Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1 Introduction
a metropolitan government aims at promoting two important values namely
participation and efficiency in the urban services governance as success of it rests
on popular participation that is encouraged by the notions of proximity to
decision-makers and local institutions. And presence of an organization that is
appropriate for locality sensitive urban services and functions enhances the
efficiency of metropolitan government
there exists an intrinsic linkage between urban basic services, spatiality and urban
governance that contributes directly to the wider process of spatial growth and
transformation in the metropolis.
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functioning of present day socio-economic systems. Urbanites(person living in city)
are connected to these services through extensive physical networks of pipes, wires,
roads, telephone links etc. Households, organizations and firms plying (travel
regularly over a route) in the cityscape are essentially dependent on these service
networks.
Urban basic services are regarded as both technical and social systems since these
supports the flow of electricity, water supply, information etc. to city dwellers and
assists their incorporation into city’s socio- economic structures. through the
respective spread networks, such services hold together the contemporary city
society. Urban systems are today more dependent on intense and entwine(twist
something together) network of these services than before - without which,
functioning of a contemporary city would be impossible. Such an all-encompassing
role of basic services refers to respective relevancy and significance to urban living,
economic development as well as to the proliferation (rapid increase in the number or
amount of something) of social relations in city sphere
urban basic services are multifaceted(bohumukhi) and ever changing systems that
provide crucial foundations to city’s production as well as consumption link and the
progress of which is intrinsically(in a natural way) related to the advancement and
regulation of the society. Thus, their importance to economic, social and spatial
development of cities and urban regions are well based.
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With regard to the relationship between urban governance, urban services and
spatiality, on a broader perspective, urban governance is about delivering services
to the urbanites that are daily, direct and locality specific.
The widely visible nature of services entails citizens to decide on the success level
of the governance arrangement i.e. delivery and management. This direct
relationship between citizens and urban governance makes city government
distinctive. urban services governance is about reflecting on the values, attitude and
behavior pattern of the users and the service providers. And effectiveness of it
requires reliance on building a mutually supportive relationship between servers
and the served. it is normally the servers’ delivery pattern, organizational structure,
management practice that builds this relationship and from that perspective, urban
governance is about managing city fabric by responding to the service
requirements of the citizenry.
a sound understanding of this capital intensity, geographical scale and the
operational sphere of the services are important in developing a better perception
of the relationship between urban basic services, spatiality and city governance.
Cox (1993) interpreted this relationship as following –
“Governance arrangement determines the functioning of urban basic services as well as the degree to
which these can overcome the vulnerabilities inflicted(caused) by their dependencies on economic and
political conditions of single localities”. শাসন ব্যব্স্থা শহুরে ম ৌলিক পলেরেব্াগুলিে কার্যকালেতা লনর্যােণ করে এব্ং মসই সারে একক
এিাকাে অেযননলতক ও োজননলতক অব্স্থাে উপে তারেে লনর্য েতা দ্বাো সৃষ্ট (সৃষ্ট) েুব্যিতাগুলি কাটির়ে উঠরত পারে।"
Thus, basing on the above theoretical connotations, it can be concluded that the
process of urban governance is primarily aimed at the operation, management
affairs of urban basic services and ultimately outlines the characteristics of the
concerned urban footprint or cities.
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services that are meant for contributing towards metropolitan
development,
4. representing the locality in various forums,
5. dealing with other government units to seek financial support,
6. authorized to regulate and control activities such as land-use zoning and
building codes,
7. operating business enterprises such as markets and utilities.
the degree and relative significance of these activities differ from one country to
another over time – based on the concerned governance philosophies of local
government. For instance, there exists variation between countries in the manner
local governments acts as an agency of central government.
1. environmental/linear/system
2. maintenance/trunk services,
3. personal services,
5. trading operations.
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special-purpose representative,
general-purpose non-representative, and
special-purpose non-representative.
25
government as a multi-functional arrangement since it has “the capacity to reach to
solutions that are critically different from a single functional organization because
these possess wide-ranging concern across functions, a concern for place” “the multi-
functional local authority can achieve integrative solutions that are either impossible
to attain or out of scope for single-functional organizations” .
the expertise and capacities of a metropolitan government are place specific and
function-generalist whereas, special-purpose governments are meant to be
function specialist i.e. water supply, urban roads etc. However, focusing on the
functional domain, achieving coordination between a number of special purpose
authorities remains a rhetoric as these are quite prone to lose the overall service
perspective i.e. administering an organization instead of possessing a community
serving attitude; and the aspirations, requirements of individual localities may
well emerge as secondary to these agencies.
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trying to rise above localism. From that point of view, categorizing metropolitan
government as “metropolitanism” which refers to the “scale of experience” and
it “is defined by the day-to-day activities of people in the ordinary business of
their lives” (p. 252). Mentionably, localism connotes an
ideology that advocates policies focusing to a particular place in a metropolis and
its interests.
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mentioning here that community involvement in the governance
paradigm(example) and metropolitan wide service provisioning are the two
crucial elements of this arrangement as the former induces sense of
belongingness and creates a net of collective interests while the later provides a
spatial identity as well as defines a sense of place. Only a general-purpose
metropolitan government is usually being found embracing community
participation in the service governance process and responsive across the
metropolis. Experiences form the United States, Canada and Asia reveal that in a
general-purpose metropolitan government, the concerned community
representatives retain the controlling authority over the bureaucrats
and ensures that they are accountable to the electorate (nirbachokmondoli). In other
words, a general-purpose metropolitan government is about ensuring due
representation of community aspirations in the services decision- making process.
the role of guiding the city in terms of basic services governance, a metropolitan
government requires appropriate and adequate capacity building through carefully
designed, phased and promoted training programs meant for the officials, elected
representatives. Further, political support is necessary for ensuring allocation of
resources and commitment for implementation, operation and maintenance of
mandated services. Following the orientation towards municipal development,
metropolitan government not only needs to be fully based on the local context, but
also be located in a broader, planned framework, though the linking of policy
levels should be attempted in a flexible way (Benz, 2001).
Hence, based on the fundamental underpinnings laid above, it can be stated that a
general-purpose metropolitan government emerged as the type that fully embodies
the ideals and objectives of local urban government.
