History and Aesthetics of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge

Michael Barelli1; Joshua White2; and David P. Billington, Hon.M.ASCE3

Abstract: This paper is a study of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge. Othmar Ammann’s bridge, completed in 1939, has strong similarities
to the ill-fated Tacoma Narrows, sharing many structural characteristics. While the New York bridge has served well for two-thirds of a
century, the deck has oscillated noticeably for most of its lifetime; in attempts to calm these motions, the Whitestone has undergone an
unusual number of retrofits—in 1940, 1946, 1988, and a new retrofit begun in 2003. From a historical perspective, these retrofits have kept
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pace with the development of suspension bridge technology, each representing the state of the art at the time they were implemented. We
can therefore view the Whitestone as a valuable physical record of developments in the profession’s understanding of structural vibrations
and aerodynamics. The goal of this paper is to place these retrofits in context, as well as to evaluate them on technical and aesthetic levels.
DOI: 10.1061/共ASCE兲1084-0702共2006兲11:2共230兲
CE Database subject headings: Bridges; suspension; Aerodynamics; Vibration; Bridge maintenance; Retrofitting; New York.

Introduction of Westchester and Long Island were booming. At the bridge’s

Several recent Scandinavian bridges have experienced noticeable
oscillations in the wind, and have been retrofitted to improve their
aerodynamic performance 关Krokeborg 共2001兲; see pp. 99–105兴.
In light of this recent experience, the writers felt a study of the
1939 Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, and its four retrofits, would be
timely and useful to the profession. A continual challenge is posed
to engineers to learn from the observation of built structures. The
Bronx-Whitestone, having served well for 65 years, represents
long experience in improving the vibration performance of
suspension bridges, a challenge that will remain for all future
long-span bridges. Furthermore, this study is useful as an inquiry
into the long-term maintenance of the built environment and our
aging infrastructure, a second challenge for the future of the
engineering profession.
The 2,300-foot Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, a model of
elegance, was the first bridge that Othmar Ammann designed
de novo since his innovative and spectacular George Washington
Bridge. Built in preparation for the New York World’s Fair of
1939 and the opening of the North Beach 共LaGuardia兲 Airport,
the bridge’s lines evoke the forward-looking optimism of both
events. Unlike the George Washington, which New Yorkers
had to share with New Jersey, this bridge was theirs alone.
It seemed to be a structure created for their pleasure, built at a
time when automobile ridership and excursions to the parklands
1
Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Princeton Univ.,
Princeton, NJ 08544.
2
Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Princeton Univ.,
Princeton, NJ 08544.
3 This paper attempts to show that the retrofits of the Bronx-
Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Princeton
Univ., Princeton, NJ 08544. E-mail: billington@princeton.edu
Note. Discussion open until August 1, 2006. Separate discussions
must be submitted for individual papers. To extend the closing date by
one month, a written request must be filed with the ASCE Managing
Editor. The manuscript for this paper was submitted for review and pos-
sible publication on August 2, 2004; approved on December 23, 2004.
This paper is part of the Journal of Bridge Engineering, Vol. 11, No. 2,
March 1, 2006. ©ASCE, ISSN 1084-0702/2006/2-230–240/$25.00.
opening ceremony in April of 1939, Robert Moses described it as
“architecturally the finest suspension bridge of them all, without
comparison in cleanliness and simplicity of design, in lightness
and absence of pretentious ornamentation” 共Moses 1939兲. What
Moses meant, of course, was visually, not architecturally, since
the design was that of an engineer 共Fig. 1兲. The opinion of the
engineering community was embodied in the words of Othmar
Ammann: “The new structure breaks no records for length of
span but it embodies a number of departures in design that
emphasize, more strongly perhaps than mere increase in size, the
rapid progress that is taking place in the bridge-builder’s art”
关Ammann 共1939b兲; see p. 217兴.
Unfortunately, the gossamer deck that worked so wonderfully
in the heavy span of the George Washington was less than
adequate in the Whitestone. Although Ammann applied all the
engineering knowledge of his day, his designs, like other bridges
of the 1930s, neglected aerodynamic effects. Within months, the
dramatic collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge would cast a
spotlight on the Bronx-Whitestone’s deficiencies and call into
question such “rapid progress…in the bridge-builders art.”
Ammann’s design is fascinating both for what he considered
and what he did not. His application of the deflection theory,
his innovative use of a plate girder stiffening system, and his
appreciation of the “English type of suspension bridge” repre-
sented the state of the art in the interwar years. After the collapse
of the Tacoma Narrows in late 1940, however, the bridge
engineering profession entered a period of damage control and
conservatism similar to that seen in John Roebling’s time, after
the wind-induced failures of the very “English type” bridges that
Ammann so lauded.
Whitestone Bridge reflect the evolution of the bridge engineering
profession in response to Tacoma. According to Blair Birdsall, a
major figure in suspension bridge design, “two schools of
thought” emerged during this era. One solution, a “brute-force”
approach, was to increase the stiffness of the deck, returning to
previous designs that had proven resistant to the dynamic and
unpredictable forces of the wind. The other solution, based on

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J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.


