and testimony of the magnificence of such achievements. But there are two
points that were left out in this argument. First, mathematics can get indefinitely
challenging and abstract. Plutarch’s account that mathematics proofs could get
“difficult, painful and dangerous” and “grievous and overbearing” echoed how modern
mathematicians approach the most difficult problems in history.380 It also coincides with
our modern educational experiences, in particular with taking a timed test on
mathematics in university settings where selectivity plays a prominent part.381
The real issue, as evidenced in Plutarch’s account of Archimedes, was that mathematical
capability is subject to comparison and competition. His account that Archimedes was
able to successfully discover a proof quicker than all the others suggests that
mathematics was not merely difficult, but was also made difficult by the urge of
comparison and competition in practice. Genius and talents that are identified with very
few people are social constructs by the comparing and competition instruments that
have acquired a status of practical necessity and inevitability.
This brings us to my second point: not all types of skills and knowledge are readily
subject to demonstration and ranking. Some of the Ancient Greek techne mentioned in
the previous chapter, such as techne of kingship, breeding sheep, and agriculture, waits
for months if not years to tell its success, And even though the success of other techne
like rhetoric, flute-playing, cooking, and gymnastics can be easily subject to public (and
often on-stage) demonstrations and binary comparisons in a short period of time,
whose gold standard is sports competitions that have a clear win or loss, and
accordingly these activities are often associated with “genius” and “brilliance” as well,
they are not amenable to the certitude of quantity and formal logics, while arithmetic
and geometry more certainly are.382 Arithmetic (λογιστική), in the writing of Plato’s The
380
A widely-known example is the first successful proof of Fermat's Last Theorem in the 1990s. It took
more than 300 years after Pierre de Fermat (1607–1665) claimed, in Latin, “I have discovered a truly
miraculous proof” of his observation but “the small margin may not contain it.” Diophantus et al.,
Diophanti Alexandrini Arithmeticorum Libri Sex, Et De Numeris Multangulis Liber Unus, 1670, 61.
381
E.g. Pleasure, Power, and Technology, 1992 [1989], 41-42.
382
This is to acknowledge that in the fields of “rhetoric, flute-playing, cooking, and gymnastics,” genius
and talent are also recognized. (Think about, respectively, public debates, music competition, competitive
cooking shows, and gymnastics competition.) But all these activities, in the forms of modern competition,
seem to draw their paradigms from those of competitive sports (see below). Furthermore, and more
specifically for my larger argument, in our modern time, apart from STEM fields and those fields that
112
Statesman 259e–260a, has to do with calculating the difference between numbers that
is connected with the work of a chief-craftsman.383 The validity of geometry proofs is
subject to the success of demonstration. To prove, so to speak, is to demonstrate.
Plutarch repeatedly used demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, or “proof”) and showing forth
(δείκνυμι, or bringing to light, making known, etc.) in the context of a geometry
proof.384
The relative ease of assessing success by quantity and by formal logic, contributes to the
ranking of knowledge. We cannot confidently judge if a modern philosopher is wiser or
more prudent than Socrates and Aristotle, while few would object that a modern
physicist or mathematician is superior to Newton and Leibniz in terms of knowledge.
Aristotle’s observation that there are prodigies of mathematics was not simply because
there are more young pupils talented in mathematics than in natural philosophy or
because mathematics takes less time to learn than political knowledge. A more
significant factor, I would argue, is that knowledge of mathematics can be ranked in
terms of difficulty and superiority, so handily and systematically that we even establish
what mathematics skills and learning would normally suit a certain age of the
population. Thus we judge a ten-year-old who understands calculus and relativity is a
very rare talent and does significantly “better” compared with those who only know
quadratic equations and Newton’s second law of motion at the same age. Without the
superficial certitude of who does “better” and the seeming manifestations of “talents”
often employ quantities (e.g. political science and economics), there are still other disciplines where
success is characterized by “genius” and “brilliance.” These include philosophy, music (and music
comparison), fine arts, English literature, etc., according to the references in footnote 40. Let us set aside
philosophy and consider the other three subjects, which belong to the arts and literature (though
philosophy, if considered in the tradition of rhetoric and public debate, is not unrelated). Awards in these
fields belong to what James F. English called “cultural prizes.” Even though recognition of success in these
disciplines might have their own aesthetic criteria, English suggested that they have borrowed from the
gold standard of competitive sports (i.e. where trophies, medals, and world records can most often be
awarded to “the best” without controversy) and called the emergence of prizes and recognition in these
cultural fields “a neoclassical convergence between the arts and spectator sport.” See English, The
Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the Circulation of Cultural Value, 2005, 51.
383
The Statesman 259e–260a
384
Marcellus 17.4 and 17.5 in Plutarch’s Lives.
113
in rankings, comparison and competition in our present-day STEM fields would not have
been so powerful and entrenched an institution.385
The confluence of the two qualities—readiness for demonstration and ranking, and the
institutionalized practice of comparison and competition it brings forth and facilitates—
was together embodied in the knowledge of mechanical devices and machines in
ancient times. Mechanical and machine are words of Ancient Greek origin: μηχανικός
(mekhanikos) and μηχανή (mekhane). As an adjective, μηχανικός has two senses. It may
describe a person as “resourceful” and “inventive,” or something that has the qualities
of a device or machine. As a noun, μηχανή means any physical contrivance that achieves
a purpose (e.g. crane to lift weights, bridge to cross a river, structure for irrigation), or
metaphorically any artificial means for doing something. In the context of war and
military writing, the word alone may also refer to the engine of war.386
The idea of machine goes hand in hand with that of techne. Both techne and machine, in
the sense of technique as laid out in the previous chapter, signify the means to achieve
something. There is, however, one notable difference: whereas techne encompasses a
broad scope of skills, machine only consists of those whose effectiveness can be
demonstrated through quantity. Plato, in his Cratylus, offers through the leading
interlocutor Socrates an etymology of techne (τέχνη) to be a trained skill (or acquired
habit, ἕξιν) of reason (or intellect, νοῦ). For the first part, the Greeks understood ἕξιν as
primarily a habit or skill that is not an inborn ability, but something that needs to be
acquired and trained for in an artificial way. For the second, Plato’s reason (νόος),
comparable to Aristotle’s true logos, plays an important role in techne.387 According to
Plato’s Timaeus, reason arises in us through teaching (or training, διδαχῆς), whereas its
opposite, opinion (δόξα), is through persuasion (πειθοῦς). Techne, so to speak,
385
In terms of competition, I am thinking, in particular, of the three earliest-established International
Science Olympiads for those under the age of 20: mathematics (since 1959), physics (1967), and chemistry
(1968).
386
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, s.v.
387
Cratylus 414b–414c, as in Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 6, 1953, 104-107. In these
paragraphs, Socrates introduces a neologism, ἐχονόη (rendered as having a skill or habit of reasoning),
which immediately received objection by the interlocutor Hermogenes because of the marked difference
in spelling between ἐχονόη and τέχνη. And yet it plausibly exhibits how Plato understood techne as ἕξιν
and νοῦ. On to what extent we should take Socrates’s etymologies seriously, see Trivigno, "Etymology and
the Power of Names in Plato's Cratylus," 2012. In this particular example, even though the etymology was
more likely to be flawed, my position is nevertheless that the semantics itself is plausible.
114
emphasizes not an inborn ability, but a skill that needs to be acquired and trained for in
an artificial way through the teaching (or training, διδαχῆς) of reason.388
In Cratylus, immediately following techne, Socrates continues with the etymology of

machine (μηχανή), which consists of μήκους and ἄνειν. Together they mean ἄνειν ἐπὶ
πολύ, which I translate as “to achieve as far as a large degree.”389 These Greek words
are pregnant with meanings. With ἄνειν, we have accomplish, finish, come to an end,
draw to a close, etc., suggesting not only a purposive action but also an end (in the
sense of both a purpose and a boundary) to stop at and which indicates its
consummation. For ἐπὶ, a preposition, there implies a sense of up to (or as far as)
something that can more or less be measured, for example, a height, width, length,
number of times, etc. And μήκους, a noun, denotes height, length (both in size and
time), degree, magnitude, etc., while πολύ, as a nominalized adjective here, describes
something large, great, or many, in terms of greatness, intensity, value, size, length of
time, etc.390
Accordingly, machine, unlike techne, acquired a quasi-quantitative way to evaluate its

effectiveness: by demonstrating its performance and comparing it with the intended
purpose on a linear scale of “quantity.”391 With the purpose in view, machine was
expected to just hit the mark, where it would complete and stop. Exceeding or going
beyond the given purpose is not an essential part of a machine; indeed, an excess could
be counterproductive in the cases of oversize, surplus, or overshooting.392 The idea of
machine, on the other hand, looks for problems and questions that are amenable to
quantity, and in this move, excludes a part of techne that is recalcitrant from the proper
scope of machine. Sometimes, it also conceptually transforms what is not readily
comparable into familiar quantitative terms. For example, scales are obviously for
measuring weight. Since Roman emperor Tiberius (42 BCE–37 CE), scales have also
represented the weighing of evidence in an impartial manner. An ancient vase from the
388
Timaeus 51d–52a as in Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 9, 1981 [1929], 120-123.
389
Cratylus 415a, as in Plato, Plato, with an English Translation Vol. 6, 1953, 106-108.
390
For the full scope of meanings of these words, I rely on examples given in Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-
English Lexicon, 1940.
391
Quantity I refer to here and hereafter in any context of ancient text should not be taken as scientific
quantity we are too familiar with in our time thanks to instruments of accurate quantification. Quantity
can be measured and expressed in relative linear degrees, not necessarily in an absolute sense with an
established and transferrable unit. Bear in mind terms like μήκους and πολύ, which Plato invoked here.
392
The association between completion and end (both purpose and boundary) in ἄνειν are essentially
what Greek τέλος (telos) and Latin finis signify in their multiple senses.
115
Romans, as in Figure 3.1, shows that Mercury and Apollo engage in “exploring the fates
of Achilles and Memnon, by weighing the attendant genius of the one against that of
the other.”393
Figure 3.1 Mercury and Apollo Weighing the Genius of Achilles and Memnon
More significant for human civilization, machine has to do with achieving a goal that is
“big” and “great.” Although machine does not necessarily entertain the idea of
comparatives, such as “bigger” or “greater,” the dominant representation of machine
does allude to accomplishing better than one would normally do without a machine.
The prevailing conditions for needing a machine, we were told, had been the
capriciousness of nature. In appearance, nature is far stronger than us human beings.
Machines and contrivances we design intelligently come to our aid in order to survive
and conquer nature and turn it to our advantage. Work attributed to Demades of
Athens (c. 380–c. 318 BCE) remarked on the roles of tools and the human intellect:
Force [βίᾳ] does not enable [δύναται] a man to master even the smallest things.
It was inventiveness [ἐπινοίᾳ] and [investigation, or μεθόδῳ] that made him
yoke the ox to the plough for the tilling of the land, bridle the horse, set a rider
on the elephant, and cross the boundless sea in boats of wood. The [chief-
craftsman, or ἀρχιτέκτων] and [maker, or δημιουργός] of all these things is mind
[νοῦς, or intellect], and we must use it as our guide, not always seeking to follow
393
Smith et al., A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, Vol. 2, 1891, 63.
116
[our own cleverness or quickness, or τὰς ἰδίας ὀξύτητας] but rather [the natures
and changes of the concrete matters at hand].394
In Mechanics (Μηχανικά), a text attributed to Aristotle (whose real author is likely his
disciple) that treats of mechanical theories, enunciates and testifies to similar ideas as to
how machines and mechanics are instrumental in civilization. I translated the passage
closely as follows:
Nature (φύσιν), according to which things occur, is marvelous, yet the cause
[underlying] many [of their happenings] is unknown. And [there are] things
[occurring] contrary to nature, in so far as and because art (τέχνην) is made
concerning the benefit of humankind. Among many cases, nature produces the
opposite of what is useful for us. This is because when nature always lead
toward its own, straightforward direction, what is useful [to us humankind]
undergoes changes in many ways. Therefore, whenever we are in need of
effecting (πρᾶξαι, or achieving) what is contrary to nature, thanks to the
difficulty, the hardship [both] brings out (παρέχει, or causes or enables) and
requires art (τέχνης). Hence, we call this kind of art (τέχνης) that comes to our
rescue toward such difficulties the machine (μηχανήν). For just as the poet
Antiphon wrote, it goes that: “with art (τέχνῃ) we rule over things where we are
conquered by nature.” Among such these are [that] the smaller rules over the
bigger, and the things that possess small weight move great weight, and as many
as all the things we more or less call mechanical (μηχανικὰ) problems
(προβλημάτων).395
Note that the preceding passage relates machine to techne by making machine a
specialized branch of techne to address the hardship of survival. Etymologically, the
reference to techne of machine in ancient text paved the way for what we call
“mechanical arts.”396 Also, by referring to a large degree or quantity (πολύ), mechanical
394
Quote taken and adapted with square brackets when needed from On The Twelve Years 42 as in Burtt,
Minor Attic Orators Vol. 2, 1959, 352-353.
395
My translation based on Aristotle’s Mechanics 847a as in Aristotle, Minor Works, 1955, 330.
396
Marcellus 14.4–14.5 of Plutarch's Lives discussed the instrumental (τήν … ὀργανικὴν) after talking of
Archimedes’ art (τι τῆς τέχνης), so that instrumental art is implied in context. Pappus of Alexandria’s
Collection Book 8.1–8.3 used arts (τέχνας or πάντων) to refer to the topics of mechanics (μηχανική),
where mechanical arts are implied. Vegetius (fl. 4th century CE), Roman military author, spoke of
“mechanica arte” and “artem mechanicam” in his Concerning Military Matters 4.17 and 4.22, respectively,
bearing a close resemblance to “military arts.”
117
arts did not entail the idea of “efficiency,” for example, by searching for ways to
conquer increasingly bigger foes with ever smaller expenses. Comparative adjectives
here are static comparisons for the moment, but the use of comparison did not
foreclose the practical need or impetus to increase the theoretical leverage, however.
After all, Archimedes is well-known to have said, “Give me a place to stand and with a
lever I will move the whole world.”397
Ingenuity and Quantity at Critical Times of Warfare
Humanity’s battle against nature, however, only tells us part of the story and is at the
same time delusive about the nature of machine. Since the spectacle of machine is
determined by the criticality of the situation it serves, machine lends itself too well to
war. While philosophers and theorists, such as Aristotle and Plato, conceptualized the
general purpose and applicability of machine, human affairs alone determined how
machine was used. In this regard, Plutarch conceded that in his time, the art of
machines and instruments (τήν ὀργανικὴν) had long been looked down upon
(περιορωμένη) by thinkers and philosophers like Plato and his followers because it was
not, as they perceived, pure and perfect as geometry and instead involved burdensome
and vulgar (φορτικῆς) manual work (βαναυσουργίας). Plutarch concluded that, because
mechanics (μηχανική) had been long ignored by philosophers, it “became one [branch]
of the military arts (μία τῶν στρατιωτίδων τεχνῶν ἐγεγόνει).”398 (It is worth noting, in
passing, that Plutarch’s observation can be thought of as a reminder of why we modern
philosophers should care about engineering and technology.)
Thus Plutarch told us that Archimedes, despite his purported contempt for mechanics,
turned his attention to applications that are more concrete and obvious for “human
needs” under the influence of Hiero II of Syracuse. Such concrete needs were not
securing food, crossing rivers, keeping warm, building structures, or locating
settlements. The need, obviously, proved to be one that dealt with the same human
species who, equipped with siege engines, are more destructive and fickle in speed and
selectivity in killing than natural forces or disasters. Military writers who popularized the
397
The famous quote attributed to Archimedes survives in Byzantine-Greek scholar John Tzetzes’s Book of
Histories citing fragments of Diodorus of Sicily’s Library of History that are now lost to us. See Diodorus of
Sicily, Diodorus of Sicily Vol. 12: Fragments of Books Xxi-Xxxii, 1957, 195. Pappus's Collection Book 8.19
also preserves a similar quote, as in Pappi Alexandrini and Hultsch, Pappi Alexandrini Collectionis Vol. 3,
1878, 1060.
398
118
use of stratagems endorse the use of craft, which we rarely see in the context of
conquering nature. For example, Xenophon (ca. 430–354 BCE) advised that a cavalry
commander must be ingenious (μηχανητικὸν, variant of μηχανικός) to make a small
crew of horsemen cavalrymen appear large, and to make a large crew of cavalrymen
appear small. The commander also needs to contrive (μηχανᾶσθαι, a verb derived from
machine) to trick his enemies, “because, in fact, nothing is more profitable than [the use
of] a ruse during a war.”399 Philo of Byzantium (ca. 280 BC – ca. 220 BC) exhorted his
reader to “always contrive [μηχανᾶσθαι] something intelligently” and, when short of
force, to prevail over the enemy by stealth (κλοπήν) and by betrayal (προδοσίαν).400
Polyaenus (fl. 2nd century CE), too, stated:
It is manliness (ἀνδρεία, implying strength and courage) which [makes one]

powerful to employ [their] strength against fighting enemies, but it is planning of
actions (εὐβουλίας) to prevail [over the enemies] without fight [by using] craft
(τέχνῃ) and treachery (δόλῳ).401
Indeed, it appears that whether more prestige, ingenuity, and “soul” were accorded to
military engineering as opposed to “civil(ian) engineering” in ancient writing remains an
open question, and is a matter that depended more on an author’s treatment of the
topics than on the representation of reality. Vitruvius’s On Architecture, with its eclectic
sampling of the subject in general, exhibits a tendency to acclaim civil and peaceful
applications. He used genius (ingenium), ingenuity (both ingenium and sollertiae),
ingenious (artificiosus) and finesse (subtilitas) far more often in the context of non-
military applications than for the military.402 Procopius of Caesarea (ca. 500–ca. 565 CE),
in his panegyric writing The Buildings, focused on buildings and constructions and called
their chief-craftsmen by mechanikos (μηχανικός) or mechanopoios (μηχανοποιός). He
mentioned building as a field of skill and shrewdness (σοφίᾳ, or practical wisdom), and
in one place, spoke of two young men who exhibited natural capacity (δύναμιν …
399
My translation based on The Cavalry Commander 5.2 and 5.9 as in Xenophon, Scripta Minora, 1946,
264, 268.
400
Philo of Byzantium’s On Sieges D.58, D.73 and D.78 as in Whitehead, Philo Mechanicus: On Sieges,
2016, 120, 124.
401
My translation based on Polyaenus Stratagem Book 1 Preface 3 as in Polyaenus, Stratagems of War
Vol. 1, 1994, 6.
402
Out of the four words listed here (including their declensions), I found only 6 instances of use in the
context of military affairs, compared to 9 instances for theory, 23 instances for civil constructions, and 11
instances for non-military instruments.
119
φύσεως) beyond their ages.403 Diodorus of Sicily (ca. 80–20 BCE) praised specifically the
chief-craftsmen of the pyramids in Egypt:
It is [generally] agreed that these works (ἔργα, i.e. pyramids in this context) far
surpass [the other constructions] in Egypt, not only by the weight and cost of the
constructions, but also by enthusiasm for art [φιλοτεχνίᾳ, sometimes
craftsmanship or “ingenuity”] of those who worked [on them]. People say that
we should marvel at the chief-craftsmen (ἀρχιτέκτονας) of the works (ἔργων, i.e.
pyramids in this context) ... more ... than at the kings who supplied the resources
for the works; because in leading up their plans to completion, [the chief-
craftsmen drew upon] their own souls (ψυχαῖς) and their ambition for honor,
[while the kings used] the wealth they inherited and the other people’s misery
(κακουχίαις, implying toil of the ruled).404
These examples reveal how the ancient authors sought to endorse the talent and skills
of the chief-craftsmen not by sheer quantity. Diodorus of Sicily contrasted enthusiasm,
ambition, and “souls” with weight and cost, the latter of which can be brought about
simply by extravagance and force. Vitruvius, too, stressed the “flexible ingenuity and
skill” (ingenio mobili sollertia) to improvise when commonly-used construction materials
are lacking, “acumen of genius” (ingeniorum acuminibus) to correct a false impression
from visual perception when principles (doctrinis) alone do not work, and “ingenuity and
acumen” (ingenio et acumine) to blend with the surroundings so that “the beauty may
be achieved through proper proportions (or symmetries).”405 Intellect (νοητός), genius
(ingenium), and ingenuity (sollertia) were also associated by other authors with a chief-
craftsman founding and planning a city, such as the ancient port city Alexandria (now in
Egypt).406
However, all these good qualities and skills that evince a non-quantifiable trace of the
ingenuity of a premodern “engineer” were far more frequently dwarfed by the
knowledge that could demonstrate its worth and ingenuity more obviously through
quantifiable performance achieved in military engineering. Certainly, the importance of
403
Buildings 1.1.24 and 2.8.25 as in Procopius, Procopius Vol. 7: Buildings, 1971.
404
My translation based on Book 1.64.11–13 as in Diodorus of Sicily, Diodorus of Sicily Vol. 1: Books I-Ii, 1–
34, 1989, 222.
405
On Architecture Book 5.6.7, Book 6.2.4 and Book 6.3.11 as in Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 1, 1931,
286; Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 2, 1934, 22, 32.
406
Philo of Alexandria’s On the Creation 24, Pliny the Elder’s (AD 23 – 79) Natural History Book 5.11.62,
and Ammianus Marcellinus Book 22.16.7 as in Philo of Alexandria, Philo Vol. 1, 1981, 20; Pliny the Elder,
Natural History Vol. 2, 1961, 266; Ammianus Marcellinus, Ammianus Marcellinus Vol. 2, 1937, 298.
120
quantity was also emphasized by authors in the area of civil constructions, but its
relevance was more often in the context of savings and cost estimations. For example,
Vitruvius maintained that an architect needs to use the resources and materials wisely
and economically. And Diodorus of Sicily did not praise the grandeur and extravagance
(i.e. performance) of the pyramids, but the craftsmanship and honor of the chief-
craftsmen that helped complete a grand project with plans, the idea of which implied
budgeting. In Ancient Greece, there were also anecdotes where failing to accurately
estimate the costs of public works could lead to the confiscation of a chief-craftsman’s
personal property for the damages, and in some more drastic cases, a chief-craftsman
might commit suicide out of dishonor. In all the above cases of civil projects, “ingenuity”
and “prestige” were not accorded to economics or the accuracy of quantifying.407
In military engineering, where greater size was indicative of advantage, a different story
unfolded and often proceeded in a flow of circular reasoning: scaling quantity to power,
projecting power to superiority, ascribing superiority to ingenuity, and explaining
ingenuity in a display of quantity. For example, Demetrius I of Macedon (337–283 BC), a
military commander who would become king of Macedon, was said by Diodorus of Sicily
to be inventive (εὐμήχανος) and surpass the art of chief-craftsmen (ἀρχιτεκτόνων
τέχνην) because he was able to devise many things, including the “Helepolis,” a siege
tower greater in size (ca. 135 feet by 65 feet408) than all its predecessors, in the siege of
Rhodes (305–304 BC). The size (μεγέθη) of his siege engines (μηχανῶν) and the great
number (πλῆθος) of his army made him both ingenious (φιλότεχνον, or “techne loving”)
and forcible (βίαιον) in carrying out sieges, and in this manner, he possessed “such
superiority and strength” in the attacks.409 In a separate account, Plutarch explained
that, unlike other kings who devoted their time and energy to less serviceable art (such
as playing a flute or painting), Demetrius did not give his natural endowments (εὐφυὴς),
407
Vitruvius mentioned the calculation of building costs with arithmetic (1.1.4), the importance of a
contract that specifies obligations (1.1.10), and the wise and thrifty use of resources and materials that
reduces expenses (1.2.8). He also mentioned that, in a Greek city Ephesus, a chief-craftsman would need
to pay for the extra money spent on public works if the actual cost exceeds by more than 25% of the
estimation (10.P.1). Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160–ca. 210 CE), in an example that stresses that scale and
proportion are essential to all the art, said that the chief-craftsman Chares of Lindos (fl. 280 BC)
committed suicide because of a gross mistake in estimating the cost of the famous Colossus of Rhodes.
See Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 1, 1931; Vitruvius, On Architecture Vol. 2, 1934; Sextus Empiricus,
Against the Logicians, 1935.
408
Spence et al., ed., Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome, 2016, 476.
409
Book 20.91.2 and 20.92.1–2 as in Diodorus of Sicily, Diodorus of Sicily Vol. 10: Books Xix. 66–110 and
Xx, 1954, 382, 386.
121
thought (θεωρητικός) or enthusiasm for art (φιλότεχνον) to “amusement.” The height