By 1930’s, scholars of urban affairs were in alignment to the notion that described
metropolitan area as “an integrated economic and social unit with a large
population base, encompassing a significant expanse of geographical
territory” .During the early decades of last century, the conceptual base was
developed on the premise of achieving efficiency and effectiveness in urban
services. In 1912, John Nolen put forward the idea of establishing a metropolitan
planning board for Boston metropolitan area to ease the urban service problems
that surfaced due to the active presence of several local government units.
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active presence of several political governmental units in the metropolis was
incongruous(incompatible) and conflicting and should be replaced by the
implementation of integrated government arrangement.
metropolitan area is a single economic and social entity and thus should be
overseen and managed by a single metropolitan-wide democratic authority. in the
United States central city along with its adjoining fringes collectively establishes a
single community of similar social and economic character, which is artificially
separated into special districts and counties on political ground – or in other
words, fragmented. such an arrangement resulted with governmental intricacies
(complication) namely outmoded(outdated) state laws concerning the
establishment, functioning of local governments and designation of decision-
making powers pertaining(regarding) to inclusion and annexation(dokhol kora) at
local level that are not directed by any superior authority or comprehensive plan to
control urban growth. the practice of fragmenting local government units in the
metropolitan area hinders the growth of an ideal political organization for the
metropolis. Fragmentation fundamentally prohibits the city dwellers from
perceiving themselves as inhabitants of a large community. The result is -
the natures of resultant problems are largely similar for all metropolitan areas.
These include inconveniences concerning utilities or system- maintenance services
i.e. water supply, power supply, sewerage, public health etc.; that spans all over
the metropolitan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, political integration in the metropolitan
area is necessary as the collective community needs in it cannot adequately be met
by a collection of fragmented local government units that possesses weakened
authority over urban services. Rather, public wellbeing within the entire urban
30
area can be adequately attended by the enactment of an integrated government
structure for the whole metropolitan area. Also, other scholars of urban affairs
favored the formation of metropolitan government as a way out of urban services
problems. Nonetheless, by 1930’s, there was an extensive agreement amongst
scholars of urban affairs that fragmentation of local government structure was the
fundamental difficulty of metropolis that causes service complications along with
the lack of metropolitan-wide political perspective, conflicts between local
governments and the perceived remedy was the enactment of a metropolitan
government.
2.4.3 Late 1970’s and 1990’s : retreat and resurgence of the concept
By the late 1970’s, the concept pulled back considerably due to worldwide
political opposition. In this period, influenced by neo-liberalism that
professed(nam matro) market solutions for basic services provisioning ,
fragmented mode of urban governance became “more fashionable” world-
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wide .The conceptual foundation of this mode is couched on public choice theory .
During that time, worldwide governments were in the process of cutting short
respective public commitments. Scholars of urban affairs were more into
“metropolitan governance” rather than “metropolitan government” – a notion
persuaded and spread by public choice scholars such as defined the term
“metropolitan governance” as following –
32
etc. concerns also supported the idea that the above class of urban basic services
would be better governed under an integrated arrangement.
2.5.1 Equity
Distributional equity of urban services had been another motor of the conceptual
emergence and resurgence of metropolitan government, the concern is about
allowing the governance realm to achieve equity in the distribution of services
and associated management.
33
and a depleted tax base .As a remedy, the American Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1973) suggested that if central city and
suburban jurisdictions are merged and allowed to function under the canvas of a
single unit of government, a more equitable distribution of services and taxes
could be achieved.
2.5.2 Effectiveness
2.5.3 Efficiency
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efficiency is enhanced through the realization of scale economies in public
services and when there are no inter-jurisdictional spillovers in their benefits.
2.5.4. Responsiveness
35
service end-users representing different socio-economic background be served as
well as wastage of unproductive and underproductive components be eliminated.
Additionally, since the arrangement promotes large community participation in the
governance realm, this in turn acts as a pressure for the service officials to be more
responsive to citizens requirement . higher responsiveness of the service
governance arrangement also bears the potentials to increase tax realization.
The argument for unified bureaucracy can be traced back to scientific management
that acted as an additional stimulator in forwarding the concept of integrated urban
services governance under metropolitan government. “For the parts of the
organization to function efficiently, in a coordinated manner, there must be a
unified command at the top of the system -
i.e. hierarchy is required.” The basis of this contention remains with the notion
that better control over bureaucratic discretion at the lower tier of the concerned
governance realm results positively. In operational terms, unified bureaucracy
rests on a premise - postulating that bottom-up mode of information
channelization assists the higher-ups or policy-planning domain to formulate the
necessary policies and have those circulated to the lower orders either in the form
of operational directives or plans (Sager, 2004). In support of unified bureaucracy,
organizational structure, facilitating unified operation of a number of actors with
similar policy concerns under a single canvas, is the key to rational efficient
administration of urban basic services. Additionally, referring to the empirical
evidence from his evaluation of integrated land use and transport policies in Swiss
urban areas, unity of command by a single supervisory arrangement is crucial for
effective and efficient governance. In context of urban system-maintenance or
36
environmental services, supervision by multiple authorities produces perplexity
and conflict. the proposition of unified bureaucracy postulates that a systematic
planning is necessary within administrative operation as it empowers concerned
governance realm to develop the essential organizational prudence for long term
prosperity.
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consolidation under metropolitan government is a requisite for the service
governance realm to achieve enhanced operational coordination, greater
responsiveness to end-users, public accountability and more rational decision
making.
2.6.3 Professionalization
The notion of professionalism has its roots in “the progressive faith, born out of
positivist philosophy and an awareness of the wonders fashioned by technology -
as informed by science - could be successfully applied to the problems facing
society” (West, 1995; p.5). This connotation can be elaborated using Haas’s (1990)
concept of “epistemic communities” which “is a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and a comprehensive
claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (p.38). In
this connection, Sabet and Klingner (1993) argued that professionalism is about
sharing of skills and expertise that can be of considerable assistance in reaching
agreements on service policy concerns of similar scopes across the official
municipal boundaries.
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professionals (Keating,1995). According to Bird and Slack (2007), having the
expertise or services of better quality professionals is critical for “achieving higher
effectiveness and responsiveness in different affairs of basic services governance
i.e. technical, finance, administration etc.; which eventually shapes the physical
and social character of city-regions” (p.733). The quality of city government
professionals affects both the quantity and the quality of local public services and
the efficiency with which they are delivered (Slack, et al, 2003).