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Fig. 1. Bronx-Whitestone original configuration 共1939兲 共courtesy
of the New York Transit Museum兲
aerodynamics, was to create a bridge cross section with a shape
less conducive to the phenomena that might lead to catastrophe
关Birdsall 共1983兲; see p. 66兴. This paper will illustrate that both
schools of thought are represented in the evolution of the Bronx-
Whitestone Bridge, making each retrofit a subject for evaluation
on both structural and aesthetic levels. In essence, the Bronx-
Whitestone Bridge is a physical record of the development of
suspension bridge engineering since 1930.
Each rehabilitation project is framed by related theories of
dynamic wind action. The success of each is evaluated in terms
of performance as well as aesthetics. Every retrofit of the Bronx-
Whitestone Bridge has marred its original grace in some way,
while still being only partially successful at calming aerodynamic
motions. The current project undertaken by the Metropolitan
Transit Agency 共MTA兲 Bridges and Tunnels Department aims
to restore the span to its original splendor, to account for dynamic
wind action, and to reduce the adverse effects of past rehabilita-
tions on the bridge superstructure. This project is a welcome
development that, unlike every rehabilitation project before
it, displays aesthetic sensitivity. It also represents the fusion
of Ammann’s theories of stiffness and torsional rigidity—
the most refined manifestations of Blair Birdsall’s “first school
of thought”—with 50 years of experience in the design of aero-
dynamic deck sections—Birdsall’s “second school.”
JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006 / 231
J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.
Birth of the Form
As Triborough Bridge Authority 共TBA兲 Chairman, Robert Moses
commissioned roads and bridges that would provide access to the
parks that he had developed on Long Island. In the face of stiff
congestion on the Triborough Bridge, the enticing possibility of
developing Flushing Meadow’s 1,346 acres, and the upcoming
1939–1940 World’s Fair, he anticipated the need for another high-
way crossing of the East River. In 1937, the TBA began issuing
bonds to pay for construction of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge,
and Othmar Ammann, as its chief engineer, began design.
He was given a simple mission: to connect two shores of
equal, low-lying elevation with a structure that was graceful,
functional, and economical. The bridge that Ammann created was
the fourth longest suspension span in the world at the time, its
river span of 2,300 feet being exceeded only by the 3500-foot
George Washington, the 4,200-foot span of the Golden Gate
Bridge, and the 2,310-foot spans of the San Francisco–Oakland
Bay Bridge 共Freeman 1939兲. In terms of technical refinement and
grace of form, however, Ammann’s Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
was unmatched.
The entire profile of Ammann’s bridge, including anchorages
and approach spans, was in clear view “so that the structure as a
whole 关would兴 be visible to an extent that is true in no other case”
关Embury 共1938兲; see p. 265兴. This visibility prompted special
concern for the aesthetic impact of the bridge. The result was
held up as the greatest example of structural art in long-span
bridges for students at Ammann’s alma mater, the ETH in Zurich,
in the late 1940s 关Billington 共2003兲; see p. 101兴. Many of the
structural innovations—the use of a single plate girder as a stiff-
ening system and the rigid-frame towers devoid of diagonal
bracing—contributed to its pleasing aesthetics. Such a modern
bridge was the result of Ammann’s years of experience in bridge
construction and design. It comes as little surprise that the
design specifications for the Bronx-Whitestone would be, “with
few modifications, 关those兴 used for the George Washington
Bridge” 关Ammann 共1939b兲; see p. 218兴. After doubling the
world’s longest suspended span in 1931, Ammann continued to
push long-span bridge design to new lightness and structural
simplicity.
In short, the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge was a forward-looking
structure unencumbered by constraints of the past. Economic and
aesthetic considerations drove the design, a philosophy that
Ammann had advanced in the George Washington Bridge.
Its beauty grew out of its efficiency, for as Ammann stated in
1939, deck “flexibility offers material economic advantages,
besides aiding the designer to produce more graceful structures”
关Ammann 共1939a兲; see p. 625兴. In his Civil Engineering report on
the “Planning and Design of 关the兴 Bronx-Whitestone Bridge,” he
stressed the “graceful appearance and structural simplicity” of his
design. He attributed this economy, beauty, and simplicity to the
Bronx-Whitestone’s evolution of the tradition that he began with
the George Washington:
It is now well established that long-span suspension bridges
for modern highway traffic may have a relatively flexible stiffen-
ing system, and that the degree of flexibility has a material
effect upon the economy of the design. In this respect the Bronx-
Whitestone marks another radical departure from past theories
and practice. Its stiffening girders have greater flexibility in
relation to span length than any other suspension bridge built in
recent years, except the George Washington in its present state
with only a single unstiffened highway deck. The latter bridge,
however, with a present roadway capacity equal to that of the
 Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, has a suspended dead weight per linear Table 1. Dimensions of Long-Span Suspension Bridges Built from
foot 2.5 times greater, a center span 56 percent longer, and side 1900 to 1940
spans somewhat shorter, all of which factors contribute to the Main span Span/width Span/depth
greater rigidity of the unstiffened cables. Bridge Year 共ft兲 ratio ratio
It was the aim of the writer, on esthetic as well as structural Williamsburg 1903 1600 24 40
and economical grounds, to restrict the floor structure to a mini- Manhattan 1909 1470 15 61
mum, to avoid trusses, and to keep the top at such an elevation Bear Mountain 1924 1632 27 54
above the floor as not to obstruct the view of the landscape from Delaware 1926 1750 20 63
passing vehicles. A depth of 11 feet for the stiffening girders was Ambassador 1929 1850 28 84
found to be sufficient and to fit best into the floor structure. This St. Johns 1930 1207 23 67
is only 1/210 of the length of the center span and 1/70 of the side George Washington 1931 3500 33 —a
span 关Ammann 共1939b兲; see p. 218兲兴.
Transbay 1936 2310 35 77
In this paper, Ammann advanced two important tenets of long-
Triborough 1936 1380 14 68
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span suspension bridge design, much as he had done at George

Washington. The first was the extreme flexibility of the deck, and
the second was the consideration of experiencing the bridge, both
from a distance and from a vehicle moving along the span.
Ammann and engineers like David Steinman and Leon
Moisseiff designed their suspension bridges according to the pre-
cedent set by the George Washington Bridge and its minimization
of deck stiffening, justified by the deflection theory 共Billington
1977兲. They considered the use of stiffening trusses a relic of
a misguided era, even though these trusses had prevented the
harmonic oscillations and excessive deflections that had brought
down many early suspension spans. John Roebling, in response
to a series of suspension bridge failures in the early 19th cen-
tury, had revolutionized bridge design by advocating their use
关Steinman 共1945兲; see p. 503兴. The truss along with cable stays on
his 1855 Niagara span ensured strength, rigidity, and stability not
only against the useful loads to be carried, but also against the
destructive forces of wind and storm.
The deflection theory revealed that some of the prior spans had
been proportioned with needlessly excessive depth and section.
The previously trusted elastic theory, unlike the deflection theory,
did not account for the dead load cable stiffness. To Roebling and
other adherents of the earlier theories, the stiffening truss solved
the problem of stiffness 共Buonopane and Billington 1993兲. Am-
mann, on the other hand, believed that the stiffening truss was
unnecessary when cable stiffness was accounted for in the design.
This appealing nonlinear theory led to the conclusion that a more
flexible deck would result in smaller moments and thus smaller
stresses. The cable could therefore assume the funicular shape to
carry the traffic pattern, and the deck itself could, in theory, be
built without geometric stiffness. In the words of Leon Moisseiff,
the elastic theory was “grossly in error” and “atavistic” 关Moisseiff
共1935兲; see pp. 1205–1209兴. Engineers recognized that in long-
span suspension bridges, a stiffening truss required by the elastic
theory would limit span lengths, illustrated by the Bear Mountain
and Williamsburg Bridges, in which their stiffening systems
appear more as rival structures than as ancillary ones.
So emboldened by the new theory, Ammann also advanced the
theory that the truss served only to “prevent excessive gradients
of the floor due to deflection of the cable,” not to resist the dy-
namic influence of the wind 共Rothman 1984兲. Such a philosophy
is evident in his design of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge. When
completed in 1939, its vertical flexibility was such that the 11-ft
deep stiffening girders exerted “but little restraint upon the
deformation of the unstiffened cables” 关“Bronx-Whitestone”
共1939兲, see p. 488兴. Ammann was justified in believing that the
stiffening truss was a dinosaur, and that highway bridges did
not require the same level of stiffening as the railroad spans of
Golden Gate 1937 4200 47 168
Lions Gate 1938 1550 39 104
Thousand Islands 1938 800 27 133
Bronx-Whitestone 1939 2300 31 210
Deer Isle 1939 1080 46 166
Tacoma Narrows 1940 2800 72 350
a
Note that the George Washington, as built in 1931, had no stiffening
girder.
Roebling’s era. He was correct, and his experience at George
Washington assured him that he was correct, for automobiles
could negotiate larger grades than rail cars. Nevertheless, his
decision to reject Roebling’s experience, along with the stiffening
truss, had ramifications greater than local deformations of the
carriageway.
During the interwar years, engineers accounted for horizontal
deck stiffness by treating wind forces as horizontal static forces to
be carried by a horizontal wind truss. This static approach left
them free to reduce vertical deck stiffness, as seen in Table 1,
which shows the early 20th century trend toward shallow decks.
In contrast, Roebling had “hoped to avoid with deep stiffening
trusses, massive towers, and inclined cable stays,” the mysterious
dynamic phenomena that he had witnessed 共Rothman 1984兲.
Ammann had designed the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge with
the world’s first plate-girder stiffening system, encouraged not
only by the placidly massive George Washington Bridge, but also
by the theory of elastic distribution, advanced by Moisseiff and
Lienhard 共1933兲 in a paper entitled “Suspension bridges under the
action of lateral forces.” Those writers demonstrated that the stiff-
ness in the main cables, transmitted by the hangers, would absorb
up to one-half of the static wind pressure pushing a suspended
structure laterally. Like the deflection theory, which accounted for
a vertical equilibrium position resulting from the dead load of the
suspended structure and the stiffness of the cables resisting that
force, their theory of elastic distribution determined a horizontal
equilibrium displacement resulting from the static wind force
pushing it laterally and the stiffness of the cables resisting that
force. And just as the deflection theory had justified a decrease
in vertical stiffness—manifested in the shift from the deep truss
to the plate girder—Moisseiff and Lienhard justified lower lateral
stiffness as shown in the lighter horizontal wind trusses and
narrower decks of the era. The lateral bracing at the Bronx-
Whitestone is particularly skimpy because of its shallow deck
section, which lowered the static wind design pressure that it had
to resist. Bolstered by the deflection theory and the theory of
elastic distribution, Ammann’s design for the Bronx-Whitestone
considered only rigidity under moving traffic and static wind
forces.