(ὕψος) of his intelligence (διανοίας) and spirit (φρονήματος) was, in effect, expressed
together (συνεκφερόντων) with his extraordinariness (περιττῷ, used especially in the
context of going beyond regular numbers or size) and enthusiasm for art (φιλοτέχνῳ) in
his siege works (ἔργων).410
Note how these accounts bear a striking similarity with how Archimedes employed his
talent in devising powerful war engines. Ingenuity, intellect, inventiveness, and so forth
did not exist for their own sake or manifest themselves through inherent qualities.
While these human qualities might be individual and innate, they became ingenuity and
intellect in the making, only because of the technical functions they both served and
limited. The testament to ingenuity and the evidence for intellect depended not so
much on how well a skill or talent serves an intended function, nor much on the
importance or difficulty of a goal they set out to pursue. Instead, ingenuity and intellect
and their disembodied presences relied on, and indeed were constructed by, how well
the functions and goals were quantitatively effective and tangibly decisive. Their
effectiveness and decisiveness were all the more evident and dominant in military
affairs, where the performativity of quantity was realized and made necessary by the
urgency and struggle to compete and survive, and, in turn, selectively privileged and
reinforced the ingenuity and intellect which gave rise to the very same technical
performance in quantity.
Polybius, in his accounts of Archimedes that I translated and quoted before, hinted at
some of these linkages. Embellishing and rhetorical Polybius may be, he nevertheless
limited the relevance of Archimedes’ genius to “some critical moments” (ἐνίοις καιροῖς)
and “certain circumstances” (ἔνια τῶν πραγμάτων).411 The limited moments and
circumstances he alluded to were unmistakably the military ones, which Plutarch said
were catering to the “needs” (χρείαις) and were “more visible” (ἐμφανέστερον) to the
common people.412
410
Life of Demetrius 20.1–3 as in Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives Vol. 9, 1959, 46.
411
Polybius’s The Histories 8.3.3 and 8.7.9 in Polybius, The Histories Vol. 3, 1966, 452, 461. Here καιροῖς
means critical or exact times, often implying the right moments and opportunities. And πραγμάτων
means affairs, circumstances, actions, deeds, acts, etc. See Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon,
1940, s.v.
412
Marcellus 14.4 as in Plutarch's Lives Vol. 5, 1961, 470. Here χρείαις represents, on one hand, needs,
requests, want, necessity, etc., and, on the other, service, matters, business, use, etc., that meet the
needs and requests. And ἐμφανής, the non-comparative form of ἐμφανέστερον, means visible (to the
122
Generally, in military writing, only certain circumstances would make quantitative

comparisons of power (δύναμις, also capacity and forces) relevant to superiority.
Military writer Aeneas Tacticus (fl. 4th century BC) made forces (δύναμις) a subject of
comparison chiefly in situations like road blockade, hiring mercenaries, and when an
impending invasion is expected.413 Philo of Byzantium (ca. 280 BC – ca. 220 BC)
compared forces (δύναμις) during the capture of a city, in a sea battle, and when the
enemy was expecting reinforcements.414 Force could sometimes be capacity in the
abstract sense, sometimes drawn from a combination of physical power and ingenuity.
In the treatise of Onasander (fl. 1st century CE), The General, the use of siege engines
depended on a few factors of “capacity” (δύναμιν), including luck, wealth, and might
(δυνάμεως) of fighters and the inventiveness (ἐπινοίας) of chief-craftsmen
(ἀρχιτεκτόνων).415
Ingenuity and inventiveness, though not as immediately comparable as power in limited

circumstances, were linked with the potential for power that is performative in the
heights of warfare. For Onasander, the same “inventiveness” of chief-craftsmen was
important to a general’s military stratagems at critical times, in particular when the
latter was dealing with the beleaguering enemy at close quarters and when carrying out
siege operations.416 The general, he elaborated, must be intellectual (νοερόν). The
sharpness and swiftness of mind to make quick, crucial decisions on the spot could only
be compared to that of a bird, a beam of light, a quick physical assault in battle, or a
ranged weapon like a spear, as he went on, “the general must be sharp-minded (ὀξύν),
darting (ᾄττοντα, of any rapid motion) toward every single [matter] through the
quickness of mind (ὠκύτητος ψυχῆς).”417
eye), manifest, palpable, conspicuous, notable, etc. See Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940,
s.v.
413
Aeneas Tacticus’s How to Survive under Siege 8.1, 12.2, 12.4 and 17.5 as in The Illinois Greek Club,
Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English Translation, 1923, 48, 70, 72, 92.
414
Philo of Byzantium’s On Sieges D.71, D.104 and D.86 as in Whitehead, Philo Mechanicus: On Sieges,
2016, 122, 128, 126.
415
Onasander’s The General 42.3 in The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander,
with an English Translation, 1923, 508.
416
Onasander’s The General Preface.9, 10.21 and 40.1 in The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus,
Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English Translation, 1923, 372, 426, 504.
417
My translation of Onasander’s The General 1.7 in The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus,
Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English Translation, 1923, 376. The verb “dashing” saw many uses in
different context. Onasander, citing Homer’s Odyssey 7.36, had the quickness of birds in mind when
invoking the metaphor of “dashing.” Homer himself also used “dashing” along with a bird in Iliad 23.868.
123
Ingenuity continued to bear on certain military affairs whose critical and decisive nature
reinforced their ties with ingenuity. In the works of roman historian and military officer
Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 330–ca. 395), known as Res gestae (in Latin, literally
“histories that have been carried on”), ingenuity and skill (both senses in sollertia) were
predominantly associated with crucial junctures in war, including carrying out a sack or
an ambush (Book 16.11.4 and 28.3.1) and their counteractions (Book 17.2.3 and
18.2.10), making an army deceptively large in combat (Book 21.8.3 and 27.2.5),
fortifying a narrow pass (Book 31.10.21), securing a stronghold with artillery and war
engines (Book 17.1.12), and, notably, conducting a siege (Book 21.12.16, 24.7.2 and
26.8.3).418
Vegetius (fl. 4th century CE), a military writer, was also concerned about similarly critical
moments. In the context of naval warfare, in order to forecast a storm, “all the ingenuity
(sollertia) of natural philosophy should be called for,” and being able to observe unusual
behaviors of birds and fishes that indicate an imminent storm was close to having
“divine ingenuity” (divino … ingenio).419 Like Ammianus Marcellinus, Vegetius also wrote
about sieges. Reminiscent of the story of Archimedes, he recounted how the genius of
an “engineer” (mechanici ingenio), during the Siege of Rhodes (305–304 BC),
successfully warded off a giant siege tower.420 The siege tower was “Helepolis,”
designed by Demetrius I of Macedon, himself also an “ingenious” and “inventive” genius
according to Diodorus of Sicily and Plutarch, which I quoted previously. Both sides of the
story of the siege thus offer us an account of the clash between “geniuses.”
It was in an unusual work by an anonymous author (fl. 4th century CE), titled De rebus
bellicis (“On Military Matters”), that ingenuity not only was given primacy in military
affairs, but also was assigned a preliminary quasi-quantity of “magnitude” (magnitudo).
The author addressed the emperor (as part of a eulogy in the preface) that they wrote
the military treatise “according to the capability of [their] genius” (pro ingenii facultate).
But elsewhere Homer also employed the same “dashing” along with subjects including spears and light of
the sun, respectively in Iliad 5.657 and 18.212. In close combat, Homer also described someone “dashing”
toward the enemy with a sword, a spear or on a chariot in 5.81, 11.484 and 17.460, respectively. Here I
rely on examples given in Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, s.v. ἀΐσσω.
418
Ammianus Marcellinus, Ammianus Marcellinus Vol. 1, 1932; Ammianus Marcellinus, Ammianus
Marcellinus Vol. 2, 1937; Ammianus Marcellinus, Ammianus Marcellinus Vol. 3, 1936.
419
My translation based on Vegetius’s On Military Matters Book 4.38.2 and 4.41.6 as in Flavius Vegetius
Renatus and Reeve, Epitoma Rei Militaris, 2004, 149-150, 155.
420
On Military Matters Book 4.20.2 as in Flavius Vegetius Renatus and Reeve, Epitoma Rei Militaris, 2004,
137.
124
They justified their offering of the military piece, by saying, “since the utility (utilitas) of
the matters (rerum, or things) sometimes eludes [even the imperial] inquiry … the
majority of humans run to [in the sense of getting help from] the man whom nature
(natura) has endowed with ingenuity (ingenio).”421 Then they put forth ingenuity at the
center of military inventions:422
It is generally agreed that neither the noblest birth nor the affluence of
resources nor the power resting on the magistrates nor eloquence acquired
through scholarship on paper, results in the utility (utilitates) of the arts (artium),
within which the invention of military equipment is contained, but only the
magnitude (magnitudo) of ingenuity (ingenii) alone [will do], which is the mother
of all the excellences (virtutum) [and] rests upon the serendipity of nature
(naturae).
The author has invoked the role of ingenuity and its instance (“an ingenuous device”)
many times throughout the short treatise (about 17 pages on modern pages,
illustrations included). In land battles, equipment is contrived with “ingenuity” (sollertia)
to armor a horse so the horse can spur itself and wreak havoc on enemies.423 In sea
warfare, a heavily-armed warship “under the direction of an ingenious device (ingenii,
as an instance of ingenuity), is more superior to ten [ordinary] ships so that [they] can
be sunk by it without the aid of a great number [of crew].”424 The ingenious device is
later revealed to be one that used “animal power, whenever utility calls for it” to drive
the warship “according to the flow and readiness of ingenuity” (ad facilitate cursus
ingenii).425 A special suit of armor with wool liners is put together by “fearful concern
[for injuries and death], under the guidance (magistra) of ingenuity (sollertia).”426 Apart
from fear for death, invasive needs also drive the exercise of ingenuity, sometimes
making it a practical compulsion. In order for an army to march across a river, “the
421
My translation based on On Military Matters P.2 and P.5 (where “P” stands for the preface), as in
Hassall and Ireland, ed., De Rebus Bellicis, 1979, 3 (part 2).
422
My translation based on On Military Matters P.6, as in Hassall and Ireland, ed., De Rebus Bellicis, 1979,
3 (part 2).
423
On Military Matters P.13, as in Hassall and Ireland, ed., De Rebus Bellicis, 1979, 3 (part 2).
424
My translation based on On Military Matters P.13 and P.12, as in Hassall and Ireland, ed., De Rebus
Bellicis, 1979, 3 (part 2).
425
My translation based on On Military Matters 17.1, as in Hassall and Ireland, ed., De Rebus Bellicis,
1979, 16 (part 2).
426
1979, 14 (part 2).
125
necessity of ingenuity” (ingeniosa necessitas) is said to discover a remedy for building a

kind of bridge that is “easy [to build] and extraordinary in terms of saving [time] and
utility” (compendio facile et usu praecipuum).427
The anonymous author was apparently interested in what they called the “thunderbolt”
ballista (ballista fulminalis) specifically used to defend fortifications,428 where we see
not only more occurrences of “ingenuity” than any other section, but also how ingenuity
is directly proportional to a preliminary formulation of “efficiency.” The ballista in
question was said to be “strengthened with so many and great ingenious arts,” so that it
keeps the enemy in check “not only by the power and military forces, but also by the
ingenuity of art,” implying that the power is drawn from ingenuity.429 With multiple
comparatives, they concluded with an assessment of the performance of the ballista:430
The lesser the degree of service required [from] soldiers for [using the weapons
in] the defense [of fortifications], the more outstanding the great excellence
(virtute) of ingenuity (ingenii) is. [As the power] provides abundantly for itself,
the greater number of [military] force (manus), furnished by ingenuity (ingenio)
of art (artis), had been able to bring forth whatever of power (opis) from [the
art].
The Military Genesis of Binary in Engineering
The early Greek accounts of Archimedes defending Syracuse, the ingenuity of Demetrius
I of Macedon in making “Helepolis,” as well as the anonymous Latin author’s ballista to
secure fortifications, among others, all have evidently shown that “ingenuity” and
“machines” played a central role more frequently in certain military affairs than in the
others—that is, in siege warfare.
Ancient siege warfare, from both sides of the besieger and the besieged, includes the
breaking through and the defense of city walls and gates. On the ground, the use of
battering rams and mining aimed to damage the structure of the walls, opening a
427
1979, 15 (part 2).
428
The neologism fulminalis derives from fulmineus (thunder, lightning, etc.) according to Hassall and
Ireland, ed., De Rebus Bellicis, 1979, 125 (part 2).
429
My translation based on On Military Matters 18.5 and 18.7, as in Hassall and Ireland, ed., De Rebus
Bellicis, 1979, 17-18 (part 2).
430
1979, 18 (part 2). “Power” and “art” in square brackets are inferred from gendered pronouns.
126
gateway into the city for infantry that was often greater in numbers than the soldiers in
the besieged city. In the air, where height generally gave an advantage, attacks by
ranged weapons took place between the top of siege towers and the defensive walls
and towers. Ladders were also used for individual soldiers to break into fortifications,
with the purpose of diminishing the enemy’s force on the defensive walls and
potentially opening the gate from the inside.
Military treatises from ancient times generally agree that walls and gates played a
central role in siege warfare. In the preface for siege warfare, when Vegetius identified
that the founding of cities (and accordingly, city-states) separated humanity from
“dumb and wild animals,” he credited the construction of city walls for further saving
citizens from the invasion of other humans.431 To earlier authors like Aeneas Tacticus,
gates were already at the center of defense in the fourth century BCE, as he compiled
and discussed at length past lessons showing how the assignments of gatekeepers and
the use of locks (“bolt-pints,” or βάλανος, to be specific) could go wrong.432 Philo of
Byzantium, in his treatise On Sieges, described in great technical detail the proper
constructions of fortification systems, including walls, gates, and towers.433
In addition to walls and gates, for the besieged, war engines were also a lifeline for hope
and assurance. According to Strabo, ancient cities like Cyzicus prepared for arms
(ὅπλων) and war engines (ὀργάνων) even in times of peace, and in the city of Rhodes,
“all things related to chief-craftsmen, activities of making war engines (ὀργανοποιίας),
and the storage units of arms (ὅπλων), are taken seriously above all the other things and
are treated with more caution than any other places will do.”434 The importance of war
engines and engine makers could not be overemphasized. As a strategy of the attackers
to encourage treason of the besieged enemy, prizes were sometimes offered for
431
See On Military Matters Book 4’s preface, as in Flavius Vegetius Renatus and Reeve, Epitoma Rei
Militaris, 2004, 123-124.
432
Aeneas Tacticus’s How to Survive under Siege 8.1–20.5 (cf. 5.1–5.2 on gate-keepers), as in The Illinois
Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English Translation, 1923, 92-105, cf. 42-
43.
433
Philo of Byzantium’s On Sieges A.1–A.85 as in Whitehead, Philo Mechanicus: On Sieges, 2016, 66-83.
434
Book 12.8.11 and 14.2.5 in Strabo, The Geography of Strabo Vol. 5, 1961, 500-501; Strabo, The
Geography of Strabo Vol. 6, 1960, 270-271. My translation is based the Greek text in Book 14.2.5.
127
“anyone [in the besieged city] who kill any of the engine makers (μηχανοποιῶν) or [kill]
those who are in important authority of artillery (βελῶν).”435
According to Vegetius, the defenders gained the upper hand by nature with slings,
bows, and spears thrown or shot from the height of the wall. Vegetius also added
ballistae and mangonels, which he said penetrate and smash any armor and surpass
everything else, if they are “tuned by the most diligent expert.”436 Challenging as it were
for the besiegers to break through a city, the tasks of surmounting the walls, collapsing a
portion of fortification and laying the city open, or even bursting the gate open, all lead
to binary differences that are not only visibly apparent to the beholders. An open gate is
also a slippery slope toward destruction that is too rapid and great to be redeemable.
The “crucial moments” that were described but not fully explained by Polybius were
unmistakably these kinds of circumstances where binary differences at a crucial juncture
would lead to bifurcating fates. The “deus ex machina” for both the besieger and the
besieged is war engines and military machines.437
Julius Caesar’s (100–44 BC) first-hand accounts testify to the nature of a series of binary
differences during a siege from the attacker’s point of view. Caesar’s memoirs, which
were written by himself from a third-person point of view, showed countlessly that he
had actively engaged in carrying out sieges. Preparations of serious siege works typically
included working shifts in harsh conditions while staying alert for weeks, if not months,
under constant attacks and sorties from the besieged, in the efforts to complete
earthworks like ramparts and trenches and construct siege engines such as mantlets,
penthouses, battering-rams, and siege towers.438 These created a situation for Caesar
where, on the one hand, “the labor of many months went to ruin in a moment”
(multorum mensium labor … temporis interiit) when the enemy successfully set the siege
engines on fire, and on the other, “the return of all the previous fights [of the Romans]
435
My translation based on Philo of Byzantium’s On Sieges D.12 as in Whitehead, Philo Mechanicus: On
Sieges, 2016, 112.
436
On Military Matters Book 4.29, as in Flavius Vegetius Renatus and Reeve, Epitoma Rei Militaris, 2004,
144.
437
Latin deus ex machina is borrowed from Ancient Greek ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός, which means god from the
machine. The term originates from the use of mechanical devices as a theatrical effect in Ancient Greek
theater, marking an unexpected twist of the plot that can only result from the intervention of a deity.
438
See, among others, The Gallic War Book 7.17 from Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 402-405.
128
depends on the [single] day and hour” when the Romans, getting the upper hand, saw
their siege works at stake in the last and all-out fight leading to victory.439
In other words, for the besiegers, at the center of the warfare were the siege works,
whose promise and peril retrospectively concluded the binary difference between ruin
and success as far as how the time and efforts were spent.440 The primacy of sieges
works lay in the constant threats siege engines posed to the besieged, culminating in
the effect of making either breaking or not breaking into the walls a binary difference
that has bifurcating consequences for the besieged; breaking into the wall must be so
visible an achievement, making such a binary difference that Caesar once declared he
would give prizes to those who first ascended the wall.441 (Onasander, too, promised
similar rewards.442) The nature of siege operations that gave rise to all the above
elements simultaneously—the expenditure of considerable amount of resources that
could be spoiled with a slight mistake, the binary perception of achievements that
retrospectively altered the meanings and value of the course of previous actions, and
439
My translations based on The Civil Wars Book 2.14 and The Gallic War Book 7.85–7.86, as in Julius
Caesar, The Civil Wars, 2006, 142-145; Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 504-507. In the latter situation,
stakes and iron hooks the Romans placed in the trenches (used to stop the enemies from breaking
through the encircled area and limit their combat capability) were buried by soil cast by the Gauls (i.e. the
Romans’ enemies in the Gallic War). Soon the Gauls threw out Roman solders from the siege towers with
missiles, and took down the ramparts and breastwork the Romans had built with hooks. For the laying out
of siege works in the trench and more technical descriptions, see The Gallic War Book 7.73 from Julius
Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 484-487.
440
It is true that siege engines themselves were instrumental in siege operations, but as Philo of
Byzantium pointed out, the materials and tools to build siege engines, as well as “an engineer (notably in
singular μηχανοποιόν) and men (ἄνδρας) who will be useful for the siege engines,” were also crucial to
the success of siege. See Philo of Byzantium’s On Sieges B.49 as in Whitehead, Philo Mechanicus: On
Sieges, 2016, 92-93. Therefore, it is noteworthy that Caesar, when narrating his feats, often biased in
favor of what he thought to be critical and binary moments, rather than recounting logistic support in
detail. Thus the grandeur of Rome seemed to be determined by success of warfare, warfare success by
siege operations, and siege campaigns by the performance of siege engines in crucial junctures, which, by
implication, conditioned everything else and changed the course of history under his command. As I will
argue later, the kind of causal-binary biases is not dissimilar to the nature of the dominant ideologies in
modern engineering.
441
The Gallic War Book 7.27 as in Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 418-419. See also Onasander’s The
General 42.15–16, on promising rewards to the bravest soldiers who would climb up cliffs (which were
natural barriers that protected a city and were less guarded), descend into the city, and open the gate, as
in The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English Translation, 1923,
516-519.
442
See also Onasander’s The General 42.15–16, on how to secretly mount the wall, get into the city, and
open the gate, as in The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English
Translation, 1923, 516-519.
129
the merit-based system that allocated and concentrated substantial recognition and
rewards to those who visibly achieved success—is only comparable in the sphere of
non-military activities to that of hunting and fishing in traditional societies, in particular
the killing of large games like buffalos and whales.443
On the other side of siege operations, the dramatic, catastrophic fate of humans is not
dissimilar to that of animals being pursued and hunted.444 Despite risks and
uncertainties posed to besiegers, the stakes for the defenders of their homeland, as
Aeneas Tacticus (fl. 4th century BC) pointed out, far exceeded those of the attackers
engaging in a military expedition away from their motherland.445 The toil of siege
operations lasting for months not only led to plunder by Caesar’s army. In certain cases,
it also amounted to mutilation of the armed enemies or genocide of the entire
inhabitants.446 Siege engines, again, were thrown into the center of the siege warfare.
According to Caesar, during the siege of the town of Noviodunum (now Soissons in
northern French), when the townspeople saw the bulk of the Romans’ siege works
(magnitudine operum)—including mantlets, siege towers, and earthen ramps (used to
make siege engines relatively higher and even top the wall)—they sent envoys and
surrendered.447 It was customary for Caesar to spare the lives of the besieged, if they
surrendered before battering rams hit the wall.448
The binary aspect of military engineering—success or failure, victory or defeat, life or

death, etc.—in siege warfare and beyond was definitive of the critical moment, when
quantities were brought to the forefront because the power and domination they
443
See, in particular, passages in Udy, Organization of Work, 1959, 30, 42-43, 87-88, 90-91, 118-119.
444
On this account, some authors tended to be ignorant of the aftermath of ancient wars and insensitive
to the atrocities connected with technology when they tried to dramatize the devastation of modern wars
and technological weapons. For example, in a passage on “technology and war,” Andrew G. Van Melsen
asserted that “[i]n former ages war could still appear to some as a kind of rough and tumbl[ing] social
sport, but technological terrors such as the thermonuclear bomb make it clear what war really is.” See van
Melsen, Science and Technology, 1961, 306.
445
In the preface of How to Survive under Siege, Aeneas Tacticus wrote “When men set out from their
own country to encounter strife and perils in foreign lands and some disaster befalls them by land or sea,
the survivors still have left their native soil, their city, and their fatherland, so that they are not all utterly
destroyed. But for those who are to incur peril in defence of what they most prize, shrines and country,
parents and children, and all else, the struggle is not the same nor even similar.” This passage of quotes is
taken from The Illinois Greek Club, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, with an English
Translation, 1923, 27.
446
The Gallic War Book 7.28 and 8.44, as in Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 420-421, 574-575.
447
The Gallic War Book 2.12, as in Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 106-107.
448
The Gallic War Book 2.32, as in Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1958, 130-131.
130
represented predicted, if not immediately concluded, binary success. Sometimes

success was clinched by an immediately quantitative comparison. Vegetius, for example,
provided tips on how to measure the heights of the enemy’s walls and towers from a
distance, in order to construct ladders and siege engines that surpass the fortifications
in terms of height. Siege towers, in general, were built to easily overtop walls and
towers.449 In other situations, even though greatness did not always determine success
(e.g. Demetrius’s “Helepolis”), a larger size symbolized power and confidence in success.
Apollodorus of Damascus (fl. 2nd century AD), a military chief-craftsman, advised in his
highly technical treatise Siege Matters that “for every ram, the greater and longer [it is],
and the higher the cord [the ram] has for suspension, the more powerful [it is] than
[those rams which are] not coming out [i.e. being made] this way.”450 Even though other
factors, such as appropriateness, adaptability, and portability, were also important
when it came to the performance of a battering-ram, quantities of size alone still
dominated and could sometimes override other qualitative approaches and
considerations in military engineering.451
But regardless of different approaches—quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of

both—to achieving a goal, binary ways of defining and assessing success made
quantitative approaches to measure and compare “power” a source of confidence
during siege warfare. Indeed, there were many other qualitative technologies for
prevailing in siege warfare, such as through generalship (e.g. Onasander) and
stratagems (e.g. Polyaenus), but they were excluded from an emerging specialized field
of expertise of “military engineering” that was more interested in warfare machines and
siege engines and made the idea of quantitative achievements an inseparable part of
machine.
Apollodorus of Damascus, for example, empirically established quantities and methods

for constructing “war engines” (τῶν μηχανημάτων), where the primacy of quantitative
performance was implied. His Siege Matters was a very technical treatise that notably
left out any discussion about the use of generalship or stratagems during siege.
Similarly, the anonymous author’s On Military Matters seemed to embrace the same
449
Vegetius’s On Military Matters Book 4.30 and 4.17, as in Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Vegetius: Epitome of
Military Science, 2001, 139, 130.
450
My translation based on Siege Matters 158, as in Whitehead, Apollodorus Mechanicus, Siege-Matters,
2010, 46.
451
Attic Nights Book 1.8.11–1.8.13, as in Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights Vol. 1, 1961, 68-69. In this
particular account, the chief-craftsman did not follow the commander’s instruction for the larger material
and was physically punished for choosing a smaller piece of wood. While Aulus Gellius wanted to make a
case that it is imperative to follow orders, I interpret the same incident in a different way.
131
commitment to military technologies which the author thought were the most defining
aspect of the battle. Notably, when discussing siege warfare, although the anonymous
author’s On Military Matters (Part 18 and 19) did not specify dimensions and quantities
for construction, they described procedures to make and deploy war engines that were
superior in siege warfare and led to a binary victory.
For the purpose of illustrations, the distinctions and classifications of dominant ways to
assess success and to achieve goals are briefly summarized in Table 3.1, drawing from
the examples in this chapter. Each of the three columns looks at one particular field
whose overall success is measured predominantly by one approach: architecture by
quality, siege engines by quantity, and siege warfare in binary. Each column is further
broken into three blocks, each representing a dominant approach to achieving goals.
132
Table 3.1: A Breakdown of Dominant Ways to Assess Success and to Achieve Goals in the
Selected Ancient Writing
Dominant ways to assess overall success

Qualitative Quantitative Binary
(e.g. Architecture) (e.g. Siege engines) (e.g. Siege warfare)
Improvised use of Qualities of material that Siege warfare by
Dominant ways to achieve goals
construction materials affects the performance of generalship (e.g.

Qualitative
in architecture (e.g. siege engines (e.g. Onasander) and stratagems
footnote 405) footnote 451) (e.g. Polyaenus)
Beauty in architecture Power of siege engines Siege warfare by power
Quantitative and by symmetry and based primarily on size or (quasi-quantity) of siege
comparative proportions (e.g. efficiency (e.g. many engines (e.g. “Anonymous”
footnote 405) examples above) author’s Part 18 and 19)
Theory and rules of Mechanics theory and Siege warfare based on
Architectural theory
machine techne (i.e. sciences to systemically theory and lessons (e.g.
(e.g. Vitruvius’ On
“technology”), with improve siege engines (e.g. Aeneas Tacticus and Philo
Architecture)
mixed approaches Apollodorus of Damascus) of Byzantium)
From Ancient Greek Machine to the Modern Greek Langauge
The ideas of Ancient Greek machine continued to bear on the Greek-speaking world.
Ancient Greek μηχανικός, as an adjective meaning “resourceful,” “inventive,” and
“ingenious” (e.g. Xenophon) as well as “mechanical” (i.e. of machine, e.g. Aristotle’s
disciple), was employed by later Greeks, such as Lucian (ca. 120–190 CE), Athenaeus (fl.
200 CE) and Aulus Gellius, to express “mechanic” (as a noun for occupation).452 At the
same time, the same word maintained the meaning of “mechanical” (as adjective), but
often functioned as adjective nouns to represent the field of mechanics, such as
μηχανικά (in the plural neutral case) by early authors like Aristotle’s disciple and
Plutarch (45–120 CE),453 and μηχανική (in the singular feminine case) by Plutarch and by
452
Lucian’s Hippias, or The Bath 2, Athenaeus’s The Learned Banqueters 207b and Aulus Gellius’s Attic
Nights Book 10.12.10 as in Lucian, Lucian Vol. 1, 1913, 36; Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters Vol. 2,
2006, 492, 494; Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights Vol. 2, 1960, 244.
453
Aristotle’s Mechanics 847a and Plutarch’s Marcellus 17.4 as in Aristotle, Minor Works, 1955, 330;
Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives Vol. 5, 1961, 478.
133
later authors, including Pappus of Alexandria (ca. 290–ca. 350 CE) and Procopius of

Caesarea (ca. 500–ca. 565 CE).454
The Modern Greek language has very often used μηχανικός and its declensions to
express engineering and engineer in English. While μηχανική alone (e.g. η μηχανική)
denotes the field of mechanics, the word, when combined with other words,
conveniently represents a range of ideas and institutions that are no longer related to
mechanics: school of engineering (σχολή μηχανικών), engineering sciences (επιστήμες
μηχανικών), software engineering (μηχανική λογισμικού), chemical engineering (χημική
μηχανική), aerospace engineering (αεροδιαστημική μηχανική) and biomedical
engineering (βιοϊατρική μηχανική). Likewise, μηχανικός, in most cases, is not at all a
mechanic. The word alone is sufficient to represent modern engineer (ο μηχανικός) or
engineers (οι μηχανικοί). Along with other words, it may denote software engineer
(μηχανικός λογισμικού), civil engineer (πολιτικός μηχανικός), chemical engineer
(χημικός μηχανικός), mechanical engineer (μηχανολόγος μηχανικός), electrical engineer
(ηλεκτρολόγος μηχανικός), computer engineer (μηχανικός υπολογιστών), electronic
engineer (ηλεκτρονικός μηχανικός), etc.455
When translating English engineering and engineer into Greek, some native speakers of
the Modern Greek language apparently did not think highly of μηχανική (“engineering”)
or μηχανικός (“engineer”) because of the legacy of their ancient counterparts, and
instead coined other uncommon words to replace these commonly-used words.456
Notable authors who translated Carl Mitcham’s book, Thinking through Technology: The
Path between Engineering and Philosophy, into Greek, rendered “engineering” as
μηχανοτεχνία (i.e. the art of machine, or “η τέχνη των μηχανών”) with careful
reasoning.457 According to the two translators, to avoid essentialist connotations of
engineering and to retain the most general sense of engineering, they opted for art
(τέχνη), a term which they thought exhibits “non-analytical dimensions.”458 However, by
454
Plutarch’s Marcellus 14.6 as in Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives Vol. 5, 1961, 472. For later Greek authors, see
Pappus's Collection Book 8.1 and Procopius’s Buildings 1.1.24 as in Pappi Alexandrini and Hultsch, Pappi
Mathematics Vol. 2, 1957, 614; Procopius, Procopius Vol. 7: Buildings, 1971, 10.
455
To compile a list of common words, I have relied on the Greek Wikipedia page for επιστήμες
μηχανικών (engineering sciences) and searched words that yield many results (at least 60,000) from
Google search.
456
E.g. Sidiropoulos, "Rendering of the Term Engineering in the Greek Language," 2015.
457
Mitcham, Η Τεχνολογική Σκέψη (Thinking through Technology), 2005, xxiii.
458
Mitcham, Η Τεχνολογική Σκέψη (Thinking through Technology), 2005, xxiv.
134
delegating engineering to “art of machine,” it enacted a renewed commitment to the