2.6.4 Autonomy
Autonomy refers to the type of flexibility in which the administration can act as
a self-reliant negotiating partner in the decision-making process (Sager, 2004).
Keating (1995), Barlow (1991) argued that autonomy in metropolitan government
refers to bureaucratic discretion set out by the political leadership. It eventually
enhances democratic legitimacy. According to the proponents of metropolitan
government, service policies i.e. water supply, power supply, sewerage network
etc.; due to their perceived nature of contribution to the citizens, requires technical
experts to rely on community opinion regarding the type of services required,
demands, fixing service tax or surcharge etc (Blomquist and Parks,1995). In other
words, such a mode of operation entails governance realm to translate and
interpret community aspirations through effective installation, maintenance and
responsive usage of service infrastructures (Feulner, et al, 2005; Post, 2002).
Therefore, the operational affairs of urban basic services is normally being carried
out by the executive branch of the governance realm that is guided by and
responsible to legislative authority of the metropolitan government which is an
autonomous body representing the community (Sager,2004). Bird and Slack (2007)
argued that the organizational autonomy in the metropolitan government
arrangement postulates that services decision making ought to be carried out by
the level of government that is closest to the individual citizen in order to ensure
better responsiveness or allocative efficiency and accountability. This crafts the
scope for the governance realm to align more towards redistributive policies and
sustain the same (Lowery, 2003; Keating, 1995; DeHoog, et al, 1992). In
metropolitan areas, “ensuring effective services along these lines requires publicly
elected and responsible mayors and councils to possess a substantial degree of
organizational independence and full responsibility in as open and transparent a
39
way as possible, for managing all affairs of urban basic services” (Bird and Slack,
2007; p.736).
Leland and Johnson (2004) as well as Leland and Thurmaier (2000) stated that
efficiency gains under metropolitan government arrangement accumulates through
the combination of four factors. Firstly, scale economics is achieved in the
development, maintenance and management of basic services infrastructure
through the formulation of integrated plans and programs. Such services typically
include those that are linear in nature namely water supply, power supply,
sewerage or drainage network etc. Secondly, efficiency is enhanced through
developing more publicly accountable governance structures. This can accrue
through developing a council headed by an elected mayor and represented by
public representatives as well as appointed officials possessing the necessary
authority to decide on day-to-day administrative affairs and moving from a
personnel system based on patronage to one based on merit. According to Leland
and Johnson (2004), with the authority of recruiting its own staffs as well as
upgrading their professional capacity through training and skill development
endeavors, it eventually develops a work force that is more capable of carrying out
the assigned responsibilities efficiently i.e. prompt response to end-users service
requirements, accountable administrative operation, transparency in budget
preparation and spending etc. Thirdly, merger of linear or engineering services
under the single governance canvas solves the problem of services responsibility
overlapping. Finally, the above efficiency gains render positive support in
achieving higher service responsiveness or allocative efficiency i.e. distribution of
services of better quality and adequate quantity to the end-users.
These efficiency gains accrue through the possession of two types of specialist
40
knowledge - namely functional and area spatial (Barlow, 1991). According to
Leland and Thurmaier (2000), functional specialization comes at the cost of
acquaintance of other functions and area specialization amasses at the expense of
knowledge of other areas. Functional specialization takes place at higher-levels of
metropolitan government through the assembly of specialist service division or
department. While, area specialization occur at the lower levels of government
where detailed knowledge on the geographies or spatial footprints under its
jurisdiction builds up through the information support by the ground staffs. Such
specialization serves mutual purposes – higher level finds the lower level
dependable for much needed area specific knowledge in formulating service
policies while lower level can rely on higher level for function-specialist
knowledge that is necessary for developing operational directives (Leland and
Thurmaier, 2000). Leland and Johnson (2004) contended that the main implication
of these techno-administrative underpinnings of metropolitan government
structure is that in order to be function-generalist – it must have a broad span of
control over as many functions as possible that stretches in a wider area base.
41
resources for addressing local service requirements.
Leland and Johnson (2004), Brierly (2004) contended that the success of a
metropolitan government in embracing community representation in the service
governance realm largely remains within its ability to absorb or represent the
extent of community diversity and providing the citizens with necessary
information, which they can use in making inquiries about service affairs,
composition of the governance arrangement etc. Barlow (1991) argued that
population size directly affects this particular concern. Additionally, a
metropolitan government is normally established to contain a contagious
community and a boundary that demarcates the catchment area of the service
functions. These feature in turn capacitates the same to be a true envoy of
communities and responsive of its requirement, to be governed for safeguarding
its interests, to foster a sense of local identity and local belongingness amongst the
service recipients (Hamilton, et al, 2004).
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metropolitan government that, according to Barlow (1991), facilitates in the
attainment of efficiency, greater tax sharing and community representation.
Hamilton (1999) argued that as the spatial stretch of an urban entity extends, the
necessity of enacting a metropolitan government reinvigorates. He reasoned that
broader spatial limit is a prerogative for containing the metropolitan system and
providing area wide functions more effectively to realize economic growth and
social equity. The basic understanding has been that larger jurisdictions possess
the advantage of exploiting economies of scale in the provisioning of urban
services, internalizing related policy externalities i.e. coordination between service
providing departments of the metropolitan government; that facilitates with more
proficient addressing of social equity issues (Bird and Slack, 2007; Barlow, 1991).
Additionally, enhancement of tax realization and reducing tax imbalances between
central and suburbs through tax sharing scheme, increased capacity in developing
strategic plans for the city region, cost saving in the construction and management
of large-scale infrastructure projects are more apparent in wider jurisdictions of
metropolitan government (Leland and Johnson, 2004; Vogel, 1997).
Few problems and processes stop at municipal boundaries and most feasible
solutions require larger geographical units that increase access to a large pool of
resources - both human and financial – which are less likely to be at the disposal
of small local governments (Bird and Slack, 2007). Bigger areal jurisdiction is
necessary if cities are to take full advantage of the potential opportunities for
economic cooperation, enhancing productivity and city competitiveness (Bird,
2003; Hamilton, 1999). Barlow (1991) opinionated that the service area of a
metropolitan government depends on the threshold requirements of it’s functional
scope. The greater the number of functions, the larger is the size required -
depending on the kinds of public services involved (Leland and Cannon, 1997).