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J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.

 Table 2. British and American Bridges Damaged or Destroyed in Wind
Bridge Location
Dryburgh Abbey Scotland
Union England
Brighton Chain Pier England
Montrose Scotland
Menai Straits Wales
Wheeling United States
Niagara-Lewiston United States
Niagara-Clifton United States
Tacoma-Narrows United States
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The engineering profession changed its viewpoint after the
failure of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge on November 7, 1940.
That bridge had a 2,800-foot main span, only 8-foot-deep plate
girder stiffening, and a 39-foot wide roadway. Its low width-to-
span and depth-to-span ratios were unprecedented and made this
the most flexible long-span steel bridge in history. As Professor
Farquharson later observed in his report on the collapse,
“the success of most modern structures in withstanding wind
loads quite naturally directed attention away from any warn-
ings which might have been derived from experience in the
growing field of aerodynamics” 关Farquharson 共1949兲; see p. 13兴.
The five modern bridges that have exhibited wind-induced
oscillations were designed in the 1930s following the lead
of the George Washington Bridge—Fykesund in Norway, Golden
Gate, Thousand Islands, Deer Isle, and Bronx-Whitestone.
Farquharson’s report emphasized this neglect of history by
including data on the early British bridges and others that had
experienced failures similar to Tacoma 共Table 2兲.
In 1953, Ammann reflected on his design of the Bronx-
Whitestone, saying that he was encouraged by the flexible George
Washington and unconscious of the danger of dynamic wind
action. His confidence led him to design “suspension bridges
with progressively lower degrees of girder stiffening coupled
with progressively smaller weight of the suspended structure”
关Ammann 共1953兲; see p. 231兴. He spoke from experience when he
said that “the combination of deficiency in these two most potent
factors which produce rigidity proved to have its limitations.”
Only the greatest designers have the courage to describe their
own oversights.
In the years that followed November 7, 1940, the owners
of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, first the Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority and later the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, have undertaken four significant structural modifica-
tions. The first was the addition of stays and brakes in 1940, the
second was the addition of a 14-foot-deep Warren truss to the
existing plate girder stiffening in 1946, the third was the addition
of a tuned mass damper in 1988, and the fourth is the primary
focus of this paper—the current removal of the truss, the addition
of a streamlined fairing, and the alteration of the span’s lateral
bracing.
First School
The Bronx-Whitestone’s troubles began before construction
was even complete. As the installation of the floor grid was pro-
ceeding, engineers began to notice sizable vertical oscillations.
Ammann’s prescription for the problem included buffer blocks
JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006 / 233
J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.
Span Failure
Designer 共ft兲 date
John and William Smith 260 1818
Sir Samuel Brown 449 1821
Sir William Brown 225 1836
Sir William Brown 432 1838
Thomas Telford 580 1839
Charles Ellet 1010 1854
Edward Serrell 1041 1864
Samuel Keefer 1260 1889
Leon Moisseiff 2800 1940
between the deck and tower, and temporary guy wires from the
cables to the girder at midspan. He expected that the increased
dead weight due to the pouring of the roadway concrete would
dampen the movements, but this proved to be of little assistance.
The bridge opened in April 1939 with the temporary devices still
in place.
Early in 1940, engineers commenced measurements of the
bridge’s movements in order to inform the design of a permanent
stabilizing system. Instrumented observations confirmed motorist
and pedestrian accounts, showing maximum vertical oscillations
of 14 in. up and down or 9 in. in one direction, with a period of
5–6 s. No tilt, twist, or lateral movement was observed 关Stays and
Brakes 共1940兲; see p. 55兲兴.
Ammann’s permanent solution, based on simulations con-
ducted at Princeton University by Professor E. K. Timby, was
installed in the summer of 1940 共prior to November’s events at
Tacoma兲. The first elements of the oscillation control system were
adjustable friction brakes at the towers capable of providing a
bearing pressure up to 450,000 lb. The second components of the
system were diagonal stays between the towers and stiffening
girders. Cables leading to the tower bases would obviously
have had more effect in holding down the roadway, but Corps
of Engineers regulations prevented narrowing the horizontal
clearance of the navigational channel.
At the time, the problem of oscillations was proclaimed
solved, and the autumn passed without complaint. In November
of 1940, however, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows threw the
Bronx-Whitestone’s oscillations back into question. In December,
Ammann reported,
We have had to deal with very small movements, and would
have felt no concern about them had they not tended to produce
discomfort in some persons under unfavorable conditions. No
question of safety of the bridge is involved. Its width, weight, and
the shortness of its side spans assure it of adequate rigidity for
all conditions. To remove all possibility of discomfort or feeling
of insecurity on the part of passengers, however, we believed
that the restraining and damping devices should be provided to
limit the natural elastic movement to an amount that would be
imperceptible 关Stays and Brakes 共1940兲; see p. 56兴.
Ammann was attempting to convince the public that the
small-scale oscillations should not be interpreted as omens of
catastrophe.
In application, the cable stays and brakes proved “partially, but
not entirely, effective.” Ammann reported that they made the
Whitestone Bridge “much less sensitive” to wind excitation, for
noticeable or objectionable oscillations had only occurred under
higher wind velocities and at less frequent intervals. Nevertheless,
a double-amplitude greater than 10 in. was recorded on average

