Civil Procedure
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 1
General Provisions
I. Rule Making Power of the Supreme Court
¤ 1987 Constitution Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5)
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
¤ 1987 Constitution Article VI, Section 30
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
At present, the laws governing jurisdiction of the courts
are B.P. Blg. 129 and R.A. No. 296 insofar as it has not
been repealed by B.P. Blg. 129.
II. Distinction between procedural and
substantive rules
Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights
and duties regarding life, liberty or property which when
violated gives rise to a cause of action (Bustos v. Lucero,
81 Phil. 640).
Procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing
those rights and obligations created by substantive law
by providing a procedural system for obtaining redress for
the invasion of rights and violations of duties and by
prescribing rules as to how suits are filed, tried and
decided by the courts.
As applied to civil law, substantive law is that
which declares the rights and obligations of parties who
enter into contracts, while procedural law provides or
regulates the steps to be taken by a person whose rights
under the contract was breached.
III. Force and effect of Rules of Court
Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law,
have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with
positive law (Inchausti & Co. vs. De Leon [1913], 24 Phil.,
224.) The Rules of Court is subordinate to the statute,
and, in case of conflict, the statute will prevail.
An instance is where Congress expressly
enabled the courts to establish all necessary rules for the
orderly conduct of business, provided such rules were not
repugnant to the laws of the United States, in the great
case of Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1),
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made the remark that "these section give the court full
power over all matters of practice. . . ."
Recurring now to section 28 of the Judiciary
Law, and section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
constitute the legislative authority for the promulgation of
rules by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, it is
to be noted, in the first place, that the court is given the
power to make all necessary rules for orderly procedure
in the court, and for regulating the conduct of business in
the court. We apprehend that within this language would
be included regulations having to do with the preparation
and filing of briefs. The law also provides that such rules
shall be binding and must be observed. The general
limitation is, that the rules must not be in conflict with
laws of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The
specific limitation is that no judgment shall be reversed
by reason of the failure of the court to comply with such
rules, unless the substantial rights of the party have been
impaired buy such failure. (Shioji v. Harvey, G.R. No.
18940, 27 April 1922)
IV. Power of Supreme Court to suspend the
Rules of Court
The Supreme Court may suspend the effectivity or apply
with leniency the Rules of Court in the following
circumstances:
1. When compelling reasons so warrant or when
the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes and
good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of
the rules is discretionary upon courts (CIR v. Migrant
Pagbilao Corp., G.R. No. 159593, 12 October 2006).
Among the reasons that would warrant the suspension of
the Rules are:
a. the existence of special or compelling
circumstances
b. merits of the case
c. cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of rules
d. a lack of ay showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory
e. the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby (Sarmiento v. Zaratan,
G.R. No. 167471, 5 February 2007).
Sarmiento v. Zaratan (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner Sarmiento obtained a favorable
decision with the MeTC in a case for ejectment against
respondent Zaratan. Thus, respondent Zaratan filed her
Notice of Appeal before the RTC. In its “Notice of Appealed
Case,” the RTC directed respondent to file her
memorandum within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof. Before the period to file her memorandum
expired, respondent Zaratan filed a Motion for Extension
of Time. Thereafter, she filed her Memorandum. However,
the RTC dismissed respondent Zaratan’s appeal because
she failed to timely file her memorandum. The RTC did
not act upon her Motion for Extension of Time because it
had no notice of hearing.
Respondent Zaratan filed her petition for
certiorari, which was granted by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
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Whether the RTC was correct in not acting upon
respondent Zaratan’s Motion for Extension of Time for
lack of notice of hearing, and eventually dismissing the
appeal
HELD:No.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required
where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the
motion. However, the following may warrant the
suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
In this case, the Motion for Extension of Time
does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it
merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. A
motion for extension of time is not a litigated motion
where notice to the adverse party is necessary. It is an
ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the
other of the parties to the action.
2. To relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure and the mere invocation of
substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will
automatically compel the Court to suspend procedural
rules. (Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139596,
24 January 2006)
3. Where substantial and important issues await
resolution. (Migrant Pagbilao Corp., supra)
4. When transcendental matters of life, liberty or
state security are involved (Mindanao Savings Loan Asso.
V. Vicenta Vda. De Flores, 469 SCRA 416).
5. The constitutional power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of practice and procedure necessarily
carries with it the power to overturn judicial precedents
on points of remedial law through the amendment of the
Rules of Court (Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No.
170354, 30 June 2006).
Labao v. Flores, et al. (2010)
FACTS: Respondents Flores, et al. filed a complaint with
the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against petitioner,
which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, the
NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Respondents
Flores, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the NLRC in its resolution, a copy of which their
counsel received on 13 October 2006.
Eighty-eight (88) days later, respondents Flores, et al.,
through their new counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari alleging that they were informed
only of the NLRC’s Resolution on 6 December 2006 due
to their former counsel’s negligence. The CA ruled that
respondents Flores et al.’s petition was timely filed, and
reversed the NLRC’s Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct
in acting upon respondents Flores, et al.’s petition.
HELD: No.
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None of the following recognized exceptions to
the strict observance of procedural rules are present in
this case: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2)
to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.
In this case, the acts of respondents Flores, et
al.’s former counsel bind them. Moreover, the NLRC’s
Resolution has become final and immutable. Just as a
losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.
V. Compliance with, amendment to, or waiver
of the Rules of Court provisions
Justice Moran points out that rules of procedure
are matters of public interest (Sanidad v. Cabotaje, 5 Phil.
204; Castaño v. Lobingier, 7 Phil 91, 94; Arzadon v.
Arzadon, 15 Phil. 77) and cannot be changed by
agreement of parties (Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca,
37 Phil. 921; Yangco v. Herrera, 11 Phil 402-404).
When, however, the Rules themselves allow the
parties to agree on a procedure different from that
provided therein, the agreement is valid. Thus, Rule 4,
Section 3 provides that parties may agree to change or
transfer the venue from one province to another.
Moreover, Rule 24, Section 14 allows the parties to
agree as to the procedure for taking depositions which will
be deemed valid as other dispositions.
It must be noted, upon the other hand, that
there are matters of procedure which may be waived if
public interest is not affected thereby. If, for instance, the
defendant fails to file his answer within fifteen (15) days,
but plaintiff refuses to as for judgment in default, he
thereby waives a right given him by the Rules. Since the
Court cannot declare defendant in default without a
motion to that effect by plaintiff, the latter’s right to file
the motion is exclusively his; which he may waive while
public interest is unaffected. When, however, plaintiff’s
silence is so long that it amount to a failure to prosecute
his case for an unreasonable length of time, the Court
may stop his inaction by dismissing the case. And, again,
mistakes of procedure which do not affect the merits of
the case or substantial rights of the parties are not
grounds for revising orders or judgments (I Moran, 1979
ed.).
• Rules of procedure may be made applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent
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In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.
Simeon Datumanong (2006)
FACTS: The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner Tel-Equen
administratively liable, and ordered his dismissal from
office. He appealed the administrative ruling with the
Court of Appeals, which upheld the Ombudsman’s
Resolution. Petitioner then elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.
While the case is pending, respondent
Datumanong issued a Memorandum directing petitioner’s
immediate dismissal from service stating that the decision
of dismissal is immediately executory.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition to cite
respondent Datumanong in contempt, arguing that
despite knowledge of the pendency of the case, he still
executed petitioner’s dismissal thereby pre-empting the
Supreme Court’s discretion.
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman’s Rules of
Procedure was amended stating that the pendency of an
appeal shall not stop the Ombudsman’s decision from
being executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the revised Ombudsman’s Rules
of Procedure may be given retroactive application
HELD: Yes.
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are
construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are
deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural
laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights
because no vested right may attach to nor arise
therefrom. In this case, the Ombudsman’s Rules of
Procedure are clearly procedural and no vested right of
the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such
thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold office.
JURISDICTION
In General
1. Definition of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to
hear, try and decide a case (Cuenca v. PCGG, 535 SCRA
102). It has also been referred to as the power or capacity
given by law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and
determine certain controversies (De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 510 SCRA 103).
a. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
i. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
referred to as the power of a particular
court to hear the type of case that is then
before it. The term also refers to the
jurisdiction of the court over the class of
cases to which a particular case belongs. It
is the power or authority to hear and
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determine cases of the general class to
which the proceeding in question belongs
(Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484).
ii. The term “subject matter” also refers to the
item with respect to which the controversy
has arisen, or concerning which the wrong
has been done, and it is ordinarily the right,
the thing, or the contract under dispute (De
la rama v. Mendiola, 401 SCRA 704).
iii. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law which may be either the
Constitution or a statute (Guinhawa v.
People of the Philippines, 468 SCRA 278).
Since jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law, the established general rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines
jurisdiction of the court (Cang v. Court of
Appeals, 296 SCRA 128).
iv. Since jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or by
law, it cannot be: (a) granted by
agreement of the parties; (b) acquired,
waived, enlarged, or diminished by any act
or omission of the parties; or (c) conferred
by the acquiescence of the courts (Republic
v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333). Neither can
jurisdiction over the subject matter be
conferred by the administrative policy of
any court or a court’s unilateral assumption
of jurisdiction.
v. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise
statement of ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of the
action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on
the allegations contained in the complaint
of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein
(City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports
Authority, G.R. No. 168973, 24 August
2011).
vi. The court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter cannot be made to depend upon
defenses set up in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss (Tomas Claudio Memorial
College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA
502). The settled rule is that jurisdiction is
based on the allegations in the initiatory
pleading and the defenses in the answer
are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its
determination (De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 510 SCRA 103).
vii. The general rule is that the objection for
want of jurisdiction of the controversy or
the subject matter may be made at any
time and at any stage of the proceedings.
The court may on its own initiative object
to an erroneous jurisdiction and may ex
mero motu take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case and has
a clearly recognized right to determine its
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own jurisdiction in any proceeding (Fabian
v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470). Lack of
jurisdiction is one of those excepted
grounds where the court may dismiss a
claim or a case at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that any of those ground exists,
even if they were not raised in the answer
or in a motion to dismiss (Geonzon Vda. De
Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, 565
SCRA 192).
viii. However, while it is true that jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings since it is
conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled
that a party may be barred from raising it
on the ground of estoppel (La’o v. Republic,
479 SCRA 439). In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
the Supreme Court barred a belated
objection to jurisdiction that was raised
only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the court against the party
raising the issue of jurisdiction and after
seeking affirmative relief from the court
and after participating in all stages of the
proceedings. The doctrine of estoppel by
laches in this case according to the
Supreme Court is based upon grounds of
public policy and is principally a question of
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted.
ix. It must, however, be noted that the ruling
in Tijam is the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to
bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in
cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in Tijam. In such
controversies, laches should have been
clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction
must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it (Regalado v. Go, 514
SCRA 616).
Rivera v. Judge Catalo (2015)
FACTS: Complainant Rivera filed petition for the issuance
of a new owner’s duplicate copy of his Transfer Certificate
of Title, and was raffled to Judge Catalo. Judge Catalo
granted Complainant Rivera’s petition, which became
final and executory.
Thereafter, the RD filed a manifestation that the
TCT subject of the court’s decision was already cancelled
in 1924, and that she issued an order to recall the
approval of the Affidavit of Loss filed by complainant
Rivera.
Judge Catalo called the parties for a hearing.
However, complainant Rivera did not appear despite
notice. Thus, Judge Catalo recalled his previous decision.
Aggrieved, complainant Rivera filed the present
administrative complaint against Judge Catalo for gross
ignorance of the law for recalling a decision which has
already become final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Catalo was correct in
recalling his decision despite it being final and executory
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HELD: Yes.
Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment,
a decision that has acquired finality can no longer be
altered. However, one of the recognized exceptions is
when the judgment is void.
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It neither is a source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void. Judge Catalo correctly
recalled the judgment because it was discovered that the
subject title had been cancelled. To rule otherwise would
judicially permit the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy of a title, which was no longer in existence.
Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo et al. (2014)
FACTS: Petitioner Bautista inherited a parcel of free-
patent land, which he subdivided and sold to several
vendees. Several years after the sale, petitioner Bautista
filed a complaint against respondent vendees with the
RTC to exercise his right to repurchase under
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The respondent vendees filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that since this case
involves title to or possession to real property, the value
of the property is determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege that the value
of the property more than Php20,000.00
On the other hand, petitioner Bautista argued that the
action is one that is actually for specific performance, and
thus incapable of pecuniary estimation. The RTC granted
respondents vendees Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over
petitioner Bautista’s complaint
HELD: Yes.
The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free
patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In
determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the first
criterion to be ascertained is the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. In this case, petitioner Bautista
sought to enforce the right provided by law. Despite the
involvement of real property, his action is for specific
performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin
or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being
the case, his action for specific performance is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. The
reconveyance of the title is solely dependent on the
exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question
and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought.
b. Jurisdiction over the res or property
i. Jurisdiction over the res refers to the
court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the
property which is the subject of the action.
This type of jurisdiction is necessary when
the action is an action in rem or quasi in
rem. When the action is one in personam,
jurisdiction over the res is not sufficient to
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authorize the court to render a judgment
against the defendant.
ii. Jurisdiction over the res may be acquired
by the court by placing the property or
thing under its custody or constructive
seizure (Example: attachment of
property). It may also be acquired by the
court through statutory authority
conferring upon it the power to deal with
the property or thing within the court’s
territorial jurisdiction (Example: suits
involving the status of the parties or suits
involving the property in the Philippines of
non-resident defendants).
iii. Any relief granted in actions in rem or quasi
in rem must be confined to the res, and the
court cannot lawfully render a judgment
against the defendant (Banco do Brasil v.
Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 545). For
instance, if an action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage, where the jurisdiction
acquired by the court is only over the res
and not over the person of the defendant
because the debtor-mortgagor is a non-
resident who is also outside of the
Philippines, the relief of the creditor
extends only to the property foreclosed. If
in the foreclosure sale, there arises a
deficiency, a deficiency judgment
authorized by Section 6, Rule 68 against
the debtor-mortgagor would not be feasible
because a collection of the deficiency is a
proceding in personam which requires
jurisdiction over the person of the debtor-
mortgagor.
De Joya v. Marquez (2006)
FACTS: Manuel Dy Awiten filed a complaint against Ma.
Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo for Syndicated Estafa. Hao
induced Dy to invest more than a hundred million pesos
in State Resources Development Management Corp., but
when the latter’s investments fell due, the checks issued
by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or
that the account was closed.
Prosecutor Nicdao found a probable cause to
indict petitioner and his other co-accused for Syndicated
Estafa. The RTC of Manila through Judge Marquez issued
a warrant of arrest. Petitioner asserts that respondent
judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes.
Here, the court has jurisdiction to try the case,
even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
a non-resident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the res, as when the action involves the personal
status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in
which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the
service of summons by publication and notice to the
defendant is merely to comply with due process
requirements.
Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or
thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is
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acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court
of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis,
as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law
which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject matter within its territorial
jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits
involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of
a non-resident defendant.
Gomez v. Court of Appeals (2004)
FACTS: In 1975, spouses Trocino mortgaged 2 parcels of
land to Dr. Yujuico in Cebu City. The mortgage was
subsequently foreclosed. Respondent-spouses Trocino
sold the lands to petitioners, who in turn redeemed the
lands from the mortgagee. However, spouses Trocino
refused to deliver the titles to petitioners. Thus,
petitioners sued spouses Trocino for specific performance
for the delivery of the titles. The husband Trocino died
before the suit was filed, thus his children, including
Adolfo and Mariano Trocino, were impleaded in the suit.
Summons was served, and it was only received by
Caridad Trocino, in behalf of the children. The trial court
rendered judgment against the spouses Trocino and their
heirs. Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the
annulment of the judgment, alleging that no jurisdiction
was acquired over them. At that time, Adolfo Trocino was
a resident of Ohio, USA while Mariano Trocino was a
resident of Talibon, Bohol, and both were not found in
Cebu City at the time summons was served.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: None.
The action instituted by petitioners affect the
parties alone on the basis of their personal liability of non-
delivery of titles, it is an action in personam. While it is a
real action because it affects title to or possession of land,
it does not automatically follow that the action is one in
rem. As such, personal service of summons upon the
defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of
jurisdiction over their persons.
Consequently, the judgment sought to be
executed against respondents were rendered without
jurisdiction as there was neither a proper service of
summons nor was there any waiver or voluntary
submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the
same is void, with regard to private respondents except
Caridad Trocino.
c. Jurisdiction over the Issues
i. Jurisdiction over the issue is the power of
the court to try and decide issues raised in
the pleadings of the parties (Reyes v. Diaz,
73 Phil. 484).
ii. An issue is a disputed point or question to
which parties to an action have narrowed
down their several allegations and upon
which they are desirous of obtaining a
decision.
iii. Jurisdiction over the issues is conferred and
determined by the pleadings of the parties.
The pleadings present the issues to be tried
and determine whether or not the issues
are of fact or of law. With respect to an
issue raised by the pleadings, an issue
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arises because a material allegation of a
claiming party is specifically denied by the
defending party.
iv. Jurisdiction over the issues may also be
determined and conferred by stipulation of
the parties as when in the pre-trial, the
parties enter into stipulations of facts and
documents or enter into an agreement
simplifying the issues of the case.
v. Jurisdiction over the issues may also be
conferred by waiver or failure to object to
the presentation of evidence on a matter
not raised in the pleadings.
Bernabe v. Vergara (1942)
FACTS: Victoriano Zafra passed away and was survived
by three children: Benito, Apolonia and Dominga, all
surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia died, the first
leaving a daughter named Irinea, and the second, three
children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. The heirs of
Benito and Apolonia filed an action for the partition of
inheritance left by the deceased Victoriano Zafra, against
the defendants Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom
she sad sold her share in the common property; namely,
Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina
Landicho.
Dominga Zafra, in her answer, pleaded a
counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts
contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of
plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara, which debts
constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by
said deceased Apolonia Zafra.
The trial court in its decision awarded the
plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara one-third of the
common property and, at the same time, ordered them
to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia
Zafra, in the amount of P350.
Plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara filed an
Appeal questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court to
render a judgment in the said amount of P350.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to
render a judgment in the amount of P350.
HELD: Yes.
The question now raised by the plaintiffs-
appellees as to whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money
above mentioned is unsubstantial. There can be
absolutely no doubt that the trial had such jurisdiction not
only because there was a counterclaim wherein the
amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but
because the proceeding was in the nature of one for
liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left
by the deceased ancestors may be determined and
ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case.
Plaintiffs knew that the trial court had such jurisdiction as
is shown by their omission to raise any question with
respect thereto in their appeal to the Supreme Court. And
such question may be deemed to have been passed upon
impliedly by the Court when it acted on the case and
decided the same on the merits.
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And, furthermore, the question of jurisdiction
attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of
question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The
jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter
but at most over the issue or over the persons of the
parties. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the
case involving P200 or more, and therefore the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render
judgment in the amount of P350. The question of whether
or not there was a proper issue raised in the pleading as
to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, but jurisdiction over the issue.
The Supreme Court therefore held that the question
of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only
unsubstantial but is also not the kind of question that may
deprive the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction
over the case.
d. Jurisdiction over the Parties
i. Jurisdiction over the parties is the legal
power of the court to render personal
judgment against a party to an action or
proceedings.
ii. The manner by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over the parties depends on
whether the party is the plaintiff or the
defendant. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is
acquired by his filing of the complaint or
petition. By doing so, he submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court (Davao Light &
Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 204
SCRA 343). On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the defendant in civil cases is acquired
either by his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to its authority, or by
service of summons (Ang Ping v. Court of
Appeals, 310 SCRA 343).
iii. To constitute voluntary appearance, it
must be the kind that amounts to a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. Submission to the court’s
jurisdiction takes the form of an
appearance that seeks affirmative relief
except when the relief sought is for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant.
iv. Jurisprudence states that jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is required
only in action in personam. Jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite in an action in rem and quasi
in rem. However, despite the fact that
jurisdiction over the person is not required
in actions in rem and quasi in rem,
summons must still be served upon the
defendant not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirement
(Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296
SCRA 539).
v. An objection to the jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant may be raised as
a ground for a motion to dismiss. If the
objection is not raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, the objection to
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the jurisdiction over the person is deemed
waived by virtue of the provisions of
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
vi. A party contesting the court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may also raised other defenses.
The rule allows the raising of defenses in
addition to lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant without creating
an inference of a voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court. Section 20,
Rule 14 provides:
Voluntary Appearance—The
defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary
appearance.
David v. Agtibay (2015)
FACTS: Petitioner Renato David migrated to
Canada in 1974 and became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. When he retired, he and his spouse
returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot in
Oriental Mindoro, and constructed a residential
house therein. However, in 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built the house
is public land.
Petitioner then filed a Miscellaneous
Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay
opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against the
petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9225.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
issued its Resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioner for falsification and recommended
the filing of the corresponding information in the
MTC. Upon the filing of the Information in the MTC,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-
Determination of Probable Cause therein. The MTC
denied the motion, holding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
because at the time he was said to have committed
the crime, he was still a Canadian citizen. His
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over
petitioner.
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HELD: Yes.
As a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Thus, the MTC obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-
Determination of Probable Cause.
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in
narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person
nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies
for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody
of the law.
The voluntary appearance of the
accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his
pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion
to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise
of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the
same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
There is a distinction between custody of
the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as
when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files
a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant.
On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
Considering that petitioner sought
affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly
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erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his
person.
Miranda v. Tuliao (2006)
FACTS: SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander
Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City were charged with the murders of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is under the witness
protection program.
The Manila RTC convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The
case was appealed to the Supreme Court which
acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Subsequently, SPO2 Maderal was
arrested, and executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo
B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao. Private respondent Tuliao then filed a
criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted
the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan
issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an
urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or
quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6
July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said
urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. This
was sustained by the Court of Appeals, which ruled
that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio
cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not
yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty
at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of
arrest."
Petitioners counter the finding of the
Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is required only in
applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on their
motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was already acquired
by the court by their filing of the above Urgent
Motion.
ISSUE: Whether RTC had jurisdiction over
petitioners.
HELD: Yes.
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As a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
There is, however, an exception to the
rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of
arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact
that failure to file them would constitute a waiver
of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. The third is a consequence of the fact that
it is the very legality of the court process forcing
the submission of the person of the accused that is
the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest.
In sum, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even though
there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.
Custody of the law is required before the court can
act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as
when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files
a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant.
On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
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In cases not involving the so-called
special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. CA (1991)
FACTS: Petitioner Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.
filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an ex parte application
for a writ of preliminary attachment, against
Queensland Hotel and Teodorico Adarna.
The trial court granted the ex parte
application and fixed the attachment bond at
P4,600,513.37. Davao Light submitted the
attachment bond, and the court issued the writ of
attachment.Thereafter, the summons and a copy
of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment
and a copy of the attachment bond, were served
on defendants Queensland and Adarna, and
pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized properties
belonging to the latter.
Defendants Queensland and Adarna filed
a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of
jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time
the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3,
1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,
1989), the trial court had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of
the defendants. The trial court denied the motion.
The defendants filed a special civil action
of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the trial court’s decision and ordered the
attachment discharged.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of preliminary
attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant
before the court has acquired jurisdiction over his
person by service of summons or voluntary
submission to the Court's authority.
HELD: Yes.
An action or proceeding is commenced by
the filing of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter or nature of the action or
proceeding is invoked or called into activity; and
it is thus that the court acquires jurisdiction over
said subject matter or nature of the action. And it
is by that self-same act of the plaintiff (or
petitioner) of filing the complaint (or other
appropriate pleading) — by which he signifies his
submission to the court's power and authority —
that jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his
person. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is obtained by the service
of summons or other coercive process upon him or
by his voluntary submission to the authority of the
court.
It is incorrect to theorize that after an
action or proceeding has been commenced and
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been
vested in the court, but before the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
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(either by service of summons or his voluntary
submission to the court's authority), nothing can
be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is
wrong to assume that the validity of acts done
during this period should be held in suspension
until the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the
defendant's person. The obtention by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one
thing; quite another is the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over
the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the
res or object hereof.
The events that follow the filing of the
complaint as a matter of routine are well known.
After the complaint is filed, summons issues to the
defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the
sheriff, and finally, service of the summons is
effected on the defendant in any of the ways
authorized by the Rules of Court. There is thus
ordinarily some appreciable interval of time
between the day of the filing of the complaint and
the day of service of summons of the defendant.
During this period, different acts may be done by
the plaintiff or by the Court, which are
unquestionable validity and propriety. Among
these, for example, are the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the grant of authority to the
plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant,
the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as
a matter of right without leave of court,
authorization by the Court of service of summons
by publication, the dismissal of the action by the
plaintiff on mere notice.
This, too, is true with regard to the
provisional remedies of preliminary attachment,
preliminary injunction, receivership or replevin.
They may be validly and properly applied for and
granted even before the defendant is summoned
or is heard from.
It goes without saying that whatever be
the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, as
above indicated — issuance of summons, order of
attachment and writ of attachment — and however
valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do
not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until
and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his
voluntary submission to the court's authority.
Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of
attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicant's
affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of
attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of
Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said
defendant as well as a copy of the complaint.
Service of all such documents is indispensable not
only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, but also upon
considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant
of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds
therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to
prevent attachment of his property by the posting
of a counterbond in an amount equal to the
plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to
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Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it
by causing dismissal of the complaint itself on any
of the grounds set forth in Rule 16, or
demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's
affidavit or bond in accordance with Section 13,
Rule 57.
In the case at bar, the summons and a
copy of the complaint, as well as the order and writ
of attachment and the attachment bond were
served on the defendant.
The Supreme Court reiterates and
reaffirms that writs of attachment may properly
issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied
that the relevant requisites therefor have been
fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its
discretion, require prior hearing on the application
with notice to the defendant; but that levy on
property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not
be validly effected unless preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service on
the defendant of summons, a copy of the
complaint, the application for attachment (if not
incorporated in but submitted separately from the
complaint), the order of attachment, and the
plaintiff's attachment bond.
Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles (2012)
FACTS: Respondent Constantino Angeles filed a
complaint for ejectment against petitioner Fe
Salvador. The complaint was filed in the name of
respondent, but another person, Rosauro Diaz,
was the one who executed the verification and
certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging
therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact.
In her Answer, petitioner Salvador
raiused the issue of Diaz's authority to file the case,
as there was no copy of any document attached to
the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding
the authority supposedly granted to him. On
December 11, 1995, more than a year after the
complaint was filed, respondent attached to his
Reply and/or Comment to Respondent's (herein
petitioner) Position Paper, a document entitled
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) supposedly
executed by respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz.
The MTC ruled in favor of respondent and
ordered petitioner Salvador to vacate the property.
Petitioner filed an appeal and alleged that Diaz,
who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no
authority whatsoever from respondent Angeles at
the time of filing of the suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint.
HELD: No.
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, the
Court categorically stated that "[i]f a complaint is
filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who
is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not
deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not
produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."
This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines
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Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company,
where the Court went on to say that "[i]n order for
the court to have authority to dispose of the case
on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party
should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction.
Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with
the [MeTC], the same did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of respondent [plaintiff before the
lower court]."
In this case, the subject SPA presented
by respondent Angeles was executed only on
November 16, 1994, or more than a month after
the complaint was filed, appearing to have been
notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara
County. Further, there was no certification from
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A, that said person is indeed a
notary public in Santa Clara County, California.
Verily, the court cannot give full faith and credit to
the official acts of said Robert McGuire, and hence,
no evidentiary weight or value can be attached to
the document designated as an SPA dated
November 16, 1994. Thus, there is nothing on
record to show that Diaz had been authorized by
respondent to initiate the action against petitioner.
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings,
therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction
over this case and all proceedings before it were
null and void. The courts could not have delved into
the very merits of the case, because legally, there
was no complaint to speak of. The court's
jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been
invoked at all.
2. ESTOPPEL TO DENY JURISDICTION
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (1968)
Facts: Plaintiffs filed for recovery of Php1,908, with legal
interest, against defendants. A writ of attachment was
issued against defendants' properties, but the same was
soon dissolved when defendants filed a counter bond.
Court of First Instance (CFI) rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and
executory, a writ of execution against the defendants was
issued. The writ having been returned unsatisfied,
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the Surety's bond. Upon failure of the Surety to
satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion
for execution against the counterbond. Surety moved to
quash the writ but was denied, it appealed to CA without
raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed CFI’s
decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of
Judiciary Act of 1948, which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions
where the value of the subject-matter does not exceed
Php2,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether the surety bond is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI for the first time
upon appeal.
HELD: Yes. From the time the Surety became a quasi-
party, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of the present
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action by reason of the sum of money involved. It failed
to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in
the CFI as well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of
laches or of “stale demands” is based on public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor (2005)
Facts: In May 1991, Custodio, Rufo, Tomos and Honorio,
all surnamed Balane (the “Balane’s”) filed a complaint for
Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of
Construction and Damages against Bertuldo Hinog
(“Bertuldo”). In July 1991, Bertuldo filed his answer
alleging ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 July 1980, executed by one
Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of
private respondents. Pre-trial and trial ensued. In
November 1997, the Balane’s rested their case and
Bertuldo started his direct examination. However, in June
1998, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
Bertuldo was later substituted by his heirs, who, through
counsel, filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the
record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that
private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the
amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct
docket fees. The trial court granted the motion to
expunge. In May 1999, the heirs of Betuldo filed their
supplemental pleading, appending therein a Deed of Sale
dated 15 November 1982. After paying the deficiency in
the docket fees, the trial court granted the Balane’s
prayer for reinstatement of the case. On 14 July 1999,
Bertuldo’s heirs manifested that the trial court having
expunged the complaint and nullified all court
proceedings, there is no valid case and the complaint
should not be admitted for failure to pay the correct
docket fees; that there should be no case to be reinstated
and no case to proceed as there is no complaint filed.
Issue: Whether the heirs of Bertuldo can question the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the case
Held: No. After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial
court by seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve
supplemental pleading upon the Balane’s, the heirs of
Bertuldo are effectively barred by estoppel from
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. If a party invokes
the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge
the court’s jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise
would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation,
which is against the policy of the Court.
It is also worth noting that when Bertuldo filed
his Answer on 2 July 1991, he did not raise the issue of
lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket
fees. Instead, he based his defense on a claim of
ownership and participated in the proceedings before the
trial court. It was only on 22 September 1998 or more
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than seven years after filing the answer, and under the
auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised for the first time in the motion to expunge by
Bertuldo’s heirs.
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all
stages of the case before the trial court and even invoked
the trial courts authority in order to ask for affirmative
relief, petitioners, considering that they merely stepped
into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred
by estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law,
it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from
raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.
Soliven v. Fastforms (2004)
FACTS: Fastforms, through its president Escobar,
obtained a loan from Soliven in the amount of
Php170,000.00, payable within 21 days, with an interest
of 3%, as evidenced by a promissory note executed by
Escobar. Fastforms issued a postdated check in favor of
Soliven. Three (3) weeks later, Fastforms advised Soliven
not to deposit the check as the account has insufficient
funds. Instead, Fastforms proposed to Soliven that
amount dure be rolled-over, with a monthly interest of
5%. Soliven agreed to the proposal. Subsequently,
Fastforms issued several checks in the total sum in favor
of Soliven as payment for interests. Later, despite
Soliven’s repeated demands, Fastforms refused to pay its
principal obligation and interests due. RTC rendered a
decision in Soliven’s favor. Fastforms filed an MR, raising
for the first time that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case since the dispute (principal obligation) does not
exceed Php200,000.00, and such should be within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC denied the MR. Upon appeal,
however, CA reversed the order of the RTC and said that
it lacked jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
HELD: Yes.
The main cause of action is for the recovery of
sum of money amounting to only Php195,155.00. The
damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the
consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they
are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount.
It is clear that MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.
However, while it is true that jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, this rule presupposes that estoppel
has not supervened. Here, respondent actively
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the
RTC and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative
relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging
the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse
judgment has been rendered.
Defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for
the first time on appeal
Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus (2014)
FACTS: Telesforo Julao (Telesforo) filed before the DENR,
two Townsite Sales Applications (TSA). Upon his death,
his applications were transferred to his heirs. In 1976,
Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer of
Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property
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covered by one of the TSA, to respondent spouses De
Jesus. In 1986, Solito went missing. In 1998, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in favor of the heirs
of Telesforo. Petitioners, representing themselves to be
the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the RTC Baguio, a
complaint or recovery of possession of real property
against respondent spouses. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. CA reversed the decision on two grounds: (1)
failure on the part of petitioners to identify the property
sought to be recovered; and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: None.
Since petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the
CA correctly dismissed the complaint as petitioners failed
to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact,
since the assessed value of the property was not alleged,
it cannot be determined which trial court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The assessed value must be alleged in the
complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over
the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, which
contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a
plaintiff’s cause of action.
Furthermore, the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.
Intramuros Administration v. Offshore
Construction Development Co. (2018)
FACTS: Intramuros leased three (3) real properties of
the national government to Offshore Construction.
However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism
(DOT) halted Offshore Construction's projects due to its
nonconformity with P.D. No. 1616, which required
Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area. Offshore
Construction filed a complaint against Intramuros and
DOT before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila. Eventually,
the parties executed a Compromise Agreement which the
RTC approved. In the Compromise Agreement, the
parties affirmed the validity of the two (2) lease contracts.
Thereafter, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility
bills and rental fees. Intramuros tolerated Offshore
Construction’s continuing occupation. To settle its
arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the DOT's
monthly operational expenses at the Baluarte Plano
Luneta de Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and DOT accepted the
offer. However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to
pay its arrears. Intramuros filed a complaint for ejectment
before Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) Manila. Offshore
Construction filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the MTC
granted. The MTC found that while a motion to dismiss is
a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, Offshore Construction's motion was grounded
on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
MTC held that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
While there were lease contracts between the parties, the
existence of the other contracts between them made
Intramuros and Offshore Construction's relationship as
one of concession.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes.
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The MTC erred in finding that it did not have
jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint because the
parties’ situation has allegedly become “more
complicated” than one of lease. Respondent’s defense
that its relationship with petitioner is one of concession
rather than lease does not determine whether or not MTC
has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The pleas or
theories set up by a defendant in its answer or motion to
dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction.
To determine the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint
must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be
evident on the face of the complaint. Regardless of the
claims or defenses raised by a defendant, MTC has
jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint once it has been
shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been
alleged, such as in this case.
Anama v. Citibank, N.A. (2017)
FACTS: In consideration for a loan obtained from
respondent First National City Bank of New York (now
Citibank, N.A.) (Citibank), on November 10, 1972,
petitioner Douglas F. Anama (Anama) executed a
promissory note in the amount of ₱418,000.00 in favor of
Citibank. As security, Anama also executed in favor of
Citibank a chattel mortgage over various industrial
machineries and equipment. Anama failed to pay the
monthly installments urging Citibank to file a complaint
for sum of money and replevin. Upon proof of default of
Anama, RTC issued an Order of Replevin over the
machineries and equipment covered by the chattel
mortgage, which the RTC granted.
Anama then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction with the CA
on the ground that said RTC resolution was issued in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
because of the lack of evidence proving Citibank's right to
possession over the properties subject of the chattel
mortgage. The CA granted the petition (“CA 1982
Decision”). Aggrieved, Citibank filed its Petition for review
on certiorari.
Meanwhile, on November 19, 1981, during the
pendency of the case, the fourth floor of the Manila City
Hall, where Branch 11 of the RTC of Manila and its records
were located, was destroyed by fire. Upon the Order of
the RTC, all pending incidents were suspended. On March
12, 2009, Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment
with the CA seeking the revival of the CA 1982 Decision.
In its comment, Citibank argued, among others, that the
petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of
judgment is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC. The CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction
ruling that the petition should have been filed with the
appropriate Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying Anama’s
petition to revive judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
HELD: No.
As an action for revival of judgment is a new
action with a new cause of action, the rules on instituting
and commencing actions apply, including the rules on
jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional requirements are not
dependent on the previous action and the petition does
not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which
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rendered judgment. On the other hand, jurisdiction is
defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear,
try and decide cases. What determines the jurisdiction of
the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
Held: Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private
respondents filed the petition for adoption on September
25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.

The principle is that jurisdiction over the subject VI. JURISDICTION OF COURTS IN CIVIL
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by CASES
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs A. SUPREME COURT (SC)
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
on the allegations contained in the complaint of the mandamus against the:
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is i. Court of Appeals (CA) (Section
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims 17, R.A. No. 296; Rule 65);
asserted. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, ii. Commission on Elections
the established rule is that the statute in force at the time (COMELEC) (Rule 64);
of the commencement of the action determines the iii. Commission on Audit (COA) (Rule
jurisdiction of the court. Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 64); and
129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization iv. Sandiganbayan.
Act of 1980 and its amendments, is the law which confers
jurisdiction to the courts. 2. Concurrent jurisdiction, subject to the hierarchy
of courts with:
As noted in Section 9 of BP 129, an action for a. With the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in
revival is not one the enumerated cases under the cases affecting ambassadors, other public
jurisdiction of the CA. Clearly, the CA is without ministers and consuls (Section 17, R.A. No.
jurisdiction to hear and decide the action for revival of 296 in relation to Section 21(b), B.P. Blg.
judgment filed by Anama. 129).

3. JURISDICTION AT THE TIME OF FILING OF b. With the CA, in

ACTION i. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus against the RTC
Cang v. Court of Appeals (1998) (Section 5 (1), Article 8, 1987
Constitution; Section 9(1), B.P.
Facts: Herbert Cang (“Cang”) and Anna Marie Clavano Blg. 129); and
(“Anna Marie”) were married in 1973 and begot three (3) ii. Petitions for a Writ of Kalikasan
children. Later, Cang was able to secure a divorce decree (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).
from Anna Marie in the United States (US). The US court
issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody c. With the RTC and CA:
of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving i. Petitions for Habeas Corpus
"rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to (Section 5 (1), Article 8, 1987
Cang. While in the US, Cang remitted a portion of his Constitution; Section 9(1), B.P.
salary to the Philippines for his children's expenses and Blg. 129; and Section 21(a), B.P.
another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children. Blg. 129);
Meanwhile, in September 1987, Anna Marie’s brother and ii. Petitions for Quo Warranto
sister-in-law filed an action for the adoption of Cang and (Section 5 (1), Article 8, 1987
Anna Marie’s three (3) minor children. Attached to the Constitution; Section 9(1), B.P.
application was Anna Marie’s consent to the adoption. Blg. 129; and Section 21(a), B.P.
Upon knowing this, Cang returned to the Philippines and Blg. 129); and
opposed the adoption. iii. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus against inferior
However, the trial court granted the petition for courts and other bodies (Section
adoption, and which ruling was affirmed by the Court of 5 (1), Article 8, 1987
Appeals. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled Constitution; Section 9(1), B.P.
that Anna Marie’s consent was sufficient compliance with Blg. 129; and Section 21(a), B.P.
the requisites of Article 188 of the Family Code, Blg. 129).
considering that Cang had already abandoned his children
Cang elevated his case to the Supreme Court, alleging d. With the RTC, CA & Sandiganbayan
that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it i. Petitions for a Writ of Amparo
did not have his written consent as a natural father as (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC); and
required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, ii. Petitions for a Writ of Habeas
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).
the Family Code.
3. Appellate jurisdiction
Issue: Whether the Child and Youth Welfare Code or the a. By way of Appeal by Certiorari (Rule 45)of
Family Code should govern the petition for adoption of the decisions of the:
Cang’s three (3) children i. CA;
ii. Sandiganbayan;
iii. RTC on pure questions of law;

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iv. In cases involving the - Securities and Exchange

constitutionality or validity of a Commission;
law or treaty, international - Social Security
agreement or executive Commission;
agreement, law, presidential - Employees Compensation
decree, proclamation, order, Commission;
instruction, ordinance or - Civil Service Commission;
regulation, legality of a tax, - Office of the Ombudsman
impost, assessment, toll or in administrative
penalty, jurisdiction of a lower disciplinary cases; and
court (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, - Other bodies mentioned in
Constitution); and Rule 43; and
v. Court of Tax Appeals en banc. iv. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the MTCs in
B. COURT OF APPEALS cadastral or land registration
(B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7902) cases pursuant to its delegated
jurisdiction.
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of the RTC (Section C. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS and MUNICIPAL
9(2), B.P. Blg. 129). TRIAL COURTS
(B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
2. Concurrent jurisdiction with:
a. The SC: MUNICIPAL
i. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition REGIONAL
CIVIL TRIAL
or mandamus against the RTC; TRIAL COURTS
CASES COURTS
ii. Petitions for a Writ of Kalikasan; If the gross value,
and If the gross value,
claim, or demand
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition claim, or demand
iii. does not exceed
or mandamus against the NLRC exceeds P300,000
P300,000 (outside
(but according to the SC in St. (outside Metro
Metro Manila), or
Martin Funeral Homes v. CA (G.R. Manila), or
does not exceed
No. 130866, September 16, exceeds P400,000
P400,000 (Metro
1998), all such petitions should (Metro Manila):
Manila):
be initially filed in the CA in strict 1. Actions involving personal property
observance of the rule on depending on the value;
hierarchy of courts. The 2. Admiralty and maritime cases
concurrent original jurisdiction of depending on the amount of demand
the SC can be availed of only or claim;
under compelling and exceptional 3. Probate proceedings (testate or
circumstances (Regalado, p. 40). intestate) depending on the gross
value of the estate;
b. The SC and RTC: 4. Demand for money depending on the
i. Petitions for Habeas Corpus; amount.
ii. Petitions for Quo Warranto; and
iii. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition NOTE: Exclusive of Interest, Damages
or mandamus against inferior of whatever kind, Attorney’s fees,
courts and other bodies. Litigation Expenses, and Costs
Exclusive
(IDALEC), the amount of which must
c. With the RTC, SC and Sandiganbayan: Original
be specifically alleged, but the filing
i. Petitions for a Writ of Amparo; fees thereon shall be paid.
and
ii. Petitions for a Writ of Habeas NOTE: The exclusion of the term
Data. “damages of whatever kind” applies to
cases where the damages are merely
d. Appellate jurisdiction (Section 9(3), B.P. incidental to or a consequence of the
Blg. 129): main cause of action. However, in
i. By way of Ordinary Appeal from cases where the claim for damages is
the RTC and the Family Courts; the main cause of action, the amount
ii. By way of Petition for Review of such claim shall be considered in
from the RTC rendered in the determining the jurisdiction of the
exercise of its appellate court (Administrative Circular No. 09-
jurisdiction; 94).
iii. By way of Petition for Review If the assessed If the assessed
from the final judgments, value or interest in value or interest
decisions, resolutions, orders or the real property in the real
awards of any quasi-judicial exceeds P20,000 property does
agency in the exercise of its (outside Metro not exceed
quasi-judicial functions, such as Manila), or P20,000
the: exceeds P50,000 (outside Metro
(Metro Manila): Manila), or does

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not exceed Code to hear A.M. No.

P50,000 (Metro and decide: 02-11-09-
Manila): a. Devices or SC,
5. Actions involving title to or schemes effective
possession of real property, or any employed by November
interest therein depending on the or any acts of 25, 2002).
assessed value. the board of
6. Actions the 6. Inclusion and directors,
subject matter exclusion of business
of which is voters (BP associates,
incapable of 881, its officers or
pecuniary Sec.138); partnership,
estimation. amounting to
7. Those covered fraud and
The basic issue in by the Rules misrepresent
an action on Summary ation;
incapable of Procedure b. Intra-
pecuniary corporate
estimation is one controversies
other than the a. Forcible ;
recovery of Entry and c. Controversies
money. In this Unlawful in the
kind of action, the Detainer elections or
money claim is appointments
merely incidental of directors,
(Singsong v. NOTE: With trustees,
Isabela Sawmill, jurisdiction to officers or
G.R. No. L- resolve issue of managers of
27343, February ownership to corporations,
28, 1979), determine only partnerships
the issue of or
NOTE: Annulment possession; associations;
of judgments of d. Petitions of
the RTC is also an NOTE: corporations,
action which is Irrespective of partnerships
incapable of the amount of or
pecuniary damages or associations
estimation but is unpaid rentals to be
cognizable by the sought to be declared in a
CA by express recovered; state of
mandate of BP suspension of
129. In other NOTE: Where payments.
words, all actions attorney’s fees SC may designate Petition for
which are are awarded, the certain branches Habeas Corpus or
incapable of same shall not of RTC to try application for
pecuniary exceed P20,000. exclusively bail in criminal
estimation is criminal cases, cases in the
cognizable by the b. Other civil juvenile and absence of all
RTC except the cases, domestic relations RTC judges in the
annulment of except cases, agrarian province or city.
Special
judgments of the probate cases, urban land
RTC. proceedings reform cases not
, where the falling w/in the
7. Cases not within total jurisdiction of any
the exclusive amount of quasi-judicial body
jurisdiction of the and other special
any court, plaintiff’s cases in the
tribunal, person claim does interest of justice.
or body not exceed
exercising PhP100,000 With the SC
judicial or or does not Actions affecting
quasi-judicial exceed ambassadors,
functions PhP200,000 public ministers
(General in Metro and consuls.
Jurisdiction of Manila, Concurrent --------
RTC); exclusive of With the SC and
interests CA
8. Under Sec. 5.2 and costs
of the Securities (as a. Petitions for
and Regulations amended by Habeas Corpus

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ESGUERRA NOTES

; D. FAMILY COURTS (R.A. No. 8369)

b. Petitions for
Quo Warranto; 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction
a. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children,
c. Petitions for habeas corpus in relation to the custody of
certiorari, children;
prohibition or
mandamus N.B. The SC and the CA have not been
against inferior deprived of their original jurisdiction to issue
courts and other writs of habeas corpus. Writs of habeas corpus
bodies. which may be issued exclusively by family
courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
With the SC, CA the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in
and conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
Sandiganbayan under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other
a. Petitions for a words, the issuance of the writ is merely
Writ of Amparo; ancillary to the custody case pending before the
b. Petitions for a family court. The writ must be issued by the
Writ of Habeas same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction,
Data. conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal
court and judicial instability. – Madrian v.
Madrian, G.R. No. 159374, 12 July 2007. See
also In the Matter of Application for the Issuance
With the of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Richard Brian
Insurance Thornton v. Adelfa Thornton, G.R. No. 154598,
Commissioner 16 August 2004)
Claims not
exceeding b. Petitions for adoption of children and the
PhP100,000. revocation thereof;
All cases decided c. Complaints for annulment and declaration of
by the lower nullity of marriage, matters relating to marital
courts in their status and property relations of husband & wife
respective or those living together under different status or
territorial agreement, and petitions for dissolution of
Appellate jurisdiction except --------- conjugal partnership of gains;
decisions of lower d. Support and/or acknowledgment;
courts in the e. Summary judicial proceedings under the Family
exercise of Code; and
delegated f. Petition for declaration of status of children,
jurisdiction. voluntary or involuntary commitment of
May be assigned children, matters relating to parental authority
by the SC to hear and other cases cognizable under PD 603, EO
cadastral or land 56 (series of 1996) and other related laws.
registration cases
where there is no 2. Special provisional remedies:
controversy or a. In cases of violence among the family members
Delegated ------ living in the same domicile or household, the
opposition over
the land or in Family Court may issue a restraining order
case of contested against the accused or defendant upon verified
lands, the value application by the complainant or the victim for
does not exceed relief from abuse.
P100,000. b. The court may order the temporary custody of
children in all civil actions for their custody,
N.B. Under Section 5, R.A. No. 7691 (approved on 25 support pendente lite, including deduction from
March 1994), the amounts which determine the the salary, and use of conjugal home and other
jurisdiction of the RTC under Section 19 (3), (4) and (8) properties in all civil actions for support.
of B.P. Blg. 129 were as follows:
a. From 25 March 1994 to 25 March 1999: exceeds E. Special Courts
P100,000 – outside Metro Manila, and exceeds
P200,000 – inside Metro Manila; a. Sandiganbayan
b. From 26 March 1999 to 26 March 2004: exceeds (P.D. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No. 7975
P200,000 – outside Metro Manila, and exceeds and R.A. No. 8249)
P400,000 – inside Metro Manila; and
c. From 27 March 2004 to present: exceeds 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases
P300,000 – outside Metro Manila, and exceeds filed pursuant to and in connection with E.O No.
P400,000 – inside Metro Manila. 1, 2 14 and 14-A (Sequestration cases) issued
in 1986.
Accordingly, if the amount of the claim does not
exceed the abovementioned amounts during the relevant 2. Concurrent jurisdiction with:
periods, the MTC shall have jurisdiction. RTC, CA and SC in:

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i. Petitions for a Writ of Amparo;
and
ii. Petitions for a Writ of Habeas
Data.
3. Original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petition of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising
or that may arise in cases file or which may be
filed under E.O. Nos. 1, 2 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986 PROVIDED, that the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
supreme Court.
b. Court of Tax Appeals R.A. No. 9282
1. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided:
a. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue or
other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
b. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial;
c. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in
the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
d. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges,
seizure, detention or release of property
affected, fines, forfeitures or other
penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or
other laws administered by the Bureau of
Customs;
e. Decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the
provincial or city board of assessment
appeals;
f. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on
customs cases elevated to him
automatically for review from decisions of
the Commissioner of Customs which are
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adverse to the Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
g. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and 302,
respectively, of the Tariff and Customs
Code, and safeguard measures under
Republic Act No. 8800, where either party
may appeal the decision to impose or not
to impose said duties.
F. Quasi-judicial bodies
a. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
(Sec. 5.2, RA 8799, Securities Regulation
Code)
The SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has
been transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or
the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The cases covered
by this provision have been included in the table above.
b. Civil Service Commission
Magpale vs. CSC (1992)
Facts : Magpale is an employee of the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA). A formal charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit
of Private Business without permission as required by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, Frequent and
Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of Duty was filed
against him. A Decision was rendered by the Secretary of
the DOTC finding him guilty of Gross Negligence on two
counts: (a) for his failure to account for the forty-four
(44) assorted units of equipment, among them a Sony
Betamax and a TV Camera, and (b) for failing to render
the required liquidation of his cash advances amounting
to P44,877.00 for a period of four years. He was also
found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences.
Accordingly, he was meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service with the corresponding accessory penalties.
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid Decision was denied in the DOTC's Order, he
appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board
(MSPB) of Civil Service Commission. The MSPB rendered
a Decision reversing the Decision of the DOTC. The PPA
filed an appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, and
the latter office indorsed the appeal to respondent CSC.
Magpale filed a Motion to Dismiss the PPA’s appeal
claiming among others that the CSC has no jurisdiction
over said appeal.
Issue: Whether a decision exonerating a government
employee from administrative liability and reinstating him
to his former position is appealable to the to the CSC
Held: No. While it is true, as contended by respondent
Civil Service Commission that under Section 12 (par. 11),
Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Book V of Executive Order 292, the
CSC does have the power to —
Hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or
Page 17
Civil Procedure
ESGUERRA NOTES
brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions
and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. . . .
The exercise of the power is qualified by and should be
read together with the other sections of the same sub-
title and book of Executive Order 292, particularly Section
49 which prescribes the following requisites for the
exercise of the power of appeal, to wit:
a. the decision must be appealable;
b. the appeal must be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision;
c. the appeal must be made within
fifteen days from receipt of the
decision, unless a petition for the
reconsideration is seasonably filed;
and
d. the notice of appeal must be filed with
the disciplining office, which shall
forward the records of the case,
together with the notice of appeal to
the appellate authority within fifteen
days from filing of the notice of
appeal, with its comments, if any.
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC
shall decide on appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of:
a. a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days; or
b. fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary; or
c. demotion in rank or salary or transfer;
or
d. removal or dismissal from office.
The 5 February 1990 decision of the MSPB did
not involve dismissal or separation from office, rather, the
decision exonerated Magpale and ordered him reinstated
to his former position. Consequently, in the light of our
pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Mendez
v. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service
Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject
of appeal to the CSC.
e. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)
Delos Santos vs. Sps. Sarmiento (2007)
Facts: Spouses Sarmiento agreed to sell to
Santos a residential lot. Of the P842,000.00 purchase
price, P300,000.00 shall be paid by Santos at the time of
the execution of the Contract to Buy and Sell and the
remaining balance to be paid within five (5) years at a
monthly amortization. Before the purchase price could be
paid in full, Santos and Spouses Sarmiento entered into a
Cancellation of Contract to Buy and Sell of wherein
Spouses Sarmiento agreed to refund Santos the
P584,355.10 remitted by the latter, while Santos agreed
to surrender possession of the lot to former. On 14 July
1999, Santos wrote Spouses Sarmiento, demanding
refund of P760,000.00 with interest. Spouses
Sarmiento wrote back that they intend to refund the
amount within 90 days. When Spouses Sarmiento failed
to refund Santos, the latter filed with the HLURB a
Complaint, to enforce the cancellation of contract and
demand payment of the refund plus interest and
damages. Arbiter San Vicente issued an Order dated 7
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June 2000, declaring respondents therein in default for
failure to file an answer despite notice. It is noted,
however, that the respondent named in the 7 June
2000 Order is IA-JAN Sarmiento Realty, Inc. (IJSRI), not
Spouses Sarmiento.
Issue: Does the HLURB have jurisdiction over all
cancellations of contracts of sale involving a parcel of
residential land?
Held: No. The scope and limitation of the jurisdiction of
the HLURB is well-defined. Its precursor, the National
Housing Authority (NHA), was vested under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 957 with exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business, specifically
the registration of subdivision or condominium
projects and dealers, brokers and salesmen of subdivision
lots or condominium units; issuance and suspension of
license to sell; and revocation of registration certificate
and license to sell. Its jurisdiction was later expanded
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344 of April 2,
1978, to include adjudication of the following cases:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function
to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis
ours.)
………
At present, therefore, it is clear that the
jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is
determined by the nature of the cause of action, the
subject matter or property involved and the parties.
The cases over which HLURB has jurisdiction are
those arising from either unsound real estate business
practices, or claims for refund or other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman, or
demands for specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the own
er, developer, broker or salesman.
In addition, these cases must involve a
subdivision project, subdivision lot, condominium project
or condominium unit. A subdivision project or subdivision
lot is defined under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 957, thus:
Section 2 x x x
D. Subdivision project Subdivision
project shall mean a tract or a parcel
of land registered under Act No. 496
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which is partitioned primarily for
residential purposes into individual
lots with or without improvements
thereon, and offered to the public for
sale, in cash or in installment terms. It
shall include all residential,
commercial, industrial and
recreational areas as well as open
spaces and other community and
public areas in the project.
E. Subdivision lot. Subdivision lot shall
mean any of the lots, whether
residential, commercial, industrial, or
recreational, in a subdivision project.
In quite a number of cases, we declared the
HLURB without jurisdiction where the complaint filed did
not allege that the property involved is a subdivision or
condominium project or a subdivision lot or condominium
unit.
Going back to the jurisdictional requirements, it
is also important that, with reference to cases arising
from a claim for refund or specific performance, said
cases must be filed by the subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer or owner against the subdivision or
condominium project owner, developer, broker or
salesman. Cases filed by buyers or owners of property
which is not alleged to be a subdivision or condominium
property do not fall within the jurisdiction of the HLURB
for the complainants in said cases are treated as ordinary
real estate buyers or owners, not subdivision or
condomium buyers or owners.
What about cases filed by subdivision or
condominium project owners or developers against their
buyers? The rules on this matter differ.
The general rule is stated in Pilar Development
Corporation v. Villarand Suntay v. Gocolay where we held
that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by
subdivision or condominium owners or developers against
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers or
owners. The rationale behind this can be found in the
wordings of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344, which expressly
qualifies that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are
those instituted by subdivision or condomium buyers or
owners against the project developer or owner. This
rationale is also expressed in the preambles of P.D. No.
957 and P.D. No. 1344 which state that the policy of the
law is to curb unscrupulous practices in real estate trade
and business.[52]
The only instance that HLURB may take
cognizance of a case filed by the developer is when said
case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim to a
pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a
subdivision lot or condominium unit. We allowed this
in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip in order to forestall
splitting of causes of action.
To summarize, not every case involving buyers
and sellers of real estate may be filed with the HLURB. Its
jurisdiction is limited to those cases filed by the buyer or
owner of a subdivision or condominium and based on any
of the causes of action enumerated under Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1344, and which jurisdictional facts must be
clearly alleged in the complaint.
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VII. KINDS OF ACTION
An “action” is the legal and formal demand of
one’s right from another person made and insisted upon
in a court of justice (Hermanos v. de la Riva, G.R. No. L-
19827, 6 April 1923). A “civil action” is one by which a
party sue another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong (Rule 1,
Section 3(a)).
1. As to cause or foundation
a. Personal
i. An action which is not founded upon
the privity of real rights or real
property.
ii. In a personal action, the plaintiff
generally seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of
a contract or the recovery of damages.
iii. Personal action is one brought for the
recovery of personal property, for the
enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or
for the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person
or property (Go v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, G.R. No. 156187, 11
November 2004).
b. Real
i. An action is “real” when it affects title
to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein. All other actions are
personal.
ii. An action is real when it is founded
upon the privity of real estate. That
means that realty, or an interest
therein is the subject matter of the
action.
iii. Not every action, however, involving a
real property is a real action because
the realty may only be incidental to
the subject matter of the suit. To be a
real action it is not enough that the
action must deal with real property. It
is important that the matter in
litigation must also involve any of the
following issues: title to, ownership,
possession, partition, foreclosure of
mortgage, or any interest in real
property.
Importance of distinction between personal action
and real action
• The distinction between a real action and a personal
action is important for the purpose of determining
the venue of the action. Questions involving the
propriety or impropriety of a particular venue are
resolved by initially determining the nature of the
action.
• A real action is local, i.e., its venue depends upon the
location of the property involved in the litigation.
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• A personal action is transitory, i.e., its venue
depends upon the residence of the plaintiff or the
defendant. A personal action may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff.
2. As to object
a. In rem
i. An action in rem is an action against
the thing itself instead of against the
person.
ii. A judgment in rem is binding upon the
whole world, such as a judgment in a
land registration case or probate of
will.
iii. In an action in rem jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.
b. In personam
i. An proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction
of the person, although it may involve
his right to, or the exercise of
ownership of, specific property, or
seek to compel him to control or
dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court.
ii. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose through the
judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon
the person of the defendant (Domagas
v. Jensen, 448 SCRA 663).
iii. An action in personam is an action
against a person on the basis of his
personal liability.
iv. An action in personam is said to be
one which has for its object a
judgment against the person.
c. Quasi in rem
i. An action quasi in rem is one wherein
an individual is named as defendant
and the purpose of the proceeding is
to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the
property. (Asiavest Limited v. Court of
Appeals, 296 SCRA 539).
ii. The object of an action quasi in rem is
the sale or disposition of the property
whether by attachment, foreclosure or
any other form of remedy (Banco
Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil
921). A proceeding quasi in rem is one
brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons
to the discharge of the claims assailed.
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In an action quasi in rem, an individual
is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interests therein to the obligation
or loan burdening the property.
iii. Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a
particular property but which are
intended to operate on these
questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings
and not to ascertain or cut-off the
rights or interests of all possible
claimants (Domagas v. Jensen, 448
SCRA 663).
Significance of distinction between actions in rem,
in personam and quasi in rem
• The distinction is important to determine whether or
not jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
required and consequently to determine the type of
summons to be employed.
• Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide a
case against said defendant where the action is one
in personam but not where the action in in rem or
quasi in rem.
• In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite
to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. In said
action, the court is not concerned with the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In
these actions, it is the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the res which principally matters.
• Although summons is not required in actions in rem
and quasi in rem, nonetheless, summons must be
served upon the defendant not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely fore
satisfying the due process requirement.
VIII.COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
Civil actions are commenced upon filing of the
Complaint (Section 5, Rule 1, Rules of Court). Civil actions
are deemed commenced from the date of the filing and
docketing of the Complaint, without taking into account
the issuance and service of summons (Cabrera v. Tiano,
G.R. No. L-17299, July 31, 1963).
1. Condition Precedent
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW
Under Sections 399-422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book
III, Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, all disputes may be subject of
barangay proceedings for amicable settlement except:
a. Where one party is the government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
b. Where one party is a public officer or
employee; and the disputes relates to the
performance of his judicial functions;
c. xxx xxx xxx
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d. Disputes involving parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such
barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agrees to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
e. Such other classes or disputes which the
president may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice;
f. Where the disputes involve real properties
located in different cities or municipalites
unless the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon; and
g. xxx xxx xxx
h. Sec, 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules provide for additional exception
which is any complaint by or against
corporations, partnerships or juridical
entities.
Lumbuan v. Ronqullo (2006)
The Supreme Court held that although there
was no Pangkat Tagapamayapa constituted to hear the
parties’ claims, as required under R.A. No. 7160, there
was already substantial compliance of the required
conciliation proceedings before the barangay, when the
parties met before the Barangay Chairman to discuss the
possibility of amicable settlement.
Barangay conciliation is a condition precedent to
the filing of an action (Uy v. Contreras, G.R. No.
111416 , 26 September 1994). While failure to
comply with a condition precedent is not
jurisdictional, it may be a ground to dismiss under
Section 1 (j), Rule 16, Rules of Court.
• Non-compliance with the condition precedent of
barangay conciliation does not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over a case where the defendants fail to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction. But such
objection should be seasonably made before the
court first taking cognizance of the complaint, and
must be raised in the Answer, or in such other
pleading allowed under the Rules of Court. (Espino
v. Legarda, G.R. No. 149266, 17 March 2006; Sabay
v. People of the Philippines. (G.R. No. 192150, 1
October 2014).
• Barangay conciliation is a condition precedent for
filing a claim, and compliance of the same must be
alleged in the pleading. Failure to resort to
conciliation is a ground for motion to dismiss for non-
compliance of condition precedent. (Willard Riano,
Civil Procedure 2009 ed., p. 97)
• It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to
comply with the requirement on barangay
conciliation is much the same effect produced by
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-
maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not
ripe for judicial determination. The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. (Aquino
v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008)
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Parties may go directly to court without need of
prior barangay conciliation under Section 412 of
R.A. No. 7110 in the following instances:
a. When the accused is under detention;
b. Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
c. Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property
and support pendente lite; and
d. Where action may otherwise be barred by
the statute of limitations.
2.PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor (2005)
reiterating Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion
(1989)
• While the payment of the prescribed docket fee
is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case,
as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so
when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment.
• Guidelines regarding the payment of filing fees:
- It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the
fees within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
- The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within
a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
- Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee.
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Rule 2
Causes of Action
I. Causes of Action (Sections 1 and 2)
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires that every ordinary civil action must be based on
a cause of action. Section 2 of the same rule defines a
cause of action as an act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another.
In order that one may claim to have a cause of
action, the following elements must concur:
1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and
3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages
or other appropriate relief. In other words, "a
cause of action arises when that should have
been done is not done, or that which should not
have been done is done. (Anchor Savings Bank
v. Furigay, G.R. No. 191178, 13 March 2013)
Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate
Management, Inc. (2009)
Facts: Petitioner-heirs filed for quieting of title and/or
recovery of ownership and possession with preliminary
injunction/restraining order and damages against
respondents Fil-Estate Management Inc. They claimed
that they have been in open, exclusive, and notorious
possession of parcels of land for more than 90 years
until Fil-Estate forcibly ousted them. Fil-Estate
contended that that have in their possession numerous
certificates covering the parcels of land and can only be
attacked collaterally pursuant to PD 1529. The
respondents also filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the petitioners do not have a cause of
action the RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ Complaints state a
cause of action.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that each of the
Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause
of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are
the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to
remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and,
if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. The
petitioners are in open, continuous and notorious
possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than
90 years.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action
is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis
on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed
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regardless of the defense that may be presented by the
defendant. The rule of civil procedure provides the
elements of a cause of action ; 1) a right in favor of a
plaintiff. 2) An obligation on the part of the defend ant to
violate such right. 3) an act or omission on the part of
defendant of the right of the plaintiff which constitutes
such right.
Test of the Sufficiency of the Statement of a Cause of
Action
Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc v. David
(2005)
FACTS: Private respondent Virgilio S. David (“David”), a
supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for specific
performance and damages against MOELCI II, a rural
electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental alleging that he
sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer. In
its Answer to Amended Complaint, MOELCI II pleaded,
among others, affirmative defenses which also constitute
grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds
were lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no
enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II under
the Statute of Frauds pursuant to Section 1 (g) and (i),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and improper venue.
MOELCI II likewise filed with the trial court a Motion (For
Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses and
Deferment of Pre-Trial Conference) (the “Motion”)
arguing that the document attached as Annex "A" to the
Amended Complaint of David was only a quotation letter
and not a perfected contract of sale, as alleged by David.
Thus, it contends that David’s Amended Complaint is
dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. In his
opposition, David argued that because a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
is required to be based only on the allegations of the
complaint, the "quotation letter," being merely an
attachment to the complaint and not part of its
allegations, cannot be inquired into.
The RTC denied the MOELCI II’s motion for
preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses. Aggrieved,
MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals
by way of a special civil action for certiorari, which the CA
dismissed. The CA likewise dismissed MOELCI II’s Motion
for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review1
under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the denial of MOELCI II’s motion is
proper as the court could render a valid judgment verdict
in accordance with the prayer of the David in lieu of the
affirmative defenses raised by MOELCI II.
HELD: Yes.
Considering the affirmative defenses raised by
MOELCI II, the following has been hypothetically admitted
by the parties: (a) that it had entered into a contract sale
where David bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit
10 MVA Power transformer with accessories for a total
price of ₱5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a
total price of ₱2,169,500.00; (b) that despite written and
verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price
thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of
₱272,722.27; and (c) that apart from the previously
stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various
electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands,
has an outstanding balance of ₱281,939.76. Taken
together, the Court believes that the foregoing sufficiently
lay out a cause of action.
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Moreover, Section 6, Rule 16 provides that a
grant of preliminary hearing rests on the sound discretion
of the court. Thus, absent any showing that the trial court
had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with
such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack
of jurisdiction, as in the present case, the trial court’s
order granting or dispensing with the need for a
preliminary hearing may not be corrected by certiorari.
Moreover, MOELCI II’s Motion is anchored on the ground
that the Complaint allegedly stated no cause of action, a
preliminary hearing thereon is more than unnecessary as
it constitutes an erroneous and improvident move. No
error therefore could be ascribed to the trial court in the
denial of such Motion.
In extending its scrutiny, the Court finds that
contrary to MOELCI II’s assertion, Annex "A" is not an
"undisguised quotation letter." While Annex "A" is
captioned as such, the presence of the signatures of both
the General Manager and the Chairman of the Committee
of Management immediately below the word
"CONFORME" appearing on the document’s last page
lends credulity to David’s contention that there was, or
might have been, a meeting of minds on the terms
embodied therein. Thus, the appendage of Annex "A"
does not entirely serve to snuff out David’s claims. In fact,
the ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex "A"
which necessitates a resort to its proper interpretation,
fortifies the propriety of the trial court’s denial of MOELCI
II’s Motion. The interpretation of a document requires
introduction of evidence which is precisely disallowed in
determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of
action. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed
MOELCI II’s petition and upheld the trial court’s ruling.
II. Distinguished from Right of Action
Right of Action is the right to commence and
prosecute an action to obtain the relief sought. (Herrera,
Vol. 1, p. 285, citing 1 C.J.S. 988).
The term "cause of action" has been held to be
synonymous with "right of action” but in the law of
pleading one is distinguished from the other in that a right
of action is a remedial right belonging to some person,
while a cause of action is a formal statement of the
operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The
one is a matter of right and depends on the substantive
law, while the other is a matter of statement and is
governed by the law of procedure. (L.G. Marquez v.
Varela, G.R. No. L-4845, 24 December 1952)
The right of action accrues when there exists a
cause of action. (Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314).
The elements of a right of action are: (a) the
existence of a cause of action; (b) the performance of all
conditions precedent to the brining of the action; and (c)
the right to bring and maintain the action must be in the
person instituting it.
Multi-Realty Development Corporation v.
Condominium Corporation (2006)
FACTS: In the 1970s, Multi-Realty constructed a 26-
storey condominium at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
Fonda Street in Makati City, known as the Makati Tuscany
Condominium Building (Makati Tuscany). Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the
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Condominium Act, the Makati Tuscany Condominium
Corporation (MATUSCO) was organized and established
to manage the condominium units.
The Master Deed was filed with the Register of
Deeds in 1977. Multi-Realty executed a Deed of Transfer
in favor of MATUSCO over these common areas. However,
the Master Deed and the Deed of Transfer did not reflect
or specify the ownership of the 98 parking slots.
Nevertheless, Multi-Realty sold 26 of them in 1977 to
1986 to condominium unit buyers who needed additional
parking slots. MATUSCO did not object, and certificates of
title were later issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of
the buyers. During several meetings of the MATUSCO, the
Board did not agree on the terms of the unallocated
parking slots so, they agreed to hold in abeyance any
decision on the matter.
Meanwhile, the fair market value of the unallocated
parking slots reached P250,000.00 each, for the 72 slots.
In September 1989, Multi-Realty requested that two of its
executives be allowed to park their cars in two of Makati
Tuscany’s remaining unallocated parking slots, however
MATUSCO denied this request. In another letter,
MATUSCO offered, by way of goodwill gesture, to allow
Multi-Realty to use two unallocated parking slots, which
offer was rejected by the latter. Thus, filed a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1110, against MATUSCO,
as defendant, for Damages and/or Reformation of
Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, considering tha it had
retained ownership of the 98 unassigned parking slots,
but this was not specified in the Master Deed since the
documentation and the terms and conditions therein were
all of first impression. Multi-Realty also claimed that the
mistake was discovered for the first time when MATUSCO
rejected its request. In its Answer, MATUSCO alleged that
Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it for
reformation of their contract since Multi-Realty admitted
to have sold various parking slots to third parties despite
its knowledge that the parking areas, other than those
mentioned in the Master Deed, belonged to MATUSCO.
The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the
Petition of Multi-Realty. On appeal, the CA denied Multi-
Realty’s petition and Motion for Reconsideration, hence
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Multi-Realty has a right of action to
move for the reformation of the Master Deed
HELD:No.
The term "right of action" is the right to commence
and maintain an action. In the law of pleadings, right of
action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the
former is a remedial right belonging to some persons
while the latter is a formal statement of the operational
facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is
a matter of right and depends on the substantive law
while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by
the law of procedure. The right of action springs from the
cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts
which constitute the cause of action have occurred.
In sum, one has a right of action to file a
complaint/petition for reformation of an instrument when
his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another;
or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right
and the denial thereof by another concerning a real
question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and
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substantive controversy between the parties touching on
their legal relations having adverse legal interests. This
may occur shortly after the execution of the instrument
or much later. A party to an instrument is under no
obligation to seek a reformation of an instrument while he
is unaware that any opposition will be made to carry out
the actual agreement. The statute of limitations does not
begin to run against an equitable cause of action for the
reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the
mistake has been discovered or ought to have been
discovered. The mere recording of a deed does not charge
the grantor with constructive notice of a mistake therein,
but is to be considered with other facts and circumstances
in determining whether the grantor be charged with
notice actual or constructive.
In the present case, Multi-Realty executed the
Master Deed in 1975. It had no doubt about its ownership
of the unassigned parking lots, and even sold some of
them. MATUSCO did not even object to these sales, and
even offered to buy some of the parking slots. MATUSCO
only assailed Multi-Realty’s ownership only in 1989, and
it was then that Multi-Realty discovered the error in the
Master Deed; the dispute over the ownership of the
parking slots thereafter ensued. It was only then that
petitioner’s cause of action for a reformation of the Master
Deed accrued. Since Multi-Realty filed its complaint in
1990, the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed.
However, we reversed this CA decision and declared that
the action for reformation of the lease contract was
inappropriate because Multi-Realty had already breached
the deed. The prescriptive period of 10 years, as provided
for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code, applies by operation
of law and not by the will of the parties, and that,
therefore, the right of action for reformation accrues from
the date of the execution of the contract of lease in 1968.
Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (2010)
FACTS: Philip Turner and Elnora Turner (the “Turners”)
held 1,010,000 shares of stock of Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation (LSC). In June 1999, LSC decided to amend
its articles of incorporation to remove the stockholders’
pre-emptive rights to newly issued shares of stock.
Feeling that the corporate move would be prejudicial to
their interest as stockholders, thE Turners voted against
the amendment and demanded payment of their shares
at the rate based on the book value of the shares. LSC
found the amount unacceptable and insisted that the
market value on the date before the action to remove the
pre-emptive right was taken should be the value. The
disagreement on the valuation of the shares led the
parties to constitute an appraisal committee to arrive at
the fair market value.
Thereafter, the Turners demanded payment based
on the valuation of the appraisal committee, plus
2%/month penalty from the date of their original demand
for payment, as well as the reimbursement of the
amounts advanced as professional fees to the appraisers,
which LSC refused since it had no retained earnings at the
time of the petitioners’ demand. The Turners then sued
LSC for collection and damages in the RTC (Civil Case No.
01-086). Thereafter, Turners filed their motion for partial
summary judgment claiming among others, that LSC has
accumulated unrestricted retained earnings. Thus, the
RTC issued an order granting the motion for partial
summary judgment, and subsequently ordered its
execution. On appeal, the CA held that the RTC exceeded
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its jurisdiction when it entertained the Turners and issued
the assailed Orders.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the Turners
had no cause of action, and in ruling that the RTC did not
validly render the partial summary judgment
HELD:No.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. The essential elements
of a cause of action are: (a holding that the petitioners
had no cause of action, and in ruling that the RTC did not
validly render the partial summary judgment) the
existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) a
correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such
right; and (c) an act or omission by such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury
or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the
defendant. Although the first two elements may exist, a
cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last
element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an
action in court for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
Here, it was undisputed that LSC had no unrestricted
retained earnings in its books at the time the Turners
commenced Civil Case No. 01-086, and as such, the LSC’s
legal obligation to pay the value of the Turners’ shares did
not yet arise. Thus, the CA did not err in holding that the
Turners had no cause of action.
Even if the Court considers the fact that the LSC
already had unrestricted retained earnings more than
sufficient to cover the Turners’ claims on June 26, 2002
(when they filed their motion for partial summary
judgment), such fact did not rectify the absence of the
cause of action at the time of the commencement of Civil
Case No. 01-086.
The motion for partial summary judgment, being a
mere application for relief other than by a pleading, as
not the same as the complaint in Civil Case No. 01-086.
Thereby, the Turners did not meet the requirement of the
Rules of Court that a cause of action must exist at the
commencement of an action, which is "commenced by the
filing of the original complaint in court." The Court further
stressed that subject to certain qualification, and except
as otherwise provided by law, an action commenced
before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely
brought and should be dismissed. An action prematurely
brought is a groundless suit. Unless the plaintiff has a
valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action
is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied
by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is
pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment
setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible.
III. Splitting a cause of action (Secs. 3-4)
Splitting a single cause of action is the act of
dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several
parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon
them. (Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. No. 157616,
22 July 2005)
A party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action. (Section 3, Rule 2, Rules of
Court)
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If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (Section 4, Rule
2, Rules of Court)
The rule against splitting a cause of action is intended:
a. to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of
controversy;
b. to protect the defendant from unnecessary
vexation; and
c. to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits. It comes from the old
maxim nemo debet bis vexari, pro una et
eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for
one and the same cause). (Chua v. Metrobank,
G.R. No. 182311, 19 August 2009, citing
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal, 68 Phil
287)
Sps Yap vs. First E-Bank Corporation (2009)
Facts: Sammy Yap (“Sammy”) obtained a P2 million
loan from PDCP Development Bank, Inc. (“PDCP”). As
security, Sammy’s parents, petitioners Simon Yap and
Milagros Guevarra, executed a third-party mortgage on
their land and warehouse standing on it, which
mortgage agreement allowed PDCP to extrajudicially
foreclose the property in case Sammy failed to pay the
loan.
Sammy issued a promissory note and six
postdated checks in favor of PDCP as additional securities
for the loan. When Sammy defaulted on the payment of
his loan, PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee
bank but the said checks were dishonored. This prompted
PDCP to file a complaint against Sammy for six counts of
violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
Therafter, PDCP filed an application for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property of
petitioners which served as principal security for Sammy’s
loan.
Subsequently, on motion of Sammy and without
objection from the public prosecutor and PDCP, the BP 22
cases were provisionally dismissed.
Petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan (the “lower court”) a
complaint for injunction (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction),
damages and accounting of payments against PDCP. The
complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the
ground that PDCP waived its right to foreclose the
mortgage on their property when it filed the BP 22 cases
against Sammy.
The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. It
held that PDCP had three options when Sammy defaulted
in the payment of his loan: enforcement of the promissory
note in a collection case, enforcement of the checks under
the Negotiable Instruments Law and/or BP 22, or
foreclosure of mortgage. The remedies were alternative
and the choice of one excluded the others. Thus, PDCP
was deemed to have waived its right to foreclose on the
property of petitioners when it elected to sue Sammy for
violation of BP 22.
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PDCP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the RTC. It opined that PDCP was not barred
from exercising its right to foreclose on the property of
petitioners despite suing Sammy for violation of BP 22.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent foreclosure of the
mortgaged property was barred by the previous filing of
the complaint for violation of B.P. 22.
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint for violation of B.P. 22. did not bar the
subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged property.
Petitioners anchor their position on Supreme
Court Circular 57-97, which provides for the rules and
guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases
under BP 22. Pertinent portions of Circular 57-97
provide:
1.The criminal action for
violation of [BP] 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding
civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.
Circular 57-97 has been institutionalized as
Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Section
1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions.—xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.
However, Circular 57-97 (and, it goes without
saying, Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court) was
not yet in force when PDCP sued Sammy for violation of
BP 22 and when it filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure on the mortgaged property of petitioners on
February 8, 1993 and May 3, 1993, respectively. In Lo
Bun Tiong v. Balboa, Circular 57-97 was not applied
because the collection suit and the criminal complaints for
violation of BP 22 were filed prior to the adoption of
Circular 57-97. The same principle applies here.
Thus, prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97,
the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and
collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had
been filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had
already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the
accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him to pay
the amount of the check(s).
In this case, no judgment of conviction (which
could have declared the criminal and civil liability of
Sammy) was rendered because Sammy moved for the
provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP could have
still foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection suit.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that the BP 22
cases were provisionally dismissed at Sammy’s instance.
In other words, PDCP was prevented from recovering the
whole amount by Sammy himself. To bar PDCP from
foreclosing on petitioners’ property for the balance of the
indebtedness would be to penalize PDCP for the act of
Sammy. That would not only be illogical and absurd but
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would also violate elementary rules of justice and fair
play. In sum, PDCP has not yet effectively availed of and
fully exhausted its remedy.
Note:
The Supreme Court stated the present rule in
this case. If the debtor fails (or unjustly refuses) to pay
his debt when it falls due and the debt is secured by a
mortgage and by a check, the creditor has three options
against the debtor and the exercise of one will bar the
exercise of the others. He may pursue either of the three
but not all or a combination of them.
First, the creditor may file a collection suit
against the debtor. This will open up all the properties of
the debtor to attachment and execution, even the
mortgaged property itself. Second, the creditor may opt
to foreclose on the mortgaged property. In case the debt
is not fully satisfied, he may sue the debtor for deficiency
judgment (not a collection case for the whole
indebtedness), in which case, all the properties of the
debtor, other than the mortgaged property, are again
opened up for the satisfaction of the deficiency. Lastly,
the creditor may opt to sue the debtor for violation of BP
22 if the checks securing the obligation bounce. Circular
57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
both provide that the criminal action for violation of BP 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, i.e., a collection suit. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings B.V. (2015)
FACTS: Riviera Golf entered into a Management
Agreement ¬with CCA Holdings for the management and
operation of the Club. The parties also entered into a co-
terminous Royalty Agreement that would allow Riviera
Golf and the Club’s developer, Armed Forces of the
Philippines’ Retirement and Separation Benefits System
(AFP-RSBS), to use CCA Holdings’ name and facilities to
market the Club’s shares.
Riviera Golf sent CCA Holdings a letter informing
the latter that it was pre-terminating the Management
Agreement purportedly to alleviate the financial crisis that
the AFP-RSBS was experiencing. The Royalty Agreement
was also deemed pre-terminated. CCA Holdings protested
the termination of the agreement and demanded that
Riviera Golf settle its unpaid management and royalty
fees. Riviera Golf however refused on the ground that CCA
Holdings violated the terms of the agreement.
CCA Holdings filed before the RTC a complaint
for sum of money. During the pendency of the case, the
parties executed a Compromise Agreement which the RTC
approved. Subsequently, CCA Holdings again sent a letter
to Riviera Golf, this time, demanding the sum of
US$390,768.00 representing the projected net income or
expected business profits it was supposed to derive for
the unexpired two-year term of the Management
Agreement. As its demands went unheeded, CCA
Holdings filed another complaint for sum of money and
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not CCA Holdings violated the
prohibitions against splitting a single cause of action.
HELD: Yes.
A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs,
but only one action can be filed. A single cause of action
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or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided
into two or more different actions. The rule on prohibiting
the splitting of a single cause of action is clear. Section 4,
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly states:
Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. – If
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal
of the others.
Although differing in form, the two cases are
ultimately anchored on Riviera Golf’s breach of the
Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, the Court
concludes that they have identical causes of action.
CGR Corporation vs. Treyes, Jr. (2007)
Facts: Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37.3033
hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City,
Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate
Fishpond Lease Agreements in their respective favor were
approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture
for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December
31, 2024.
Respondent Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. allegedly
forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and
once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set
up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’
fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and
fingerlings owned by petitioners.
Petitioners was thus prompted to file with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate
complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining
Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages,
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331, 1332 and
1333, against respondent.
In a separate move, petitioners filed in March
2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for
damages against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No,
04-12284. The Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners’
complaint for damages on the ground of prematurity.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner’s
complaint for damages, filed after the ejectment case, is
correct.
Held: No. The Court ruled that petitioners’ claim for
damages have no direct relation to their loss of
possession of the premises. It had to do with respondents
alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of
milkfish and other marine products in their
fishponds,ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by
petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious
icons and even decapitating the heads of some of
them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements
of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending
actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment
rendered on one action will, regardless of which is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be
invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.
Res judicata may not apply because the court in
a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for
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damages other than the use and occupation of the
premises and attorneys fees.
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal
of the complaint for damages, the elements
of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final
judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount
to res judicata in the former.
Petitioners filing of an independent action for
damages other than those sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and
occupation of their properties could not thus be
considered as splitting of a cause of action.
IV. Remedies against splitting a single cause
of action
There are two remedies against splitting a single cause
of action, namely:
(a) by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground
of litis pendentia (Section 1(e), Rule 16,
Rules of Court), or res judicata (Section
1(f), Rule 16, Rules of Court); and
(b) by filing an answer alleging either of the
aforementioned grounds as affirmative
defense.
Tests to Ascertain Whether Two or More Suits Relate to
a Single or Common Cause of Action
Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation
(2011)
FACTS: George Umale entered into a Contract of Lease
with Canoga Park Development Corporation (Canoga), for
a period of two (2) years, involving an eight hundred sixty
(860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, owned by Canoga.
Prior the expiration of their lease contract,
Canoga filed an unlawful detainer case against Umale
before the MTC, alleging Umale’s violation of stipulations
in the lease contract regarding the use of the property.
Umale allegedly constructed restaurant buildings and
other commercial establishments on the lot, without first
securing the required written consent and necessary
permits. Umale likewise subleased the property to various
merchants-tenants in violation of the lease contract. The
MTC thus issued a decision in favor of Canoga, which on
appeal to the RTC Branch 155, Pasig City, was affirmed in
toto.
The case, however, was re-raffled to the RTC-
Branch 267, Pasig City because the Presiding Judge of the
RTC-Branch 155, upon motion, inhibited himself from
resolving the Umale’s motion for reconsideration. RTC-
Branch 267 granted Umale’s Motion for Reconsideration
and accordingly, the case was dismissed for being
prematurely filed. Aggrieved, Canoga filed its petition for
review with the CA.
During the pendency of the petition for review,
the respondent filed another case for unlawful detainer
against the Umale. This time, the Canoga used as a
ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease
contract. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Canoga,
which on appeal, was reversed and set aside by the RTC
on the ground of litis pendentia. The CA nullified and set
aside the assailed decision, and ruled that there was no
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litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different
causes of action.
ISSUE: Whether the two unlawful detainer suits filed by
Canoga relate to a Single or Common Cause of Action
HELD:No.
Litis pendentia exists when the following
requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two
actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in
the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between
the two actions should be such that any judgment that
may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a
single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the
dismissal of the others. Several tests exist to ascertain
whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action, such as whether the same evidence would support
and sustain both the first and second causes of action
(also known as the "same evidence" test), or whether the
defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the
complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of
determining whether the cause of action in the second
case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.26
Of the three tests cited, the third one is
especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the
cause of action in the second case existed at the time of
the filing of the first complaint – and to which we answer
in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of
the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s
violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the
filing of the second case was based on the expiration of
the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the
first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease
contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease
was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16,
2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by
the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15,
2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract
that the cause of action in the second ejectment
complaint accrued and made available to the respondent
as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of
action in the second case was not yet in existence at the
time of filing of the first ejectment case.
As regards the reiteration in the second case of
the cause of action in the first case, the Court ruled that
the restatement does not result in substantial identity
between the two cases because even if the respondent
alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for
ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for
ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the
expiration of the lease contract
V. Joinder of Causes of Action
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a
joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or
more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of
action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or
petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join
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ESGUERRA NOTES
several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action
in one declaration, complaint or petition. (Ada v. Baylon,
G.R. No. 182435, 13 August 2012)
The objectives of the rule or provision are to
avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one
action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving
one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of
litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be
construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible,
without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.(Id.)
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may
assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as they may have against an
opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject
to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not
include special civil actions governed by special rules.
(Id.)
VI. Requisites for Joinder of Causes of Action:
1. The party joining the causes of action must
comply with the rules on joinder of parties.
Note: The following are elements for a
joinder parties (Sec. 6, rule 3):
a. A right to relief in respect to
or arising out of the same
transaction or series of
transaction; and
b. A common question of law or
fact.
2. The joinder shall not include special civil action
or actions governed by special rules.
3. Where the causes of action are between the
same parties but pertain to a different venues
or jurisdiction is with the regional trial court,
provided that:
a. One of the causes of
action falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC;
and
b. The venue lies thereon.
4. Where the claims in the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction
(Totality Rule)
Sps. Perez vs. Hermano (2005)
Facts: Petitioners filed a civil case for Enforcement of
Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary
Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President
Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against
respondent Antonio Hermano before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224. Respondent filed
his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. Thereafter,
respondent Hermano filed a "Motion with Leave to
Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate
Trial" which was granted by the trial court in an Order
dated 28 February 2000.
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Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly ordered
that petitioners’ causes of action be severed.
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the
complaint petitioners’ cause of action against respondent.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left
to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our
present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one
complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a)
it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out
of the same contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same
nature and character.
In this case, petitioners have adequately alleged
in their complaint that after they had already agreed to
enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc.,
through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other
documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over
the same properties but for a lower consideration, two
mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of
respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and
acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million pesos
(P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land,
Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage
their properties which they had already agreed to sell to
the latter.
From the averments in the complaint, it
becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions of
fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and
respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction
over the same properties. There is the question of fact,
for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed
misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of
respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which
of the four contracts were validly entered into by the
parties. Note that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for
a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor
be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus,
respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is
subsequently declared that what was entered into by
petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale
(as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
them) because this would mean that the contracts of
mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the
absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally,
there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land,
Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent
Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make
them liable for damages.
Sps. Decena, v. Sps. Piquero (2005)
Facts: Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the
owners of a house and lot in Parañaque City. The
petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and
Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement
in which the former sold the property to the latter for
P940,250.00 payable in six (6) installments via postdated
checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the
property. It appears in the MOA that the petitioners
obliged themselves to transfer the property to the
respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the
condition that if two of the postdated checks would be
dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be
obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners. On
May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos,
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Bulacan, filed a Complaint against the respondents with
the RTC Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the
sale/MOA, recovery of possession of the property, and
damages.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground the said court had no jurisdiction over the
property subject matter of the action because it was
located in Paranaque City. They averred that the principal
action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and
the recovery of the possession of the property is a real
action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been
brought in the RTC of Paraaque City, where the property
subject matter of the action was located, and not in the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners resided.
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their
action for damages and attorneys fees is a personal action
and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of
Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their
second cause of action for the recovery of the possession
of the property is a real action, the same may,
nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of
action for damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule
2 of the Rules of Court.
By way of reply, the respondents averred that
Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court applies only
when one or more of multiple causes of action falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the
other or others are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, and the venue lies therein.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss finding that
Section 5(c), Rule 2 was applicable. Upon motion for
reconsideration however, the court granted the motion to
dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It
ruled that the principal action of the petitioners was a real
action and should have been filed in the RTC of Paranaque
City where the property subject matter of the complaint
was located. However, since the case was filed in the RTC
of Bulacan where the petitioners reside, which court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it
must be dismissed.
Issue: WON Section 5 (c) Rule 2 of the ROC is applicable.
Held:No. After due consideration of the foregoing, we
find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners,
as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one cause of
action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the
MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the first two
installments in payment of the property as agreed upon,
and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real
property, as well as the house constructed thereon
occupied by the respondents. The claim for damages for
reasonable compensation for the respondents’ use and
occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as
moral and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners
on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the
respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of
action, and are not independent or separate causes of
action. The action of the petitioners for the rescission of
the MOA on account of the respondents’ breach thereof
and the latter’s failure to return the premises subject of
the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’
eviction therefrom is a real action. As such, the action
should have been filed in the proper court where the
property is located, namely, in Parañaque City,
conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
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Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos,
Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue was
improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably
with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
VII. Totality Rule
“Totality rule" under Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg.
129 states that "where there are several claims or causes
of action between the same or different parties, embodied
in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions."
Determination of Jurisdictional Amount in Relation to the
Totality Rule
Under BP 129, as amended, and under R.A
7691, the jurisdictional amount excludes the following:
a. Interest
b. Damages of whether kind
c. Attorney’s Fees
d. Litigation expenses and cost
These matters, however, shall be included in
determining the fililng fees (Riano, p. 179)
“Damages of whatever kind” applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or
consequence of the main cause of action (Adm. Circ. No.
09-94, June 14, 1994). Thus , if the main cause of action
is the recovery of damages, the amount of damages
should not be excluded in determining the jurisdictional
amount (Sante v. Claravall, G.R 173915, February 22,
2010).
Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps (1986)
Facts: Petitioner Remedio Flores (“petitioner”) filed a
Complaint against respondents Ignacio Binongcal
(“Binongcal”) and Fernando Calion (“Calion”) with the
Regional Trial Court, Baguio and Benguet Province (the
“lower court”). Said Complaint consists of two (2) causes
of action: (a) the first cause of action alleged in the
complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on various occasions from August to October,
1981; and (b) the second cause of action was against
respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay
the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several
occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
Respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of
the demand was only P11,643.00 and under Section
19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand
is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), and
although another person, Calion, was allegedly indebted
to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation
was separate and distinct from that of Calion, who joined
Binongcal’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The lower court ordered the dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint. Hence, the appeal.
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Issue: Whether or not the RTC dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Held: Yes. The lower court correctly dismissed
petitioner’s Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In cases of
permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the
claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. If the
causes of action are separate and independent, their
joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where the amount of the demand
is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a
separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal
trial court.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held
that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a
careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is
a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate
and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
VII. Estoppel to Question Jurisdiction
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor (2005)
Facts: Private respondents own a parcel of land. They
allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said
property for a period of ten years and construct thereon
a small house. After the expiration of the ten-year period,
they demanded the return of the occupied portion and
removal of the house constructed thereon but Hinog
refused and instead claimed ownership. Private
respondents filed a complaint for “Recovery of Ownership
and Possession, Removal of Construction and
Damages”against Hinog. Trial ensued but Hinog died
without completing his evidence. New counsel appeared
for the deceased and filed a motion to expunge the
complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed
to specify the amount of damages claimed so as to pay
the correct docket fees and further alleged that the
private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee
since the main subject matter of the case cannot be
estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession
and removal of construction. Private respondents
opposed. While the trial court ordered the complaint to be
expunged from the records, it held however that upon the
complete payment of such fees, the Court may take
appropriate action in the light of the ruling in the case of
Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals.
Thereafter, the private respondents, upon
payment of deficiency docket fee, filed a manifestation
with prayer to reinstate the case. Despite petitioners’
opposition, the trial court issued the assailed Order
reinstating the case.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly
reinstated the complaint upon the payment of deficiency
docket fees.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the
reinstatement of the complaint was just and proper
considering that the cause of action of private
respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty
years, and private respondents did not really intend to
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evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee but
simply contend that they could not be faulted for
inadequate assessment because the clerk of court made
no notice of demand or reassessment. They were in good
faith and simply relied on the assessment of the clerk of
court.
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee
is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at
the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so
when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to
abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when
insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs
and there was no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply.
The Supreme Court held that the Manchester
rule has been modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) vs. Asuncion, which defined the following
guidelines involving the payment of docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, which vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter
or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fees within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor
is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
I. WHO MAY BE PARTIES
• Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action
(Rule 3, Sec. 1).
1. Natural Persons
o A natural person is a human
being, which is a product of
procreation (Jurado, Civil Law
Reviewer, 21st ed., p. 62).
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2. Juridical Persons
o A juridical person exists only in
contemplation of law, and is a
product of legal fiction (Jurado,
supra.).
o The juridical persons who may be
parties to a civil action are those
enumerated in Article 44 of the
New Civil Code, namely:
(a) The State and its political
subdivisions;
(b) Other corporations,
institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose,
created by law; and
(c) Corporations, partnerships
and associations for private
interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and
distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or
member.
3. Entities authorized by law
o One need not be or juridical person to be a
party to a civil action. As long as an entity
is authorized by law to be a party, such
entity may sue or be sued or both.
o The following are examples of entities
authorized by law to be parties (W. B.
Riano, Civil Procedure: A Restatement for
the Bar, 2009 ed., p. 212):
a. Under Sec. 21 of the Corporation Code
of the Philippines, a corporation by
estoppel is precluded from denying
its existence and the members thereof
can be sued and be held liable as
general partners.
b. A contract of partnership having a
capital of three thousand pesos or
more but which fails to comply
with the registration
requirements is nevertheless liable
as a partnership to third persons (Art.
1772 in relation to Art. 1768 of the
New Civil Code).
Articles 1772 and 1768 of the New Civil Code
provide:
Article 1772. Every contract of
partnership having a capital of three
thousand pesos or more, in money or
property, shall appear in a public
instrument, which must be recorded in
the Office of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Article 1768. The partnership has a
juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of each of the partners, even in
case of failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 1772, first
paragraph.
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c. The estate of a deceased person may be a
party to an action (Limjoco v. Intestate Estate
of Fragante, 8 Phil. 776; Nazareno v. Court of
Appeals, 343 SCRA 637).
d. A legitimate labor organization may sue and
be sued in its registered name (Labor Code,
Article 242[e]).
e. The Roman Catholic Church may be a party
and as to its properties, the archbishop or
diocese to which they belong may be a party
(Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 47; Versoza v.
Fernandez, 49 Phil. 627).
f. A dissolved corporation may prosecute and
defend suits by or against it provided that the
suits (i) occur within three (3) years after its
dissolution, and (ii) the suits are in connection
with the settlement and closure of its affairs
(Corporation Code, Sec. 122).
• The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming
party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant,
or the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff (Rule
3, Sec. 1).
• The term "defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a counter-
claim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth,
etc.) — party defendant (Rule 3, Sec. 1).
• Remedy when a party impleaded is not
authorized to be a party (Riano, supra.)
o Where the plaintiff is not a natural or
a juridical person or an entity
authorized by law, a motion to dismiss
may be filed on the ground that “the
plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue”
(Rule, 16, Sec.1[d]).
o Where it is the defendant who is not
any of the above, the complaint may
be dismissed on the ground that the
“pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action” (Rule 16, Sec. 1[g]),
because there cannot be a cause of
action against one who cannot be a
party to a civil action.
o If the plaintiff has capacity to sue but
he is not the “real party in interest,”
he ground for dismissal is “failure to
state a cause of action” (Aguila v.
Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 246;
Balagtas v. Court of Appeals, 317
SCRA 69), not “lack of legal capacity
to sue.”
The Roman Catholic Church may be a party and
as to its properties, the archbishop or the diocese to which
they belong may be a party
Versoza v. Fernandez (1926)
FACTS: This action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna by Monseñor Alfredo Verzosa, as
Roman Catholic Apostolic Bishop for the diocese of Lipa,
constituted as a unipersonal religious corporation, for the
purpose of compelling the defendants, Zosimo Fernandez,
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Salvador Unson, Tomas Cabreza, Ramon Fabella, Pedro
F. Caballes, and Pedro Lavadia, to account for a fund held
by them as trustees pertaining to the Brotherhood of the
Most Holy Sacrament of the town of Pagsanjan, and for
other purposes. The complaint as originally filed on 22
June 1925, was amended on 16 October 1925, for the
purpose of adding to the allegations of the complaint
certain facts relative to a litigation heretofore conducted
by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Archbishop of Manila
against the predecessors of the same defendants. The
defendants demurred both to the original and amended
complaint. As stated in the demurrer to the amended
complaint, the grounds of exception to the complaint are
three: First, that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the
action; secondly, that the facts alleged in the complaint
do not constitute a cause of action; and, thirdly, that the
court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff, as Bishop of the
diocese of Lipa, has a right to maintain the instant
complaint.
HELD: Yes.
In view of the allegations of the complaint, there
can be no sort of doubt as to the right of the plaintiff, as
Bishop of the diocese of Lipa, to maintain this action. As
ecclesiastical superior of the parish priest (who is ex oficio
Rector of the Brotherhood), the Bishop necessarily has an
interest in the enforcement of the trust, even apart from
the duty imposed upon his predecessor, the Archbishop
of Manila, in the closing paragraph of the royal cedula, to
enforce exact and punctual performance of the trust.
The demurrer to the amended complaint of a
general character, being directed to the questions of the
jurisdiction of the court, the right of the plaintiff to
maintain the action, and the sufficiency of the facts stated
to constitute a ground of action. None of the points
presented in the demurrer are well founded.
Several points of some interest are discussed in
the learned opinion of the trial court, and several of his
conclusions have been here subjected to criticism in the
brief of the appellant; but in view of the fact that these
matters have not been put in issue by special demurrers
and of the further fact that the complaint is certainly
sufficient in respect to the right of the plaintiff to compel
the proper performance of trust, we can deem it advisable
merely to reverse the judgment and overrule, as we
hereby do overrule, the demurrer, with the result that the
defendants will be required to answer.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF PARTIES
A.Real Party in Interest
Definition - A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit
(Rule 3, Section 2).
Unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of
Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest (Rule 3,
Section 2).
The determination of who the real party-in-interest is
requires going back to the elements of a cause of
action. A cause of action involves the existence of a
right and a violation of such right. Evidently, the
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owner of the right violated stands to be the real party
in interest as plaintiff and the person responsible for
the violation is the real party in interest as defendant
(Lee v. Romillo, 161 SCRA 589).
a. Lack of Personality to Sue
Evangelista vs. Santiago (2005)
Facts: Petitioners filed with the trial court an action for
declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of the
title of parcels of land which Petitioners allegedly occupied
and possessed. They claimed that the OCT was fake and
spurious. Respondent filed his Answer and claimed that
the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the
Complaint since such an action will result in the reversion
of the ownership of the Subject Property to the State and
hence it is the State which must bring the action; thus,
the Complaint stated no cause of action.
The trial court decided against the Petitioners. The
trial court ratiocinated that the Petitioners did not have
the legal standing to sue because it is the State who must
file the corresponding case of annulment of illegal title
through the Office of the Solicitor General. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Order of the trial court and denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners had the legal personality to
file the action?
HELD: No, they had no legal personality to sue. The Court
believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed
petitioners Complaint, but for reasons different from
those relied upon by the RTC and the CA.
No legal capacity v. No COA
Before anything else, it should be clarified that the
plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action are two
different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two
different affirmative defenses.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA: Lack of legal capacity
to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification
to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that
the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence
grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term
"lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the
term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers
to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account
of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of a
party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not
the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can
be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground
of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can
be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently
states no cause of action.
Despite the allegation of the respondent that
petitioners had no legal capacity to sue, this Court may
assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative
defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before
the trial court stated no cause of action because the
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petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the
real party-in-interest. It is the respondent’s contention
that only the State can file an action for annulment of his
certificates of title, since such an action will result in the
reversion of the ownership of the Subject Property to the
State.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred
that rather than an action for nullity of respondent’s
certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the
Subject Property.
No legal or equitable title
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that
their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting
of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the RTC
and the CA that petitioners had no personality to file the
said action, not being the parties-in-interest.
The plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to
quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest
in, the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint
that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate
interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right
to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the
Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to
file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title
and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action.
Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Win Multi Rich
Builders, Inc. (2009)
Facts: This case involves a claim for a sum of money
which arose from a construction dispute.
Petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc.
entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders (Multi-
Rich) represented by Wilson G. Chua (Chua), its President
and General Manager, for the construction of a garment
factory. The construction of the factory building was
completed on 27 November 1996.
Respondent Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. (Win)
was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on 20 February 1997 with Chua as its
President and General Manager. On 26 January 2004, Win
filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner
and Mr. Ying amounting to P8,634,448.20
Petitioner also denied owing anything to Win, as
it had already paid all its obligations to it.
In the hearing held on 10 February 2004, the
counsel of Win moved that its name in the case be
changed from "Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc." to "Multi-
Rich Builders, Inc." In the Reply filed by petitioner, it
moved to dismiss the case since Win was not the
contractor and neither a party to the contract, thus it
cannot institute the case. Petitioner obtained a Certificate
of Non-Registration of Corporation/Partnership from the
SEC which certified that the latter did not have any
records of a "Multi-Rich Builders, Inc." Moreover, Win in
its Rejoinder did not oppose the allegations in the Reply.
Win admitted that it was only incorporated on 20 February
1997 while the construction contract was executed on 26
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March 1996. Likewise, it admitted that at the time of
execution of the contract, Multi-Rich was a registered sole
proprietorship and was issued a business permit by the
Office of the Mayor of Manila.
RTC granted the motion of Win for EQA to
deposit the amount. Upon deposit, Win move for the
release of the garnished money, which was vehemently
objected to by the Petitioners but nevertheless granted
by the RTC. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA. CA annulled the two orders of the RTC but ruled
that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:WON Win has a legal personality to institute the
present case.
Held:No, Win is NOT a real party in interest. A suit may
only be instituted by the real party in interest as defined
in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Win admitted that the contract was executed
between Multi-Rich and petitioner. It further admitted
that Multi-Rich was a sole proprietorship with a business
permit issued by the Office of the Mayor of Manila. A sole
proprietorship is the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent
form of business enterprise.31 It is an unorganized
business owned by one person. The sole proprietor is
personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the
business. In the case of Mangila v. CA, we held that: … In
fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file
a suit in court…. A sole proprietorship does not possess a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise.
The original petition was instituted by Win,
which is a SEC-registered corporation. It filed a collection
of sum of money suit which involved a construction
contract entered into by petitioner and Multi-Rich, a sole
proprietorship. The counsel of Win wanted to change the
name of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The change
cannot be countenanced. The plaintiff in the collection suit
is a corporation. The name cannot be changed to that of
a sole proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is not
vested with juridical personality to file or defend an
action.
In order for a corporation to be able to file suit
and claim the receivables of its predecessor in business,
in this case a sole proprietorship, it must show proof that
the corporation had acquired the assets and liabilities of
the sole proprietorship. Win could have easily presented
or attached any document e.g., deed of assignment which
will show whether the assets, liabilities and receivables of
Multi-Rich were acquired by Win. Having been given the
opportunity to rebut the allegations made by petitioner,
Win failed to use that opportunity. Thus, we cannot
presume that Multi-Rich is the predecessor-in-business of
Win and hold that the latter has standing to institute the
collection suit.
b. Standing to Sue
He who is directly affected and whose interest is
immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. Thus,
a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the
case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the
court’s jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial
power on his behalf. (Domingo vs. Carague, 456 SCRA
450, 2005)
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Oposa v. Factoran(1993)
B. Representative Parties
Facts: This is a class suit brought by 44 children, through
their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the
Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and
name of “their generation as well as those generations
defended by a representative or someone acting in a
yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in
against the Secretary of the Department of Environment
the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the
property in interest (Rule 3, Sec. 3).
timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to
cease and desist from accepting and approving more
A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust,
timber license agreements. The children invoked their
a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in
by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.. The
his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to
principal may sue or be sued without joining the
cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary
principal except when the contract involves things
to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and
belonging to the principal (Rule 3, Sec. 3).
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court,
V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc.
invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it
(2015)
was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
FACTS: Petitioner V-Gent bought 26 two-way plane
Issue:Did the children have the legal standing to file the
tickets from respondent Morning Star Travel and Tours.
case?
V-Gent returned a total of 15 unused tickets to the
defendant. Of the 15, Morning Star refunded only 6
Held:Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition
tickets and refused to refund the remaining 9 unused
ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the
tickets despite repeatd demands. Petitioner V-Gent filed
case based on the concept of “intergenerational
a money claim against Morning Star for payment of the
responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment
unrefunded plus attorney’s fees.
carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment
for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
Morning Star countered that V-Gent was not
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future
entitled to a refund because the tickets were bought on
generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-
the airline company’s “buy one, take one” promo.It
impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of
alleged that there were only 14 unused tickets and only 7
the police power of the state in the interest of public
of these were refundable; considering that it had already
welfare.
refunded 6 tickets, then there was nothing else to refund.
Morning Star also questioned V-Gent’s personality to file
Pascual v. Pascual (2005)
the suit asserting that the passengers, in whose names
the tickets were issued, are the real parties-in-interest.
FACTS: Petitioner, Dante Pascual, a permanent resident
of the USA, appointed Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by
ISSUE: Whether or not V-Gent is the real party-in-
an SPA to file a case for cancellation of TCT, to collect
interest.
monthly rentals from the tenant, to enter into amicable
settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of
HELD: No.
payment/and/or dispute resolution, and to execute and
sign any and all papers which may be necessary relative
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in
to the above acts. Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed
the name of the real party-in-interest - the party who
before the Isabela RTC a complaint for annulment of
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
transfer certificate of title and Deed of Absolute Sale of
suit. In suits where an agent represents a party, the
Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.
principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file
The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on two grounds,
a suit in his own name on behalf of the principal.
one of which was non-compliance with the requirement
under Section 412 of the LGC, she contending that there
An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own
is no showing that the dispute was referred to the
name and without joining the principal when the following
barangay court before the case was filed in court.
elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name
during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint must first be
of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the transaction did
brought before the Lupon by the Attorney-in-fact.
not involve the property of the principal.
HELD: No.
In the present case, only the • first element is
present; the purchase order and the receipt were in the
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the
name of V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are
action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
absent because: (1) V-Gent disclosed the names of the
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity,
passengers to Morning Star - in fact the tickets were in
the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
their names; and (2) the transaction was paid using the
and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
passengers' money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a
Rules of Court cannot apply.
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his
own name for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may
sue or be sued without joining the principal except when
the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

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To construe the express statutory requirement
of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of
the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would
abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as
defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court
vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule. In fine, since the
plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not
an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-
herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no
jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it
for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
C. Indispensable Parties
Definition – An indispensable party is a real party-in-
interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action (Rule 3, Sec. 7).
Compulsory joinder of Indispensable Parties - The
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment
rendered by the court (Lucman v. Malawi, G.R. No.
159794, 19 December 2006).
Dismissal For Failure To Implead an Indispensable
Party
o Since the joinder of indispensable parties is
compulsory, the action should be dismissed
when indispensable parties are not impleaded of
are not before the court. The absence of
indispensable parties renders all subsequent
actions of the trial court null and void for want
of authority to act not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present (MWSS v.
Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 287).
o An outright dismissal of the action when
indispensable parties are not impleaded is a
procedural error. Instead, parties may be
dropped or added by the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just (Rule 3,
Sec. 11). It is when the order of the court to
implead an indispensable party goes unheeded
may the case be dismissed. The court is fully
clothed with the authority to dismiss a complaint
due to the fault of the plaintiff as when, among
others, he does not comply with any order of the
court (Rule 17, Sec. 3; Plasabas v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, 31 March 2009).
Pascual v. Robles: In the Matter of the Heirship
(Intestate Estates) of the Rodriguezes (2010)
Facts: A petition for Declaration of Heirship and
Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the
Estates of the Late Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio
Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC of Iriga City.
Since nobody opposed the petition, the RTC
entered a general default against the whole world, except
the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the RTC
rendered a Partial declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina
Rodriguez as heirs in the direct descending line of the late
Antonio.
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UP College of Law
Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered
their appearances, including respondent Jaime Robles
(Robles). The RTC issued an Order declaring Robles to be
an heir. However, the RTC flipped-flopped in its
subsequent decisions but the latest decision reinstated
the original order declaring Henry, Certeza, and Rosalina
Rodriguez as the heirs.
Robles then appealed but RTC denied the
appeal. Robles filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the SC. SC referred the petition to the CA. The CA
rendered judgment annulling the Amended Decision of
the RTC. Nevertheless, Robles filed an appeal with this
Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. SC denied
the petition of Robles and the said Resolution became
final and executory.
A petition for certiorari was filed before the SC
by petitioner Rene B. Pascual but Robles was not
impleaded. Thereafter, the SC rendered a decision.
Hence this petition assailing the decision which
was rendered without him being impleaded. Robles
contends that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be
adversely affected or injured or benefited by the
judgment in the instant case. Hence, the failure of service
upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well as
petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was not
required or given the opportunity to file his comment or
answer to the said petition nor served with any order,
resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the
instant petition, is a clear denial of his right to due
process.
In his Comment and Opposition, Pascual
contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate
in the instant petition. Petitioner argues that in an original
action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party
against the lower court and the prevailing party. Robles
was never impleaded, because he was not the prevailing
party in the assailed Decision of the CA as well as the
questioned Order of the RTC.
Issue: WON Robles is an indispensable party in the
Petion for Certiorari before the SC.
Held: YES. Robles is an indispensable party. Petitioner
admitted in his Comment and Opposition to Robles'
Motion that in the instant petition he filed, only the CA
and the RTC were impleaded as respondents.
Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain
cases. – When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the
petitioner shall join as private respondent or
respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private respondents to appear
and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents
affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in
such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against
the private respondents only, and not against the judge,
court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
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In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz,5 this Court Held: No. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ruled as follows: ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of
without whom no final determination can be had of an the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is despite the order of the court, that the latter may
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act issued.
in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot Uy v. CA (2006)
attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void Facts: The Heritage Memorial Park is a flagship project
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)
parties but even as to those present.6
in Fort Bonifacio. To implement the project, the BCDA, on
September 9, 1994, entered into an agreement
In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable
denominated as the Pool Formation Trust
party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the
Agreement (PFTA) with the Philippine National Bank
outcome of the petition. Robles is interested in sustaining
(PNB) and the Public Estates Authority (PEA). The BCDA
the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would
was designated as the Project Owner; PEA, the Project
benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion
Manager; and PNB as the Trustee.
would render the petition for certiorari defective.
Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead
As project owner, the BCDA was tasked to sell
Robles as respondent.
the Heritage Park Investment Certificates to the public
and buyers become certificate holders. The certificate
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of
gives the PNB the absolute legal and beneficial title
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
to Heritage Park in trust for the certificate holders. The
an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party
PNB, as trustee, shall protect the values of the assets in
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by
the trust, receive and have custody over the proceeds
order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
from the sale of the certificates, administer the various
initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times
funds, including disbursements for project costs and
as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
related expenses, turnover the Perpetual Care Fund to the
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
Successor Trustee, turnover custody over documents
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
pertaining to the Heritage Park and the residual funds to
plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
BCDA, and turnover all the documents and records to the
Board of Trustees after completion of the project.
Based on the foregoing, and in the interest of
fair play, the Court finds it proper to set aside its decision
PEA, as project manager, is tasked to
and allow Robles to file his comment on the petition.
implement and complete the various engineering works
and improvements of Heritage Park.
Limos v. Spouses Odones (2010)
On November 20, 1996, PEA and the petitioner,
Facts: Private respondents Sps Odones filed a complaint
a single proprietorship doing business under the name
for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against
and style of Edison Development and Construction,
petitioners Limos, Rosa delos Reyes and Sps Delos Reyes
executed a Landscaping and Construction Agreement
before Tarlac RTC. The complaint alleged that they are
whereby the petitioner undertook to do all the
the owners of a 940 sq m land by virtue of an Extrajudicial
landscaping, including the construction of
Succession of Estate and Sale dated Jan 29, 2004,
a terrasoleum of the Heritage Park. The Heritage Park
executed by the surviving heirs of Donata Lardizabal, in
Executive Committee approved the agreement on May
whom the original title was vested. After registering the
29, 1997.
document of conveyance, they found out that the OCT
was cancelled and replaced by a TCT in the petitioners’
Pursuant to Section 11.01 of the PFTA, in April
name. Respondents sought the cancellation of said TCTs
1999, the certificate holders of the project organized
on the ground that the Sps Lardizabal’s signatures were
themselves into a non-stock, non-profit corporation, the
forgeries.
Heritage Park Management Corporation (HPMC), now the
private respondent herein.
In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of
Particulars, which was denied, and in their answer
In October 1999, alleging delay in the
pleaded affirmative defenses one of which was the non-
construction of the projects and huge discrepancy
joinder of the other heirs of Donata as
between the Accomplishment Report and the actual
indispensable parties .
physical accomplishment of petitioners construction firm,
the Heritage Park Executive Committee terminated the
RTC & CA denied Motion to Set for Preliminary
two construction contracts namely, the landscaping and
Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses because
nursery works, and the construction of the terrasoleum.
respondents had already replied, hence this petition for
certiorari.
On March 17, 2000, pursuant to the terms of
the PFTA, HPMC assumed all the functions, duties and
Issue: WON the affirmative defense of non-joinder of
responsibilities of the PEA, including those under an
indispensable parties is a ground for dismissal of action
assailed contract.