For instance, in achieving technical gain, greater tax sharing for trunk or linear
services i.e. water supply, sewerage, power supply; bigger spatial stretch is
preferred (Leland and Johnson, 2004). Reform pursuits are also intrinsically
related to principles regarding the shape of metropolitan areas as most urban
services require a continuous geographic boundary for their activities and some -
such as fire protection - needs relatively compact spheres of operation (Barlow
l98l). According to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
(1996) a metropolitan government area “should be so constituted that it has the
43
capacity to perform . . . functions with the greatest possible efficiency, efficiency
being understood in terms of economies of scale, specialization and the
application of modern technology” (p.277). Experiences from Calcutta, India
(Barman, 1999); Santiago, Chile (Nickson, 2005); Lexington-Fayette county,
Kentucky (Lowery, 2003); Cokurova, Turkey (Sayinalp, 2001); Metro of Oregon
(Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001) reveal that benefits of this kind are offered
by the institutional dynamics that is founded on justifications of metropolitan
government. Schematically, the process can be explained as following –
Institutional
Figure 2.1: Linkage between conceptual justification, institutional dynamics and accrued
Justification of dynamics
benefits of metropolitan government Accrued benefits
metropolitan Efficiency
government Unified
Source: Devised by the author based on Leland andgain
bureaucracy Johnson (2004).
Efficiency Greater tax
Functional and sharing
territorial
Effectiveness consolidation
Community
representation
Equity Professionalization
2.8 Forming a metropolitan government : the strategies
Wider spatial
Responsiveness Autonomy stretch
Over the years, a number of strategies have been resorted to in pursuit of enacting
metropolitan government. These include city-county consolidation, annexation,
merger of municipalities, city-county separation and establishment of a
comprehensive urban county (Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001). However, the
commonly practiced approaches include city county consolidation, annexation and
two-tier government. In the following sub-sections, these three approaches of
forming metropolitan government have been discussed-
City-county consolidation involves the merger of the core city government with
the intended county that results with the emergence of a single government unit –
44
thus abolishing political fragmentation and its problems(Ross Stephens and
Winkstrom, 2001). The resultant city government is empowered to serve the
requirements and interests of metropolitan area such as facilitating citizens
proximity to urban services, achieving scale economics in the development of
urban basic services infrastructure through necessary legislative means (Leland
and Johnson, 2004). Carr (2004) argued that consolidation approach alters the
configuration of local governance - motivating the governance realm to emphasize
more on citywide issues and enhances the role of elected as well as appointed
officials in enlightening the citizens about the public decisions. Consolidated
government is presumed to allow for greater consideration of regional interests,
rather than narrow territorial ones (Carr, 2004). Carr and Feiock (2004; 2002)
claimed that city county consolidation is conducive for achieving efficiency as it
reduces the local government unit’s administrative cost as well. This accrued
efficiency gain in turn encourages local government to reduce property taxes thus
raising the competitiveness of the locality (Leland and Johnson, 2004; Rusk, 2003,
1993; Pierce, 1993). Such abridged government costs as well as reduced tax
scenario achieved through consolidation are conducive for residential and business
growth in a locality that has otherwise been stagnant (Leland and Johnson, 2004).
2.8.2 Annexation
Annexation involves the core city incorporating adjacent suburban territory and
providing the newly arrogated areas with city services (Ross Stephens
and Winkstrom, 2001). During the early phases of metropolitan development,
annexation occurred when settlements grew together spatially, or, with the merger
of distinct local jurisdictions, such as town or village governments, into a single
municipality (Brierly, 2004). In later phases, annexation policies became crucial
for determining a maximum area for the core city and for determining the long-
term potential of a metropolitan area (Brierly, 2004; Rusk, 2003)
45
government (Gurwitt, 2000). An annexation policy provides a direct solution to
metropolitan fragmentation problem through the reduction in the number of
independent municipalities thus reducing the pressure on local finances related to
core urban services (Brierly, 2004). This enables the newly formed bigger city
government to impose equal service tax across the region (Bird, 2003).
Historically, developers promoted area wide growth through both central city
annexation and mergers with smaller jurisdictions (Ross Stephens and Winkstrom,
2001). Historical motives of the approach had been to promote metropolitan
growth - accomplished through area wide comprehensive planning so that
municipal officials could plan developments and build infrastructures (APA 2001).
Promotion of real estate investment and extension of public services into these
annexed territories were also the other key concerns (APA 2001).
The two-tier model consists of an upper tier governing body (usually a region,
district, or metropolitan area), encompassing a fairly large geographic area, and
lower tier or area municipalities such as cities, towns, villages, townships, wards
(Bird and Slack, 2007; Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001). In principle,
normally under this arrangement, the upper tier formulates policies pertaining to
services meant for region-wide benefits, acts to reduce policy externalities and
strives for achieving economies of scale in urban basic services governance (Bird
and Tarasov, 2004; Vogel, 1997). The lower tier delivers city services at the
neighbourhood or city level (Bird and Slack, 2007; Brierly, 2004; Vogel, 1997).
Bird (2003) pointed out that under the two-tier system, service charges are levied
at an equal rate across the region, which in turn facilitates redistribution of fiscal
resources from municipalities contributing with higher volume of taxes to those
possessing a relatively small tax bases.
46
democracy and community control can be retained and local requirements can
well be met by lower-tier of the government (Barlow, 1991). The arrangement has
been quite successful in ensuring the economic competitiveness, social cohesion
and fiscal viability of city-regions in the global economic setting (Bird and
Tarasov, 2004). Proponents of this approach contended that it captures the benefits
of metropolitan government without incurring disadvantages.
47
polycentric or fragmented mode of urban basic services governance - the basis of
which remains with public choice theory (Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001).