Greek machine and its related words,459 therefore begging the question of how the
Greek machine is related to engineering and at the same time solidifying the semantic
bond between engineering and machine that they wanted to untie.460
Enduring Historical-Conceptual Structures of the Ideas of Engineering in

European Languages
My chapter has been alluding to the exact opposite of the segregation between
engineering and machine. I argue that, conceptually speaking, the normative content of
modern engineering dates back to the Greek machine, as contrivance, war engines, and
means that are employed most visibly in warfare. Indeed, the ancient Greek μηχανή and
μηχανικός do not fully correspond to the scope of our modern engineering.
Nevertheless, their use by the end of the fourth century CE,461 as demonstrated in the
works cited in this chapter, already provided precedents for three interdependent
historical-conceptual structures of the ideas of engineering that have endured over
time: the constructed value of innate genius and ingenuity as a source of inspirations for
visible achievements, the dominance of quantity and mathematics in the confidence of
performance, and the critical moments created by incessant competition between
humans in warfare.
I call them enduring historical-conceptual structures, because the potency of

mathematics and genius in the making and using of engines to dominate in warfare and
other similarly visible achievements had been documented beyond classical antiquity.
On the one hand, classical experiences were widely inscribed, translated, and circulated
in Europe. For example, the legend of Archimedes was recounted in the popular essays
of Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) in Middle French. Montaigne referred to
Archimedes’ machines by engin, a word derived from Latin ingenium, which in
Montaigne’s time conveyed not only ingenuity but also its instances like machines.462
459
Mitcham, Η Τεχνολογική Σκέψη (Thinking through Technology), 2005, xxii.
460
Compare, somewhat contradictorily, Mitcham, Η Τεχνολογική Σκέψη (Thinking through Technology),
2005, xxi.
461
The cut-off century is entirely based on the collection of the ancient authors I picked for this chapter.
Except for Procopius of Caesarea (ca. 500–ca. 565 CE), all the authors I cited lived before the end of the
fourth century CE. Excluding Procopius of Caesarea, however, does not affect my overall arguments.
462
In Medieval Latin, ingenium started to denote instances of ingenuity, notably machines and engines.
135
Montaigne’s essays were further translated by John Florio (1552–1625) into English.
John Florio lifted the word “skill” and “engine” from his native English vocabulary and
dialect, a move that Montaigne did not make as much with Middle French engin and
chose:463
[Archimedes being] taken from his bookish contemplation, to shew some

practise of his skill [Middle French chose, meaning thing], for the defence of his
countrie, reared sodainely [suddenly] certaine terror-moving engines [Middle
French engins], & shewed effects farre exceeding all mens conceite, himselfe
notwithstanding disdaining all his handie-worke, supposing he had thereby
corrupted the dignitie of his arte; his engines and manuall works being but the
apprentiships, and trialls of his skill [not in the original Middle French text] in
sporte.
On the other hand, and even more importantly, Latin ingenium, Old French engin and
engigneor, and Italian ingegniere—the oldest of their kinds—were all influential. The
forms of their spelling, as well as the assortment of connotations in these words—
genius and ingenuity, visible achievements of machines in quasi-quantity, and the
mutual shaping of military engines and critical times in warfare—were adopted and
appropriated by many European languages, with renewed interest and native
experiences in visible performance of an “engine,” the purview of an “engineer.” We
may refer first to how modern engineer is spelled similarly in many languages, as in
Table 3.2.
463
Cf. Michel de Montaigne and Florio, The Essayes or Morall, Politike and Millitarie Discourses of Lo:
Michaell De Montaigne, 1603, 61; Michel de Montaigne, Essais De Messire Michel Seigneur De Montaigne,
1580, 170.
136
Table 3.2: A List of Modern Languages that Spell “Engineer” Similarly464
Language Spelling
American/British English engineer
Brazilian/European Portuguese engenheiro
Croatian inženjer
Czech inženýr
Danish ingeniør
Dutch ingenieur
Finnish insinööri
French ingénieur
German Ingenieur
Italian ingegnere
Norwegian ingeniør
Polish inżynier
Romanian inginer
Russian инженер (Latinization: inzhener)
Swedish ingenjör
Ukrainian інженер (Latinization: inzhener)
For example, Middle English engyn came from Old French engin, and one of the earliest
usages was in Robert Mannyng’s (ca. 1275–1338) Chronical.465 Mannyng’s Chronical
recounted how the legendary wizard Merlin convinced his king that he would bring the
stones from “Ireland” to Britain and build a “steadfast” monument “ever to last.”466 The
monument that Merlin was purported to build is now Stonehenge, a visible, sizeable
extant structure which, along with the Great Pyramid, are two of the most notable “civil
engineering triumphs” or “wonder[s] of ancient civilization” recounted by modern
scholars.467 Merlin told how the “giants” had first brought the stones from Africa to
Ireland, not with force or strength. To move and place the stones, the giants used
“quaintise” (cleverness), “cunning,” and “sleight” (sly), and “contrived” and “worked”
with “engines very quaintly [cleverly].” I translate the entire passages in Table 3.3:468
464
This table is compiled based on the headwords in different languages of Wikipedia pages that
correspond to English engineer.
465
"Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022, s.v.
466
The stones might have actually come from the Preseli Hills in west Wales, not Ireland.
467
E.g. Collins et al., The Professional Engineer in Society, 1989, 149; Davis, Thinking Like an Engineer,
1998, 9. Note that Michael Davis did not approve of such characterization as an origin of engineering.
468
The Middle English passages are based on Furnivall, The Story of England, by Robert Manning of
Brunne, A.D. 1338, 1887, 307-308.
137
Table 3.3: Selected Translations of Mannyng’s Chronical
Line Middle English In Modern English Spelling (or Equivalents)

8779 “ȝyf þou wilt make a werk stedefast, [Merlin:] “If you will make a work steadfast
8780 “Þat fair wyl be, & euere to last, that fair will be, & ever to last
“Sent for þo stones, þere þey stande, Sent for the stones, there they stand,
“Þat þe Geaunt broughte til Irlande. That the Giant brought (un)til Ireland
“Rounde aboute, þen ar þey set; Round about [all around], then are they set;
8784 “Out of Aufryke were þey fet; Out of Africa were they fetch(ed);
“Ilkon on oþer ys set vpright, Each one other is set upright,
“No man in erþe haþ no myght No man in earth has no might
“ffor to take doun a ston; for to take down a stone;
8788 Ne sette þeym eft ys þer non.” No(r) set them afterwards is there none.”
Þen seyde þe kyng, & on hym low: Then said the king, & on him [Merlin] low:
“Sertes, þat were selcouþ ynow “Certainly, that were seldom [unusual] enough
“Þat þo stones þat þou of seys, that thou stones that thou of see
8792 “Ar so heuy, & of swylk peys, Are so heavy, & of such weight,
“Þat non haþ force ne fuysoun that none has force no(r) foison [abundance]
“To remue þem vp ne doun, To remove them up no(r) down,
“& ar so fer ouer þe se! & are so far over the sea!
8796 “Who myghte þem þanne brynge to me?" Who might them then bring to me?”
Þen seide Merlyn vnto þe kynge, Then said Merlin unto the king,
“Queyntise ouer-comeþ alle þynge. “Quaintise [cleverness] overcomes all thing.
Strengþe ys god wyþ trauaille; Strength is god with travail;
8800 “Þer strengþe ne may, sleyght wil availle; there strength no(t) may, sleight [sly] will avail;
“Sleyght & connyng doþ many a chare, sleight & cunning does many a trick [or deed],
“Bygynneþ þyng þat strengþe ne dar; Begins thing that strength no(t) dare;
“Wyþ sleyght myght þou þe stones wynne, With sleight might thou the stones win,
8804 “& in Bretaigne set þem inne, & in Britain set them in,
“Þer þou ne schalt wyþ no strengthe There thou no(t) shall with no strength
“Remewe hem a stones lengthe. Remove them a stone’s length.
“In Aufrik were þey compassed & wrought; In Africa were they contrived & worked
8808 “Geauntz til Irland þennes hem brought, Giants (un)til Ireland thence them brought
“& sette þem on an hil ful hey & set them on a hill full (i.e. very) high
“Wiþ engyns ful queyntely. With engines full quaintly [cleverly].
“ffirst when þey ware compassed newe, first when they were contrived new,
8812 “Þey dide gret god to þem þat knewe; They did great god to them that knew…”
Similarly, in the Early Scots language, John Barbour’s (ca. 1320–1395) The Bruce, a long
narrative poem about Robert the Bruce (1274–1329), King of Scotland, described a
138
Fleming military engineer, John Crab. The engineer aided Walter Stewart (ca. 1296–
1327) in defending Berwick, the town that the Scots recaptured recently from England
in 1318. Although there were many other men, including archers, club-men, and
crossbowmen, John Crab was singled out and was the only aide with a name. The
engineer made military engines (“engynys”) and cranes and provided different kinds of
catapults and shots to defend Berwick. The engineer must be superior and
indispensable, as he was of “such great skill [sa gret sutelté]” in “preparing and
arranging [ordane, now spelled ordain] and making apparatus [apparaill, in a sense
owing to preparations] to defend and assail the wall [til, now spelled tile, meaning
bricks] of a war-castle, or, if not, [of] a city, that no one slyer [sleyar, meaning more
cunning] might be found” (Book 17.239–249).469
In defending the town, the Scots captured an unnamed engineer from the English and
forced him to cooperate. This engineer (“engynour” or “gynour”) was said to be “the
slyest [sliest, i.e. most cunning] of the profession [mister], and the (only) one (“ony”)
that people knew of, far or near” (Book 17.434–436).470 Like Archimedes of Syracuse,
the two engineers proved to be instrumental in successfully defending Berwick during
the siege of 1319, and were portrayed to effect great power with little force. The enemy
then deployed a “sow” (or armored moving shelter), a siege engine that protected
“miners” who would undermine the foundation of the wall when the sow was close to
the structure. The anonymous engineer maneuvered a mangonel quickly and lightly
(both senses in deliverly), slung stones flying smartly (smertly, i.e. swiftly and
vigorously), and finally smashed the shelter. John Crab, who “had prepared his gear all
along, set fire to his bundle of sticks,” threw them to the sow and burnt it, and won the
battle (Book 17.597–710).471
Even though analyzing paralleling developments in other European languages is a

daunting and tremendous task that I cannot undertake alone in this dissertation, it is
instructive to show that the confluence of these enduring historical-conceptual
structures of the ideas of engineering became salient and entrenched in Western
civilization, which can be corroborated by more linguistic evidence. In Ancient Greek
and Roman times, genius and machine (and ingenuity and engineer) were completely
469
My translation based on Duncan, ed., The Bruce, 2007, 629.
470
471
139
different word families in Greek and Latin. In modern (and premodern) European
languages, the two referents converged in very similar (if not the same) words.
For example, in Italian, ingegno (intelligence, ingenuity, talent, etc.) and inganno (deceit,
trick, etc.) overlap in forms and meanings drawing from Latin ingenium.472 Italian
ingegnare and ingegnarsi (to devise with mind), ingégno (engine, tool, device, etc.),
ingegnóso (witty, wily, ingenious, etc.) and ingegniéro or ingeniére (“an inginer, a
fortifier, a deviser of engines”) were documented in Italian-English dictionaries in the
sixteenth century.473 Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469–1527) The Art of War, published in
1521, employed these words, including ingegno (“talent” and “genius”), ingegnarsi
(“contrive”), and ingegneri (plural of “engineer”).474 A Spanish-English-Latin dictionary in
1591 included engaño (deceit), engeño (“an engine, machina”), engenero (“an engine
maker”), and ingenio (“witte, ingenium”).475 The dictionary’s lexicographer revised and
added a number of entries, now in a Spanish-English dictionary, as follows:476
 Ingeniéro, a maker of engines or rare devises, a cunning workman.

 Ingéño, vide Engéño, an engine or rare devise for to effect some strange
thing in wars, &c.
 Engeñéro, an enginer, one that plotteth or maketh instruments with strange
devises, to effect rare and difficult matters withall, a cunning workeman.
 Engéño, or Engénio, an engine or cunning instrument, a craftie or politike
invention, a scaffold in building, a framing or workemanship, a place over
the scaffolde whence some angell appeered.
 Engáño, deceit, fraude, beguiling, coosenage [i.e. cozenage], cunning,
shifting.
Of special interest is the French language. In Old French (from the 8th century to the 14th
century), engin conveyed ruse and cunning (usually to deceive), intelligence and talent,
472
Marr et al., Logodaedalus: Word Histories of Ingenuity in Early Modern Europe, 2018, 78-79.
473
Thomas, Principal Rules of the Italian Grammer with a Dictionarie, 1550, s.v; Florio, Worlde of Wordes
[Dictionarie in Italian and English], 1598, s.v.
474
Compare respective pages between the following Italian source and modern English translation:
Marchand et al., ed., L’arte Della Guerra; Scritti Politici Minori, 2001, 29, 32, 38, 160, 176, 222, 239, 265;
Lynch, ed., Art of War, 2003, 5, 7, 12, 85, 93, 124, 134, 151.
5, 7, 12, 85, 93, 124, 134, 151 vs 29, 32, 38, 160, 176, 222, 239, 265
475
Perceval, Bibliothecae Hispanicae: Pars Altera. Containing a Dictionarie in Spanish, English, and Latine,
1591, s.v.
476
Perceval, A Dictionarie in Spanish and English, 1599, s.v.
140
war machines, and mechanical device for specific use.477 As late as in the sixteenth
century, engin now expressed both “an engine or instrument” and “understanding,
witte,” without the former sense of deceit.478 Although negative connotations of engin
were carried through mal-engin (“deceitfully dealing”), derivatives of engin were mainly
disapproving expressions, including enginer or engigner (“to bewitch, to enchant: also to
deceive”) and engigneur (“a deceiver”). Engineer and ingenuity were positively
conveyed through inge–, a prefix derived from Latin ingenium: ingenieux (“wittie, of
good understanding”) and ingenieur (“an Inventor: a fortifier of townes and forts”).479
But there was no clear distinction between the two sets of words, as they were easily
confused and sometimes used interchangeably. For some lexicographers, ingenieur is, in
English, “An Enginer, Engine-maker; Fortifier,” but in French, enginer, as a verb, was to
bewitch, deceive, or beguile.480 In the eighteenth century, engigneur once meant
ingénieur (i.e. engineer).481 The late prominent French linguist Alain Rey (1928–2020)
noted that there was an awkward harmony (l'homonymie gênante) between these
words.482
In the English language, the developments of engine followed the Old French engin
closely. Engine was derived from Old French engin in all the senses possessed by the
latter, but engineer appeared to share very few of the burden of deceit and wile from
the Old French engin or engigneur.483 English engineer did not appear to go through the
process of what French linguists call “réfection” (i.e. restoration), which had helped
improve the image of French ingénieur by distancing itself from the equivalents having
en– (e.g. engigneor).484 All the equivalents of English engineer in other languages in
Table 3.2, save Portuguese engenheiro, have a prefix in–. It is likely that in the formation
of their words for engineer, these closely-related languages either adopted a spelling
similar to French ingénieur based in Latin ingenium from the beginning, or straddled a
form between French ingénieur and engigneur, until they took the side of the
exonerated ingénieur and fixed on the rebranded identity. No matter what paths they
477
Rey, Dictionnaire Historique De La Langue FrançAise, 2010, s.v.
478
Hollyband, A Dictionarie French and English, 1571, s.v.
479
Hollyband, A Dictionarie French and English, 1593, s.v.
480
Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues, 1611, s.v.
481
Jean-Baptiste de La Curne de Sainte-Palaye, Dictionnaire Historique De L’ancien Langage François,
1878, s.v. The manuscript for the dictionary was drafted in the eighteenth century.
482
Rey, Dictionnaire Historique De La Langue FrançAise, 2010, s.v.
483
"Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022, s.v.
484
Compare Rey, Dictionnaire Historique De La Langue FrançAise, 2010, s.v; "Oxford English Dictionary
Online," 2022, s.v.
141
took, processes similar to the French réfection may have taken place at some time, and
the purification of engineer has always been at work.
But the vindication of engineer has hardly changed the fundamentals of engineering.
The historical-conceptual structures of the ideas of engineering, which have been
uncovered and discussed through the Greek machine and their premodern successors in
this chapter, are embodied social practices not bounded immediately by
contemporaneous words and expressions, though their linguistic-conceptual origins may
be reckoned and outlined afterward, as demonstrated in this chapter. I suggest the
legacy of these linguistic concepts must have been somewhat entrenched not only in
English, but also in most of the modern European languages (as in Table 3.2), and their
influence on and manifestations in the Western concepts of engineering can never be
overlooked.
These historical-conceptual structures have stayed with us, evolved with technology and
social institutions, reinforced and asserted their interconnections, and become even
more formidable and relevant to our modern life—engineering and non-engineering
alike. The refined categories include, among others, the virtue and merit of talent and
genius as a valuable source for producing visible (usually binary and quantitative) feats,
the confidence and trust in quantity and mathematics in assessing and determining
performance, and the institutionalized competition among humans and their
organizations that manufacture stress and critical moments. The scope and manner of
how these qualities interact and pertain to us in modern times will be the subject of the
next chapter.
142
CHAPTER 4: MODERN ENGINEERING AS TECHNOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
CHAPTER 4
Modern Engineering as Technology of

Technology
Engineering and Machine Rendered Civilian
Machine as God: From Siege-Engines to Civilian Machines
Before we stride into the present day’s engineering, it is necessary to at least provide a
broad-brush description of how the binaries in ancient military writing have translated
into modern categories and experiences. The binaries in ancient siege wars were crucial
because they led to bifurcating consequences that could never be taken lightly—the life
and death, the doom and flourishing of an individual, a community, or a city state. The
binary survival of these entities is predicated on war engines, and derives their belief
and confidence in machine from its exceptional performance that clinches a turnaround.
It is not a matter of whether it is “deus ex machina” (god from machine) or “machina ex
deo” (machine from god).485 In some cases, machine has become, in reality, the object
485
The latter was used by Lynn White Jr. (1907–1987) in his book title, suggesting that (non-military)
machinery technology has been religiously motivated by Western Christianity since medieval times See,
inter alia, White, Machina Ex Deo: Essays in the Dynamism of Western Culture, 1968, 69-73, 89-94. Note
that Lynn White did not differentiate between military and non-military machine in terms of their
connection to Western Christianity. His examples, nevertheless, showed that his argument of “machina ex
deo” is based on civil use of machinery. For the Latin (and Greek) expression deus ex machina, see
footnote 437.
143
of admiration, worship, adoration, and even sacrifice (see below). It is, in essence,
“machine as god.”
Here are a few examples. Partially influenced by his former experiences of serving in the
U.S. Navy, Buckminster Fuller (1895–1983) wrote the following passages in his 1940
poem “No More Secondhand God,” about how aviators and sailors relied on
instruments during World War II:486
I see God in
the instruments and the mechanisms that
work
reliably,
more reliably than the limited sensory departments of
the human mechanism.
And he who is befuddled by self or

by habit,
by what others say,
by fear, by sheer chaos of unbelief in
God
and in God’s fundamental orderliness
ticking along on those dials
will perish.
And he who unerringly
interprets those dials
will come through.
Whether Fuller’s description reflects that “he” sees machine as God or a partial image of
God or of his arrangement of the world’s order is unimportant to us. Of interest is how
the machine is close to a god during a life-and-death situation, and how it echoes
Plutarch’s accounts of the Romans “fighting against the gods,” which were Archimedes’
military engines.487
486
Fuller, No More Secondhand God and Other Writings, 1971, 2. I found this source, during the summer
of 2016, in Mitcham, Thinking through Technology, 1994, 36.
487
See footnote 345 and the passage cited.
144
Richard McKenna’s (1913–1964) novel, The Sand Pebbles, reflected a similar

phenomenon of faith in machine, with an added emotional attachment. The
protagonist, Jake Holman, was a machinist on a battleship (referred to as U.S.S. San
Pablo) in the novel. He made a trip to the engine room:488
The spell of the [ship’s] engine was on him.

…
“Hello, engine. I'm Jake Holman,” he said under his breath.
Jake Holman loved machinery in the way some other men loved God, women
and their country. He loved main engines most of all, because they were the
deep heart and power center of any ship and all the rest was trimming, much of
it useless. [See my footnote above.]
But in modern times, there has also been a growing identification of machine with God
in a non-military context. Henry Adams’s (1838–1918) “The Dynamo and the Virgin”
showed that the powerful motors, as a symbol of modernity from industry, became an
object of worship that had been accorded only to God:489
To him, the dynamo itself was but an ingenious channel for conveying
somewhere the heat latent in a few tons of poor coal hidden in a dirty engine-
house carefully kept out of sight; but to Adams the dynamo became a symbol of
infinity. As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of machines, he began to
feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt
the Cross.
488
MacKenna, The Sand Pebbles, 1962, 10-11. This passage was cited by Samuel Florman in The Existential
Pleasures of Engineering, and was further critiqued by Sally Hacker for gendering technology. See
Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, 1976, 136; Hacker, "Doing It the Hard Way," 1985, 129.
489
Adams, "The Dynamo and the Virgin," 1907, 332. Henry Adams often conflated dynamos with X-rays,
and in this way, depicted a single new set of fascination and moral significance from the two distinct kinds
of artifacts and energy. The technical differences between the two was unimportant to him. What loomed
large was the modernity represented by these emerging oddities.
145
And in his poem “Prayer to the Dynamo,” the worship also put us in peril, because the
force driven by electric currents was occult, not moral, and even supernatural and
unaccountable:490
We know that prayer is thrown away.

For you are only force and light;
A shifting current; night and day;
We know this well, and yet we pray.
For prayer is infinite.
Like you! Within the finite sphere

That bounds the impotence of thought.
We search an outlet everywhere
But only find that we are here
And that you are—are not
This dual, sometimes irreconcilable nature of machine that has been shown thus far—
the reliable efficacy and functional enclosure on the one hand, and the unaccountable
concealment of sociocultural relations and spiritual significance on the other—have
been explored, respectively, in the formulation of “thing knowledge” and “device
paradigm” in philosophy of technology, and I am not going to reiterate these themes.491
The more significant for our purpose is the mystic power which Henry Adams traced to
the indispensable and occasionally capricious potency of machine.
The technological “cult” is alive and well in modern industry, and its manifestations are
systematic and common in non-Christian places where animism is more prevalent. In
Taiwan, for example, bags of corn-crisp snacks “Kuai Kuai” (乖乖, an expression asking
to “behave well”) packaged in green color (signifying “green light” and non-stopping)
are seen as “good luck charms” and exclusively placed on (or near) crucial machines and
equipment, from small-sized companies, banks, laboratories, and hospitals, to the
490
Adams, "Prayer to the Dynamo," 1920, 129. In “The Dynamo and the Virgin,” he said that although
both the Virgin and the dynamo “were all occult … [and] all reacted on his mind … he rather inclined to
think the Virgin easiest to handle.” A fundamental difference he drew between the Virgin and the
Dynamo was that the power and energy of the Virgin “could hardly be deflected, diverted, polarised,
absorbed more perplexingly than” the radiant matter. See Adams, "The Dynamo and the Virgin," 1907,
339.
491
Baird, Thing Knowledge, 2004; Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 1984.
146
national research institute Academia Sinica and many high-tech giants like TSMC and
MediaTek.492 The superstitious cultural practice can only be explained by the binary
difference between the functioning and non-functioning of a machine. Faith in
provisioning snack sacrifice for machine reflects the idea of regarding machine not as a
non-human actor or agent that is comparable to human players in a symmetry of
semiotics and emergent temporally in crucial times, as suggested by some STS
theories.493 Instead, modern machine is, ipso facto, a secular deity always in a decisive
capacity.
Figure 4.1. A Bag of “Kuai Kuai” in Green
(Source: https://www.kuai.com.tw/)
The Silent Engineers: From the Conflicts of Military Engines to the Competition of Civilian
Machines
While there have been instances where technological development led and funded by
military campaigns trickled down and was adapted to peaceful uses, such as computer
numerical control (CNC) and the Internet,494 civilian technology, by and large, takes its
course through private investment and interests. Nevertheless, in certain cases, the
process of the latter’s developments does suggest a parallel with the military
counterpart. Specifically for our present purposes, I will provide evidence that the
492
Ngo, "The ‘Good Luck’ Snack That Makes Taiwan’s Technology Behave," 2021; Anonymous, "Kuai Kuai
Culture," 2021.
493
E.g. Latour, Science in Action, 1987; Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 1995.
494
Noble, Forces of Production, 1984; Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 1999.
147
expansion of machine’s decisive binary power to civilian life has been interrelated to the
outgrowth of rapid developments in the industry and private sectors that prioritized
progress, competition, and technological control over the repair, maintenance, and
democratization of old or “low” technology.495 And conversely and no less importantly,
competition and progress can rarely be established with confidence unless there is a
reductive, binary way to conveniently (and often superficially) determine whether it is
advancement or regression. In several cases that follow, the binary contest of
technology for the purpose of “progress” existed in open competition that was visible to
spectators, without bloodshed on a battlefield.
For example, fifty decades before Henry Adams went to the 1900 Paris Exposition and
was mesmerized by the then state-of-the-art dynamo, the Great Exhibition of 1851 was
nothing short of a civilian competition of mechanical arts, and was in many ways a
technological display between nations in industry. From the perspective of the American
and the British, in retrospect, at the center of intense attention and interest was the
relative technological prowess in the binary of winning and losing. According to early
research drawing from primary sources of newspaper, a particular highlight was Alfred
C. Hobbs (1812–1891), an American locksmith, who represented his locksmith company
and competed with the best locks in Britain. In an open trial with witnesses and
journalists at the Exhibition, he picked the Chubb detector lock within twenty-five
minutes, and later, proceeded to open the Bramah lock displayed at Bramah’s
storefront and won a prize. Both locks were at the forefront of the British lock
manufacturers and were believed to be the best ones in the world. In addition,
McCormick’s reaper, “which looked so ungainly in the Crystal Palace, was demonstrating
its value in the open fields where the agricultural jury watched its performance in
amazement” and won a medal. And an American clipper-yacht won a contest and
arrived twenty-four minutes earlier than its runner-up. Accordingly, some contemporary
American author observed that the United States “had conclusively shown its
supremacy over the British in mechanical skill.”496
But more rivalries took place not in displays of a spectacle, but through fierce
commercial competition that was supported by industry leaders. In Britain, Charles
Hutton Gregory (1817–1898), president of the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE),
warned in his 1868 presidential address that even though state-run establishments had
495
The idea of maintenance is inspired by the Maintainers’ movement of Lee Vinsel and many his
colleagues.
496
Cunliffe, "America at the Great Exhibition of 1851," 1951, 122-126.
148
contributed to more powerful guns, bombshells, and warships and maintained the
global leadership of the Royal Navy, manufacturers and suppliers from the private
sectors were supposed to be the rival of the government. Such policy, he believed, may
stimulate progress, and it was “by such competition many valuable inventions have
been produced already.”497
A decade later, one of Gregory’s successors took this position even further, now
considering its own curated history of engineering in civilian sectors. John Hawkshaw
(1811–1891), English civil engineer and president of the then British Association for the
Advancement of Science, examined in 1875 how most prominent mechanical appliances
and civil constructions in the past had often been spillover from military initiatives, and
that the great cathedrals were owing to ecclesiastical endeavors. In the former, he
reasoned, “in the long sieges … during the old wars of Greece and Rome, the inventive
power of man was taxed to the utmost to provide machines for attack and defence.” In
the latter, he commented, “these great ecclesiastical buildings were erected, which are
not more remarkable for artistic excellence than for boldness in design.” He lamented,
in general, “works of a utilitarian character, which concern the engineer, did not receive
much encouragement.”498 Hawkshaw suggested that his times were different and,
indeed, “happier … for inventors: keen competition among manufacturers does not let a
good invention lie idle now.”499 He singled out Watt’s steam engine as the culmination
and archetype of the new motive power, making engineering works relying on steam
power not only possible but also become a necessary asset of modernity.
Significantly, in many ways, he extended the language of fierce competition,