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On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed a is dependent on the agreement and consent of the parties
complaint against the PEA before the Construction to the construction contract, to submit their dispute for
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) where it sought arbitration. Absent such consent, the CIAC cannot validly
to recover payment for its progress billings on the said proceed against a party for lack of jurisdiction.
projects.
In this instance, both parties agreed to submit
On March 14, 2002, an Alias Writ of the dispute for arbitration. However, the CIAC should
Execution was issued by CIAC and on the following day, have dismissed the same on the ground that the private
a Notice of Garnishment was served on private respondent was not impleaded, it being an indispensable
respondent. party to the case.

Private respondent HPMC then filed a petition Indispensable parties must be joined either as
for Injunction/Prohibition before the Court of Appeals on plaintiffs or defendants. Whenever it appears to the court
the ground that CIAC had no jurisdiction over the subject in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party
matter since HPMC was not impleaded as a party thereby has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the
depriving it of its right to be heard. The appellate court trial and to order the inclusion of such party. The absence
ruled in favor of respondent, of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority
Petitioners contention is that private respondent to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
HPMC is not a party-in-interest to the case since it is a those present.
mere trustee of the construction and development funds
and would not be directly benefited or injured by the It has come to the Courts attention that from
outcome of the case. the inception of the case, PEA informed the CIAC that
pursuant to the PFTA and the Deed of Assignment, all its
Private respondent contends that upon its rights and obligations under the contract have already
incorporation and election of its Board of Trustees, it been assigned to private respondent.
assumed ownership of the Heritage Park Project. Further,
since it is a non-stock, non-profit corporation, with the The responsibility of impleading all the
certificate holders as its members, any claim against the indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff. The defendant
PEA is in reality a claim against all the parties who pooled does not have the right to compel the plaintiff to
and contributed their resources for the project; hence, it prosecute the action against a party if he does not wish
is an indispensable party. to do so, but the plaintiff will have to suffer the
consequences of any error he might commit in exercising
Issue: WON HPMC a real party-in-interest or an his option.
indispensable party
• Where obligation of the parties is solidary,
Held: An indispensable party is one whose interest will either of the parties is indispensable
be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be
Cerezo v.Tuazon (2004)
had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
Facts: A passenger bus collided with a tricycle
with the other parties that his legal presence as a party
somewhere in Pampanga. The tricycle driver Tuazon filed
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.
a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner
of the bus line, and her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo.
Based on the Construction Agreement, PEA
However, the summons issued by the trial court was
entered into it in its capacity as Project Manager, pursuant
returned unserved as the Cerezo spouses no longer held
to the PFTA. According to the provisions of the
office nor resided in Makati. The trial court issued alias
PFTA, upon the formation of the HPMC, the PEA would
summons against the Cerezo spouses at their address in
turn over to the HPMC all the contracts relating to
Camiling, Tarlac.
the Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the CIAC
Case on May 31, 2001, PEA ceased to be the Project
Mrs. Cerezon brings this present petition lack of
Manager of the Heritage Park Project, pursuant to Section
jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could
11 of the PFTA. Through a Deed of Assignment, PEA
not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire
assigned its interests in all the existing contracts it
jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo points out that
entered into as the Project Manager for Heritage Park to
there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover,
HPMC. As early as March 17, 2000, PEA officially turned
Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate
over to HPMC all the documents and equipment in its
civil action for damages in the criminal action.
possession related to the Heritage Park Project. Petitioner
was duly informed of these incidents through a letter
Held: Such contention betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs.
dated March 13, 2000. Apparently, as of the date of the
Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of
filing of the CIAC Case, PEA is no longer a party-in-
criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the
interest. Instead, it is now private respondent HPMC, as
present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil
the assignee, who stands to be benefited or injured by
Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
the judgment in the suit. In its absence, there cannot be
a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court
The same negligent act may produce civil
which is effective, complete or equitable.[ We thus
liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the
reiterate that HPMC is an indispensable party.
Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a
quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An
Does CIAC have jurisdiction over the dispute?
aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies.
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1008] is pertinent. It
An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed
provides that the jurisdiction of the CIAC over the parties

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ESGUERRA NOTES
independently from the criminal action. There is,
however, a distinction between civil liability arising from
a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The
choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-
delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of
the action.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages
based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged
that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising due care and
diligence in the supervision and management of her
employees and buses, hired Foronda as her driver.
Tuazon became disabled because of Forondas
recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence,
aggravated by Mrs. Cerezos lack of due care and diligence
in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly Foronda.
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states
in part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is
not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable
party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action
in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of
the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an
employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazons
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a
solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case,
each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.
There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only
mutual representation. Where the obligation of the
parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employers liability based on a
quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employers
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.The words
primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer to
the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation
rather than to the character and limits of the obligation.
Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may
sue the employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a
subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal
negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and
separately for his own civil negligence in failing to
exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely
subsidiary is wrong.
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UP College of Law
The action can be brought directly against the
person responsible (for another), without including the
author of the act. The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till
after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the
action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action.
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts
acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to
dispose of the present case on the merits.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the
criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer
liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the
aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employees delict and corresponding primary liability are
established.[47] If the present action proceeds from a
delict, then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is
necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the
quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of
Foronda.
D. Necessary Party or Proper Party
• Definition – A necessary party is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party
if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action (Rule
3, Sec. 8).
• Non-joinder of necessary parties to be
pleaded - Whenever in any pleading in which a
claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined,
the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and
shall state why he is omitted (Rule 3, Sec. 9).
o Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the
omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his
person may be obtained (Rule 3, Sec. 9).
o The failure to comply with the order for his
inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the claim against such party (Rule 3,
Sec. 9).
o The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not
prevent the court from proceeding in the action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party
(Rule 3, Sec. 9).
Laperal Development Corporation, et. al v. CA
(1993)
Facts: Atty. Filoteo T. Banzon sought recovery of
attorney's fees from Oliverio Laperal, Laperal
Development Corporation, and Imperial Development
Corporation for professional services rendered by him in
the various cases. On 1983, the case was thereafter
decided on the basis of a Compromise Agreement. One of
the provisions in the Compromise Agreement stated that
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Atty. Banzon was waiving all other claims he may have
against the defendant.
Banzon filed a complaint against Oliverio
Laperal. Laperal Development Corporation. Imperial
Development Corporation, Sunbeams Convenience
Foods, Inc. and Vicente Acsay for the annulment of the
Compromise Agreement and the collection of Atty’s Fees
that was adjudged payable to him as attorney's fees by
Ascario Tuazon in Civil Case No. 3918; and 4) the
payment to him of nominal damages and attorney's fees.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in
the annulment of a decision of an equal body. CA affirmed
the RTC but held, however, that attorney's fees were due
Atty. Banzon in the cases of Laperal Development
Corporation v. Ascario Tuazon and Ascario Tuazon v.
Judge Maglalang and Republic v. Sunbeams Convenience
Foods. Inc..
Petitioners now challenges the decision insofar
as it orders them to pay Banzon attorney's fees for his
legal services in the aforementioned cases
Held: Concerning one of the cases, Republic vs.
Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. (G.R. No. 50464),
this case was also included in the Compromise
Agreement.
Notably, Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.
(Sunbeams, for brevity), referred to in the complaint as
"Mr. Laperal's Corporation," was not joined by name as a
party-defendant. Apparently, the private respondent
believed that Oliverio Laperal, being the president of the
said company, was directly obligated to him for the
attorney's fees due him for his handling of the case for
Sunbeams.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a
personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the
entities connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder
cannot be made to answer for any of its financial
obligations even if he should be its president.
There is no evidence that Sunbeams and Laperal
are one and the same person. While it is true that Laperal
is a stockholder, director and officer of Sunbeams, that
status alone does not make him answerable for the
liabilities of the said corporation. Such liabilities include
Banzon's attorney's fees for representing it in the case
of Republic v. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.
Sunbeams should have been joined as a party-
defendant in order that the judgment of the lower court
could legally affect it. But even if it was not impleaded,
the court could still validly proceed with the case because
Sunbeams was not an indespensable party but only a
proper party. A proper party is one which ought to be a
party if complete relief is to be accorded as between those
already parties. A party is indespensable if no final
determination can be had of an action unless it is joined
either as plaintiff or defendant.
The Compromise Agreement upon which the
decision of the court was based was between plaintiff
Atty. Banzon and the defendants represented by Oliverio
Laperal. To repeat, Sunbeams was not a party to this
agreement and so could not be affected by it.
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III. Permissive Joinder of Parties
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All
persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series
of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law
or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff
or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense
in connection with any proceedings in which he may have
no interest.
The rule on permissive joinder of parties is that the
parties (plaintiff/defendant) can be joined in a single
complaint and can sue or be sued in separate suits.
Requisites:
i. The right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions;
ii. There is a question of law or fact common to all
the plaintiffs or defendants; and
iii. Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the
provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and
venue. (Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Standard Insurance)
IV. Effect of Misjoinder and Non-joinder of Parties
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
— Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground
for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party
may be severed and proceeded with separately.
▪ An outright dismissal is not the immediate remedy in
case of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Instead,
parties may be dropped or added by the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative. It is when
the order of the court to implead an indispensable
party goes unheeded that the case may be dismissed.
▪ The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of the action. At any stage
of the judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are
just, parties may be added on the motion of a party
or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the court may dismiss
the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
order. (Pamplona Plantation Co. v. Tinghil)
V. Class Suits
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to
join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds
to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully
protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend
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for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
Requisites for a class suit to prosper:
1. The subject matter of the controversy must be of
common or general interest to many persons;
2. The persons are so numerous that it is impracticable
to join all as parties;
3. The parties actually before the court are sufficiently
numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned; and
4. The representatives sue or defend for the benefit of
all. (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473; Sulo ng Bayan,
Inc. v. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347)
VI. Defendants
1. Unwilling co-plaintiff
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent
of any party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be
obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason
therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
2. Alternative defendant
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 13. Alternative defendants. — Where the
plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is
entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as
defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief
against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief
against the other.
▪ Plaintiff may sue the shipping company and the
arrastre operator alternatively for the recovery of
damages to goods shipped through a maritime
vessel (Rizal Surety & Insurance Company v. Manila,
70 SCRA 187)
3. Unknown defendant
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 14. Unknown identity or name of
defendant. — Whenever the identity or name of a
defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the
unknown owner heir devisee, or by such other
designation as the case may require, when his identity
or true name is discovered, the pleading must be
amended accordingly.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 16. Service upon defendant whose
identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In any
action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his or her
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry, within ninety (90) calendar days
from the commencement of the action, service may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him or her by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and
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in such places and for such time as the court may
order.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
calendar days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer. (14a)
4. Entity without juridical personality as
defendant
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as
defendant. — When two or more persons not organized
as an entity with juridical personality enter into a
transaction, they may be sued under the name by which
they are generally or commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the name and
addresses of the persons composing said entity must all
be revealed.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 7. Service upon entity without juridical
personality. — When persons associated in an entity
without juridical personality are sued under the name by
which they are generally or commonly known, service
may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon
any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the
office or place of business maintained in such name. But
such service shall not bind individually any person whose
connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been
severed before the action was brought.
VII. Death of party; duty of counsel
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. —
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after
such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for
the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
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▪ Upon receipt of the notice of death, the court shall
determine whether or not the claim is extinguished
by such death. If the claim survives, the court
shall order the legal representative/s of the
deceased to be substituted for the deceased.
▪ The purpose behind the rule on substitution of
parties is the protection of the right of every party
to due process. (Torres v. Court of Appeals, 278
SCRA 793)
▪ General Rule: Non-compliance with the rules on
substitution of a deceased party renders the
proceedings of the trial court infirm because the
court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of
the legal representative of the deceased. (Brioso
v. Rili-Mariano, 396 SCRA 549)
o Exception: In an ejectment case, the non-
substitution of the deceased by his legal
representatives does not deprive the court
of jurisdiction. A judgment in the
ejectment case may be enforced not only
against the defendant, but also against the
members of their family, their relatives, or
privies who derived their right of
possession from the deceased defendant.
(Florendo, Jr. v. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304)
▪ Formal substitution is not necessary when the
heirs themselves voluntarily appeared in the
action and participated therein. (Vda. De
Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305)
▪ Service of summons is not required to effect
proper substitution. Instead of service of
summons the court shall order the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be
substituted for said deceased.
▪ Examples of actions which survive the death of a
party:
1. Actions and obligations arising from
delicts;
2. Actions based on the tortious conduct of
the defendant;
3. Actions to recover real and personal
property;
4. Actions to enforce a lien on such
properties;
5. Actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property by reason of tort or
delict committed by the deceased;
6. An ejectment case survives the death of a
party and continues until judgment
because the issue concerning the illegality
of the defendant’s possession continues.
(Vda. De Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250
SCRA 305)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. —
When the action is for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until
entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained
by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
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especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of a deceased person.
• Execution shall not issue in favor of the winning
party. The final judgment should be filed as a claim
against the estate of the decedent without need of
proving the claim under Rule 86, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court.
VIII. EFFECT OF NON-SUBSTITUTION OF A
DECEASED PARTY
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor
(2005)
Facts: Respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio,
all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint against petitioner
Bertuldo Hinog for the Recovery of the possession and
ownership of their property which was leased to Hinog.
Allegedly, despite the expiration of the ten-year period
lease contract, Hinog refused to vacate. Bertuldo was able
to file his Answer and start his direct examination.
However, he died on 24 June 1998 without completing his
evidence. Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel. Atty.
Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel.
Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the
complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed
to pay the correct docket fees. Private respondents
opposed the motion to expunge, raising as one of its
grounds the lack of legal personality of Atty. Petalcorin to
represent the litigants for his non-compliance with
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
The motion was granted but subject to the
payment of the deficiency docket fees. Upon such
payment, the trial court reinstated the complaint. This
order was contested by petitioners. In its 15 October
1999 Order denying petitioners’ MR, the trial court noted
that there has been no substitution of parties following
the death of Bertuldo. Hence, it directed Atty. Petalcorin
to comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. On 19 November 1999, Atty. Petalcorin
complied with such directive.
Petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be
reinstated.
In their Comment, private respondents assailed
Atty. Petalcorin’s lack of legal personality to appear as
counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo for his failure to comply
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: What is the effect of the non-compliance on the
rule on substitution (Section 17) upon the legal
personality to sue of Atty. Petalcorin?
Held: Strictly speaking, before said compliance, Atty.
Petalcorin had no standing in the court a quo when he
filed his pleadings. Be that as it may, the matter has been
duly corrected by the Order of the trial court dated 15
October 1999.
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the
purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection
of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure
that the deceased party would continue to be properly
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represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule
on substitution would render the proceedings and
judgment of the trial court infirm because the court
acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding. Thus, proper substitution of
heirs must be effected for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future
claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation
against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him.
In this case, formal substitution of the parties
was effected sixteen months after the death of Bertuldo
and only when the trial court directed Atty. Petalcorin to
comply as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.
De la Cruz v. Joaquin (2005)
Facts: Respondent Pedro Joaquin filed against Petitioners
Sps. dela Cruz for recovery of possession and ownership
of his land. Joaquin alleged that he obtained a loan from
dela Cruz. As security, he executed a Deed of Sale. He
alleged that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage
and he was deprived of his right to repurchase. On 24
December 1988, Pedro Joaquin died. In 1990, the RTC
decided in favor of Joaquin. On 15 February 2002, before
the CA, the daughter of the deceased Pedro, Lourdes dela
Cruz, moved for her substitution as the party-plaintiff.
The CA resolved in favor of Joaquin. In CA’s
2004 Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, CA ordered a substitution by legal
representatives. In this present Petition for Review, the
petitioners assert that the trial court lost jurisdiction over
the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin during the
pendency of the case and having no substitution by the
heirs made.
Issue: WON a formal substitution by the heirs of Pedro
Joaquin is necessary when they themselves actively
participated in the case?
Held:No. As a general rule, the Court nullifies not only
trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the
legal representatives of the deceased, but also the
resulting judgments since the courts acquired no
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives
or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.
Notwithstanding this general rule, a formal substitution
by heirs is not necessary when they themselves
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present
evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions
negate any claim that the right to due process was
violated. The alleging party must prove that there was an
undeniable violation of due process.
The Rules require the legal representatives of a
dead litigant to be substituted as parties to a litigation.
Strictly speaking, this requirement is necessitated by due
process and not a matter of jurisdiction. Thus, when the
rights of the legal representatives of a decedent are
actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or
belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect
the validity of the promulgated decision. After all, due
process had thereby been satisfied.
The heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared
and participated in the case. We stress that the appellate
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court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and
substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had
been ordered correctly. In all proceedings, the legal
representatives must appear to protect the interests of
the deceased. After the rendition of judgment, further
proceedings may be held, such as a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for
Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and
the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro
Joaquin. There being no violation of due process, the
issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to
nullify the trial court’s Decision.
Factual milieu not similar to Chittick v. CA. In
the Chittick case, the children who allegedly substituted
for their mother refused to continue the case against their
father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as
parties. The father also died during the pendency of the
case; thus, the children were bound to substitute for the
defendant also. The substitution effectively merged the
persons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus
extinguished the obligation being sued upon.
Charles Limbauan v. Faustino Acosta (2008)
Facts: Respondent Faustino Acosta took possession of a
portion of an unused land which should have been utilized
by the government as a leprosarium. A portion of the land
which Acosta possessed for himself was occupied by
Paulino Calanday who in turn conveyed the land to Juanita
Roces. Roces paid her rentals to Acosta. Subsequently,
she sub-leased it to her nephew Charles Limbauan. In
1987, Limbauan stopped paying his rentals claiming the
land was government property. Years later, the
government declared the land for the housing projects for
DOH employees. Acosta thereafter filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Limbauan. The MTC, RTC, and
CA decided in favor of Acosta. However, during the
pendency of the case before the CA, Acosta died on 22
October 2000.
The present petition seeks to reverse the CA
ruling, raising as one of its grounds the lack of proper
substitution of a party in compliance with Rule 3, Section
16 (now 17) of the Rules of Court which rendered the case
moot and academic. The petition alleges that on account
of the failure of Acosta’s counsel to inform the CA of the
death of Acosta during the pendency of the appeal before
it, the proceedings and judgment should be invalidated.
Issue: WON the failure of the counsel to comply with his
duty under Section 17 will invalidate the proceedings and
the judgment thereon?
Held: No, this kind of action survives the death of Acosta.
Hence, the failure of counsel to comply with his duty
under Section 17 to inform the court of the death of his
client and no substitution of such party is effected will
NOT invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon
if the action survives the death of such party. Moreover,
the decision rendered shall bind his successor-in-
interest. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any
action for recovery of real property, is a real action and
as such survives the death of Acosta. His heirs have taken
his place and now represent his interests in the instant
petition.21 Hence, the present case cannot be rendered
moot despite the death of respondent.
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ESGUERRA NOTES
IX. DEATH OR SEPARATION OF PARTY WHO
IS A PUBLIC OFFICER (SEC. 17)
Requisites for substitution of public officer:
1. Removal/death of public officer and
appointment of successor within 30
days unless otherwise provided.
2. Successor adopts, continues, or
threatens to continue the act sued
against
3. There is substantial need to continue
the action
Substitution is not automatic. Requisites:
1. Notice to the new public officer
2. Opportunity to be heard for the new
officer (Section 17)
The phrase “in his official capacity”
emphasized that the public officer is a party in
an action in his official capacity, and not
private, capacity. (Herrera, 2000, citing Feria)
X. INCOMPETENCY OR INCAPACITY
(SEC. 18)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3
Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party
becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon
motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued
by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person
assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem.
XI. TRANSFER OF INTEREST (SEC. 19)
Where a party to an action filed with the CA a motion
stating that it had sold, transferred, and assigned to a
third person the property subject of the litigation, and
prayed that the latter be substituted as party-defendant-
appellee, although the motion was not acted upon, the
transferee is bound by any judgment which may be
rendered for or against the transferor. The transfer was
made pendent lite, and with notice of lis pendens. As the
new owner of the property, the transferee is the party
with a substantial interest in the property. Hence, it would
be the most interested in terminating the case. Herrera
citing Mayuga v. CA, 154 SCRA 309, 28 September 1987.
Even if the transferee is not a formal party to the case,
the motion for substitution not having been acted upon,
it is nonetheless bound by a compromise agreement, said
transferee being one of the contracting parties. Persons
who are not formal parties to a civil case but who willingly
and voluntarily enter into a compromise agreement are
bound thereby. Supra.
The Supreme Court has declared in a number of decisions
that a transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same
position as its predecessors-in-interest, the original
defendant, and is bound by the proceedings has in the
case before the property was transferred to it. It is a
proper but not an indispensable party as it would in any
event be bound by the judgment against his predecessor.
This would follow even if it is not formally included as a
defendant through an amendment of the complaint.
Herrera citing Fatalino v. Sanz, 44 Phil. 691.
The appeal, however, of the original party should also
redound to the transferee’s benefit. As it is the transferee
that may ultimately be required to satisfy the judgment if
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it is affirmed on appeal, it is only fair that it be deemed
to have also appealed together with its predecessor-in-
interest, from the decision. To erase all doubts as to the
status of the transferee, the latter may be deemed
impleaded in substitution of the original defendant.
Herrera citing Jocson v. CA, G.R. No. 95446, 16 March
1992.
Thus, where an assignable right has been transferred
before action is brought, the proceeding ought to be
instituted in the name of the assignee; and where an
assignment is effected pendente lite, it is proper to have
the assignee substituted for the original plaintiff. If such
substitution should not be effected and the transfer of the
right action should not be brought to the attention of the
court, the original plaintiffs, if successful in litigation
would hold the fruits of the action as a sort of trustee for
the use and benefit of his assignee. But it would be
surprising doctrine to hold that where the assignee has
assented to the continued prosecution of the action by the
original plaintiff, the defendant can nullify the judgment,
after litigation has been concluded on the ground that the
interest in litigation has been transferred. When this feat
is attempted, the defendant can be properly met by the
proposition that if any irregularity was committed in the
prosecution of the case, it was, as to him, error without
injury. Certainly it cannot be contended that the transfer
of the right of action pendente lite affects the jurisdiction
of the court. Herrera citing E.B. Marcha Transport Co.,
Inc. v. IAC, 147 SCRA 276.
XII. INDIGENT PARTY (SEC. 21)
Under the present rule, the application to litigate as a
pauper may be filed by either the plaintiff or defendant
and hearing to litigate as a pauper may be made ex parte.
Proof in support of the application need not necessarily be
by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial,
city, or municipal treasurer for as long as the court is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter, and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
The exemption includes transcript of stenographic notes
which the court may order to be furnished for himself and
his family.
Unlike the former rule which creates a lien only for legal
fees, under the present rule, the amount of the docket
and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted
from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in
the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court
otherwise provides. Herrera, 2000.
Compare with Section 19 of Rule 141:
SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal
fees. Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that
of their immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and
(b) who do not own real property with a fair market value
as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three
hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt
from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered
in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the
litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
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ESGUERRA NOTES

immediate family do not earn a gross income

abovementioned, and they do not own any real property Rule 4
with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an VENUE OF ACTIONS
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of
the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any,
shall be attached to the litigants affidavit. I. Venue refers to the place where a civil action may
be tried; in civil cases, it essentially concerns a rule
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested of procedure which looks primarily at the
person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint convenience of the litigants. (Gumabon, et al. v.
or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, Larin, G.R. No. 142523, 27 November 2001)
without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have
been incurred. II. Venue and jurisdiction, distinguished.
If the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
Venue Jurisdiction
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then
the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other It is the place where the It refers to the authority of
hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both cause is instituted, heard the court to hear and decide
requirements, then the application should not be denied or tried. a case.
outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency It may be waived. Jurisdiction over the subject
test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound matter is conferred by law
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for and cannot be waived.
exemption. Sps. Algura v. the LGU of Naga, G.R. No. It may be changed by the It is fixed by law and cannot
150135, 30 October 2006. written agreement of the be the subject of agreement
parties. of the parties.
A party may be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis only It is not a ground for a Lack of jurisdiction over the
upon a proper showing that he has no means to that motu proprio dismissal, subject matter may be a
effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding except in summary ground for a motu proprio
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. procedure. dismissal.
Thus, every would-be litigant who seeks exemption from Procedural Substantive
the payment of the fees prescribed for maintaining an
action must establish, not simply allege, his lack of III. Venue of real actions
means. Herrera citing Admin. Matter No. 88-1-646-0, En
Banc, Minute Resolution, 159 SCRA 623. 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 4
Where there is a multiplicity of such parties, each must Section 1. Where the action is real, the venue is
show lack, in propia persona, as it were. The particular local; hence, the venue is the place where the real
circumstances or possible consequences of an actual or property involved, or any portion thereof, is situated.
contemplated suit are such as to transcend the narrow
personal interests of the immediate parties thereto and to
so impugn upon the wider interests of the people at large
IV. Venue of personal actions
as to assume an aspect of “national importance,” does not
under any existing law or rules justify excusing such
parties from paying the requisite judicial fees or costs. 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 4
Supra.
Section 2. If the action is personal, the venue is
transitory; hence, it is the residence of the plaintiff or
XIII. NOTICE TO SOLICITOR GENERAL defendant at the option of the plaintiff.
(SEC. 22)

1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 3 V. Venue of actions against non-residents

1.
Section 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. — In any
action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations,
the court, in its discretion, may require the appearance of
the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or a
representative duly designated by him.
Quasi in rem (action affects personal
status of plaintiff) – residence of plaintiff
Where the defendant does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the
action may be commenced and tried in the
court of the place where the plaintiff resides.
(Rule 4, Sec.3)

2. In rem (action affects property of

Under this new rule, “presidential decree” is now
defendant in Philippines) – location of
included and the term “superior” from the term court
property
has been deleted. Thus this provision is now applicable
Where the defendant does not reside and is
to any court and not limited to a superior court. Herrera,
not found in the Philippines, and the action
2000.
affects any property of said defendant located
in the Philippines, the action may be
commenced and tried where the property or
any portion thereof is situated or found. (Rule
4, Sec.3)

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VI. When rule not applicable
1. Where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise
Diaz v. Adiong (1993)
Certain public officers instituted with the
Regional Trial Court, Marawi City, separate criminal & civil
complaints for libel against Patricio Diaz (“Diaz”), the
publisher and editor of the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of
general circulation in Cotabato City. Diaz moved for the
dismissal of the action for damages, arguing that venue
was improperly laid since neither respondents hold office
in Marawi nor was the article published there.
Ruling: An offended party who is at the same time a
public official can only institute an action arising from libel
in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and
the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed
& first published.
In the present case, it is indubitable that venue
was improperly laid. However, unless and until the
defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue
cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid
since, for all practical intents and purposes, the
venue though technically wrong may yet be
considered acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
Petitioner Diaz then should have timely challenged the
venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant
to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately,
Diaz had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint
with Counterclaim. His motion to dismiss was therefore
belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court
of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action
for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper
venue may be waived and such waiver may occur
by laches.
Withal, objections to venue in civil actions
arising from libel may be waived; it does not, after all,
involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed, the laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it
does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather
than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to
jurisdiction.
Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to
improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss
before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive
pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set
up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted
his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
petitioner may no longer object to the venue which,
although mandatory in the instant case, is
nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must
be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed
waived.
2. Where parties have validly agreed in writing
before filing of the action on exclusive venue
thereof
The parties may agree on a specific venue which could
be in a place where neither of them resides (Universal
Robina Corp., vs. Lim, 535 SCRA 95) The parties may
stipulate on the venue as long as the agreement is (a)
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in writing; (b) made before the filing of the action;
and (c) exclusive as to the venue. (Rule 4, Sec. 4[b])
The mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation
is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as "exclusively" and "waiving for this
purpose any other venue, "shall only" preceding
the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the
other courts," or words of similar import, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement
on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. (Auction in Malinta, Inc., vs. Luyaben,
G.R. No. 173979, 12 February 2007)
Legaspi v. Republic (2008)
Facts: Jesusito D. Legaspi, as owner and manager of
J.D. Legaspi Construction (“petitioner”), entered into a
Construction Agreement with the Social Security
System (“respondent”) in June 1997 for the
construction of a four-storey building in Baguio City
which will serve as respondent's branch office.
Petitioner had several meetings with
respondent's representatives during which he informed
them of his difficulty in meeting his obligations under
the contract due to the devaluation of peso. After
several failed meetings, petitioner sent a letter to
respondent requesting an adjustment in the contract
price, which was denied by respondent. This
constrained petitioner to file a complaint for payment
of sum of money plus damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent, filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that venue was
improperly laid and petitioner had no cause of action.
On the ground of improper venue, it was respondent's
argument that the Construction Agreement provided
that all actions may be brought before the proper court
in Quezon City and that petitioner waived any other
venue.
Ruling: As a general rule, venue of personal
actions is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. –
All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant,
where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
The parties, however, are not precluded from
agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as
qualified by Section 4 of the same rule.
Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be
filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their
suit not only in the place agreed upon but
also in the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment
of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
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As regards restrictive stipulations on venue,
jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that
such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, such as
"exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any
other venue," "shall only" preceding the
designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the
other courts," or words of similar import, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an
agreement on an additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.
In the present case, the Construction
Agreement provides:
ARTICLE XIV – JUDICIAL REMEDIES
All actions and controversies that
may arise from this Agreement
involving but not limited to demands
for the specific performance of the
obligations as specified in the clauses
contained herein and/or as resolved
or interpreted by the CLIENT
pursuant to the third paragraph of
Article I hereof may be brought by
the parties before the proper courts
in Quezon City where the main office
of the CLIENT is located, the
CONTRACTOR hereby expressly
waiving any other venue.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The venue is specific - Quezon City - and
accompanied by the words "the
CONTRACTOR hereby expressly waiving any
other venue," which connote exclusivity of
the designated venue. These terms clearly
stipulate exclusively the venue where
actions arising from the Construction
Agreement should be filed.
• Effect of venue stipulation when the validity of
the written instrument is controverted
Briones v. Court of Appeals (2015)
FACTS: Virgilio C. Briones (“Briones”) filed a Complaint
for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan
Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290846, and
Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC of Manila.
Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss praying for the
dismissal of Briones's complaint on the ground of
improper venue. Cash Asia pointed out the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts stating that "all legal
actions arising out of this notice in connection with the
Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought
in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of
Makati City." In view thereof, it contended that all actions
arising out of the subject contracts may only be
exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as
such, Briones's complaint should be dismissed for having
been filed in the City of Manila. In response, Briones filed
an opposition, asserting, inter alia, that he should not be
covered by the venue stipulation in the subject contracts
as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated that
his signatures on the said contracts were forgeries.
ISSUE: Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground
of improper venue?
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HELD: No. A complaint directly assailing the validity of
the written instrument itself should not be bound by the
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should
be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To
be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint
of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation
when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the
instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the
subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the
actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City.
However, it must be emphasized that Briones's complaint
directly assails the validity of the subject contracts,
claiming forgery in their execution. Given this
circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with
the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their
validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue,
Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the
City of Manila where the subject property is located.
• Complementary-Contracts-Construed Together
Doctrine
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Lim (2005)
FACTS: Philippine Bank of Communications (“plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon and
Tri-Oro International Trading & Manufacturing
Corporation (“defendant”) with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the collection of a deficiency amounting to
P4,014,297.23 exclusive of interest.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants obtained a loan
from it and executed a continuing surety agreement in
plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff granted a renewal of said loan
upon defendants’ request, the most recent being on
January 21, 1998 as evidenced by Promissory Note
Renewal BD-Variable No. 8298021001 in the amount of
P3,000,000.00. It was expressly stipulated therein that
the venue for any legal action that may arise out of said
promissory note shall be Makati City, 'to the exclusion of
all other courts.' Defendants allegedly failed to pay said
obligation upon maturity.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of improper venue, invoking the stipulation
contained in the last paragraph of the promissory note
with respect to the restrictive/exclusive venue.
ISSUE: Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground
of improper venue?
HELD: No. A stipulation as to venue does not preclude
the filing of the action in other places, unless qualifying
or restrictive words are used in the agreement. In the
instant case, the stipulation on the exclusivity of the
venue as stated in the PN is not at issue. What plaintiff
claims is that there was no restriction on the venue,
because none was stipulated in the SA on which plaintiff
had allegedly based its suit. Accordingly, the action on the
SA may be filed in Manila, plaintiff's place of residence.
In enforcing a surety contract, the
"complementary-contracts-construed-together" doctrine
finds application. According to this principle, an accessory
contract must be read in its entirety and together with the
principal agreement. This principle is used in construing
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contractual stipulations in order to arrive at their true
meaning; certain stipulations cannot be segregated and
then made to control. This no-segregation principle is
based on Article 1374 of the Civil Code.
The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the
present case. Incapable of standing by itself, the SA can
be enforced only in conjunction with the PN. The latter
documents the debt that is sought to be collected in the
action against the sureties.
Notably, the PN was a contract of adhesion that
petitioner required the principal debtor to execute as a
condition of the approval of the loan. It was made in the
form and language prepared by the bank. By inserting the
provision that Makati City would be "the venue for any
legal action [that] may arise out of [the] Promissory
Note," petitioner also restricted the venue of actions
against the sureties. The legal action against the sureties
arose not only from the SA, but also from the PN.
VII. Waiver of improper venue
When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to
dismiss it is deemed waived. In other words, venue is
waivable. It is procedural, not a jurisdictional matter. It is
intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather
than restrict their access to the courts. The rules on venue
simply arrange for the convenient and effective
transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to
their power, authority or jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action. (Philippine Banking Corp., vs.
Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649, 28 February 1994)
1. Express waiver
The parties may expressly waive improper venue,
when they agree on a specific venue which could be
in a place neither of them resides in nor where the
property is located.
The parties may stipulate on the venue as long as
the agreement is (a) in writing; (b) made before the
filing of the action; and (c) exclusive as to the
venue. (Rule 4, Sec. 4[b])
2. Implied waiver
There is an implied waiver of improper venue,
when the defendant filed his answer and went to
trial without objecting to the improper venue. (Rule
9, Sec. 1)
The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised
seasonably, else it is deemed waived. Where the
defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss
on the ground of improper venue or include the
same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to
have waived his right to object to improper venue.
(Bautista v. Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc., G.R. No.
148361, 29 November 2005)
Dacoycoy vs. IAC(1991)
Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy filed, before the RTC
of Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent
Rufino De Guzman for the annulment of 2 deeds of sale
involving a parcel of rice land located in Barrio Estanza,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce
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thereof, and damages due to the latter’s refusal to have
said deeds set aside upon petitioner's demand.
Before summons could be served on De Guzman, the RTC
issued an order requiring counsel for the petitioner to
confer with respondent judge on the matter of
venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It
found, based on the allegations in the complaint, that
petitioner's action is a real action as it sought not only the
annulment of the deeds of sale but also the recovery of
ownership of the subject property, which is outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner then
lodged an appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
which affirmed the order of dismissal of his complaint.
Ruling: The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's
complaint by respondent trial court on the ground
of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper
venue is inappropriate because venue may be
waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails
to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as
provided by Rule 4, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, and
allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed
waived. Thus, unless and until the defendant objects
to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid.
The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
VIII. How to question improper venue
1. Motion to dismiss
Under Rule 16, Sec. 1(c), a motion to dismiss
may be filed if the venue was improperly laid.
2. Affirmative defense in answer
If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of
the grounds provided for dismissal under Rule
16 may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in
the answer and in discretion of the court, a
preliminary hearing may be made as if a motion
to dismiss has been filed. (Rule 16, Sec. 6)
Thus, if no motion to dismiss was filed, the
defendant may question the improperly laid
venue in his answer.
PLEADINGS
(SUBSTANTIAL REQUIREMENTS)
PLEADINGS, IN GENERAL
Defined
Pleadings are the written statements of the respective
claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court
for appropriate judgments. (Section 1, Rule 6) Thus,
pleadings cannot be oral because they are clearly
described as “written” statements. (Riano, p.51).
Pleadings have the following purposes:
a. To apprise the Court of the rival claims in a judicial
controversy submitted for trial and decision;
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b. To indicate fairly the nature of the claims and Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory
defense of both parties; and regardless of the amount (Sec. 7, Rule 6).
c. To present, define and narrow the issues, to limit
the proof to be submitted in the trial and form the A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same action
foundation of proof to be submitted during trial as is barred, unless otherwise allowed by the Rules of Court
well as advice a party to what his adversary would (Sec. 7, Rule 6).
rely on as a cause of actions or as defense. (Lianga
Lumber v. Lianga Timber, G.R. No. 386685, 31 (c) Cross-claim
March 1977).
A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party
Distinguished from motion (Rule 15, Sec. 1) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a
A pleading is different from a motion. Section 1, Rule 15, counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may cover all or
of the Rules of Court expressly states that a motion is an part of the original action (Sec. 8, Rule 6).
application for relief other than by a pleading.
(d) Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint
Pleading Motion
Purpose: To submit a Purpose: To apply for an A third (fourth, etc.) — party complaint is a claim that a
claim or defense for order not included in the defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
appropriate judgment. judgment. person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth,
It may be initiatory It cannot be initiatory as etc.) — party defendant for contribution, indemnity,
they are always made in a subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
case already filed in court. opponent's claim (Sec. 11, Rule 6).
It is always filed before It may be filed even after
judgment. judgment.
There are only nine (9) Any application for relief The third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint shall be denied
kinds of pleadings not by a pleading is a admission, and the court shall require the defendant to
allowed by the Rules of motion. institute a separate action, where: (a) the third (fourth,
Court. etc.)-party defendant cannot be located within thirty (30)
It must be written. It may be oral when made calendar days from the grant of such leave; (b) matters
in open court or in the extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised;
course of a hearing or trial. or (c) the effect would be to introduce a new and separate
controversy into the action (Sec. 11, Rule 6).
Pleadings allowed under the Rules of Court
(e) Pleadings-in-intervention
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
One filed by an intervenor asserting a claim against either
19-10-20-SC
or all of the original parties. (Section 3, Rule 19).
Section 2. Pleadings allowed. - The claims
(f) Answer
of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or
An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets
complaint-in-intervention.
forth his defenses.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the
Parts of a pleading:
pleading asserting a claim against him or her.
Ordinarily, a pleading has the following parts:
An answer may be responded to by a reply only if the
1. Caption. It sets forth the name of the court, the
defending party attaches an actionable document to the
title of the action, and the docket number if assigned. The
answer. (2a)
title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They
shall all be named in the original complaint or petition;
(a) Complaint but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the
name of the first party on each side be stated with an
The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause appropriate indication when there are other parties. Their
or causes of action. The names and residences of the respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
2. The body. The body of the pleading sets forth
(b) Counterclaim its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or
defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may pleading.
have against an opposing party (Sec. 6, Rule 6).
a. Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so
by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is numbered to be readily identified, each of which
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting shall contain a statement of a single set of
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does circumstances so far as that can be done with
not require for its adjudication the presence of third convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. number in all succeeding pleadings.
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, b. Headings. — When two or more causes of action are
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial joined the statement of the first shall be prefaced

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by the words "first cause of action,'' of the second
by "second cause of action", and so on for the
others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are
addressed to one of several causes of action in the
complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words
"answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to
the second cause of action" and so on; and when
one or more paragraphs of the answer are
addressed to several causes of action, they shall be
prefaced by words to that effect.
c. Relief. — The pleading shall specify the relief
sought, but it may add a general prayer for such
further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable.
d. Date. — Every pleading shall be dated.
3. Signature and address.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 7
Section 3. Signature and address. — (a)
Every pleading and other written submissions to the court
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him
or her.
(b) The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by
him or her that he or she has read the pleading and
document; that to the best of his or her knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) It is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or
jurisprudence, or by a non-frivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing
jurisprudence;
(3) The factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after availment of the
modes of discovery under these rules; and
(4) The denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified,
are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
(c) If the court determines, on motion or motu proprio
and after notice and hearing, that this rule has been
violated, it may impose an appropriate sanction or refer
such violation to the proper office for disciplinary action,
on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule,
or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly and
severally liable for a violation committed by its partner,
associate, or employee. The sanction may include, but
shall not be limited to, non-monetary directive or
sanction; an order to pay a penalty in court; or, if imposed
on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of part or all of
the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses
directly resulting from the violation, including attorney’s
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fees for the filing of the motion for sanction. The lawyer
or law firm cannot pass on the monetary penalty to the
client. (3a)
4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 7
Section 4. Verification. — Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath or verified.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly
authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of
the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form
of a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney,
should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the
following attestations:
(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct
based on his or her personal knowledge, or based on
authentic documents;
(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery.
The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a
certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the
pleading.
A pleading required to be verified that contains a
verification based on “information and belief,” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
(4a)
Purpose of verification:
The purpose of requiring verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and
correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is
simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and
noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. (Torres-Gomez v. Codilla, G.R.
No. 195191. 20 March 2012.)
5. Certification against forum shopping.
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
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1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 7
Section 5. Certification against forum
shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he or she has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or
her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or
she shall report that fact within five (5) calendar days
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party,
whether in the form of a secretary’s certificate or a special
power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall
not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his or her counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions. (5a)
Effect of failure to comply:
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall
not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground
for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
What is forum shopping?
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails
of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court." Forum shopping is an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it
trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It
degrades the administration of justice and adds to the
already congested court dockets. (Heirs of Marcelo Sotto
v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, 17 February 2014.)
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An important factor in determining its existence is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by
the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same
reliefs. (Id.)
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when
the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.
(Id.)
How allegations made
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 1. In general. — Every pleading
shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts,
including the evidence on which the party pleading
relies for his or her claim or defense, as the case may
be.
If a cause of action or defense relied on is based on
law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their
applicability to him or her shall be clearly and concisely
stated. (1a)
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent
provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be
clearly and concisely stated.
"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are so essential
that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. (Cañete, et
al. v. Genuino Ice Company, Inc., G.R. No. 154080, 22
January 2008).
Evidentiary facts – refer to those which are necessary to
prove the ultimate fact or which furnish evidence of the
existence of some other facts.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 4. Capacity. Facts showing the capacity of
a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of person that is
made a party, must be averred.
A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue
or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by
specific denial, which shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's
knowledge.
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1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 2. Alternative claims and defenses. A
party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action
or defenses.
When two or more statements are made in the
alternative and one of them if made independently would
be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 3. Conditions precedent. In any pleading
a general averment of the performance or occurrence
of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 5. Fraud and mistake, condition of mind.
In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other
condition of the mind of a person may be averred
generally.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 6. Judgments. In pleading a judgment or
decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to
aver the judgment or decision without setting forth
matter showing jurisdiction to render it. An authenticated
copy of the judgment or decision shall be attached to the
pleading. (6a)
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 9. Official documents or act. In pleading
an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver
that the document was issued or the act done was in
compliance with law.
Need to bring new parties.
When the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
(Section 12, Rule 6)
Contents
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 7
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Section 6. Contents. — Every pleading stating
a party’s claims or defenses shall, in addition to those
mandated by Section 2, Rule 7, state the following:
(a) Names of witnesses who will be presented to
prove a party’s claim or defense;
(b) Summary of the witnesses’ intended
testimonies, provided that the judicial affidavits of said
witnesses shall be attached to the pleading and form an
integral part thereof. Only witnesses whose judicial
affidavits are attached to the pleading shall be presented
by the parties during trial. Except if a party presents
meritorious reasons as basis for the admission of
additional witnesses, no other witness or affidavit shall be
heard or admitted by the court; and
(c) Documentary and object evidence in support of
the allegations contained in the pleading. (n)
COMPLAINT
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 3. Complaint. - The complaint is the
pleading alleging the plaintiff’s or claiming party’s cause
or causes of action. The names and residences of the
plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
(3a)
• Allegations
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 1. In general. — Every pleading shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise
and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the
evidence on which the party pleading relies for his or her
claim or defense, as the case may be.
If a cause of action or defense relied on is based on law,
the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to
him or her shall be clearly and concisely stated. (1a)
• Manner of making allegations in a
Complaint
1. Conditions precedent are matters which must be
complied with before a cause of action arises. When
a claim is subject to a condition precedent, the
compliance of the same must be alleged in the
pleading.
2. Failure to comply with a condition precedent is an
independent ground for a motion to dismiss: that a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied (Sec. 1[j], Rule 16).
3. When making averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting such fraud or mistake
must be stated with particularity (Sec. 5, Rule 8). It
is not enough therefore, for the complaint to allege
that he was defrauded by the defendant. Under this
provision, the complaint must state with particularity
the fraudulent acts of the adverse party. These
particulars would necessarily include the time, place
and specific acts of fraud committed against him.
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4. Malice, intent, knowledge or other conditions of the
mind of a person may be averred generally(Sec. 5,
Rule 8). Unlike in fraud or mistake, they need not be
stated with particularity. The rule is borne out of
human experience. It is difficult to state the
particulars constituting these matters. Hence, a
general averment is sufficient.
5. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be
sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in
a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of person that is made a party,
must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue
as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity
of any party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall
include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly
within the pleader's knowledge. (Sec. 4, Rule 8)
Reyes v. Makati RTC (2008)
Facts: Petitioner Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo
C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the
spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia,
Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith
Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation
established by their family. Pedro died in 1964, while
Anastacia died in 1993. The former had his estate
judicially partitioned among his heirs, but the latter had
not made the same in her shareholding in Zenith. Zenith
and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar to obtain
accounting of funds and assets of Zenith, and to
determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and
Anastacia that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated. In his answer with counterclaim, Oscar
denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of
Anastacia and questioned the jurisdiction of SEC to
entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement
of Anastacia’s estate. The case was then transferred to
Makati Regional Trial Court. Oscar then filed a “Motion to
Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit” and
prayed that the same must be dismissed. The RTC denied
the motion. The motion was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, but was again denied.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint is a mere nuisance
or harassment suit.
Held: The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain,
concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action and must
specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
must be stated with particularity. These rules find specific
application to Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which
speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to
fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public
and/or to the stockholders.
Allegations of deceit, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely
conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of
the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not
sufficiently state an effective cause of action. Fraud and
mistake are required to be averred with particularity in
order to enable the opposing party to controvert the
particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or
mistake. Tested against these standards, charges of fraud
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against Oscar were not properly supported by the
required factual allegations. While the complaint
contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by
him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring
the controversy within the special commercial court’s
jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but
are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged
appropriation of shares can be characterized as “illegal
and fraudulent” were not explained nor elaborated on.
The case must be dismissed.
• Test of Sufficiency of the Facts Alleged in
the Complaint to Constitute a Cause of
Action
Labao v. Flores, et al. (2010)
FACTS: Respondents Flores, et al. filed a complaint with
the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against petitioner,
which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, the
NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Respondents
Flores, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the NLRC in its resolution, a copy of which their
counsel received on 13 October 2006.
Eighty-eight (88) days later, respondents Flores, et al.,
through their new counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari alleging that they were informed
only of the NLRC’s Resolution on 6 December 2006 due
to their former counsel’s negligence. The CA ruled that
respondents Flores et al.’s petition was timely filed, and
reversed the NLRC’s Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct
in acting upon respondents Flores, et al.’s petition.
HELD: No.
None of the following recognized exceptions to
the strict observance of procedural rules are present in
this case: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2)
to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.
In this case, the acts of respondents Flores, et
al.’s former counsel bind them. Moreover, the NLRC’s
Resolution has become final and immutable. Just as a
losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.
Capacity of parties
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
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There is partial denial when the defendant

Section 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that
is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise
an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the
capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include
such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the
pleader’s knowledge. (4)
Actions based upon a document
An actionable document is a document relied upon by
either the plaintiff or the defendant.
Whenever an actionable document is the basis of a
pleading, the rule specifically direct the pleader to set
forth in the pleading the substance of the instrument or
the document and:
a. to attach the original or the copy of the document to
the pleading as an exhibit and to be part of the
pleading; or
b. with like effect, to set forth in the pleading said copy
of the instrument or document (Sec. 7, Rule 8).
This manner of pleading a document applies only to one
which is the basis of action or a defense. Hence, if the
document does not have the character of an actionable
document, as when it is merely evidentiary, it need not
be pleaded strictly in the manner prescribed by Sec. 7,
Rule 8.
ANSWER
Defined; in general
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
denies only a part of the averment, as when he
specifies so much of it as is true and material
and denies the remainder.
(3) Denial by disavowal of knowledge
There is denial by disavowal of knowledge when
the defendant alleges having no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the material averment made in the
complaint. Such denial must be made in good
faith.
Note: When the defendant alleges having no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations of the
other party but such matters are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, a
claim of “ignorance or lack of information” will
not be considered as a specific denial. (Aquintey
v. Tibong, G.R. No. 166704, 20 December 2006)
c. Capacity of parties (Sec.4, Rule 8)
A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any
party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which
shall include such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge.
d. Genuineness of documents (Sec. 8,
Rule 8)
Rule: When an action or defense is founded
upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts.