Ostrom (et al 1961) - supporting Tibeout’s (1956) contention – came up with the
argument that fragmented governmental structure stimulates competition between
service providers and facilitates citizens by voting with their feet - as he phrased
it-to choose for their place of residence, which best meets their private and public
needs. The era witnessed the emergence of doubt about the potentials of large size
governments to contribute towards social and economic developments (Auerbach,
2007; Keating, 1995).The outright reasons were the two oil crises that exposed the
weaknesses of large scale governments and uncertainties over the outcomes of
long-term planning. Governments were scaling back from respective public
commitments instead of expanding (Keating, 1985). Eventually, metropolitan
government movement came to a halt and even reversed. Examples of Greater
London, Metropolitan Barcelona (Morata, 1991) and the Rijnmond in the
Netherlands (Netherlands Scientific Council, 1990) can be cited in this connection.
i. citizens reserve the right to choose their local government and change it,
iv. local governmental authorities should share power with private sector
and enjoy less authoritative control,
48
vi. decision making in a local governmental unit ought to be divided
amongst diverse concerns,
vii. the legal and political competence of each unit of government is limited
in relation to other governments and individuals are citizens of several
governments, and
Collectively these political and economic principles undergird the public choice
argument concerning metropolitan governance.
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren’s (1961) support for the polycentric or fragmented
character of local government in the metropolis rests on the premise that
interaction between government units active in metropolis under fragmented
arrangement is less muddled than generally depicted. On the contrary, fragmented
49
arrangement constitutes a system-
"To the extent that they (governments) take each other into account
in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and
cooperative undertakings or have course to central mechanisms to
resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a
metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with
consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the
extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a “system.”
(cited in Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001; p.108)
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) also contended that the biggest obligation of
a government – be it a central or local – is to support its citizenry with goods and
services that are public in nature and are needed for preserving the desired
condition of community affairs. They advanced their argument by insisting that
the production of public goods and services needs to be differentiated from the
respective delivery to the citizenry (Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001). Ostrom
(et al, 1961) pointed out that a city government may provide a service to the
citizenry that can be contracted out to another government unit or to a private
vendor for production instead. Moreover, the areal jurisdiction - in which a service
is meant to be provisioned - should be chalked out basing on the criterias of
control, efficiency, political representation and local self-determination (Ostrom,
et al, 1961). Based on such principles, Ostrom (et al, 1961) argued that urban
areas need different scale of governmental units for delivering citizens with an
array of basic services. They quite successfully produced perplexity over the
important assertions of reform arguments –fragmented governmental structure in
metropolis causes the surfacing of an inefficient situation in the urban basic
services governance and a single, area wide government is more capable of
effective and efficient management of the same (Ostrom, et al, 1961).
50
qualm on the validity of the concept (Warren, 1964).He also defended fragmented
nature of government in the metropolis by arguing that it provides the potential
service recipients with an array of options from which they can opt those that
meets their criteria. According to Warren’s (1964) opinion, active existence of
multiple service providers in the urban sphere does not infer that a production
inefficiency scenario will be inevitable and the arrangement is incapable of
addressing regional issues. Hirsch (1968) added further weights to Ostrom,
Tiebout, and Warren's (1961)contention by stating that individual service requires
different geographical boundaries to achieve efficiency and effectiveness i.e.
distribution and management. Principles such as economics (scale economy),
politics (people government), and administration (multifunctional jurisdictions
sufficient in scope to resolve conflicting interests) ought to be considered in
deciding the responsibilities of government service organizations (Hirsch, 1968).
Alongside these issues, he also contended that spatial benefits, cost spillovers and
income redistribution deserves due consideration in this regard. Finally, basing on
these connotations, Hirsch (1968) suggested that urban services should be
governed by an array of public as well as private organizations - differing in
services area coverage and organizational size.
51
diverse combination of service predilections and their motivations to bear the cost
of the services, validate respective preference. They further asserted that smaller
organizations that are responsible for fewer services acts more precisely to
represent community demand compared to larger units – thus, justifying the
rationale of service provisioning by multiple organizations.
Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom further advanced the concept in 1977 when
they introduced the theory of coproduction of services within public choice
literature. Their argument was based on the premise that the presence of a higher
number of service providers in turn encourages coproduction. Elinor and Vincent
Ostroms (1977) argument in this connection found its base on one of Olson’s
(1965) assertion – “a local public economy is a compilation of service generating
and distributing units that collectively constitutes a system of service governance”
(Cited in Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001; p.116). It is worth of citing here
that coproduction of public services is an arrangement in which consumers
contribute in some ways to the production of the service with which they are
connected to – thus encouraging a mixed approach in this regard (Whitaker, 1980).
Examples of coproduction includes consumers seeking government assistance,
consumers providing assistance to the government, consumers and government
officials reaching to an agreement concerning policy decisions through mutual
adjustment process (Whitaker, 1980). As per Percy’s (1984) assertion,
coproduction facilitates with (1) higher level of services (2) lower cost of services
(3) enhanced responsiveness of service agencies to citizens preference and needs
(4) increased citizen participation in other areas of local governments.
52
In summary, polycentric or fragmented character of urban government have been
defended by it’s proponents in the following manner –
2.10.1 Decentralization
53
structures in service administration realm thus attempting to ensure that more
options are available for citizens. Scott and Meyer (1991) argued that when
decision power is bestowed amongst service providers that are operational in flat
hierarchies, it enables the same to come into close contact of its actual clientele
and becomes more capable of matching their preferences. And when more
individual preferences are met, it results with the attainment of higher public
wellbeing (Osborne and Ted, 1992).
2.10.2 Self-administration
The notion of self-administration has thrived out of the idea that individual
preferences are best matched when these are not filtered by professional expertise
in the actual public service delivery (Sager, 2004). The argument rests on the
citizen-client conceptual premise of new public management literature that defines
urban public services in terms of demand stimulated by the clientele (Kettl, 2000;
Lane, 2000). Fischer (1990) claimed that the assimilation of citizens group who
are affected by a certain policy and thus contradicts with government’s right to
define service objectives and policy experts definition of service problems, is
attained through public participation in specialist’s work (participatory policy
analysis). The idealistic outcome, thus, would be self-administration by those who
would define and provide their service requirements. Osborne and Ted (1992; p.
47) argued that proponents of an “entrepreneurial public sector” in line with public
choice theory, anticipate city governments to “measure the performance of their
service agencies, focusing not on the inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by
their goals - their missions - not by their rules and regulations.” This perceptional
transformation in service governance realm from the supply to the demand side
changes the functional orientation of the corresponding bureaucrats – from
generalist to specialist (Sager, 2004).