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Fig. 2. Bronx-Whitestone, with cable stays 共1940兲 and truss 共1946兲
共photograph by J. Wayman Williams, Princeton Ammann Archive,
with permission兲
six times a year. Also, on four occasions between 1940 and 1946,
the double amplitudes exceeded 20 in., once reaching 30 in.
共Ammann 1946兲. Even though contemporaneous commentators
claimed “satisfactory stabilization” and “imperceptible oscilla-
tions,” in the long term the bridge continued to undulate.
It did not take long for the motoring populace of New York
to become frustrated with movements. After the Tacoma
Narrows failure, these oscillations began to scare them. In his
autobiography, Robert Moses recalled that shortly after the
Tacoma Narrows catastrophe, a lady in a small car driving
towards Queens saw a lamppost on the bridge moving up
and down. Remembering Tacoma, she became frightened. She
jammed on the brakes, jumped out, and began running the
remaining distance to Whitestone. Other motorists, seeing the
woman running for her life, leaped out and followed. The chair-
man called Ammann soon after this panic, pressing him to rectify
the situation. Ammann kept reassuring Moses, in his “Swiss
brogue,” that “the britch is safe, the britch is safe.” Moses kept
replying that “it doesn’t make a damn bit of difference if drivers
won’t use it!” 关Moses 共1970兲; see p. 194兴.
In Ammann’s eyes, the bridge movements created negotiable
gradients for automobile suspensions, and they were not life
threatening to the structure. In Moses’ view, however, these
motions were psychologically distracting and potentially
damaging to the bridge’s toll collections. In the end, Moses
prevailed over Ammann’s objections and planning for the addi-
tional stiffening of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge began in 1941.
E. L. Pavlo, the chief engineer of the firm charged with the prepa-
ration of the stiffening truss plans and specifications, agreed with
Ammann that the stiffening satisfied “a psychological need,” even
though he recognized that the floor stays installed in 1939–1940
were not reducing the magnitude of “objectionable movement”
关Pavlo 共1947兲; see pp. 98–101兴.
Despite the initial opposition from Ammann, a proposal was
hammered out. The first plan called for 25-ft-deep trusses on the
inside of the existing stiffening girders, in the sidewalk space,
and to have them work in tandem with the girders. Ammann and
the other consulting engineers rejected this idea for two reasons:
234 / JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006
J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.
it would have been difficult to erect and it involved a complex
stress relationship with the existing stiffening girders. The second
proposal, which was eventually adopted, was for a composite
girder-truss design in which the existing stiffening girder would
act as the bottom chord of a new 14-ft-deep truss 共Fig. 2兲. War-
time shortages, however, delayed the work until 1946. This
scheme increased the maximum moment of inertia per girder or
truss more than sevenfold from the original 2,650 to 19,850
in.2 · ft2 共Ammann had the habit of using the units in.2 · ft2 instead
of the more standard ft4兲. This increased rigidity came at the
expense of increased dead weight, which grew 14.5% from
10,940 to 12,600 lb/ft of bridge 关Ammann 共1946兲; see p. 103兴.
Another part of the 1946 work involved the removal of the side-
walks and the widening of the roadway to a full six-lane capacity.
According to Moses, this made it appear to travelers that the
trusses were merely part of a widening operation 关Moses 共1970兲;
see p. 195兴. In the end, Ammann was satisfied with the new form
that his bridge had taken: “While the truss members will undoubt-
edly detract somewhat from the extreme simplicity of the original
design, with its plain shallow girders, they will not be sufficiently
conspicuous to mar the graceful appearance” 关Ammann 共1946兲;
see p. 103兴.
Stiffness Index
In 1941, Ammann published a report with Glenn Woodruff and
Theodore von Kármán on the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows.
Ammann’s role was primarily to investigate the structural aspects
of the Tacoma design. He nevertheless kept a critical eye on
the wind tunnel tests being performed. The investigation was
Ammann’s first introduction to the field of aerodynamics and its
implications for future bridge designs. The 1941 report contains
a full series of wind tunnel tests, as well as a complete mathemati-
cal analysis of the vibration of suspension bridges. Interspersed
with the mathematical and scientific complexity, however,
Ammann felt it was pertinent to compare the simple static deflec-
tions of various bridges. Traditionally, the necessary stiffness of
suspension bridges was based on the ratio of live-load deflection
to span length. The design live-load for the Tacoma Narrows
design was only 1,500 lb/ft, compared with 3,000 for the Bronx-
Whitestone and 4,000 for the Golden Gate 关Ammann et al.
共1941兲; see p. 77兴. The slenderness of the Tacoma Narrows design
resulted from its smaller design load.
Ammann began to realize, however, that even if the bridge
did not have to deal with tremendous traffic loads, a minimal
absolute stiffness was required in order to deal with wind-induced
oscillations. The Tacoma Narrows collapse had shown that the
traditional measure of bridge stiffness was inadequate. “It has
been a general practice to use the ratio of live load deflections to
span length as a criterion and limitation of ordinary bridge
types…. This criterion evidently does not apply to the rigidity of
long-span suspension bridges under wind action” 关Ammann et al.
共1941兲; see p. 75兴. Thus bridge designers needed a new set of
criteria.
As a designer, Ammann knew that great designs do not stem
from overly complex analyses. He wanted a simple way to predict
a bridge’s dynamic behavior, and one that could be used as a
guide to safe design. Ammann found himself in much the same
position as Roebling a century earlier, seeking to move the
profession forward in the face of failure. To do so, Ammann
seized on the importance of adequate stiffness, an idea firmly
grounded in Birdsall’s “first school.” By 1943, he summed up his
 Table 3. Bridges Ordered by Stiffness Index
L f q ·I Cable Girder Side span
Bridge 共ft兲 Ls / L 共ft兲 共lb/ ft兲 共in2 · ft2兲 term term correction S
Wheeling 1,010 — 72 910 — 104 — 1.00 104
Union 449 — 30 400 — 109 — 1.00 109
Brighton 243 — 16 250 — 128 — 1.00 128
Niagara-Clifton 1,258 — 91 460 2,000 41 112 1.00 153
Tacoma I 共1940兲 2,800 0.39 232 5,700 2,600 201 6 0.76 159
Deer Isle 1,080 0.45 108 2,400 840 182 86 0.73 196
Menai Straits 580 0.48 43 2,280 — 435 — 0.71 310
Golden Gate 4,200 0.27 475 21,600 88,000 373 40 0.84 346
Thousand Islands 800 0.44 80 3,200 500 328 171 0.74 367
Bronx-Whitestone 共1939兲
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2,300 0.32 200 10,940 5,300 449 27 0.81 384