Section 4. An answer is a responsive pleading Exceptions: The requirement of an oath does

in which a defending party sets forth his or her defenses. not apply when:
a) the adverse party does not appear to
be a party to the instrument; or
b) when compliance with an order for an
Types of Defenses
inspection of the original instrument is
refused.
1. Negative
a. A negative defense is the specific
Memita v. Masongsong (2007)
denial of the material fact or facts
alleged in the pleading of the
Facts: Masongsong, under the business name
claimant essential to his cause or
of RM Integrated Services, was the distributor of San
causes of action. [Rule 6, Section
Miguel Foods, Inc.’s Magnolia chicken
5(a)]
products. Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken
products on a 25-day payment credit to Memitas Vicor
b. How alleged, generally (Section
Store (“Memitas”) in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City.
10, Rule 8)
Masongsong filed a complaint for collection of sum of
A negative defense is stated in the form of a
money against Memitas for its alleged non-payment of
specific denial, which may be a/an:
purchased goods from the former. In his answer, while
Memitas did not deny that he purchased goods on credit
(1) Absolute denial
from Masongsong, he claimed, however, that there were
There is absolute denial when the defendant
questionable deliveries, short deliveries and
specifies each material allegation of fact the
discrepancies, and possible manipulation of delivery
truth of which he does not admit and whenever
receipts, hence his refusal to pay. The trial court ruled in
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
favor of Masongsong, and was upheld by the Court of
matters upon which he relies to support his
Appeals. Memitas assail, among others, the admissibility
denial.
of the sales invoices presented by Masongsong.
(2) Partial denial
Held: Memita, in alleging questionable and
short deliveries, in effect alleges that Masongsong

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committed fraud. As the party invoking fraud, Memita has
the burden of proof. Whoever alleges fraud or mistake
affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation,
since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns and private concerns have been fair and
regular.
The best evidence of the transaction between
Memita and Masongsong are the sales invoices. The sales
invoices show that Memita or his representative
acknowledged receipt of Masongsongs deliveries without
protest. Memita aired his doubts about the amounts only
after Masongsong asked him to pay his credit. Moreover,
although Memita confronted Masongsong with a check
dated 1 July 1996 in the amount of P127,238.40 payable
to RM Integrated Services, Masongsong stated that the
said amount did not include any transaction in the present
case.
Memitas’ evidence reveal that Memita failed to
prove fraud on Masongsong’s part. Therefore, the trial
court is correct in stating that Memitas is liable to
Masongsong in the amount of P603,520.50 plus interest
of 12% per annum as agreed upon by the parties and as
stated in the sales invoices.
e. Negative pregnant
A negative pregnant is a denial pregnant with an
2.
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to. It is not a specific denial and is actually an
admission. This arises when the pleader merely repeats
the allegations in a negative form. (Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium (2000), p.177)
Philippine American General Insurance Co. v.
Sweet Lines (1992)
Facts: A total of 7,000 bags of low density
polyethylene (600 bags of polyethylene 641 and 6,400
bags of polyethylene 647) were shipped from Baton
Rouge, LA to Manila on board SS Vishva Yash, a vessel
belonging to the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI).
From Manila, the cargoes were shipped to Davao on board
MV Sweet Love, a vessel owned by Sweet Lines. The
consignee was Far East Bank with arrival notice to Tagum
Plastics, Inc. (“Tagum Plastics”), Tagum, Davao City. The
cargoes were insured by Far East Bank with the Philippine
American General Insurance Co (“Philamgen”). After the
shipments were discharged, it was discovered that there
were damages, losses and shortages on the cargo
covered by the bills of lading. Philamgen and Tagum
Plastics commenced a suit against Sweet Lines Inc.(SLI),
Davao Arrastre, SCI Line and FE Zuellig to recover the
cost of damaged shipment. Philamgen argued, among
others, that SLI failed to adduce any evidence in support
of its defense of prescription and that the bills of lading
said to contain the shortened periods for filing and for
instituting an action against the carrier were never offered
in evidence.
Held: As petitioners are suing upon SLI's
contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as
contained in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be
categorized as actionable documents which under the
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action
or defenses, and the genuineness and due execution of
which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied
under oath by the adverse party. The rules on actionable
documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or
defense based on said documents. Petitioners' failure to
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specifically deny the existence, much less the
genuineness and due execution, of the instruments in
question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions,
verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or
in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same
case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove
the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to
have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. Moreover, when the due execution
and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted
because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific
verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
presented formally in evidence for it may be considered
an admitted fact.
Even granting that petitioners' averment
in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the
procedural earmarks of what in the law on
pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a
denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an
admission of the averment it is directed to. Thus,
while petitioners objected to the validity of such
agreement for being contrary to public policy, the
existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were
nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.
Affirmative
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be
negative or affirmative.
(a) xxx
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new
matter which, while hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the pleading of the claimant,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him or
her. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession
and avoidance.
Affirmative defenses may also include grounds for the
dismissal of a complaint, specifically, that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment. (5a)
An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new
matter which, while hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the pleading of the claimant,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him.
Affirmative defenses include
(1) fraud,
(2) prescription,
(3) release,
(4) payment,
(5) illegality,
(6) statute of frauds,
(7) estoppel,
(8) former recovery,
(9) discharge in bankruptcy, and
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ESGUERRA NOTES
(10) any other matter by way of confession and
avoidance.
Affirmative defenses may also include grounds for the
dismissal of a complaint, specifically, that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment.
• Should be specifically pleaded
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 12. Affirmative defenses. —
xxx
(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the
earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof.
Periods to Plead
xxx
• Resolving affirmative defenses
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 12. Affirmative defenses. —
xxx
(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above
affirmative defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from
the filing of the answer.
(d) As to the other affirmative defenses under the first
paragraph of Section 5(b), Rule 6, the court may conduct
a summary hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days from
the filing of the answer. Such affirmative defenses shall
be resolved by the court within thirty (30) calendar days
from the termination of the summary hearing.
• Remedy
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 12. Affirmative defenses. —
xxx
(e) Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the
subject of a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, but may be among
the matters to be raised on appeal after a judgment on
the merits. (n)
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 11. Allegations not specifically
denied deemed admitted. — Material averments in a
pleading asserting a claim or claims, other than those as
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to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied. (11a)
➢ Admissions may be withdrawn by amendments.
The original pleadings are superseded by the amended
pleading (Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Plan, G.R. No. L-40155,
10 September 1976)
➢ Failure to specifically deny under oath an
actionable document results in the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of said document.
Note: While failure to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document generally implies an admission of the same
by the other party, such implied admission is deemed
waived if the party asserting the same has allowed the
adverse party to present evidence contrary to the
contents of such document without objection. (Central
Surety v. Hodges, G.R. No. 12730, 22 August 1960).
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
Section 1. Answer to the complaint. —
The defendant shall file his or her answer to the
complaint within thirty (30) calendar days after
service of summons, unless a different period is fixed
by the court. (1a)
Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign
private juridical entity. — Where the defendant is
a foreign private juridical entity and service of
summons is made on the government official
designated by law to receive the same, the answer
shall be filed within sixty (60) calendar days after
receipt of summons by such entity. (2a)
Section 3. Answer to amended
complaint. — When the plaintiff files an amended
complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall
answer the same within thirty (30) calendar days
after being served with a copy thereof.
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the
defendant shall answer the amended complaint
within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the
order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed
may serve as the answer to the amended complaint
if no new answer is filed.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an
amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim,
amended third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, and
amended complaint-in-intervention. (3a)
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Waiver of Defenses
Pleading Time to File
General Rule within thirty (30) General Rule: Defenses and objections not pleaded either
calendar days after in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
service of summons waived. (Sec.1, Rule 9)
(a) within
thirty (30) calendar Exceptions:
days after service of 1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
summons to resident 2) Litis pendentia
agent or to agent or 3) Res judicata; and
Defendant is officer in the 4) Prescription of action
foreign private Philippines; 5)
juridical entity
(b) summons is COUNTERCLAIMS
served on
government official Defined and in general
designated by law to
To Complaint receive the same - 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
within sixty (60) 19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
calendar days after
receipt of summons Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is
by such entity. any claim which a defending party may have against an
When service of Within the time opposing party. (6)
summons is by specified in the order
publication granting leave to
serve summons by A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the
publication, which recovery sought by the opposing party, but may
shall not be less than claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind
sixty (60) days from that sought by the opposing party
Non-resident At least sixty (60)
Maranan v. Manila Banking Corp. (2007)
defendant on days to answer
Answer whom
FACTS: Mandarin Development Corporation (“Mandarin”)
extraterritorial
obtained from Manila Banking Corporation
service of
(“Respondent”) a ten million peso loan as additional
summons is made
working capital. Alicia C. Maranan (“Petitioner”), with Yu
When filing is a Within thirty (30)
Kim Chuy, Sofio Mo Gianan, Nestor Ignacio, and Roberto
matter of right calendar days service
Posadas, signed a surety agreement binding themselves
To Amended of amended
solidarily liable with Mandarin for the said loan.
Complaint complaint.
Mandarin's outstanding loan obligation inclusive of
When filing is NOT Within fifteen (15)
interest reached P30,500,000 prompting respondent to
a matter of right calendar days from
file a complaint for a sum of money against Mandarin, as
notice of the court
well as Pacific Enamel and Glass Manufacturing
order admitting the
Corporation (“Pacific Enamel”), S. Antonio Roxas Chua,
amended complaint.
Jr., and the aforementioned guarantors including herein
petitioner.
To Within twenty (20) calendar days from
Counterclaim service of pleading. Chua and Pacific Enamel filed a motion to
/ dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause
Crossclaim of action against them. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss and accordingly dropped them from the case.
About two years later, petitioner filed an Amended
To Same period as with the original Answer impleading Chua and Pacific Enamel as
Third(Fourth, defendant. defendants in her counterclaim.
Etc.)- Party
Complaint ISSUE: Whether petitioner's resort to a counterclaim
instead of a third-party complaint in impleading Chua and
Pacific Enamel was proper.

To Within twenty (20) calendar days from the HELD: No. Petitioner’s resort to a counterclaim was not
Supplemental notice of the order admitting the same, proper. Sections 6 and 14 of Rule 6 provide:
Complaint unless a different period is fixed by the
court. SEC. 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any
Reply Within fifteen (15) calendar days from service of the claim for money or other relief which a defending
pleading responded to. party may have against an opposing party. A
counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the recovery
sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that
sought by the opposing party's claim. (Emphasis
supplied) 2005jur

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SEC. 14. Bringing new parties. — When the
presence of parties other than those to the original action
is required for the granting of complete relief in the
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court
shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
Records show that at the time of the filing of the
Amended Answer in which Chua and Pacific Enamel were
impleaded in the counterclaim, the two were no longer
parties to the action. Note that the trial court had already
dropped Chua and Pacific Enamel from the case for lack
of cause of action against them. Under the Rules, a
counterclaim may be filed only against an opposing party.
The filing of a counterclaim against a third party is not
allowed, but the court may order such party to be brought
in as defendant.
How raised
Included in answer
(Rule 6, Sec. 9; Rule 11 Sec. 8)
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-
crossclaims. — A counter-claim may be asserted against
an original counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original
cross-claimant.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. — A
compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a
defending party has at the time he or she files his or her
answer shall be contained therein.
After Answer
(Rule 6 , Sec.9; Rule 11 Sec. 9)
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after
answer. — A counterclaim or a cross-claim which either
matured or was acquired by a party after serving his or
her pleading may, with the permission of the court, be
presented as a counterclaim or a cross-claim by
supplemental pleading before judgment.
Compulsory Counterclaims
It is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts, arises out of or is connected with the transaction
or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. (Rule 6, Sec. 7)
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1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 9
Section 2. Compulsory Counterclaim. — A
compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up shall
be barred.
Nature of compulsory counterclaims
a. It is auxiliary to the original suit such that as a
general rule, the court must have jurisdiction
over the original action in order to hear the
compulsory counterclaim. The exception is
discussed in Padilla v. Globe Asiatique below
(page 51).
Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park
Association (2000)
Facts: The then Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
(“USSR”) owned a residential lot in Forbes Park, Makati.
Due to the USSR’s representation and repeated
reassurance that it would be building a residence for its
Trade Representative, Forbes Park authorized its
construction and work began shortly thereafter. Despite
this, and upon ocular inspection, Forbes Park discovered
that USSR was constructing a multi-level apartment
building, in violation of Forbes Park’s deeds of restrictions.
Thus, Forbes Park suspended all permits of entry for the
personnel and materials to USSR’s construction site.
Financial Building, the contractor or USSR’s
building, filed a complaint for injunction and damages
against Forbes Park with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The latter, in turn, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that Financial Building had no cause of action
because it was not the real party-in-interest. Financial
Building’s case was dismissed and terminated.
After the termination of Financial Building’s
case, Forbes Park filed a complaint for damages against
Financial Building arising from violation of its rules and
regulations.
Issue: Whether Forbes Park’s complaint for damages
arising from violation of its rules and regulations is proper
for adjudication in a separate and subsequent action
Held: No. Financial Building’s case and the instant case
arose from the same occurrence the construction work
done by Financial Building on the USSRs lot in Forbes Park
Village. The issues of fact and law in both cases are
identical. The factual issue is whether the structures
erected by Financial Building violate Forbes Parks rules
and regulations, whereas the legal issue is whether
Financial Building, as an independent contractor working
for the USSR, could be enjoined from continuing with the
construction and be held liable for damages if it is found
to have violated Forbes Parks rules.
As a result of the controversy, Financial Building
seized the initiative by filing the prior injunction case,
which was anchored on the contention that Forbes Park’s
prohibition on the construction work in the subject
premises was improper. The instant case on the other
hand was initiated by Forbes Park to compel Financial
Building to remove the same structures it has erected in
the same premises involved in the prior case and to claim
damages for undertaking the said construction. Thus, the
logical relation between the two cases is patent and it is
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obvious that substantially the same evidence is involved
in the said cases.
Moreover, the two cases involve the same
parties. The aggregate amount of the claims in the instant
case is within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court,
had it been set up as a counterclaim in Civil Case No.
16540. Therefore, Forbes Park’s claims in the instant case
should have been filed as a counterclaim in Civil Case No.
16540.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to
the proceeding in the original suit and derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim
presupposes the existence of a claim against the
party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is
no claim against the counterclaimant, the
counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed,
more so where the complaint is dismissed at the
instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if
the dismissal of the main action results in the
dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it
stands to reason that the filing of a motion to
dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the
compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the
motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the
counterclaim.
Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the
setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible
remedies. In the event that a defending party has a
ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at
the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he
decides to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his
compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his
compulsory counterclaim, he may still plead his ground
for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer. The
latter option is obviously more favorable to the defendant
although such fact was lost on Forbes Park.
The ground for dismissal invoked by Forbes Park
in Financial Building’s case was lack of cause of
action. There was no need to plead such ground in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer since the same was
not deemed waived if it was not pleaded. Nonetheless,
Forbes Park still filed a motion to dismiss and thus
exercised bad judgment in its choice of remedies. Thus,
it has no one to blame but itself for the consequent loss
of its counterclaim as a result of such choice.
c. Effect of dismissal. - If the dismissal of the
complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the
counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot
survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself
states sufficient cause of action then it should
stand independently of and survive the
dismissal of the complaint. However, if the
dismissal is pursuant to circumstances covered
by Section 6, Rule 16 and Sections 2 and 3 of
Rule 17, then the dismissal of the complaint
does not result in the dismissal of the
counterclaim, whether compulsory or
permissive.
Pinga vs. Santiago (2006)
Facts: Pinga was a defendant in a complaint for injunction
filed by Santiago in 1998. On October 2004, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) already ordered the dismissal of the
complaint after Santiago’s counsel had sought the
postponement of the hearing scheduled then. However,
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the order of dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by
the RTC in an Order dated 9 June 2005, which took into
account the assurance of Santiago’s counsel that he
would give priority to that case. On the scheduled
hearing, Santiago’s counsel still failed to appear, thus, the
RTC dismissed the complaint and allowed Pinga to present
his evidence ex parte.
Santiago filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the RTC’s Order, opting however not to seek that their
complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that the
entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed
from presenting evidence ex-parte. The RTC granted the
Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the
counterclaim, citing as the only ground therefor that
"there is no opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
of [Pinga]."
Issue: Whether the dismissal of a complaint for failure to
prosecute must necessarily result in the dismissal of the
counterclaim therein.
Held: No. The dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the
plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever
nature in the same or separate action. Accordingly, the
RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the
counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17 mandates that the
dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the
same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the
counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such
counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a
remand is necessary for trial on the merits of the
counterclaim.
Ratio: Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears
the same integral characteristics as a complaint; namely
a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another.
The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the
counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the
plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the complaint.
Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause
of action cannot survive.
It would then seemingly follow that if the
dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the
cause(s) of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim
cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the case, especially as
a general rule. More often than not, the allegations
that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or
omission of the plaintiff other than the plaintiff’s
very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such acts
or omissions imputed to the plaintiff are often
claimed to have occurred prior to the filing of the
complaint itself. The only apparent exception to this
circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim
that the very act of the plaintiff in filing the
complaint precisely causes the violation of the
defendant’s rights. Yet even in such an instance, it
remains debatable whether the dismissal or
withdrawal of the complaint is sufficient to obviate
the pending cause of action maintained by the
defendant against the plaintiff.
These considerations persist whether the
counterclaim in question is permissive or compulsory. A
compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, does not
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require for its adjudication the presence of third parties,
and stands within the jurisdiction of the court both as to
the amount involved and the nature of the claim. The fact
that the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based
are founded within the same transaction or occurrence as
the complaint, is insufficient causation to negate the
counterclaim together with the complaint. The dismissal
or withdrawal of the complaint does not traverse the
boundaries of time to undo the act or omission of the
plaintiff against the defendant, or vice versa.
While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit
of litigation by the plaintiff, either through his/her own
initiative or fault, it would be iniquitous to similarly
encumber the defendant who maintained no such
initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly moves for the
dismissal of the counterclaim or neglects to timely pursue
such action, let the dismissal of the counterclaim be
premised on those grounds imputable to the defendant,
and not on the actuations of the plaintiff.
The other considerations supplied in Metals are
anchored on the premise that the jurisdictional foundation
of the counterclaim is the complaint itself. The theory is
correct, but there are other facets to this subject that
should be taken into account as well. On the established
premise that a counterclaim involves separate causes of
action than the complaint even if derived from the same
transaction or series of transactions, the counterclaim
could have very well been lodged as a complaint had the
defendant filed the action ahead of the complainant. The
terms ancillary or auxiliary may mislead in signifying that
a complaint innately possesses more credence than a
counterclaim, yet there are many instances wherein the
complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is meritorious. In
truth, the notion that a counterclaim is, or better still,
appears to be merely ancillary or auxiliary is chiefly the
offshoot of an accident of chronology, more than anything
else.
The formalistic distinction between a complaint
and a counterclaim does not detract from the fact that
both of them embody causes of action that have in their
end the vindication of rights. While the distinction is
necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the
rules of procedure, it should be remembered that the
primordial purpose of procedural rules is to provide the
means for the vindication of rights. A party with a valid
cause of action against another party cannot be denied
the right to relief simply because the opposing side had
the good fortune of filing the case first. Yet this in effect
was what had happened under the previous procedural
rule and correspondent doctrine, which under their final
permutation, prescribed the automatic dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim upon the dismissal of the
complaint, whether upon the initiative of the plaintiff or
of the defendant.
Thus, the present rule embodied in
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more
equitable disposition of the counterclaims by
ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the
merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the
survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the
counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the
complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing
it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment
or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those
defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified,
the amended rules now unequivocally protect such
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counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the
dismissal of the complaint.
d. The court must have jurisdiction both as to
amount and nature of the counterclaim, except
when the original action was filed before the
Regional Trial Court. In the latter case, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.
Maceda vs. Court of Appeals (1989)
Facts: Private respondent Cement Center, Inc. (“Cement
Center”) filed a case for ejectment against Maceda. In his
answer to the complaint, Maceda set up a counterclaim
for P240,000, the alleged value of the improvements
which he introduced to the subject property. Maceda
claimed that the original owners of the property promised
to reimburse him of his expenses for said property’s
improvement.
In its decision, the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) ordered Maceda to vacate the premises and pay
the plaintiff P2,000 per month as reasonable
compensation for his use of the premises until he actually
vacates, and P5,000 as attorney's fees. It ordered
Cement Center to pay Maceda P158,000 as the value of
his improvements and repairs, less his accrued rentals of
P64,000 as of December 1985 and the sum of P12,000
which he had earlier received as partial reimbursement.
The MTC’s mandate for Cement Center to pay Maceda was
upheld by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the
RTC’s decision and set aside Cement Center’s obligation
to pay Maceda P182,200.00 corresponding to the value of
the supposed necessary and useful improvements.
Held: MTC had NO jurisdiction over Maceda’s
counterclaim of P240,000. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that the MTC did not have original jurisdiction over
his counterclaim as it exceeds P20,000. Correspondingly,
the RTC did not have appellate jurisdiction over the claim.
The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan
awarding him P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that of
the Regional Trial Court raising the award to P182,200,
were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action for sum of money
(Maceda's counterclaim for the value of his improvements
is one such action) is limited to a demand that "does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and
costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind." (Sec.
33, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129.) A counterclaim in the
municipal or city court beyond that jurisdictional
limit may be pleaded only by way of defense to
weaken the plaintiffs claim, but not to obtain
affirmative relief.
e. When original action filed with RTC, the
counterclaim is deemed compulsory regardless
of amount.
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. xxx xxx xxx
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and nature thereof, except
that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
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regardless of the amount. A compulsory counterclaim not
raised in the same action is barred, unless otherwise
allowed by these Rules. (7a)
f. Filing fees and certificate of non-forum
shopping are not required in compulsory
counterclaims
Carpio vs. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas),
Inc (1996)
Facts: Carpio filed a Complaint for annulment of
foreclosure sale and damages) against the Rural Bank
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, Inc. Respondent bank filed its
Answer with Counterclaim, denying specifically the
material allegations of the complaint, and praying for
damages. Carpio filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim on the ground that respondent banks
counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification
against forum shopping.
Held: A certificate of non-forum shopping is NOT required
for the filing of compulsory counterclaims. It bears
stressing that the Section 5, Rule 7 distinctly provides
that the required certification against forum shopping is
intended to cover an initiatory pleading, meaning
an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
relief. Certainly, respondent bank’s Answer with
Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed merely to
counter petitioners complaint that initiates the civil
action. In other words, the rule requiring such
certification does not contemplate a respect of such claim. There are, however, recognized
defendants/respondents claim for relief that is derived
only from, or is necessarily connected with, the main
action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by the plaintiff
to comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted
above, directs the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, not the dismissal of
respondents counterclaim.
g. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not
raised (Rule 11, Sec. 8 and Rule 9, Sec. 2)
i. A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-
claim that a defending party has at the
time he files his answer shall be contained
therein. (Rule 11, Sec. 8)
ii. A compulsory counterclaim, or cross-
claim, not set up shall be barred. (Rule 9,
Sec. 2)
iii. When a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim or a cross-claim through
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires, he may,
by leave of court, set up the counterclaim
or cross-claim by amendment before
judgment. (Rule 11, Sec. 10)
h. A compulsory counterclaim need not be
answered.
Sarmiento v. San Juan (1983)
Facts: Private respondent Belfast Surety & Insurance Co.
Inc. (“Belfast”) filed a civil action against Sarmiento for
indemnification under an Indemnity Agreement executed
by them in connection with a bail bond. Sarmiento filed
an answer with compulsory counterclaim. Thereafter,
upon motion from Belfast, the judge scheduled the pre-
trial. At the scheduled pre-trial, only Belfast’s counsel
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appeared. Sarmiento was declared as “non-suited” and
the court allowed Belfast to present its evidence ex parte.
Upon the denial of Sarmiento’s motion for
reconsideration, he filed a case for certiorari against the
judge, alleging in part that the pre-trial was premature
inasmuch as Belfast did not file an answer to Sarmiento’s
counterclaim. Thus, the "last pleading" has not yet been
filed so as to authorize the judge to schedule a pre-trial
in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Held: No. An answer to a compulsory counterclaim is NOT
required before pre-trial may be scheduled. While it may
be true that the private respondent had not filed any
answer to the counterclaim contained in the petitioner's
answer, such circumstance does not prevent the trial
court from conducting the pre-trial.
The requirement that the pre-trial shall be
scheduled "after the last pleading has been filed" is
intended to fully apprise the court and the parties of all
the issues in the case before the pre-trial is conducted. It
must be remembered that the issues may only be
ascertained from the allegations contained in the
pleadings filed by the parties. The last permissible
pleading that a party may file would be the reply to the
answer to the last pleading of claim that had been filed in
the case, which may either be the complaint, a cross-
claim, a counterclaim or a third party complaint, etc. Any
pleading asserting a claim must be answered, and the
failure to do so by the party against whom the claim is
asserted renders him liable to be declared in default in
exceptions to the rule, making the failure to answer
a pleading of claim as a ground for a default
declaration, such as the failure to answer a
complaint in intervention, or a compulsory
counterclaim so intimately related to the complaint
such that to answer to same would merely require
a repetition of the allegations contained in the
complaint.
In the case presently considered, the nature of
the counterclaim in the petitioner's answer has not been
made clear, except to categorize it as a compulsory
counterclaim. Such being the case, it is likely to be one
where the answering thereof is not necessary, and the
failure to do so would not be a ground to be declared in
default. In any event, the private respondent's failure to
answer the petitioner's counterclaim after the period to
file the answer had lapsed is no obstacle to holding a pre-
trial. The requirement that the last pleading must have
been filed before a pre-trial may be scheduled should
more appropriately be construed to mean not only if the
last pleading had been actually filed, but also if the period
for filing the same had expired.
i. A compulsory counterclaim is allowed under
the Rule on Summary Procedure (Rules of
Summary Procedure (RSP), A. M. No. 00-11-
01-SC, Sec. 3)
The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the
complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims'
pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. (RSP,
Sec. 3)
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Remedy for omitted counterclaim due to oversight,
excusable neglect (Rule 11, Sec. 10)
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. —
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-
claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires, he or she may, by leave
of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by
amendment before judgment.
Criteria or Tests that may be used in determining
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. CPR
Promotions and Marketing, Inc. (2015)
FACTS:
Respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing,
Inc. (“CPR Promotions”) obtained loans from petitioner
MBTC. These loans were covered by fifteen (15)
promissory notes (PNs) all signed by respondents,
spouses Leoniza F. Reynoso and Cornelio P. Reynoso, Jr.
(spouses Reynoso), as Treasurer and President of CPR
Promotions, respectively.
The spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of
real estate mortgage on separate dates to secure the
loans. Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted,
prompting MBTC to file a petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. Notwithstanding
the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total
amount of PhP13,614,000, petitioner MBTC alleged that
there remained a deficiency balance of PhP2,628,520.73,
plus interest and charges as stipulated and agreed upon
in the PNs and deeds of real estate mortgages. Despite
petitioner's repeated demands, however, respondents
failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner
filed an action for collection of sum of money against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-230, entitled
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. CPR Promotions
and Marketing, Inc. and Spouses Cornelio Reynoso, Jr.
and Leoniza F. Reynoso. The trial court ruled in MBTC’s
favor. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s
ruling, and ordered MBTC to refund CPR Promotions the
amount of Php 722,602.22.
MBTC asserts that the CA's grant of a refund
valued at PhP722,602.22 is erroneous because CPR
Promotions never set up a counterclaim for refund of any
amount.
ISSUE:
Was the CA’s order granting the refund proper
considering that CPR Promotions never set up a
counterclaim for refund?
HELD:
No. Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory
if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
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jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount
and nature, except that in an original action before the
RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.
In determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, We have, in several cases,
utilized the following tests:
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and
the counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule? HEITAD
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of
the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties
and the court? This test is the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."
Based on the above tests, it is evident that a
claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis
the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory
counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed
by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in
both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in
order to prove their respective claim. Second,
adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other
since these two actions are absolutely incompatible with
each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially
unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing
claims arose from the same set of transactions. And
finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of
separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and
needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and
the court, for said actions would involve the same parties,
the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only
difference here would be in the findings of the courts
based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue
of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the
amounts due.
Having determined that a claim for recovery of
an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action
for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim,
We rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same.
It is elementary that a defending party's
compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time
he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall
effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the records,
what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Then,
realizing, based on its computation, that it should have
sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents
set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant's
Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents'
belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not
cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their
Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess,
if any, is already barred.
Permissive Counterclaim
Korean Exchange v. Gonzales (2005)
Facts: The de Mesa siblings are the original
incorporators of the board of directors (“BOD”) of Phi-Han
Development, Inc. (PHDI). The President is Jae II Aum
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(“Aum”), a Korean national, was the president and
Lourdes de Mesa Mendoza (“Mendoza”) was the corporate
secretary. PHDI and the de Mera siblings (‘plaintiffs”) filed
a complaint against Aum and Korea Exchange Bank (KEB)
(“Civil Case NO. G-3012”). Plaintiffs alleged that through
the machinations of Aum, KEB granted a loan to the PHDI
for 500kUSD, with the condition that it be deposited to
KEB in the name of PHDI. Plaintiffs executed a real estate
mortgage over their properties. The only authorized by
the BOD of PHDI are Aum and Mendoza. Aum withdrew
160kUSD from the account by forging the signature of
Mendoza. He was again allowed to withdraw, leaving
163kUSD as the balance. Aum could not have withdrawn
without the connivance of KEB. KEB filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the the case was within SEC’s
jurisdiction. When the Motion was denied, KEB filed a
petition for certiorari in with the CA but which was also
dismissed by said court. They appealed said dismissal to
the SC.
Pending resolution, KEB filed a complaint
against the BOD and PHDI for sum of money and
reformation of the mortgage (“Civil Case No. G-3119”).
KEB alleged that the true agreement was to bind only
PHDI as the debtor. KEB prayed that PHDI pay the
50kUSD plus interest. PHDI filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of forum shopping, saying that KEB should
have filed its counterclaim for the reformation of the
mortgage and collection of 500kUSD in Civil Case No. G-
3012. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. PHDI filed
an answer with counterclaims and alleged that its loan
should be extinguished by set-off.
In Civil Case No. G-3012, KEB filed a motion to
dismiss for forum shopping.
The lower court denied the Motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. G-3012 on the ground that the causes of
action of PHDI in the latter were different from their
counterclaim in Civil Case No. G-3119. The lower court
also denied the Motion to dismiss the counterclaims of
PHDI in Civil Case No. G-3119 in finding that the reliefs
prayed for by PHDI did not include the collection of the
160kUSD from KEB.
Held: A counterclaim, as now used and understood,
includes both set-off and recoupment and is broader than
both; it includes equitable demands and secures to the
defendant full relief which is a separate action at law and
would have secured him on the same state of facts being
substantially a cross-action by the defendant against the
plaintiff.
A set-off (compensacion) is a money demand by
the defendant against the plaintiff arising upon contract
and constituting a debt independent of and unconnected
with the cause of actions set forth in the complaint, and
may be used to offset a plaintiffs claim but not to recover
affirmatively. As in the case with recoupment, set-off may
be used to offset a plaintiffs claim but not to recover
affirmatively. This is similar to the English rule which was
first authorized by an English statute in 1729.
A recoupment (reconvencion) differs from a
counterclaim (contrarreclamacion) in that, under a
counterclaim, the defendant may have an affirmative
judgment where he is able to prove a demand in excess
of the plaintiffs demand, whereas in the case of
recoupment, whatever the damages proved by the
defendant, they can go only to reduce or extinguish the
claim against him. Recoupment must arise out of the
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contract or transaction upon which the plaintiffs claim is
founded. Recoupment is of French origin and means the
cutting back of the plaintiffs claim by the defendant. It
thus implies an admission of the plaintiffs claim.
In Lopez v. Gloria and Sheriff of Leyte, the Court
ruled that for set-off or recoupment to be considered as
a counterclaim, the following must concur: (1) the same
be essentially a genuine action of the defendant against
the plaintiff; (2) the same should have as its object to
neutralize, wholly or partially, that which the plaintiff is
trying to obtain; (3) the same does not have for its object
to destroy directly the action of the plaintiff; and (4) the
same ought not to pray for a positive remedy distinct from
the payment of money.
The Court explained that under the first
requisite, independent of any other consideration, a
genuine action is constituted by the defendant which
could be employed separately against the plaintiff. On the
second requisite, the Court declared that the defendant
admits the facts upon which the action of the plaintiff is
based. The second requisite is absent if the defendant
bases his claim on facts which directly destroy the action
or cause of action of the plaintiff. In such a case, the claim
of the defendant would only be a special defense.[36] On
the third requisite, set-off or recoupment may be merely
a defense and not a counterclaim if it only tends to oppose
or to destroy the action of the plaintiff.
After consideration of the material allegations of
the answer of the respondents in Civil Case No. G-3119,
we believe that the respondents claim of set-off or
compensation of the US$160,000.00 against the claim of
US$500,000.00 of the petitioner against the respondents
is a counterclaim. The respondents admit in their
complaint in Civil Case No. G-3012 and in their answer in
Civil Case No. G-3119 that they secured a loan from the
petitioner in the amount of US$500,000.00, but maintain
that they are not liable for the payment of the said loan
because the petitioner, in connivance with Jae Il Aum, had
withdrawn not only US$160,000.00 but the entire deposit
of US$500,000.00 from the peso and dollar accounts of
respondent PHDI without the consent of the respondents.
The latter did not seek to recover affirmatively from the
petitioner.
However, we do not agree with the contention
of the respondents that their counterclaims are
compulsory in nature. Section 7, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court reads:
Sec. 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing
partys claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature
thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
As correctly held by the CA, the counterclaim of
the respondents for moral and exemplary damages
against the petitioner is permissive. So is the respondents
claim of a set-off or compensation of the US$160,000.00
which they sought in Civil Case No. G-3012 against the
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US$500,000.00 claimed by the petitioner against the
respondents in Civil Case No. G-3119.
As the Court held in Yulienco v. Court of
Appeals: A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money
or other relief which a defending party may have against
an opposing party. A counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In other words, a
compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of
a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit
involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise
to it.
The criteria or tests by which the compulsory or
permissive nature of specific counterclaims can be
determined are as follows:
(1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim
and counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants
counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and
the counterclaim?
In the present case, the issues of fact and law
raised by the petitioner in its complaint in Civil Case No.
G-3119, and in the counterclaims of the respondents for
the set-off of not only the US$160,000.00 but the entirety
of the deposits of the respondent PHDI of
US$500,000.00, and for moral and exemplary damages,
are not identical or even largely the same. In the
complaint of the petitioner in Civil Case No. G-3119, the
issue is whether the loan of US$500,000.00 was secured
by respondent PHDI from the petitioner, and whether the
respondents failed to pay the same and its increment
despite the petitioners demands. On the other hand, the
issues in the respondents counterclaims for set-off of the
amount of US$160,000.00 are the following: whether the
signature of respondent Lourdes Mendoza appearing on
the said withdrawal application was forged; whether the
petitioner connived with Jae Il Aum when the latter
withdrew the said amount from the accounts of
respondent PHDI; whether the petitioner and Jae Il Aum
are obliged to pay the said amount to the respondent
PHDI; and whether the obligations of the respondent to
pay their loan of US$500,000.00 is extrajudicial pro tanto.
Any judgment of the court on the complaint of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. G-3119 would not bar any suit
on the respondents counterclaim. The evidence of the
petitioner on its claim in its complaint, and that of the
respondents on their counterclaims are thus different.
There is, likewise, no logical relation between the claim of
the petitioner and the counterclaim of the respondents.
Hence, the counterclaim of the respondents is an
initiatory pleading, which requires the respondents to
append thereto a certificate of non-forum shopping. Their
failure to do so results to the dismissal of their
counterclaim without prejudice.
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out
of or is not necessarily connected with the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is
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essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case
Alba, Jr. v. Malapajo (2016)
FACTS:
Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr. filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 15, a
Complaint against respondents Raymund D. Malapajo,
Ramil D. Malapajo and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City
for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or
cancellation of title and damages. Respondents Malapajo
filed their Answer with Counterclaim. Respondents
counterclaimed for damages and for reimbursement of
petitioner's loan from them plus the agreed monthly
interest in the event that the deed of sale is declared null
and void on the ground of forgery.
Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to
(Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among others, that
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of
respondents' permissive counterclaim; and, that
assuming without admitting that the two real estate
mortgages are valid, the rate of five percent (5%) per
month uniformly stated therein is unconscionable and
must be reduced. Respondents filed their Rejoinder
thereto.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for
Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss had been
Filed alleging that respondents' counterclaims are in the
nature of a permissive counterclaim, thus, there must be
payment of docket fees and filing of a certification against
forum shopping; and, that the supposed loan extended
by respondents' mother to petitioner, must also be
dismissed as respondents are not the real parties-in-
interest. The RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's
motion finding that respondents' counterclaims are
compulsory.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents' counterclaim, i.e.,
reimbursement of the loan obtained from them in case
the deed of absolute sale is declared null and void on the
ground of forgery, is permissive in nature which requires
the payment of docket fees and a certification against
forum shopping for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the same.
HELD:
The counterclaim is compulsory.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim
must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original
action before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for
adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the
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court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is
barred if not set up in the same action.
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise
out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.
To determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, we have devised the following
tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b)
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants'
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiffs' claim as well as the defendants' counterclaim?
and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property
by assailing the validity of the deed of sale on the subject
property which he allegedly executed in favor of
respondents Malapajo on the ground of forgery.
Respondents counterclaimed that, in case the deed of sale
is declared null and void, they be paid the loan petitioner
obtained from them plus the agreed monthly interest
which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the
subject property executed by petitioner in favor of
respondents. There is a logical relationship between the
claim and the counterclaim, as the counterclaim is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Notably,
the same evidence to sustain respondents' counterclaim
would disprove petitioner's case. In the event that
respondents could convincingly establish that petitioner
actually executed the promissory note and the real estate
mortgage over the subject property in their favor then
petitioner's complaint might fail. Petitioner's claim is so
related logically to respondents' counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials for the claim and the
counterclaim would result in the substantial duplication of
the time and effort of the court and the parties.
Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory,
it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would
be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main
action but in a different proceeding, it would be abated on
the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it
would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata.
There is, therefore, no need for respondents to pay docket
fees and to file a certification against forum shopping for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said
counterclaim.
• Payment of docket fees for compulsory
counterclaims remains to be suspended.
The ruling in Korea Technologies Co., Ltd.
v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7,
2008) with respect to the requirement of
payment of docket fees for compulsory
counterclaims has been deleted in a
revised issuance (OCA Circular 96-2009
dated August 13, 2009).
• Permissive counterclaims require payment
of docket fees, while compulsory
counterclaims do not
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• Remedy for omitted counterclaim due to
oversight, inadvertence, excusable neglect
(Rule 11, Sec. 10)
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM
In General
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in
which a defending party sets forth his defenses.
Period to plead
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. —
A counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within
twenty (20) calendar days from service.
REPLY
Defined and in general
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 10. Reply. — All new matters alleged
in the answer are deemed controverted. If the plaintiff
wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new
matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an
amended or supplemental complaint. However, the
plaintiff may file a reply only if the defending party
attaches an actionable document to his or her answer.
A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to
deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters
alleged in, or relating to, said actionable document.
In the event of an actionable document attached to the
reply, the defendant may file a rejoinder if the same is
based solely on an actionable document. (10a)
▪ A reply is the responsive pleading to an answer,
not to counterclaim or cross-claim.
▪ Not mandatory—If a party does not file such
reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are
deemed controverted.
When required
a. Challenge due to authenticity of documents
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 8
Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When
an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he or she
claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear
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to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with
an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.
▪ “Actionable document” – the document
relied upon by either the plaintiff and the defendant.
E.g. Promissory note in an action for collection of sum of
money; Deed of mortgage in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage
▪ Denial under oath means that the denial must
be verified. The absence of an oath will result in the
implied admission of the due execution and genuineness
of the document
▪ When a party is deemed to have admitted the
genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document, defenses that are implied from said admission
are necessarily waived, such as the following:
a) defenses of forgery of the document;
b) the lack of authority to execute the document;
c) that the party charged signed the document in
some other capacity than that alleged in the
pleading; or
d) that the document was never delivered (Hibberd
v. Rhode McMillian, 32 Phil 476)
▪ Also cut-off by the admission is the defense that
the document was not in words and figures as set out in
the pleadings (Imperial Textile Mills v. CA, 183 SCRA
584).
▪ However, the following defenses may still be
interposed despite the implied admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the document, since
these are not inconsistent with the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument:
a. payment;
b. want of consideration;
c. illegality of consideration;
d. usury;
e. fraud.
Prescription, release, waiver, statute of frauds, estoppel,
former recovery or discharge in bankruptcy are likewise
not barred, since these defenses have no direct
relationship to the concepts of “genuineness and due
execution” (Riano).
Casent Realty Development Corp. vs. Philbanking
Corporation (2007)
Facts: In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development
Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of
Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) involving the
amounts of P 300,000.00 and P681,500.00. On 8 August
1986, these promissory notes were assigned to
respondent Philbanking through a Deed of Assignment.
Petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes
despite demands. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for
the collection of sum of money. Respondent raised the
defense of extinguishment of obligation, stating that on
27 August 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago
which conveyed petitioner’s property to respondent with
the intention of extinguishing petitioner’s outstanding
accounts with the respondent. Petitioner presented a
Confirmation Statement stating that petitioner no longer
had loans with the respondent.
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After respondent presented its evidence,
petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to
Evidence, pointing out that respondent’s failure to file a
Reply to the Answer which raised the dacion and
Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the
genuineness and due execution of said documents, and
that since these obligation was extinguished, respondent
no longer had the right to collect from petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed an Opposition
stating that since it did not file a Reply, all new matters
alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted, pursuant
to Rule 6, Section 10 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of extinction of obligation. The
Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that in resolving
petitioner’s Demurrer, the trial court erred in considering
the affirmative defenses raised in the Answer.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s failure to file a Reply
and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under
oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness
and due execution of these documents? YES.
Held: What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss
based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff
is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The
evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding
technical aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the
plaintiff’s evidence should not be the only basis in
resolving a demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to
should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of
Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings.
These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial
notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial,
admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being
the defendant’s evidence.
The defense of Dacion and Confirmation
Statement, which were submitted in the Answer, should
have been specifically denied under oath by respondent
in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
These defenses are not deemed controverted by
respondent’s failure to file a Reply. Rule 8, Section 8
specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a
written instrument and provides the manner of denying
it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which
merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus,
where the defense in the Answer is based on an
actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under
oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed
admitted. Since respondent failed to deny the
genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are
deemed admitted. This judicial admission should have
been considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence.
Nevertheless, petitioner remains liable to
respondent. In this case, the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement do not sufficiently prove that petitioner’s
liability was extinguished. In executing the Dacion¸ the
intention of the parties was to settle only the loans of
petitioner with respondent, not the obligation of petitioner
arising from the promissory notes that were assigned by
Rare Realty to respondent. When petitioner and
respondent executed the Dacion on 27 August 1986, what
was then covered was petitioner’s subsequent loan from
the respondent in the amount of P3,921,750.00.
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It must be noted that the promissory notes
subject of the case were given as security for the loan
granted by respondent to Rare Realty. Through the Deed
of Assignment, respondent stepped into the shoes of Rare
Realty as petitioner’s creditor. Thus, in 1989, when Rare
Realty defaulted in its payment to respondent,
respondent proceeded against the security assigned to it,
that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner.
Under these promissory notes, petitioner is still liable for
the amount of P300,000.00 with interest thereon.
THIRD / FOURTH PARTY COMPLAINT
Defined
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)-party
complaint. — A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third
(fourth, etc.)-party defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his or her
opponent's claim.
The third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint shall be denied
admission, and the court shall require the defendant to
institute a separate action, where: (a) the third (fourth,
etc.)-party defendant cannot be located within thirty (30)
calendar days from the grant of such leave; (b) matters
extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised;
or (c) the effect would be to introduce a new and separate
controversy into the action. (11a)
Remedies when denied
When a complaint is dismissed, the third-party complaint
is also dismissed. But if the plaintiff appeals the dismissal,
the defendant-third-party plaintiff must also appeal to
obtain affirmative relief.
ANSWER TO THIRD/FOURTH PARTY COMPLAINT
In general
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 6
Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)—party
complaint. — A third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant may
allege in his or her answer his or her defenses,
counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses
that the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff may have
against the original plaintiff's claim. In proper cases, he
or she may also assert a counterclaim against the original
plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the third-
party plaintiff.
Time to plead
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
Section 5. The time to answer a third (fourth, etc.)—
party complaint shall be governed by the same rule as the
answer to the complaint.
Extension of time to plead
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 11
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Section 11. Extension of time to file an
answer. — A defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be
granted an additional period of not more than thirty (30)
calendar days to file an answer. A defendant is only
allowed to file one (1) motion for extension of time to file
an answer.
A motion for extension to file any pleading, other than an
answer, is prohibited and considered a mere scrap of
paper. The court, however, may allow any other pleading
to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (11a)
• The certification is mandatory under Sec. 5 of Rule 7
but not jurisdictional since jurisdiction over the
subject of the action is conferred by law. (Robert
Development Corporation v. Quitain, 315 SCRA
150).
• There is forum shopping when a party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court (Asia
United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No.
191388).
• Three ways of committing forum shopping:
o Filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet;
o Filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved; and
o Filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action, but with
different prayers (Chua v. Metrobank,
596 SCRA 535).
• The rationale against forum shopping is that a party
should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havocs upon
orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.
• The certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party, not the attorney (Damasco v.
NLRC, 346 SCRA 714)
• While it is true that the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the party-pleader and
not by his counsel, the rule is subject to exceptions.
If for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record
to sign on his behalf. (Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine
National Bank).
• Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as
when the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them
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substantially conforms with the Rule. (Vda. de
Formoso v. Philippine Naitonal Bank)
• The failure to comply with the required certification
is not curable by a mere amendment and shall be a
cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal for
failure to comply with the certification requirement is
not to be done by the court motu proprio. The rule
requires that the dismissal be upon the motion and
after hearing.
• Strict compliance with the provision regarding the
certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded. It does not, however,
prohibit substantial compliance therewith under
justifiable circumstances, considering especially that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. The
substantial compliance rule, however, will not be
applied if dishonesty attended the signing of the
certification.
• It has also been held that the rules on forum
shopping, which were precisely designed to promote
or facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective which is the goal of all rules of
procedure—that is, to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible (Great Southern Maritime
Services v. Acuña, 452 SCRA 422). However, any
liberal application has to be justified by ample and
sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and
not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule
(BPI v. CA, G.R. No. 168313).
• If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be a ground for summary dismissal. Here,
no motion to dismiss and hearing are required. The
dismissal in this case is with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for
administrative sanctions.
• A false certification shall constitute indirect contempt
of court without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal sanctions.
• Failure to comply with the undertakings in the
certification against forum shopping has the same
effect as the submission of a false certification
(Oliveros v. Sison, 548 SCRA 265).
Ao-As v. CA (2006)
Facts: The Lutheran Church in the Philippines is a
religious organization duly registered with the SEC. At the
time of its incorporation, the church was divided into
three districts, namely: North Luzon District (NLD); the
South Luzon District (SLD); and the Mindanao District
(MDD). Subsequently, new districts were added. Since
the addition of the new districts an 11 member board of
directors representing 5 districts managed the church
without challenged from the membership until several
years later when certain controversies arose involving the
resolutions of the Board terminating the service of the LCP
business manager and corporate treasurer since 1979,
Mr. Hipe. The controversies divided the board into two
groups the Ao-as group and the Batong group.
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The termination of Mr. Hipe sparked a series of
cases filed in different tribunals between the Ao-As group
and the Batong group. One of which is the SEC case No.
3857 for accounting and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction and appointment of a management
committee, filed by the Ao-As group against the Batong
group. This SEC case reached the Court of Appeals, the
CA held that the issues raised by the Ao-As group in the
said case were already raised and passed upon in other
cases pending at the time the Ao-As group filed their SEC
case.
Held: Ao-As group did NOT commit deliberate and
intentional forum shopping. The elements of forum
shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
Otherwise stated, there is forum shopping
where a litigant sues the same party against whom
another action or actions for the alleged violation of the
same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are
still pending. The defense of litis pendentia in one case is
a bar to the other/others; and, a final judgment is one
that would constitute res judicata and thus would cause
the dismissal of the rest. Absolute identity of the parties
is not required. It is enough that there is substantial
identity of the parties. It is enough that the party against
whom the estoppel is set up is actually a party to the
former case. There is identity of causes of action if the
same evidence will sustain the second action. The
principle applies even if the relief sought in the two cases
may be different. Forum shopping consists of filing
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum
shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same prayer,
the previous case having been finally resolved (res
judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of
causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata11 ). If the forum
shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the
subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on
one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if
there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
prejudice.
The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-
As group in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 are entirely different
from the causes of action in the other cases NLRC Cases
No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90, Civil Cases No.
133394-CV and 131879-CV, and SEC-SICD Cases No.
3556 and 3524.
It is true that the causes of action in the latter
cases were included as additional grounds in SEC-SICD
Case No. 3857 for the appointment of the management
committee and for accounting "of all funds, properties and
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assets of LCP which may have come into their possession
during their incumbency as officers and/or directors of
LCP." However, the creation of a management committee
and the prayer for accounting could not have been asked
for in the labor (NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-
01979-90) and forcible entry (Civil Cases No. 133394-CV
and 131879-CV) cases.
As regards the other SEC Cases, though, the Ao-
As group could have indeed prayed for the creation of the
management committee and the accounting of the funds
of the LCP. In fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner in SEC-SICD Case No. 3556 had prayed for the
appointment of a management committee in a motion
dated 18 June 1991. This motion, however, was
subsequent to the filing of SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 on
17 August 1990, for which reason the SEC-SICD ruled
that such motion cannot be given due course considering
that it was one of the incidents of SEC-SIDC Case No.
3857. In effect, the SEC-SIDC had denied the subsequent
motion on the ground of litis pendentia. But should SEC-
SICD Case No. 3857, which contains the earlier prayer to
create a management committee, be likewise dismissed?
Following the rules set forth in the preceding paragraphs,
it would depend on whether the different SEC cases
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping on the
part of Ao-As group.
We hold that this is not a case of willful and
deliberate forum shopping and, hence, the SEC-SICD
Case No. 3857, which contains the earlier prayer to create
a management committee, should not be dismissed. The
reason for this is the strict evidentiary requirement
needed to grant a prayer to create a management
committee. The power of the SEC to create a
management committee is found in Section 6(d) of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, which
provides:
Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such
jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following
powers:
d) To create and appoint a management
committee, board or body upon petition or motu propio
to undertake the management of corporations,
partnerships or other associations not supervised or
regulated by other government agencies in appropriate
cases when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss,
wastage or destruction of assets or other properties or
paralization of business operations of such corporations
or entities which may be prejudicial to the interest of the
minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general
public.
Evidently, it should be difficult to deduce the
"imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of assets or other properties" from an
allegation of a single act of previous misappropriation or
dissipation on the part of the Batong group. It is often
only when the previous misappropriations and
dissipations have become extensive and out of control
that it can be candidly said that there is an imminent
danger of further dissipation. The Ao-As group cannot be
faulted therefore for not praying for the creation of a
management committee in the first couple of cases it filed
with the SEC, and neither can they be faulted for using
the causes of action in previously filed cases to prove their
allegation of imminent dissipation. We cannot rule out the
possibility that the danger of imminent dissipation of the
corporate assets became apparent only in the acts of the
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respondents subsequent to the filing of the first two SEC
cases.
Forum Shopping certificate for a corporation
• A juridical entity, unlike a natural person, can only
perform physical acts through properly delegated
individuals. The certification against forum shopping
where the plaintiff or a principal party is a juridical
entity like a corporation, may be executed by
properly authorized persons. This person may be the
lawyer of the corporation. As long as he is duly
authorized by the corporation and has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in the
certification against forum shopping, the certification
may be signed by the authorized lawyer (National
Steel Corporation v. CA, 388 SCRA 85).
PAL v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Assn of the
Philippines (FASAP) (2006)
Facts: FASAP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice,
illegal suspension, and illegal dismissal against PAL before
the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. The NLRC ruled in favor of
FASAP. The NLRC modified the arbiter’s decision by
setting aside the finding that PAL was guilty of unfair labor
practice, but affirming the rest of the decision.
Subsequently, PAL filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, it was accompanied by a Certification of Non-
forum shopping executed by Cesar R. Lamberte and
Susan Del Carmen, Vice-President Human Resources and
Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services of PAL,
respectively, who are not parties to the case. The
certification, however, was without proof that the two
affiants had authority to sign in behalf of petitioners. As
a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case for
failure to show the authority of affiants to sign for PAL
and for failure of the other petitioners to join in the
execution of the certification. A motion for reconsideration
was filed with a Secretary’s Certificate attached
evidencing that affiants Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del
Carmen have been authorized by Board Resolution No.
00-02-03 to initiate and/or cause to be filed on behalf of
PAL petitions and pleadings in all labor-related cases. As
to the other petitioners, it was argued that they are mere
nominal parties so that their failure to execute the
certification does not justify dismissal of the petition.
Despite this submission, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the case is now before
this Court.
Held: The petitioner violated the rules on certificate of
non-forum shopping. The necessity for a certification of
non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari is
found in Rule 65, Section 1, in relation to Rule 46, Section
3 of the Rules of Court. These provisions require it to be
executed by the corresponding petitioner or petitioners.
As no distinction is made as to which party must execute
the certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both
natural and juridical entities. When the petitioner is a
corporation, the certification should be executed by a
natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can be
called upon to execute the certification, although such a
person may have personal knowledge of the facts to be
attested to.
This Court has explained that a corporation has
no power except those conferred on it by the Corporation
Code and those that are implied or incidental to its
existence. The exercise of these powers is done through
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the board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and
agents. Given these corporate features, the power of a
corporation to sue in any court is generally lodged with
the board of directors. The board, in turn, can delegate
the physical acts needed to sue, which may be performed
only by natural persons, to its attorneys-in-fact by a
board resolution, if not already authorized under the
corporate by-laws.
Thus, only individuals vested with authority by
a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In addition, the
Court has required that proof of said authority must be
attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum
shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.
Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a
certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of
the signatory’s authority.
The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had
a certification of non-forum shopping executed by Cesar
R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen. The certification,
however, was without proof of authority to sign. When a
motion for reconsideration was filed, a Secretary’s
Certificate was submitted as proof that the board of
directors of PAL had authorized the two to execute the
certificate. Nonetheless, the Court finds that this belated
submission is an insufficient compliance with the
certification requirement.
This Court has allowed the reinstatement of
petitions that were dismissed due to lack of proof of
authority to sign the certification upon its subsequent
submission, saying that this amounted to
substantial compliance. The rationale was that
the signatories, at the time of execution of the
certification, were in fact authorized to sign, although
proof of their authority was lacking.
This is not what happened in this case. A perusal
of the Secretary’s Certificate submitted reveals that the
authority to cause the filing of the petition was granted
on February 15, 2000. The petition, on the other hand,
was filed on January 24, 2000 and was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals on January 31, 2000. This means that at
the time the certification was signed, Cesar R. Lamberte
and Susan Del Carmen were not duly authorized by the
Board of Directors of PAL and, consequently, their signing
and attestations were not in representation of PAL. This
effectively translates to a petition that was filed without a
certification at all as none was issued by PAL, the principal
party to the case.
The required certification of non-forum
shopping must be valid at the time of filing of the petition.
An invalid certificate cannot be remedied by the
subsequent submission of a Secretary’s Certificate that
vests authority only after the petition had been filed.
National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals
(2002)
FACTS: A dispute arose between National Steel
Corporation (NSC) and NSC-HDCTC union regarding the
grant of productivity and quality bonuses, as well as fiscal
year end incentive awards. Both parties submitted to
voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator (VA) ruled
that productivity and quality bonus demand had no merit
but year-end incentive awards should be made. A partial
motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting NSC to
file a petition for review with the CA. CA dismissed the
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petition due to failure to comply with requirements of
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular
No, 04-94 on forum shopping since Atty. Padilla, one of
the counsels of record of petitioner signed and certified
the certification against forum shopping. Motion for
reconsideration was denied, thus the case was elevated
to the SC via a petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of petitioner’s
counsel may be deemed sufficient in a certification
against forum shopping.
HELD: Yes. The SC has held in BA Savings Banks v. Sia
that the certificate of non-forum shopping required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 may be signed for and
on behalf of a corporation by a specifically authorized
lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required
to be disclosed in such document. The reason being, that
unlike natural person, corporations may perform physical
actions only through properly designated individuals,
namely its officers and/or agents. Physical acts, like the
signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-
laws or by specific acts of the board of directors.
Filing and service defined
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 2. Filing and Service, defined. —
Filing is the act of submitting the pleading or other paper
to the court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
pleading or any other court submission. If a party has
appeared by counsel, service upon such party shall be
made upon his or her counsel, unless service upon the
party and the party’s counsel is ordered by the court.
Where one counsel appears for several parties, such
counsel shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper
served by the opposite side.
Where several counsels appear for one party, such party
shall be entitled to only one copy of any pleading or paper
to be served upon the lead counsel if one is designated,
or upon any one of them if there is no designation of a
lead counsel. (2a)
Coverage
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall
govern the filing of all pleadings, motions, and other
court submissions, as well as their service, except
those for which a different mode of service is
prescribed. (1a)
Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. –
Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading
subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar
papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon
the parties affected. (4)
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Manner of Filing
• Personal
• Registered Mail
• Accredited Courier
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 3. Manner of filing. — The filing of
pleadings and other court submissions shall be made
by:
(a) Submitting personally the original thereof,
plainly indicated as such, to the court;
(b) Sending them by registered mail;
(c) Sending them by accredited courier; or
(d) Transmitting them by electronic mail or other
electronic means as may be authorized by
the Court in places where the court is
electronically equipped.
In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the
pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second and
third cases, the date of the mailing of motions,
pleadings, and other court submissions, and payments
or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the
envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as
the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court.
The envelope shall be attached to the record of the
case. In the fourth case, the date of electronic
transmission shall be considered as the date of filing.
(3a)
• In the first mode, the clerk of court shall indicate or
endorse on the pleading or paper filed, the date and
hour of filing.
• In the second mode, the date of mailing as shown by
the post office stamp on the envelope or registry
receipt shall be considered as the date of filing,
payment or deposit in court.
Manner of service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 5. Modes of Service. — Pleadings,
motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other court
submissions shall be served personally or by
registered mail, accredited courier, electronic mail,
facsimile transmission, other electronic means as may
be authorized by the Court, or as provided for in
international conventions to which the Philippines is a
party. (5a)
Section 13. Service of Judgments, Final
Orders or Resolutions. — Judgments, final orders,
or resolutions shall be served either personally or by
registered mail. Upon ex parte motion of any party in
the case, a copy of the judgment, final order, or
resolution may be delivered by accredited courier at
the expense of such party. When a party summoned
by publication has failed to appear in the action,
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judgments, final orders or resolutions against him or
her shall be served upon him or her also by means of
publication at the expense of the prevailing party. (9a)
• Personal
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 6. Personal Service. — Court
submissions may be served by personal delivery of a
copy to the party or to the party’s counsel, or to their
authorized representative named in the appropriate
pleading or motion, or by leaving it in his or her office
with his or her clerk, or with a person having charge
thereof. If no person is found in his or her office, or his
or her office is not known, or he or she has no office,
then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight
in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or
counsel's residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing therein. (6a)
• Personal service is made by:
(a) delivering a copy of the papers personally to
the party or his counsel, or
(b) or by leaving the papers in his office with his
clerk or a person having charge thereof.
If no person is found in the office, or his office is not
known or he has no office, then by leaving a copy of
the papers at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein between eight in the morning and six
in the evening.
• Mail
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered
mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post
office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the
party or to the party’s counsel at his or her office, if
known, otherwise at his or her residence, if known,
with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to
the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after
ten (l0) calendar days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the sender
or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary
mail. (7a)
• The preferred service by mail is registered mail.
Service by ordinary mail may be done only if no
registry service is available in the locality of either
the sender or the addressee.
• Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from
the date he received the first notice of the
postmaster, whichever is earlier.
• Substituted service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 8. Substituted service. – If service
of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and
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other papers cannot be made under the two preceding
sections, the office and place of residence of the party
or his or her counsel being unknown, service may be
made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with
proof of failure of both personal service and service by
mail. The service is complete at the time of such
delivery. (8a)
• This mode is availed of only when there is failure to
effect service personally or by mail. This failure
occurs when the office and residence of the party or
counsel are unknown.
• Subsituted service is effected by delivering the copy
to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both
personal service and service by mail.
• Electronic Means and Facsimile
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 9. Service by electronic means
and facsimile. — Service by electronic means and
facsimile shall be made if the party concerned consents
to such modes of service.
Service by electronic means shall be made by sending
an e-mail to the party’s or counsel’s electronic mail
address, or through other electronic means of
transmission as the parties may agree on, or upon
direction of the court.
Service by facsimile shall be made by sending a
facsimile copy to the party’s or counsel’s given
facsimile number. (n)
Section 11. Change of electronic mail
address or facsimile number. — A party who
changes his or her electronic mail address or facsimile
number while the action is pending must promptly file,
within five (5) calendar days from such change, a
notice of change of e-mail address or facsimile number
with the court and serve the notice on all other parties.
Section 12. Electronic mail and facsimile
subject and title of pleadings and other
documents. — The subject of the electronic mail and
facsimile must follow the prescribed format: case
number, case title and the pleading, order or
document title. The title of each electronically-filed or
served pleading or other document, and each
submission served by facsimile shall contain sufficient
information to enable the court to ascertain from the
title: (a) the party or parties filing or serving the paper,
(b) nature of the paper, (c) the party or parties against
whom relief, if any, is sought, and (d) the nature of
the relief sought. (n)
• Presumptive Service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 10. Presumptive service. — There
shall be presumptive notice to a party of a court setting
if such notice appears on the records to have been
mailed at least twenty (20) calendar days prior to the
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scheduled date of hearing and if the addressee is from
within the same judicial region of the court where the
case is pending, or at least thirty (30) calendar days if
the addressee is from outside the judicial region. (n)
• Court-issued orders and other documents
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 18. Court-issued orders and other
documents. — The court may electronically serve
orders and other documents to all the parties in the
case which shall have the same effect and validity as
provided herein. A paper copy of the order or other
document electronically served shall be retained and
attached to the record of the case. (n)
• Priority
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 14. Conventional service or filing
of orders, pleadings and other documents. –
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following orders,
pleadings, and other documents must be served or
filed personally or by registered mail when allowed,
and shall not be served or filed electronically, unless
express permission is granted by the Court:
(a) Initiatory pleadings and initial responsive
pleadings, such as an answer;
(b) Subpoenae, protection orders, and writs;
(c) Appendices and exhibits to motions, or other
documents that are not readily amenable to
electronic scanning may, at the option of the
party filing such, be filed and served
conventionally; and
(d) Sealed and confidential documents or
records. (n)
• The service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally, whenever practicable. This
is the preferred mode of service (Uy v. Medina). If
another mode of service is used other than personal
service, the service must be accompanied by a
written explanation why the service or filing was not
done personally. Exempt from this explanation are
the service of papers emanating from the court. A
violation of this requirement may be cause for the
paper to be considered as not having been filed.
Upon party in default
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 9
Section 3. Default; Declaration of. — If
the defending party fails to answer within the time
allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
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judgment granting the claimant such relief as his or
her pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall
be entitled to notices of subsequent proceedings but
shall not take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in
default may at any time after notice thereof and before
judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the
order of default upon proper showing that his or her
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence and that he or she has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default
may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the
judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading
asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try
the case against all upon the answers thus filed and
render judgment upon the evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment
rendered against a party in default shall neither exceed
the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for
nor award unliquidated damages.
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the Solicitor General or
his or her deputized public prosecutor, to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State
in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated. (3a)
Completion of service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 15. Completeness of service. —
Personal service is complete upon actual delivery.
Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of ten (10) calendar days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides. Service by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee, or after five (5) calendar days from the
date he or she received the first notice of the
postmaster, whichever date is earlier. Service by
accredited courier is complete upon actual receipt by
the addressee, or after at least two (2) attempts to
deliver by the courier service, or upon the expiration
of five (5) calendar days after the first attempt to
deliver, whichever is earlier.
Electronic service is complete at the time of the
electronic transmission of the document, or when
available, at the time that the electronic notification of
service of the document is sent. Electronic service is
not effective or complete if the party serving the
document learns that it did not reach the addressee or
person to be served.
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Service by facsimile transmission is complete upon
receipt by the other party, as indicated in the facsimile
transmission printout. (10a)
• Upon actual delivery, personal service is
deemed complete.
• Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless
the court otherwise provides.
• Substituted service is complete at the time of
delivery of the copy to the clerk of court.
Proof of filing and service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 16. Proof of filing. — The filing of a
pleading or any other court submission shall be proved
by its existence in the record of the case.
(a) If the pleading or any other court submission
is not in the record, but is claimed to have
been filed personally, the filing shall be
proven by the written or stamped
acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of
court on a copy of the pleading or court
submission;
(b) If the pleading or any other court submission
was filed by registered mail, the filing shall
be proven by the registry receipt and by the
affidavit of the person who mailed it,
containing a full statement of the date and
place of deposit of the mail in the post office
in a sealed envelope addressed to the court,
with postage fully prepaid, and with
instructions to the postmaster to return the
mail to the sender after ten (10) calendar
days if not delivered.
(c) If the pleading or any other court submission
was filed through an accredited courier
service, the filing shall be proven by an
affidavit of service of the person who brought
the pleading or other document to the
service provider, together with the courier’s
official receipt and document tracking
number.
(d) If the pleading or any other court submission
was filed by electronic mail, the same shall
be proven by an affidavit of electronic filing
of the filing party accompanied by a paper
copy of the pleading or other document
transmitted or a written or stamped
acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of
court. If the paper copy sent by electronic
mail was filed by registered mail, paragraph
(b) of this Section applies.
(e) If the pleading or any other court submission
was filed through other authorized electronic
means, the same shall be proven by an
affidavit of electronic filing of the filing party
accompanied by a copy of the electronic
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acknowledgment of its filing by the court.
(12a)
Section 17. Proof of service. –— Proof of
personal service shall consist of a written admission of
the party served, or the official return of the server, or
the affidavit of the party serving, containing a
statement of the date, place, and manner of service.
If the service is made by:
(a) Ordinary mail. – Proof shall consist of an
affidavit of the person mailing stating the facts
showing compliance with Section 7 of this Rule.
(b) Registered mail. – Proof shall be made by the
affidavit mentioned above and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof, the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or
sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.
(c) Accredited courier service. – Proof shall be made
by an affidavit of service executed by the person
who brought the pleading or paper to the service
provider, together with the courier’s official
receipt or document tracking number.
(d) Electronic mail, facsimile, or other authorized
electronic means of transmission. – Proof shall
be made by an affidavit of service executed by
the person who sent the e-mail, facsimile, or
other electronic transmission, together with a
printed proof of transmittal. (13a)
• The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by
its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in
the record, but is claimed to have been filed
personally, the filing shall proved by the written or
stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of
court on a copy of the same.
• If the pleading or paper is filed by registered mail,
the proof of filing is by the registry receipt and by
the affidavit of the person who did the mailing,
containing a full statement of the date and place of
depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed
envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully
prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to
return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
not delivered.
• Proof of personal service shall consist of the written
admission of the party served. It may also be proven
by the official return of the server, or the affidavit of
the party serving, containing full information of the
date, place and manner of service.
• If service is by registered mail, the proof shall consist
of the affidavit of the person mailing and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card is to be filed immediately upon its receipt
by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
• If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall
consists of the affidavit of the person mailing of the
facts showing compliance with Section 7, Rule 13.
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Lis Pendens
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, Rule 13
Section 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action
affecting the title or the right of possession of real
property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his or her answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province
in which the property is situated notice of the pendency
of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record
shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice
of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned
may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
AMENDMENTS
In General
Pleadings may be amended:
(1) by adding or striking out an allegation or the
name of any party, or
(2) by correcting a mistake in the name of a party
or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect
Purpose: So that the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities,
and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Liberality
Barfel dev’t. Corp v. CA (1993)
Facts: Barfel sold to Reginas two parcels of land with two
houses erected thereon in Ayala Alabang, stipulating that
the Barfel will apply the payment of the cash portion of
the purchase price to the removal of any and all liens on
the properties. The contract stated that apart from a BPI
mortgage and the Deed of Restrictions annotated at the
back of the title, the subject property was free from all
liens. Reginas made the downpayment upon signing the
agreement.
It was later discovered that there was
apparently a second mortgage with the PISO/Central
Bank. Upon this information, Victor Barrios assured the
buyer that the second mortgage has been reduced and
that he will submit the necessary documents to support a
legal and valid acceptable arrangement for the release of
such mortgage. Thereafter, the PSB granted Reginas
loan, which again subjected aforesaid properties to a
mortgage. PSB now promises to pay directly to BPI from
the proceeds of the loan and pay the sellers the purchase
price. The latter conformed to the arrangement.
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Given the prior assurance of a workable
arrangement regarding the Central Bank mortgage, the
buyers now manifested its willingness to pay P2M ahead
of the proceeds for the PSB loan. Notwithstanding such
negotiations however, the sellers here are in gross and
evident bad faith and malicious breach of contract for they
have failed to comply with the obligation to release the
second mortgage. BPI further averred that the sellers
actually disauthorized them to consummate the
transaction despite previous arrangements.
Reginas and Zaragoza filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Barfel and the
Spouses Barrios. Pre-trial was conducted and both
parties presented evidence.
During Barfel’s presentation, Reginas filed a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint and motion
to admit the same. The amendment sought to implead
PISO bank as additional party defendant and compel it to
accept payment of the existing second mortgage from
Reginas, since no complete relief can be had unless the
second mortgage is released.
Barfel opposed. The RTC admitted the amended
complaint. The CA sustained the lower court’s order
saying that the amendment was made without intent to
delay the action. The essence of liberal construction was
accorded by the courts.
Held: The amended complaint should not be allowed. The
amendment was made with intent to delay the action and
substantially alters the cause of action of Reginas and the
defense of Barfel. After the case is set for hearing,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of
court. Such leave may be refused if it appears that the
motion was made with intent to delay the action or that
the cause of action or defense is substantially altered.
(Sec. 3, Rule 10)
The amendment sought by private respondents,
which is to include a new party defendant at a late stage
in the proceeding, is not a formal but a substantial one.
Private respondents will have to present additional
evidence on the PISO second mortgage. The effect would
be to start trial anew with the parties recasting their
theories of the case. The correct amount of the second
mortgage owed by petitioners to PISO bank (apparently
a controverted point), would have to be litigated and this
could be time consuming.
As a general policy, liberality in allowing
amendments is greatest in the early stages of a law
suit, decreases as it progresses and changes at
times to a strictness amounting to a prohibition.
This is further restricted by the condition that the
amendment should not prejudice the adverse party
or place him at a disadvantage.
Form
When any pleading is amended, the following shall be
filed:
(1) a new copy of the entire pleading,
(2) incorporating the amendments, which shall be
indicated by appropriate marks,. (Sec. 7, Rule
13)
Effect
An amended pleading supersedes the pleading it amends.
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▪ However, admissions in superseded pleadings
may be received in evidence against the
pleader; and
▪ Claims or defenses alleged therein not
incorporated in the amended pleading shall be
deemed waived. (Sec. 8, Rule 10)
Kinds of amendment
Amendments may either be formal or substantial. Formal
amendment is one, which seeks to correct a mere defect
in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical
or typographical error. (Rule 10, Sec. 4) Amendments,
which go beyond such corrections, are substantial.
Formal amendments may be corrected by the court at any
stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided
no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. (Rule
10, Sec. 4) Except where the amendment is a matter of
right, substantial amendment may be made only upon
leave of court. Such leave may be refused if it appears to
the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Godinez vs. Court of Appeals (2007)
Facts: On August 30, 2000, Delfina Village Subdivision
Homeowners Association (DVSHA) (“respondent”), filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, an amended complaint for injunction and damages
against spouses Zosimo and Elizabeth Godinez and their
son Edwin (“petitioners”), The complaint alleges that
petitioners were operating a mineral processing plant in
the annex of their residential house located
within Delfina Village. Municipal Ordinance No. 63 s.
1993, has classified the village, as a medium-density
residential district.
On September 13, 2000, petitioners filed their
answer raising the following affirmative defenses: a) the
complaint states no cause of action; b) respondent has no
capacity to sue; c) it is not a real party in interest; d) the
complaint fails to implead the real parties in interest;
and e) respondent failed to refer the case for conciliation
to the barangay before filing its complaint.
On April 3, 2001, the trial court issued an Order
directing respondent to amend its complaint and attach
thereto proofs showing that it is a juridical person with
capacity to sue and that it is the real party in interest.
On April 16, 2001, respondent submitted its
amended complaint impleading, as additional plaintiffs,
its officers and members, and attaching thereto its
Certificate of Registration with the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation, as well as its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws.
Held: In resolving this issue, we are guided by two
principles. First, there is nothing sacred about processes
or pleadings and their forms or contents, their sole
purpose being to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as
well as procedural rules should be construed liberally.
Second, the judicial attitude has always been favorable
and liberal in allowing amendments to a pleading in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and so that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their
rights determined, and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay.
Here, we find no reason to deviate from the
foregoing dicta. It is on record that in its first amended
complaint, respondent DVSHA alleged that it is a
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registered association. However, it failed to attach to its
complaint the supporting certificate of registration, as
well as its articles of incorporation and by-laws. In their
answer, petitioners promptly assailed respondent’s lack
of personality to sue. The trial court, desiring to
determine if indeed respondent has the capacity to sue,
directed respondent to amend its complaint anew by
attaching thereto the necessary documents.
Sections 1 and 4, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SEC. 1. Amendments in general.
Pleadings may be amended by adding or
striking out an allegation or the name of any
party, or by correcting a controversy may
speedily be determined without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
SEC. 4. Formal amendments. A
defect in the designation of the
parties and other clearly clerical or
typographical errors may be summarily
corrected by the court at any stage of the
action, at its initiative or on motion, provided
no prejudice is caused thereby to the
adverse party.
Here, the amendment of respondent’s complaint
at the instance of the trial court merely involves the
designation of respondent as a proper party, i.e., whether
it has a juridical personality and, therefore, can sue or be
sued. We note that when respondent amended its
complaint by attaching the required supporting
documents, such amendment did not change its
cause of action. Nor was its action intended to
prejudice petitioners. Verily, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it ordered the amendment of the
complaint.
Amendments as a matter of right
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 10
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of
right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any
time within ten (10) calendar days after it is served.
(2a)
The right to amend a pleading as a matter of right
may be exercised only once, Hence, even if no responsive
pleading has yet been served, if the amendment is
subsequent to a previous amendment made as a matter
of right, the subsequent amendment must be with leave
of court.
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Even
if the motion to dismiss is granted by the court, the
plaintiff may still amend his complaint as a matter of right
before the dismissal becomes final as long as o answer
has yet been served (Bautista vs. Maya-Maya Cottages,
G.R No. 148361, November 29, 2005).
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The court would be in error if it refuses to admit an
amended pleading when its exercise is a matter of right.
The error is correctible by mandamus (Breslin vs. Luzon
Stevedoring, G.R. No. L-3346, September 29, 1949)
because the trial court’s duty to admit an amendment
complaint made as a matter of right is purely ministerial.
Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz (2006)
Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint
for replevin filed by Estrella Corpuz (“respondent”),
against Alpine Lending Investors (“Alpine”), one of the
petitioners herein, and Zenaida Lipata (“Zenaida”). The
complaint alleges that Zenaida was respondents former
neighbor. Pretending to help respondent in securing a
Garage Franchise from the Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Zenaida took from her the original registration
papers of her vehicle, a Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate
No. UMR 660. Zenaida, using respondent’s registration
papers in representing herself as the owner of the vehicle,
was able to retrieve it from Richmond Auto Center where
it was being repaired. Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared
with the vehicle. Respondent then reported the incident
to the LTO Muntinlupa City Branch. There, she was
informed that Zenaida mortgaged her vehicle with
petitioner Alpine. The LTO showed respondent the Chattel
Mortgage Contract bearing her forged signature.
Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about
the spurious mortgage and demanded the release of her
vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request on
condition that Zenaida should first be charged criminally.
Respondent then caused the filing with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City complaints for
falsification of private document and estafa against
Zenaida. Eventually, a warrant of arrest was issued
against her. Respondent informed Alpine about these
developments, but the latter still refused to turn over the
vehicle to her.
Instead of filing an answer to respondent’s
complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion to
dismiss on the ground that it is not a juridical person,
hence, not a proper party in the case.
In an Order dated September 2, 2002, the RTC
denied Alpines motion to dismiss. Alpine then filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. The RTC
then directed respondent to file her amended complaint
within ten (10) days.
However, respondent filed her Amended
Complaint with an accompanying Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint two (2) days late. Nonetheless, in an
Order dated December 13, 2002, the RTC admitted the
amended complaint.
On January 3, 2003, Alpine filed a Motion
to Expunge respondents motion to admit amended
complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not
accompanied by a notice of hearing.
In her Comment on Alpines motion to expunge,
respondent averred that her contested motion need not
be accompanied by a notice of hearing as it is a non-
litigated motion.
On January 24, 2003, the RTC denied Alpines
motion to expunge for lack of merit. Alpine moved for a
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reconsideration, but this was denied in an Order
dated January 28, 2003.
Held: Sections 1 and 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provide:
SEC. 1. Amendments in general. Pleadings
may be amended by adding or striking an
allegation or the name of any party, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation or description
in any other respect, so that the actual merits of
the controversy may speedily be determined,
without regard to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner.
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of
right. A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is
served or, in the case of a reply, at any time
within ten (10) days after it is served.
As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine
filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to dismiss,
not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss
is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2,
Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed,
respondent could amend her complaint in Civil Case No.
C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Courts
ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., considering
that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it
is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the
amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie
against it. In other words, the trial courts duty to admit
the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact,
respondent should not have filed a motion to admit her
amended complaint.
It has always been the policy of this Court to be
liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in order that
the real controversies between or among the parties may
be presented and cases be decided on the merits without
delay.
Amendments by leave of court
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 10
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court.
— Except as provided in the next preceding Section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave
of court. But such leave shall be refused if it appears
to the court that the motion was made with intent to
delay or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the
pleading stated no cause of action from the beginning
which could be amended. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this Section shall be made upon
motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse
party, and an opportunity to be heard. (3a)
Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 10
Section 5. No amendment necessary to
conform to or authorize presentation of
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evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. No amendment of
such pleadings deemed amended is necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence. (5a)
REMEDIES
Periods to answer
a. Amendments
Amendment as a matter of right—
The defendant shall answer the same within
thirty (30) calendar days after being served with
a copy thereof.
Amendment not a matter of right—
The defendant shall answer within fifteen (15)
calendar days from notice of the Order
admitting the same.
▪ An answer earlier filed may serve as
the answer to the amended complaint,
if no new answer is filed.
Applicability
This Rule shall apply to the answer to
(1) an amended counterclaim,
(2) amended cross-claim,
(3) amended third (fourth, etc.)— party
complaint, and
(4) amended complaint-in-intervention.
(Sec. 3, Rule 11)
b. Supplemental complaint
This may be answered within twenty (20) calendar
days from notice of the order admitting the same,
unless a different period is fixed by the court.
▪ If no new or supplemental answer is filed—
The answer to the complaint shall serve as
the answer to the supplemental complaint.
(Sec. 7, Rule 11)
c. Supplemental pleadings
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 10
Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. —
Upon motion of a party, the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him or her to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead
thereto within ten (10) calendar days from notice of
the order admitting the supplemental pleading. (6a)
A supplemental pleading setting forth transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented may be
permitted
(1) upon motion of a party
(2) reasonable notice and
(3) upon such terms as are just
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Period to answer
The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days
from notice of the order admitting the supplemental
pleading. (Sec. 6, Rule 11)
A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of
action as long as it has some relation to the original
cause of action set forth in the original complaint
Ada v. Baylon (2012)
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of spouses
Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses
Baylon). At the time of their death, the Spouses Baylon
were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita,
Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and Lilia. The
petitioners, mostly heirs of the children of the Sps.
Baylon, filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition,
accounting and damages against the surviving Baylon
siblings Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein
that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43
parcels of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the
death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took
possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated
for herself the income from the same. Using the income
produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly
purchased two parcels of land and refused to effect a
partition of the said parcels of land. During the pendency
of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated 6 July
6 1997 conveyed Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
to Florante. On 16 July 2000, Rita died intestate and
without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante the petitioners
filed a Supplemental Pleading dated 6 February 2002
praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent
be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the
Civil Code. The RTC held that the death of Rita during the
pendency of the case had rendered the issue of ownership
insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own
moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate.
Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10
parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same
be partitioned among her heirs. The RTC also rescinded
the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot
No. 4706 in favor of Florante. The CA held that before the
petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must
first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709
and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate
of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA
asserted, an action for rescission is premature. Further,
the CA ruled that the petitioners' action for rescission
cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting
and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for rescission of
donation can be lumped with an action for partition
through a mere supplemental pleading.
HELD:
Yes, a supplemental pleading may raise a new
cause of action as long as it has some relation to the
original cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
In Young v. Spouses Sy, the SC elucidated that a
supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add
something to the primary pleading; it does not replace
that which it supplements. The purpose of the
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supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new
facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to
which the plaintiff is entitled, hence any supplemental
facts which further develop the original right of action, or
extend to vary the relief, are available by way of
supplemental complaint even though they themselves
constitute a right of action. Here, the issue as to the
validity of the donation inter vivos of the said lots is a new
cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original
complaint but is germane to and is in fact intertwined with
the cause of action in the partition case.
i. Distinguished from amended pleadings
Shoemart, Inc. v. CA (1990)
Facts: Anson Emporium Corp. (Anson) leased from
Shoemart portion of a building for two years. The lease
stipulated that if after termination of the lease, Shoemart
permits Anson to remain, the lease shall be understood
to be on a month to month basis in the absence of a
contrary written agreement.
Anson remained in possession after the two-
year period but on an increased rental. Four years later,
Shoemart terminated the lease and gave notice to Anson
to vacate, which the latter refused. A complaint for
ejectment was filed against him with the MTC. Shoemart
asked for, and was granted, leave to file supplemental
complaint which alleged that the rental of all tenants of
the premises had been increased to P45,142.00, which
Anson refused to pay. Anson alleged that Shoemart’s
claim for increased rentals has been barred. MTC ruled for
Anson.
The RTC reversed the judgment and ordered
Anson to vacate the premises and to pay P34,622 and
P45,142 respectively for the two lease agreements, with
1% interest from October 1977. Shoemart filed a motion
for reconsideration of the award of damages, saying it is
less than what is really due. RTC granted this motion.
CA affirmed the ejectment of respondent but
reduced the damages awarded by stating that the 1%
interest will start to run from October 1987. Private
respondent sought the correction of the clerical error
regarding date of the effectivity of the payment for
damages. Said motion was granted
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration seeking
the reinstatement of the RTC’s decision was denied. CA
ruled that petitioner’s claim for damages is limited to the
P45,142 alleged in the supplemental complaint.
Held: The subsequently amended complaint in the case
at bar does not render the original complaint abandoned
or inexistent. Petitioner's recovery is not limited by the
amount of P45,142.00 prayed for in the supplemental
complaint as increased rental. This is not a case of a
complaint subsequently amended, the effect of which is
to render the original complaint abandoned or inexistent
and let the amendment take form as the sole substitute
upon which the case stands for trial.
A supplemental complaint or pleading supplies
deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, not to entirely
substitute the latter. A perusal of the original complaint
shows that it prayed, among others, that the private
respondent be ordered to pay petitioner P34,622.00 and
all other rentals and charges that may be due until
respondent vacates the premises. Petitioner, therefore,
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did not foreclose its right to demand increased rentals
that may be recovered expressed in terms of the fair
rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the real property. Unlike in an amended
complaint, the original complaint exists side by side with
the supplemental complaint.
The supplemental pleading merely served to
aver supervening facts which were then not ripe for
judicial relief when the original pleading was filed.
Supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies
in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with the
latter.
The failure of petitioner to amend its complaint
or file additional supplemental pleadings to allege
subsequent rental increases is of no moment.
In view of the failure of private respondent to
object to the presentation of evidence showing that there
were four (4) rental increases on the subject premises
although three (3) of said increases are not alleged in the
pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards
the said increases or issues which shall be considered as
if they have been raised in the pleadings. As found by the
RTC, private respondent did not controvert the evidence
submitted by petitioner in determining the fair rental
value of the premises including those imposed on all other
tenants of petitioner occupying the Makati Arcade. If,
indeed, the rental increases were unconscionable,
respondent should have at least presented evidence to
substantiate its claim. The burden of proof to show that
the rental demanded is unconscionable or exorbitant rests
upon private respondent as the lessee.
Private respondent failed to discharge its burden
when it omitted to present any evidence at all on what it
considers is the fair rental value other than what were
submitted by petitioner. As a matter of fact, all the other
tenants did not question the reasonableness of the rental
increases.
BILL OF PARTICULARS/INTERVENTION
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Definition
A bill of particulars is a detailed explanation respecting
any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness/particularity in the complaint as to enable a
party to properly prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial (Rule 12, Sec. 1).
Office and Purpose:
• The proper preparation of an intelligent answer
requires information as to the precise nature,
character, scope and extent of the cause of action in
order that the pleader may be able to squarely meet
the issues raised, thereby circumscribing them
within determined confines and preventing surprises
during trial, and in order that he may set forth his
defenses which may not be so readily availed of if
the allegation controverted are vague, indefinite,
uncertain or are mere general conclusions (Virata v.
Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 52, 1993).
• The proper office of a bill of particulars is to inform
the opposite party and the court of the precise nature
and character of the cause of action (Tan v.
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Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84195, 11 December
1989).
Virata v. Sandiganbayan (1993)
Facts: Cesar Virata was among the forty-four co-
defendants of Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez in a
complaint filed by the Sandiganbayan. The complaint was
amended thrice, the last amendment thereto is
denominated as Second Amended Complaint. The plaintiff
alleged four actionable wrongs against petitioner: (1) his
participation in the reduction of the electric franchise tax
and the tariff duty of fuel oil imports by all public utilities
(2) his participation in the the approval of the '3-Year
Program for the Extension of MERALCO's Services to
Areas’ (3) his participation in the formation of Erectors
Holdings, Inc. and (4) his acting as a dummy of
corporations controlled by Romualdez and Marcos.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on various
grounds including the failure of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint to state a cause of action. The
motion was denied by Sandiganbayan. SC affirmed the
Sandiganbayan, and advised petitioner that if he perceive
some ambiguity or vagueness therein, the remedy is not
a motion to dismiss, but rather for a bill of particulars.
Petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars,
claiming that the general and sweeping allegations of the
Second Amended Complaint and the purported illegal acts
imputed to them as well as the alleged causes of actions
are vague and ambiguous. They are not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity as would enable
defendant Virata to properly prepare his answer or
responsive pleading. Sandiganbayan partially granted the
motion; of the four actionable wrongs, it granted the
motion with respect only to the fourth, since the other
three actionable wrongs are not squarely under the
Tantuico case.
Not satisfied with the partial grant of the
motion, petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Held: The Motion for Bill of Particulars be granted totally.
It was grave error for the Sandiganbayan to state that
"[a]lleging the specific nature, character, time and extent
of the phrase 'active collaboration' would be a mere
surplus age and would not serve any useful purpose" for
precisely, without any amplification or particularization
thereof, the petitioner would be hard put in meeting the
charges squarely and in pleading appropriate defenses.
Nor can We accept the public respondent's postulation
that "any question as to the validity or legality of the
transactions involved in the charges against defendant-
movant is irrelevant and immaterial in the resolution of
the instant incident, inasmuch as the same is a matter of
defense which shall have its proper place during the trial
on the merits, and on the determination of the liability of
defendant-movant after the trial proper." This is absurd,
for how may the petitioner set up a defense at the time
of trial if in his own answer he was not able to plead such
a defense precisely because of the vagueness or
indefiniteness of the allegations in the complaint? Unless
he pleads the defense in his answer, he may be deprived
of the right to present the same during the trial because
of his waiver thereof.
Since the issues have not as yet been joined and
no evidence has so far been adduced by the parties the
Sandiganbayan was in no position to conclude that the
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matters which the. petitioner seeks are "within his
intimate or personal knowledge."
It is the office or function, as well as object or
purpose, of a bill of particulars to (1) amplify or limit a
pleading, (2) specify more minutely and particularly a
claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, (3)
give information, not contained in the pleading, to the
opposite party and the court as to the precise nature,
character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or
defense relied on by the pleader, and (4) apprise the
opposite party of the case which he has to meet, (a) to
the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the
matters specified, and (b) in order that surprise at, and
needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and
(c) that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also
been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of
particulars to (5) define, clarify, particularize, and limit or
circumscribe the issues in the case, to (6) expedite the
trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose
of a bill of particulars is to (7) prevent injustice or do
justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished
without the aid of such a bill.
Moreover, the phrase "to enable him properly to
prepare his responsive pleading . . ." in Section 1 of Rule
12 implies not just the opportunity to (8) properly prepare
a responsive pleading but also to (9) prepare an
intelligent answer. The proper preparation of an
intelligent answer requires information as to the precise
nature, character, scope and extent of the cause of action
in order that the pleader may be able to squarely meet
the issues raised, thereby circumscribing them within
determined confines and, preventing surprises during the
trial, and in order that he may set forth his defenses which
may not be so readily availed of if the allegations
controverted are vague, indefinite, uncertain or are mere
general conclusions.
• What is beyond its scope
o The complaint for which a bill for a more definite
statement is sought need only inform the defendant of
the essential (or ultimate) facts to enable him, the
defendant, to prepare his answer… Any more ‘particulars’
in that event would be evidentiary in character, which
must be adduced at the trial proper (Tan v.
Sandiganbayan, supra.).
o Notes:
• If the purpose is for preparation for trial, the
appropriate remedy is to avail discovery
procedures or pre-trial.
• It is erroneous to require disclosure of evidence
relied upon by the adverse party in a motion for
bill of particulars.
• A motion for bill of particulars to require a
pleader to set forth matters showing jurisdiction
of a court to render its judgment is not proper.
Tan v. Sandiganbayan (1989)
Facts:
The PCGG filed a complaint against the twenty-two
petitioners, together with the late Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos, Don Ferry, and Federico Moreno, praying,
among others, for the return and reconveyance of all
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funds and other property impressed with constructive
trust in favor of PCGG and the Filipino people, as well as
funds and other property acquired by Defendants by
abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment.
Subsequently, the PCGG filed an Expanded
Complaint. In essence, these are the allegations of PCGG:
1. The petitioner Lucio Tan was Mr. Marcos' business
partner;
2. Through undue influence, coercion, and abuse of
light they acquired shareholdings from various
firms, and built a business empire therefrom;
3. The remaining petitioners acted as their "dummies,
nominees, or agents";
4. Together with the Marcoses, they maneuvered their
way into these firms and acquired control thereof;
5. The same were accomplished through unacceptable
machinations such as insider trading and similar
acts, in violation of existing laws;
6. They also unjustly enriched the petitioners at the
expense of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Filipino people.
Notwithstanding this, the twenty-two
petitioners moved for a bill of particulars. The respondent
Court denied the petitioners' motion, and denied
reconsideration. The petitioners submit that the PCGG's
averments are made up of bare generalizations,
presumptuous conclusions of fact and law, and plain
speculations, for which a motion for a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars allegedly lies.
The Sandiganbayan's decided that Paragraphs
14 to 15, inclusive of the Expanded Complaint, had
already supplied or provided the specifications and
particulars theretofore lacking in the original Complaint.
Held:
The Motion for Bill of Particulars should NOT be
granted. The foregoing allegations of the PCGG are
actionable wrongs that are proper for a complaint. The
PCGG's Complaint/Expanded Complaint is garbled in
many respects, but this is no excuse for sloth on the part
of the petitioners. The Complaint/Expanded Complaint is
complete enough to perish fears of the PCGG pulling a
surprise subsequently.
It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply
material allegations necessary to the validity of a
pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense stated
in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense
other than the one stated. Also it is not the office or
function, or a proper object, of a bill of particulars to set
forth the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule
of evidence on which he intends to rely, or to furnish
evidential information whether such information consists
of evidence which the pleader proposes to introduce or of
facts which constitute a defense or offset for the other
party or which will enable the opposite party to establish
an affirmative defense not yet pleaded. The PCGG's
complaint (as amended) does set out allegations,
however confusingly put in print, which, interrelated to
one another, are enough to support a formal civil charge.
If the petitioners are not aware of the PCGG's
asseverations, the remedy is to deny the same in their
answer for lack of "knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the said averments. They
cannot, however, demand for any more particulars
without actually making the PCGG expose its evidence
unnecessarily before the trial stage.
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When to file
The Motion for Bill of Particulars should be filed
before responding to a pleading.
o If directed to a complaint, the motion shall be filed
within thirty (30) calendar days after service of
summons.
o If directed to a counterclaim, the motion shall be
filed twenty (20) calendar days from service of the
counterclaim.
o If directed to a reply, the motion shall be filed ten
(10) calendar days from the service of said reply.
Requisites
The Motion for Bill of Particulars shall point out
(a) defects complained of;
(b) paragraphs wherein they are contained; and
(c) the details desired.
Action of the Court (Sec. 2, Rule 12)
Upon receipt of the motion, which the clerk must
immediately bring to the court’s attention, the court may:
(a) deny the motion outright;
(b) grant the motion outright; or
(c) hold a hearing on the motion.
Compliance
o Compliance with the order granting the motion
— If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the
compliance therewith must be effected within ten (10)
days from notice of the order, unless a different period is
fixed by the court. (Rule 12, Section 3).
o Effect of non-compliance (Rule 12, Section 4) —
If the order is not obeyed, or in case of insufficient
compliance therewith, the court may:
(a) order the striking out of the pleading or the
portions thereof to which the order was
directed; or
(b) make such other order as it deems just
Stay of period to file responsive pleading
After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite
pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion, the
moving party may file his responsive pleading within the
period to which he was entitled at the time of filing his
motion, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event (Rule 12, Sec. 5).
Bill a part of pleading
A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading for which
it is intended (Rule 12, Sec. 6).
INTERVENTION
Definition
• Intervention is a legal proceeding by which a
person who is not a party to the action is
permitted by the court to become a party by
intervening in a pending action after meeting
the conditions and requirements set by the
Rules of Court (First Philippine Holdings
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Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 30;
Rule 19).
• It is a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him to
protect or preserve a right or interest which may
be affected by such proceeding (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573,
11 September 2008).
• It is never an independent proceeding, but is
ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation. Its purpose is to enable a stranger
to an action to become a party to protect his
interest (Santiago Land Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 79;
See Saw vs. CA, 195 SCRA 740 and
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Presiding
Judge, 182 SCRA 820, 1990).
Saw v. CA (1991)
Facts: Equitable Banking Corporation (“Equitable”) filed
a collection suit with preliminary attachment against
Freeman, Inc. (“Freeman”) and Saw Chiao Lian, its
President and General Manager. The petitioners moved to
intervene, alleging that (1) the loan transactions between
Chiao Lian and Equitable were not approved by the
stockholders representing at least two thirds (2/3) of
corporate capital; (2) Chiao Lian had no authority to
contract such loans; and (3) there was collusion between
the officials of Freeman and Equitable in securing the
loans. The motion to intervene was denied, and the
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Equitable and Chiao Lian entered
into a compromise agreement which was approved by the
lower court. However, it was not complied with, so
Equitable secured a writ of execution, and two lots owned
by Freeman, Inc. were levied upon and sold at public
auction.
The CA sustained the denial of the motion for
intervention, holding that the compromise agreement will
not necessarily prejudice petitioners whose rights to
corporate assets are at most inchoate, prior to the
dissolution of Freeman, and that intervention under Sec.
2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper only
when one's right is actual, material, direct and immediate
and not simply contingent or expectant.
Held: The petitioners may NOT be allowed to intervene
in the action. To allow intervention: (a) it must be shown
that the movant has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or otherwise qualified; and (b) consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a
separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.
The interest which entitles a person to intervene
in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment. Here, the interest,
if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect,
contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and
collateral. While a share of stock represents a
proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the
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corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof with any
legal right or title to any of the property, his interest in
the corporate property being equitable or beneficial in
nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners of
corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as
a distinct legal person.
Intervention is not an independent proceeding,
but an ancillary and supplemental one which, in the
nature of things, unless otherwise provided for by the
statute or Rules of Court, must be in subordination to the
main proceeding. It may be laid down as a general rule
that an intervenor is limited to the field of litigation open
to the original parties. In the case at bar, there is no more
principal action to be resolved as a writ of execution had
already been issued by the lower court and the claim of
Equitable had already been satisfied. The decision of the
lower court had already become final and in fact had
already been enforced. There is therefore no more
principal proceeding in which the petitioners may
intervene.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge
(1990)
Facts: Metrobank loaned Good Earth Emporium (GEE)
P4.9M, and the latter mortgaged its air conditioning units
as security. Said units were purchased from Raycor Air
Control systems. However, Raycor was not completely
paid by GEE on the installation costs to the extent of
P150,000.
When GEE was foreclosed by BPI Consortium,
Metrobank filed a complaint for replevin to recover the
units. The defendants consortium filed their answer.
Subsequently, Raycor filed a motion for leave to
intervene, which was granted.
The complaint was later dismissed with
prejudice when the parties agreed to a compromise
settlement, without informing the intervenor Raycor.
Held: The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be
heard like any other party.There is here no final dismissal
of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower
court has the effect not only of allowing the intervention
suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous order of
dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try
and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is
proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the
original defendants to dismiss the case, without notice to
and consent of the intervenor, has the effect of putting to
rest only the respective claims of the said original parties
inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the claim
of private respondent which was allowed by the court to
intervene without opposition from the original parties.
After the intervenor has appeared in the action,
the plaintiff has no absolute right to put the intervenor
out of court by the dismissal of the action. The parties to
the original suit have no power to waive or otherwise
annul the substantial rights of the intervenor. When an
intervening petition has been filed, a plaintiff may not
dismiss the action in any respect to the prejudice of the
intervenor.
It has even been held that the simple fact that
the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s action does
not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. An
intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original
suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be
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defeated by dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after the
filing of the petition and notice thereof to the other
parties. A person who has an interest in the subject
matter of the action has the right, on his own motion, to
intervene and become a party to the suit, and even after
the complaint has been dismissed, may proceed to have
any actual controversy established by the pleadings
determined in such action. The trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff’s action does not require dismissal of the action
of the intervenor.
The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to
be heard like any other party. A claim-in-intervention that
seeks affirmative relief prevents a plaintiff from taking a
voluntary dismissal of the main action. Where a
complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiff's action
had been expressly dismissed, the intervenor's complaint
was not subject to dismissal on the ground that no action
was pending, since dismissal of plaintiffs action did not
affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the dismissal
of intervenor's complaint. An intervenor's petition
showing it to be entitled to affirmative relief will be
preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of the
principal action.
• Intervention cannot alter the nature of the action and
the issues already joined (Castro v. David, 100 Phil.
454).
• It is neither compulsory nor mandatory but only
optional and permissive (Mabayo Farms, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, 1 August 2002).
Legal interest
The legal interest must be one that is actual and material,
direct and of an immediate character, not merely
contingent or expectant so that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment
(Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522;
Office of the Ombudsman v, Samaniego, supra.).
Requisites; Who may intervene (Rule 19, Sec. 1)
(1) There must be a motion for intervention filed before
rendition of judgment by the trial court;
(2) The movant must be a person who has a legal interest
(a) in the matter in litigation,
(b) in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or
(c) is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
(3) The intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties
and that the intervenor’s rights may not be fully
protected in a separate proceeding (Rule 19, Sec. 1).
Time to intervene
The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court (Rule 19, Sec.
2).
• A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the
original parties
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Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v.
Radstock Securities Limited (2009)
Facts: Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) was granted a franchise to construct,
operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and South
Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway. CDCP
Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP,
obtained loans from Marubeni Corporation of Japan
(Marubeni). CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans
when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned
and managed.
In 1983, CDCP’s name was changed to
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) in
order to reflect that the Government already owned
90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under private
ownership. Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP
Mining remained unpaid. On 20 October 2000 and 22
November 2000, the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC
Board) passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s
liability to Marubeni. Previously, for two decades the
PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for
the Marubeni loans.
In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire
credit to Radstock Securities Limited (Radstock), a foreign
corporation. Radstock immediately sent a notice and
demand letter to PNCC. On 15 January 2001, Radstock
filed an action for collection and damages against PNCC
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213 (trial court). In its order of 23 January 2001,
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against PNCC. The trial court ordered PNCCs bank
accounts garnished and several of its real properties
attached. On 14 February 2001, PNCC moved to set aside
the 23 January 2001 Order and to discharge the writ of
attachment. PNCC also filed a motion to dismiss the case.
The trial court denied both motions. PNCC filed motions
for reconsideration, which the trial court also denied.
PNCC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66654, assailing the
denial of the motion to dismiss. On 30 August 2002, the
Court of Appeals denied PNCC’s petition. PNCC filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
also denied in its 22 January 2003 Resolution. PNCC filed
a petition for review before the Supreme Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 156887.
The trial court continued to hear the main case.
On 10 December 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of
Radstock. PNCC thereafter appealed the trial courts’
decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 87971.. In a Resolution dated 4 December 2006 in
G.R. No. 156887, the Supreme Court referred the
Compromise Agreement to the Commission on Audit
(COA) for comment. The COA recommended approval of
the Compromise Agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court
noted the Compromise Agreement and referred it to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87971. In its 25
January 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals approved the
Compromise Agreement.
PNCC and Radstock entered into a Compromise
Agreement. Under this agreement, PNCC shall pay
Radstock the reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00 in
full settlement of PNCC’s guarantee of CDCP Mining’s
debt. In its 25 January 2007 Decision, the Court of
Appeals approved the Compromise Agreement.
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Strategic Alliance Development Corporation
(STRADEC) moved for reconsideration. STRADEC alleged
that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the
National Government’s shares, receivables, securities and
interests in PNCC. The matter is subject of a complaint
filed by STRADEC against PNCC and the Privatization and
Management Office (PMO) for the issuance of a Notice of
Award of Sale to Dong-A Consortium of which STRADEC
is a partner. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-882,
is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 146 (RTC Branch 146).
The Court of Appeals treated STRADEC’s motion
for reconsideration as a motion for intervention and
denied it on the ground that the motion was filed only
after the Court of Appeals and the trial court had
promulgated their respective decisions.
Rodolfo Cuenca (Cuenca), a stockholder and
former PNCC President and Board Chairman, filed an
intervention before the Court of Appeals. Cuenca alleged
that PNCC had no obligation to pay Radstock. The Court
of Appeals also denied Cuenca’s motion for intervention.
Cuenca did not appeal the denial of his motion.
Meanwhile, Sison, also a stockholder and former
PNCC President and Board Chairman, filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment Approving Compromise
Agreement before the Court of Appeals. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97982.
Asiavest, a judgment creditor of PNCC, also filed
an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File the
Attached Opposition and Motion-in-Intervention before
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97982. The Court
of Appeals denied Asiavest’s urgent motion.
Held: The Court of Appeals improperly denied Asiavest’s
motions for intervention. The rule that the motion for
intervention must be filed before the rendition of
judgment by the trial court is not absolute. The rule on
intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended
to make the powers of the Court completely available for
justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims, overriding technicalities on
the timeliness of the filing of the claims.
Concededly, STRADEC has no legal interest in
the subject matter of the Compromise Agreement.
STRADECs interest is dependent on the outcome of Civil
Case No. 05-882. Unless STRADEC can show that RTC
Branch 146 had already decided in its favor, its legal
interest is simply contingent and expectant.
However, Asiavest has a direct and material
interest in the approval or disapproval of the Compromise
Agreement. Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC and
a court has already issued a writ of execution in its favor.
Asiavest’s interest is actual and material, direct and
immediate characterized by either gain or loss from the
judgment that this Court may render. Considering that
the Compromise Agreement involves the disposition of all
or substantially all of the assets of PNCC, Asiavest, as
PNCCs judgment creditor, will be greatly prejudiced if the
Compromise Agreement is eventually upheld.
Pleadings-in-intervention
The intervenor shall file a complaint-in-intervention if
he asserts a claim against either or all of the original
parties, or an answer-in-intervention if he unites with
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the defending party in resisting a claim against the latter A copy of the complaint and order for
(Rule 19, Sec. 3). appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, shall
be attached to the original and each copy of the
Answer to complaint-in-intervention summons (Sec 2, Rule 14).

The answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall be filed If with leave of court

within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order admitting It shall be made
the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court (1) by motion,
(Rule 19, Sec. 4). (2) in writing,
(3) supported by affidavit of the plaintiff
or some person on his behalf, and
Rule 14 (4) setting forth the grounds for the
Summons application. (Sec. 19, Rule 14)
Who serves
The summons may be served by
Definition and purpose (1) the sheriff,
(2) his deputy, and
Summons is the writ by which the defendant is notified of (3) in case of failure of service of summons by
the action brought against him. them, the court may authorize the plaintiff - to
serve the summons - together with the sheriff
▪ The issuance of summons is mandatory on the (Sec. 3, Rule 14).
part of the court.
▪ In an action in personam, the purpose of In cases where Tthe plaintiff shall be authorized
summons is not only to notify the defendant of summons is to be to cause the service of
the action, but also to acquire jurisdiction over served outside summons.
his person. the judicial
▪ Service of summons is required even if the region of the
defendant is aware of the filing of the action court where the
against him. case is pending
▪ In an action in rem or quasi in rem, the purpose If the plaintiff is a it shall notify the court, in
of summons is mainly to satisfy the juridical entity, writing, and name its
constitutional requirements of due process. authorized representative
therein, attaching a board
Duty to issue resolution or secretary’s
The court shall direct the clerk of court to issue the certificate thereto, as the
corresponding summons to the defendants within five (5) case may be, stating that
calendar days from receipt of the: such representative is duly
(1) the initiatory pleading; and authorized to serve the
(2) proof of payment of the requisite legal fees. summons on behalf of the
(Sec. 1, Rule 14) plaintiff.
If the plaintiff the case shall be dismissed with
Validity of Summons misrepresents prejudice, the proceedings shall
Summons shall remain valid until duly served, unless it is that the be nullified, and the plaintiff
recalled by the court (Sec. 4, Rule 14). defendant was shall be meted appropriate
served sanctions.
Alias summons summons, and it
In case of loss or destruction of summons, the court may, is later proved
upon motion, issue an alias summons (Sec. 4, Rule 14). that no summons
was served
Form
If summons is The court shall order the
Content returned without plaintiff to cause the service of
The summons shall be being served on summons by other means
(1) directed to the defendant, any or all the available under the Rules.
(2) signed by the clerk of court, and defendants
(3) under seal (Sec 2, Rule 14). Failure to comply with the order
shall cause the dismissal of the
The summons shall contain: initiatory pleading without
(a) the name of the court and the names of prejudice.
the parties to the action; (Sec. 3, Rule 14).
(b) When authorized by the court upon ex
parte motion, an authorization for the On whom
plaintiff to serve summons to the
defendant In general
(c) a direction that the defendant answer The clerk of court shall issue the corresponding
within the time fixed by these Rules; and summons to the defendants. (Sec. 1, Rule 14)
(d) a notice that unless the defendant so
answers, plaintiff will take judgment by Service in person on defendant
default and may be granted the relief Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
applied for (Sec 2, Rule 14).