Regarding the notion of control of the bureaucracy by the clientele, Osborne and
Ted (1992; p.47) brought the argument into the spotlight by stating that
“(Polycentric local governments) empowers citizens by pushing control out of the
bureaucracy, into the community.” Niskanen (1971) contended that clientele
control is about introducing the institutional framework of fragmented service
54
governance to the notion that citizens are entitled to choose from a range of
service option and thus developing the organizational operation culture
accordingly as it is being perceived as “a mechanism for allowing individuals
maximum scope for choice” (p.123). As per this notion, when multiple institutions
actively ply in a service environment, these would be bound to maintain extensive
public or clientele accountability to uplift their profile in order to be competitive
(Osborne and Ted, 1992). According to Weingast and Moran (1983), the concept
of clientele accountability has its base on principal agent theory in which
legislature is being viewed as principal and the public administration as agent.
Jones (1995) contended that due to the administration’s specialization, the
information indiscretion problem has to be addressed by the principal. Proponents
of the new public management favor contracting - both outside as well as inside
the administration- in order to advance clients privilege of selecting service
providers. “The idea behind proposing contracts is that failure of the agent to
comply with the agreements in the performance contract would allow the principal
with the right to act on the basis of the employment contract, including the
possibility of firing the agent” (Lane, 2000; p.11). Thus, in short it can be asserted
that the notion of clientele control implies that the more a bureaucrat relies on
clientele base, the more responsive he or she will be to their preferences.
Parks and Oakerson (2003), Vogel (1997) and Keating (1995) - based on
empirical evidences - contended that in fragmented arrangement, excess
importance has been placed on the assumption that citizens select their residences
based on their sagacity and self-interest. Referring to their general political
behavior and their request to maximize public goods, Keating (1995) argued that
the premise “humans are rational individual utility maximizers” is not a constant
phenomenon (cited in Ross Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001; p. 119). As an
evocative declaration of human impetus, it has been palpably false. According to
55
Keating (1995; p. 62), individuals’ notion of interest is also “a difficult one to
comprehend as they tend to govern it in many ways by the structure in which they
find themselves”. He asserted that emotive i.e. place attachment; and pedestrian
factors are more influential other than rationality and self-interest when citizens
make political, policy and residential choices. Vogel (1997) and Keating (1995)
strongly opposed the notion that citizens choose their place of residence based on
the motive of maximizing policy preferences. Rather, monetary, work place and
other considerations exert constrains upon citizens in this connection.
The second criticism of fragmented governance remains with the notion that it has
not been successful to come up with an alternative mechanism whereby citizens
are given more opportunities to convey their service preferences directly to the
elected representatives. According to Jones and Hart (1985; p. 193), the “critical
problem of fragmented arrangement is to devise a valid and reliable signaling
mechanism of individual preferences comparable to the way the monetary system
operates in the perfectly competitive private market place.” Empirically, the
concept lacks proof that it is competent enough an arrangement to ensure
effectiveness and efficiency (Vogel, 1997; Jones and Hart, 1985). The
deficiency steams from the difficulties of measuring the performance.
Fragmented urban governance has long been criticized for promoting inequity,
and inefficiency under the shadow of competitiveness (Rusk, 2003; Mitchell, 1999;
Vogel, 1997). Also pointed out by Vogel (1997), fragmented governance of urban
basic services creates it’s own public goods problem as it promotes externalities in
service governance i.e. lack of coordination between operators and service
financing; that fosters distributional inequality. And according to Warner and
Hefetz (2002), Lowery (2000), market solutions promulgated by fragmented
arrangement are not outfitted with the apparatus i.e. governance mechanism; to
resolve such problems. Rather, empirical evidence suggests that the mechanism -
to a considerable extent - has been an overstated one as Vogel (1997) opinionated
that erosion in service quality, lack of competition and high cost of contracting
and monitoring are common. Moreover, Bird and Slack (2007), Warner and
Hefetz (2002), Hamilton (1999) criticized fragmented governance for
promulgating non-coordination between services of similar scopes that leads to
non-achievement of scale economics in the development and maintenance services.
56
Fragmented government spreads a narrow notion of publics engagement (Parks
and Oakerson, 2003; Warner and Hefetz, 2002). According to Warner and Hefetz
(2002), market based approach of provisioning and managing urban basic services
treats all citizens as consumers and those failing to produce effective demands
must drop their voice. The arrangement encourages the notion of profit
maximization more amongst urban services providers which – according to Hefetz
and Warner’s (2002) view - might well compel sacrificing of broader social goals
or objectives i.e. providing qualitative urban basic services to dwellers irrespective
of their socio-economic backgrounds to promote social equity.
Parks and Oakerson (2003; 2000) came up with a more serious criticism of the
fragmented urban basic services governance –existence of multiple service
providers is incomprehensible to the average citizen. This condition is non-
conducive for strengthening local democracy and accountability.
57
Fragmented arrangement does not permit for redistributive policies (Ross
Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001; Keating, 1995). Parks and Oakerson (2003; 1989)
noted that the difficulty remains with the fact that the arrangement takes no notice
of the political process by which such policies are formed and sustained.
According to Siddique (2005) and Parks and Oakerson (2003), redistribution takes
place when the political and social process upholds the notion of unity and
common interest/s in which individual feels the sense of responsibility for
community. Fragmented local government dissuades the presence of political and
social necessities by compelling communities to go into competition and inducing
politicians to stress on particular rather than common interests (Hefetz and Warner,
2002; Keating 1995). Hefetz and Warner, (2002) contended that public choice
approach is founded on narrow local politics that prevents municipalities to
involve in inter-jurisdictional competition.
Hefetz and Warner (2002), Lowery (2000) Keating (1995) in their empirical
studies demonstrated that fragmented governance of urban basic services approach
increases power and authority of bureaucrats over local representatives in service
governance realm. This is because citizens in reality do not have “the time or
58
inclination to gather all the information necessary to decide their policy choices”
(Keating, 1995; p.127). In particular, when professional bureaucrats control the
service production arrangements, not only they assume the authority to decide the
types of service to be delivered but also define the service problems as well as
how these are to be addressed (Hefetz and Warner, 2002; Lowery, 2000; Keating,
1995).