quantitative progress, as well as the source of ingenuity in visible performance—the
ideas that I argued had been hitherto more explicit in military engineering than
elsewhere—to the forefront of then “civil engineering,” a growing profession which, like
the former Greek master-art of a chief-craftsman, started out to claim all the branches
of modern engineering. Thanks to the likes of steam engines, he reasoned:500
The slow and laborious toil of hands and fingers … was turned to other
employments, where, aided by ingenious mechanical contrivances, the produce
497
Gregory, "Address of the President," 1868, 201.
498
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, lxxx-lxxxi.
499
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, lxxxvi.
500
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, lxxxiv.
149
of one pair of hands was multiplied a thousandfold, and their cunning extended
until results marvellous, if you consider them, were attained.
To him, all these developments were most obvious in the textile industry, that “[m]ore
ingenuity and creative mechanical genius is perhaps displayed in machines used for the
manufacture of textile fabrics than by those used in any other industry.”501 In the case
of power looms, “the greatest discovery in the art of weaving ... led eventually to the
substitution of steam for manual labour, and enabled a boy with a steam-loom to do
fifteen times the work of a man with a hand-loom.” And “[f]or complex ingenuity few
machines will compare with those used in the manufacture of lace and bobbin net ...
reducing the cost of its produce to one-fortieth of what the cost had been.”502
Hawkshaw said engineering practitioners were “unseen workers,” whose “inventions
the majority of mankind know little.” He added, “[t]hey worked silently at home, in the
mill, or in the factory, observed by few … in most cases, these silent workers had no
wish to expose their work to public gaze …They … succeeded by rare genius, long
patience, and indomitable perseverance.”503
The Priests of the New Epoch and their Superstitious Engines: Machine and Mechanics
at the Center of Civil(ian) Engineering
On the other hand, like the few ancient Greek and Roman authors who did not reduce
ingenuity to comparison and quantity, Hawkshaw simultaneously embraced a
qualitative, eclectic view about civil engineering. He thought that if engineers could be
said to surpass their predecessors, it was not because of superior ideals, but “the
accumulation of experience.” To this end, he welcomed all relevant knowledge to
contribute to engineering, as he wrote, “whenever difficulties shall arise or works have
to be accomplished for which there is no precedent, he [sic, here and hereafter] who
has to perform the duty may step forth from any of the walks of life, as engineers have
not infrequently hitherto done.”
501
502
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, lxxxv-lxxxvi.
503
150
The success and practicality of engineering works, he recognized, “is often determined
by other elements than the inherent difficulty in the works themselves.”504 He did not
want to, for example, immediately replace “old and obsolete machines … bad forms of
furnaces …wasteful grates, existing in most dwelling-houses,” and would only adopt
new devices when it was time to “build new mills, new furnaces, new steamboats, or
new houses.”505 It was his belief that “we cannot create a force; we can, and no doubt
shall, greatly improve the application of those with which we are acquainted.” In this
spirit, in genuinely asked: whereas “[t]he telescope extended our vision to distant
worlds … [p]ostal deliveries were and are [still] great and able organizations; but what
are they to the telegraph?”506
A sense of déjà vu from the last Chapter now comes upon us: civil engineering, a parallel
with its ancient predecessor of a chief-craftsman’s master-art, claimed all the fields of
engineering, including military engineering,507 and yet it sometimes embraced machine
as an archetype of engineering. George S. Morison (1842–1903), president of the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), maintained in his presidential address the
enormous breadth of civil engineering, a profession that includes all civilian engineering
fields:508
It is a common error to think of civil engineering as a co-ordinate branch of a

general profession with many other branches; to class it with mechanical
engineering, with hydraulic engineering, with sanitary engineering, with mining
engineering, with electrical engineering, or with any other specific branch. The
name of every special branch of engineering has a distinctive meaning; the
mechanical engineer deals with machines; the hydraulic engineer, with water;
the mining engineer, with mines; the sanitary engineer, with drainage, and the
railroad engineer, with railroads. The word “civil” has no such distinctive
meaning; it only shows that civil engineering is the work of the citizen and not
504
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, xcix.
505
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, xcviii.
506
Hawkshaw, "Address of Sir John Hawkshaw," 1876, xcix-c.
507
In United States, civil engineering and military engineering formally crossed path when the Corps of
Engineers was formally assigned in 1821 to survey and build major roads and canals, and could be called
“civil engineers.” At the same time, polarization between the Corps of Engineers and “the non-military
civil engineers” surfaced into open disparagement as early 1880 in the American Society of Civil
Engineers. See The American Society of Civil Engineers, The American Civil Engineer, 1852-1974, 1974, 4,
148-149.
508
Morison, "Address at the Annual Convention," 1895, 471.
151
the work of the soldier. Civil engineering, in its true meaning, embraces every
special branch of engineering.
He cited the current ASCE’s constitution and added that the membership encompassed
“a civil, military, naval, mining, mechanical, electrical or other professional engineer, an
architect or a marine architect, qualified to design as well as to direct engineering
works.” On the other hand, the title of a civil engineer did not come without
qualifications:509
The professional limitation which should be applied to the civil engineer is that
he [sic, here and hereafter] must be a man who, in his own department, can
design as well as direct; he must have that control over his work which nothing
but intelligent knowledge of the subject gives … Any man who is thoroughly
capable of understanding and handling a machine may be called a mechanical
engineer, but only he who knows the principles behind that machine so
thoroughly that he would be able to design it or to adapt it to a new purpose,
whatever that purpose may be, can be classed as a civil engineer. [And similar
arguments applied to “sanitary engineer,” “mining engineer,” and “electrical
engineer.”]
And yet, Morison gave primacy to machine and what could be called mechanical
engineering, now in the makeover of the civilian, non-war “engine.” He defined tools
very broadly, including “warehouses and office buildings” and “the Congressional
Library.”510 But he asserted that “engine” was the highest form of a tool of a civil
engineer:511
Every engineering work is built for a special ulterior end; it is a tool to accomplish
some specific purpose. Engine is but another name for tool; the business of an
engineer relates to tools; a civil engineer must be capable of designing as well as
handling tools. The highest development of a tool is an engine which
manufactures power. All the great possibilities of our profession come from the
existence of such tools.
509
Morison, "Address at the Annual Convention," 1895, 471-472.
510
511
152
By engine, he was referring to any machine that generates power, the exemplar of
which was steam engines. He considered the time “when man began to manufacture
power … as the division between the ancient and the modern, between ignorance and
intelligence, between the national strife which may then be classed as barbarism, and
the new civilization.”512 The conception of “engine” provided unqualified confidence in
managing other non-technical affairs:513
Accurate engineering knowledge must succeed commercial guesses.

Corporations, both public and private, must be handled as if they were
machines, and the men who will so handle them will find their best training in
the education which will make the best civil engineers.
This was because, unlike other knowledge like theology, metaphysics, biology, and
medicine, “[t]he physical laws of power and strength are mathematically exact and
admit of no trifling.”514 Morison reasoned:515
their laws have not the mathematical rigidity, the clear definition and the
thorough discipline which mark the laws with which our profession works …
Dealing with accurate definite laws and guided by the corrective touch of
physical nature, the education of the engineer will become more necessary,
more thorough and more exact than that of any other professional man.
The rigor of the reoriented civil engineering, whose merit and value were now based on
exact mathematics, helped formulate initial selectivity and elitism. He suggested the
ASCE’s constitution “would perhaps have been better expressed if it had been said
that … [only] who, with knowledge of the great sources of power in Nature, uses that
knowledge in the design and direction of engineering works, is qualified to be a
member,” and that “the architect who treats his profession as a fine art to decorate a
construction which he cannot design, belongs elsewhere.” He proposed that the
difference between the ASCE and other engineering societies was “[o]ur Society [i.e.
ASCE] should include the choicest minds.”516 Whereas each of the other engineering
512
513
514
Some sociologists of knowledge observed that exact laws and mathematics in natural science has
facilitated “a substantial agreement on who is doing important work.” See Cole, "Scientific Reward
Systems: A Comparative Analysis," 1978, 169.
515
516
153
societies “is devoted to some specific branch of engineering … [with] qualifications …

comparatively light … [and] receives into its ranks every engineer working in its
specialty,” he continued, “we receive engineers of every specialty, but not every
engineer.”517 Selectivity was facilitated by competition. He suggested that “[t]he man
who works alone without measuring himself by others never does his best. The engineer
must measure himself by what others do and also let others measure him.”518 He finally
took pride in civil engineering with extraordinary conceit:519
Nothing illustrates the power of mind over matter better than the work of our
profession … it is by the training of this mind that the civil engineer must prevail.
We are the priests of material development, of the work which enables other
men to enjoy the fruits of the great sources of power in Nature, and of the
power of mind over matter. We are priests of the new epoch, without
superstitions.
Morison’s statements overshadowed many of his successors that were less interested in
machine, making later claims about the purview of civil engineering modest and more
reasonably bounded. Consider J. James R. Croes (1834–1906), also president of the
ASCE. In his 1901 address, titled “A Century of Civil Engineering,” he defined:520
Civil Engineering treats of the intelligent direction of the laws governing matter
so as to produce effects which will reduce to a minimum the time and physical
labor required to supply all the demands of the body of man and leave more
opportunity for the exercise of the mental and spiritual faculties.
Note the stated purpose of civil engineering, as Croes framed it, was liberating. He
considered progress as a law of nature, but natural development unfolded only slowly.
Civil engineering, therefore, “strives to simulate the results of the slow processes of
Nature, by causing the sources of power to act rapidly in any desired direction,”521 a
statement that was not unlike Aristotle’s formulation of machine as we saw in the last
Chapter. Notably, he manifested progress in modern transportation, buildings, and
public utilities, and identified what progress looked like:522
517
518
519
520
Croes, "A Century of Civil Engineering," 1901, 608.
521
522
154
Appreciating, too, the fact that there is constant progress, and that what now
seems admirably adapted to our needs may in a short time require to be
superseded by improved structures and processes, the tendency of the time is
toward the production of works which will have a definite term of life, rather
than toward the construction of everlasting monuments.
In a way that is more expansive than his predecessor’s, Charles Hermany (1830–1908),
president of the ASCE, also spoke in his 1904 address about the role of engineering. As
we will see shortly, “civil engineering” now seemed to him a part of engineering, and yet
engineering was exemplarily physical laws of machine. He assumed, first, that the
developments of civilization must be uninterrupted, and “[t]he Engineer’s province in
this work is concerned largely with the physics which enter into the problem” and
knowing exactly “what is needful and possible.” An engineer must have their
“conceptions … correct, minute and comprehensive” and “be abreast or ahead of the
times … to materialize.”523 Great achievements were only possible with an elitism of
inborn genius instead of incessant work. His ideal conception of engineering means:524
concentration and abstraction of mental processes of the utmost tense,

compared with which diligence is as the temperature of the dewpoint is to solar
heat. It constitutes an incandescence of vitality that implies the will, the intellect
and the anatomy of a robust manhood. This accomplishment proceeds largely
from heredity or natural endowment and is supplemented by training and
culture.
He expanded on why materializing engineering concepts is hard, because bounded by

physical laws and mathematics, only correct formulations of ideas lead to possible
engineering works. His primary reference was, again, machine:525
the science of mechanics is the philosophy of Engineering … It teaches him the

scope and limits of his enterprises and how to discriminate correctly between
the possible and the impossible. It constitutes a court of final resort in which his
causes are physically adjudicated, whence no appeal is ever permitted and
where immutable law dominates. In its dominion he is ever a subject, but never
a sovereign, though he were a Hercules or a Demi-god. In the study and
523
Hermany, "Address at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention," 1904, 458-459.
524
Hermany, "Address at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention," 1904, 459.
525
155
practicable application of mechanics, mathematics is the philosopher’s stone,

which enables the Engineer to transmute force, not into gold, but into the
service of man, which is better than gold.
On the other hand, he defined civil engineering:526
The modern Civil Engineer is not … to create monumental and symbolic

structures in populous cities whose wealth is expended to commemorate the
glory of empire and to give expression to unattainable aspirations in dreamers.
His work is mainly a differentiation from the former ideals of man, in that he
makes populous cities healthier and stronger, minimizes distances between
them, brings them in daily connection in the affairs of life, such as commerce,
travel, thought and speech, all of which tends more to the establishment of the
actual brotherhood of man than has been accomplished through the ages
preceding his advent.
He delimited the exemplary civil engineering work to constructions, and argued that
“art” had been an indispensable part of civil engineering:527
The extraneous loading of engineering works with ornamentation and

decoration is, of course, needless and vicious, for such additions are but
questionable appendages to any form of art, but in the true art sense,
engineering works rival all forms of art, though the modern engineer, when he
presents to us ideals, idols or toys, erects Obelisks on Bunker Hill and the
Potomac Flats, a Statue of Liberty in the harbor of New York, an Eiffel Tower on
the Champs de Mars, and a Ferris Wheel on the shore of Lake Michigan.
He differentiated between the construction arts of an engineer and what he called “fine
arts:”528
Every engineering structure is but a correct balancing of all the forces it

comprises, and, in whatever material presented, is membered or articulated so
that the trained eye reads the direction of the stresses involved, which is the
highest possible expression of constructive art, partly because it is true and
partly because its utility or serviceability to man is universally manifest. It
symbolizes its purpose and expounds the motive and character of its author in
526
527
528
156
unmistakable and irrefutable terms. It constitutes a voiceless herald that brings

joy to the multitudes that gaze upon it, for they know that it is their redeemer
from despairing drudgery and burdensome labor. This is not the case with what
is called the fine arts, the meaning and service of which latter are perhaps
supremely idealized, specialized and limited to the apprehension and
appreciation of those who have what is called cultivated taste, while the benefit
derived therefrom is an exalted and undefinable something which eludes
description, even by the language of the poet.
Judging from all the above sources, I argue that the sociotechnical basis underlying
Morison’s grander statements than Croes’s or Hermany’s was not because engines or
machines were fundamentally superior to or necessarily more useful than civil
constructions. The unspoken grounds for the confidence were the following
assumptions: the primacy of engine as the highest form of a “tool,” the rigor of
mathematics in the direction and control of material progress, the merit of genius, and
the selectivity about the “choicest” mind. Considering how Hermany presented
“engineering” and “civil engineering” differently, it is evident that the source of the
engineering confidence lay in a habitual reduction: the functions and value of civilian
engines, like those of the former war machines, can be reduced to numbers and
equations, rendering competition and progress illusorily straightforward and
unequivocal. In construction, it made no sense to declare that a 20-story building is
greater or more useful than a 10-story one or to continue building higher structures. For
machine, it was all the way easier to compare and assert the supremacy of a more
powerful and efficient steam engine, and to declare a lesser one obsolete.529
The Warlike Evolution of the Civilian Machine
The profound sentiment and implications of how machine made tremendous progress
had been voiced by Samuel Butler (1835–1902). In a newspaper article titled “Darwin
among the Machines,” he suggested that survival of the fittest among animals was not
529
David Edgerton, in his The Shock of the Old, observed that “‘Useful things disappear more completely
than meaningful and pleasurable things,’ noted a brilliant analyst, who recalled how we keep old
paintings, jewels and suchlike, but not tools. They disappear as soon as they no longer have practical use.”
My passage here suggested that both usefulness and practical use are the outcomes of relative easiness
of comparison.
157
even a near rival to the evolution of modern machines. Machines evolved rapidly
because of human selection, and it remained to be wondered, how machinery’s
“subservience to the use of man has played that part among machines which natural
selection has performed in the animal and vegetable kingdoms.”530 He continued, with
caution, that the opposite of servitude may also be true—humans also served and took
great care of the machine like servants:531
If they [machines] want “feeding” … they will be attended by patient slaves

whose business and interest it will be to see that they shall want for nothing. If
they are out of order they will be promptly attended to by physicians who are
thoroughly acquainted with their constitutions
And hence the reversal of power relations:532
man will have become to the machine what the horse and the dog are to man.
He will continue to exist, nay even to improve, and will be probably better off in
his state of domestication under the beneficent rule of the machines than he is
in his present wild state. We treat our horses, dogs, cattle, and sheep, on the
whole, with great kindness; we give them whatever experience teaches us to be
best for them … [machines] cannot kill us and eat us as we do sheep …
Butler anticipated, and indeed feared, that533
Day by day, however, the machines are gaining ground upon us; day by day we
are becoming more subservient to them; more men are daily bound down as
slaves to tend them, more men are daily devoting the energies of their whole
lives to the development of mechanical life. The upshot is simply a question of
time, but that the time will come when the machines will hold the real
supremacy over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a truly
philosophic mind can for a moment question.
While Butler’s critique and pessimism may sound like a remote concern, the prospect
that machines evolve at an ever faster speed was greeted by engineers with enthusiasm
in a renewed calling. Henry Selby Hele-Shaw (1854–1941), English mechanical engineer
530
Butler, "Darwin among the Machines," Jun. 13, 1863.
531
532
533
158
and automobile inventor, understood the question of machine evolution as a

meticulous effort to ever evolve machine—that is, in theory, there is a method to
improve the method of machine evolution:534
there appears to be no reason why, at any rate, a great advance should not be
made on the present methods of machine evolution, for it must be pointed out
that, in one respect, the machine problem is vastly more simple than the
chemical, in that we can combine at will machine parts, and understand their
mode of combination; whereas we have no certain physical conception of the
nature of the molecular combinations which result in the production of such
different external forms
In his discussion of the science of machine evolution, if we desire to successfully put

ideas into new inventions, he pointed out three pitfalls to avoid, including not ignoring
“previous achievements,” “principles,” and “practical details.”535 He noted that he could
not expect that all inventors would willingly follow his suggestions, but they would
ignore them at their cost, because536
a law which has special application to biological development holds rigidly, both
with respect to machines and their inventors, and a process of natural selection
assuredly results in the survival of the fittest.
He appeared to put machines before humans, and inadvertently validated Samuel

Butler’s early concern:537
Biologists tell us that each animal lives in one short life the whole course of
development of its species. So must the inventor live through the whole progress
of the special machine he seeks to improve.
Hele-Shaw raised at once two aspects of machines that complemented each other
uneasily. On the one hand, there seemed to be endlessly diverse possibilities of how a
practitioner may build a machine, as he claimed, by combining mechanical parts with
freedom, which was more restricted in other fields like chemistry, and on this ground he
believed mechanical problems were simple. On the other, under the presence of the
universal, neutral law of evolution, building machines was a formidable challenge,
534
Hele-Shaw, "The Evolution of Machines," 1885, 404.
535
536
537
159
because fierce competition made the success and failure in the commercial realities of
building machines a binary matter of life and death as in the evolution of a species.
“Survival of the fittest” was no less an extended metaphor than an informed analogy.
Making a civilian machine here was sometimes reminiscent of engaging in warfare.

When Charles Babbage (1791–1871) spoke of his famous difference engine—a
mechanical calculator that tabulated the values of a polynomial function—and
described the greatest difficulty in making the machine, one that worked perfectly
correctly. He explained538
It arose not from the difficulty of contriving mechanism to execute each

individual movement, for I had contrived very many different modes of
executing each; but it really arose from the almost innumerable combinations
amongst all these contrivances—a number so vast, that no human mind could
examine them all.
It instantly occurred to me that a similar difficulty must present itself to a general
commanding a vast army, when about to engage in a conflict with another army
of equal or of greater amount.
And he went on and discussed how the ingenuity required for making his difference
engine corresponded to a general’s capability in arranging forces in a modern battle:539
It is now felt and admitted, that it is the civil capacity of the great commander
which prepares the way for his military triumphs; that his knowledge of human
nature enables him to select the fittest agents, and to place them in the
situations best adapted to their powers; that his intimate acquaintance with all
the accessories which contribute to the health and comfort of his troops, enables
him to sustain their moral and physical energy…
When directly engaged in the operations of contending armies occupying a wide
extent of country … With these elements he must undertake one of the most
difficult of mental tasks, that of classifying and grouping the innumerable
combinations to which either party may have recourse for purposes of attack or
defence. Out of the multitude of such combinations, which might baffle by their
simple enumeration the strongest memory, throwing aside the less important,
538
Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, 1864, 179.
539
Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, 1864, 180-181. The quoted passages appeared also
in his earlier work. See Babbage, The Exposition of 1851, 1851, 222-223.
160
he must be able to discover, to fix his attention, and to act upon the most
favourable.
The genius that can meet and overcome such difficulties must be intellectual,
and would, under different circumstances, have been distinguished in many a
different career.
The Peacetime Frenzy of Ingenuity
Engineering the Modern “Crunch Time”
At last, the aforementioned genius, which had been circularly validated when critical
moments were presented and had been identified with military resourcefulness of
prevailing in the binary of success and failure, was now a defining characteristic of many
different careers and found its way into civilian activities. The process involved, among
others, the general demilitarization of engineering into civilian engineering, by which
military engineering was gradually pushed away from the center of any existent
engineering discipline, and any devotion of ingenuity to weaponry and killing would now
incur disgust and repulsion.540
Examples of similar developments after World War II are abundant in most developed
countries. In general, the militant conflicts that drew from the indispensable rare talent
of commanders and engineers were pacified and turned into non-violent competition:
large-scale warfare was turned into the arms race and space race; insurrection and
militants were replaced with elections, political campaigns, and the recent information
wars; the hostility of foes in regional skirmishes yielded to popular nationalism, trade
wars, and occasionally, sports rivalry among national professional athletic teams. Even
more broadly speaking, the binary of life and death in the existential survival of
individuals and communities, in one way or another, was for the most part symbolically
substituted by a conglomerate of modern binaries which are taken no less seriously
than the literal life and death in former times: the rise and fall of a representative
political party in an election, the growth and decline of an economy, the promise and
peril of opposing ideologies, the flourishing and doom of corporations and capital, the
540
Consider how H. G. Wells anticipated the future of war, where “the engineers will be intrenching and
bringing up a vast variety of complicated and ingenious apparatus designed to surprise and inconvenience
the enemy in novel ways.” In developed countries and in peacetime, similar accounts are no longer
appropriate or relevant. See Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress
Upon Human Life and Thought, 1902.
161
success and failure of a natural or legal person, the operation and breakdown of
essential facilities and services, the positive and negative on financial statements, the
prevailing and losing in consequential legal trials, etc.
It is doubtful how much of a role modern engineering continues to play in the life and
death of the modern binaries, compared with the functions of other occupations and
entities. Do engineers help significantly with the upkeep of essential facilities and
services? These are empirical questions depending on specific engineering disciplines
and locations, such that we may say civil engineers and power plant engineers are more
direly needed than other engineers working for private interests. But as far as the
dominant narratives go concerning the difference between “engineers” and
“engineering technologists,” most engineering activities are problem-solving and the
design and creation of new products and services. In contrast, engineering technologists
are said to take greater responsibility for implementing and extending existing
technology and making modifications in the design process.541 This suggests that
engineering, ideally, looks to the future and concerns progress and improvement, even
though it is not uncommon that engineers sell, communicate, and maintain technology
in an official capacity.
Does engineering contribute substantially to value creation and economic growth, so

that it is influential in the gain and loss of a financial statement, success and failure of an
enterprise, and progress and decline of a national economy? The answer is paradoxically
true. Mainstream policy statements are never short of identifying engineering as a
crucial contributor to economic competitiveness and growth at different scales.542
Nevertheless, as scholars have pointed out, the other way of the relation may also be
true: that commercial and economic crises have created discourse, resources, and moral
economy for practitioners, educators, and policymakers to step up for science and
engineering.543 These recurrently-created crises provide fodder for modern “crunch
time” that, first and foremost, throws engineering in the limelight of national
541
These are common descriptions in introductory engineering textbooks. See, for example, Moaveni,
Engineering Fundamentals, 2016, 3-4; Oakes and Leone, Engineering Your Future, 2018, 35-37; Eide et al.,
Engineering Fundamentals & Problem Solving, 2018, 4-6; Kosky et al., Exploring Engineering, 2016, 3-5.
542
E.g. National Academy Press, Educating the Engineer of 2020, 2005; Royal Academy of Engineering,
Engineering and Economic Growth: A Global View, 2016.
543
Lucena, Defending the Nation, 2005; Wisnioski, "What's the Use? History and Engineering Education
Research," 2015; Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers, 1971; Seely, "The Other Re-Engineering of
Engineering Education, 1900-1965," 1999.
162
development, much like how in competitive sports the entire team’s prolonged efforts
are reductively represented and overshadowed by the performance of the few in the
crunch time.544
But on this point, I wish to provide additional food for thought: since the fundamental
ideas of value creation or economic growth are based on product sales and domestic
consumption (think about revenues and GDP), it should not come as a surprise that
engineering, which is normatively supposed to solve problems and create new products
and services, is closely related to the maintenance, if not acceleration, of the speed of
consumption that contributes, ipso facto, to the economy. The interdependency of
engineering and economy is nothing more than a sociocultural construct, as long as
either of the two concepts is unchallenged and reinforced in public discourse.
Driven by the ever-present economic and commercial competition, the imperative for
growth and improvement made engineering and science the perfect prime mover for
improving existing technology at an unprecedented, accelerated speed. In the 1930s,
Lewis Mumford already commented that “[t]echnics in its traditional forms provided no
means of continuing its own growth.” He briefly observed that engineers, as an
emerging crossover between industrialists, scientists, and common workers, played a
key role in raising the ceiling of technology.545 In the 1970s, Harry Braverman depicted
engineering as standing at the forefront of calculating the “dollar” in the interest of
capitalist management. And David Noble set out to place engineering at the heart of the
scientific monopolization of technology serving corporate capitalism. Modern
enterprises, as it were, became gatekeepers of state-of-the-art technology for the big
tech companies, and monetary gain continued to motivate engineering to push the
boundary of technology.546 Engineers, so to speak, internalize those critical moments at
544
For example, in the preface of an ASEE report, the authors acknowledged that “with the end of the
Cold War, engineering education needed a new set of guiding principles to replace those that had been
developed following World War II. Rather than a world based largely on superpower competition and
national security, engineers now faced a world of intense international economic competition and
widespread public uncertainty about the uses of technology.” See American Society for Engineering
Education, Engineering Education for a Changing World, 1994, 8.
545
Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 1934, 219.
546
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 1974, 199-200; Noble, America by Design, 1977, 33-49.
163
the scales of a national economy, a corporate entity, or a technological product, and

make the crunch time career-wise and personal.547
Binary, Quantity, and the Differentiation of Technology
A caveat must be added that these perspectives, which equate engineering in general
with corporate engineering, presented only part of the picture. Two elements have been
missing from the treatment of engineering. First, grand narratives based on the
economic consideration of corporate engineering hardly explain why in engineering
colleges, merit-based competition and motivations for doing “better” are also prevalent
and somewhat independent of the needs of the industry. Amy Sue Bix, for example,
documents the history of college concrete-canoe racing and how competition cultures
serve the needs of pedagogy, reinforce meritocracy and elitism, and permeate into K-12
education.548
Even without the administration of open competition, or without the binary of winning
and losing, modern engineering is by dominant tradition a binary practice. Most of our
advanced machines now include computer programs, and computer code is said to
either work or not work.549 Moreover, the open-ended nature of engineering design
projects, coupled with a set of constructively narrowed criteria to select a “best” design
or “pick a winner,” contributes to the heavy workload in engineering, because there is
always room (along perhaps with senses of achievement, power, and pleasure) for
making a solution “better” in terms of specific metrics (through, in part, quantifying
qualitative categories).550 Clear-cut methods to quantify and rank each alternative
547
Themes of engineers internalizing national crises were common in developing countries in the catch-up
with industrialized nations. See Han and Downey, Engineers for Korea, 2014, 134. The internalization of
corporate challenges and an engineer’s embodiment of the commercial value of their products are
insights taken from Taiwanese sociological studies of the labour process of engineers in the high-tech
industry, including Fang, "A Study on Labor Systems of Professional Employees in the Technology
Industry," 1997; Tang, "Selling My Soul to Work," 2001. Similar themes of the latter two can also be seen
in Kidder, The Soul of a New Machine, 1981.
548
Bix, "Mastering the Hard Stuff: The History of College Concrete-Canoe Races and the Growth of
Engineering Competition Culture," 2019.
549
In an article of The Guardian about the working life of a male software engineer, it says in his job, “two
things are certain–his code either works or it doesn’t.” Benedictus, "Work: Number Cruncher: A Working
Life the Software Engineer," Nov. 15, 2008.
550
To reach this conclusory statement, one needs to straddle and synthesize two isolated genres of
engineering education literature: on one hand, how project-based design projects are canonically taught
164
design not only appear in engineering design education (e.g. decision or selection
matrix). They also appeal to some philosopher of engineering as a cornerstone of
practical or instrumental reasoning in engineering.551
Engineering as an Exemplar of “Technology of Technology” and Its Place in the