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(1) by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person and informing the defendant that he or she
is being served, or
(2) if he or she refuses to receive and sign for it, by
leaving the summons within the view and in the
presence of the defendant (Sec. 5, Rule 14)
Entity without juridical personality
When persons associated in an entity without juridical
personality are sued under the name by which they are
generally or commonly known, service may be effected
(1) upon all the defendants by serving upon any one
of them, or
(2) upon the person in charge of the office or place of
business maintained in such name.
BUT such service shall not bind individually any
person whose connection with the entity has, upon
due notice, been severed before the action was filed.
(Sec. 7, Rule 14)
Associations
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be
made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel of the corporation wherever they may be
found, or in their absence or unavailability, on their
secretaries.
If such service cannot be made upon any of the
foregoing persons, it shall be made upon the person
who customarily receives the correspondence for the
defendant at its principal office.
In case the domestic juridical entity is under
receivership or liquidation, service of summons shall
be made on the receiver or liquidator, as the case
may be.
Should there be a refusal on the part of the persons
above-mentioned to receive summons despite at least
three (3) attempts on two (2) different dates, service
may be made electronically, if allowed by the court, as
provided under Section 6 of this Rule (Sec. 12, Rule 14)
List exclusive
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Benito (1999)
FACTS: Petitioner E.B. Villarosa, a limited
partnership, and private respondent Benita executed a
deed of sale with development agreement wherein
Villarosa agreed to develop certain parcels of land
belonging to Benito into a housing subdivision for the
construction of low cost housing units. They further
agreed that in case of litigation arising from any dispute,
the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.
The private respondent subsequently filed a
Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
the petitioner before the Trial Court of Makati for lack of
developments within the aforesaid properties. The
Service of Summons as well as the complaint was served
upon the branch manager in Cagayan de Oro. Plaintiff
filed a Special Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
summons was improperly served and for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Respondent
says that the Service was improperly served since it was
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given to an employee in its branch office and not to one
of the persons enunciated in Rule 14 section 11 of the
ROC.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the service of summons on the branch
manager was proper
NO. Section 11, Rule 14 allows service to the
general manager, not the branch manager. The maxim
expression unios est exclusion alterius applies in this
case. The enumeration of persons whom summons may
be served is restricted, limited and exclusive. The new
rule specifically changed the proper recipient of a service
from a mere manager to a general manager in order to
prevent ambiguous and illogical interpretations in the
future. The court therefore acquires no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.
In the case at bar, since the service was given to
a mere branch manager in one of petitioner’s branches
instead of the general manager in its main office in Davao,
such service is deemed insufficient. The courts therefore
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
Foreign Juridical Entity
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 14. Service upon foreign
private juridical entities. — When the defendant is
a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted
or is doing business in the Philippines, as defined by
law, service may be made on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose,
or, if there be no such agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or on any of
its officers, agents, directors or trustees within the
Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered
in the Philippines, or has no resident agent but has
transacted or is doing business in it, as defined by
law, such service may, with leave of court, be
effected outside of the Philippines through any of the
following means:
(a) By personal service coursed through the
appropriate court in the foreign country
with the assistance of the department of
foreign affairs;
(b) By publication once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country where the
defendant may be found and by serving a
copy of the summons and the court order
by registered mail at the last known address
of the defendant;
(c) By facsimile;
(d) By electronic means with the prescribed
proof of service; or
(e) By such other means as the court, in its
discretion, may direct. (12a)
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Spouses
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 11. Service upon spouses. —
When spouses are sued jointly, service of summons
should be made to each spouse individually. (n)
Public corporation
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
SECTION 15. Service upon Public
Corporations. — When the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected
on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city
or municipality, or like public corporations, service
may be effected on its executive head, or on such
other oGcer or oGcers as the law or the court may
direct.
Prisoners
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 8. Service upon prisoners. —
When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail
or institution, service shall be effected upon him or
her by the officer having the management of such
jail or institution who is deemed as a special sheriff
for said purpose. The jail warden shall file a return
within five (5) calendar days from service of
summons to the defendant. (9a)
Minors and Incompetent
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
SECTION 10. Service upon Minors and
Incompetents. — When the defendant is a minor,
insane or otherwise an incompetent person,
service of summons shall be made upon him or her
personally and on his or her legal guardian if he or
she has one, or if none, upon his or her guardian
ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by
the plaintiff. In the case of a minor, service shall
be made on his or her parent or guardian.
Unknown defendant or whereabouts unknown
*Whether in rem, quasi in rem or personal
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 16. Service upon defendant
whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.
— In any action where the defendant is designated
as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
or her whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, within ninety (90)
calendar days from the commencement of the
action, service may, by leave of court, be effected
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upon him or her by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such
time as the court may order.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) calendar days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer. (14a)
Non-resident
*in rem, quasi in rem
When the defendant
(1) does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and
(2) the action affects
a. the personal status of the plaintiff or
b. relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent; or
c. in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or
d. the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines,
Service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines
(1) by personal service as under section 6; or
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order,
• in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant,
(3) or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer. (Sec. 16, Rule 14)
Santos v. PNOC (2008)
FACTS: PNOC Exploration Corp. (respondent)
filed a complaint for a sum of money against Pedro T.
Santos, Jr. (petitioner), seeking to collect the P698,502.10
unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to Santos when
he was still member of the board of directors.
Personal service of summons to Santos failed
because he could not be located in his last known address
despite earnest efforts to do so. On PNOC’s motion, the
trial court allowed service of summons by publication.
PNOC then caused the publication of the summons in
Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, PNOC submitted the affidavit of
publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an
affidavit of service of the PNOC’s employee to the effect
that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to
Santos’ last known address.
When Santos failed to file his answer, PNOC
moved the case be set for the reception of its evidence ex
parte. The trial court granted the motion. An omnibus
motion for reconsideration was then sought by Santos,
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alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by PNOC
failed to comply with Sec. 19, Rule 14, as it was not
executed by the Clerk of Court. He also claimed denial of
due process for he was not notified of the trial court’s
order. PNOC opposed the motion and insisted that it
complied with the rules on service by publication. The trial
court denied Santos’ motion.
ISSUE: Whether there is improper service of summons
because summons by publication only applies to actions in
rem, and not in personam
NO. Since petitioner could not be personally
served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of
court to effect service of summons upon him by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was
properly served with summons by publication.
The in rem/in personam distinction was
significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the
kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of
this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule
to in rem actions only. This has been changed. The present
rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where
the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the
like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now
applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi
in rem.
Service of summons by publication is proved by
the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk,
or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of
summons by publication is complemented by service of
summons by registered mail to the defendant's last known
address. This complementary service is evidenced by an
affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons
and order for publication in the post office, postage
prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his
last known address." The rules, however, do not require
that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by
the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the
mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to
make the complementary service by registered mail is
imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in
the action against him. This was equivalent to service of
summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner.
Residents temporarily out
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 17. Extraterritorial service. —
When the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines, service may, by
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by
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personal service as under Section 5; or as provided for
in international conventions to which the Philippines is
a party; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant, or in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60) calendar days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Section 18. Residents temporarily out of
the Philippines. — When any action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the
Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding Section.
Palma vs. Galvez (2010)
Facts: On July 28, 2003, Palma filed with the RTC an action
for damages against the Philippine Heart Center, Dr. Giron,
Dr. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed
professional fault, negligence and omission for having
removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the
same and the tissues extracted from her during her
surgery; and that although the specimens were
subsequently found, Palma was doubtful and uncertain
that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that
of somebody else. Later, Palma filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Complaint, praying for inclusion of some
nurses, one of which is respondent Agudo.
The RTC’s process server submitted his return of
summons stating that the alias summons, together with a
copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were
served upon Agudo thru her husband Alfredo, who received
and signed the same since Agudo was out of the country.
Agudo’s counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer stating that he
was just engaged by Alfredo Agudo, as respondent Agudo
was out of the country and the Answer was already due.
Two weeks later, counsel again filed a Motion for Another
Extension of Time to File Answer, stating that the draft
answer was finished but would be sent to Agudo for
clarification/verification before the Phil. Consulate in
Ireland. Two weeks later, Agudo filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction
over her as she was not property served with summons
since she was temporarily out of the country. Palma filed
her Opposition to the MTD, arguing that a substituted
service of summons on Agudo’s husband was valid and
binding on her, that the service of summons under Sec.
16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and maybe effected by other
modes of service.
RTC granted Agudo’s MTD. RTC found that while
summons was served at Agudo’s house and received by
her husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service
of summons on her as she was out of the country at the
time it was served. Palma thus filed this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid service
of summons on Agudo.
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Held: YES. In civil cases, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the
service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the
former. Agudo was a Filipino resident temporarily out of
the country at the time of the service of summons, thus
service of summons on her is governed by Sec. 16, Rule
14 of the ROC:
“Sec. 16. When an action is
commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by
leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.”
“Sec. 15. When the defendant does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines x x x service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under
section 6;or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places x x x”
The use of the words “may” and
“also” in Sec. 16 means that it is not
mandatory. Other methods of service of
summons allowed may also be availed of.
Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out
of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (1) submitted
service set forth in Sec. 7, Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country with leave
of court, (3) service of publication, with leave
of court; (4) in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. Sec. 7 states that:
“Sec. 7. If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.”
In this case, the service of summons was made
at her residence with her husband, Alfredo Agudo,
acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of
suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that
place, and therefore, was competent to receive the
summons on Agudo’s behalf.
Statements were made that establish the fact
that Agudo had knowledge of the case filed against her,
and that her husband had told her about the case as
Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel: (1) In
the notice of appearance and Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer, Agudo’s counsel confirmed that Agudo was
out of the country and his service was engaged by the
husband. In the other motion for extension of time,
Agudo’s counsel stated that a draft of the answer
had already been prepared, to be submitted to Agudo in
Ireland. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Agudo when her counsel entered his appearance on
Agudo’s behalf, without qualification and without
questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and
even filed 2 Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.
In effect, Agudo, through counsel, invoked RTC’s
jurisdiction over her person. This is considered voluntary
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submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Petition is
granted. Agudo is directed to file her Answer.
Modes of service
(a) Personal
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 5. Service in person on
defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person and informing the defendant
that he or she is being served, or, if he or she refuses
to receive and sign for it, by leaving the summons
within the view and in the presence of the defendant.
(6a)
(b) Substituted
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 6. Substituted service. — If, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
personally after at least three (3) attempts on two
(2) different dates, service may be effected:
(a) By leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence to a person at least
eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient
discretion residing therein;
(b) By leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge
thereof. A competent person includes, but is
not limited to, one who customarily receives
correspondences for the defendant;
(c) By leaving copies of the summons, if refused
entry upon making his or her authority and
purpose known, with any of the officers of the
homeowners’ association or condominium
corporation, or its chief security officer in
charge of the community or the building
where the defendant may be found; and
By sending an electronic mail to the defendant’s
electronic mail address, if allowed by the court. (7a)
• There must be prior three (3) attempts on
two (2) different dates service in person on
defendant
Ang v. Chinatrust Commercial Bank Corp. (2016)
FACTS: A petition for money claim was filed with the RTC
of Makati with an application for issuance of writ of
preliminary attachment against defendants Nation
Petroleum Corporation (“NPC”) and the Angs. RTC Makati
issued summonses to defendants, which was received by
NPC through its Corporate Secretary Ms. Melinda Ang.
Despite diligent efforts to locate the other defendants
Mario Ang, Nena Ang, Renato Ang, Pauline Ang et. Al,
personal service could not be made and substituted
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service was made by leaving the summons at their office
through Ms. Charlotte Magpayo, administrative assistant
of NPC. Defendants entered a special appearance with a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over their person
since they were not validly served summons, arguing that
substituted service of summons to Charlotte Magpayo is
improper and failed to comply with strict requirements of
law. RTC denied the motion. CA upheld that resort to
substituted service with respect to the individual
defendants was proper. Case was elevated to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not substituted service of summons
was validly resorted to in this case.
HELD: No. While the Rules permit substituted service,
they also require strict compliance with its statutory
requirements because of its extraordinary character.
After all, substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of personal service. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals
established the elements of a valid substituted service, to
wit: (1) the sheriff must establish the impossibility of
prompt personal service; (2) there must be specific
details in the return describing the circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) if
substituted service is made at defendant’s residence,
sheriff must leave a copy of the summons with a person
of “suitable age and discretion residing therein;” and (4)
if substituted service is made at defendant’s office or
regular place of business, the sheriff must instead leave
a copy of the summons with a competent person in charge
thereof, referring to the person managing the office, such
as the President or Manager. Here, the impossibility of
prompt personal service was not established, and a
property custodian is not a competent person in charge
of the defendant’s workplace.
Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation (2013)
FACTS: Petitioner Chu purchased several heavy
equipment from respondent Mach Asia Trading Corp. on
installment and paid through post-dated checks. Upon
presentment, the checks were dishonored. A demand
letter was sent, to which petitioner Chu responded that
his business was badly hit by the Asian economic crises
and he shall pay in partial payments and surrender the
subject units should he fail to do so. Respondent filed a
complaint before RTC Cebu for sum of money and
replevin. Sheriff failed to personally serve summons since
petitioner was not at his resident and resorted to
substituted service upon a certain Rolando Bonayon,
security guard of the petitioner. Failing to file any
responsive pleading, RTC declared Chu in default and
ruled against him. Chu sought recourse with the CA,
alleging that the substituted service was invalid. CA
affirmed the RTC decision. Case elevated to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the substituted service of
summons was valid.
HELD: No, the substituted service of summons was
invalid. In case of substituted service, there should be a
report indicating that the person who received the
summons on defendant’s behalf was one the defendant
had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons. Also, impossibility
of prompt personal service must be should by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and that
such efforts failed. Here, the security guard who received
the summons on behalf of the petitioner was not shown
to be authorized and possessed a relation of confidence
that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. The
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process server’s neglect or inadvertence in the service of
summons should not unduly prejudice plaintiff’s right to
speedy justice.
Macasaet v. Co (2013)
FACTS: Co sued Abante Tonite and its columnist, editors,
publisher, and managers for damages because of an
allegedly libelous article published in the 6 June 2000
article of the tabloid. RTC Manila issued summons to the
individual defendants but the Sheriff could not serve the
summons since defendants were out of the office then. A
2nd attempt was made in the afternoon of the same day
but was told that the defendants were always out to
gather news. Sheriff then resorting to substituted service
of summons through the editorial assistant of the tabloid.
Petitioners moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due
to invalid substituted service of summons. RTC ruled for
respondent, that there was substantial compliance with
the rules, considering the difficulty to serve the summons
personally due to the nature of their job which compels
them to be out and unavailable. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the substituted service of
summons was valid.
HELD: Yes, the substituted service of summons was
valid. It is no longer debatable that the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully and any substituted service
other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective. The Sheriff twice attempted to serve the
summons in their office address and each attempt failed
because petitioners were always out and not available due
to the nature of their job. After learning that there was no
likelihood of the petitioners going to the office during the
business hours of that or any other day, the Sheriff
concluded that further attempts to personally serve them
within a reasonable time will be futile and the
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. The SC
ruled that while strict compliance with the personal
service of the defendants, the Court does not cling to such
strictness should the circumstances already justify
substituted service instead.
• Impossibility of prompt service must
appear in the return of the service
Spouses Galura v. Math-Agro
Corporation (2009)
Facts:Spouses Galura purchased broiler starters and finishers
from Math-Agro Corporation (MAC). The Spouses Galura paid
MAC P72,500. Despite several demands, they failed to pay the
P353,500 unpaid balance. MAC engaged the services of a
certain Atty. Pasamba for the purpose of collecting the unpaid
balance from the Spouses Galura. A demand letter was sent to
spouses Galura wherein it stated that they were giving them 5
days upon receipt of the letter, to pay the unpaid balance plus
interest; that failure to pay would result in an action in court.
Because of non-payment after demand was made, MAC filed a
complaint with the RTC praying that the court would order
spouses Galura to settle the balance plus attorney’s fee and
litigation expenses. In their complaint, MAC provided for their
address where summons may be served to them. Clerk of Court
Ortega issued the summons. 1st SERVICE: went to 230 Apo St.,
Sta. Mesa Heights , Quezon City where he was informed that
the Spouses Galura were presently residing at Tierra Pura
Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City . 2nd SERVICE: went
to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona ,
Tarlac to serve the summons, however he learned that the
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property had been foreclosed and that the Spouses Galura no
longer resided there. 3rd SERVICE: went to Tierra Pura
Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City , to serve the
summons. Sildo served the summons on Teresa L. Galura’s
sister, Victoria Lapuz. The Spouses Galura failed to file their
answer. RTC declared them in default and allowed MAC to
present its evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of MAC and
ordered the Spouses Galura to pay the unpaid balance,
attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation. Subsequently, RTC
issued a writ of execution to implement its Decision. Thereafter,
Spouses Galura received ―from their parents-in-law‖ a copy of
the 10 November 2004 Order. Spouses Galura filed with the CA
a petition for annulment of judgment and final order under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
claiming that the RTC’s Decision and Order were void beacuse
the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because
the substituted service of summons was invalid, and there was
extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe that it would
not file a case against them - MAC, despite the commitment of
its owner not to file the complaint, did so. Such an act on the
part of Math-Agro and its owner constitutes extrinsic fraud, as
it prevented petitioners from defending themselves in the action
lodged with the RTC. common law; it is a method extraordinary
in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in
the circumstances authorized by statute.‖ CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals held that there
was a valid substituted service of summons, that the allegation
of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable, and that the Spouses
Galura should have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, or petition for relief. The Spouses Galura filed a
MR but was denied. Hence, the present petition. In the present
case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the
impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time; (2)
that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served, was of
suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the
residence of the Spouses Galura. Consequently, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Galura, and
thus the Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTC’s Decision
and Order.
Issue:Was there a valid substituted service of summons?
NONE.
Held: Sildo, in his Rertun, did not state that his attempts
to serve the summons by personal service at the Tierra
Pura Subdivision address failed, and that the same could
not be made within a reasonable time. He likewise failed to
state facts and circumstances showing why personal
service of the summons upon the petitioners at the said
address was impossible. Finally, he also failed to state that
Ms. Victoria Lapuz, the person with whom he left the
summons, was a person of sufficient age and discretion,
and residing in the said Tierra Pura address. In a case
where a petition for annulment of a judgment or final order
of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the
action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that
the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the
final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a
judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time
either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order an any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions does not apply
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Pascual v. Pascual (2009)
Facts: Constatino A. Pascual filed a complaint for Specific
Performance before the RTC. In the Return Service, the
Process Server reported that he failed to deliver the
summons to the defendant. According to the report, the
defendant [Dr. Lourdes Pascual] was not at her home and
only her maid was there who refused to receive the
summons. His efforts to effect the service is backed up by
a certification of the Barangay in the area. The following
day, the Process Server went back at the defendant’s
place, but again she is not home.
Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the
RTC. Subsequently, the Process Server returned with the
report that a substituted service was effected. For failure
of respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, filed
a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default to which Dr.
Lourdes Pascual filed an opposition claiming that she was
not able to receive any summons and a copy of the
complaint hence the RTC cannot exercise jurisdiction
over her person. RTC declared Dr. Lourdes Pascual in
Default. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied. Consequently, the RTC in its decision found favor
on Mr. Constantino Pascual against Dr. Lourdes Pascual.
She then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default with
the argument of non-service of Summons. RTC denied and
on the same day issued a Certificate of Finality and Entry
of Judgment. Dr. Lourdes filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 in the CA. The CA ruled favoring
her. Petitioner herein [Constantino Pascual] through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 comes now
to the SC.
Issue: Whether the Service of Summons is valid?
Held: In a case where the action is ‘in personam’ and the
defendant is in the Philippines, the service may be done by
personal or substituted. A plain reading of Rule 14, Sections
6 and 7 indicates that “Personal Service” should and always
be the first option, only when the said summons cannot be
served within a reasonable time can the process server
resort to substituted service. The Court gave a discussion as
to the nature of the requisites of substituted service in
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals. We can break down this
section into the following requirements to effect a valid
substituted service:
1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal
Service
2) Specific Details in the Return
3) A Person Suitable of Age and
Discretion
4) A Competent Person in Charge
Petitioner contends that there was a
valid substituted service of summons
as shown in three officer’s return.
However, this Court stresses that the Process
Server must show that the defendant cannot be served
promptly, or that there was an impossibility of service. The
Return of Summons in this case does not show or indicate
the actual exertion or any steps by the officer to serve the
summons. In the absence of even the barest compliance
with the procedure for substituted service of summons
outlined in the Rules, the principle of “Presumption of
Regularity” cannot apply.
Exception – the absence in the sheriff’s return of a
statement about the impossibility of personal
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service does not conclusively prove that the service
is invalid (liberal rule)
Mapa v. CA (1993)
Facts: A complaint for Recovery of sum of money was filed
vs. High Peak Mining. Summons was issued to be served
upon Mapa, the chairperson, & upon other officers of the
corporation. However, said summons was served upon an
employee of said corp. Defendants were declared in
default. Defendants filed an MTD & Set Aside Default
Judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the ct. over
their person as the service of summons was improper, i.e.,
served upon an EE who may not be considered as an “agent”
of the corporation; moreover, Sheriff did not indicate in his
Return his efforts at serving summons personally before
resorting to substituted service.
Issue: WON the Court the Court acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant. NO
Held: The Court lacked jurisdiction.
1. General Rule: Sheriff’s Return must show that
prior attempts at personal service were made by the Sheriff
& that such attempts had failed, prompting him to resort to
Substituted service. HOWEVER, it must be emphasized
that Absence in the Sheriff’s Return of a statement about
the impossibility of personal service DOES NOT conclusively
prove that the service is invalid. Proof of such prior
attempts may be submitted by the plaintiff during the
hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the
substituted service. While Sheriff’ Return carries w/ it the
presumption of regularity, that entries therein are deemed
correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in
relation to the official duty for w/c the return is made was
not simply done bec. it is not disclosed therein. Besides, the
sheriff’s neglect in making such a disclosure should not
unduly prejudice the plaintiff if what was undisclosed was in
fact done.
2. The EE may be considered as an “agent” for the
purpose of Sec. 13, & there was a substantial compliance
under the said sec. because in the CAB, petitioner failed to
deny the statement in Sheriff’s Return that the EE is
“authorized to receive process of this nature”, said Return
enjoying the presumption of regularity, & the logical
conclusion is that she delivered the summons to the
corporation.
3. In an action in personam as in the CAB,
personal service of summons w/in the forum is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court.
Effect of receipt by security guard
Individual Defendant
Robinson v. Miralles (2006)
FACTS:Respondent Celita Miralles filed a For substituted service to be justified, the following
complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Remelita Robinson, alleging that $20,054 was borrowed by
Robinson, as shown in the MOA they both executed.
Summons was served on Robinson at her given
address. However, per return of service of the Sheriif,
petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the trial court
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issued an alias summons to be served at Muntinlupa City,
petitioner’s new address.
Again, the Sheriff reported twice thereafter that
the summons could not be served on petitioner. Sheriff
Pontente, who was to serve the summons interposed that
he was stopped by the Security Guard of Alabang Hills
Village because they were allegedly told by Robinson not to
let anyone proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite
the explanations of the Sheriff, the guards didn’t let him in.
Thereafter, the Sheriff just left a copy of the complaint to a
guard, who refused to affix his signature on the original
copy, so he will be the one to give the summons to petitioner
Robinson.
Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in
default for her failure to file an answer seasonably despite
service of summons. The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of Miralles ordering Robinson to pay her obligations
plus cost of damages. A copy of the court Order was sent to
petitioner by registered mail at her new address and a writ
of execution was also issued.
Robinson filed a petition for relief from the
judgment by default. She claimed that summons was
improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings
are void. Petitioner Robinson contends that the service of
the summons upon the subdivision guard is not in
compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related
to her or staying at her residence, as required by the rule.
ISSUE: Whether the substituted service of summons
effected is valid
YES. Although the SC have ruled that the
statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective, the Court frowns upon an overly strict
application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter
of the procedural rules, that governs.
Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to
effect personal or substituted service of summons upon
petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the
sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received the
summons through the security guard. Considering her
strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its
consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that
summons has been properly served upon petitioner and
that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons
may be made through personal or substituted service in
the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.
Under our procedural rules, personal service is
generally preferred over substituted service, the latter
mode of service being a method extraordinary in character.
circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal
service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party;
and (c) the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the
party’s office or place of business.
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Defendant Corporation
Orion Security Corporation v.
Kalfam Enterprises, Inc. (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner Orion Security Corporation is
a domestic private corporation engaged in the business of
providing security services. One of its clients is
respondent Kalfam Enterprises, Inc. Respondent was not
able to pay petitioner for services rendered. Petitioner
thus filed a complaint against respondent for collection of
sum of money. The sheriff tried to serve the summons
and a copy of the complaint on the secretary of
respondent’s manager. However, respondent’s
representatives allegedly refused to acknowledge their
receipt. The summons and the copy of the complaint were
left at respondent’s office. When respondent failed to file
an Answer, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondent
in default. The trial court, however, denied the motion on
the ground that there was no proper service of summons
on respondent.
Petitioner then filed a motion for alias summons,
which the trial court granted. The process server again
left the summons and a copy of the complaint at
respondent’s office through respondent’s security guard,
who allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt.
Again, respondent failed to file an Answer. On motion of
petitioner, respondent was declared in default.
Thereafter, petitioner was allowed to adduce evidence ex
parte.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution declaring it in default. Respondent alleged
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person
due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration. The trial court rendered a
default judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held
that summons was not validly served on respondent.
Petitioner’s MR of the Court of Appeals’ decision was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over respondent due to the latter’s voluntary
appearance in the proceedings before the said court.
Petitioner insists substituted service of summons on
respondent’s security guard is substantial compliance
with the rule on service of summons, in view of the
exceptional circumstances in the present case.
Respondent counters that the special
appearance of its counsel does not constitute voluntary
appearance. Respondent maintains that its filing of an
opposition to petitioner’s motion to declare respondent in
default and other subsequent pleadings questioning the
trial court’s jurisdiction over it does not amount to
voluntary appearance. Respondent stresses it was not
properly served with summons via substituted service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over respondent either by (1) valid
substituted service of summons on respondent; or (2)
respondent’s voluntary appearance in the trial court and
submission to its authority.
HELD: NO. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or
through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.
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As a rule, summons should be personally served
on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time that
substituted service may be resorted to. In this case,
records show that respondent’s president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
or in-house counsel never received the summons against
respondent, either in person or by substituted service.
Note that in case of substituted service, there
should be a report indicating that the person who received
the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with
whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring
that the latter would actually receive the summons. Here,
petitioner failed to show that the security guard who
received the summons in respondent’s behalf shared such
relation of confidence that respondent would surely
receive the summons. Hence, we are unable to accept
petitioner’s contention that service on the security guard
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements
of substituted service.
Neither did the trial court acquire jurisdiction
over respondent by the latter’s voluntary appearance in
court proceedings. Note that a party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said
court based on the ground of invalid service of summons
is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. In this case, records show that
respondent, in its special appearance, precisely
questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground
of invalid service of summons. Thus, it cannot be deemed
to have submitted to said court’s authority.
Hence, respondent cannot be bound by the trial
court’s judgment ordering it to pay petitioner a sum of
money.
Consistent with International Conventions
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 9. Service consistent with
international conventions. — Service may be made
through methods which are consistent with established
international conventions to which the Philippines is a
party. (n)
(c) Publication
Where the defendant is
(1) designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
(2) whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, within
ninety (90) calenday days from the
commencement of the action
Service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
(1) publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and
(2) in such places and for such time as the court
may order (Sec. 16, Rule 14)
Note: Any orer granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, whicl shall not be less than sixty
calendar days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer (Sec. 16, Rule 14).
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Extraterritorial
When the defendant
(1) does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and
(2) the action affects
a. the personal status of the plaintiff or
b. relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent;
or
c. in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein,
or
d. the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines,
Service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines
(1) by personal service as under section 6; or
(2) as provided for in international conventions to
which the Philippines is a party;
(3) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order,
• in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant,
(4) or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable
time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer. (Sec.
17, Rule 14)
Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is
temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be
also effected out of the Philippines by extraterritorial
service. (Sec. 18, Rule 14)
Valmonte v. CA (1996)
FACTS: Rosita Dimalanta, sister of petitioner Lourdes
Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property
and accounting of rentals against petitioners Valmonte
spouses. Lourdes Valmonte is a foreign resident. The RTC
denied private respondent's motion to declare petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied. Private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and
declaring Lourdes in default. A copy of the appellate
court's decision was received by petitioner Lourdes’
husband at his Manila law office and in Seattle,
Washington.
ISSUE: Whether in an action for partition filed
against her and her husband, who is also her attorney,
summons intended for her may be served on her
husband, who has a law office in the Philippines
NO. Private respondent's action, which is for
partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature
of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for
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the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a
specific property and not to render a judgment against
him. As petitioner Lourdes Valmonte is a nonresident who
is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her
must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service,
to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made
either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of
the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court
may deem sufficient.
Perkin Elmer Singapore v. Dakila Trading (2007)
FACTS: Dakila Trading Corp (Dakila) entered
into a Distribution Agreement with Perkin-Elmer
Singapore Pte. Ltd. (PES) which appointed Dakila as sole
distributor of its products in the Philippines. PES was
obligated to give Dakila a commission for the sale of its
products in the Philippines. Dakila was granted the right
to purchase and sell the products of PES. The agreement
further stipulated that Dakila shall order the products of
PES, which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PES
itself or from PEIP.
However, PES unilaterally terminated the
Distribution Agreement, prompting Dakila to file before
the RTC a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment
against PES and its affiliate, Perkin-Elmer Instruments
Philippines Corporation (PEIP). RTC denied respondent’s
prayer.
Dakila filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of
Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Dakila’s
General Manager (DGM) to Serve Summons Outside of
the Philippines. RTC granted this motion. Thus, an Alias
Summons was issued by the RTC to PES. But the said
Alias Summons was served and received by Perkin-Elmer
Asia (PEA), a corporation allegedly unrelated to PES. PEIP
moved to dismiss the Complaint filed by Dakila. PEA, on
the other hand, sent letters to Dakila and RTC to inform
them of the wrongful service of summons.
Accordingly, Dakila filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Complaint, together with the Amended
Complaint claiming that (1) PEA had become a sole
proprietorship owned by the PES, (2) PES changed its
name to PEA, (3) such changes did not avoid its due and
outstanding obligations to Dakila, and (4) the name of
PES in the complaint should be changed to PEA. RTC
admitted the Amended Complaint.
Dakila filed another Motion for the Issuance of
Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize DGM to
serve summons outside the Philippines. RTC granted the
motion. RTC thus issued summons and the DGM went to
Singapore and served summons on PES.
Meanwhile, RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss
filed by PEIP, compelling the latter to file its Answer to
the Amended Complaint.
PES filed with the RTC a Special Appearance and
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, which were
denied. It held that even though the Amended Complaint
is primarily for damages, it does relate to a property of
PES, to which the latter has a claim interest, or an actual
or contingent lien, which will make it fall under one of the
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requisites for extraterritorial service. PES filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 with application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the
CA. The CA affirmed the RTC Orders.
ISSUE: Whether summons were properly
served under the 2nd or 4th instance of extra-territorial
service
NO. Extraterritorial service of summons applies
only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if
an action is in personam. In the case at bar, there can
never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon
it, because the case involving collection of a sum of
money and damages is an action in personam, as it deals
with the personal liability of PES by reason of the alleged
unilateral termination of the Distribution Agreement. The
objective sought in Dakila’s Complaint was to establish a
claim against PES. Moreover, The action instituted by
Dakila affects the parties alone, not the whole world.
Thus, being an action in personam, personal
service of summons within the Philippines is necessary in
order for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the
person of PES, and this is not possible in the present case
because the PES is a non-resident and is not found within
the Philippines. Dakila’s allegation in its Amended
Complaint that PES had personal property within the
Philippines in the form of shares of stock in PEIP did not
make the case fall under any of the four instances
mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
as to convert the action in personam to an action in rem
or quasi in rem and, subsequently, make the
extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner
valid.
The 2nd instance for extra-territorial service has
no application in the case. The action for collection of a
sum of money and damages was purely based on the
personal liability of the PES. For the action to be one
falling under the 2nd instance, the main subject matter of
the action must be the property itself of the PES in the
Philippines and in such instance, judgment will be limited
to the res. However, the allegations made by the
respondent that the petitioner has property within the
Philippines in support of its application for the issuance of
a writ of attachment was actually denied by the RTC.
Neither does the allegation that PES had
personal property within the Philippines in the form of
shares of stock in PEIP convert the case from an action in
personam to one quasi in rem, so as to qualify said case
under the 4th instance of extra-territorial service. What is
required is not a mere allegation of the existence of
personal property belonging to the non-resident
defendant within the Philippines but that the non-resident
defendant’s personal property located within the
Philippines must have been actually attached. Evidently,
PES’s personal property within the Philippines, in the form
of shares of stock in PEIP, had not been attached; hence,
the case for collection of sum of money and damages
remains an action in personam.
In the case at bar, there can never be a valid
extraterritorial service of summons upon it, because the
case involving collection of a sum of money and damages
is an action in personam, as it deals with the personal
liability of PES by reason of the alleged unilateral
termination of the Distribution Agreement. The objective
sought in Dakila’s Complaint was to establish a claim
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against PES. Moreover, The action instituted by Dakila
affects the parties alone, not the whole world.
Thus, being an action in personam, personal
service of summons within the Philippines is necessary in
order for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the
person of PES, and this is not possible in the present case
because the PES is a non-resident and is not found within
the Philippines. Dakila’s allegation in its Amended
Complaint that PES had personal property within the
Philippines in the form of shares of stock in PEIP did not
make the case fall under any of the four instances
mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
as to convert the action in personam to an action in rem
or quasi in rem and, subsequently, make the
extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner
valid.
Voluntary appearance
The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Sec.
23, Rule 14)
Cezar V. Ricafort-Bautista (2006)
FACTS: Private respondent Specified Materials
Corporation filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Cezar due to the latter’s failure
to pay the construction materials it purportedly purchased
under a credit line extended by private respondent. At
the time of the institution of the action, petitioner’s
obligation stood at P1,860,000.00, and under the terms
of the credit arrangement, materials sold to petitioner
were supposed to be paid within 30 days from date of
delivery, subject to a 3% interest per month for delayed
payments.
After the filing of the complaint, summons was
issued, and this was received by a certain Robles. As
petitioner failed to file his answer to the complaint,
private respondent moved that he be declared in
default. This motion was granted.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint alleging that it erroneously
computed petitioner’s obligation to be P1,860,000.00,
when it should have amounted to P2,005,000.00. A copy
of the motion and the Amended Complaint were
personally received by petitioner as evidenced by his
signatures thereon. The Amended Complaint was
ordered admitted. The court ruled in favor of plaintiff.
Petitioner, by way of special appearance,
argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
his person. This motion was denied. Petitioner filed
before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment,
Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order. This petition was dismissed for “failure
to attach an affidavit of merit alleging the facts supporting
the good and substantial defense, as well as the affidavits
of witnesses or document supporting the defense.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
this was denied. Following this set-back, petitioner filed
before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
resolutions of the CA, which was also denied for failure to
comply with procedural requirements. Our resolution
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became final and executory. Private respondent filed a
Motion for Execution before the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the
substituted service of summons effected by the sheriff
NO. The person who allegedly received the
summons was identified in the sheriff’s return as Arsenio
Robles, was not petitioner’s employee, was a native of
Batangas and was merely peddling mango seedlings
within the vicinity of his office when the summons was
served.
In the event that summons cannot be served
within a reasonable time, the Rules permit that
substituted service may be resorted to. In this case, the
sheriff employed the substituted service of
summons. The defect, however, in the manner in which
he implemented this mode of service of summons is
readily apparent on the face of the return. It must be
emphasized that laws providing for modes other than the
personal service of summons must be strictly followed in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of respondent or defendant. As the sheriff’s return in the
present case does not contain any statement with regard
to the impossibility of personal service the same is
patently defective and so the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions will not lie.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s voluntary
appearance cured the defect in service of summons.
HELD: YES. In Flores v. Zurbito, we held that
an appearance in whatever form without expressly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person,
is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant or respondent, thus:
He may appear without such formal appearance
and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for
example, and unless by such appearance he specifically
objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives
his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Hence, in this case, petitioner’s filing of a Motion
for Re-setting of the Hearing effectively cured the defect
of the substituted service of summons. Petitioner’s
insistence of lack of jurisdiction over his person is utterly
lacking in any legal basis.
Lhuiller v. British Airways (2010)
FACTS: Lhuillier took respondent British
Airway’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to
Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested
Halliday, one of the respondent’s flight attendants, to
assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the
overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help
and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I
were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have
a broken back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane
was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant,
Kerrigan, singled her out from among all the passengers
in the business class section to lecture on plane safety.
Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other
passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in
need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of
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the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she
knew the plane’s safety regulations being a frequent
traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a
mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner
and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your
attitude."
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to
respondent’s ground manager and demanded an apology.
However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were
"only doing their job."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for
damages. Summons, together with a copy of the
complaint, was served on the respondent through
Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline
Services, Inc.
Respondent, by way of special appearance
through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of
the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts
of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention. Thus, since respondent is
domiciled in London; respondent’s principal place of
business is in London; petitioner bought her ticket in Italy
(through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome); and Rome,
Italy is petitioner’s place of destination, then it follows
that the complaint should only be filed in the proper
courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-
Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident
agent in the Philippines.
Instead of filing a Comment/Opposition,
petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Formal
Amendment to the Complaint and Issuance of Alias
Summons. Petitioner alleged that upon verification with
the SEC, she found out that the resident agent of
respondent in the Philippines is Alonzo Q. Ancheta.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Pending
Incident and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether British Airways, in filing its
motion to dismiss may be deemed as having in fact and
in law submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower
court,.
HELD: NO. The Warsaw Convention has the
force and effect of law in this country. The Warsaw
Convention applies because the air travel, where the
alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the
United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to
the Warsaw Convention. Since the Warsaw Convention
applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention.
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial
court through special appearance of counsel, is not
deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, a defendant who files
a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, together with other grounds raised
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance
means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant
in court is without qualification, in which case he is
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deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction
over his person due to improper service of summons.
A special appearance before the court––
challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other
grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by
the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his
person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
In this case, the special appearance of the
counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and
other pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed
to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said
trial court.
• Seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance
David v. Agtibay
G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015
FACTS: Petitioner Renato David migrated to Canada in
1974 and became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
When he retired, he and his spouse returned to the
Philippines and purchased a lot in Oriental Mindoro, and
constructed a residential house therein. However, in
2004, they came to know that the portion where they built
the house is public land.
Petitioner then filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO). In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private
respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on
the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against the
petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner for
falsification and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information in the MTC. Upon the filing of
the Information in the MTC, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause therein.
The MTC denied the motion, holding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, because at
the time he was said to have committed the crime, he
was still a Canadian citizen. His motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over petitioner.
HELD: Yes.
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Thus, the MTC obtained jurisdiction over petitioner when
he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause.
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In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances,
an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.
The voluntary appearance of the accused,
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person,
is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such
as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring
the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
There is a distinction between custody of the law
and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other
reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but
not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who
is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the
law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative
relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
jurisdiction over his person.
Return of service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 20. Return. — Within thirty (30)
calendar days from issuance of summons by the
clerk of court and receipt thereof, the sheriff or
process server, or person authorized by the court,
shall complete its service. Within five (5) calendar
days from service of summons, the server shall file
with the court and serve a copy of the return to the
plaintiff’s counsel, personally, by registered mail, or
by electronic means authorized by the Rules.
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Should substituted service have been effected, the
return shall state the following:
(1) The impossibility of prompt personal
service within a period of thirty (30)
calendar days from issue and receipt of
summons;
(2) The date and time of the three (3)
attempts on at least (2) two different dates
to cause personal service and the details of
the inquiries made to locate the defendant
residing thereat; and
(3) The name of the person at least eighteen
(18) years of age and of sufficient
discretion residing thereat, name of
competent person in charge of the
defendant’s office or regular place of
business, or name of the officer of the
homeowners’ association or condominium
corporation or its chief security officer in
charge of the community or building where
the defendant may be found. (4a)
Proof of service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 14
Section 21. Proof of service. — The
proof of service of a summons shall be made in
writing by the server and shall set forth the manner,
place, and date of service; shall specify any papers
which have been served with the process and the
name of the person who received the same; and
shall be sworn to when made by a person other than
a sheriff or his or her deputy.
If summons was served by electronic mail, a printout
of said e-mail, with a copy of the summons as served,
and the affidavit of the person mailing, shall constitute
as proof of service. (18a)
Proof of Service by Publication Publication
If the service has been made by publication, service may
be proved by
(1) the affidavit of the publisher, his foreman or
principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager,
(2) an attached copy of the publication, and
(3) an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known
address. (Sec. 22, Rule 14)
Rule 15
Motions
In general
A motion is an application for relief other than by a
pleading. (Sec. 1, Rule 15)
Form
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1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 2. Motions must be in writing.
— All motions shall be in writing except those made
in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial.
A motion made in open court or in the course of a
hearing or trial should immediately be resolved in
open court, after the adverse party is given the
opportunity to argue his or her opposition thereto.
When a motion is based on facts not appearing on
record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or
depositions presented by the respective parties, but
the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly
or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (2a)
General rule: All motions shall be in writing.
Exceptions:
(1) Motions made in open court or
(2) Motions made in the course of a hearing or trial
(Sec. 2, Rule 15).
Generally
The Rules applicable to pleadings shall apply to written
motions so far as concerns
(1) caption,
(2) designation,
(3) signature, and
(4) other matters of form (Sec. 11, Rule 15).
May be oral
General rule: All motions shall be in writing.
Exception Motions made in open court or in the
course of a hearing or trial (Sec. 2, Rule 15).
A motion made in open court or in the course of a hearing
or trial should immediately be resolved in open court,
after the adverse party is given the opportunity to argue
his or her opposition thereto (Sec. 2, Rule 15).
Motion based on facts not appearing on the record
the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions
presented by the respective parties, but the court may
direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.
Motion for leave
A motion for leave to file a pleading or motion shall be
accompanied by the pleading or motion sought to be
admitted. (Sec. 10, Rule 15)
Contents
A motion shall
(1) state the relief sought to be obtained
(2) the grounds upon which it is based, and
(3) shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits
and other papers, if required by these Rules or
necessary to prove facts alleged therein. (Sec.
3, Rule 15)
Omnibus motion rule
A motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available,
and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived. (Sec. 9, Rule 15)
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Exceptions
The court shall dismiss the claim when Non-litigious Motions
it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that
(1) the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter,
(2) there is another action
pending between the same
parties for the same cause,
or that
(3) the action is barred by a
prior judgment or
(4) barred by the statute of
limitations. (Sec. 1, Rule 9)
Prohibited motion
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 12. Prohibited motions. — The
following motions shall not be allowed:
(a) Motion to dismiss except on the following
grounds:
i. That the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim;
ii. That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same
cause; and
iii. That the cause of action is barred by a Litigious Motions
prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
(b) Motion to hear affirmative defenses;
(c) Motion for reconsideration of the court’s
action on the affirmative defenses;
(d) Motion to suspend proceedings without a
temporary restraining order or injunction
issued by a higher court;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, affidavits or any other papers,
except a motion for extension to file an
answer as provided by Section 11, Rule 11;
and
(f) Motion for postponement intended for
delay, except if it is based on acts of God,
force majeure or physical inability of the
witness to appear and testify. If the motion
is granted based on such exceptions, the
moving party shall be warned that the
presentation of its evidence must still be
terminated on the dates previously agreed
upon.
A motion for postponement, whether written or oral,
shall, at all times, be accompanied by the original
official receipt from the office of the clerk of court
evidencing payment of the postponement fee under
Section 21(b), Rule 141, to be submitted either at the
time of the filing of said motion or not later than the
next hearing date. The clerk of court shall not accept
the motion unless accompanied by the original receipt.
(n)
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1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 4. Non-litigious motions. —
Motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of adverse parties are non-
litigious motions. These motions include:
i. Motion for the issuance of an alias
summons;
ii. Motion for extension to file answer;
iii. Motion for postponement;
iv. Motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution;
v. Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution;
vi. Motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession;
vii. Motion for the issuance of an order
directing the sheriff to execute the final
certificate of sale; and
viii. Other similar motions.
These motions shall not be set for hearing and shall be
resolved by the court within five (5) calendar days
from receipt thereof. (n)
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 5. Litigious motions. — (a) Litigious
motions include:
i. Motion for bill of particulars;
ii. Motion to dismiss;
iii. Motion for new trial;
iv. Motion for reconsideration;
v. Motion for execution pending appeal;
vi. Motion to amend after a responsive
pleading has been filed;
vii. Motion to cancel statutory lien;
viii. Motion for an order to break in or for a writ
of demolition;
ix. Motion for intervention;
x. Motion for judgment on the pleadings;
xi. Motion for summary judgment;
xii. Demurrer to evidence;
xiii. Motion to declare defendant in default;
and
xiv. Other similar motions.
(b) All motions shall be served by personal service,
accredited private courier or registered mail, or
electronic means so as to ensure their receipt by the
other party.
(c) The opposing party shall file his or her opposition
to a litigious motion within five (5) calendar days
from receipt thereof. No other submissions shall be
considered by the court in the resolution of the
motion.
The motion shall be resolved by the court within fifteen
(15) calendar days from its receipt of the opposition
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thereto, or upon expiration of the period to file such
opposition. (n)
Notice of Hearing on Litigious Motions;
Discretionary
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 6. Notice of hearing on litigious
motions; discretionary. — The court may, in the
exercise of its discretion, and if deemed necessary for
its resolution, call a hearing on the motion. The notice
of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing.
(5a)
Proof of Service
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 7. Proof of service necessary. — No
written motion shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof, pursuant to Section
5(b) hereof. (6a)
Motion Day
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
Section 8. Motion day. — Except for
motions requiring immediate action, where the court
decides to conduct hearing on a litigious motion, the
same shall be set on a Friday. (7a)
Dismissal with Prejudice
1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 15
SECTION 13. Dismissal with Prejudice.
— Subject to the right of appeal, an order
granting a motion to dismiss or an affirmative
defense that the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
that the claim or demand set forth in the
plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; or that
the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds, shall bar the reEling of the
same action or claim.
Rule 16
Motion to Dismiss
*provisions either deleted or transposed
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Rule 17
Dismissal of Actions
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 17
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A
complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such
notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent
court an action based on or including the same claim.
O.B. JOVENIR CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS.
MACAMIR REALTY AND CA (2006)
Facts: Respondent Macamir Realty, and spouses Miranda
filed a complaint seeking the annulment of certain
agreements it had with petitioner O.B. Jovenir
Construction and Dev’t Corp (“Jovenir Corp), Oscar
Jovenir, and Gregorio Liongson after it discovered that
Jovenir had misrepresented itself as a legitimate
contractor.
Ten days after the filing of the complaint,
Macamir filed a Motion to Withdraw Compliant, alleging
that its counsel discovered a supposed technical defect
(lack of authority of Spouses Miranda to sue on behalf of
Macamir Corp) in the compliant. Thus, respondent prayed
that they be allowed to withdraw the compliant without
prejudice.
Subsequently, Macamir filed a similar complaint
(2nd Complaint) against the same parties. This time,
however, a Board Resolution authorizing the spouses
Miranda to file a complaint on behalf of Macamir Corp was
attached to the complaint.
Eleven days after the filing of the Motion to
Withdraw and seven days after the filing of the second
complaint, the Makati RTC granted Macamir’s Motion to
Withdraw. Meanwhile, Jovenir Corp filed a motion to
dismiss the 2nd complaint on the grounds of forum-
shopping. Said motion was, however, denied. The court
declared that at the time the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint was filed, none of the defendants had filed any
answer or any responsive pleading. Thus, it was then
within respondents right to cause the dismissal of the
complaint without having to await action of the court on
their motion. This Order was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals
Issue: Does Macamir have to wait for an order from the
court granting its Motion to Withdraw its first complaint
before it can file its second compliant?
Held: No. We find no error on the part of the lower courts
since the denial of the motion to dismiss is wholly in
accord with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure
stated:
Dismissal by the plaintiff An action may be
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dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice
operates as an adjudication upon the merits
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed
in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. A class suit shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court.
Indubitably, the provision ordained the
dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of
right at any time before service of the answer. The
plaintiff was accorded the right to dismiss the complaint
without the necessity of alleging in the notice of dismissal
any ground nor of making any reservation.
In Go v. Cruz, the Court, through Chief Justice
Narvasa, has recognized that where the dismissal of an
action rests exclusively on the will of a plaintiff or
claimant, to prevent which the defending party and even
the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no action
whatever on the part of the court except the acceptance
and recording of the causative document. The facts in that
case are well worth considering. Therein, the notice of
dismissal was filed by the plaintiff on 12 November 1981.
Respondent filed his answer three days earlier, or on 9
November, but plaintiff was served a copy of the answer
by registered mail only on 16 November. Notwithstanding
the fact that the answer was filed with the trial court three
days prior to the filing of the notice of dismissal, the Court
still affirmed the dismissal sought by the plaintiff. The
Court declared that the right of the plaintiff to cause the
dismissal of the complaint by mere notice is lost not by
the filing of the answer with the trial court, but upon the
actual service to the plaintiff of the answer.
The Court further ruled that [plaintiffs] notice
ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action then
pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or
other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was
effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives
[plaintiff] might have had for bringing it about, and was,
as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, without
prejudice, the contrary not being otherwise stated in the
notice and it being the first time the action was being so
dismissed.
It is quite clear that under Section 1, Rule 17 of
the old Rules, the dismissal contemplated therein could
be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of
dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval by
the Court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without
prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. It is due
to these considerations that the petition should be denied.
Evidently, respondents had the right to dismiss
their complaint by mere notice on 13 February 1997,
since as of even date, petitioners had not yet served their
answer on respondents. The Motion to Withdraw
Complaint makes clear respondents desire to withdraw
the complaint without prejudice. That respondents
resorted to a motion to effect what they could have
instead by mere notice may be indicative of a certain
degree of ignorance of procedural rules on the part of
respondents counsel. Yet such error, if it could be called
as such, should hardly be of fatal consequence.
Petitioners posit that the remedy of filing a notice of
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dismissal is not exclusive, respondents having the option
of securing the courts approval to the dismissal. On the
contrary, the trial court has no discretion or option
to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff
under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter
of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the
most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial
court has no choice but to consider the complaint
as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such
dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground.
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 17
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. —
Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him or
her of the plaintiffs motion for dismissal, the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his or her counterclaim in a separate action
unless within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the
motion he or she manifests his or her preference to have
his or her counterclaim resolved in the same action.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.
ANTONIO, JR. VS. MORALES (2007)
Facts: E.M Morales & Associates (“EMMA”) filed a
complaint for a sum of money against Pablo Antonio (the
“petitioners”), to which petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss on two grounds: (a) respondent’s failure to attach
a certificate of non-forum shopping to its complaint; and
(b) respondent’s lack of legal capacity to sure, since it is
a sole proprietorship.
Subsequently, Engr. Morales filed an Amended
Complaint, attaching thereto a certificate of non-forum
shopping. RTC admitted the amended complaint and
denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner, thus,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and eventually a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
remained pending for more than six years.
During the pendency of the Petition for
Certiorari, respondent Morales filed with the RTC a Motion
to Dismiss his complaint. The RTC granted said Motion
and dismissed the case without prejudice. Thereafter,
respondent filed a manifestation with the Court of
Appeals, informing the CA that the case was dismissed
without prejudice.
Meanwhile, Morales filed a new complaint for
the collection of sum of money against petitioner. This
prompted the petitioner to file a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of prescription. Petitioner maintains that from
August 14, 1995, when he received respondents last
letter of demand, to September 23, 2002, when
respondent filed his second complaint, more than seven
years had elapsed; and that the first case, Civil Case No.
95-1796, did not interrupt the running of the period. The
RTC, however, denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss,
prompting the latter to file a petition for certiorari with
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the CA, which eventually denied their petition. Thus,
petitioner appealed to the SC.
Issue: Is petitioner’s cause of action already barred by
prescription?
Held: No, petitioner’s invocation of prescription is
misplaced. We recall that on December 18, 1995,
respondent initially filed with the RTC of Makati City
its first complaint. While it was later dismissed
without prejudice to his own motion, we note that
the dismissal sought was not for the purpose of
voluntarily abandoning his claim. On the contrary,
respondent’s intention was to expedite the enforcement
of his rights. Understandably, he felt frustrated at the
snails pace at which his case was moving. As mentioned
earlier, CA-G.R. SP No. 59309 remained pending before
the Court of Appeals for six (6) long years.
We further observe that respondent acted
swiftly after the dismissal of his case without prejudice by
the Makati RTC. He immediately filed with the Court of
Appeals a manifestation that Civil Case No. 95-1796 was
dismissed by the lower court. But the Court of Appeals
acted on his manifestation only after one year. This delay,
beyond respondents control, in turn further caused delay
in the filing of his new complaint with the Quezon City
RTC. Clearly, there was no inaction or lack of interest on
his part.
The statute of limitations was devised to
operate primarily against those who slept on their rights
and not against those desirous to act but could not do so
for causes beyond their control. Verily, the Court of
Appeals did not err in holding that the RTC, Branch 215,
Quezon City did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
denied petitioners motion to dismiss respondents
complaint and ruled that respondents filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-47835 is not barred by
prescription.
Effect on counterclaim
If a counterclaim has already been pleaded by
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss, and the court grants the said motion,
the dismissal “shall be limited to the complaint.” The
counterclaim is not dismissed, whether it is a compulsory
or permissive counterclaim because the rule makes no
distinction.
The defendant if he so desires may prosecute
his counterclaim either in a separate action or in the same
action. Should he choose to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action, he must notify the court of
his preference within fifteen days from notice of the
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. Should he opt to prosecute
his counterclaim in a separate action, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his
right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint.
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 17
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for
no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the
date of the presentation of his or her evidence in chief on
the complaint, or to prosecute his or her action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
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court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
CRUZ VS. CA (2006)
FACTS: There are four different cases between the
parties, which are involved in the present controversy,
namely: (1st) an unlawful detainer case; (2nd) a Quieting
of Title; (3rd) an injunction case; and (4th) an Annulment
of Title with Damages. The first case was resolved
in favor of petitioner Cruz. As regards the second case, it
was dismissed by the RTC for respondents’ failure to
prosecute. Lastly, the third case was dismissed on the
ground of res judicata.
As regards the fourth case, petitioners
interposed a Motion for Outright Dismissal, which was
granted by the court. As such, respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. The court granted said Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, it reversed its prior order
and reinstated the case. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a
Petition for Review with the CA. Unfortunately, the CA
held that there was no res judicata and thus, dismissed
the Petition. Thereafter, petitioners sought relief before
the SC.
ISSUE: Are all the elements of res judicata present?
HELD: No. As regards the second element of res judicata,
private respondents argue that the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 1600 (for Quieting of Title) was not a dismissal on the
merits. The dismissal of this case, they claim, will not bar
the filing of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2583-02 for
Annulment of Title) because there was neither litigious
consideration of the evidence nor any stipulations
submitted by the parties at the trial. In fact, there was no
pre-trial conference and that after four years of court
inactivity, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Their argument does not hold water. Section 3
of Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If,
for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court's own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court.
The rule enumerates the instances where the
complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff's fault: (1) if
he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his
evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply
with the rules or any order of the court. Once a case is
dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of
an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with
prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise
provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless
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there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is
without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. The order
dismissing Civil Case No. 1600 reads:
For failure of the plaintiffs as well as counsel to
appear on several settings despite due notices,
precisely for the reception of plaintiffs'
evidence, upon motion of the defendant through
Atty. Mark Arcilla, this case is dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
It is clear from the afore-mentioned order that
said case was dismissed, upon petitioners' motion, for
failure of private respondents and their counsel to attend
several scheduled hearings for the presentation of their
evidence. Since the order did not contain a qualification
whether same is with or without prejudice, following
Section 3, it is deemed to be with prejudice and shall have
the effect of an adjudication on the merits. A ruling based
on a motion to dismiss, without any trial on the merits or
formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment
on the merits.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. DE GUZMAN
(2010)
Facts: Respondent Gina de Guzman obtained a
P300,000.00 loan from petitioner, Philippine National
Bank, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land registered in her name. Gina acquired the property
from her father, Francisco de Guzman, through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1978. Gina’s sister,
Rosalia de Guzman, the beneficiary of the family home
standing on the said lot, gave her consent to the
mortgage.
Later, Rosalia filed a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Document, Cancellation of Title,
Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages
against Gina and petitioner, alleging that the purported
sale of the property by Francisco to Gina was fraudulent.
The Complaint was then amended to replace respondent
Intestate Estate of Francisco de Guzman as plaintiff.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the case due
to Rosalia’s failure to comply with the court’s order to pay
the legal fees so that alias summons could be served. No
appeals was taken from this order, thus, the dismissal
became final and executory.
Thereafter, respondent Intestate Estate filed
another Complaint, also for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance,
Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages, against Gina and
petitioner, with essentially the same allegations as the
former Complaint.
On June 1, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of res judicata, alleging that the
Complaint is barred by prior judgment. In an Order, the
RTC denied said motion. The court ruled that, since there
was no determination of the merits of the first case, the
filing of the second Complaint was not barred by res
judicata.
Subsequently, petitioner filed two more motions
to dismiss raising forum-shopping and lack or jurisdiction
as a ground, respectively. Both motions were, however,
denied. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Orders. Eventually the
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case reached the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the second complaint is NOT
barred by res judicata because there was no
determination of the merits of the first case?
Held: No. In any case, we agree with the CAs
conclusion that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss. However, we do not agree that the
judgment of dismissal in the first case was not on
the merits. A ruling on a motion to dismiss, issued
without trial on the merits or formal presentation
of evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits.
Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is explicit
that a dismissal for failure to comply with an order
of the court shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits. In other words, unless the court
states that the dismissal is without prejudice, the
dismissal should be understood as an adjudication
on the merits and is with prejudice.
Nonetheless, bearing in mind the
circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that res
judicata should not be applied as it would not serve the
interest of substantial justice. Proceedings on the case
had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is only fair
that the case be allowed to proceed and be resolved on
the merits. Indeed, we have held that res judicata is to
be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality, particularly in this case
where there was actually no determination of the
substantive issues in the first case and what is at stake is
respondents home.
3A APPAREL CORPORATION VS. METROPOLITAN
BANK AND TRUST CO. (2010)
Facts: Petitioner 3A Apparel Corporation (the
corporation) mortgaged its condominium unit to
respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(MBTC) to secure a loan. For failure to settle its obligation,
MBTC extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, drawing
the corporation, represented by its president Ray Shu, to
file a complaint for petition for annulment of real estate
mortgage, promissory note, foreclosure of sale, and
related documents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig against MBTC and its officers.
After almost two years from the time the
case was scheduled for presentation of the corporation’s
evidence, without it having presented any evidence,
Branch 264 of the Pasig, RTC, upon motion of MBTC,
dismissed the corporation’s complaint for failure to
prosecute.
The corporation’s motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the trial court, it filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, positing that
substantial justice must prevail over mere technicalities.
By Decision of July 18, 2008, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. It held that dismissal on the
ground of failure to prosecute has, citing Section 3 of Rule
17, the effect of an adjudication on the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
Issue: Is dismissal for failure to prosecute an
adjudication on the merits?
Held: Yes, Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is
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indeed clear that a dismissal for failure to prosecute is an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared
by the court. No such declaration was made by the trial
court, hence, its dismissal of the corporations petition
should be challenged by appeal within the reglementary
period.
The invocation of justice and fair play by the
corporation does not impress.
. . . In order to perfect an appeal all that is
required is a pro forma notice of appeal.
Perhaps due to failure to file a notice of appeal
within the remaining two days of the appeal
period, petitioners counsel instead filed the
instant petition. The rules of procedure,
however, do not exist for the convenience of
the litigants. These rules are established to
provide order to and enhance the efficiency of
our judicial system. They are not to be trifled
with lightly or overlooked by mere expedience
of invoking substantial justice.
Indeed, a plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute its
action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch
in order to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same
time, minimize the clogging of court dockets. The
expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of the
plaintiff as the courts.
The corporation’s attempt to attribute part of
the blame to the trial court which cancelled the hearing
on April 15, 2002 when the presiding judge was on official
leave, and that on June 20, 2002 during the semestral
docket inventory of cases, at which times the corporation
claims to have been ready to present evidence does not
impress too. If indeed that were the case, it could have
presented its evidence during the succeeding scheduled
hearings. Yet, it did not. Instead, it caused the
postponement of the subsequent six scheduled hearings
from August 7, 2002 to July 9, 2003 inclusive for
unjustifiable reasons.
Effect on counterclaim
PINGA VS. SANTIAGO (2006)
Facts: Respondent Santiago filed a complaint for
injunction against petitioner Pinga. The complaint alleged
that petitioner and one Saavedra had been unlawfully
entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood
and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut. In
their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
disputed respondent’s ownership over the properties and
claimed that his father had been in possession thereof
since the 1930s.
During the trial of the case, respondent failed to
present his evidence. It appears that on 25 October 2004,
the RTC already ordered the dismissal of the complaint
after respondents counsel had sought the postponement
of the hearing scheduled then. However, the order of
dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by the RTC in
an Order dated 9 June 2005, which took into account the
assurance of respondents counsel that he would give
priority to that case.
At the hearing of 27 July 2005, respondent’s
counsel once again failed to appear, sending in his stead
a representative who sought the postponement of the
hearing. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the motion for
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postponement and moved instead for the dismissal of the
case. The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents
had failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time, in fact not having presented their evidence
yet. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, opting, however, not to seek that their
complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that the
entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed
from presenting evidence ex parte. They cited two cases
which noted the instances in which a counterclaim could
not remain pending for independent adjudication. The
court granted respondent’s motion and dismissed
petitioner’s counterclaim. This prompted petitioner to file
a Motion for Reconsideration, but the court denied the
same. Notably, respondent filed an Opposition to
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration wherein they
argued that compulsory counterclaims cannot be
adjudicated independently of plaintiff’s cause of action,
and a conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries
with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaims.
Issue: Is the dismissal of the complaint due to failure
to prosecute carries with it the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim?
Held: No. We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the
complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily
carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants
to prosecute the counterclaim.
Our core discussion begins with Section 3, Rule
17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If,
for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these Rules
or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in
a separate action. This dismissal shall have
the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the
court.
The express qualification in the provision that
the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiffs fault,
as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim
in the same or separate action. This stands in marked
contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules
of Court which were superseded by the 1997
amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals due to failure
to prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17, to wit:
SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to
appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these rules or any order of
the court, the action may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the courts
own motion. This dismissal shall have the
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effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by court.
Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of
such dismissal due to failure to prosecute on the pending
counterclaims. As a result, there arose what one authority
on remedial law characterized as the nagging question of
whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries with
it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Jurisprudence
construing the previous Rules was hardly silent on the
matter.
Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it
ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section
3, Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the complaint
is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute the counterclaim in the same or separate
action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it
should be on the merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of
the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on
the merits of the counterclaim.
The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3
of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the
counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is
based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on
the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the
counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws, which stand independent of the
complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing
it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment
or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those
defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified,
the amended rules now unequivocally protect such
counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the
dismissal of the complaint.
PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS. DAKILA
TRADING CORPORATION (2007)
Facts: Respondent Dakila entered into a Distribution
Agreement with petitioner Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia
(PEIA), a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Singapore and engaged in the business of
manufacturing, producing, selling or distributing of
laboratory equipment. By virtue of the agreement, PEIA
appointed the Dakila as the sole distributor of its products
in the Philippines. Furthermore, the agreement provides
that Dakila shall order the products of PEIA, which it shall
sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from
Perkin-Elmer Instrument Philippines (PEIP), an affiliate of
PEIA.
On 2 August 1997, PEIA unilaterally terminated
the agreement, prompting respondent to file before the
RTC a Complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages against PEIA and PEIP.
Dakila then filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance
of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize
Respondents General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve
Summons Outside of the Philippines, which the RTC
granted in its Order, dated 27 April 2000., an Alias
Summons, dated 4 September 2000, was issued by the
RTC to PEIA. However, said Alias Summons was served
on 28 September 2000 and received by Perkinelmer
Asia, a Singaporean based sole proprietorship, owned by
the petitioner Perkin Elmer Singapore, Ltd (PSE) and,
allegedly, a separate and distinct entity from PEIA.
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Subsequently, Dakila filed an Ex-Parte motion
to Admit Amended Complaint. In its Amended Complaint,
Dakila claimed that PEIA had become a sole
proprietorship owned by PSE. According to Dakila, a
change in PEIA’s name and juridical status did not detract
from the fact that all its due and outstanding obligations
to 3rd parties were assumed by PSE. Thus, in its amended
complaint, Dakila sought to change the name of PEIA to
PSE.
Thereafter, the RTC admitted respondent’s
amended complaint. This prompted PSE to file a Special
Appearance and Motion to Dismiss respondent’s Amended
Complaint. PSE’s Motion to Dismiss, however, was
denied. As such, Petitioner PSE filed an answer ad
cautelam with compulsory counterclaim. In its
counterclaim, petitioner PSE sought payment of damages
and attorney’s fees by reason of the alleged unfounded
suit filed by respondent Dakila.
Issue: Will the dismissal of the instant case carry with
it the dismissal of petitioner’s counterclaim?
Held: No. Finally, as regards the petitioners
counterclaim, which is purely for damages and attorney’s
fees by reason of the unfounded suit filed by respondent
against it, it has long been settled that the same truly falls
under the classification of compulsory counterclaim and it
must be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, it is
barred. In the case at bar, this Court orders the dismissal
of the Complaint filed by the respondent against the
petitioner because the court a quo failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the latter. Since the
complaint of the respondent was dismissed, what will
happen then to the counterclaim of the petitioner? Does
the dismissal of the complaint carry with it the dismissal
of the counterclaim?
In the cases of Metal Engineering Resources
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and BA
Finance Corporation v. Co., the Court ruled that if the
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main
action of the case and dismisses the same, then the
compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal
controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no
jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the
counterclaim. If we follow the aforesaid pronouncement
of the Court in the cases mentioned above, the
counterclaim of the herein petitioner being compulsory in
nature must also be dismissed together with the
Complaint. However, in the case of Pinga vs. Heirs of
German Santiago, the Court explicitly expressed that:
Similarly, Justice Feria notes that the present
rule reaffirms the right of the defendant to move
for the dismissal of the complaint and to
prosecute his counterclaim, as stated in the
separate opinion [of Justice Regalado in BA
Finance]. Retired Court of Appeals Justice
Hererra pronounces that the amendment to
Section 3, Rule 17 [of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure] settles that
nagging question whether the dismissal of
the complaint carries with it the dismissal
of the counterclaim, and opines that by
reason of the amendments, the rulings in
Metals Engineering, International
Container, and BA Finance may be deemed
abandoned. x x x.
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x x x, when the Court promulgated the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amended
Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines that
were inconsistent with the new rules
incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar
as incidents arising after the effectivity of the
new procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA
Finance, or even the doctrine that a
counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed
along with the complaint, clearly conflicts with
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
abandonment of BA Finance as doctrine extends
as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted
the new Rules of Civil Procedure. If, since then,
abandonment has not been affirmed in
jurisprudence, it is only because no proper case
has arisen that would warrant express
confirmation of the new rule. That opportunity
is here and now, and we thus rule that the
dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the
plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute any pending
counterclaims of whatever nature in the
same or separate action. We confirm that
BA Finance and all previous rulings of the
Court that are inconsistent with this
present holding are now abandoned.
[Emphasis supplied].
It is true that the aforesaid declaration of the
Court refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on dismissal of
the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, it does not also preclude the application of
the same to the instant case just because the dismissal
of respondents Complaint was upon the instance of the
petitioner who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over
its person.
Also in the case of Pinga v. Heirs of German
Santiago, the Court discussed the situation wherein the
very filing of the complaint by the plaintiff against the
defendant caused the violation of the latters rights. As to
whether the dismissal of such a complaint should also
include the dismissal of the counterclaim, the Court
acknowledged that said matter is still debatable, viz:
Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it
bears the same integral characteristics as a
complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action
constituting an act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. The main
difference lies in that the cause of action in the
counterclaim is maintained by the defendant
against the plaintiff, while the converse holds
true with the complaint. Yet, as with a
complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of
action cannot survive.
x x x if the dismissal of the complaint somehow
eliminates the cause(s) of the counterclaim,
then the counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that
hardly is the case, especially as a general rule.
More often than not, the allegations that form
the counterclaim are rooted in an act or
omission of the plaintiff other than the plaintiffs
very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such
acts or omissions imputed to the plaintiff are
often claimed to have occurred prior to the filing
of the complaint itself. The only apparent
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exception to this circumstance is if it is
alleged in the counterclaim that the very
act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint
precisely causes the violation of the
defendants rights. Yet even in such an
instance, it remains debatable whether the
dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is
sufficient to obviate the pending cause of
action maintained by the defendant
against the plaintiff.
Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if
the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the
cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot
survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states
sufficient cause of action then it should stand
independently of and survive the dismissal of the
complaint. Now, having been directly confronted with the
problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by
reason of the unfounded suit may prosper even if the
main complaint had been dismissed, we rule in the
affirmative.
It bears to emphasize that petitioners
counterclaim against respondent is for damages and
attorneys fees arising from the unfounded suit. While
respondents Complaint against petitioner is already
dismissed, petitioner may have very well already incurred
damages and litigation expenses such as attorneys fees
since it was forced to engage legal representation in the
Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the
improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause
of action of petitioners counterclaim is not eliminated by
the mere dismissal of respondent’s complaint.
It may also do well to remember that it is
this Court which mandated that claims for damages and
attorneys fees based on unfounded suit constitute
compulsory counterclaim which must be pleaded in the
same action or, otherwise, it shall be barred. It will then
be iniquitous and the height of injustice to require the
petitioner to make the counterclaim in the present action,
under threat of losing his right to claim the same ever
again in any other court, yet make his right totally
dependent on the fate of the respondents complaint.
If indeed the Court dismisses petitioners
counterclaim solely on the basis of the dismissal of
respondents Complaint, then what remedy is left for the
petitioner? It can be said that he can still file a separate
action to recover the damages and attorneys fees based
on the unfounded suit for he cannot be barred from doing
so since he did file the compulsory counterclaim in the
present action, only that it was dismissed when
respondents Complaint was dismissed. However, this
reasoning is highly flawed and irrational considering that
petitioner, already burdened by the damages and
attorneys fees it may have incurred in the present case,
must again incur more damages and attorneys fees in
pursuing a separate action, when, in the first place, it
should not have been involved in any case at all.
Since petitioners counterclaim is compulsory in
nature and its cause of action survives that of the
dismissal of respondents complaint, then it should be
resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
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Remedy of plaintiff
KO V. PNB (2006)
Facts: Petitioners filed an action for the Annulment of
Mortgage, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, and Annulment
of TCTs and Deed of Sale. The complaint alleged that the
assailed mortgage and foreclosure proceedings were null
and void since the written consent of petitioners, as
beneficiaries of the mortgaged property were not
secured.
During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and
their counsel failed to attend a scheduled trial. Upon
motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that
they have been continuously pursuing negotiations with
respondent bank to purchase back the property and have
gained positive results. Respondent bank countered that
from the time the complaint was filed, a period of three
years had elapsed but petitioners failed to prosecute their
case, showing lack of interest in the early resolution
thereof.
Issue: Is an Appeal under Rule 45 the proper remedy in
elevating a case dismissed due to failure to prosecute?
Held: No. On the procedural aspect, we find that
petitioners erred in filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court instead of filing an
appeal with the Court of Appeals. Section 3, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.
If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint
may be dismissed upon the motion of the defendant
or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.
This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the order of dismissal, petitioners counsel
filed a timely motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the trial court. Considering that an order of dismissal
for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication
on the merits, petitioners counsel should have filed a
notice of appeal with the appellate court within the
reglementary period. Instead of filing a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper recourse was an
ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41,
which provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
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1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 17
Section 4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party complaint. — The provisions of this Rule shall
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party complaint. A voluntary dismissal by the
claimant by notice as in section 1 of this Rule, shall be
made before a responsive pleading or a motion for
summary judgment is served or, if there is none, before
the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
DEFAULT
(RULE 9, SEC. 3)
Nature in general
If the defending party fails to answer within the time
allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading
may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires
the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (Rule 9,
Section 3, par. 1)
When may a defendant be declared in default?
1. Failure to file answer
Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails
to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court
shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice
to the defending party, and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default. Thereupon,
the court shall proceed to render judgment granting
the claimant such relief as his or her pleading may
warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires
the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court. (Rule 9, Section 3, par. 1, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
2. Failure to furnish copy of answer
3. Failure to appear at pre-trial
Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the
plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the
next preceding section (duty of parties and their
counsel to appear at pre-trial) shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the court. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof. (Rule 18, Section 5)
4. Failure to comply with modes of discovery
Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or
managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order
made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to
answer designated questions, or an order under Rule
27 to produce any document or other thing for
inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it
to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other
property or an order made under Rule 28 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination,
the court may make such orders in regard to the
refusal as are just, and among others the following:
…
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(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,
or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party. [Rule 29, Section
3(c)]
When allowed
Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending
party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the
court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice
to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare
the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his or her pleading may warrant, unless the court
in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk
of court. (Rule 9, Section 3, par. 1, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC)
Effects
Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not
take part in the trial. [Rule 9, Section 3 (a), as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC]
Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a
claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others
fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon
the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented. [Rule 9, Section 3 (c)]
GAJUDO V. TRADERS ROYAL BANK (2006)
Facts: Petitioners alleged that petitioner Chua obtained a
loan from respondent in the amount of P75k secured by
a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land, and owned
in common by petitioners. As the loan was not paid,
respondent commenced extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings and the property was sold to respondent for
the sum of P24.9k. Petitioners filed a complaint against
respondent seeking the annulment of the extra-judicial
foreclosure and auction sale of the property, allegedly
because the sale was tainted with irregularity and the bid
price was shockingly or unconscionably low, among
others. Respondent filed its answer with counterclaim,
asserting that the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
property was done in accordance with law and that the
bid price was neither unconscionable, nor shockingly low.
During trial, a big conflagration hit the City Hall
of QC destroying the records of the case. After the records
were reconstituted, it was discovered that the foreclosed
property was sold by respondent to the Ceroferr Realty
Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated
on the certificate of title had already been cancelled.
Petitioners, with leave of court, amended their complaint,
but the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice
for failure to pay additional filing fees.
Petitioners re-filed the complaint with the same
court, impleading as additional defendants the Ceroferr
Realty Corporation, and as additional cause of action, that
the new defendants conspired with respondent in
canceling the notice of lis pendens. Petitioner filed a
motion to set the case for pre-trial, which motion was
denied by the trial court on the ground that respondent
bank has not yet filed its answer. Petitioner filed a motion
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to declare respondent in default, alleging that no answer
has been filed despite the service of summons.
Accordingly, respondent was declared in default and
petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte. A
partial decision was rendered.
Respondent filed a motion to set aside partial
decision by default and admit the Answer with
counterclaim. The court denied said motion. Respondent
appealed the Partial Decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Petitioners challenge the CA Decision for failing to
apply the provisions of Section 3, Rule 9. In essence,
petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments
flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not
the same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in failing to apply the
provisions of Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and in applying instead the rule on
preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133.
Ruling: No. The Petition has no merit. Between the two
rules, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the
application of either one of them. To begin with, Section
3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is
directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer.
According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion
on whether to require the presentation of evidence ex
parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on
the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted.
In particular, the court’s judgment "shall not exceed the
amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor
award unliquidated damages."
As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the
party making allegations has the burden of proving them
by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the parties
must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon
the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
This principle holds true, especially when the latter has
had no opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order.
Regarding judgments by default, it was
explained in Pascua v. Florendo that complainants are not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the
defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can
be granted only after the court has ascertained that the
relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts
proven by the presenting party.
As held in the case of Lim v. Ramolete, the
default or failure of the defendant to answer should not
be interpreted as an admission that the plaintiff’s cause
of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled
to the relief prayed for. Being declared in default does
not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being
heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. A
defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court.
While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he
leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to
it that any judgment against him must be in accordance
with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff’s cause is,
of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not
supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent.
Although the defendant would not be in a position to
object, elementary justice requires that only legal
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evidence should be considered against him. If the
evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a
judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be
justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in
kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.
In sum, while petitioners were allowed to
present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they
were not excused from establishing their claims for
damages by the required quantum of proof under Section
1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may
have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence
does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then,
there is no incompatibility between the two rules.
VLASON ENTERPRISES v. CA (1999)
Facts: Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as the
local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company of
Honduras & Panama, requested permission for its
vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to unload
its cargo and to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) compound in San Fernando, La Union. Despite the
approval of the request, the customs personnel boarded
and seized the vessel on suspicion that it was the
hijacked M/V Silver Med and that its cargo would be
smuggled into the country. While seizure proceedings
were ongoing, La Union was hit by 3 typhoons, which
damaged the vessel. Because of this, Omega entered into
a salvage agreement with respondent Duraproof Services
to secure and repair the vessel at an agreed
consideration.
The District Collector of Customs lifted the
warrant of seizure, but the Customs Commissioner
declined to issue a clearance and instead forfeited the
vessel and its cargo. This prompted Duraproof to enforce
its preferred salvors lien by filing with the RTC a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
actions of the Customs Officers, and impleading PPA and
Med Line Philippines, Inc. as respondents. Duraproof
amended its petition to include other companies involved,
including Vlason Enterprises. In both Petitions, Duraproof
failed to allege anything pertaining to Vlason, or any
prayer for relief against it.
Summonses for the amended Petition were
served. Duraproof moved several times to declare the
respondents it impleaded in default. Out of those
respondents, only the following were declared by RTC in
default: the Singkong Trading Co., Commissioner Mison,
M/V Star Ace and Omega. Duraproof filed an ex parte
Motion to present evidence against the defaulting
respondents, which was granted.
The RTC ruled in favor of Duraproof and ordered
Vlason to pay P3 Million worth of damages. Duraproof
moved for the execution of judgment. The Motion was
granted and a Writ of Execution was issued.
Vlason Enterprises filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it was allegedly not
impleaded as a defendant, served summons or declared
in default, and hence Duraproof may not present evidence
against it in default. The trial court issued a cease and
desist order to restrain the implementing the Writ of
Execution and from levying on the personal property of
the defendants. The order was unheeded.
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Duraproof filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify the cease and desist
orders of the trial court. CA issued a TRO against the RTC
order. The CA rendered the assailed Decision, stating that
the decision of the RTC had become final and executory,
never having been disputed or appealed to a higher court,
and that the lower court may now take appropriate action
on the urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of
execution. Thus, the RTC issued a writ of possession over
petitioner’s barge Lawin.
Issue: Whether or not the default judgment rendered by
the RTC was binding on Vlason.
Ruling: No. Vlason was never declared in default. The
trial court denied Duraproof’s motion to declare all the
defendants in default, but it never acted on the latter’s
subsequent motion to likewise declare Vlason in default.
The RTC declared in default only Atty. Eddie Tamondong,
as well as the other defendants Hon. Salvador Mison, M/V
Star Ace, Omega Sea Transport Co., Inc. of Panama and
Sinkong Trading Co., but despite due notice to them, they
failed to appear. Even Duraproof cannot pinpoint which
trial court order held petitioner in default.
More important, the trial court admitted that it
never declared petitioner in default. There could not have
been any valid default-judgment rendered against it. The
issuance of an order of default is a condition sine qua non
in order that a judgment by default be clothed with
validity.
Furthermore, it is a legal impossibility to declare
a party-defendant to be in default before it was validly
served summons.
Order of default
• When some answer and others default
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading
asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall
try the case against all upon the answers thus filed
and render judgment upon the evidence
presented. [Rule 9, Section 3(c)]
• Extent of relief to be awarded
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment
rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from
that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
[Rule 9, Section 3(d)]
• Where not allowed
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the Solicitor General
or his or her deputized public prosecutor, to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated. [Rule 9,
Section 3(e), as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC]
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Procedure after order of default
Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending
party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the
court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice
to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare
the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his or her pleading may warrant, unless the court
in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk
of court. (Rule 9, Section 3, par. 1, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC)
Remedy from order of default
Motion to set aside
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in
default may at any time after notice thereof and
before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside
the order of default upon proper showing that his or
her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he or she
has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions
as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
[Rule 9, Section 3(b), as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC]
BHAGWAN RAMNANI V. COURT OF APPEALS
(1993)
Facts: The Dizons filed a case for a sum of money against
the spouses Ramnani for their failure to remit the value
of jewelry which they received on a consignment basis.
Josephine Ramnani submitted an answer with
counterclaim stating the fact that it was the Dizons who
owed them money.
The spouses Ramnani did not appear during the
pre-trial; hence they were declared in default.
Consequently, the spouses Dizon presented their
evidence ex parte. The lower court ruled in against the
spouses Ramnani, holding them liable to the spouses
Dizon.
The Ramnanis filed a motion for reconsideration
on the ground that a "personal obligation contracted by
the wife without the consent of the husband (was) being
made enforceable against the spouses' conjugal
partnership despite absence of any allegation and proof
that the same redounded to the benefit of the family. The
motion was denied. Hence, a Petition for Certiorari was
filed with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the trial
court erred in denying the motion to lift order of default
despite a clear showing of a meritorious defense.
The CA denied the petition, stressing that the
writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner’s allegation of
a valid and meritorious defense is a matter that could very
well be ventilated in an ordinary appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not setting aside
the order of default against petitioner Ramnani.
Ruling: No. The remedies available to a defendant who
has been declared in default are:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion,
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under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he
has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before the
same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default
has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
While the first remedy was adopted by the
petitioner, the motion to lift the order of default was
denied for failure to prove that the non-appearance is
excusable. The invocation of the deteriorating health of
defendant Josephine necessitating her trip abroad for
appropriate medical treatment is unavailing and there is
no medical certificate to attest to such illness.
The petitioner insists, however, that he had a
meritorious defense which the trial court should not have
disregarded. A meritorious defense is only one of the two
conditions. A satisfactory showing by the movant of the
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect
is also an indispensable requirement for the setting aside
of a judgment of default or the order of default. In view
of petitioners’ non-compliance with this requirement, the
motion to lift the order of default was properly denied.
Remedies from judgment by default
Before finality
1. Motion for reconsideration or new trial
(Rule 37)
2. Appeal (Rules 40 and 41)
MARTINEZ V. REPUBLIC (2006)
FACTS: Jose R. Martinez filed a petition for the
registration in his name of three (3) parcels of land he
allegedly purchased from his uncle. He claimed
continuous possession of the lots, that the lots had
remained unencumbered, and that they became private
property through prescription.
The OSG, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, opposed the petition. Despite the opposition
filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general
default, even against the Republic of the Philippines. This
ensued when during the hearing, no party appeared
before the Court to oppose Martinez’s petition.
RTC concluded that Martinez and his
predecessors-in-interest had been for over 100 years in
possession characterized as continuous, open, public, and
in the concept of an owner. The RTC thus decreed the
registration of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez.
From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal.
However, after the records had been transmitted to the
CA, the RTC received a letter from the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) stating that only two of the lots sought to
be registered were referred to in the Notice of Hearing
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published in the Official Gazette, and that the third lot was
omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan for
that property. LRA manifested that this lot should not
have been adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction.
This letter was referred by the RTC to the CA for
appropriate action.
The CA reversed the RTC and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for registration. It found the
evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support
the registration of the subject lots. Martinez directly
assailed the CA decision before the SC, claiming that the
OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or
appeal its allowance by the RTC, following the order of
general default.
ISSUE: Whether an order of general default bars the
Republic from interposing an appeal from the trial court’s
subsequent decision.
HELD: No. We hold that a defendant party declared in
default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by
default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision
is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of
a motion to set aside the order of default.
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a
party declared in default had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of
Appeals:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion,
under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has
meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before the
same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may file
a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has
been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored
on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after
that provision’s deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court
did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina
doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted
defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered
against him.
Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful
proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no
anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists,
applying the principle of stare decisis. Jurisprudence
applying the 1997 Rules has continued to acknowledge
the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to appeal as
among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in
this petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
The OSG does not impute error on the part of
RTC in improperly declaring the Republic in default even
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though an opposition had been filed to Martinez’s petition.
The RTC appears to have issued the order of general
default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared
before it on the hearing. But it cannot be denied that the
OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez’s
petition long before the said hearing. It was improper to
declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed
to appear on the day set for the initial healing. Strangely,
the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default
order. It would thus be improper for the Court to make a
pronouncement on the validity of the default order since
the same has not been put into issue.
After finality
1. Petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38)
2. Annulment of judgment (Rule 47)
Is certiorari a proper remedy?
JAO & COMPANY, INC. V. CA (1995)
FACTS: Due to the non-appearance of the petitioner Jao
& Company, Inc., during the hearing on the merits, the
RTC Manila, upon motion of herein private respondent
Top Service, Inc., issued an order dated April 14, 1989
declaring said petitioner in default and allowed evidence
to be presented ex-parte. The petitioner however filed an
answer. On May 26, 1989, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering Jao to pay Top Service the agreed
rentals with 12% interest. A writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by the RTC. By virtue of such decision, Top
Service stated that Jao’s counsel had withdrawn his
appearance in the trial court and left no forwarding
address. No notice of the said order of default and the
decision could be given it. The former contends that the
latter’s remedy was timely appeal, which the latter failed
to perfect.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the trial court,
promulgated on May 26, 1989, became final.
HELD: Yes. Under ordinary circumstances, the proper
remedy of a party wrongly declared in default is either to
appeal from the judgment by default or to file a petition
for relief from judgment, and not certiorari. A default
judgment is an adjudication on the merits and is, thus,
appealable. Since appeal is the proper remedy, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie.
Petitioner contends that it could not be bound
by the questioned Order of April 14, 1989 declaring it in
default and the subsequent Decision of May 20, 1989
because it did not receive copies thereof. Respondents
counter that such non-service was due to petitioner's fault
in not furnishing the trial court with its "forwarding
address" after its counsel withdrew his appearance. This
Court is not in a position to settle this issue of fact — as
indeed the Supreme Court does not decide such
questions.
But it is not disputed that after receipt of the
decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, whatever defects — if indeed there was any — may
have been committed by the trial court in failing to give
constructive notice of its erroneous default order was
cured by petitioner's voluntary filing of the said motion
for reconsideration. Upon denial thereof, petitioner should
have appealed. But instead of doing that, it opted for the
wrong remedy of certiorari.
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INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V.
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (2001)
FACTS: In 1996, the Chairman of the Technical Panel for
Engineering, Architecture, and Maritime Education of
CHED, received a letter from Douglas Macias, Chairman
of the Board of Aeronautical Engineering, PRC inquiring
whether petitioner Indiana Aerospace University had
already acquired university status in view of their
representation in the advertisement in the Manila Bulletin.
After investigation, it was found that there was
a violation committed by petitioner when it used the term
“university” when it had not yet complied with the basic
requirement of being a university as prescribed in CHED
Memorandum. It was affirmed that petitioner (registered
as Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc.) had not amended
its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to a
“university.” CHED ordered petitioner to desist from using
the word “university.” Petitioner through its chairman and
founder appealed the Order of CHED averring that the
school will suffer damage if it will not be allowed to use
the word “university” in its school name.
Prior to the court decision granting the Cease
and Desist Order filed by CHED, petitioner filed Complaint
for Damages before the Court. Respondent CHED then
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for damages.
Petitioner filed Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The
trial court denied respondent CHED’s motion to dismiss
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
petitioner. The trial court also directed CHED to file its
Answer to the decision within 15 days from the receipt of
the Court Order – which was August 15, 1998. On
September 22, 1998, petitioner filed Motion to Declare
Respondent in Default pursuant to Section 9, Section 3.
On the same day, respondent CHED filed for Motion for
Extension of Time to File its Answer until November 18,
1998 and submitted its Answer on November 17, 1998.
On November 11, petitioner filed its Opposition to the
Motion for Extension of Time to File respondent’s Answer.
The trial court rendered its Decision and granted
petitioner’s motion to declare respondent CHED in
Default.
Respondent CHED consequently filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari arguing that the RTC had
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
respondent CHED in default despite its Filing of an
Answer. The CA ruled that respondent CHED should not
have been declared in default, because its answer had
been filed long before the RTC ruled upon petitioner’s
Motion to declare respondent in default. Thus,
respondent had not obstinately refused to file an Answer;
on the contrary, its failure to do so on time was due to
excusable negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari was the proper remedy
to assail the order declaring CHED in default.
HELD: The SC agreed with respondent CHED that
certiorari was the only plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, because the default
Order had improvidently been issued.
The remedies available to a defendant declared
in default are as follows:
(1) a motion to set aside the order of default under
Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the
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default was discovered before judgment could be
rendered;
(2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule
37, if the default was discovered after judgment but
while appeal is still available;
(3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment has
become final and executory; and
(4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1,
Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been resorted to.
These remedies, however, are available only to
a defendant who has been validly declared in
default. Such defendant irreparably loses the right to
participate in the trial. On the other hand, a defendant
improvidently declared in default may retain and exercise
such right after the order of default and the subsequent
judgment by default are annulled, and the case remanded
to the court of origin. The former is limited to the remedy
set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 of the pre
1997 Rules of Court, and can therefore contest only the
judgment by default on the designated ground that it is
contrary to evidence or law. The latter, however, has the
following options: to resort to this same remedy; to
interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification
of the order of default, even before the promulgation of a
judgment by default; or in the event that judgment has
been rendered, to have such order and judgment declared
void.
In prohibiting appeals from interlocutory orders,
the law does not intend to accord executory force to such
writs, particularly when the effect would be to cause
irreparable damage. If in the course of trial, a judge
proceeds without or in excess of jurisdiction, this rule
prohibiting an appeal does not leave the aggrieved party
without any remedy. In a case like this, a special civil
action of certiorari is the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.
Hence, a petition for certiorari is available to
respondent CHED to assail the judgment by default on the
ground that it is intrinsically void for having been
rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order of default.
Rule 18
Pre-Trial
Nature and purpose
Pre-trial is a procedural device held prior to the trial for
the court to consider the following purposes:
1. The possibility of amicable settlement or of a
submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
2. The simplification of issues;
3. The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
The process of securing admissions,
whether of facts or evidence, is essentially
voluntary. When the parties are unable to
arrive at a stipulation of agreed facts, the
court must close the pre-trial and proceed
with the trial of the case (Filioil Marketing
Corp. vs. Dy Pac & Co., G.R. No. 296636,
30 September 1982)
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4. The limitation of the number and identification
of witnesses, and the setting of trial dates;
5. The advisability of a preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner;
6. The propriety of rendering judgment on the
pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist;
7. The requirement for the parties to:
a. Mark their respective evidence if not
yet marked in the judicial affidavits of
their witnesses;
b. Examine and make comparisons of the
adverse parties’ evidence vis-à-vis the
copies to be marked;
c. Manifest for the record stipulations
regarding the faithfulness of the
reproductions and the genuineness
and due execution of the adverse
parties’ evidence;
d. Reserve evidence not available at the
pre-trial, but only in the following
manner: (i) for testimonial evidence,
by giving the name or position and the
nature of the testimony of the
proposed witness; for documentary
evidence and other object evidence,
by giving a particular description of
the evidence;
No reservation shall be allowed if not made
in the manner described above.
8. Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action. (Sec. 2, Rule 18, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
The failure without just cause of a party and counsel to
appear during pre-trial, despite notice, shall result in a
waiver of any objections to the faithfulness of the
reproductions marked, or their genuineness or due
execution.
The failure without just cause of a party and/or counsel
to bring the evidence required shall be deemed a waiver
of the presentation of such evidence.
The branch clerk of court shall prepare the minutes of the
pre-trial, which shall have the following format: (see
prescribed form provided under A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Note: Pre-trial is mandatory in civil cases. It should
be terminated promptly.
When
After the last responsive pleading has been
served and filed, the branch clerk of court shall issue,
within five (5) calendar days from filing, a notice of pre-
trial which shall be set not later than sixty (60) calendar
days from the filing of the last responsive pleading. (Sec.
1, Rule 18, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
The motion is to be filed within five (5) days
after the last pleading joining the issues has been served
and filed. (Administrative Circular No. 3-99,January 15,
1999)
The “last pleading” need not to be literally
construed as one having been served and field. For
purposes of pre-trial, the expiration of the period for filing
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of the last pleading is sufficient. (Sarmiento vs. Juan, G.R.
No. 56605, 28 January 1983)
LCK INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. PLANTERS DEV’T. BANK
(2007)
FACTS: Petitioner LCK is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing as such under Philippine laws.
Respondent bank is a banking institution duly authorized
to engage in banking business under Philippine laws.
On 1 September 1995, petitioner LCK obtained
a loan from the respondent bank in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 as evidenced by two promissory notes. As
a security for the loan obligation, petitioners-spouses
Chiko and Elizabeth Lim executed a Real Estate Mortgage
over a parcel of land at Quezon City (Quezon City
property). Later on, to secure the same obligation,
another Real Estate Mortgage was executed over another
parcel of land located at Baguio City (Baguio City
property).
Subsequently, petitioner LCK incurred default in
its payment; thus, making the obligation due and
demandable. Several demands were thereafter made by
the respondent bank to no avail. On 13 October 1997, a
final letter-demand was sent by respondent bank to
petitioner LCK asking for the payment of its obligation in
the amount of P2,962,500.00. Such final demand
notwithstanding, petitioner LCK failed or refused to pay
its obligation.
Consequently, respondent bank caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the Baguio City property which
was sold at the public auction. Since the proceeds of the
foreclosed Baguio City property were not enough to
satisfy the entire loan obligation which amounted to
P2,962,500.00, respondent bank further caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the Quezon City property.
Prior to the auction sale of the Quezon City
property on 18 March 1998, petitioners, on 12 March
1998, filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, an
action for Annulment of the Foreclosure of Mortgage and
Auction Sale of the Quezon City property with Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction and with Damages.
Thereafter, the RTC conducted a pre-trial
conference. In the Pre-Trial Order dated 8 September
2000, the parties made admissions and stipulations.
On 18 April 2001, the parties agreed to submit
the case for the decision of the RTC based on the
stipulations and admissions made at the pre-trial
conference.
HELD: Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important
procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century, pre-trial is a device intended to clarify
and limit the basic issues between the parties. It thus
paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of
the case. Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:
a. The possibility of an amicable
settlement or of a submission to
alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
b. The simplification of the issues;
c. The necessity or desirability of
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amendments to the pleadings; therefrom by necessary implication to be integral parts of