Rusk (2003) asserted that fragmented urban basic services governance promotes
inflexible service jurisdiction that are compressed between increasing service
requirements and eroding incomes. This compels the same to rely on government
grants and loans, which eventually curtails local governments’ authority and
increases central governments control in service affairs.
Pierce (1994) also reflected Rusk’s view during the same period as he asserted,
with reference to American cities - that –
59
to transportation to solid waste disposal to assuring a competent
workforce for the future, are reached in piecemeal, often haphazard
fashion, or worse still are never made at all.” (cited in Ross
Stephens and Winkstrom, 2001; p. 48)
Pierce (1994) argued that almost all categories of urban problems – be it the
strategic economic development, environmental services provision and protection,
transportation, recreations, parks, urban growth management can be handled by an
are wide metropolitan government with adequate power. Alongside, Rusk (1993),
Pierce (1994), other scholars namely Cisneros (1994), Dodge (1996) also
contributed to this conceptual resurgence through their writings that contended a
stronger local government with capacities to serve a wider areal base can
positively contribute to the governance of urban basic services. The principal
components for the resurgence of metropolitan government concept - according to
their opinion - were as following-
60
of functional and territorial integration in the era of globalization have positioned
metropolitan government back in the saddle (Lefèvre 1998; Stein, 1993). Lefèvre,
(1998) argued that globalization of economy has emerged with a different
meaning for metropolises –
Jouve and Lefèvre, (1997), Sharpe (1995) and Stein (1993) contended that either
through providing services for consumptions such as housing or serviced lands for
other uses or economic support for infrastructure building/rebuilding or achieving
political consensus with numerous stakeholders to formulate as well as
successfully implement area-wide policies of similar scope, the cities need to keep
their places in international competition. From this inevitability, Lefèvre (1998)
claimed that in the 1990’s, metropolitan areas have rather emerged as a complex
web of social relations that are dependent on economic and technological factors
more than ever before since -
“…on the one hand, these elements establish that the search for
metropolitan authorities is a matter of certain territories finding the
necessary tools to provide them with the government structures
which will, in the long term, arm them better than others to face
and benefit from these developments. On the other, such changes
mean that new actors must be introduced (local governments,
citizens’ associations, business community, for example) and
mobilized if area-wide governmental structures are to be set up” (p.
9).
Thus, as evident from the above citation, in 1990’s, the idea of institutionalizing
integration or the spirit of metropolitan government by impelling the ingredients
of good governance into action have eventually inclined towards introducing,
mobilizing and realizing a harmony between the all concerned actors on shared
purposes (Lefèvre, 1998; Jouve and Lefèvre, 1997).
61
This resurgence of metropolitan government concept surfaced with new promises
- notably in its notion of the institution or institutional policies and the methods of
implementation (Sharpe, 1995). To the proponents of such resurgence,
metropolitan government arrangement offers a more functional vision of the urban
area than before and the focus now is more on values of negotiation, partnership
and flexibility in the constitution of new structures (Jouve and Lefèvre, 1997;
Stein, 1993). Thus, it emerged as the result of a constitutive process with a
profoundly different idea of institutionalization (Jouve and Lefèvre, 1997). This
very emphasis on institutionalization has been the motivation behind the
enactment of metropolitan government in a number of Italian (Bologna, Turin,
Rome), German (Stuttgart, Dresden) metropolises where the leadership has been
elected through adult franchise and being bestowed with the responsibilities of
important services namely strategic planning, public transport, waste management
and economic development (Hoffman-Martinot, 1994). In this regard, Lefèvre
(1998) noted that metropolitan territory is perceived as the scale i.e. areal stretch;
on which the central cities could rely. With this process, metropolitan government
arrangement has become both a necessary instrument and an advantage in
attaining respective objectives (Lefèvre, 1998).
Another interesting feature of this conceptual resurgence in the 1990’s has been
that a number of developing countries across all the continents have resorted to
metropolitan government mechanism to cure the urban ills similar to those that
emerged in the cities and metropolitan areas of the United States throughout the
last century. The outcome of such an adoption has been positive –the ills have
either been eradicated or brought to minimum. The following sub-sections
explains some of the core factors that contributed to this conceptual resurgence of
metropolitan government.
62
in this resurgence during 1990’s. In the following sub-sections, these features are
discussed –
A. Local democracy
Metropolitan government in two ways promotes local democracy (Parks and
Oakerson2003). The first emphasizes on the significance of citizens possessing
correct information. For a true or effective democratic control over the local urban
government, citizens ought to possess the exact knowledge about its functions as
well as its level of competency in executing these. Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog
(1990 – cited in Parks and Oakerson, 2003) – by comparing citizens level of
awareness about service provisions between general purpose integrated and
fragmented settings - demonstrated that respondents from the former arrangement
make less mistake in recognizing the service providers on whom they rely. In this
connection, Parks and Oakerson (2003) suggested that as an informal but
widespread norm in fragmented arrangement, service officials are quite practiced
at impugning to other levels within for unimpressive service performance while
demanding recognition for good performance no matter how distant or unrelated
they have been with it. These findings also indicate that service governance under
fragmented arrangement is likely to craft scopes for more of such manipulation
that might cause fading of local democracy. The second way is related to citizens’
pattern of reactions when they become dissatisfied with service provision under
fragmented setting. Lyons and Lowery (1989; 1986) have assembled these
reactions on two dimensions namely, an active-passive and a constructive-
destructive dimension – basing on Hirschman’s (1970) theoretical discourse of
exit voice and loyalty. The responses they analyzed relate to situations that
citizens confronted in case of a fading quality of city services. Lyons and Lowery
(1989; 1986) categorized voice as an active-constructive response and conceived it
as an endeavor by the citizens to alter policies that causes dissatisfaction. Exit -
the active-destructive retort to negative satisfaction -has been viewed as a
translation of Tiebout’s (1956) voting with one’s feet. Neglect has been classified
as a passive-destructive answer expressing hopelessness with the changes thus
instigating citizens to take away their support from the city government while
dwelling within the metropolitan boundary. And loyalty - the passive-constructive
response - has been viewed as a way of rendering incessant support for the local
governments with the expectation that it will work on to improve the service
63
governance.