Contemporary Systems of Knowledge and Practice
The binary and quantity whereby engineering is predominantly assessed and

systematically advanced bring us to the second neglected aspect, that not all the
technologies can be readily and meaningfully subject to metrics and comparison. Recall
the diverse scope of Greek techne (and German Technik) discussed in Chapter 3, where
technology in the broadest sense is not limited to industrial arts. In contrast, Mumford’s
technics and Braverman’s or Noble’s technology are conceptually tied to practical arts of
material (and visibly obvious) production.552 In the world of the narrowly-construed
technology, engineering is naturally at the helm. Engineering methods and practice are
supposed to aim at definite practical ends and take final goals for granted, as some
philosopher noted.553 Moreover, in engineering, technology of achieving successful
production lends itself, functionally and recursively, to the successful enhancement of
such production technology. That is, the technological means and quantitative criteria
for material production may also reflexively apply to themselves, enhancing the very
technology of production, as technology helps build better technology.
Engineering thus displays a functional performance of what I will call “technology of

technology” for the rest of my writing. To clarify, technology here conveys the full sense
of the word, including specific techniques and means, systems of practice-oriented
knowledge, and technological artifacts and systems. And by the preposition “of,” the
relation of two referents has the senses of “concerning” and “belonging to.” For
illustrative purposes, one may tentatively think of the relation as “concerning” or
and administered in engineering colleges, and on the other, how engineering students explained the
challenging and hard work of engineering. In particular, I am drawing from the following two sources:
Dym and Little, Engineering Design: A Project-Based Introduction, 2004, 108-113; Godfrey and Parker,
"Mapping the Cultural Landscape in Engineering Education," 2010, 12-13.
551
E.g. Hughes, "Practical Reasoning and Engineering," 2009, 390-393.
552
Lewis Mumford defined technics as “the field [of practical arts], that part of human activity wherein, by
an energetic organization of the process of work, man controls and directs the forces of nature for his
own purposes.” See footnote 133 and its corresponding paragraph.
553
Notably, this position is taken not only by engineering practitioners, but also by some philosopher of
engineering. See Hughes, "Practical Reasoning and Engineering," 2009, 375-379.
165
“about,” but bear in mind there are more bonds than that. By extension, and as a
matter of interest, if we understand “science,” the commonplace counterpart of
technology, ideally as systematic knowledge and studies that do not immediately
concern practical application or obvious purposes of the knowledge, there are also
other combinational relations, namely, “technology of science,” “science of technology,”
and “science of science,” in addition to “technology of technology.” A full discussion of
the other three relations is beyond the scope of this work, but I am providing a
preliminary classification of their subcategories and specific examples in Table 4.1.
There are caveats here: the table is only illustrating my theoretical constructs, and there
are always gray areas as well as risks in categorizing technique and knowledge.
It is noteworthy that “science of technology” includes the Ancient Greek technology as

meta-techne, as discussed in Chapter 3, and that “science of science” includes areas
familiar to STS scholars: science studies, sociology of (scientific) knowledge, philosophy
of knowledge, etc.554 I consider sociology of knowledge to be an archetype of “science
of science,” because it goes beyond knowledge of knowledge. As reflexive sociology, it
must also be able to reflexively analyze and account for itself through similar modes of
analysis and explanations employed for other types of knowledge like natural science.555
Similarly, engineering seems to be an archetype of “technology of technology,” because
engineering, as a technology, not only works on other non-technical technologies (e.g.
the so-called “social engineering” and “human engineering”), but it also normatively
enhances itself in a reflexive (and recursive and self-referential) manner: machines,
computer programs, algorithms, and technical knowledge are used to create better
ones of the like. Having these in mind, the rest of this chapter devotes to a treatment
and critique of modern engineering as technology of technology.
554
It should also be noted that the term “science of science” has been predominantly adopted by (natural
and social) scientists that use statistics and other quantitative methods to study science. Pierre Bourdieu
was one of the relative few who speaks of “science of science” from the perspectives of qualitative social
science. See Bourdieu, Science of Science and Reflexivity, 2004. An earlier, and much more discursive
attempt, is in Goldsmith and Mackay, ed., The Science of Science: Society in the Technological Age, 1964.
Its participant noted, in pp. 200-201, that the “new study might be called ‘history, philosophy, sociology,
psychology, economics, political science and operations research (etc.) of science, technology, medicine
(etc.)’. We prefer to dub it ‘Science of Science’, for then the repeated word serves as a constant reminder
that science must run the entire gamut of its meanings in both contexts.” For an approach to “science and
science” grounded in the cognitive tradition of psychology, see De Mey, The Cognitive Paradigm, 1982.
555
Reflexivity is one of the tenets of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge. See, in
particular, Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 1991, 7.
166
Table 4.1: Subcategories and Specific Examples of Four Relations between Science and Technology
Types of
Categories Subcategories Specific Examples
Relations
Systematic treatment 1. Epistemology, cognitive science, etc. 1. Educational and learning theories, etc.
about science or 2. Encyclopedias, library science, etc. 2. Chronicles of human thoughts, the Dewey
knowledge in general Decimal Classification, etc.
Specific formal knowledge 1. Peer-reviewing of knowledge 1. Review articles, Nobel Prizes, etc.
Science of
or studies about science or 2. Science and society, science policy 2. Science and democracy, politics and expertise,
science
knowledge making, etc. etc.
Critique of science, sociology of Commentary on science, phenomenology,
Somewhat including the
knowledge, philosophy of science, network topologies of science communities,
above two
history of science, etc. paradigms, etc.
1. Studies of technology in general, 1. Ancient Greek technology (“meta-techne”),
taxonomy (i.e. science of naming) of systems of technology, classification of industry,
technology, etc. taxonomy for technology and engineering, etc.
Systematic treatment of 2. Technology and society, technology 2. Social construction of technology, Marxist
technology or techniques and culture, understanding theoretical approaches to technology (e.g. labor
in general technological change in context, etc. process theory), technological momentum,
cybernetics, technological determinism, etc.
Science of 3. Innovation studies and policy 3. Classification of technologies in general,
technology making, etc. ideation process, etc.
1. Engineering science 1. Engineering textbooks
2. Explanation of technical terms and 2. Technical dictionaries, structural drawings, etc.
Specific formal knowledge
technology
or studies about
3. Examination and evaluation of 3. Technology policy making, patent examination,
technology (and
specific technologies technology assessments, etc.
techniques)
4. Studies of human 4. Political science, linguistics, economics, etc.
technology/techniques
167
5. Performative rules of human 5. Grammars, common laws, the law of markets,

techniques and artifacts Moore's law, etc.
Somewhat including the Philosophy of technology, history of Criticism of technology, ethics of technology, IEEE
above two technology, engineering studies, etc. Technology and Society Magazines, etc.
1. Data science, meta-analysis, etc. 1. Data mining, statistics, etc.
2. Science education, science 2. Science courses, science museums, popular
Technology (or techniques) communication, etc. science literature, etc.
about science or 3. Advocacy for science in general 3. The National Science Foundation
knowledge in general 4. Scientism in practice 4. Logical positivism, scientific or reductive
materialism, biomedicalization, West-centric
Technology
science, etc.
of science
1. Scientific instrumentation, 1. Particle accelerators, science software, scientific
technology used for science, etc. discovery aided by artificial intelligence, etc.
Specific technology (or 2. Teaching pedagogies, mnemonics, 2. Spaced learning, Bloom’s taxonomy,
techniques) about science educational assessments of knowledge, mnemonics, history exams, etc.
or knowledge etc.
3. Advocacy for certain ideas or 3. Science policies, think tanks, propaganda, etc.
knowledge
1. Methodology (i.e. a system of 1. Grounded theory (qualitative research),
techniques used for certain practice) engineering design process, cost-benefit analysis,
etc.
2. Innovation in technology 2. Research and development (R&D), science
Technology Technology (or techniques)
parks, etc.
of about technology or
3. Philosophical approaches to 3. The politics of artifacts, critical theory of
technology techniques in general
technology technology, postphenomenology, multistability,
etc.
4. Means of circulating technological 4. Technology transfer, technology podcasts, open
artifacts and techniques source, Creative Commons, etc.
168
5. Advocacy for technology in general 5. The National Academy of Engineering

6. Ideas, attitudes, or movements 6. Luddism and Neo-Luddism, technocracy,
about the use or development transhumanism, technological singularity,
technology technological fix, etc.
1. Practical domain knowledge to 1. Mechanical engineering, electrical engineering,
produce, evaluate, and enhance chemical engineering, computer science,
technological artifacts aerospace engineering, etc.
2. Means to repair or maintain 2. Maintenance manuals, funding for
technological artifacts infrastructure renovation, etc.
3. Specific techniques to rationalize and 3. Scientific management, human-computer
enhance sociotechnical systems interaction (e.g. user interface design analysis),
human factors (industrial engineering), etc.
4. Specific means to improve existing 4. Drug discovery through artificial intelligence,
Specific technology (or
technology (or produce new machine learning, regulatory reforms, social
techniques) about
technology) reform movements, etc.
technology or techniques
5. Practical domain knowledge to 5. Literary criticism and film criticism, comparative
analyze, compare, and enhance human law, medical research, exercise and sport sciences,
techniques or artifacts etc.
6. Guidelines or regulations on 6. Building codes, codes of ethics for engineers,
technology and technical practices moral frameworks and ethical considerations in
engineering design process, etc.
7. Advocacy for specific ways to 7. Technology policies, industrialization,
develop, defend, or reject certain appropriate technology, lobbying of big tech
technology and its interests companies, antitrust, engineering ethics, etc.
169
Technology of Technology and Its Dominant Forms
In the last two chapters, we have seen that the Ancient Greek techne concerns with the
means to reach a goal and spans diverse arts and techniques. The English technology I
refer to, as indicated earlier, is the essence of techne in Ancient Greek which signifies a
trained skill (or acquired habit, ἕξιν) of reason (or intellect, νοῦ) in tandem with true
logos (ἀληθοῦς λόγου). Trained skills and reason are not inborn qualities, but something
we acquire through learning. True logos can be interpreted as unconcealed rules and
principles,556 and does not necessarily carry a binary true or false. True logos, whether
concerned with making or doing, not only entails a goal or end in view, but also suggests
rules that we uncover and follow to succeed in meeting the goal. The reformulation of
the concept of technology here denotes the means to reach a goal we want to achieve,
and that we can reasonably determine if we reach it, no matter how flexible or loose a
criterion may be.
Unlike techne, the idea of Ancient Greek machine (μηχανή) exhibited a preliminary
sense of quasi-quantity that was more or less observably measurable in Plato’s
etymology (Cratylus 415a). With a purpose in view, machine was expected to reach a
goal, but Plato’s etymology also suggested that machine would not exceed or go beyond
the given purpose. In Ancient military texts, however, we began to see an inchoate
concern with comparatively more quantity, power, and efficiency in siege-engines and
warlike machines at the crucial moments of warfare. Mechanics, so to speak, grew out
of master-art (and architecture) and overshadowed the latter in terms of urgency and
eminence. In the nineteenth century, the evolving machine not only had a civilian
counterpart that ascended to the epitome of civil(ian) engineering. There arose also
civilian competition, formalized methods, and professional commitment concerning the
systematical improvement of machine. I argued that engineering in this manner
displayed an archetype of “technology of technology.”
With technology being the means in the use of knowledge and resources to meet
specific needs or goals in context, what I will define as technology of technology is still a
technology, albeit of a special, rarefied form. My conceptualization of technology of
technology comes with the following three characteristics and senses.
556
In true logos (ἀληθής λόγος), ἀ- means un- and ληθής suggests concealed or forgotten. While Harris
Rackham preferred to render logos as reason or reasoning, a more straightforward interpretation is
obviously “principle” or “rule,” as indicated by the example given in the Liddell-Scott-Jones lexicon, as in
Liddell et al., ed., A Greek-English Lexicon, 1940, s.v.
170
The First Sense: Technology of Technology to Improve Existing Technologies
First, technology of technology is a technology of a higher order. Instead of utilizing the

normally-used means to achieve the ends, technology of technology attends to the
improvement and perfection of the means themselves. Technology of technology in this
sense may benefit from Ancient Greek technology (meta-techne or “science of
technology”), but its primary interest is the effective means and practices to improve
technology (or techniques, means, etc.), not the formal understanding or theoretical
knowledge of it. Formalized skills and systematic rules of techne are often the outcome
and purpose of technology of technology. Generally, it entails an effort to formalize and
systematize the practice of techne, so as to maintain its effectiveness. But its dominant
form may make it imperative to enhance the efficiency of technology: the more a
technology can achieve, the more valuable it is. We have already seen one of its
preliminary forms in the accounts of the thunderbolt ballista by the anonymous author
in Chapter 3.
In the name of efficiency, what is formerly the means of technology now becomes the
primary purpose of technology of technology. In other words, dominant technology of
technology is a means-ends reversal and the transformation of means into ends—a
pursuit of and a dictation to the continuous improvement and propagation of technical
means as its ends, as the focal meanings and purposes of its core business.557 And
whereas technology concerns the effective (and sometimes the best) means to attain a
goal and does not formulate, contemplate, or question the said goal, technology of
technology loses sight of the ultimate ends entirely. Dominant technology of technology
may sometimes defy the common sense of not exceeding the goal as per Plato’s
understanding of machine and produce technical means that are surpassing our needs
(e.g. technological “overkill”), until more demand and consumption are socially created
and until older technologies are rendered obsolete. With this understanding, what
Langdon Winner called “autonomous technology” is more akin to technology of
technology than to technology.
557
Hannah Arendt also spoke of the “reversal of the means-end category” in her writing. The illustration
she provided, nonetheless, pertained to “design[ing] objects for the operational capacity of the machine
instead of designing machines for the production of certain objects.” Her view is therefore more akin to
Samuel Butler’s discussion of the reversal of power relations in the latter’s “Darwin among the Machines”
as I discussed earlier. See Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, 152.
171
Indeed, technology of technology is as old as technology itself. Making occasional

improvements to technology, teaching technology to others by systematizing and
articulating its effective rules, and learning to practice a technology by attempting
various methods for the desired outcome, all constitute notable examples of technology
of technology, and are, indeed, an inseparable part of the practice of technology per
se.558 But with the power of scientific methods, modern technology of technology
overshadows its predecessor, which, despite its effectiveness in turning out artifacts and
technical means, was criticized by Lewis Mumford as being responsible for “bigness and
heaviness,” “dead weight,” “a certain crudeness in its utilization,” “reckless waste of
resources,” and “technological backwardness in the most advanced part of technology”
roughly between 1700 and 1900 (or what he called the “paleotechnic” phase). In this
regard, technology of technology has become all the more self-conscious, now in terms
of self-censorship of technological efficiency.559
Moreover, technology of technology at present is often detached from the actual

practice of technology and could potentially leave behind the technology’s initial
purpose in that it distinguishes itself categorially from the practice of technology in
question. In our times, any professional that is occupationally different from the
practitioners in the same field falls into the category of technology of technology. For
example, education researchers are distinct from educators, coaches from athletes,
construction managers from construction workers, legislators from legal practitioners,
literary critics from literature authors, financial analysts from financiers, etc. Similarly,
academic engineering research and “engineering science” whose purported applications
are removed from practical considerations and industrial needs are technology of
technology under my definition.560
The Second Sense: Technology of Technology to Compare Distinct Technologies
558
Teaching and learning can be understood as requirements for any technology to be circulated between
communities and passed down for generations. Making occasional improvements to technology, too, is
needed to adapt it to changing circumstances and needs. Apparently, reasons play an important part in
these actions of technology of technology, to the extent that they are “an intrinsic part of the reflexive
monitoring of action carried on by all human agents … [who] routinely ‘keep in touch’ with the grounds of
their behaviour as an aspect of producing and reproducing that behaviour.” See Giddens, Modernity and
Self-Identity, 1991, 63.
559
Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 1934, 167, 230-231, 255.
560
See, in particular, the challenge to “engineering science” in the 1980s and 1990s, as in Seely, "The
Other Re-Engineering of Engineering Education, 1900-1965," 1999, 285.
172
The second characteristic of technology of technology, when in its dominant and

dominating forms, goes beyond working on and evaluating functionally similar means
that serve their predetermined purpose. The second sense of technology of technology
pertains to a peculiar custom and praxis to valuate distinct technologies that reach
similar goals and to prioritize the most familiar and exclude or hide the others from
view. For example, both literary critics and literature authors should acknowledge that
the purpose of writing is to communicate and express ideas and thoughts, but they may
implicitly favor writing and letters over other technologies of communication like
movies and music. Legislators, regulatory agencies, and legal practitioners may work
diligently to draft new bills and regulations and ensure compliance with new policies,
say, to stop the spread of a pandemic disease. When overemphasizing legislation and
enforcement of rules, they may play down the importance of other factors that may also
help achieve the same goal, such as good leadership, collective responsibility, and the
role of education, public opinion, and media. It is, however, difficult to imagine that a
reasonable literary critic or legislator would normally exclude and disadvantage other
ways of technologies. For one thing, there is not often an ideological blindfold that
prevents one from acknowledging that other means are equally important and valid. For
another, it is next to impossible to effectively valuate and rank different means that are
essentially complimentary and incommensurable.
In fact, it is in the fields of science and technology that this dominant mode of
technology of technology is most typical and in full swing and asserts its primacy. The
search for universality, causality, and rigor in the making of a scientific method, and the
ideals of objectivity, dispassion, and impersonality that are grounded on numbers and
mathematics, mark not merely the emergence of the privileged way of doing, but also
the hallmark of an instrumental technology to evaluate different technologies.561 That
is, when achieving its dominance over technologies, technology of technology goes
beyond what Thomas Gieryn called “boundary-work,” which sporadically employs
rhetoric technology in the arbitrary demarcation of science from non-science.562 Rather,
it is the kind of the formalized, systematized, and institutionalized manner and criteria
to classify and distinguish that phrenology and horoscope do not deserve consideration
like neuroscience and psychology do, because of the latter’s quantitative predictive
561
For an early articulation of the norms and ideologies in science, compare, for example, Merton, "The
Normative Structure of Science," 1973 [1942]; Mulkay, "Norms and Ideology in Science," 1976.
562
Gieryn, "Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in
Professional Ideologies of Scientists," 1983.
173
power to explain a person’s personality. Technology of technology also encompasses

the anthropocentric standards and criteria that exclude animal techniques and artifacts
from being considered technology.563 Within the realm of human technology,
technology of technology frequently manifests itself in differentiating “contemporary
technology”—now claimed to be “applied science”—from “prescientific arts and crafts,”
so any “arts and crafts without an underlying science” no longer qualify for and belong
to present-day technology.564 To appropriate Pierre Bourdieu, technology of technology
of this kind is technology of dispositions and judgments, of “habitus,” that is ingrained in
the practice of differentiation of technology and performs technical judgment on
judgment.565 Thus this dominant technology of technology may exhibit the same
problem as scientism, technocracy, biomedicalization, legalism, West-centric science,
etc.566
Note that technology of technology—like the idea of technology I sought to rescue from
its modern, dominant form by reinstating it to Ancient Greek techne—does not entail as
a prerequisite the differentiation and ranking of technologies based on numeric-based
criteria. Certain philosophical approaches to technology, for example, when comparing
democratic values of distinct technological systems, such as Winner’s politics of
artifacts, is rightfully a technology of technology, albeit a marginalized one by the
mainstream.567 As far as the numeric-based technology of technology acquires
dominance with technological hegemonies, the quantitative instruments that had
hitherto lent themselves only to problems in science and engineering have also
expanded to the practice of management, governance, policy analysis, and
563
Such is a critique made throughout in Shew, Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge, 2017..
The standards and criteria mentioned here are clearly those of David Baird, and by extension, of Ian
Hacking and Karl Popper. Refer back to my discussion in footnote 99.
564
Bunge, "Technology as Applied Science," 1966, 337-341.
565
Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 1990; Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of
Taste, 1984.
566
E.g. Clarke et al., "Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of Health, Illness, and U.S.
Biomedicine," 2010; McEvoy, "Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice,"
2007; Harding, Is Science Multicultural?: Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies, 1998.
567
One technology of technology of the mainstream is apparently what Jennifer Karns Alexander called
“the [modern] mantra of efficiency” in her careful and insightful historical work. On the other hand, my
conceptualization of the dominant technology of technology in the remaining chapter centers on the
technology of quantitative instruments, wherein the instrument of efficiency is not only part of it but also
its most notable product. Cf. Alexander, The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social Control,
2008.
174
accounting.568 Under the sway of similar doctrines, technologies as distinct as

educational testing and body measurements have been furnished with the use of a bell
curve.569
As a consequence, the dominant forms of technology of technology have, on the one

hand, effectively transformed problems and issues that are not entirely amenable to
quantitative instruments into numeric problems that can be addressed by mathematics.
On the other hand, they developed instruments to make the transformation less bumpy
and, in the end, a commonplace and standard practice.570 Effectively, the dominant
technology of technology has become concerned only about problems that are
quantifiable and left out what have been the most recalcitrant to quantities, such as
words, qualities, meanings, and so forth.571
The Third Sense: Technology of Technology as Reflexive Technical Practice
The third and last characteristic of technology of technology is technology that proceeds
in a reflexive turn and becomes embodied and personified. It demands that our own
practice of technology—whether in personal life, at work, or at leisure—should conform
to the same criteria and values that we impose elsewhere in the former two senses of
technology of technology I discussed. Note that the terms reflexive and reflexivity are
used to capture the most general senses “to bend back” or “to turn back” originating
from Latin reflecto, as conveyed by reflexive verbs and pronouns (e.g. they pride
themselves).572 Whereas in research methods of social sciences and the humanities,
reflexive and reflexivity connote a self-critical stance and capacity to think about how
one’s own experiences, personality, value, and even presence may affect the inquiry
and representation of the object, my reference to these terms does not presuppose
being self-critical. This is in line with broad literature in sociology and contemporary
568
E.g. Rotenstreich, "Technology and Politics," 1967; Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity
in Science and Public Life, 1995.
569
E.g. Fendler and Muzaffar, "The History of the Bell Curve: Sorting and the Idea of Normal," 2008; Davis,
"Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the Invention of the Disabled Body in the
Nineteenth Century," 2006.
570
E.g. Lampland and Star, ed., Standards and Their Stories, 2009.
571
E.g. Glassner and Moreno, ed., The Qualitative-Quantitative Distinction in the Social Sciences, 1989.
572
"Oxford English Dictionary Online," 2022, s.v; Glare, ed., Oxford Latin Dictionary, Second Edition, 2012,
s.v. For a taxonomy of “reflexivity” in terms of reflex and reflect, see Ashmore, "The Reflexive Thesis:
Wrighting Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," 1989, 30-32.
175
social theory. Reflectivity can be critical or uncritical and can be pertinent to different
levels of analysis: agency (e.g. of individuals, researchers, etc.), disciplines (e.g. social
science, law, etc.), and society.573 Wherever it is necessary for me to explicitly indicate
the desirability of reflexivity or make a value judgment, I will add critical or uncritical to
specify.574
To illustrate my point, take Frederick Winslow Taylor as an extreme, uncritical example

of reflexive technology of technology. As a scientific manager (and a pioneer in
industrial engineering), he was not only notorious for timing each action of workers in
factories and offices and strikingly improving the efficiency of work by standardizing and
enforcing procedures. Harry Braverman noted that Taylor was also “an exaggerated
example of the obsessive-compulsive personality: from his youth he had counted his
steps, measured the time for his various activities, and analyzed his motions in a search
for ‘efficiency.’”575
The ironic and alarming part is, perhaps, that it does not take any compulsive disorder
to be anything like Taylor, so long as we rationalize the principle of technology of
technology and venture to enforce it in our lives and our ways of doing, for example, by
attempting to objectify and “technicalize” our own experiences through mathematics,
science or engineering. The use of self-monitoring devices has recently exhibited similar
traits. The regime for managing productivity in the workplace is now packaged in those
self-improvement smartphone apps intended for individuals volunteering to have their
social life under technological control.576 Personal wearable devices that track our sleep
and break it into sleep stages according to neuroscience dictate how good we perceive
our sleep to be in numeric scores, in addition to areas for improvement.577
573
Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992.
574
For a similar naming convention that denotes critical reflexivity and uncritical reflexivity, see the
following work in in engineering education Reynante, "Learning to Design for Social Justice in Community-
Engaged Engineering," 2022.
575
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 1974, 91-92.
576
Gregg, "Getting Things Done: Productivity, Self-Management, and the Order of Things," 2015.
577
See the chapter on productivity in Cederström and Spicer, Desperately Seeking Self-Improvement: A
Year inside the Optimization Movement, 2017. My personal experiences with a Samsung Galaxy Watch 4
have confirmed this. Moving while one is asleep lowers the sleep score, as the device thinks the user
becomes awake and therefore disrupts the sleep or the “sleep cycle.” The focus on sleep stages (light
sleep, deep sleep, and REM) based on neuroscience neglects that the sleep also restores the body.
176
Often, these uncritical reflexive adaptations of technology are “voluntary” and “free
choices” in appearance. As Marx and generations of his close followers like Harry
Braverman and David Noble showed, technology of machines and the principle of
productivity have set the standards and expectations of work and served the interests of
capitalism that are frequently at odds with those of workers.578 The more curious is,
however, that the clashes are now often turned into collaboration, and the discontent is
converted into consent. Michael Burawoy’s seminal study of factory workers shows
that, as long as beating a challenge from the management involves choosing from a few
technical strategies, it gives reward and pleasure to the workers after some struggles.
Playing the “game” of “making out”—namely, being successful in the challenging,
competitive game of production—entails the generation of “consent” to the
sociotechnical rules and the relations they govern, making these elements as natural
and inevitable as the rules of sport to an athlete.579
Burawoy’s sense of consent is a crucial point of departure for understanding the