Tacoma II 共1951兲 2,800 0.39 280 8,678 95,700 254 218 1.00a 472
Bronx-Whitestone 共1946兲 2,300 0.32 200 12,600 39,700 517 199 0.81 578
George Washington 共1931兲 3,500 0.19 316 26,035 168 676 0.2 0.89 600
Verrazano 4,260 0.29 390 36,650 80,000 771 77 0.83 702
George Washington 共1962兲 3,500 0.19 326 40,000 66,000 1006 62 0.89 949
Transbay 2,310 0.50 231 18,800 56,000 667 767 0.70 1004
Bear Mountain 1,632 — 200 11,500 30,000 472 2,566 1.00 3037
Williamsburg 1,600 — 178 16,800 310,000 774 6,622 1.00 7396
a
The second Tacoma Narrows was built with unusual deck-to-tower brackets, making the use of the side span correction factor seem inappropriate to the
writers.

new understanding of dynamic bridge behavior with the develop- the performance history of previous designs. He doubled the
ment of a “stiffness index,” essentially a simple measure to coefficient in front of the truss term in order to better account for
determine which bridges needed additional stiffening 共Ammann, damping, and also added a correction term to account for the side
unpublished manuscript, February 1943, Princeton University span’s length Ls
Ammann Archive兲. The stiffness index was by no means an exact
tool, but nevertheless it proved that stiffness was “unmistakably”
a “major factor influencing 关bridge兴 behavior” 关Ammann 共1953兲,
see p. 132兴.
S= 冉 8.2q
f
+
0.14I
共10−3 · L兲4
冊冉 1 − 0.6
Ls
L
冊 共3兲

In deriving the index, Ammann began by considering the
simplest model of a suspension bridge, a beam supported by a
parabolic cable. He then calculated the half-span uniform load
which causes a one-foot deflection at the quarterpoint of the main
span. He chose this unusual loading condition because it simu-
lates the deflected shape of a bridge in its first assymetric mode
共a complete derivation is presented in the Appendix兲. Professor
Wilhem Ritter, Ammann’s professor at the ETH, had attempted
a similar sort of analysis in his articles on suspension bridges
共Ritter 1883兲. In concrete bridges, Robert Maillart had used a
half-span loading analysis in his study of the deck-stiffened arch,
assuming that the arch would be thin enough that it would take
essentially no bending 关Billington 共1997兲; see pp. 97–129兴.
Ammann arrived at a formula which breaks the bridge stiff-
ness into two terms, one representing the cable component and
one the stiffening girder component
8.2q 2457.6EI
S= + 共1兲
f L4
Using E = 28· 106 psi
8.2q 0.07I
S= + 共2兲
f 共10−3 · L兲4
where q⫽weight of the suspended structure 共lb/ft兲; f⫽cable sag
共ft兲; I⫽moment of inertia of the stiffening girders in 共in.2 · ft2兲;
and L⫽span length 共ft兲.
Although he derived his equation analytically, Ammann then
treated the formula empirically and modified it to better fit with
The stiffness index represents, according to Herbert Rothman,
one of Ammann’s partners at Ammann and Whitney, Ammann’s
attempt to “distinguish those bridges that ‘behaved’ well from
those that did not” 关Rothman 共1984兲; see p. 127兴. An index above
370 was desirable, and one above 600 was optimal. As a direct
result of his investigations, Ammann added stiffening trusses
to the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, raising its stiffness index from
384 to 578. He continued to use the stiffness index throughout his
career, applying it on all his later bridges.
The stiffness index is characteristic of Ammann’s Swiss
education, for its genius lies in its simplicity as well as in its firm
empirical foundation. The index is intended to be proportional
to a bridge’s antisymmetric stiffness, since Ammann knew that
antisymmetric vibration was the most easily excited mode. It
makes sense that Ammann would rely on such a formula when the
study of bridge dynamics was a new field. It is a testament to the
importance that Ammann placed on his stiffness index, however,
that he continued to use it even in his late career, at a time when
the dynamics field was reaching maturity.
Ammann’s investigations into the stiffness index were an
attempt at establishing guidelines for long-span suspension bridge
design. The George Washington Bridge had a main span more
than twice that of any bridge built in the 19th century. It was
entirely unstiffened, yet remained stable in even the highest winds
due to its large dead weight. Applying the stiffness index to
the dimensions of the George Washington, these facts become
apparent 共Table 3兲. The extremely low truss stiffness term of 0.2
is supplemented by a very large cable stiffness term of 676,
resulting in a satisfactorily high index value.

JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006 / 235

J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.