Constructive Destructive
Figure 2.2: Matrix of citizens response regarding their satisfaction with local government
Lyons and Lowery (1990) asserted that local or city government structure caters
powerful – though not direct – influence on the way citizens craft these responses.
They claimed that citizens psychological attachment to the community tends to be
higher in general purpose integrated metropolitan settings than fragmented
arrangements. Based on their findings, they further suggested that such an
attachment made citizens constructive answers to negative satisfaction through
voice and loyalty more probable and the destructive responses in the form of exit
and neglect less likely.
B. Citizens’ satisfaction
DeHoog, Lyons, and Lowery (1992) have found in their empirical study that
citizens are at least in two ways satisfied with metropolitan government mode of
urban services management. In their study, they examined an array of
hypothesized determinants of citizen satisfaction including individual-level,
jurisdictional-level and city specific variables from two opposite urban
arrangements of Kentucky namely, Louisville-Jefferson County under fragmented
and Lexington-Fayette County under integrated metropolitan settings (also cited in
Parks and Oakerson, 2003). They found that citizens were more satisfied in
receiving and paying for more services. And more services are provided by
general purpose integrated metropolitan government. Additionally, DeHoog,
Lyons, and Lowery (1992) argued that citizens psychological attachment is higher
in integrated metropolitan settings. Kelleher and Lowery (2001) claimed that the
structure of city government does cater a direct influence on the variance of
citizens satisfaction – though not on mean. In their experimental research also on
Louisville-Jefferson county and Lexington-Fayette county, they found that the
satisfaction variance was significantly higher under fragmented government.
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Kelleher and Lowery (2001) categorized this outcome as a contradiction to the
public choice argument on the premise that by providing citizens with diverse
flavor to match their choices to an array of tax-service packages offered in
fragmented settings, most citizens should be equally satisfied. Instead, Kelleher
and Lowery (2001) contended that service preferences do not differ significantly
between consumers. Rather, the issue of equal access to services - by both the
wealthy and poor community - differs significantly in fragmented settings. Thus,
fragmentation - in contradiction to integrated arrangement - works to ensure that
some will be much more satisfied with local services than others (Parks and
Oakerson, 2003; Lowery, 1999).
65
(Parks and Oakerson, 2003, 2000; Ostrom, 1972). But Parks and Oakerson (2003)
– referring to the economic tools of public choice theory – asserted that
intergovernmental agreements/relations possesses less potentials to render
solutions in this connection since it involves higher transaction costs, conflicts of
interests, framing and even distortion of preferences while attempting to adopt
coordinated policy responses in fragmented setting and thus “a tragedy of
commons is far more likely than effective service governance” (quoted by Parks
and Oakerson 2003; p.4 from Lowery 2001, 1998 and Downs, 1994).
66
“Areas in which the central city is highly elastic - that is, comprises
a high proportion of metropolitan area population - can be
considered to be examples in some sense of a regional government.
Single-county metropolitan areas with strong county governments
can also be considered highly regionalized. And in some cases,
multipurpose regional government exists through explicit city-
county consolidation or through other means” (p. 129).
Notably, the pretext for the emergence of new regionalism in the 1990’s –
according to Savitch and Vogel, (1996; p. 2) - is engrained in the following
propositions –
Operationally, Collins (1994) argued that the new regionalism is about enhancing
functionality of cities or city-regions. To test this argument, Savitch and Vogel
(1996) examined regional/metropolitan government of ten cities across the United
States. Basing on the results, they concluded that the conceptual connotations of
new regionalism is couched in regional economics that thrives on politics of
governing cities and city-regions with particular focus on achieving excellence in
protecting the environment, building or rebuilding service infrastructures,
delivering new or better services to the citizenry. Attainment of these goals helps
cities or city-regions to concentrate jobs or economic activities in central urban
67
areas on one hand. And on the other, facilitates a considerable number of such job-
holders to move to cheaper destinations at the periphery through effective
stretching of services across the metropolitan regions (Savitch and Vogel, 1996).
Such locales surface under a governance framework in which intensive vertical
and horizontal relationships of formal nature between bodies responsible for
various services are operational (Savitch and Vogel, 1996).
Savitch and Vogel (1996) also noted in their examination that cities with less
inequalities had more inclination towards comprehensive formalized relationships
between various interests – which is synonymous to metropolitan government
arrangement. Nonetheless, Swanson (1996), Nelson (1996), Stowers (1996) –
referring to the experience of Jacksonville, Metro of Portland and Miami –
contended that functioning as defecto regional government, metropolitan
governments in these cities have been able to avoid conflicts of interest between
various locales, achieve better co-operations between stakeholders, attain greater
success in formulating and implementing economic development strategies,
develop information base on the local government structure, numbers, types etc.
that becomes easily accessible and comprehensible to the citizenry.
The arrangement surfaced with some functional advantages in the 1990’s that did
not accrue during the 1960’s and 1970’s. According to Feiock (2004), it in this
period city leaders, managers and concerned scholars came to the realization that
the arrangement reduces information costs, can internalize development spillover
effects that can reduce the demands for unnecessary subsidies to business.
Additionally, in the 1990’s, scholars started reasserting that metropolitan
government arrangement is well positioned to formulate, implement and manage
comprehensive basic services planning on a city wide basis which is one of the
prerequisites for coordinated urban development (Rusk, 2003; Hawkins, Ward,
and Becker, 1991). Additionally, metropolitan government also emerged as
supportive towards public-private cooperation in addressing development
challenges, reducing the time and cost necessary to gain approval for new
developments. The later feature provides a mechanism to streamline the regulatory
and development approval process - thereby effectively eliminating confusion,
68
delays, and uncertainties that results from the need of obtaining development
approvals from multiple departments and agencies (Feiock, 2004; Feiock, and
Jeong 2002). Hawkins, Ward, and Becker (1991) argued that integrated
metropolitan government could better address problems of multijurisdictional
economic decline and geographically uneven development than fragmented
arrangement. The inherent reason being that metropolitan government fosters
inter-operator dependence thereby enhancing the environment for cooperation and
coordination in urban services governance that in turn caters opportunities for
achieving greater economic development thereby generating jobs and offering a
reasonable quality of life to the citizenry.
2.13 Conclusion
69