(uncritical) reflexive technology of technology: participating in the competitive game of
making technological choices limited by technology of technology gives us rewards and
pleasure, and in doing so, it is more likely that we internalize the mode of technology of
technology that governs our envisioning of choices, mistake it for an unquestionable
foundation of reality, and become accustomed and inattentive to its concomitant
consequences. As an instance that should bring home to most readers, in academia,
doing and publishing research is often a highly-valued activity of a scholar. But carrying
out research and producing publications for their own sake, and even “studying” and
“inventing” more efficient ways for rapidly facilitating these activities, without
considering their quality and purposes, are morally questionable.580 The last activity of
578
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 1974; Noble, America by Design, 1977.
579
Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent, 1979. Inasmuch as the participants played active roles in generating
consent to the rules, it becomes trivial to judge if these rules (as well as the attitudes and values as
reflected by the rules) are “subliminal and unconscious.” Nor are the complex networking relationships of
these elements too important to us. What really matters is the labor relations and the underlying
technical rationality and work ethic that help initiate and sustain the system and leave it challenged and
reproduced. The concept of manufacturing consent thus differs sharply from “the hammerer's adjustment
to the hammer, a baby's to its mother, or a driver's to the local traffic patterns.” Cf. Von Laue,
"Technologg, Society, and Freedom in the Tower of Babel," 1983, 120, 124.
580
Critiques of these practices abound, including Reif, "The Competitive World of the Pure Scientist,"
1961; Baillie, "Waste for Life: Socially Just Materials Research," 2012; Djuric, "Penetrating the Omerta of
Predatory Publishing: The Romanian Connection," 2015; Radder, From Commodification to the Common
Good, 2019, 227-232.
177
using a scholar’s investigative skills and creativity to research and publish (often in larger
quantity) without a justifiable end, unfortunately, also falls uncritically under the
reflexive technology of technology.581
Dominant Engineering Practice as Technology of Technology
I argued previously that engineering is an exemplar of technology of technology, but this

needs additional qualification. Not all the practices of engineering are predominantly a
technology of technology. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the Ancient Greek master-
art and Roman architecture, as well as modern civil engineering and construction that
complies with regulations and standards when designing and building a structure or
infrastructure with purposes, appear to me more of a technology, as opposed to a
technology of technology—and I am saying they are only technology without the least of
disparagement. Ancient military engineering and the nineteenth century’s mechanical
engineering, on the other hand, exhibited the characteristics of technology of
technology at large.
Central to the question of technology of technology is the notion of dominance; that is,
engineering we commonly refer to is the kind of engineering practice that happens to be
dominant, which I simply call dominant engineering practice. Borrowing the ideas of
“dominant images” and “dominant practices” from Gary Downey,582 the dominance I
refer to here not only indicates the status quo of being more popular and noticeable,
where certain engineering knowledge and practice are apparently at the forefront of
engineering, while others are on the margin. Alice Pawley’s empirical works showed that
common narratives of engineering included applied science and math, problem-solving,
and making things.583 Dominance, on the other hand, also reflects that the status is an
acquired privilege, where power and importance are accumulated and reproduced. I will
call it “dominant engineering practice” for the rest of the chapter to avoid essentializing
engineering practice. As observed by Downey, existing “dominant practices in
engineering” acquire dominance only through subjugating other technical practices and
581
In engineering research, this last example may be seen as “a technology of technology of technology,”
as engineering research (with its purported applications) is already a technology of technology. To avoid
unnecessarily verbose and convoluted terms, I refer to any “higher-order” technology like this simply as
technology of technology.
582
Downey, "What Is Engineering Studies For?," 2009.
583
Pawley, "Universalized Narratives: Patterns in How Faculty Members Define “Engineering”," 2009.
178
making them less relevant in engineering. The designation of subordinating practices of

engineering as dominant engineering practice, therefore, takes a firm stance that
engineering practice can be otherwise.584
Similar to how military engineering became dominant, as discussed in Chapter 3, the

hierarchies of importance among different practices and knowledge of modern
engineering are not only sustained by the priorities of the conceived urgency, but also
through binary and quantitative criteria that conveniently determine success and
retrospectively give credit to the most apparent and visible contributors. Dominant
engineering practice, in this manner, has favored engines and machines over nuts and
bolts, souls and genius over body and labor, research and design over practice and
implementation, innovation and creation over maintenance and sustainability, revenues
and value over social good and justice, etc.585
The reorientation of my focus to what is “dominant” makes my critique of engineering

practice possible and more sensible. Built upon my analysis of Ancient Greek techne and
machine in Chapter 3, our modern engineering practice, in its dominant form occupied
with quantity and binary, is neither techne of machine, i.e. μηχανοτεχνία, which native
modern Greek speakers have proposed to represent engineering in English.586 Nor is it
meta-techne (i.e. Ancient Greek “technology”) or a science of technology in mechanical
and industrial arts, much less simply a techne. This is because modern engineering
practice, unlike the preliminary Greek or Roman mechanical arts that devoted only to
machine and its quantitative performance in clinching a binary success, and unlike the
nineteenth century’s conceptualization of the evolving machine and engine as the
metrics of technological progress, leaves its mark on more and more fields that are only
remotely related to “machine” but can now be called “engineering,” such as chemical
engineering, industrial engineering, biomedical engineering, genetic engineering, etc.
Modern engineering, as an institution, also bears on other technologies (in the broad
sense) that cannot or should not be subjugated to quantitative and binary
rationalization. Moreover, engineering also self-regulates itself in an uncritical reflexive
way—including its formation, dynamics, and assessment—by applying similar
584
Downey, "What Is Engineering Studies For?," 2009, 66.
585
I prefer dominant over hegemonic because dominance suggests a status quo that is acquired through
power, while hegemony is influence and leadership to be exercised by a more specific entity that is
unquestionably its source, as in cultural hegemony and hegemonic masculinity. Engineering practice along
cannot be the source of the explanations or ways engineering is dominantly carried out.
586
See how Greek translators rendered English engineering in Greek and explained their rationales in
Mitcham, Η Τεχνολογική Σκέψη (Thinking through Technology), 2005, xxiii.
179
engineering principles to itself that are hitherto well-established to be applicable only to

lifeless objects.
I will investigate all these related themes, by discussing three ways in which dominant
engineering practice corresponds to and acts like the three senses of technology of
technology I outlined before.
The First Sense: Dominant Engineering as Technical Problem Solving
Dominant engineering practice continuously pushes back the boundary of technology by

inventing new technologies and improving established ones. As a profession, a pivotal
duty of engineering has been to serve the exigencies of technical needs arising from its
immediate institutional context, preponderantly by solving diverse kinds of technical
problems for whoever employs an engineer.587 In the US, the exemplar of engineering
was once low-cost and high-volume production for mass consumption, culminating in
Ford's assembly line production of the “one-size-fits-all” Model T, until the annual
introduction of new models became the new norm and forced Ford to consider
consumer demands instead of costs.588 Not only did engineering sometimes disregard
users’ actual needs for technology. Engineering at times also preoccupied itself with
building universal theories and equations that were remote from realities, played down
the aspect of manufacturing in engineering when building prototypes, or undertook
public construction projects single-mindedly to the exclusion of a construction’s
surrounding environments.589
At present, engineering in the English-speaking world is often an over-professionalized

field that excludes non-engineering professionals, such as business leaders and
technicians who do not have academic credentials or licenses, from being full or
associate members of its professional organizations. The policies and norms that
587
Mitcham, "Engineering Design Research and Social Responsibility," 1994, 153-154; Noble, America by
Design, 1977. Refer also to Goldman, "The Social Captivity of Engineering," 1991, 129.
588
Downey, "Low Cost, Mass Use," 2007; Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-
1932, 1984, 13.
589
E.g. Reuss, "Andrew A. Humphreys and the Development of Hydraulic Engineering: Politics and
Technology in the Army Corps of Engineers, 1850-1950," 1985; Leslie, "Charles F. Kettering and the
Copper-Cooled Engine," 1979; Marine, America the Raped: The Engineering Mentality and the Devastation
of a Continent, 1969, esp. 16-19, 200-201.
180
differentiate engineers from non-engineers differ sharply from, say, those of Taiwan,
where engineering is understood far more broadly in scope.590 In the US, one ironic
consequence of the century-long struggles for shielding the engineering profession from
private and corporate interests, along with a growing emphasis on engineering science,
is that engineering limits itself to technical functions of solving problems (indeed,
challenging engineering problems).591 The focus on technical problem solving is a
pattern also seen in the engineering formation of the UK, Germany, France, and
Korea.592
The majority of engineers are, in general, a cadre of specialized technical labor working
predominantly in the service and interests of corporate capitalism that ultimately
defines the purposes and direction of technology.593 On one hand, engineers have been
portrayed as prime movers of capitalist management who invent and implement new
technologies, and in that process, they make conscious or unconscious choices between
functionally-similar alternative technologies in favor of ones that deskill and replace
workers.594 On the other hand, engineering has grown into such a large occupation that
it begins to show signs of being subjugated to the same process of deskilling.595 The
engineering work that focuses on technical problem-solving makes the profession
largely unaware of the social impact of technology on society as well as the implications
of engineering practice and labor relations for its practitioners’ very own working
conditions and quality of life.596
In popular literature, the frantic aspect of engineering work, with endless toil and
sleepless nights, in order to eventually meet tight schedules to deliver a product to the
590
Shih, "Towards an Engineering Ethics with Non-Engineers," 2021. One notable consequence of not
considering non-engineers in engineering and technological developments is to miss many other crucial
players in the community of practice, thereby discounting their technological knowledge. See Johnson,
"Revisiting Technology as Knowledge," 2005.
591
Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers, 1971; Seely, "The Other Re-Engineering of Engineering Education,
1900-1965," 1999.
592
Downey, "Are Engineers Losing Control of Technology?," 2005; Han and Downey, Engineers for Korea,
2014.
593
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 1974; Noble, America by Design, 1977.
594
Noble, Forces of Production, 2011 [1984], 85; Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 1998 [1974],
266-267. Noble’s account of engineers’ social choices between numerical-control and record-playback
machine tools, in particular, highlights the deliberations involved to displace labor and cut costs.
595
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 1998 [1974], 167.
596
For the latter, see O'Brien, "Is Silicon Valley Bad for Your Health?," November 1, 2015; Sharone,
"Engineering Overwork," 2004; Ross, No-Collar: The Humane Workplace and Its Hidden Costs, 2003.
181
market, is best and dramatically captured by Tracy Kidder’s Pulitzer-winning The Soul of
a New Machine.597 In more general reality too, under the growingly detailed division of
labor, it is the duty of engineering to attend to technologies and artifacts, including
“communication” about technical information with colleagues and clients.598 The
tension between “engineering” and other departments like production and
manufacturing in modern corporations sometimes makes engineering fall back to the
reinforced, confined institutional duties ensuring “the best performance” of a product
and preventing it from “going to fail.”599 As critiqued by Robert Zussman, this narrowly-
defined “technical rationality.”600
is the engineer’s stock-in-trade [and] requires the calculation of means for the
realization of given ends. But it requires no broad insight into those ends or their
consequences. Engineers are aware of, are trained to be aware of, these
limitations; insofar as they do consider ends, they cease to act as engineers.
The Second Sense: Dominant Engineering Practice as Technology Differentiating Other

Technologies
Dominant engineering practice differentiates other technologies outside its technical

purview. If the aforementioned engineering practice in the first sense, which attends
only to engineering technologies and artifacts, proves to be technically provincial,
engineering practice that benchmarks less technical and non-technical technologies is
socially too ambitious, and indeed often on the brink of conceit. The particular
engineering mentality of our interest includes, for example, the common and shopworn
opinion that architecture is less of a technology than civil engineering, because the
former engages with the value of “beauty and comfort which are basically ‘non-
technical’ categories,” while the latter deals with “[t]echnical categories, such as
597
Kidder, The Soul of a New Machine, 1981.
598
Anderson et al., "Understanding Engineering Work and Identity," 2010; Hatmaker, "Practicing
Engineers," 2012.
599
Anderson et al., "Understanding Engineering Work and Identity," 2010, 166; Paretti and McNair,
"Analyzing the Intersections of Institutional and Discourse Identities in Engineering Work at the Local
Level," 2012, 66-67.
600
Zussman, Mechanics of the Middle Class, 1985, 122-123. I want to thank Donna Riley for bringing to my
attention this passage during my dissertation proposal defense. The quote also appears as an epigraph in
her book, as in Riley, Engineering and Social Justice, 2008, 33.
182
accuracy and durability, … [that] are the yardstick of technological progress.”601 As José
Ortega y Gasset pointed out in his pioneering series of published lectures, “A Meditation
on Technique,” in the 1930s, technology (la técnica, or technique) in modern times does
not belong to someone who invents “by sheer chance” (por puro azar) or to the artisan
(artesano). Technology is that of the technician (técnico) who should more aptly be
called an “engineer” (ingeniero).602
But beyond the turf war between engineering and their “less technical” yet closely
related counterparts, insofar as engineering has been successful in managing industrial
systems and solving technical problems, there is a popular belief that engineering is also
well suited for tackling social issues. Whereas in 1895, George S. Morison, president of
the ASCE, only had the audacity to say that theology, metaphysics, biology, and
medicine did not have “the mathematical rigidity … which mark the laws with which our
[engineering] profession works” and to proclaim that “We are the priests of material
development ... which enables other men to enjoy the fruits of the great sources of
power in Nature,”603 by the early twentieth century, presidents from the American
Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE) were ready to assert their unique qualifications
for solving social problems. For example, Harold W. Buck (1873–1958), president of
AIEE, opined:604
It matters not whether the problems before him are political, sociological,
industrial or technical, I believe that the engineering type of mind, if the proper
breadth of view has been acquired, is best fitted to undertake them.
The underlying ideology was the assumption that laws governing human affairs may be
modeled after laws of physics, as Comfort A. Adams (1868–1958), another president of
AIEE, asked in his address:605
Are there no laws in this other realm of human relations which are just as
inexorable as the physical laws with which we are so familiar? Is there no law of
compensation which is the counterpart of our law of conservation of energy?
601
Skolimowski, "The Structure of Thinking in Technology," 1966, 382. Skolimowski himself appeared to
endorse, instead of being critical of, this view.
602
Ortega y Gasset, "Meditación De La Técnica," 1964, 360-361, 368.
603
Morison, "Address at the Annual Convention," 1895, 473, 483.
604
Buck, "The Engineer's Destiny," 1917, 600. Cited in Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers, 1971, 66.
605
Adams, "Cooperation [President's Address]," 1919, 792. Cited in Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers,
1971, 66.
183
Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), American sociologist, economist, and vocal critic of

consumer capitalism and its concomitant waste and inefficiency, was sympathetic
toward these views and cast engineers as the best candidate to manage public affairs
efficiently. According to Veblen, thanks to the professional training as well as a “native
bent” for managing systems of materials that are “impersonal” and “dispassionate” by
nature, engineers were competent to disregard prerogatives, vested interests, and
politics, and to boost the efficiency of our failing social systems based on “tangible
performance” of matters.606
In our times, although similar proposals are not as pretentious as they used to be, they
are simply more nuanced, hegemonic, and prevalent. The foremost example is the
large-scale applications of artificial intelligence in what were formally social activities
that involved only human discretion and judgments. A notable, sophisticated version of
their underlying philosophy is evident in the idea of “technological singularity” popular
in the fields of artificial intelligence in electrical engineering and computer science.
Technological singularity posits that cutting-edge technology improves exponentially
over time and is set to surpass all human intelligence and social progress combined. Its
theory is grounded in the omnipotent potential of engineering, “when the thing being
engineered is intelligence itself, the very thing doing the engineering, it can set to work
improving itself.”607
To proponents of technological singularity, transcending human intelligence not only

includes reverse-engineering the brain and quantifying and comparing its speed, size,
efficiency, computational power, energy consumption, and “bits of information.”608
Implicit agendas of technological singularity also reduce the goals of human techniques
to binary (victory or defeat, right or wrong, etc.) and regard beating human
“intelligence” in these technologically-narrowed categories as achievements of artificial
intelligence, including in the games of chess and Go.609 This is not surprising, as the
606
Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System, 1921, 74, 132, 32.
607
Shanahan, The Technological Singularity, 2015, xvi.
608
Shanahan, The Technological Singularity, 2015, 32; Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans
Transcend Biology, 2005, 137.
609
See, for example, a series of articles in Nature and in Science published by researchers of DeepMind, a
Google’s subsidiary, between 2016 and 2018: Silver et al., "Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural
Networks and Tree Search," 2016; Silver et al., "Mastering the Game of Go without Human Knowledge,"
2017; Silver et al., "A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters Chess, Shogi, and Go
through Self-Play," 2018. Compare the treatment of Go in these engineering papers with Feenberg’s
184
famous Turing test—a touchstone to determine if a machine exhibits human

intelligence—involves a pass-fail “test” in terms of an imitation game. In the test, a
human jury asks questions of a human and a machine, whose real identity remains
unknown, compares the performance of the conversation, and identifies which is the
human and which is the machine.610
To the extent that the proponents of technological singularity went on and professed
that machines “will encompass ... emotional and moral intelligence of the human brain
itself” and “will claim to have emotional and spiritual experiences, just as we do
today,”611 the substantive question is not whether these achievements are at all
possible or likely to happen according to their confident predictions. My challenges are
to the motivation and investment behind these endeavors to surpass humans, and to
the (often quantitative and binary) criteria to draw a comparison. Moreover, as
contended by Andrew Feenberg, there are human activities where techniques are not
appropriate, as in “child rearing,” “artistic production,” “forming friendships,” and
“enjoying Thanksgiving dinner.”612
Another dominant idea similar to technological singularity is the engineering mindset of

“technological fix,” when technologies are applied to problems that are not suitable for
a technological solution and when repairing the damages of technology prescribes
another more advanced technology.613 The belief that there are always ideas to be
found and implemented to prevail over any quandaries—“business problems, health
issues, relationship difficulties, as well as the great scientific, social, and cultural
challenges of our time”—continued to motivate Ray Kurzweil to believe in a
technological singularity where the “imperative” and “power” of technological problem
solving take the rein.614
A related recent example of the technological fix mentality is a list of fourteen “Grand
Challenges for Engineering” published by the US’s National Academy of Engineering.
discussion of the etiquette, aesthetics, and spirituality in the traditions of Go: Feenberg, Alternative
Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory, 1995, 193-220.
610
Copeland, "The Turing Test," 2003, 6-8.
611
Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, 2005, 8, 388.
612
Feenberg, "Critical Theory of Technology," 2009, 150; Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical
Theory Revisited, 2002, 177.
613
Sarewitz and Nelson, "Three Rules for Technological Fixes," 2008; Drengson, "The Sacred and the Limits
of the Technological Fix," 1984.
614
Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, 2005, 2.
185
While most challenges can certainly benefit from engineering, at least three items have
reduced complicated issues to an engineering fix, including to “improve urban
infrastructure,” “prevent nuclear terror,” and “develop carbon sequestration,” as if the
problems of aging infrastructure, nuclear proliferation, and global warming,
respectively, demand only engineering solutions.615 As pointed out by engineering
education scholar and activist Donna Riley, the act of self-promotion and presenting
engineering as solving “grand” challenges “seems perhaps more grandiose than
grand.”616 As many American engineering programs, including my institution, integrated
similar self-aggrandizing languages into course materials, the grand challenges were
framed as an imperative for engineering to “unpack” and “formulate,” foreclosing
ethical discussion and policy questions surrounding what is always an interdisciplinary,
bafflingly complicated challenge.617
The mentality of engineering problem solving also expands to engineering ethical

questions that are not supposed to be understood or solved in engineering terms. For
example, to approach ethical problems, some textbook author of engineering ethics
who were trained in engineering introduced what they called “ethical problem-solving
techniques.” The “linedrawing technique,” for example, proposes to sort different
hypothetical scenarios on a linear scale according to their “moral acceptableness” in
order to assess how ethically sound a given state of affairs is.618
Admittedly, this is not how most textbooks teach engineering ethics.619 Nevertheless,
when it comes to the assessment of ethical reasoning in engineering (and in other
professions as well), the trend seems to favor more automatic and efficient approaches.
615
National Academy of Engineering, Grand Challenges for Engineering, 2008; National Academy of
Engineering, Nae Grand Challenges for Engineering, 2017.
616
Riley, "We've Been Framed! Ends, Means, and the Ethics of the Grand(Iose) Challenges," 2012, 127.
617
According to one assignment template we circulated internally in my institution during the fall of 2018,
students were asked to “[d]emonstrate an understanding of what [their selected grand] challenge
entails,” including answering questions like “[w]hy is it a challenge (scope it effectively and consider
technical and contextual elements)” and “[w]hat role might engineers have in solving this challenge.”
There were no questions asked as to what the challenge is about, why the challenge is important, who has
expressed interest to see the challenge taken and who will benefit, and what non-engineering experts
engineers will need to consult in developing solutions. When I was an instructor of record at the time, I
needed to constantly engage with the narrow scope of these template assignments, take a step back, and
develop more critical questions reflecting my identities as an engineer-philosopher.
618
Fleddermann, Engineering Ethics Fourth Edition, 2012, 59-62.
619
Such as Harris et al., Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases Fourth Edition, 2009; Martin and
Schinzinger, Introduction to Engineering Ethics Second Edition, 2010.
186
The most widely-used assessment tool, called Defining Issue Test (DIT), is a proprietary
measuring instrument for sale.620 The DIT is built upon a “multiple-choice examination
that can be group administered and computer scored ... eliminat[ing] the need for a
trained administrator and rater familiar with the 800+ page scoring guide” used in older
tests.621 The DIT’s most important score, or the P-score, to measure “moral reasoning
skills,” is based on post-conventional morality.622 Even though the theoretical
foundation of morality, linked to Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget, has been
challenged, practitioners relying on the instrument are often less open-minded to
concede.623
Similar quantitative methods of assessment are pervasive in engineering education,624 in

many cases owing to the primacy of administrative efficiency over qualitative
dimensions of assessment. In my educational institution, for example, “assessment” of a
college-level engineering course used to be reporting the percentages of students who
were “below competent,” “competent,” and “above competent” based on uniform
criteria that demarcated the numerical scores earned in certain assignments, in
disregard of difference between instructors.625 Under the guise of “rigorous
research,”626 the gathering of evidential quantified data diminishes, if not thwarts, the
use of good teaching and course materials that can hardly be quantitatively
documented or assessed. More broadly speaking, in engineering education research,
there is a marked preference for quantitative research methods, indeed a systematic
620
According to their owner, "the standard scoring fee is $5.50 for each participant in the sample" plus
"standard shipping and handling costs" adding another 10% of the total order. See Center for the Study of
Ethical Development, "Ordering Information," 2020.
621
Barry and Herkert, "Engineering Ethics," 2014, 681.
622
Loui, "Assessment of an Engineering Ethics Video: Incident at Morales," 2006.
623
See the following heated exchanges Curzer et al., "Do Ethics Classes Teach Ethics?," 2014; Thoma et al.,
"How Not to Evaluate a Psychological Measure: Rebuttal to Criticism of the Defining Issues Test of Moral
Judgment Development by Curzer and Colleagues," 2016.
624
E.g. Pellegrino et al., "The Science and Design of Assessment in Engineering Education," 2014.
625
For the engineering class I was a teaching assistant of in the fall of 2020, we were asked to use uniform
criteria to define that a student is “competent” in problem solving “using systematic engineering
approaches and tools,” if their grade for a particular programming assignment is between 80–95%. (The
other two categories are “above competent” and “below competent.”) For all the other learning
outcomes, including “identif[ing] ethical issues in a complex context,” competency was defined as having
a grade below 100% and no less than 80%. These assessment criteria, however arbitrary and coarse-
grained, applied to all similar courses, regardless of how different instructors may have applied and
interpreted the numerical scores.
626
Borrego, "Conceptual Difficulties Experienced by Trained Engineers Learning Educational Research
Methods," 2007.
187
issue for the field.627 It follows that, if methodology determines what research questions
can be addressed in engineering education research,628 then the academia of
engineering and engineering education, as a whole, may still be oblivious to the many
problems that cannot be construed and addressed solely by quantitative ways.
The Third Sense: Dominant Engineering Practice as Uncritical Reflexive Engineering