the pre-trial order as much as those that are expressly
d. The possibility of obtaining stipulations or stipulated, the general rule will not apply.
admissions of facts and of documents to
avoid unnecessary proof; The case at bar falls under this particular
exception. Upon scrupulous examination of the Pre-Trial
e. The limitation of the number of witnesses; Order dated 8 September 2000, it can be deduced that
the parties stipulated that the remaining sum of petitioner
f. The advisability of a preliminary reference LCKs obligation as of 13 October 1997 was
of issues to a commissioner; P2,962,500.00. In the same Pre-Trial Order, the parties
likewise stipulated that the Baguio City property was sold
g. The propriety of rendering judgment on the at the public auction for P2,625,000.00 and the Quezon
pleadings, or summary judgment, or of City property for P2,231,416.67. On both occasions,
dismissing the action should a valid ground respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder. By
therefor be found to exist; applying simple mathematical operation, the mortgaged
properties were purchased by the respondent at the
h. The advisability or necessity of suspending public auctions for P4,856,416.67; thus, after deducting
the proceedings; and therefrom the balance of petitioner LCKs obligation in the
amount of P2,962,500.00, an excess in the sum of
i. Such other matters as may aid in the P1,893,916.67 remains.
prompt disposition of the action.
Requirements for appearance
The purpose of entering into a stipulation of
facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the
It shall be the duty of both parties and their
court as well of the costs of proving facts which will not
counsels to appear at the pre-trial, court-annexed
be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
mediation, and judicial dispute resolution, if necessary.
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Its main objective is to
The non-appearance of a party may be excused
simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally
only:
dispense with it.
1. For acts of God;
The parties themselves or their
2. Force majeure; or
representative with written authority from them are
3. Duly substantiated physical disability.
required to attend in order to arrive at a possible amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
must be fully authorized in writing to enter into an
facts and documents. All of the matters taken up during
amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
the pre-trial, including the stipulation of facts and the
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions made by the parties, are required to be
admissions of facts and documents. (Sec. 4, Rule 18, as
recorded in a pre-trial order.
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
In the Pre-Trial Order dated 8 September
2000, the RTC defined the issues as follows: (1) whether
or not the petition was filed with the Office of the Clerk of
Procedure
Court; (2) whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage by defendant bank was made in
It shall be the duty of the the branch clerk of
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135; and (3)
court, after the last responsive pleading has been served
whether or not the parties are entitled to their respective
and filed, to issue, within five (5) calendar days from
claims for attorneys fees and damages.
filing, a notice of pre-trial which shall be set not later than
sixty (60) calendar days from the filing of the last
Based on the admissions and stipulations
responsive pleading. (Sec. 1, Rule 18, as amended by
during the pre-trial conference and the issues defined by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
the court a quo as embodied in the Pre-Trial Order, the
parties agreed to submit the case for the resolution of the
Notice
RTC. Both petitioners and respondent also manifested
that they would forego their respective claims for
The notice of pre-trial shall include the dates
attorneys fees, leaving solely the issue of the validity of
respectively set for:
the foreclosure of mortgage and auction sale for the RTCs
disposition. However, in petitioners Memorandum filed
a. Pre-trial;
after the case was submitted for resolution, petitioners
b. Court-Annexed Mediation; and
raised the question of overpayment, a new issue that was
c. Judicial Dispute Resolution.
included neither in their Complaint nor in the issues
defined in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the RTC.
The notice of pre-trial shall be served on
counsel, or on the party if he or she has no counsel. The
Generally, pre-trial is primarily intended to
counsel served with such notice is charged with the duty
make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition
of notifying the party represented by him or her. (Sec. 3,
of a case are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the element
Rule 18, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at the pre-
trial conference all issues of law and fact they intend to
raise at the trial. However, in cases in which the issue Pre-trial brief required
may involve privileged or impeaching matters, or if the
issues are impliedly included therein or may be inferable