 In 1953, Ammann wrote that the Tacoma Narrows “repre-
sented a great projection of the experience gained in the 19th
century.” He expressed regret at the dearth of “experience
on intermediate structures,” lamenting the lack of a method
to “project or extrapolate the behavior of the earlier” bridges.
“Experience,” Ammann believed, was “the most important and
reliable source of information presently available to the profes-
sion for the purpose of deriving safe design criteria” 关Ammann
共1953兲; see p. 236兴. The stiffness index that Ammann introduced
was necessary to the engineering community, for it would provide
such an experience-based method.
D. B. Steinman, in his 1943 paper “Rigidity and aerodynamic
stability of suspension bridges,” presented his own method of
calculating the “spring constant” K of a suspension bridge, using
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a conservation of energy method 关Steinman 共1943兲; see p. 1361兲.
For a bridge vibrating in a mode of n equal segments he presented
the formula
␲2 4␲
4
K = n2 H q + n EI 共4兲
L2 L4
If we look at the first asymmetric mode,
n=2
qL2
Hq =
8f
共5兲
K=
␲2 q
2 f
冉冊 EI
+ 16␲4 4
L
冉 冊
Steinman’s formula takes the same form as Ammann’s Eq. 共1兲,
except with different coefficients
S = 8.2 冉冊
q
f
EI
+ 2,457.6 4
L
冉 冊
The important parameter, however, is the ratio of these coeffi-
cients, or the relative importance of the cable-to-girder terms.
In Steinman’s case, this ratio is 316. In Ammann’s case, this ratio
is 300—nearly the same. Steinman and Ammann were highly
competitive with each other and rarely agreed. It is fascinating,
then, that two giants of bridge engineering would both develop
comparable stiffness indices. Both would also go on to examine
torsional stiffnesses. Each of them recognized that the profession
was in dire need of such simple tools that emphasized the criteria
for structurally stable bridges.
In application, Ammann’s index has been accurate. Table 3
shows the application of the index to several suspension bridges,
which for the most part is a good indicator of the performance of
the spans. The index is not perfect, of course; the value for the
second Tacoma Narrows is a little low, given its satisfactory
performance. The replacement bridge is equipped with a variety
of devices to ensure its stability, including tower-to-deck brackets,
a vented deck, and especially high damping. Ammann’s index
cannot account for these factors, nor can it distinguish between
deck sections that are prone to aerodynamic problems like the
squat H sections of the first Tacoma Narrows or the Bronx-
Whitestone. Nevertheless, given its simplicity, the index is sur-
prisingly revealing about the behavior of different configurations.
Ammann, being deeply concerned with the economy and
scale of his suspension bridges, fostered the creation of graceful
and safe structures throughout his career. He did so at George
Washington and he did so with the stiffness index at Bronx-
Whitestone. And while the Tacoma Narrows failure may have
236 / JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006
J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.
Table 4. Energy Absorption for First Symmetrical Torsion Mode
Energy Total
Element Component 共%兲 共%兲
Cable Tension 43.2 74.3
Dead load 31.1
Truss Chords 10.2 10.7
Webs 0.5
Girder 4.5
Laterals 1.0
Stay ropes Center span 0.01 1.7
Side span 1.7
Tower 4.8
Roadway slab 2.8
Suspenders 0.2
Total 100
sent bridge engineers back to Roebling’s time, Ammann softened
the blow and advanced the profession by proving the importance
of experience. The stiffness index, manifested in the 1946 retrofit
of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, was his response to Tacoma, and
it came to represent the first school of American suspension
bridge design in the modern era.
Second School
Even after the addition of the truss in 1946, the Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge has defied efforts to suppress its aerodynamic motion. For
more than three decades, the bridge continued to excite nervous
motorists. In November of 1968, 22 years after the addition
of the truss, a storm with 70 mph winds caused the bridge to
sway vertically enough to cause a “bizarre panic” in which 30
frightened motorists abandoned their vehicles and fled the span.
It also continued to frustrate engineers, who had become less
satisfied with the previous retrofits as more accurate analyses of
the bridge’s behavior became possible. Wind tunnel tests in the
early 1980s indicated that, at Whitestone, symmetrical vertical
oscillations peaked at wind speeds around 40 mph. Symmetrical
torsional vibrations, on the other hand, did not seem to climax—
they increased with the wind 共Harmonizing 1984兲. This is typical
of a bridge made torsionally unstable by negative aerodynamic
damping, showing the need for further consideration of the
Whitestone’s motion 共Rothman 1995兲. Both modes of vibration
proved that long-term fatigue was a threat to the steel of the
Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, and the latter warned of catastrophic
antisymmetric torsional vibrations reminiscent of those seen at
Tacoma in 1940. Despite Ammann’s 5,300 observations of bridge
motion, during which not one appreciable torsional motion was
seen, engineers decided to err on the side of caution.
Thus there were two vibrations—vertical and torsional—
for which one solution was required. Herbert Rothman, chairman
of Weidlinger Associates, was put in charge of the rehabilitation.
Rothman had worked with Ammann since 1945, and was
Ammann & Whitney’s chief bridge engineer when he left in 1977
to join Weidlinger. Rothman decided against stiffening any
component of the bridge because the cable, as predicted by the
deflection theory, so greatly dominates the structural response
共Table 4; Rothman 1995兲. He rejected “beefing up” the center
connections between the deck and cables to counter antisym-
metric torsional oscillations because this remedy would not
reduce symmetrical torsional vibrations. Strengthening the lateral
 bracing was deemed inadequate and too costly, and streamlining
the deck with fairings was rejected as too expensive as well.
At the time, Rothman believed that the most practical solution to
the Bronx-Whitestone’s dual aerodynamic weaknesses was the
installation of a tuned mass damper 共TMD兲 at midspan.
Concern about the safety of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
did not end there, however. The annual inspection of the bridge
in 2000 indicated that the bridge had become dangerously heavy
for its current supporting cables. Like most suspensions bridges
in the United States, over time the wires of the Bronx-Whitestone
have suffered from corrosion and subsequent hydrogen embrittle-
ment. On top of this, since the installation of the Warren truss,
annual traffic on the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge has grown
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from 8.6 million to 40 million vehicles. Truck traffic within
the New York metropolitan area has grown, and the Whitestone
Expressway corridor in Queens has been aggressively
developed—shopping malls and the New York Times printing
facility occupy the site of the former Flushing Airport, LaGuardia
Airport’s flight limits have been raised, and the Long Island
Expressway, Van Wyck Expressway, and Grand Central Parkway
all converge nearby. Thus traffic volume as well as the design
dead load have increased, while the main cables and suspenders
have degraded in strength. It thus came as little surprise that
the 2000 inspection revealed a number of breaks in the wires
comprising the main cable and hangers.
In the summer of 2002, MTA Bridges and Tunnels began
a $286 million overhaul to remedy this situation and not only
bring the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge closer to its original design,
but also prolong its useful life. The primary goal is to relieve
the stress on these cables while reducing the bridge’s dynamic
response to the wind. The renovations hope to extend the service
life of the suspension cables by more than 20 years, time to
develop a plan for the eventual replacement of the suspenders.
The project has two phases, and is expected to be completed in
2008. First, representative of Birdsall’s “second school,” is the
replacement of the 1946 Warren truss with wedge-shaped fiber-
glass fairings on the outside of the stiffening girders. The second
phase lowers and replaces the chevron-braced wind truss with one
made up of x braces of varying sections.
Each phase of the $286 million project brings the Bronx-
Whitestone Bridge closer to its original grace and further away
from its original instability. The weight of the suspended structure
will decrease through the removal of the 1946 truss and the
replacement of the existing 4.5 in. concrete-filled grid deck and
1.25 in. asphalt wearing surface with an orthotropic deck. The
resulting weight savings are substantial, for the truss added 1,700
lb/ft to the dead weight of the bridge, and the extant roadway
weighs 72 lb/ft2 as opposed to the 36 lb/ft2 of the new decking.
Thus the total dead weight will drop from 12,000 to 10,264 lb/ft.
The renovations will leave the bridge lighter, and its stiffness
index lower, than it was on opening day in April of 1939. Othmar
Ammann often held the weight of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
up as a feature that protected it from the catastrophic oscillations
that doomed the lighter Tacoma Narrows. In the lighter bridge,
then, one must raise the question of aerodynamics. How will the
Bronx-Whitestone be protected from wind-induced motion?
The fiber-reinforced polymer composite fairing, which
stretches 3,700 ft from anchorage to anchorage, will reduce the
possibility of dangerous wind flow patterns 共Landers 2002兲.
Winds passing over a streamlined body such as a wing generally
hug its surface and reform in its wake. If the wind separates
from the surface, it may reattach before passing off the body in a
relatively smooth flow. This is not the case with bluff bodies
JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006 / 237
J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.
such as the plate girders of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge. Such
forms disrupt the normal pattern, and flow separation occurs
without reattachment. Two thin, unstable layers interact to create
vortices that are shed alternately in rows off the upper and lower
downwind sides of the bluff body. “If their shedding frequency
excites a structural frequency, the structure displaces rhythmically
and begins to control the vortex production” 关Scanlan and
Vellozzi 共1980兲; see p. 249兴. What occurs is the “lock-on” of the
shed vortex rhythm to the structural rhythm, which the latter
controls. However, the phenomenon is often broken up, with
the separate rhythms reappearing, as wind velocity changes and
the vortex and structural rhythms disengage. The vertical motions
that have been observed in the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge through-
out its existence have been attributed to this type of motion.
The TMD that was installed in 1988 did not eliminate vortex
shedding and lock-on, but it did reduce their effects through
inertial damping.
Flutter, a wind-induced oscillation that is more dangerous
than vortex shedding excitation, is a case in which the structural
motion is so influential that it alters the local flow over the body
to the point where the net wake vortex rhythm becomes and
remains that of the structural motion. In bridges, there are two
kinds of flutter, the classical type and the single-degree-of-
freedom torsional type. Classical flutter involves coupled bending
and torsion motions, and it is only seen in streamlined bridge
decks. It is rarely seen because it requires high wind velocities
that are not often encountered 共up to 125 mph兲. This is the pri-
mary reason why streamlined bridges have a desirable form, and
why the current rehabilitation has affixed a fairing to the plate