Practice
Dominant engineering practice, as uncritical reflexive technical practice, includes the

way we enact engineering principles in our daily personal life. Previously, I took
Frederick Winslow Taylor as an example in scientific management (and industrial
engineering), but any activity that applies engineering principles and mechanical views
to oneself, belongs to this category. These include numerous occasions documented by
anthropologists when they observed computer programmers and technical support
experts begin to think like a computer or an information-processor, express human
agencies in mechanical terms, commit to being part of the machine, have the machine
(symbolically) inside oneself, and eventually become the machine.629 As the renowned
computer scientist Donald Knuth famously (and seriously) put it, “[i]t has often been
said that a person does not really understand something until he teaches it to someone
else. Actually, a person does not really understand something until he can teach it to a
computer, i.e., express it as an algorithm.”630 Insofar as human knowledge is to be
measured by its compatibility with an expression in algorithms, human nature and
humanness may someday (or perhaps has already) come close to an algorithm.
Even more significantly, uncritical reflexive engineering does not only expand to
individual practitioners or isolated practice; dominant engineering practice also takes
roots firmly on its own institutional ground, producing and reproducing the very
627
Borrego et al., "Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Research Methods in Engineering Education,"
2009; Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas, "State of Qualitative Research in Engineering Education: Meta-Analysis
of Jee Articles, 2005-2006," 2008.
628
Case and Light, "Framing Qualitative Methods in Engineering Education Research," 2014, 536-537.
629
Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations, 2007, 2-5, 10-12, 35-38; Downey, The Machine in Me,
1998, 51-53, 137, 147-148, 160, 181, 225.
630
Knuth, "Computer Science and Its Relation to Mathematics," 1974, 327.
188
formation of engineering.631 To tackle the challenges of recruiting and retaining

engineering students in the 1980s, policy statements in engineering education used to
model the educational system as an engineering pipeline “for the purpose of
quantitatively estimating the flow of qualified students through the system,”632 as if
educational trajectories of aspiring engineers were a problem of modeling and system
management in hydraulics and fluid mechanics. This view reflected a renewed interest
in managing engineering education through engineering means (if not merely
engineering terms by metaphor) that could date back to the following language of the
Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education (SPEE) in the 1930s:633
[Engineering] educational processes reflect our national genius for quantity

production. Pressed to get a maximum result in a minimum of time, engineering
educators have borrowed, half unconsciously, from the management methods of
industry. The essence of the scheme consists in first vizualizing the process as a
whole, then dividing it into major steps in a logical progression, and finally
breaking the work down into small units to be done in a definite sequence,
under pre-arranged conditions and with the materials supplied precisely when
needed and in the most convenient form; this task sequence to be carried out
under close supervision, with continuous inspection and grading of piece parts,
and the rewards to be paid in terms of a standard task with a quality bonus.
From educational policies to the actual practice, when engineers are believed by
engineering professors to be “the most appropriate men for management ... because
they can treat people like elements in a system,”634 it follows that the ideas of
“selectivity” and “rigor” which are normally linked to the methodology for dealing with
artifacts now bear upon the criteria of selecting and training future engineers.
631
Note that while uncritically reflexive engineering practice may sometimes lead to cultural
reproduction, it is a different concept from the latter. In engineering, scholars have documented how
practitioners built ideal images of engineers modelled on themselves and how research-focused faculty
designed engineering curriculum aiming to prepare students for academically-oriented graduate studies.
These practices of cultural production, however, are not necessarily based on reflexive technical practice.
See Riley et al., "Social Justice and Inclusion: Women and Minorities in Engineering " 2014, 335; Lattuca
and Stark, "Learners," 2009, 151-152.
632
Bowen, "The Engineering Student Pipeline," 1988, 733.
633
American Society for Engineering Education, Report of the Investigation of Engineering Education,
1923-1929, 1934, 1091. Cited in Riley, "Employing Liberative Pedagogies in Engineering Education," 2003,
140-141; Hacker, Pleasure, Power, and Technology, 1992 [1989], 70.
634
189
Selectivity and rigor can be readily attained, not only because physical laws are universal
and unquestionable, but also due to the fact that standards and criteria can be applied
in every place regardless of context. As put forth by the SPEE in the 1930s, despite
varieties of functions and practices of engineering across different nations, the
“essential genius” behind engineering is “universal.”635
In the engineering classroom, this translated into the use of timed tests, whose
underlying principle is that math and science knowledge is universally measurable and
demonstrable. As Sally Hacker uncovered in her ethnography, such an assessment
instrument is to ensure that not all the engineering students will pass and that only
some of them will graduate and become engineers.636 Coupled with those subjects of
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) that often purport to have a
right or wrong numeric answer, high-stakes and selective exams that use “curve-
grading” have infused the engineering curriculum with a notorious “weed-out tradition”
that is unusual in non-STEM majors.637
As I discussed in Chapter 3, Archimedes’ capability and skills to come to grips with

geometry proofs that are “difficult, painful and dangerous” and his skills to bring about
visible feats in risky situations gave rise to the glorification of talent and the neglect of
other skills and contributions. By the same token, similar conditions in engineering
education have overemphasized the importance of binary and quantity, made them the
centerpiece of engineering, and excluded other relevant knowledge and practice that
cannot be evaluated in a binary and quantitative manner, such as communication and
empathy. The clear-cut nature of numbers and logic coupled with a deliberately
deployed crunch time (e.g. timed tests, merit-based competition, etc.) is nothing more
than an ostensibly objective metric under the cloak of rigor and selectivity—a simplistic,
engineered approach to the very question of grading and assessment in engineering
education. Yet the expediency and convenience of the uncritical reflexive engineering
practice are conducive to the dominance of genius, elitism, and meritocracy in
engineering education. A study has shown that engineering and computer science are
among the STEM fields where professors, postdoctoral researchers, and graduate
students are most likely to perceive that aptitude is more important than hard work to
635
American Society for Engineering Education, Report of the Investigation of Engineering Education,
1923-1929, 1934, 752.
636
637
Seymour and Hewitt, Talking About Leaving: Why Undergraduates Leave the Sciences, 1997.
190
be successful.638 Another study demonstrated that when students “rate” their

professors, physics, mathematics, chemistry, and engineering are among the fields
where the students would be more likely to use the word “genius.”639
Even though engineering is far more than about quantity or right or wrong, and even
though accumulated years of experience and hard work can undoubtedly make a good
engineer, anxiety over innate capacitates still permeate the perception of engineering
students. The two above studies convincingly show how the belief in talent and genius is
statistically correlated with the underrepresentation of women and Black Americans in a
field of study.640 At the micro level in engineering education, minorities of students have
grappled with the dominant, misleading idea that only the “smartest,” “brightest,” and
“most intelligent” students go into engineering.641 Some woman student reported that
they continually compared themselves to “the smartest kids” in their school as well as
“other people who don’t try as hard” as they do,642 which further suggests that talent is
also a concept of efficiency, of how much effort one will need to expend before reaching
a specific caliber. Studies show that while women felt they must be smart and
638
Leslie et al., "Expectations of Brilliance Underlie Gender Distributions across Academic Disciplines,"
2015. According to their supplementary materials, among the twelve STEM fields surveyed by the
authors, engineering and computer science both take the third place where talent is believed by
practitioners to be more important than hard work, only second to mathematics and physics. For
reference, earth science, neuroscience, and molecular biology are the STEM fields that emphasized
aptitude the least. Unfortunately, the authors lumped together all the engineering fields, so we are not
able to see variance among different branches of engineering.
639
Storage et al., "The Frequency of “Brilliant” and “Genius” in Teaching Evaluations Predicts the
Representation of Women and African Americans across Fields," 2016. The part of the study relied
entirely on the online tool of “Gendered Language in Teacher Reviews”
(https://benschmidt.org/profGender), which tallied the frequency of a specific term in student comments
on RateMyProfessors.com by means of data mining. The owner of the tool has recognized several
limitations on their website, but the minor flaws in methodology does not undermine the validity of the
claims in general.
640
Leslie et al., "Expectations of Brilliance Underlie Gender Distributions across Academic Disciplines,"
2015; Storage et al., "The Frequency of “Brilliant” and “Genius” in Teaching Evaluations Predicts the
Representation of Women and African Americans across Fields," 2016. One highlight of Storage et al.’s
study is that even controlling the importance of math (through the SAT Math score), the belief in talent
(specifically by professors, postdoctoral researchers, and graduate students) still statically significantly
predicts fewer women and Black Americans at the bachelor’s level.
641
Bruning et al., "Intersectionality as a Framework for Understanding Diverse Young Women’s
Commitment to Engineering," 2015, 8; Seron et al., "“I Am Not a Feminist, But. . .”: Hegemony of a
Meritocratic Ideology and the Limits of Critique among Women in Engineering," 2018, 148.
642
Reed et al., "Engineering as Lifestyle and a Meritocracy of Difficulty: Two Pervasive Beliefs among
Engineering Students and Their Possible Effects," 2007, 11-12.
191
competitive to belong to engineering, Black Americans said they needed to prove their
intellectual self-worth to be recognized.643
While diversity in engineering is at stake and calls for interdisciplinary, coordinated, and
sustained efforts, diversity is occasionally tackled by engineering means. To address the
diversity of student teams in classroom settings, algorithms have been developed to
“achieve maximum diversity within groups and homogeneity among groups,” a pretense
that diversity has a numeric value that can be maximized by computer programs. 644 And
whereas the only way to right the wrong of the historically enduring structure of
oppression and violence is through substantive equality and justice, arguments for
diversity are often infused with instrumental reasoning. For example, between 1991 and
1992, a committee under the US’s National Research Council intervened to increase
diversity in science and engineering. The committee, specifically, depicted the
usefulness of minorities in predominantly economic terms under the threat of global
competitors and compared the benefit of diversity to that of biodiversity:645
our nation has become increasingly dismayed by its waning leadership in the
international economic arena. The nature of the economic base of this country
presents a growing need for skilled workers, for knowledge workers, for
intellectual talent, and for ingenuity. Since the new entrants to the work force by
the year 2000 will be predominantly women and minorities, our economic
security will depend on how well we have educated, trained, and incorporated
these individuals into full participation…
Women and minorities, as new entrants to the work force, … bring questions,
fresh ideas, new and different perspectives on old problems, new energies, and
new skills … Our country faces enormous transitions, for it is quite clear that
business as usual is not the name of the game. The full participation of women
and minorities contributes a diversity in the citizenry and in the work force, and
that gives our society added resilience and adaptability—just what we need to
accomplish and to guide rapid change. The strategy of using diversity to assure
long-term vitality is not new, of course. It has worked very well in nature, in
investments, in business development, in education, and in our culture.
643
Cf. Seymour, "The Loss of Women from Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Undergraduate Majors:
An Explanatory Account," 1995, 451; McGee and Martin, "Stereotype Management among Academically
Successful Black Mathematics and Engineering Students," 2011.
644
Borges et al., "A New Group-Formation Method for Student Projects," 2009, 573.
645
Wilson, "The Benefits of Diversity in the Science and Engineering Work Force," 1992, 3-4.
192
Similar policy discourse continued to garner renewed attention and interest. In the year
of 2000, the US’s National Academies maintained that science is a “merit-based
enterprise,” and in the wake of global competition, “we must compete with other
communities for the best minds the world has to offer … we must ensure that no source
of scientific intellect is overlooked or lost,” hence making a case for including women
and ethnic minorities.646 A decade later, the National Academies reiterate a similar crisis
of domestic talent in science and engineering (S&E), now also fueled by the unreliable
supply of foreign workforce:647
The United States stands again at the crossroads: A national effort to sustain and
strengthen S&E must also include a strategy for ensuring that we draw on the
minds and talents of all Americans, including minorities who are
underrepresented in S&E and currently embody a vastly underused resource and
a lost opportunity for meeting our nation's technology needs…
If the uncertainty about the future participation of international students

suggests that we need to ensure that we draw on all demographic sources, the
dramatic changes in the demographics of the domestic population, especially the
school-age population, suggest that the problem is all the more urgent.
In addition to the National Academies, several other organizations also expressed

parallel views, including, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), the
American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE), the US Council on Competitiveness
and its affiliate Building Engineering and Science Talent (BEST), MentorNet, the National
Consortium for Graduate Degrees for Minorities in Engineering and Science (GEM),
etc.648
There are three dangers inherent in these arguments. First, diversity and inclusion
policies heavily tied to capitalism and conditions of economics may not be able to
maintain the proclaimed growth in innovation, as the demand of an increasing
workforce often maintains existing power structures and therefore reinforces minorities
646
The National Academies, Who Will Do the Science of the Future?, 2000, vii, 4.
647
The National Academies, Expanding Underrepresented Minority Participation, 2011, 2-3.
648
Fox, ed., Expanding Underrepresented Minority Participation, 2003, 26-27, 40-41, 52-53, 75-76, 119,
139.
193
as secondary candidates for participation.649 Second, the demand for inclusion is prone
to the rise and fall of the nation’s economy, so employment and upward mobility would
also be at the mercy of economic conditions coupled with existing power structures.
Examples from labor history and labor relations repeatedly showed that the
enlargement of the workforce to include women and minorities often put them in
positions that are vulnerable to occupational injuries, illness, and technological
unemployment.650
And third, as we have seen, meritocracy and elitism in the name of rigor and selectivity
recognize only the “best” at critical junctures, but it is not a sustainable way for
inclusion and diversity. In particular, as historians Jennifer S. Light and Janet Abbate
recounted, capable and talented women who contributed tremendously to the
automation of ballistics computations and the overcoming of hardware limitations were
classified as sub-professionals and excluded from the media and did not receive credit
or recognition they deserved.651
I take the following insight and lesson from Light’s and Abbate’s stories about the
wartime history of women in computing. While a meritocratic and elitist system may
initially recognize the talent of minorities for inclusion because they are useful, a system
that continuously favors binary success and quantitative performance tends to discount
the collaborators, components, and process behind a success story, and to give credit
only to its leaders, products, and results according to existing power structures and
reward distribution systems. Critical times that are socially and institutionally
constructed only provide temporary opportunities for those who have been historically
marginalized. Despite the initial openness to participation based on personal talent and
merit, as time goes on, when the crises and states of emergency are removed, the talent
of minorities becomes unimportant and differential treatment reigns. Whether intended
or not, the ideas of rigor and selectivity seem to perpetuate hindrance to minorities’
success.
649
For example, see the statement of the AIChE in Fox, ed., Expanding Underrepresented Minority
Participation, 2003, 26-27.
650
E.g. Hacker, "Sex Stratification, Technology and Organizational Change: A Longitudinal Case Study of
at&T," 1979; Green, Race on the Line, 2001; Ferus-Comelo, "Double Jeopardy: Gender and Migration in
Electronics Manufacturing," 2006; Ku, "Human Lives Valued Less Than Dirt: Former Rca Workers
Contaminated by Pollution Fighting Worldwide for Justice (Taiwan)," 2006.
651
Light, "When Computers Were Women," 1999; Abbate, Recoding Gender, 2012, 11-38.
194
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion: Toward Critical Reflexivity

of Technology and the Empowerment of
Subjugated Practice
My Narrative Flow and Argument Structure: A Recap to Look Ahead
My dissertation has developed a number of interrelated themes centered on questions

of technology and engineering. Despite various and often competing meanings of a
word, through analytical lenses of linguistics and philosophy and primary sources in
history, the preceding chapters show that there have been broader senses of a concept
that subsume these different meanings: the Ancient Greek technology as meta-techne
(or science of technology), techne and English technology as means toward an end, and
machine (and engine and engineering) as human techniques and tools to achieve a
purpose that can be evaluated more or less quantitatively. As articulated in my
linguistic-philosophical approach, sticking with or deviation from these general senses
manifests a purposive, normative commitment to something that is not inherent in the
essence of the concepts.
In Chapter 2, we saw that technology, as the use of rhetoric to treat an art, was
contrasted sharply with theology (sometimes in a play on words) at the center of the
disagreement between early Christian denominations in the first few centuries. The
strategic, semantic shift of technology from rhetoric to presentation, and from
persuasion to representation, was a significant and influential development for the
etymology of technology in the seventeenth century. With the neutral quality
195
embedded in one strand of Ancient Greek technology, Caspar Streso's efforts to

transcend all religious controversies by systematizing and formalizing what other had
said according to (seemingly value-neutral) logic and to derive theological methods and
practical theology proved to be an exceptionally successful move away from the
religious strife and political impasse of his time. Still, Latin technologia was more
commonly used in the context of language and practical arts (compared with in
religion), evincing a dispassionate attitude toward any project on systems of practical
knowledge of distinct scope: from a systematic treatment of all or particular branches of
knowledge, the nomenclature, and glossaries in a particular field, to the explanation of a
single technical term.
While in the nineteenth century, Noah Webster might neglect that technology as meta-
techne had been increasingly associated with mechanical arts and ignore at one stroke
the emerging genres of technical dictionaries and treatises claimed to be
“technologies,” later generations of lexicographers could hardly ride against the tide. In
fact, they went with the currency of the word and conversely reinforced and made
popular the concept of technology endorsed and mobilized by industrialists,
entrepreneurs, and technical professionals who were in search of progress in
mechanical (and useful) arts. The fate of technology as meta-techne overlapped and
went hand in hand with developments of techne and its conceptual, linguistic
equivalents (e.g. art, craft, industry, etc.). And finally, the concept of technology shifted
its meanings from endeavors that study and explain the relatively more advanced
techne to the reference to the techne itself with all its modern connotations.652
The close ties between techne and the modern ideas of progress that implicitly
differentiate “high” technology from “low” technology led us to Chapter 3, where I
carried out a study of techne comparable to that of technology in the former chapter.
There was a twist: instead of fixing on the most general senses of a concept (i.e.
technology generalized to be meta-techne), I directed our attention to how techne was
classified and differentiated. In the works of Xenophon and Plato, even though techne
covers a diverse range of activities, no all the techne was considered equal in status and
importance: Xenophon prioritized agriculture and hunting for their military values, and
Plato disapproved of rhetoric as well as other arts that pretend to resemble the truth
(e.g. painting and sculpture). And while Aristotle limited techne to manufacturing
652
This last development is outside the scope of my dissertation and has been well researched by Eric
Schatzberg in his article and book “Technik Comes to America” and Technology: Critical History of a
Concept.
196
activities and implied that even master-art (i.e. techne of the chief-craftsman or
“architect”) lacks moral values and that, in comparison, moral excellence is inherent in
political science, he nonetheless drew from the commanding authority of master-art
and compared it to political philosophy.
I established, on the grounds of both etymology and conceptual history, that the
connections between modern engineering and machine date back to Ancient Greek
master-art and machine and that the modern concepts of engineering have their roots
in Latin etymon ingenium and other Ancient Greek and Latin words that represent
ingenuity. Although master-art came with both civil and military duties, with rare
exceptions (e.g. Vitruvius’s On Architecture), the corpus of Ancient Greek and Latin
literature by and large highlighted its more prominent, military roles and accorded
genius (and all its conceptual equivalents like endowment and intelligence) to
achievements that demonstrated superiority through quantity and binary comparison in
“military engineering.” In my case study of Archimedes, among other examples of war
engines (i.e. the machine) in siege operations, we saw how individual qualities self-
reinforced one another in ways tantamount to circular reasoning: scaling quantity to
power, projecting power to superiority, ascribing superiority to ingenuity, and explaining
ingenuity in a display of quantity. Together I called them “enduring historical-conceptual
structures,” and through linguistic evidence, I suggested that they have been
entrenched in the ideas of engineering in English and in most European languages and
that their legacy in the modern Western concepts of engineering can never be
overlooked.
I argued that one key condition for the emphasis of these individual qualities and their
network effects in ancient siege warfare was the critical times perceived by witnesses
during the conflicts. Critical circumstances not only prioritized expedients in military
engineering that could immediately and visibly demonstrate power and promise (often
binary) superiority. More broadly speaking, in the writing of military operations in
general (i.e. not limited to military engineering), participants and historians alike also
selectively interpreted history, retrospectively identified crucial junctions, and
subjectively allocated credit and accolades to the few players and factors who appeared
to decisively contribute to the end result. Overall, in the ancient technical writing of
military engineering, qualitative ways to achieve military goals (e.g. through
generalship) and qualitative ways to evaluate success (e.g. by discourse on stratagems)
were marginalized or even excluded in favor of the quantified power of machines and
the binary, decisive outcome of siege operations.
197
In the first half of Chapter 4, I showed how modern engineering reflected its ancient
counterparts and outlined several connections that allowed us to trace the lineage of its
conception back to antiquity. First, the critical times that were formerly intensified by
the life and death of humans in military conflicts and which I argued were the key
condition for the enduring historical-conceptual structures of engineering are
considered no less severe in our times. In fact, déjà vu of crucial moments has been
institutionalized in the ideas of engineering and technology on macro levels: the
“survival of the fittest” among machines under fierce commercial competition, the
doom or flourishing of corporations (along with their stockholders and employees)
whose performance and competitiveness are subject to technological change and are
monitored in quantitative terms (e.g. market shares and financial statistics like the P/E
ratio), and the growth or decline of a national economy being elusively driven by
technological progress and the reservoir of STEM talents in the increasing globalization
of international trade.
Second, it will be mistaken to declare that critical times are entirely socially constructed,
as they also have a material basis in the renewed dependence on civilian machinery. The
machine, so to speak, is the pervasive, material embodiment of the etymon engine (or
Middle English engyn) of engineering. The functioning of modern machines and
equipment is considered no less critical than that of the ancient military engines in
warfare: not only could the failure of critical machines in hospitals, power stations, and
transportation systems (e.g. instruments of an airplane) be life-threatening, but the
non-stop, reliable functioning of machines in banking systems, data centers, and
production lines is also considered no less crucial by their various stakeholders.
Third, and no less importantly, the binary and quantitative categories of the machine
writ large have disproportionately represented engineering. Engineering education and
industries, in turn, created the hidden curriculum and open secret that celebrate
meritocracy and natural endowment based primarily on how quickly engineering
students and engineers can demonstrate quantitative skills and binary performance that
are visible in technical terms. The evaluation criteria in question are not fundamentally
different from the ones that proclaimed Archimedes a genius because he could solve
formidable geometry proofs far more swiftly than his fellows and because his one soul
and his mechanical inventions readily and evidently overpowered the many hands of the
Roman army and his compatriots during warfare. The idea of genius here is the
prevailing belief in the etymon ingenuity (or Latin ingenium) of engineering. Norms of
meritocracy and natural endowment go hand in hand with the regime of selectivity and
rigor. On micro levels, together they impose stresses and strains on individuals pursuing
198
an engineering career and create second-order “critical times” and barriers to entry for
the aspiring engineers to thrive in the face of comparison and pressure augmented by
quantitative assessments and binary categories of performance (e.g. how quantitative
skills are assessed in timed exams with right-or-wrong answers). Selective “success
stories” of the relative few, when left unchallenged, may further reproduce and
reinforce the system on macro levels and perpetuate the enduring historical-conceptual
structures of engineering.
The second half of Chapter 4 set out to develop the concept of technology of technology
and shed new light on the dominant practice of modern engineering described so far. If
up until now my investigation into the enduring historical-conceptual structures of
engineering and its mechanisms comes to be the pathophysiology of the disorder in
modern dominant engineering practice, then this part of my dissertation develops
analytical concepts to systematically document its syndrome which bears upon
technology and which in many cases creates conditions for the perpetuation of the
same disorder.
Revisiting conceptual categories of Ancient Greek techne, technology, and machine from
the previous chapters, I formulated technology of technology as any technical practice
that concerns or belongs to technology and described its three general senses—
improvements on technology, technology that differentiates other technologies, and
the reflexive turn of technology. My analysis by and large illustrated their more
dominant, uncritical, and undesirable forms with irony. Built upon these concepts, I
further critiqued that modern dominant engineering practice that favors quantitative
efficiency and dwarfs other technical practices is technology of technology in the former
three senses.
At last, my examination and critique of dominant engineering practice in terms of

technology of technology crisscross many themes discussed earlier and provide a fresh
critical perspective on the heart of the problem. One matter of primary importance is
that the uncritical reflexive institutional practice of engineering holds together different
elements—critical times, machine, quantity, power, superiority, meritocracy, and
ingenuity. The self-referential, closed system of dominant engineering practice can
hardly be challenged, so long as we do not expose its self-reinforcing normative
structure that has endured historically and institutionally. In other words, in addition to
identifying and challenging each dominant component, any agenda to engage with the
dominant structure of engineering practice must call into question the network effects
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of these dominant qualities and problematizes the underlying sociotechnical rationale

which, as breeding grounds, facilitate their growth and strengthen their links.
The Subjugated Technical Practice
For now let us consider the “other technical practices” that are rendered invisible
systematically. Under the regime of modern dominant engineering practice as
“technology of technology,” some technologies and technical practices become
subjugated often because they are not the “ideal type” of technologies in the Weberian
sense. At the micro-level, unlike dominant technical practices in engineering, subjugated
technical practices, more often than not, are not grounded in exact numbers, formal
skills, objective phenomena, end results, problem solving, scientific certainty, causal
effects, systematic analysis, or technical rationales. Instead, subjugated technical
practices often resort to the respective contrasting parts: indeterminate expressions,
tacit knowledge, subjective experiences, the process, problem definition, situational
uncertainty, indecisive actions, holistic appreciation, and reasonableness.
And at the macro-level, the system of dominant technical practice manifests a number
of characteristics permeating the system: technological superiority, exceptionality and
individuality, rigorous criteria (and proceduralism and selectivity), efficiency, social and
cultural reproduction, meritocracy, control and replacement, technocracy, and self-
referentiality. On the other hand, the system of subjugated technical practice values
these counterparts: practical appropriateness, contribution and collectivity, sensible
criteria (and reasonable accommodations and inclusivity), meaningfulness, critical
reflexity, diversity, empowerment and improvement, participatory decision making, and
permeability. All these contrasting pairs, along with the corresponding dimensions of
technical practice at the micro- and macro-levels, are juxtaposed in Table 5.1 for
illustrative purposes.
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Table 5.1: Dimensions of the Dominant and Subjugated Technical Practice
Level of Analysis Dimension Dominant Technical Practice Subjugated Technical Practice

Symbols of presentation and
Exact numbers Indeterminate expressions
representation
Forms of knowledge Formal skills Tacit knowledge
Matters of interest Objective phenomena Subjective experiences
Individual Sources of motivation End results The process
practice at the Means-ends relationships Problem solving Problem definition
micro-level Certainty (of representation,
Scientific certainty Situational uncertainty
predictions, etc.)
Expectations of actions’ effects Causal effects Indecisive actions
Modes of relating things Systematic analysis Holistic appreciation
Sources of justification Technical rationales Reasonableness
Systems’ criteria for the success of
Technological superiority Practical appropriateness
practice
Basis of recognition in the system Exceptionality and individuality Contribution and collectivity
Systems’ criteria for the inclusion of Rigorous criteria, proceduralism, Sensible criteria, reasonable
practice and selectivity accommodations, and inclusivity
System of System imperatives Efficiency Meaningfulness
practice at the Maintenance of the system by the
Social and cultural reproduction Critical reflexity
macro-level practice
System formation Meritocracy Diversity
System management of practice Control and replacement Empowerment and improvement
Systems’ exercise of political power Technocracy Participatory decision making
Systems’ relations with other
Self-referentiality Permeability
practice systems
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In many ways, individual subjugated technical practices encompass what are often
stereotyped (or gendered) in engineering and represent the opposites of the “technical”
in the dynamics of the social/technical binaries and “dualisms,” including
communication (both presentation and writing), interaction, empathy, expressiveness,
collaboration, multi-tasking, management, marketing, supportiveness, caring for bodies,
qualitative approaches, etc.653 As a result, the subjugated technical practice also
includes what Jürgen Habermas did not think belong to technical-practical actions,
namely, “communicative actions” that strive for mutual understanding to be their
goals.654
In engineering, oral and written communication with people, rightfully a technical

practice, is suppressed by the system of dominant practice in favor of superior and more
efficient technical practices, such as communicating in numbers, equations, and physical
laws.655 It is because communication consists of expressions having multiple meanings in
different contexts and can only be interpreted together with other references.
Communication, moreover, requires subjective judgment about its appropriateness in
practice, has a personal component of knowledge that cannot be easily formalized and
taught, and is always uncertain with regard to its intended effect (e.g. misinterpretation
and misunderstanding).
To the extent that the subjugated technical practice, as in the case of communication,
may not serve the perceived ends in a definite way, it may sometimes undermine the
initial purposes it ought to serve. Other subjugated technical practice in engineering
includes certain reflexive practice in engineering design, for example, when “problem
definition” refines and articulates the objectives (the “ends”) of a design. Even
systematic and more rigid approaches to engineering design acknowledge that, in this
process, “[a]s we gather information from clients, users, and others, our own views of
653
E.g. Faulkner, "Dualisms, Hierarchies and Gender in Engineering," 2000. In particular, Wendy Faulkner’s
article rightfully argued that more complicated, and often contradictory dualisms, existed, and
accordingly, in connoting the underlying tensions and value systems, she prefers "dualisms" to "binaries."
To make my point, I select categories that are more durable institutionally in the social/technical binaries
than the other pairs, such as the abstract/concrete dualisms.
654
To the extent that Habermas limited the scope of “purposive-rational actions” to instrumental actions
and rational choices, he also contrasted “work,” his conceptually equivalent construct, with “interaction.”
In confining what “work” may rightfully encompass, he was in danger of discounting non-traditional work
such as housework and emotional labor. See Habermas, "Technology and Science as "Ideology"," 1971,
91-92; Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 1984, 284-286.
655
Faulkner, "Dualisms, Hierarchies and Gender in Engineering," 2000, 337-340.
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the problem will shift,” and there will be “new (and possibly evolving) understanding ...
of the design problem.”656 Different definitions of a problem entail different goals in the
design. And different teams working on the same project may produce different sets of
objectives and priorities because analysis, interpretation, and revision of goals are open-
ended in nature.657 To appreciate the value of divergent goals and interests, Gary
Downey proposes the “collaborative problem definition” in engineering, which “involves
investigating and assessing other perspectives ... in negotiations of technological
developments ... to understand these technical issues from different points of view and
critically recognize and examine the limitations of their own perspectives.”658
Critical Reflexivity of Technology
Any agenda to engage with the dominant engineering practice, such as the collaborative
problem definition proposed by Downey, is by necessity a critical reflexive practice that
is the counterpart of the “uncritical reflexive engineering practice.” Considering that it is
a purposive action to engage with dominant engineering practice and advocate for
policy changes in the system of practice, at the heart of such endeavor is a technology
that concerns another technology and is ipso facto a technology of technology. As I
discussed previously, philosophical approaches to technology, such as Winner’s politics
of artifacts, are rightfully technology of technology, as long as we keep this concept
general, open, and inclusive. Just as we have adamantly resisted representing
technology as “high technology,” so here we also avoid equating technology of
technology with its more dominant form.659
But designating such engagement and advocacy as “philosophical approaches to

technology” or “technology of technology” is akin to holding the question of technology
and engineering at a comfortable distance. That is, a critical distance is taken as given
and is maintained between us—as philosophers, historians, sociologists, linguists,
engineering educators, etc.—and our research questions and human subjects.
Maintaining the two as separate entities not only presupposes the false idea that our
research and teaching technologies (e.g. productivity devices, information technology
(IT) services, cloud storage, means of communication, modes of instruction, compliance
training, library resources and databases, course materials, course management
656
Dym et al., Engineering Design: A Project-Based Introduction, 2014, 43-44.
657
Dym et al., Engineering Design: A Project-Based Introduction, 2014, 62-64.
658
Downey, "Pds: Engineering as Problem Definition and Solution," 2015, 447.
659
For a non-exhaustive list of technology of technology, refer back to Table 4.1.
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systems, evaluation of teaching, course-level assessment, etc.) are immune from and
unaffected by the ideas of “high technology,” the prevalence of engineering systems,
and the influences of the dominant system of practice (as in Table 5.1). It also fails to
recognize that our research and practice in situ constitute the technology, the
engineering system, and the system of practice. The idea of outreach is out of reach if
we do not see that our research and practice, on the one hand, and the larger discourse,
imaginary, and structure of engineering, technology, and practice, on the other, are
mutually constitutive. Our work, naturally, has the opportunity for engagement and may
be held accountable for the system of which we are a part. While the uncritical reflexive
technology sustains and reinforces the historical-conceptual structure of dominant
engineering practice as discussed before, the same institutional reflexivity may also be
employed as technology for engagement and policy changes.
Even though reflexivity is a characteristic of both science and technology, contemporary

sociologists have largely considered such reflexivity, so to speak, to be either a feature
of science (in terms of knowledge, concepts, theory, etc.) or a subject primarily of
(social-)scientific and theoretical interest. For example, David Bloor posited that his
strong programme of the sociology of scientific knowledge should be reflexive, as “its
patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology [of scientific
knowledge] itself.”660 Anthony Giddens called it “the double hermeneutic” when
findings, descriptions, and interpretations of a sociologist are picked up by the social
actors and shape their subsequent behaviors and frames of references, no less
frequently and significantly than when a sociologist enters the lifeworld of the actors,
learns about what they know, and forms a view of the world.661 On the level of human
agency and social systems, Giddens hinted at the reflexivity of practice, as he recognized
that “reflexivity is a defining characteristic of all human action” in that we monitor the
course of behavior in relation to the context and conventions of social activities and
change our course of action in light of continual inputs of new knowledge, and that such
reflexive monitoring of action is also prevalent in social organizations and systems (e.g.
modern states, prison, etc.).662 Giddens was nonetheless concerned with a theoretical
rendering of the reflexivity of practice and its consequences for and connections with
660
Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 1991, 7.
661
Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 1984, 284.
662
Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 1984, xxii-xxiii; Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 1990,
36; Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 1991, 15, 158.
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wide-spread phenomena, rather than practice that engages with practice or such
reflexivity of the practice.663
In my understanding of social research, wherever reflexivity does concern practice

about practice, one large share of such “reflexive practice” resides in research
methodology, i.e. a system of methods about research practice. Mutually constitutive
reflexivity, in particular, is prevalent in qualitative research, including constructivist (and
interpretivist) approaches, critical theory, ethnomethodology, and the extended case
method.664 But the product of research methodology is chiefly (if not exclusively)
knowledge. Even though knowledge can turn into technology as a matter of course (e.g.
findings published in papers), the methodology of social research does not engage with
the practice of their research subjects so long as the practice it looks after is the
research practice of the researcher. In this regard, what is mutually constitutive or
reflexive is the intersubjective knowledge between researchers and their human
subjects. While it is possible that practice of human subjects may take a different course
thanks to the exchange of ideas and knowledge with researchers, beyond this point,
social actors are left to their own devices when interpreting the practical implications of
reflexive knowledge. By and large, research practice of researchers and the practice of
the human subjects they study remain unrelated and share no common interests.
One notable exception that employs reflexivity in social science as a practice to engage
with habitual practice is Pierre Bourdieu, and I am going to take his theory and practice
as an example in greater detail. For Bourdieu, reflexivity is “a requirement and form of
sociological work, that is, as an epistemological program in action for social science.”665
The commitment to reflexivity interrogates the biases of knowledge specifically
associated with a researcher, including their membership (e.g. social class, nationality,
ethnicity, gender, etc.) and position in the academic world (e.g. academic ranks, fields of
663
That Giddens was only marginally concerned with practice in Modernity and Self-Identity is evident in
the very last few pages on the implications of theory compared with the rest of the book. But even his
concluding remarks about practice and its location remain relatively underwhelming. See Giddens,
Modernity and Self-Identity, 1991, 226-231.
664
Charmaz, "Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods," 2003, 250-251; Annells,
"Grounded Theory Method: Philosophical Perspectives, Paradigm of Inquiry, and Postmodernism," 1996,
384-385; Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992,
37; Burawoy, "The Extended Case Method," 1998.
665
Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992, 38. It
should be acknowledged that I largely rely on this particular source in the rendering of Bourdieu’s social
theory in this and the next two passages.
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study, the composition of their institutions, etc.). More importantly, he drew attention
to the intellectualist bias of the academia666
which entices us to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to

be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically, [and
which] is more profound and more distorting than those rooted in the social
origins or location of the analyst in the academic field, because it can lead us to
miss entirely the differentia specifica [i.e. specific difference] of the logic of
practice.
Bourdieu is in particular concerned with the manner in which we withdraw “from the
world and from action in the world in order to think that action,” and it remains to be
uncovered “in what ways this withdrawal … impact on the thought that they make
possible and thereby on what we think.”667 In the language of the logic of practice, one
of the foreseeable impacts is a disposition to reduce practical logic to theoretical logic,
or in terms of my own words about practice, to subjugate practical practice to research
practice. What is missing from the precipitate reduction of practice to research is the
ethical dimension of social science and its moral and political implications. In Bourdieu’s
view, sociological knowledge has practical significance for individuals (and participants)
in that it brings to awareness how they reflexively master and enact the social
categories of thought and action and become an inseparable part of the collective. The
emancipatory power of sociological knowledge lies in its capability to “help us unearth
the social unconscious embedded into institutions as well as lodged deep inside of us”
as well as to “[give] tools for distinguishing zones of necessity and of freedom, and
thereby for identifying spaces open to moral action.”668 Social science, with moral
character, may become normative and institutional, when its mission is now to
“necessitate conducts, to tear them away from arbitrariness by reconstituting the
universe of constraints which determine them, without justifying them,” to “necessarily
[take] sides in political struggles,” and to “tell us under what conditions moral agency is
possible and how it can be institutionally enforced [my emphasis], not what its course
ought to be” under the guise of a socio-political forecast.669
666
Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992, 39.
667
Bourdieu, "The Scholastic Point of View," 1990, 382. Part of the quote is cited in Wacquant, "Toward a
Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992, 39.
668
Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992, 49.
669
Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992, 50-51.
206
Bourdieu’s positions just highlighted an exemplar of the critical reflexivity of practice—

from research practice to practical practice—even though it remains doubtful that his
research practice (mostly through writings on education, culture, and intellectuals) and
the practical practice of the wider public (e.g. political struggles) were always mutually-
constitutive. It was said that, before the 1990s, he rarely signed petitions and belonged
to “no formal political grouping, party, or union,” probably on the premise that “to be
politically efficacious, scientists must first constitute an autonomous and self-regulating
ensemble.”670 This persona is sharply different from his public image in the 1990s as a
public intellectual involved in politics,671 by which point we say his practice finally
culminated with critical reflexivity of practice.
I used Bourdieu to illustrate what I look for in my concept of critical reflexivity of

technology and its instance critical reflexive technology. Critical reflexive technology (or
practice) is an umbrella term that denotes technology of technology (in the general
sense) that takes a critical reflexive turn which, as a technology, engages with
technology—specific, general, or somewhat both—on one or multiple levels, including
systematic, intuitional, disciplinary, and personal technologies. It is not only for
simplicity that I call it critical reflexivity of technology. Considering that technology that
engages and technology being engaged are mutually constitutive in the same broad,
inclusive concept of technology, encapsulating “technology of technology” in
“technology” demonstrates a commitment to critical reflexivity.
As a technology that engages with technology, critical reflexive technology is necessarily

a very context-specific practice. Whereas science, drawing its ideal type from the theory
of physical science, may be content to discover and operate on what is more or less
universal, general, and deterministic, technology can hardly circumvent the real nitty-
gritty of the contextual, local-specific, and non-deterministic environment that involves
the complexities of the material world and the vagaries of human behavior. As Steven
Goldman said, technologies “never lose their particularity and are explicitly inseparable
from the intentional, contingent, willful, and value-laden contexts of their
formulation.”672 The same must hold true for critical reflexive technology. Even when
critical reflexive technology is concerned with a broad, general concept of technology,
670
Wacquant, "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," 1992, 53-54.
671
Wacquant, "The Sociological Life of Pierre Bourdieu," 2002, 556; Crossley, "Pierre Bourdieu (1930-
2002)," 2002.
672
Goldman, "Philosophy, Engineering, and Western Culture," 1990, 129. Goldman wrote the text I
quoted with reference to engineering in the context of how “the objects of engineering reasoning are far
more complex than the objects of scientific reasoning.” It is my view that a similar point can be made
about technology.
207
the engagement must be limited and specific to the spatio-temporal context and the
specifics of the phenomenon. For example, the dominant perception of technology as
high technology in English may not be comparable to its conceptual equivalent in
Chinese, and the question of technology in our times is necessarily different from that of
the previous generations.
As a corollary, it is a fallacy that critical reflexive technology can benefit from

generalized knowledge and principles any more than from a first-hand survey and
understanding of the context and resource at hand that can substantively inform and
guide our practice. To illustrate this point, take my experience in engineering education
as an example and a lesson learned. Fresh from completing two graduate-level courses
in engineering education—Foundations of Engineering Education as well as Engineering
Education Research Methods to be specific—and having earned my own college degree
in electrical engineering and having researched the cultures of engineering for a couple
of years, I did not expect myself to be so underprepared for teaching a first-year
introductory engineering course in college while engaging with the normative content of
engineering education. As it turned out, the literature of engineering education research
I had read did not easily translate into practice and actions, because in general it did not
speak about what an instructor of engineering education needs to figure out in the
specific context of practice, as I illustrate in contrast in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Distinct Sets of Concern in Engineering Education Research and Practice
Areas of Interest Literature in Engineering Education Research673 Context-Specific Questions in Engineering Education Practice
What is my students’ prior knowledge? What skills am I going to

emphasize? And how do I teach them? What material should I
Learning theories, the situative perspective on cover on each day of my class, and in what reasonable pacing
Student learning learning (or the study of learning as a situated and sequence? Should I give quizzes? What types of questions
activity), the social dimensions of representations should I use in midterm and final exams? How long should the
(e.g. graphs and tables) used in engineering, exams be?
learning approaches (e.g. problem-based and
project-based learning, case studies, design- What does my student’s college life look like? Are they caught
oriented learning, etc.), curriculum design, up with something else when taking my class? How do I balance
engineering design education, the use of between support and course policies? How do I respond when a
Learning
information technology in engineering education student requests me to accept late assignments or to remove
Environments
etc. late penalties? How to increase attendance? Is a particular
approach to increasing attendance justifiable? What should I do
when I find a student cheating on assignments or exams?
Different perspectives on engineering identity,

How do my students perceive engineers and engineering? How
identity productions and formation in engineering
do they think about engineering’s relevance to them? What do
Identity education, the significance of identity for
they think of themselves as aspirant engineers? What image of
education, empirically prevalent categories of
engineers and engineering should I present or even promote?
engineering student identities, etc. 674
673
Unless otherwise noted by footnotes in this column, all the topics listed below are drawn from Johri and Olds, ed., Cambridge Handbook of Engineering
Education Research, 2014.
674
Tonso, "Student Engineers and Engineer Identity," 2006.
209
Why do my students want to study engineering, and how do I

Theoretical frameworks about motivations, know? What are their expectations of this class? What have
Motivation empirical data on students’ motivations to study they been told about this class (e.g. from their academic
engineering and remain in engineering, etc.675 advisors and from former students)? What are the skills they
want to learn most? How can I best motivate my students?
Where do my students come from? What are the ways to

present engineering that can promote diversity? Similarly, what
course materials, grade breakdowns, and assessments should I
Career pathways of engineers, retention and
use? Should I let students form their own teams for group
Diversity and persistence of women and minorities, social justice
projects? If not, when I create student groups, what should I
retention and inclusion, community engagement in
consider to ensure diversity, peer support, and the functioning
engineering education, etc.
of a student group? What should and can I do when minority
students in my class seem to struggle? Is retention and
persistence a goal that is always worth pursuing?
Engineering education and technological change, What technology do my students currently use, and how
new opportunities offered by technology, how comfortable do they feel when using them? What technology
learning is mediated and affected by specific should I adopt in class, and will they do more harm than good in
Technology
technology (e.g. the use of simulations, virtual a particular case? And what technology should I reject (e.g.
learning, remote learning, asynchronous learning, cheating prevention tools)?677 What technological tools should I
the flipped classroom, etc.), etc.676 teach my students to use?
675
Matusovich et al., "What Does "Motivation" Really Mean? An Example from Current Engineering Education Research," 2009; Matusovich et al., "Why Do
Students Choose Engineering?," 2010; Jones et al., "An Analysis of Motivation Constructs with First-Year Engineering Students: Relationships among
Expectancies, Values, Achievement, and Career Plans," 2010.
676
Bishop and Verleger, "The Flipped Classroom: A Survey of the Research," 2013; Lindsay and Good, "Effects of Laboratory Access Modes Upon Learning
Outcomes," 2005.
677
This question is all the more relevant now that online proctoring software has become more prevalent.
210
A Proposal for Critical Reflexive Technology
Certainly, subjugated technical practices have the potential to interrogate the

preordained goals of technology. For example, engineering design and problem
definition, in the self-critical manner, could subvert the dominant form of engineering.
Nevertheless, for the full potential of technology to serve humanity, not limited by its
normative commitment to stereotypical modern technology or dominant engineering
practice, a certain critical reflexive way of technical practice is called for.678 I have called
it critical reflexivity of technology along with its instance critical reflexive technology.679
Critical reflexive technology recognizes that effective means themselves, regardless of

the choice of purposes, can never be sufficiently laudable: the ideas of cunning, tricks,
and guile have been a part of techne since Ancient Greece;680 we should not also forget
all the atrocious applications of technology in modern warfare and vice. In the
meantime, critical reflexive technology does not intend to denounce technology
altogether, but salvage monumental aspects of civilization from their unrestrainedly
oppressive forms. Andrew Feenberg, for example, used the term “practical universality”
to refer to the general validity of useful knowledge systems, including “scientific
knowledge,” “basic technical discoveries such as antibiotics, plastics, or electricity,”
“efficiency,” and “technical rationality” in view of its “different aspects.”681 Technical
practices like these are the features of advanced societies that have the potentialities of
emancipation, and rightfully, we do not want to surrender them to the pursuit of
modern high technology.
678
The limits of engineering design on navigating conflicting design priorities and multiple definitions of
an objective were evidenced in Ann Johnson’s study of the early setback in the US for the greater
availability of anti-lock braking (ABS) systems. See Johnson, Hitting the Brakes: Engineering Design and the
Production of Knowledge, 2009, 105-116.
679
In my forthcoming article in the journal Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology (scheduled to
be published in 2023), I used the term “critical technology of technology” throughout. The reason why I
have adopted critical reflexive technology instead in the dissertation is due to my commitment to
reflexivity of technology, as I discussed in the last section. During my writing of the article for Techné, I did
not have the chance to thought about the question of reflexivity and delineate a distinct concept of
reflexivity for technology, let alone space to fit that into an already long paper.
680
Homer’s Odyssey (ca. the 8th or 7th century BCE) made reference to crafty wile (δολίης τέχνης, 4.455)
and tricks (τέχνας and τέχνῃσι, 8.327 and 8.332). In the works of Xenophon and Plato, techne was
connected with war (Mem. 2.1.28; Oeco. 4.4), flattery (Soph. 222e–223a, 240d and 264d), and deception
(Soph. 240d and 264d).
681
Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory, 1995, 182, 219,
231; Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited, 2002, 66, 142.
211
Likewise, critical reflexive technology wishes not to forgo the potential of engineering or
any “technology of technology.” It is not being a homo faber that has made us a distinct
species marking the Anthropocene, but rather the capability of “technology of
technology” in the custody of technology, for good or ill. Technology of technology, in
its broadest senses and with unrealized potential, shall be the pragmatic ways of
improving, evaluating, comparing, and critiquing technologies, as well as the critical
reflexive manner of personalizing, institutionalizing, embodying, and enacting
technology. Therefore, technology of technology—since we have refrained from
essentializing it—shall include any endeavors in philosophy of engineering and
technology that engages with modern technology. And if there is one defining
characteristic that makes a reflexive technology deserve the modifier critical, it ought to
be its readiness to critique and embed such habitual questioning in the systematic
discourse and interrogation about technology, making critical reflexive technology
institutionally one responsible guardian and arbitrator of technology. To adapt what
Bruno Latour (1999, 24) has famously put, critical reflexive technology proper is “to do
what Victor Frankenstein did not do, that is, not to abandon the creature to its fate but
continue all the way in developing its strange potential.”682
But what and whose potentials should we unleash with critical reflexive technology? I
argue that it should first direct its critique toward any system of practice that disguises
its hegemonic power under the pretense of value neutrality, exerts dominance over
other legitimate practice, and limits the breadth and diversity of technology and
practice. I have deconstructed how different elements in the uncritical reflexive
institutional practice of engineering exhibit self-serving network effects and create the
very conditions for the social and cultural reproduction of the dominant structure of
engineering practice. Such deconstruction remains theoretical knowledge and, at best, a
demonstration of research practice—certainly not a practical practice. It is not a critical
reflexive technology, until it takes on the mantle of a tool, an instrument, apparatus, a
repertoire, an organized group of implements, a network of interlocking contrivances,
and an institution of pragmatic technology that interrogates the dominant structure of
engineering practice and side with the subjugated technical practice, which the critical
reflexive technology must first and foremost become a member of. Critical reflexive
technology aims at the institutional empowerment and mobilization of legitimate
technical practices that have been suppressed and marginalized by entrenched power.
682
Latour, "On Recalling Ant," 1999, 24.
212
Among what critical reflexive technology may enlist are technology and engineering
ethics, labor and environmental movements in the high-tech industry, and technical
knowledge that has been historically gendered and racialized.683 Critical reflexive
technology ought to highlight and validate the qualities of the subjugated technical
practice that are discounted in the fields of engineering and technology, and yet
contribute in no small measure to even most “technical” projects.684
I am going to outline three practical aspects of critical reflexive technology; each is set
to cope with one of the three modes of technology of technology prevalent in dominant
engineering practice that I discussed before.
First, critical reflexive technology shall call into question the means-ends reversal and
the transformation of means into ends by calling for the ultimate ends of engineering
and technology. These include, inter alia, will society and humanity benefit from a
particular engineering or technological development in question, and who are the main
beneficiaries? Does a technology live up to its promise (i.e. the purported ends), and
who represents the interests behind the progress of the technology? Does the
technology empower technological choices, rather than limiting options of technical
means and non-technical self-expression? These suggest that even when an engineer or
a scientist is apparently secluded from the application of their intellectual products, they
shall consider the ethical implications of their work. Theoretically, sociology of science
and technology has long provided us with the investigative lens to uncover the social
interests that are buried in technical practice.685 Practically, Gary Downey’s and Donna
Riley’s respective pioneering works showed that there are a few effective strategies
(and indeed “technologies”) to incorporate problem definition, sensibilities, and critical
lens into engineering that has been dominated by technical problem solving.686
Second, to address the kind of engineering that gives prominence to certain

technologies and disadvantages other alternatives based on numeric criteria, critical
reflexive technology is to expose the ideological component behind seemingly value-
neutral ways of sorting out technologies. In this regard, whereas there are highly
683
For labor and environmental movements in the high-tech industry, see Smith et al., Challenging the
Chip: Labor Rights and Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry, 2006.
684
Light, "When Computers Were Women," 1999; Abbate, Recoding Gender, 2012, 11-38.
685
Mulkay, "Norms and Ideology in Science," 1976; Pinch and Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and
Artefacts," 1987.
686
Downey, "Pds: Engineering as Problem Definition and Solution," 2015; Downey, "Critical Participation:
Inflecting Dominant Knowledge Practices through Sts," 2021; Riley, Engineering Thermodynamics and 21st
Century Energy Problems: A Textbook Companion for Student Engagement, 2012.
213
technical, narrowly-defined problems in engineering, such as that of the structural

integrity of a bridge where mathematics and “hard” engineering knowledge are most
relevant, a bridge as a full artifact and its interaction with the surroundings entail
legitimate inquiries about its aesthetics, ethics, public goods, sustainability, and
environmental impacts. On the one hand, critical reflexive technology will need to
demonstrate that numeric-based technical knowledge is an ideal construct that gets
nowhere without the “softer,” subjugated technical practice like communication and
ethical reasoning in engineering, and that it rises to prominence only because of the
network effects of prevalent ideas and practice within the dominant engineering
practice. On the other, it should also investigate and reveal the struggles of the
subjugated knowledges, make a case for their defenses in engineering where they are
most often marginalized, and make room for its growth in the dominant structure of
engineering practice. Recent works from Black scholars on the lived experiences and
struggles of under-served, under-represented groups in the face of algorithmic bias and
reactionary computing technology reveal exactly the necessity of reinstating the
marginalized and neglected practice in our most familiar and widespread engineering
systems.687
Third, critical reflexive technology must be self-critical and careful about one’s interests
in our very own ground of engineering practice. These include how our position and
knowledge bring certain types of technical choices to the foreground, limiting the scope
of technical practice, and foreclosing other possibilities. Pedagogical activities that have
been integrated into engineering education for more than two decades show that it is
both feasible and salutary to build that self-awareness into engineering education,688
potentially infusing engineering with a critical reflexive technology. The critical reflexive
practice requires, furthermore, judicious awareness that technical practice has its own
limitations, when purposeful actions, means-ends relations, or even brief thoughts of
goals or strategies are irrelevant and sometimes counterproductive to activities that are
intended to be meaningful.689 Engineering and technology do not need to be “grand” or
“high” in every possible way; it needs to step back, acknowledge its weakness, validate
687
McIlwain, Black Software: The Internet and Racial Justice, from the Afronet to Black Lives Matter, 2020;
Williams, "Towards an Engineering Ethics with Non-Engineers," 2021.
688
E.g. Downey et al., "The Globally Competent Engineer," 2006; Downey, "Location, Knowledge, and
Desire," 2011; Riley, Engineering Thermodynamics and 21st Century Energy Problems: A Textbook
Companion for Student Engagement, 2012.
689
Hannah Arendt shared a similar view that “Homo faber, in so far as he … thinks in no terms but those
of means and ends which arise directly out of his work activity, is just as incapable of understanding
meaning.” The “meaningfulness” includes not only the human world but also nature and the
environment. See Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, 155.
214
other forms of knowledge and rationality, and be humbled and go on to collaborate

with non-engineering experts when confronting the formidable challenges of our times.
Critical reflexive technology, or ideally multiple variants of them, should institutionally

be built into the social systems to broaden and diversify the scope of technical practice
and empower the subjugated technical practices under engineering and other dominant
technologies of technology. Moreover, if we would like our own research and practice
to be a critical reflexive technology, it entails a commitment to stepping out of our
academic home base and comfort zone to effectively reach out to the public, engage
with stakeholders, and facilitate real changes. Among others, one priority for us is doing
justice to and empowering subjugated technical practice under dominant forms of
engineering and technology of technology, in our personal and institutional technical
practice.
Joining the endeavors of many other philosophers, sociologists, historians, and

engineers working to engage with the modern landscape of technology and engineering,
my proposal for critical reflexive technology is indebted to the latter’s inspirations and
enunciation of critical concepts, which I did my best to give credit to in the preceding
text. Recall that critical reflexive technology operates on the complexities of its
contextual, local-specific, and non-deterministic environment. My proposal must
necessarily be different in the identification of the problems and the rendering of
suggestions. Nonetheless, it shares similar goals of any humanitarian critique and
initiative to (re)think about alternatives that better serve humanity and to implement
them in our technological world. In the last analysis, critical reflexive technology may be
considered a technology complementary to other attempts to make similar critique and
engagement an essential component of our personal and institutional technical practice.
215
REFERENCE
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Engineering as Technology of Technology and the Subjugated Practice

Bono Po-Jen Shih

Science and Technology Studies

Gary Downey (Chair)

July 28, 2022

Keywords: values in engineering, critique and engagement, techne, philosophy of

Bono Po-Jen Shih

My dissertation draws on both historical and philosophical approaches to the question

Returning back to the present, I develop a philosophical critique of contemporary

Bono Po-Jen Shih

GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

The dissertation is an interdisciplinary project seeking to critique and engage with

My philosophical critique of modern engineering characterizes it as a negative instance

My writing also deeply benefited from my experience of learning in the Department of

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. II

Dominant Tropes of “Technology” and “Engineering”

The Norms of Technology: The “Latest” and More “Advanced”

Certain characterizations of technology that emphasize technological progress and

by Michael Burawoy's path-breaking study of factory workers (and their involvement in

The phenomenon that technology is pervasively associated with technical rationality

“one-dimensional society” and “one-dimension thought,” Lewis Mumford’s

The Norms of Engineering: Specialized Technology Concerned With Efficiency

On the other hand, the idea of engineering appears to be a parallel to technology.

Whereas technology, an initially general concept, has been increasingly limited to

Engineering Education (ASEE) included 13 engineering branches in its educational

Despite the seeming diversification and expansion of engineering—from civil

Earned Bachelor’s Degrees in US Population

My dissertation makes an attempt to show that the underrepresentation of certain

 Problem-solving: an engineer is “someone who is a creative, ingenious person who

 Having a firm background in mathematics and scientific laws and principles.

In this regard, whereas the dominant representation of technology as “new,” “latest,”

Research Background and Intellectual Context

A Reflection on My Engineering Education Experiences in College

However, my concern about the practicality and implications of molecular

As it turned out, my concern over molecular communications was translated into an

communications had to be unrealistically simplified and set up in order to make reliable

My career transition from communications engineering into science and technology

Engineering Education Research and Engineering Studies

 Inborn (as opposed to acquired) ability: talent, gifts, endowments, genius,

these individual elements nevertheless coproduce the structure of dominant

Equally significantly, I attempt to demonstrate that systems of dominant engineering

The tendency of engineering education research to apply the state-of-the-art techniques

History and Philosophy of Engineering

1. From a Material History to the History of Ideas

contribution of “engineers.” This is common for engineer-historians44 and engineering

Unbeknownst to me until I plowed through much of this dissertation, the line of my

My research complements Schatzberg’s work by addressing his observation that

2. Bringing Military Engineering to the History of Technology

As will be demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, my findings of the dominance of military

Moreover, when Lewis Mumford introduced his concept of “monotechnics,” a stand-in

was broadly life-centered, not work-centered or power-centered.”62 Similarly, Albert

As we will see in the passages about Archimedes’s unusual achievements in military

3. Engineering and Technology Relationships

novel goals.75 Joseph Pitt, in a pragmatic, community-based approach to knowledge,

a theme to deconstruct, as in the striking difference between Samuel Florman’s The

All these attest to the widespread phenomenon that engineering is a powerful

My dissertation title, which suggests “engineering as technology of technology,” is no

Coincidentally, a position, such as mine, that engineering is a part or subset of

Goldman’s conceptual frameworks and insights allow us to identify that engineering, in

captive to social determinants of technological action that selectively exploit

Lastly, Ashley Shew, echoing Johnson’s appreciation of technological knowledge that

4. The Differentiation of Technology and Our Existential Matters at Stake

Engineering, on this account, is a “technology of technology” in the fullest sense this