girder of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge.
On the other hand, unstreamlined bridge decks such as a squat
H section resembling the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge are subject to
single-degree-of-freedom torsional flutter. A particularly impor-
tant case of this is separated-flow torsional flutter which, like all
types of flutter, is self-excited. In other words, “once a structural
motion is set up by any cause, that motion causes wind pressures
of a destabilizing nature to build up and enhance that motion”
共Scanlan and Vellozzi 1980兲.
When a section like the Bronx-Whitestone’s is not moving it
may trip vortices above and below the deck. Flow separation
increases when even a small amount of torsional motion causes
the deck to rotate. In this case, the vortex closest to the deck
during flow separation creates a high suction tending to further
twist the deck. “At some critical velocity, the vortices travel
across the deck in a rhythm of destabilizing action” 共Scanlan and
Vellozzi 1980兲. If the response of the structure is in phase with the
frequency of the shed vortices, the deck reverses its direction of
rotation and the wind then acts on it in a manner that reinforces
the elastic response. Unlike vortex shedding excitation, in which
disengagement occurs when the wind velocity increases, flutter-
induced motion actually increases with increasing velocity. If
unchecked, flutter can be catastrophic, as shown by the collapse
of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge.
For the Tacoma Narrows the critical velocity to initiate flutter
was absurdly low—between 13 and 25 mph. Tests at the bound-
ary layer wind tunnel in London, Ontario have set the Bronx-
Whitestone’s flutter speed at 50 mph 关Scott 共2001兲; see p. 355兴.
Both bridges have such low flutter speeds that one wonders why
the Tacoma Narrows did not collapse sooner and why the Bronx-
Whitestone has not collapsed yet. The reasons are much the same
for both spans. First, flutter is checked at the Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge by the TMD as well as by cable ties from the main cable
to the deck at midspan, and was checked at Tacoma Narrows
 by the latter until their failure left the bridge susceptible to a
catastrophic mode. Second, the natural wind is turbulent and
incoherent across the entire span. Finally, the Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge is special because quartering winds are the strongest gusts
it encounters—rarely does a gale buffet the bridge at right angles.
Nevertheless, though it is uncommon for storms to blow perpen-
dicular to the Whitestone span, it is not out of the question. And
while the center cable ties remain intact, it is not impossible to
imagine their failure.
The Bronx-Whitestone is highly sensitive to a change of wind
direction. The bridge is sensitive to wind directions within small
angles near east or west whereas the prevailing wind direction at
the site is the south, which is a favorable one for this bridge
共Tanaka 1992兲. The Bronx-Whitestone Bridge is therefore advan-
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tageously sited. In their decision to install the fairing, engineers at
Weidlinger have shown a knowledge of these possibilities and
understanding of the aerodynamic phenomena at work on the
bridge. The stream-lined form of the fascia creates a leading edge
for the deck section that encourages the adherence of the wind
flow to the structural surface—a contrast with the bluff body,
flow-separating characteristics of the existing plate stiffening
girder. Fairings therefore inhibit the discharge of the leading edge
vortex by changing the angle of attack when the deck is stationary
or even slightly rotated. Furthermore, experience at the Little Belt
suspension bridge in Denmark has shown that by gradually
“streamlining” the rectangular box, i.e. by fitting of cantilevered
decks or wedge-shaped fairings successively, it is possible to
more than double the critical wind speed of the proposed box
section 关Ostenfeld and Larsen 共1992兲; see p. 6兴.
In summary, the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge’s deck section will
be transformed into a quasi-winged box similar to that of the
Severn River Bridge in Great Britain. One drawback seen in the
latter structure is the deflection and concentration of the wind
stream into the traffic paths, which renders the span inoperable in
high winds. After a wind storm in the mid-1990s that upended
tractor trailers on the Throgs Neck Bridge—situated only 2 mi
northeast of the Bronx-Whitestone–this phenomenon bears a
closer look that may expose some dangers of the fairing design.
This analysis has emphasized aerodynamics, but the impor-
tance of structure cannot be overlooked. “Since torsion is the
essential motion in flutter, any means of inhibiting it is valid, and
high structural stiffness 共high natural frequency兲 in torsion is such
an approach. In fact, bridges with intrinsic flutter tendencies aero-
dynamically but high torsional stiffness can still be safe” 共Scanlan
1979兲. The current rehabilitation of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
is designed both to decrease its “intrinsic flutter tendencies”
through the addition of the fairing and to increase its torsional
stiffness through the addition of a lower lateral system.
Thus the current retrofit of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
is representative of Birdsall’s “second school” because of its
concern with the form of the suspended structure as a means to
reduce aerodynamic excitation. In order to reduce the stress in the
bridge’s suspenders, a reduction in weight was necessary, but this
posed vibration problems that even the original span had not
faced. The solution was something about which Ammann could
only speculate in 1953 when he introduced his stiffness index.
He recognized the importance of “the structural form which
determines the dynamic wind forces acting on the structure,” but
advised against relying on anything but “adequate vertical
stiffness” for resistance to vibration 共Ammann 1953兲.
The rehabilitation is necessary and welcome from an esthetic
standpoint as well, for it shows the wisdom and beauty of
Ammann’s original design. The Bronx-Whitestone Bridge is not
238 / JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006
J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.
Fig. 3. Bronx-Whitestone, with fairing 共2003兲 共photograph by
J. Wayman Williams, Princeton Ammann Archive, with permission兲
Tacoma Narrows, and it will never meet such a fate. It began its
useful life as a generally stable structure subject to periodic
unsettling motions. In the 1940s its actions were calmed—
inefficiently—by an unintended truss. The current rehabilitation
does little to change Ammann’s original design; the profile of the
bridge, its weight, and its simplicity will remain intact. Ammann’s
1939 bridge was only deficient in one respect—aerodynamics.
The fairing is an acknowledgement of this fact, for it accentuates
the shallowness of the plate girder that Ammann intended to be
the bridge’s only stiffening member. And while the fairing
obscures the original plate girder it succeeds, as other streamlined
decks do, in showing the new structural system, which is in effect
an aerodynamic box section.
Much of the structural beauty that will be created by the
current retrofit may be attributed to Othmar Ammann’s original
design, for the truss removal and fairing addition is essentially an
attempt to return to that structure. An image of the new fairings
shows a bridge that appears correct and tightly designed 共Fig. 3兲.
It is the Bronx-Whitestone’s simple geometry and minimal orna-
mentation that allows the fairing to blend so well. It does not
seem to be an addition or an affectation, rather it seems as though
it were always intended to be there. Therefore, the latest retrofit
will do much to improve the appearance of the Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge and it will also come close to restoring its original grace.
In essence, this rehabilitation will be the redesign that
Rothman rejected in 1988 when he decided to install the tuned
mass damper at midspan. Of that decision, he wrote
The cable so greatly dominates the bridge that stiffening any
other component is of little value. Changing the cable is imprac-
tical, and changing the bridge weight is hopeless. The only
choices available were: streamline the bridge or increase damp-
ing. The second alternative was selected because it was far less
expensive, did not interfere with traffic, and preserved the bridge
appearance 共Rothman 1995兲.
Rothman was talking about the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge as
described by Table 4. His current proposal for the Bronx-
Whitestone will leave the contribution of the cable relatively
unchanged despite the reduction in dead weight. The laterals and
roadway slab participation will account for the elimination of the
stiffening truss, and most importantly, the fairing will reduce the
possibility of the first symmetrical torsion mode’s occurrence.
In summary, the current rehabilitation will reduce the weight
of the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, it will increase its torsional
stability, and it will restore the span to its highly acclaimed
original form. For the first time since its construction the Bronx-
Whitestone Bridge will have torsional rigidity, provided by a
 torsionally stiff open box structure whose form will reflect its
function. The fairing is the primary feature that differentiates this
bridge from the original 1939 span, but it appears timeless and
correct nonetheless. In engineering terms, it is an “aerodynamic
enhancement” that represents the second school of thought de-
scribed by Birdsall earlier in this paper. In visual terms, it is a low
profile addition that does not obstruct views from the bridge deck
and maintains the narrow line of the suspended structure across
the East River.
The Bronx-Whitestone Bridge has changed greatly over its
Fig. 4. Half-span loading p broken into symmetric and assymmetric
63-year history, and its continuously evolving form has reflected
components
the changing concerns and considerations of bridge engineers
since Tacoma. It is no coincidence that many New Yorkers call
the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge the “sister bridge” of the Tacoma
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Narrows. This paper has shown that they were born of the same EI␩⬙ − H␩ = − M p 共6兲
theory and that the Bronx-Whitestone is the closest surviving
This equation relates the deflection ␩ of the bridge’s truss to the
relative of the doomed span. Its gossamer leap across the East
overall bending moment M p. There is an additional term, how-
River was justifiable in 1939, for the deflection theory permitted
ever, which takes into account the relieving moment provided by
such shallow decks. Tacoma’s collapse a short time later forced
H, the horizontal component of the main cable tension.
the profession to focus, as Birdsall observes, on stiffness and
The half-span loading p can be thought of as the sum of two
torsional rigidity in the early years and aerodynamic sections in
full-span loadings—a symmetric load and an antisymmetric load
the modern era. The Bronx-Whitestone Bridge has never been a
of p/2 共Fig. 4兲. Only the symmetric load will cause an increase in
galloper, but because of its heritage it has always been closely
the cable tension. We can therefore break the horizontal tension
watched.
force H into two components, one from self-weight and one from
Therefore it is fortunate that the current rehabilitation succeeds
the symmetric live load
in approaching a clarity of form unmatched by previous retrofits.
The ethereal quality of Ammann’s Bronx-Whitestone will be
restored. It will be a manifestation, in steel, of a wind-weary
structure’s newly lightened deck as well as its recognition that
冉 冊
H = Hq + H p/2 = q +
p L2
2 8f
共7兲

wind has indeed become “the dominant dynamic force which will where L and f are the main span and cable sag, respectively.
hereafter control the design of long-span suspension bridges” Ammann thought of the additional live load p as some small
共Ammann 1953兲. percentage of the self-weight of the bridge—in this case, 5%

p = 0.05q
Acknowledgments
qL2
The writers would like to acknowledge the considerable help H = 1.025 共8兲
and advice of Herbert Rothman. Also, part of this study has 8f
been sponsored by the National Science Foundation Grant No. Returning to the equation of bending, we can imagine two limit
0095010, by the Council on Science and Technology at Princeton cases. In the first, we set EI⫽0 and consider the deflection of the
University, and by documents given to the Princeton Maillart cable acting by itself. We call this load that is taken solely by the
Archive by Margot Ammann-Durrer and Lawrence Ammann. cables pc. Again assuming no cable elongation, only the antisym-
metric load will cause a deflection. At the quarter-point of the
span, this deflection is
Appendix. Stiffness Index Derivation
p cL 2
To arrive at his stiffness index, Ammann considered the simplest ␩max =
64H
model of a suspension bridge, a truss, or beam of stiffness EI
connected to parabolic suspension cables. The entire self-weight q
of such a bridge is taken by the cable system, while the truss 64H 8.2q
remains undeformed. Under the action of live loads, however,
pc = 2 ␩max = ␩max 共9兲
L f
both the cables and the truss share in the work. Ammann ignored
In the other limit, we set H⫽0 and look at the load pt taken by the
the elongation of both the suspender and main cables and so could
stiffening truss. In this case,
assume that the deflections of the truss and main cables were
equal.
5 p tL 4
In order to simulate the deflected shape of the bridge’s first ␩max =
vertical, assymetric mode, Ammann imposed a uniform live load 12,288 EI
p over half of the span. He then calculated the magnitude of p that
would create a unit deflection at the quarter point of the span—the 12,288EI EI
origin of the term “stiffness” index 关Stüssi 共1974兲; see p. 72兴. pt = ␩max = 2,457.6 4 ␩max 共10兲
5L4 L
Ammann felt that the resistance a bridge offered against assuming
certain mode shapes would be a natural indicator of the bridge’s Adding these two contributions together and normalizing by ␩max,
dynamic stability. He began with the equation of bending we arrive at Ammann’s stiffness index

JOURNAL OF BRIDGE ENGINEERING © ASCE / MARCH/APRIL 2006 / 239

J. Bridge Eng. 2006.11:230-240.

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S= 冉 8.2q
f
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0.14I
共10−3 · L兲4
冊冉 1 − 0.6
Ls
L
冊 共13兲
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