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The parties shall file with the court and serve on
the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their
receipt thereof at least three (3) calendar days before the
date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs, which
shall contain, among others:
1. A concise statement of the case and the reliefs
prayed for;
2. A summary of admitted facts and proposed
stipulation of facts;
3. The main factual and legal issues to be tried or
resolved;
4. The propriety of referral of factual issues to
commissioners;
5. The documents or other object evidence to be
marked, stating the purpose thereof;
6. The names of the witnesses, and the summary of
their respective testimonies; and
7. A brief statement of points of law and citation of
authorities.
Failure to file pre-trial brief shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. (Sec. 6, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
No evidence shall be allowed to be presented
and offered during the trial in support of party’s evidence–
in-chief other that those that had been earlier identified
and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by
the court for good cause shown. (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
July 13, 2004)
Record or order of pre-trial
Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall
issue an order within ten (10) calendar days, which shall
recite in detail the matters taken up.
The order shall include the following:
1. An enumeration of the admitted facts;
2. The minutes of the pre-trial conference;
3. The legal andfactual issue/s to be tried;
4. The applicable law, rules, and
jurisprudence;
5. The evidence marked;
6. The specific trial dates for continuous trial,
which shall be within the period provided
by the Rules;
7. The case flowchart to be determined by the
court, whichal shall contain the different
stages of the proceedings up to the
promulgation of the decision and the use of
time framers for each state in setting the
trial dates;
8. A statement that the one-day examination
of witness rule and most important witness
rule under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
(Guidelines for Pre-Trial) shall be strictly
followed; and
9. A statement that the court shall render
judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment, as the case may be.
The direct testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff shall be
in the form of judicial affidavits. After the identification of
such affidavits, cross-examination shall proceed
immediately.
Postponement of presentation of the parties’ witnesses at
a scheduled date is prohibited, except if it is based on acts
of God, force majeure or duly substantiated physical
inability of the witness to appear and testify. The party
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who caused the postponement is warned that the
presentation of its evidence must still be terminated
within the remaining dates previously agreed upon.
Should the opposing party fail to appear without valid
cause stated in the next preceding paragraph, the
presentation of the scheduled witness will proceed with
the absent party being deemed to have waived the right
to interpose objection and conduct cross-examination.
The contents of the pre-trial order shall control he
subsequent proceedings, unless modified before trial to
prevent manifest injustice. (Sec. 6, Rule 18, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Should the action proceed to trial, the pre-trial order:
1. Defines and limits the issues to be tried;
and
2. Controls the subsequent course of the
action except if it is modified before trial to
prevent manifest injustice.
The contents of the pre-trial order shall control the
subsequent course of the action, unless:
1. Modified before trial to prevent manifest
injustice (Sec. 7, Rule 18, as amended).
2. Issues that are impliedly included among
those listed or that may be inferable from
those listed by necessary implication which
are as much integral parts of the pre-tral
order as those expressly listed (Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation vs. Amalgamated Management
and Development Corporation, G.R. No.
177729, 28 September 2011).
A party is deemed to have waived the right to
invoke stipulations in the pre-trial order if he failed to
object the introduction of evidence outside of the pre-trial
order, as well as in cross-examining the witness in regard
to said evidence.
Effect of failure to appear
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.
When duly notified, the failure of the plaintiff and counsel
to appear without valid cause when so required, pursuant
to the next preceding Section, shall be cause for dismissal
of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part
of the defendant and counsel shall be cause to allow the
plaintiff to present his or her evidence ex parte within ten
(10) calendar days from termination of the pre-trial, and
the court to render judgment on the basis of the evidence
offered. (Sec. 5, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
CALALANG VS. CA (1993)
Facts: On April 29, 1980, respondent Filipinas
Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for collection of a
sum of money against petitioner Conrado Calalang and 3
other defendants namely, Hugo M. Arca, Rio Arturo
Salceda and the Acropolis Trading Corporation with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District,
Branch 36, Makati under Judge Segundo M. Zosa.
Petitioner, after having been served with
summons on May 19, 1980, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
June 2, 1980. The other summoned defendant, Hugo M.
Arca, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on June 5, 1980.
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The two other defendants namely, the Acropolis Trading
Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda were also summoned
but only a clerk-employee of the Acropolis Trading
Corporation received the summons while Arturo R.
Salceda was no longer residing at his given address.
On November 16, 1987, the trial court issued an
Order setting the
pre-trial of the case for January 7, 1988
at 8:30 a.m.
At the pre-trial conference, respondent bank's
counsel arrived 15 minutes late or at 8:45 a.m.. However,
the case had already been dismissed. Thus, in the Order
of January 7, 1988, the court declared:
For failure of plaintiff's counsel to appear
inspite of notice and considering that this
case has been pending for seven (7) years,
without plaintiff having taken positive steps
to prosecute the same, it is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17,
Rules of Court. Defendants' counterclaim is
likewise dismissed.
On January 12, 1988, counsel for the
respondent bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
order of dismissal citing as reason for his late arrival "the
unusually heavy traffic he encountered along Kamias
Road in Quezon City, which was caused by a stalled
jeepney along the main thoroughfare." The motion was
denied on January 26, 1988.
Ruling: The pre-trial conference scheduled for
January 8, 1987 was not premature. A pre-trial cannot
validly be held until the last pleading has been filed, which
last pleading may be the plaintiff's reply, except where
the period to file the last pleading has lapsed. 15 The
period to appear and file the necessary pleading having
expired on the Acropolis Trading Corporation, the lower
court can direct that a pre-trial conference be held among
the answering defendants. However, though it is within
the discretion of the trial court to declare a party non-
suited for non-appearance in the pre-trial conference,
such discretion must not be abused. The precipitate haste
of the lower court in declaring the respondent bank non-
suited was uncalled for and deserved a second look.
Considering the fact that the counsel for the
plaintiff/respondent bank did arrive for the pre-trial
conference, though a bit late and that counsel for the
defendant was himself also late, the trial court should
have called the case again. An admonition to both
counsels to be more prompt in appearing before the Court
as scheduled would have sufficed, instead of having
dismissed the complaint outright.
Unless a party's conduct is so negligent,
irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide
substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the
courts should consi
der lesser sanctions which would still amount
into achieving the desired end.
To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay
must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and
dilatory resulting in trifling of judicial processes.
On plaintiff
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.
If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his or her
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his or
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her action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or
her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Rule 17,
Sec. 3, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
SPOUSES CORPUZ VS. CITIBANK (2009)
FACTS: Azucena Corpuz (Azucena) was a cardholder of
Citibank Mastercard No. 5423-3925-5788-2007 and
Citibank VISA Card No. 4539-7105-2572-2001 both
issued by Citibank, N.A. (Citibank). Each card had a credit
limit of P40,000.00. In view of her then impending official
business trip to Europe, Azucena paid in full on December
7, 1998 her monthly chargeson both credit cards via
checks and also made advance check payments of
P20,000.00 on December 8, 1998 for her VISA Card, and
another P20,000.00 for her Mastercard on December 14,
1998, to cover future transactions.
While in Italy on December 9, 1998, Azucena
dined at a restaurant. To settle her bill of 46,000 liras,
she presented her VISA Card, but to her surprise and
embarrassment, the restaurant did not honor it. She then
brought out her Mastercard which the restaurant
honored. On even date, Azucena incurred a bill of 378,000
liras at a shop which she intended to charge to her credit
cards. This time, both her VISA and Mastercard were not
honored, drawing her to pay the bill in cash.
Informed of the incidents via overseas
telephone calls to Manila, Azucenas husband Renato
Corpuz (Renato) inquired why his wifes credit cards were
not honored, to which Citibank explained that her check-
payments had not yet been cleared at the time.
Upon her return to the country, Azucena
wrote Citibank on January 13, 1999 informing it that her
credit cards had not been honored and demanding the
refund of her overseas call expenses amounting to
132,000 liras or P3,175.00 at the time. Citibank did not
respond to the letter, however, drawing Azucena to write
Citibank for the cancellation of the cards].
Citibank still sent billing statements to
Azucena, however, charging her interest charges and late
payment penalties. Only after Azucenas counsel informed
Citibank of imminent legal remedieson her part did
Citibank indulge Azucena with a written explanation why
her credit cards were not honored in Italy.
Azucena and Renato (hereafter the spouses)
later filed on November 12, 1999 a complaint for damages
against Citibank at the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
City.
After an exchange of pleadings ─ reply,
rejoinder and sur-rejoinder ─ by the parties, and the
issues having been joined, the trial court set the case for
pre-trial conferenceon May 5, 2003 during which the
spouses and their counsel failed to appear, despite notice.
On Citibanks counsels motion, the trial court, by Orderof
even date, dismissed the spouses Complaint and directed
Citibank to present evidence on its Compulsory
Counterclaim.
The spouses moved for the reconsideration
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of the trial courts May 5, 2003 Order, explaining that their
failure to attend the pre-trial conference was due to the
negligenceof their counsel who failed to inform
[them]
about [the pre-trial] and include the same in his
calendar because . . . the pre-trial was still far away. The
spouses motion for reconsideration was denied by Order
of September 17, 2003
HELD: Section 5of Rule 18 provides that the dismissal of
an action due to the plaintiffs failure to appear at the pre-
trial shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. In this case, the trial court deemed the
plaintiffs-herein spouses as non-suited and ordered the
dismissal of their Complaint. As the dismissal was a final
order, the proper remedy was to file an ordinary appeal
and not a petition for certiorari. The spouses petition for
certiorari was thus properly dismissed by the appellate
court.
Procedural infirmities aside, this Court took
a considered look at the spouses excuse to justify their
non-appearance at the pre-trial but found nothing
exceptional to warrant a reversal of the lower courts
disposition thereof.
Counsel for the spouses admit having failed
to inform his clients of the scheduled pre-trial because he
forgot to note the same in his calendar and eventually
forgot about it due to heavy workload. The spouses
eventually admitted too having received the notice of pre-
trial. Azucena, who is a lawyer herself, advanced the
reason that she forgot about the scheduled pre-trial owing
to her then forthcoming retirement at the Office of the
Solicitor General to thus press her to accomplish her
assigned work including winding up all administrative
matters in the office prior to her leaving.
While Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court allows as an exception a valid cause for the non-
appearance of a party at the pre-trial, the instances cited
by the spouses and their counsel hardly constitute
compelling exigencies or situations which warrant
occasional flexibility of litigation rules.
On defendant, compare with default
If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default.
CITIBANK, N.A. VS. CHUA (1993)
Facts: On September 4 of 1985, he (private respondent
Crescencio Velez) deposited his unfunded personal checks
with his current account with the petitioner. But prior to
depositing said checks, he would present his personal
checks to a bank officer asking the latter to have his
personal checks immediately credited as if it were a cash
deposit and at the same time assuring the bank officer
that his personal checks were fully funded. Having already
gained the trust and confidence of the officers of the bank
because of his past transactions, the bank's officer would
always accommodate his request. After his requests are
granted which is done by way of the bank officer affixing
his signature on the personal checks, private respondent
Cresencio Velez would then deposit his priorly approved
personal checks to his current account and at the same
time withdraw sums of money from said current account
by way of petitioner bank's manager's check. Private
respondent would then deposit petitioner bank's
manager's check to his various current accounts in other
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commercial banks to cover his previously deposited
unfunded personal checks with petitioner bank. Naturally,
petitioner bank and its officers never discovered that his
personal check deposits were unfunded. On the contrary,
it gave the petitioner bank the false impression that
private respondent's construction business was doing
very well and that he was one big client who could be
trusted. This deceptive and criminal scheme he did every
banking day without fail from September 4, 1985 up to
March 11, 1986. The amounts that he was depositing and
withdrawing during this period (September 4, 1985 to
March 11, 1986) progressively became bigger. It started
at P46,000.00 on September 4, 1985 and on March 11,
1986 the amount of deposit and withdrawal already
reached over P3,000,000.00. At this point in time (March
11, 1986), the private respondent Cresencio Velez
presumably already feeling that sooner or later he would
be caught and that he already wanted to cash in on his
evil scheme, decided to run away with petitioner's money.
On March 11, 1986, he deposited various unfunded
personal checks totalling P3,095,000.00 and requested a
bank officer that the same be credited as cash and after
securing the approval of said bank officer, deposited his
various personal checks in the amount of P3,095,000.00
with his current account and at the same time withdrew
the sum of P3,244,000.00 in the form of petitioner's
manager's check. Instead of using the proceeds of his
withdrawals to cover his unfunded personal checks, he
ran away with petitioner bank's money. Thus, private
respondent Cresencio Velez's personal checks deposited
with petitioner bank on March 11, 1986 in the total
aggregate amount of P3,095,000.00 bounced. The checks
bounced after said personal checks were made the
substantial basis of his withdrawing the sum of
P3,244,000.00 from his current account with petitioner
bank."
Subsequently, on August 19, 1986, petitioner
bank filed a criminal complaint against private
respondents for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) and estafa (six counts) under
Article 315 par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On April
28, 1988, the investigating fiscal recommended the filing
of an information against private respondents for
violations of the mentioned laws.
On June 13, 1989, petitioner bank submitted its
answer to the complaint filed by private respondents. In
the Order dated February 20, 1990, the case was set for
pre-trial on March 30, 1990 and petitioner bank was
directed to submit its pre-trial brief at least 3 days before
the pre-trial conference. Petitioner bank only filed its pre-
trial brief on March 30, 1990.
On March 30, 1990, the date of the pre-trial
conference, counsel for petitioner bank appeared,
presenting a special power of attorney executed by
Citibank officer Florencia Tarriela in favor of petitioner
bank's counsel, the J.P. Garcia & Associates, to represent
and bind petitioner bank at the pre-trial conference of the
case at bar.
Inspite of this special power of attorney, counsel
for private respondents orally moved to declare petitioner
bank as in default on the ground that the special power
of attorney was not executed by the Board of Directors of
Citibank. Petitioner bank was then required to file a
written opposition to this oral motion to declare it as in
default. In said opposition petitioner bank attached
another special power of attorney made by William W.
Ferguson, Vice President and highest ranking officer of
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ESGUERRA NOTES
Citibank, Philippines, constituting and appointing the J.P.
Garcia & Associates to represent and bind the BANK at
the pre-trial conference and/or trial of the case of
"Cresencio Velez, et al. vs. Citibank, N.A.". In an Order
dated April 23, 1990, respondent judge denied private
respondents' oral motion to declare petitioner bank as in
default and set the continuation of the pre-trial
conference for May 2, 1990.
On the scheduled pre-trial conference, private
respondents reiterated, by way of asking for
reconsideration, their oral motion to declare petitioner
bank as in default for its failure to appear through an
authorized agent and that the documents presented are
not in accordance with the requirements of the law.
On August 15, 1990, respondent judge issued
an order declaring petitioner bank as in default.
HELD: We reiterate the previous admonitions of this
Court against "precipitate orders of default as these
have the effect of denying the litigant the chance to be
heard. While there are instances, to be sure, when a
party may be properly defaulted, these should be the
exceptions rather than the rule and should be allowed
only in clear cases of an obstinate refusal or inordinate
neglect to comply with the orders of the court. Absent
such a showing, the party must be given every
reasonable opportunity to present his side and to refute
the evidence of the adverse party in deference to due
process of law".
Considering further that petitioner bank has a
meritorious defense and that the amount in contest is
substantial, the litigants should be allowed to settle their
claims on the arena of the court based on a trial on the
merits rather than on mere technicalities.
New provisions under A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC
Court-Annexed Mediation
After the pre-trial, and after issues are joined, the court
shall refer the parties for mandatory court-annexed
mediation.
The period for court-annexed mediation shall not exceed
thirty (30) calendar days without further extension. (Rule
18, Section 8)
Judicial Dispute Resolution
Only if the judge of the court to which the case was
originally raffled is convinced that settlement is still
possible, the case may be referred to another court for
judicial dispute resolution. The judicial dispute resolution
shall be conducted within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of failure oof the
court-annexed mediation.
If judicial dispute resolution fails, trial before the original
court shall proceed on the dates agreed upon.
All proceedings during the court-annexed mediation and
the judicial dispuite resolution sgall be confidential. (Rule
18, Section 9)
Judgment After Pre-Trial
Should there be no more controverted facts, or no more
genuine issue as to any material fact, or an absence of
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any issue, or should the answer fail to tender an issue,
the court shall, without prejudice to a party moving for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 34 or summary
judgment under Rule 35, motu proprio include in the pre-
trial order that the case be submitted for summary
judgment or judgment on the pleadings, without need of
position papers or memoranda. In such cases, judgment
shall be rendered within ninety (90) calendar days from
termination of the pre-trial.
The order of the court to submit the case for judgment
pursuant o this Rule shall not be subject to any appeal
or certiorari. (Rule 18, Section 9)
Rule 20
Calendar of Cases
Calendar (Rule 20, Sec. 1)
• The clerk of court, under the direct supervision
of the judge, shall keep a calendar of cases for
pre-trial, for trial, those whose trials were
adjourned or postponed, and those with
motions to set for hearing.
Preferences (Rule 20, Sec. 1)
• Preference shall be given to:
o habeas corpus cases;
o election cases;
o special civil actions; and
o those so required by law.
Assignment of cases (Rule20, Sec. 2)
• The assignment of cases to the different
branches of a court shall be done exclusively
by raffle.
• The assignment shall be done in open session
of which adequate notice shall be given so as
to afford interested parties the opportunity to
be present.
Rule 22
Computation of Time
How to compute time (Rule 22, Section 1)
• In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act or event from which the designated
period of time begins to run is to be excluded
and the date of performance included.
• If the last day of the period, as thus computed,
falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday
in the place where the court sits, the time shall
not run until the next working day.
Effect of interruption (Rule 22, Section 2)
• Should an act be done which effectively
interrupts the running of the period, the
allowable period after such interruption shall
start to run on the day after notice of the
cessation of the cause thereof.
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• The day of the act that caused the interruption
shall be excluded in the computation of the
period.
Rule 30
Trial
Schedule of Trial (Rule 30, Section 1, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
• The parties shall strictly observe the scheduled
hearings as agreed upon and set forth in the
pre-trial order.
(a) The schedule of the trial dates, for both plaintiff
and defendant, shall be continuous and within
the following periods:
i. The initial presentation of plaintiff’s
evidence shall be set not later than thirty
(30) calendar days after the termination of
the pre-trial conference. Plaintiff shall be
allowed to present its evidence within a
periof of three (3) months or ninety (90)
calendar days which shall incude the date
of the judicial dispte resolution, if
necessary;
ii. The initial presentation of defendant’s
evidence shall be set not later than thirty
(30) calendar days after the court’s ruling
on plaintiff’s formal offer of evidence. The
defendant shall be allowed to present its
evidence within a periof of three (3)
months or ninety (90) calendar days;
iii. The period for the presentation of evidence
on the third (fourth, etc.)-party claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim shall be
determined by the court, the total of which
shall in no case exceed ninety (90)
calendar days; and
iv. If deemed necessary, the court shall set
the presentation of the parties’ respective
rebuttal evidence, which shall be
completed within a period of thirty (30)
calendar days.
(b) The trial dates may be shortened depending on
the number of witnesses to be presented,
provided that the presentation of evidence of all
parties shall be terminated within a period of ten
(10) months or three hundred (300) calendar
days. If there are no third (fourth, etc.)-party
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim, the
presentation of evidence shall be terminated
within a period of six (6) months, or one
huindred eighty (180) calendar days.
(c) The court shall decide and serve copies of its
decision to the parties within a period not
exceeding ninety (90) calendar days from the
submission of the case for resolution, with our
without memoranda.
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Adjournments and postponements (Rule 30,
Section 2, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
• A court may adjourn a trial from day to day, and
to any stated time, as the expeditious and
convenient transaction of business may require,
but shall have no power to adjourn a trial for a
longer period than one month for each
adjournment nor more than three months in all,
except when authorized in writing by the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court.
• The party who caused the postponement is
warned that the presentation of its evidence
must still be terminated on the remaining dates
previously agreed upon.
Illness of party or counsel (Rule 30, Section 3, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
• A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of
illness of a party or counsel may be granted if:
a) it appears upon affidavit or sworn
certification that the presence of such
party or counsel at the trial is
indispensable; and
b) that the character of his or her illness
is such as to render his or her non-
attendance excusable.
Hearing days and calendar call (Rule 30, Section 4,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Trial shall be held from Monday to Thursday, and courts
shall call cases at exactly 8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.,
pursuant to Administrative Circular 3-99. Hearing on
motions shall be held on Fridays, pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 15.
All courts shall ensure the posting of their court calendars
outside their courtrooms at least one (1) day before the
scheduled hearings, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 250-
2015.
Subpoena (Rule 21)
• Subpoena is a process directed to a person
requiring him or her to attend and to testify at the
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any
investigation conducted by competent authority, or
for taking of his or her deposition. (Rule 21, Sec. 1,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
▪ SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - is a process
directed to a person requiring him to
bring with him at the hearing or trial of
an action any books, documents, or
other things under his control.
▪ SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM – is a
process directed to a person requiring
him to attend and testify at the hearing
or the trial of the action, or at any
investigation conducted by the
competent authority, or for the taking of
his deposition.
• Service of Subpoena (Rule 21, Section 6)
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▪ Service of subpoena shall be made in the
same manner as personal or substituted
service of summons.
▪ The original shall be exhibited and a copy
thereof delivered to the person on whom it
is served.
▪ The service must be made so as to allow
the witness a reasonable time for
preparation and travel to the place of
attendance.
▪ Costs for court attendance and the
production of documents or other materials
shall be tendered and charged accordingly.
(Rule 21, Sec. 6, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC)
• Compelling attendance (Rule 21, Sec. 8)
▪ In case of failure of a witness to attend, the
court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon
proof of the service thereof and of the
failure of the witness, may issue a warrant
to the sheriff of the province, or his or her
deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him
or her before the court or officer where his
or her attendance is required, and the cost
of such warrant and seizure of such witness
shall be paid by the witness if the court
issuing it shall determine that his or her
failure to answer the subpoena was willful
and without just cause. (Rule 21, Sec. 8, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
▪ Exceptions (Rule 21, Sec. 10): This rule
shall not apply to:
a) a witness who resides more than one
hundred (100) kilometers from his or
her residence to the place where he or
she is to testify by the ordinary course
of travel; or
b) a detention prisoner if no permission
of the court in which his or her case is
pending was obtained. (Rule 21, Sec.
10, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC)
• Contempt (Rule 21, Sec. 9)
▪ Failure by any person without adequate
cause to obey a subpoena served upon him
or her shall be deemed a contempt of the
court from which the subpoena is issued. If
the subpoena was not issued by a court,
the disobedience thereto shall be punished
in accordance with the applicable law or
Rule. (Rule 21, Sec. 9, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC)
▪ Exceptions (Rule 21, Sec. 10): This rule
shall not apply to:
a) a witness who resides more than one
hundred (100) kilometers from his or
her residence to the place where he or
she is to testify by the ordinary course
of travel; or
b) a detention prisoner if no permission
of the court in which his or her case is
pending was obtained. (Rule 21, Sec.
10, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC)
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• Quashing a subpoena (Rule 21, Section 4)
▪ The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum
upon motion promptly made and, in any event,
at or before the time specified therein if it is
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy
of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the
subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of the production thereof.
▪ The court may quash a subpoena ad
testificandum on the ground that the witness is
not bound thereby. In either case, the subpoena
may be quashed on the ground that the witness
fees and kilometrage allowed by these Rules
were not tendered when the subpoena was
served.
Conduct
Order of Trial (Rule 30, Section 5)
• Unless the court for special reasons otherwise
directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated
in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:
a. The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of
his or her complaint;
b. The defendant shall then adduce evidence in
support of his or her defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaints;
c. The third-party defendant if any, shall adduce
evidence of his or her defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and fourth-party complaint;
d. The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall
adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded
by them;
e. The parties against whom any counterclaim or
cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce
evidence in support of their defense, in the
order to be prescribed by the court;
f. The parties may then respectively adduce
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for
good reasons and in the furtherance of justice,
permits them to adduce evidence upon their
original case; and
g. Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall
be deemed submitted for decision, unless the
court directs the parties to argue or to submit
their respective memoranda or any further
pleadings.
• If several defendants or third-party defendants, and
so forth, having separate defenses appear by
different counsel, the court shall determine the
relative order of presentation of their evidence.
(Rule 30, Sec. 5, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC)
Oral Offer of Exhibits (Rule 30, Section 6)
The offer of evidence, comment or objection thereto,
and the court ruling shall be made orally in accordance
with Sections 34 to 40 of Rule 132.
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Agreed statement of facts (Rule 30, Section 7)
• The parties to any action may agree, in writing,
upon the facts involved in the litigation, and
submit the case for judgment on the facts
agreed upon, without the introduction of
evidence.
• If the parties agree only on some of the facts in
issue, the trial shall be held as to the disputed
facts in such order as the court shall prescribe.
(Rule 30, Sec. 7, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC)
Suspension of Actions (Rule 30, Section 8)
• The suspension of actions shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code and other laws. (Rule
30, Sec. 8, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
• The Civil Code provides:
Article 2030. Every civil action or proceeding shall
be suspended:
(1) If willingness to discuss a possible
compromise is expressed by one or both parties;
or
(2) If it appears that one of the parties, before
the commencement of the action or proceeding,
offered to discuss a possible compromise but the
other party refused the offer.
The duration and terms of the
suspension of the civil action or proceeding and
similar matters shall be governed by such
provisions of the rules of court as the Supreme
Court shall promulgate. Said rules of court shall
likewise provide for the appointment and duties
of amicable compounders.
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
Duty of judge to receive evidence and power to
delegate to clerk of court (Rule 30, Sec. 9)
• The judge of the court where the case is pending
shall personally receive the evidence to be
adduced by the parties. However, in default or
ex parte hearings, and in any case where the
parties agree in writing, the court may delegate
the reception of evidence to its clerk of court
who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court
shall have no power to rule on objections to any
question or to the admission of exhibits, which
objections shall be resolved by the court upon
submission of his or her report and the
transcripts within ten (10) calendar days from
termination of the hearing. (Rule 30, Sec. 9, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Trial by commissioner (Rule 32)
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• Reference by consent (Rule 32, Sec. 1)
▪ By written consent of both parties, the
court may order any or all of the issues in
a case to be referred to a commissioner to
be agreed upon by the parties or to be
appointed by the court.
▪ The word "commissioner" includes a
referee, an auditor and an examiner.
• Reference ordered on motion (Rule 32, Sec. 2)
▪ When the parties do not consent, the court
may, upon the application of either or of its
own motion, direct a reference to a
commissioner in the following cases:
a) When the trial of an issue of fact requires
the examination of a long account on
either side, in which case the
commissioner may be directed to hear
and report upon the whole issue or any
specific question involved therein;
b) When the taking of an account is
necessary for the information of the court
before judgment, or for carrying a
judgment or order into effect;
c) When a question of fact, other than upon
the pleadings, arises upon motion or
otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for
carrying a judgment or order into effect.
• Order of reference; powers of the
commissioner (Rule 32, Sec. 3)
▪ When a reference is made, the clerk shall
forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy
of the order of reference. The order may specify
or limit the powers of the commissioner, and
may direct him or her to report only upon
particular issues, or to do or perform particular
acts, or to receive and report evidence only and
may fix the date for beginning and closing the
hearings and for the filing of his or her report.
Subject to other specifications and limitations
stated in the order, the commissioner has and
shall exercise the power to regulate the
proceedings in every hearing before him or her
and to do all acts and take all measures
necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of his duties under the order. He
or she may issue subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless
otherwise provided in the order of reference, he
or she may rule upon the admissibility of
evidence. The trial or hearing before him or her
shall proceed in all respects as it would if held
before the court. (Rule 32, Sec. 3, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Consolidation of trial (Rule 31, Sec. 1)
• When actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated, and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
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Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco Tyan Ming
Development, Inc. (2009)
Facts: The Philippine National Bank (PNB) extended
credit facilities worth P800,000,000.00 to respondent
Gotesco Tyan Ming Development, Inc. (GOTESCO). To
secure the credit facility, GOTESCO executed a Mortgage
Trust Indenture over a parcel of land in Pasig City.
GOTESCO failed to pay the amount in full. Accordingly,
PNB instituted foreclosure proceedings on the GOTESCO
property.
The one-year redemption period expired
without GOTESCO exercising its right of redemption.
Accordingly, PNB consolidated the title in its name. PNB
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession with the RTC of Pasig City. The case was
docketed as LRC Case No. R-6695-PSG and was raffled to
Branch 155. GOTESCO then filed a motion to consolidate
LRC Case No. R-6695-PSG with its case for annulment of
foreclosure proceedings, specific performance and
damages against PNB, docketed as Civil Case No. 68139,
and pending with RTC Branch 161. The Hon. Judge Luis
R. Tongco of Branch 155 issued an Order granting the
motion for consolidation.
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration with RTC
Branch 161 but it was denied. PNB then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA. CA rendered the assailed
Decision dismissing the petition. PNB contends that the
consolidation of its petition for issuance of a writ of
possession with GOTESCOs case for annulment of
foreclosure proceedings has seriously prejudiced its right
to a writ of possession. It points that after the
consolidation of title in its name, when GOTESCO failed to
redeem the property, entitlement to a writ of possession
becomes a matter of right. Moreover, a petition for
issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious
proceeding; hence, it must not be consolidated with a civil
action for the annulment of foreclosure proceedings,
specific performance, and damages, which is litigious in
nature.
Issue: Whether or not the lower courts properly granted
GOTESCO’s motion for consolidation.
Held: No. The legal basis of an order of consolidation of
two (2) cases is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states:
SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions
involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
In Teston v. Development Bank of the Philippines, we laid
down the requisites for the consolidation of cases, viz.:
A court may order several actions pending
before it to be tried together where they arise from
the same act, event or transaction, involve the same
or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on
the same evidence, provided that the court has
jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue
advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any
of the parties.
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The rule allowing consolidation is designed to
avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or
abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets,
and to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and
vexation to the parties- litigants. Thus, in Philippine
Savings Bank v. Maalac, Jr., we disregarded the
technical difference between an action and a proceeding,
and upheld the consolidation of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession with an ordinary civil
action in order to achieve a more expeditious resolution
of the cases.
But in the instant case, the consolidation of
PNBs petition for a writ of possession with GOTESCOs
complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceeding
serves none of the purposes cited above. On the
contrary, it defeated the very rationale of consolidation.
The record shows that PNBs petition was filed on May
26, 2006, and remains pending after three (3) years,
despite the summary nature of the petition. Obviously,
the consolidation only delayed the issuance of the
desired writ of possession. Further, it prejudiced PNBs
right to take immediate possession of the property and
gave GOTESCO undue advantage, for GOTESCO
continues to possess the property during the pendency
of the consolidated cases, despite the fact that title to
the property is no longer in its name. It is clear that the
motion for consolidation was filed merely to frustrate
PNBs right to immediate possession of the property.
Moreover, jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that, upon the expiration of the
redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the
possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute. Thus, the mere filing of an ex parte motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession would suffice, and
there is no bond required since possession is a necessary
consequence of the right of the confirmed owner. It is a
settled principle that a pending action for annulment of
mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance
of the writ of possession. Indisputably, the consolidation
of PNBs petition with GOTESCOs complaint runs counter
to this well established doctrine.
Compare with:
Rule 2, Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party
may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
a. The party joining the causes of action shall comply
with the rules on joinder of parties;
b. The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules;
c. Where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and
d. Where the claims in all the causes action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Rule 3, Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All
persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series
of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
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severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law
or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff
or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense
in connection with any proceedings in which he may have
no interest.
Severance of trial
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 31
Section 2. Separate trials. — The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues
Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (2005)
Facts: Petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc.,
through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David
Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively,
obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans
evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August
1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. The three
promissory notes were for the amount of P50,000 each
and uniformly provided for (1) a term of three years; (2)
an interest of 15 % per annum, payable quarterly; and
(3) the repayment of the principal loans after three years
from their respective dates. In December 1997, the
parties entered into a renegotiation of the three
promissory notes resulting in the reduction of the interest
from 15% to 6% per annum. In a letter dated 16
December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner
corporation that he was terminating the loans and
demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of
US$150,000 plus unpaid interests.
On 2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed a
complaint for a sum of money and damages against the
petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The
petitioner corporation, together with its president and
vice-president, filed an Answer raising as a defense the
lack of cause of action, among others. According to them,
Christian had no cause of action because the three
promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
During the pendency of the case, two of the promissory
notes with due dates of 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000
matured. The trial court rendered a decision on 5 May
2000 declaring the first two promissory notes dated 7
August 1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and
demandable and ordered the payment of the amount due
plus unpaid interests. While conceding that at the time
the complaint was filed, none of the promissory notes was
due and demandable, the trial court ruled that under
Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
a complaint which states no cause of action may be cured
by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if
the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the
instant complaint, as defendants obligation are not yet
due and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover
on the first two promissory notes in view of the
introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
covered by the two promissory notes are now due and
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demandable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling in
toto.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of
action at the time it was filed can be cured by the accrual
of a cause of action during the pendency of the case.
Held: No. At the time the complaint was filed with the
trial court on 2 February 1999, none of the three
promissory notes was due yet; although, two of the
promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999
and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the
case with the trial court. Despite its finding that the
petitioner corporation did not violate the modified terms
of the three promissory notes and that the payment of
the principal loans were not yet due when the complaint
was filed, the trial court did not dismiss the complaint,
citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried with the express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation
of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial
justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
The lower court’s interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual
merits of a case may be determined in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to
technicalities, and that all other matters included in the
case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby
avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 applies to
situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised
in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the
trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a
complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be
cured by evidence presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is
applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at
the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is
defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For
example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of
a condition precedent upon which the cause of action
depends, evidence showing that such condition had
already been fulfilled when the complaint was filed may
be presented during the trial, and the complaint may
accordingly be amended thereafter. It thus follows that
a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued
cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of
a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action
is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless
suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper
motion seasonably filed by the defendant. As this Court
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eloquently said in Surigao Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v.
Harris:
It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception,
either at law or in equity, that to recover at all there must
be some cause of action at the commencement of the
suit…unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause
of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual
of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental
complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued
cause of action is not permissible.
Rule 33
Demurrer to Evidence
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 33
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his or her
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his or her motion is denied he
or she shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
Republic vs. Tuvera (2007)
Facts: The Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), in behalf of the Republic, filed before the
Sandiganbayan a Complaint against Juan and Victor
Tuvera, seeking to recover funds allegedly acquired by
said parties in flagrant breach of trust and fiduciary
obligations with grave abuse of right and power in
violation of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines. In particular, the Complaint alleged
that Juan Tuvera, as Presidential Executive Assistant of
President Marcos, took advantage of his relationship to
influence upon and connection with the President by
engaging in a scheme to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of the Republic and of the Filipino people,
specifically, by securing TLA No. 356 on behalf of Twin
Peaks despite existing laws expressly prohibiting the
exportation of mahogany of the narra species and Twin
Peaks’ lack of qualification to be a grantee thereof for lack
of sufficient logging equipment to engage in the logging
business.
In their Answer, respondents Victor Tuvera and
Twin Peaks claimed that Twin Peaks was awarded TLA No.
356 only after its articles of incorporation had been
amended enabling it to engage in logging operations, that
the Republic’s reference to Chinese operations and
revenue of approximately P45 million were merely
imagined, and that the PCGG has no statutory authority
to institute the action.
The trial ensued. After the Republic rested its
case, with leave of court, respondents filed a Demurrer to
Evidence. Respondents argued that the Republic failed to
present sufficient legal affirmative evidence to prove its
claim. In particular, respondents’ demurrer contends that
the memorandum (Exh. B) and TLA No. 356 are not "legal
evidence" because "legal evidence" is not meant to raise
a mere suspicion or doubt. Respondents also claim that
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income tax returns are not sufficient to show one’s
holding in a corporation. Respondents also cited the
factual antecedents culminating with the Court’s decision
in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Corp., Inc. v. Sec. of Environment
and Natural Resources.
The Republic filed a Manifestation, contending
that the demurrer is not based on the insufficiency of its
evidence but on the strength of the evidence of
respondents as shown by their own exhibits.
In its Resolution dated 23 May 2001, the
Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to evidence and
referred to the decision of this Court in Ysmael in holding
that res judicata applies.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly
sustained the demurrer to evidence.
Held: No. The Supreme Court noted that the
Sandiganbayan justified the grant of demurrer with res
judicata as rationale. Res judicata is an inappropriate
ground for sustaining a demurrer to evidence, even as it
stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. A
demurrer may be granted if, after the presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence, it appears upon the facts and the law
that the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In contrast,
the grounds for res judicata present themselves even
before the presentation of evidence, and it should be at
that stage that the defense of res judicata should be
invoked as a ground for dismissal. Properly speaking, the
movants for demurral who wish to rely on a controlling
value of a settled case as a ground for demurrer should
invoke the ground of stare decisis in lieu of res judicata.
The Manila Banking Corp. vs. University of
Baguio,Inc, (2007)
Facts: Manila Banking Corporation (“MBC”) filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against the University of
Baguio for the latter’s failure to pay its loan. Five years
later, MBC amended the complaint and impleaded GDI as
additional defendant, alleging that it was unaware and did
not approve the diversion of the loan to GDI; that it
granted the loan without collateral upon the university’s
undertaking that it would construct new buildings; and
that GDI connived with the university and Bautista, Jr. in
fraudulently contracting the debt.
In its Answer, the university claimed that the
bank and GDI approved the diversion. Allegedly, Victor G.
Puyat, then GDI’s President, and Vicente G. Puyat, then
the bank’s President, decided to use the proceeds of the
loan. The university stated that Vicente G. Puyat and
Victor G. Puyat even assured the university, in separate
letters11both dated October 22, 1981, that it would be
relieved of any liability from the loan. Consequently, even
if the loan was overdue, the bank did not demand
payment until February 8, 1989.
Thereafter, MBC and GDI executed a deed
of dacion en pago, whereby the latter ceded and
transferred to MBC a parcel of land consisting of 210,000
square meters located in Nasugbu, Batangas and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-70784, in full
settlement of the loan.
The university moved to dismiss the amended
complaint on the grounds that: (1) there was "no more
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cause of action" against it since the loan had been settled
by GDI; and (2) the bank "failed to prosecute the action
for an unreasonable length of time." Said motion was,
however, denied, by the trial court since the "matters
relied upon by the university were evidentiary in nature."
The university moved for reconsideration, which was
opposed by MBC. The trial court granted the University’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and the Complaint
for Sum of Money.
Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing the amended
complaint, without trial, upon motion of respondent
university?
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the university’s
motion to dismiss the amended complaint was improper
under Rule 16 because it was filed after respondent
university filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also,
the motion’s merit could not be determined based solely
on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the amended
complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of
dacion en pago, which was not even alleged in the
complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been
expunged from the record, the trial court erred in its
finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on
the deed. In fact, on January 11, 2002 or just three
months before it dismissed the amended complaint, the
trial court had even noted petitioner counsel’s
manifestation regarding the parties’ initial efforts to enter
into a "dacion en pago but not based on the previous offer
made but on a new proposal involving new properties"
and urged them to pursue further settlement discussions.
In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner
had "no more cause of action" or lacked a cause of action
against the university. Said motion was a motion to
dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to
evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had
presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at
bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and
petitioner had not rested its case. Therefore, the August
17, 1999 Order properly denied the motion to dismiss for
being improper under either Rule 16 or 33.
Distinguished from demurrer in criminal case (Rule
119, Sec. 23)
1. In a civil case, leave of court is NOT required before
filing a demurrer. In a criminal case, a demurrer is
filed with or without leave of court.
2. In a civil case, if the demurrer is granted, the order
of dismissal is appealable. In a criminal case, the
order of dismissal is NOT appealable because of the
constitutional policy against double jeopardy.
3. In a civil case, if the demurrer is denied, the
defendant may proceed to present his evidence. In
a criminal case, the accused may adduce his
evidence only if the demurrer is filed with leave of
court. He cannot present his evidence if he filed the
demurrer without leave of court. (Riano, p. 401)
Action on Demurrer to Evidence
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 33
Section 2. Action on demurrer to evidence. — A
demurrer to evidence shall be subject to the provisions of
Rule 15.
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The order denying the demurrer to evidence shall not
be subject of an appeal or petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus before judgment.
Rule 34
Judgment on the Pleadings
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 34
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may; on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
Sunbanun vs. Go (2010)
Facts: Sunbanun is the owner of a residential house. Go
leased the entire ground floor of petitioner’s house for one
year which was to expire 7 July 1996. To earn extra
income, Go accepted ldodgers from whom she received a
monthly income of P15,000. Go paid for the monthly
rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove away Go’s
lodgers by telling them that they could stay on the rented
premises only until 15 April 1996 since she was
terminating the lease. The lodgers left the rented
premises by 15 April 1996, and petitioner then padlocked
the rooms vacated by Go’s lodgers. Go filed an action for
damages against petitioner. Go alleged that she lost her
income from her lodgers. Petitioner alleged that Go
violated the lease contract when she subleased the
premises. Petitioner moved for the case to be submitted
for judgment on the pleadings considering that the only
disagreement between the parties was the correct
interpretation of the lease contract.
Held: In this case, the trial court rendered a judgment on
the pleadings. Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court
reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no
controverted matter in the case after the answer is
filed.[7] A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on
the facts as pleaded,[8] and is based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and
the accompanying annexes.
This case is unusual because it was petitioner, and not
the claimant respondent, who moved for a judgment on
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the pleadings during the pre-trial. This is clear from the
trial courts Order dated 7 October 1997 which reads:
ORDER
When this case was called for pre-trial, parties
appeared together with counsel. Defendant [Doris
U. Sunbanun] moved that considering that there
is no dispute as far as the contract is concerned
and the only disagreement between the parties is
on the interpretation of the contract so that the
issue boils down on to which of the parties are
correct on their interpretation. With the
conformity of the plaintiff [Aurora B. Go], this case
is therefore considered closed and submitted for
judgment on the pleadings. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the
pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of her own
allegations and without giving respondent the opportunity
to introduce evidence, is deemed to have admitted the
material and relevant averments of the complaint, and to
rest her motion for judgment based on the pleadings of
the parties. As held in Tropical Homes, Inc. v. CA:
As to the amount of damages awarded as a
consequence of this violation of plaintiffs rights, the lower
court based its award from the allegations and prayer
contained in the complaint. The defendant, however,
questions this award for the reason that, according to the
defendant, the plaintiff, in moving for judgment on the
pleadings, did not offer proof as to the truth of his own
allegations with respect to the damages claimed by him,
and gave no opportunity for the appellant to introduce
evidence to refute his claims. We find this objection
without merit. It appears that when the plaintiff moved to
have the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant
interposed no objection and has practically assented
thereto. The defendant, therefore, is deemed to have
admitted the allegations of fact of the complaint, so that
there was no necessity for plaintiff to submit evidence of
his claim.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner
ejected respondents lodgers three months before the
expiration of the lease contract on 7 July 1996. Petitioner
maintains that she had the right to terminate the contract
prior to its expiration because respondent allegedly
violated the terms of the lease contract by subleasing the
rented premises. Petitioners assertion is belied by the
provision in the lease contract[12] which states that the
lessee can use the premises as a dwelling or as lodging
house. Furthermore the lease contract clearly provides
that petitioner leased to respondent the ground floor of
her residential house for a term of one year commencing
from 7 July 1995. Thus, the lease contract would expire
only on 7 July 1996. However, petitioner started
ejecting respondents lodgers in March 1996 by informing
them that the lease contract was only until 15 April 1996.
Clearly, petitioners act of ejecting respondents lodgers
resulted in respondent losing income from her lodgers.
Hence, it was proper for the trial court and the appellate
court to order petitioner to pay respondent actual
damages in the amount of P45,000.
Asian Construction v. Sannaedle Co., Ltd.
G.R. No. 181676, 11 June 2014
Facts: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of
Money filed by respondent Sannaedle against petitioner
Asian Construction alleging that a Memorandum of
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Agreement (MOA) was executed to engage the
respondent to supply and erect insulated panel systems
at various pavilions at the Philippine Centennial
Exposition Theme Park. Pursuant thereto, petitioner
made various payments amounting to US$3,129,667.32
leaving a balance of US$615,620.33. Respondent claims
that it made several written demands for petitioner to pay
the said balance, but to no avail. Thereafter, petitioner
filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Respondent then
moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the Answer admitted all material allegations of the
Complaint, and therefore, failed to tender an issue. Thus,
respondent deems that petitioner's Answer, in effect,
admitted the existence of the MOA and its failure to pay
the balance despite repeated demands.
Issue: Whether judgment on the pleadings is proper.
Held: YES. Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An
answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with
the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections
8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
resulting in the admission of the material allegations of
the adverse party’s pleadings. Here, it is irrefutable that
petitioner acknowledged having entered into a MOA with
respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of
US$615,620.33. While petitioner allegedly raised
affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of
non-forum shopping, no legal capacity to sue and
fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar respondent
from seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other
than these affirmative defenses, petitioner’s denial
neither made a specific denial that a MOA was perfected
nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of
said agreement.
Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan
University Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 207970, 20 January 2016
Facts: Petitioner Fernando Medical, a domestic
corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies,
delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies
at the respondent Wesleyan University’s hospital.
According to petitioner, respondent paid only P67,3
57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00,
leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54. In 11
February 2009, the parties entered into an agreement
whereby petitioner agreed to reduce its claim to only
P50,400,000.00, and allowed the respondent to pay the
adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36
months. Respondent notified petitioner that its new
administration had reviewed their contracts and had
found the contracts defective and rescissible due to
economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was
consequently declining to recognize the 2009 agreement
because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees
and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of
office had expired.
Petitioner sent a demand letter to respondent.
Due to respondent's failure to pay as demanded,
petitioner filed with the RTC its complaint for sum of
money. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon
the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue;
(c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. After the RTC
denied the motion to dismiss, respondent filed its answer.
In 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based
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on the Pleadings, stating that respondent had admitted
the material allegations of its complaint, and thus, did not
tender any issue as to such allegations.
Issue: Whether judgment on the pleadings is proper.
Held: YES. The essential query in resolving a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are
issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Here, the
respondent expressly admitted the petitioner’s
allegations on: (a) the four transactions for the delivery
and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the
total liability of the respondent; (c) the payments made
by the respondents; (d) the balance still due to the
petitioner; and (e) the execution of the February 11, 2009
agreement. The admission of the various agreements,
especially the February 11, 2009 agreement, significantly
admitted the petitioner’s complaint. To recall, the
petitioner’s cause of action was based on the February 11,
2009 agreement, which was the actionable document in
the case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of
the February 11, 2009 agreement, and contained a copy
thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the February 11, 2009
agreement, judgment on the pleadings became proper.
Distinguished from summary judgment
Diman vs. Alumbres (1998)
Facts: A complaint for Quiting of Title and Damages by
Lacalle against Diman. Diman personally served a
Request for Admission from Lacalle but it was unheeded.
Lacalle did not file their Answer as well. Dimans moved
for summary judgment for failure of Lacalle to file their
pre-trial briefs. Lacalle opposed such motion. Diman’s
motion was denied by the RTC on the ground that the
complaint and answer shows a material issue.
Held: It is also the law which determines when a
summary judgment is proper. It declares that although
the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact
-- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual
allegations -- if it is shown by admissions, depositions or
affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not
genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that "except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entiled
to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render
a summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant as
the case may be.
Parenthetically, the existence or appearance of
ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and
their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what
distinguish a proper case for a summary judgment from
one for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19 of the
1964 Rules. In the latter case, there is no ostensible issue
at all, but the absence of any because of the failure of the
defending party's answer to raise an issue. Rule 19
expresses the principle as follows:
"Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading **."
On the other hand, in the case of a summary
judgment, issues apparently exist -- i.e., facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet
no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
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denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the
answer – but the issues thus arising from the pleadings
are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by
admissions, depositions or admissions. In other words, as
a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings
is a judgment on the facts as pleaded while a summary
judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven
by affidavits, depositions or admissions. Another
distinction is that while the remedy of a judgment on the
pleadings may be sought only by a claimant (one seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a summary
judgment may be applied for by either a claimant or a
defending party.
These basic distinctions escaped His Honor. He
denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment in his
Order of June 14, 1995, opining that a "perusal of the
Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that material
issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and defendants
claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting
their respective titles thereto and accused each other of
possessing false title to the land." He added, citing cases,
that a summary judgment "is not proper where the
defendant presented defenses tendering factual
issues which call for the presentation of evidence." Such
a ratiocination is grossly erroneous. Clearly, the grounds
relied on by the Judge are proper for the denial of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings -- as to which the
essential question, as already remarked, is: are there
issues arising from or generated by the pleadings? -- but
not as regards a motion for summary judgment -- as to
which the crucial question is: issues having been raised
by the pleadings, are those issues genuine, or sham or
fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions accompanying the application therefor?
Action on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 34
Section 2. Action on motion for judgment on th
pleadings. — The court may motu proprio or on motion
render judgment on the pleadings if it is apparent that the
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.
Otherwise, the motion shall be subject to the provisions
of Rule 15 of these Rules.
Any action of the court on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings shall not be subject of an appeal or petition
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
Rule 35
Summary Judgments
Ontimare vs. Elep (2006)
Facts: Plaintiffs and Respondents are neighbors in
Quezon City. Respondent wanted to build a four-door,
two-storey apartment on their lot. Petitioner owned the
adjoining house and adjacent lot. His terrace extends to
the boundary between his property and respondents.
Respondents wrote to petitioner to seek his consent to
the construction of a firewall adjacaent to his existing
firewall. Instead of consenting, petitioner filed a
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complaint with the Building Official asking that the
request for a building permit be withheld since a firewall
would adversely affect the ventilation and market value
of his property. A cease and desist order to stop the
construction was issued but was thereafter lifted upon
written explanation by respondents to the City engineer.
Respondents were issued a new building. While workers
were construction the firewall, petitioner fired his
shotgun, threatening to kill anyone who would enter his
property. As a result, a portion of the firewall remained
unfinished. According to respondents, water seeped in the
building and damaged the sanding, the wood parquet
floors and the ceiling. Respondents filed an action for
damages with application for preliminary injunction and
restraining order against petitioner, who moved for
summary judgment. RTC issued the summary judgment
in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner to pay
respondent damages. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
Held: Hence, for summary judgment to be proper, two
(2) requisites must concur, to wit: (1) there must be no
genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount
of damages; and (2) the moving party must be entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
When, on their face, the pleadings tender a
genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. An issue
is genuine if it requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim.
In the instant case, the summary judgment was
rendered afterthe presentation of evidence by both
parties in a full blown trial. Records show that during the
two-year trial of the case, Ontimare Sr. had presented his
own witnesses, all four of them, and had cross-examined
the witnesses of the opposing party. The trial courts
decision was merely denominated as summary judgment.
But in essence, it is actually equivalent to a judgment on
the merits, making the rule on summary judgment
inapplicable in this case.
Motion required
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, Rule 35
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The
motion shall cite the supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions, and the specific law relied upon. The adverse
party may file a comment and serve opposing affidavits,
depositions or admissions within a non-extendible period
of five (5) calendar days from receipt of the motion.
Unless the court orders the conduct of a hearing,
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Any action of the court on a motion for summary
judgment shall not be subject of an appeal or petition for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
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Asian Construction and Development Corp. v. PCIB
(2006)
Facts: PCIBank filed a complaint for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
Asiakonstrukt (defendant). After ex-parte presentation of
evidence, RTC issued the writ of preliminary attachment.
Defendant pleaded in its Answer severe financial and
currency crisis which adversely affected and put
defendant out of business. PCIBank filed a verified Motion
for Summary Judgment contending that the defenses
interposed by the defendant are sham, and contrived.
RTC rendered a summary judgment ordering defendant
to pay PCIBank.
Held: Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as
amended, except as to the amount of damages, when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or
accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of
litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact
which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown
trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise
issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions
show that such issues are not genuine, then summary
judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a
matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a
motion for summary judgment, is the presence or
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished
from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the
facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then
there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the
facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue
of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place
of trial.
Dupasquier v. Ascendas (Philippines) Corp
G.R. No. 211044, 24 July 2019, supra
Facts: The Net Group, represented by petitioners Jacques
A. Dupasquier and Carlos S. Rufino, and respondent
Ascendas (Philippines) Corp. entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU), for the acquisition of the entire
issued and outstanding shares of stock of the Net
Corporations. The parties stipulated that the Closing Date
of the MOU shall be after 2 calendar weeks from the
signing of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) but not
later than 31 March 2007. The MOU provided an
arbitration clause, as part of Clause 14, wherein any
dispute arising out of or in connection with the MOU shall
be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration. Likewise
in Clause 14 of the MOU, the parties provided that upon
the termination or lapse of the MOU, the MOU shall cease
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to have any force and effect except for Clause 14(e)
[Confidentiality].
Because of Ascendas’s failure to execute the MOA by the
Closing Date, the Net Group informed Ascendas that they
deemed the MOU as lapsed as of 1 April 2007. In turn,
Ascendas wrote a letter to the Net Group specifying that
the parties have until 28 September 2007 to resolve the
disputes between them, otherwise, Ascendas will refer
the dispute to arbitration.
The Net Group filed a petition for declaratory relief,
pleading for a judicial declaration that the arbitration
agreement contained in the MOU be declared ineffective
and that Net Group can no longer be compelled to submit
to arbitration because the Arbitration Clause would not
survive the lapse of the MOU on 31 March 2007 since the
parties agreed that only the confidentiality clause would
survive the termination or lapse of the MOU.
In its answer to the petition for declaratory relief filed by
the Net Group, Ascendas argued that the Arbitration
Clause in the MOU survived. The Net Group filed a motion
for summary judgment alleging that Ascendas' defenses
were purely legal in nature. The RTC granted the Net
Group's motion for summary judgment, declaring that
respondent cannot compel petitioners to proceed to
arbitration on the basis of said arbitration clause.
Ascendas then filed a notice of appeal. The CA reversed
the RTC decision, ruling that considering the separability
doctrine wherein the Arbitration Clause remains operative
despite the termination of the MOU, the RTC cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because the parties
should have referred the matter to arbitration. Hence, this
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court
ISSUE: Whether the summary judgment was proper
considering that the issue to be resolved is only as to the
interpretation of the MOU.
Held: YES. The conflict between the parties may be
addressed in a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court.
Under Rule35, Section 1, a summary judgment may be
used to expedite the proceedings and to avoid useless
delays, when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits or
admissions on file show that there exists no genuine
question or issue of fact in the case, and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Here, the parties merely presented issues as to the
interpretation of the MOU. There was therefore no
genuine question or issue of fact that must be resolved
using the presentation of evidence. At most, the Court
may rule on the interpretation of the contract by simply
reviewing its terms.
Rule 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 36
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.
— A judgment or final order determining the merits of the
case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
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the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. — If
no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed
within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or
final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the
book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the
judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of
its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of
the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the
clerk, within a certificate that such judgment or final order
has become final and executory.
Section 3. Judgment for or against one or more of
several parties. — Judgment may be given for or against
one or more of several plaintiffs and for or against one or
more of several defendants. When justice so demands,
the court may require the parties on each side to file
adversary pleadings as between themselves and
determine their ultimate rights and obligations.
Section 4. Several judgments. — In an action against
several defendants, the court may, when a several
judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more
of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.
Section 5. Separate judgments. — When more than
one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at
any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to
a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of
such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with
respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall
proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate
judgment is rendered the court by order may stay its
enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment
or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may
be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in
whose favor the judgment is rendered.
Section 6. Judgment against entity without juridical
personality. — When judgment is rendered against two or
more persons sued as an entity without juridical
personality, the judgment shall set out their individual or
proper names, if known.
Form
Rule 36, Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final
orders. — A judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed
by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
Concept of final judgment and final order
BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals (1994)
Facts: Yanky Hardware Company, Inc. (YANKY), applied
for and was granted by petitioner BA Finance Corporation
a credit accommodation. To secure the payment of all its
loans, YANKY executed a chattel mortgage over its stock-
in-trade or merchandise inventory in favor of petitioner.
In time, petitioner demanded from YANKY the payment of
its accumulated obligations, or the delivery of the
mortgaged chattels for purposes of extrajudicial
foreclosure.
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Petitioner filed a complaint against YANKY for replevin
with damages or, in the alternative, payment of the
amount of P559,565.00 plus interest, contending that it
had the right to take possession of the chattels described
in the chattel mortgage or to be paid the total amount of
the loans plus interest. The trial court ordered the seizure
of all the merchandise and other personal properties
described in the chattel mortgage. The sheriff accordingly
seized chattels found in the premises of YANKY and later
transferred them to petitioner's warehouse.
Upon motion, the trial court accordingly issued an order
for the sale of the mortgaged properties at public auction
to prevent depreciation of value. Respondent Wilson Siy
won as highest bidder. Petitioner then filed an Urgent
Motion to Cancel Auction Sale stating that it was not given
an opportunity to participate in the sale and was deprived
of its right to bid. The trial court granted petitioner’s
motion and cancelled the auction sale.
Respondent Siy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order cancelling the auction sale. The trial court, in an
order dated 20 June 1984, granted the motion for
reconsideration and allowed respondent Siy to put up a
bond to justify the release of properties to him.
Respondent Siy submitted a surety bond after which, on
28 June 1984, the sheriff was directed to deliver to Siy
the chattels thus sold. Conformably with the above order,
the sheriff delivered assorted hardware materials to Siy
and submitted a Sheriff's Report on the properties
actually delivered. On 24 July 1984, respondent Siy filed
his motion to compel delivery of certain chattels sold in
the auction sale but not delivered by petitioner to him. In
an order dated 27 July 1984, the trial court directed
petitioner to produce and/or account for the undelivered
properties. On 22 January 1986, the trial court issued an
order directing petitioner to deliver to Siy the properties
appearing in the inventory minus the properties already
delivered, and if this be not possible, to pay the
equivalent amount thereof.
Twenty-three (23) days after its receipt of the
aforementioned order, petitioner filed its notice of appeal
and a record on appeal with the Court of Appeals. In its
appeal, petitioner questioned the 20 June 1984 order of
the trial court which, in effect, permitted the intervention
of respondent Siy by entertaining his motion for
reconsideration and allowing him to put up a surety bond
to justify the release of the properties to him. The Court
of Appeals held that petitioner could no longer appeal the
20 June 1984 order because it was already way beyond
the reglementary period to appeal.
Petitioner submits that the order of 20 June 1984 was
merely interlocutory hence unappealable, and that in
appealing the final order of 22 January 1986, it should be
allowed to question the order of 20 June 1984 because its
reversal will necessarily render null and void the final
order of 22 January 1986.
Issue: Whether the order dated 20 June 1984 granting
respondent Siy’s motion for reconsideration of the order
cancelling the auction sale can be assailed in the present
appeal.
Held: No. The principal case filed with the trial court by
petitioner against YANKY was for replevin or, in the
alternative, for collection of the amount of the loans, plus
interest owed by YANKY. This Court likewise noted that
the disputed order of 22 January 1986, subject of the
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present appeal, only directed petitioner to turn over to
respondent Siy properties which had remained
undelivered to the latter as highest bidder, a matter which
was merely an incident of the principal case. The order
of the trial court was already final so far as it concerned
the dispute between petitioner and respondent Siy
because it was to resolve the right of the latter to receive
the disputed properties and petitioner's obligation to
deliver those properties to Siy. This is based on the
settled rule that only a final order or judgment on the
merits may be the subject of an appeal. A final order is
defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined; on the other hand, an order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely,
but leaves something more to be done upon its merits.
Hence, the argument of petitioner that it can still question
the order of 20 June 1984 while appealing the final order
of 22 January 1986 is untenable. It may be true that the
20 June 1984 order allowed the intervention of
respondent Siy and reversed the court's previous order
setting aside the auction sale. However, upon submission
by Siy of a surety bond with the court, the latter issued a
final order dated 28 June 1984, which was issued earlier
than the final order of 22 January 1986. The order of 28
June 1984 directed the delivery of the auctioned
properties to respondent Siy.
Although the order of 20 June 1984 may be considered
interlocutory as it required something more to be done by
respondent Siy, i.e., the filing of the bond, the subsequent
order of 28 June 1984 can be considered a final one which
determined and settled the issue on the validity of the
auction sale and the right of respondent Siy as highest
bidder to acquire the properties he purchased. Petitioner
should have appealed the 28 June 1984 order if it wanted
to question the validity of the intervention of respondent
Siy as well as of the auction sale. But it did not do so.
Moreover, records show that after the issuance of the
order of 28 June 1984 directing the delivery of the
properties to Siy, the remaining proceedings in the trial
court pertained only to the execution and implementation
by the sheriff of the order of 28 June 1984.
Kinds (as to finality)
1. Rendition of judgment
Rule 36, Section 1. Rendition of judgments and
final orders. — A judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by him, and
filed with the clerk of the court.
2. Entry of judgment
Rule 36, Section 2. Entry of judgments and final
orders. — If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in
these Rules, the judgment or final order shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date of finality of the
judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the
date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final order and
shall be signed by the clerk, within a certificate that
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such judgment or final order has become final and
executory.
3. Entry of satisfaction of judgment
Rule 39, Section 44. Entry of satisfaction of
judgment by clerk of court. — Satisfaction of a
judgment shall be entered by the clerk of court in
the court docket, and in the execution book, upon
the return of a writ of execution showing the full
satisfaction of the judgment, or upon the filing of
an admission to the satisfaction of the judgment
executed and acknowledged in the same manner as
a conveyance of real property by the judgment
obligee or by his counsel unless a revocation of his
authority is filed, or upon the endorsement of such
admission by the judgment obligee or his counsel,
on the face of the record of the judgment.
Rule 39, Section 45. Entry of satisfaction with or
without admission. — Whenever a judgment is
satisfied in fact, or otherwise than upon an
execution on demand of the judgment obligor, the
judgment obligee or his counsel must execute and
acknowledge, or indorse an admission of the
satisfaction as provided in the last preceding
section, and after notice and upon motion the court
may order either the judgment obligee or his
counsel to do so, or may order the entry of
satisfaction to be made without such admission.
Kinds (as to process procuring)
1. Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34)
Rule 34, Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. —
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may; on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.
2. Judgment on demurrer to evidence (Rule 33)
Rule 33, Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After
the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
or her evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
or her motion is denied he or she shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
or she shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. (as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC)
3. Summary judgments (Rule 35)
Rule 35, Section 1. Summary judgment for
claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his or her
favor upon all or any part thereof. (as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
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Rule 35, Section 2. Summary judgment for
defending party. — A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his or her
favor as to all or any part thereof. (as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
4. Default judgments
Rule 9, Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the
defending party fails to answer within the time
allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party,
and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his or her pleading may warrant, unless the
court in its discretion requires the claimant to
submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may
be delegated to the clerk of court
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default
shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party
declared in default may at any time after notice
thereof and before judgment file a motion under
oath to set aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his or her failure to answer was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence and that he or she has a meritorious
defense. In such case, the order of default may
be set aside on such terms and conditions as the
judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading
asserting a claim states a common cause of
action against several defending parties, some of
whom answer and the others fail to do so, the
court shall try the case against all upon the
answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment
rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from
that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the Solicitor General
or his or her deputized public prosecutor,
investigate whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that
the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
5. Judgments after ex parte presentation of
evidence
Rule 18, Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. —
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section
(duty of parties and counsel to appear at the pre-
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trial) shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of
the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.
6. Orders for dismissal
a. Dismissals under Rule 17
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff.
— A complaint may be dismissed by the
plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such
notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in a
competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. (as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC)
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.
— Except as provided in the preceding section,
a complaint shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him or her of the plaintiffs motion
for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to
the complaint. The dismissal shall be without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his or her counterclaim in a separate
action unless within fifteen (15) calendar days
from notice of the motion he or she manifests
his or her preference to have his or her
counterclaim resolved in the same action.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph shall be without
prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the
court. (as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.
— If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails
to appear on the date of the presentation of his
or her evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his or her action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these Rules
or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court. (as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Section 4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party complaint. — The
provisions of this Rule shall apply to the
dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party complaint. A voluntary dismissal by
the claimant by notice as in section 1 of this
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Rule, shall be made before a responsive
pleading or a motion for summary judgment is
served or, if there is none, before the
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
b. Dismissals under Rule 18, Section 5
Rule 18, Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. —
When duly notified, the failure of the plaintiff and
counsel to appear without valid cause when so
required, pursuant to the next preceding Section,
shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of
the defendant and counsel shall be cause to allow
the plaintiff to present his or her evidence ex parte
within ten (10) calendar days from termination of
the pre-trial, and the court to render judgment on
the basis of the evidence offered. (as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
c. Dismissals under Rule 29, Section 5
Rule 29, Section 5. Failure of party to attend or
serve answers. — If a party or an officer or
managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear
before the officer who is to take his or her
deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
or fails to serve answers to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of
such interrogatories, the court on motion and
notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading
of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default
against that party, and in its discretion, order him
or her to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the
other, including attorney's fees. (as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
Kinds (as to parties)
1. As against one or more several parties
Rule 36, Section 3. Judgment for or against one
or more of several parties. — Judgment may be
given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs
and for or against one or more of several
defendants. When justice so demands, the court
may require the parties on each side to file
adversary pleadings as between themselves and
determine their ultimate rights and obligations.
2. Several judgments
Rule 36, Section 4. Several judgments. — In an
action against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgment is proper, render
judgment against one or more of them, leaving the
action to proceed against the others.
3. Against entity without juridical personality
Rule 36, Section 6. Judgment against entity
without juridical personality. — When judgment is
rendered against two or more persons sued as an
entity without juridical personality, the judgment
shall set out their individual or proper names, if
known.
Kinds (as to claims)
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1. Entire
2. At various stages or separate judgments
Rule 36, Section 5. Separate judgments. — When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, the court, at any stage, upon a
determination of the issues material to a particular
claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the claim, may render a separate
judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment
shall terminate the action with respect to the claim
so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to
the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment
is rendered the court by order may stay its
enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent
judgment or judgments and may prescribe such
conditions as may be necessary to secure the
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the
judgment is rendered.
Rule 41, Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(f) An order of execution
Kinds (as to how executed)
1. Judgments not stayed on appeal
Rule 39, Section 4. Judgments not stayed by
appeal. — Judgments in actions for injunction,
receivership, accounting and support, and such
other judgments as are now or may hereafter be
declared to be immediately executory, shall be
enforceable after their rendition and shall not, be
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal
therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may
make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or
award of support.
2. Judgments for money
Rule 39, Section 9. Execution of judgments for
money, how enforced. —
(a) Immediate payment on demand. — The officer
shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor
the immediate payment of the full amount stated
in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The
judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank
check payable to the judgment obligee, or any
other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the
amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt
directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized
representative if present at the time of payment.
The lawful fees shall be handed under proper
receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over
the said amount within the same day to the clerk
of court of the court that issued the writ.
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If the judgment obligee or his authorized
representative is not present to receive payment,
the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid
payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall
turn over all the amounts coming into his
possession within the same day to the clerk of
court of the court that issued the writ, or if the
same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a
fiduciary account in the nearest government
depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the
locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for
the remittance of the deposit to the account of the
court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall
then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee
in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any,
shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while
the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of
court for disposition as provided by law. In no case
shall the executing sheriff demand that any
payment by check be made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor
cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer
shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which
may be disposed, of for value and not otherwise
exempt from execution giving the latter the option
to immediately choose which property or part
thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy
the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on
the personal properties, if any, and then on the
real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the
personal or real property of the judgment obligor
which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment
obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the
personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and
other personal property, or any interest in either
real or personal property, may be levied upon in
like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The
officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor
and other credits, including bank deposits,
financial interests, royalties, commissions and
other personal property not capable of manual
delivery in the possession or control of third
parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon
the person owing such debts or having in his
possession or control such credits to which the
judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the
judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the
court within five (5) days from service of the notice
of garnishment stating whether or not the
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judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to
satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the
report shall state how much funds or credits the
garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The
garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check
issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall
be delivered directly to the judgment obligee
within ten (10) working days from service of notice
on said garnishee requiring such delivery, except
the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the
court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees
holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall
have the right to indicate the garnishee or
garnishees who shall be required to deliver the
amount due, otherwise, the choice shall be made
by the judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same
procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to
delivery of payment to the judgment obligee.
3. Judgments for specific acts
Rule 39, Section 10. Execution of judgments for
specific act. —
(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other
specific acts; vesting title. — If a judgment directs
a party to execute a conveyance of land or
personal property, or to deliver deeds or other
documents, or to perform, any other specific act
in connection therewith, and the party fails to
comply within the time specified, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the
disobedient party by some other person appointed
by the court and the act when so done shall have
like effect as if done by the party. If real or
personal property is situated within the
Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may by an order divest the
title of any party and vest it in others, which shall
have the force and effect of a conveyance
executed in due form of law.
(b) Sale of real or personal property. — If the
judgment be for the sale of real or personal
property, to sell such property, describing it, and
apply the proceeds in conformity with the
judgment.
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The
officer shall demand of the person against whom
the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real
property is rendered and all persons claiming
rights under him to peaceably vacate the property
within three (3) working days, and restore
possession thereof to the judgment obligee,
otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of
appropriate peace officers, and employing such
means as may be reasonably necessary to retake
possession, and place the judgment obligee in
possession of such property. Any costs, damages,
rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be
satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for
money.
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(d) Removal of improvements on property subject
of execution. — When the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after the hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed
by the court.
(e) Delivery of personal property. — In judgment
for the delivery of personal property, the officer
shall take possession of the same and forthwith
deliver it to the party entitled thereto and satisfy
any judgment for money as therein provided.
4. Special judgments
Rule 39, Section 11. Execution of special
judgments. — When a judgment requires the
performance of any act other than those
mentioned in the two preceding sections, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to
the writ of execution and shall be served by the
officer upon the party against whom the same is
rendered, or upon any other person required
thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such
party or person may be punished for contempt if
he disobeys such judgment.
Effects of judgments and final orders
1. Local
Rule 39, Section 47. Effect of judgments or final
orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a
specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will,
or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration or the condition, status or
relationship of the person, however, the probate of
a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been missed in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest, by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties
or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final
order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
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2. Foreign
Rule 39, Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or
final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order, is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Amendment of judgment
1. Before it becomes final and executory
Eternal Gardens Memorial v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (1988)
Facts: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks
Corporation and private respondent North Philippine
Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists
executed a Land Development Agreement whereby the
former undertook to introduce and construct at its own
expense and responsibility necessary improvements on
the property owned by private respondent into a
memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as
memorial plot lots. Respondent executed in petitioner's
favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage) on the lots
with titles involved in the land development project.
All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its
claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question.
Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as
plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader against
respondent and Maysilo Estate, alleging that it has no
claim of ownership except as a purchaser thereof and is
willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the
owners of said properties.
During trial of the case, respondent presented a
motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due
and unpaid from petitioner. The trial court denied judicial
deposit in its order dated February 13, 1984. Another
order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the
February 13, 1984 order, (1) setting aside the order for
respondent's deposit of the amounts it had previously
received from petitioner; and (2) denying respondent’s
motion to require Eternal Gardens to deposit the balance
under the Land Development Agreement.
Respondent filed before the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) a petition for certiorari praying that
the Orders of February 13, 1984 and October 26, 1984 of
the Regional Trial Court be set aside and that an order be
issued to deposit in court or in a depositor trustee bank
of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the
private respondent. The IAC dismissed the petition in its
decision on February 27, 1985. However, in its Resolution
dated 5 September 1985m ut reversed its decision and
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ordered the respondent to deposit whatever amounts are
due from it under the Land Development Agreement.
Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of
the above decision but it was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the IAC abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reconsidering its
resolution of February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead
in the resolution of September 5, 1985, that petitioner
Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are due from
it under the Land Development Agreement.
Held: No. There is no question that courts have inherent
power to amend their judgments, to make them
conformable to the law applicable provided that said
judgments have not yet attained finality. In fact, motions
for reconsideration are allowed to convince the courts that
their rulings are erroneous and improper and in so doing,
said courts are given sufficient opportunity to correct their
errors.
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted among
others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still
obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent;
that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is
willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said
amounts. Such admissions in the complaint were
reaffirmed in open court before the IAC as stated in the
latter court's resolution dated September 5, 1985. Under
the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible
reason for petitioner's objections to the deposit of the
amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance
of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader
where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only
required by the nature of the action but is a contractual
obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development
Program.
The essence of an interpleader, aside from the
disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the
part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or
funds in controversy with the court. The IAC found that
more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that
interest alone for savings or time deposit would be
considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal
Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence
of the complaint for interpleader, the Court of Appeals
cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court
committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires
correction by the requirement that a deposit of said
amounts should be made to a bank approved by the
Court.
2. After it becomes final and executory
Nunal v. Court of Appeals (1993)
Facts: Respondents filed a case for partition and
accounting of a parcel of land located in Isabela against
Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now deceased and herein represented
by her heirs. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned
by Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, deceased
parents of petitioner and the respondents. Respondents
claimed that said parcel of land has been in possession of
petitioner Luisa Lyon Nuñal since 1946 and that she made
no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite
demands made by private respondents for the partition
and delivery of their shares.
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On December 17, 1974, the trial court rendered
its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered
the partition of the property. On July 30, 1982, the order
of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for the
ordered partition.
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter
of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, filed a
motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary
injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a
party to the case her rights, interests, ownership and
participation over the land should not be affected by a
judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is
unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and
participation is concerned, said share not having been
brought within the jurisdiction of the court.
The trial court dismissed the motion to quash
order of execution with preliminary injunction filed by
Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition. The private
respondents filed motion for clarification as to whether
the partition of property is to be confined merely among
the party plaintiffs and defendants, to the exclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin. On January 9, 1987, the lower court
issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of
the property, it would be unfair and unjust if she would
be left out in the partition of said property. The
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Whether of not the trial court may order the
inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to
participate in the partition of the property in considering
that the decision rendered in that case has long become
final and executory.
Held: No. In the case of Manning International
Corporation v. NLRC, We held that ". . ., nothing is more
settled in the law than that when a final judgment
becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the
highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are
the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "any amendment. or alteration
which substantially affects a final and executory judgment
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose."
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court
in the case has become final and executory. Thus, upon
its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, any modification that he would
make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin
would be in excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary
Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the
parties in the case and all other heirs for her share in the
subject property, in order that all the parties in interest
can prove their respective claims.
Industrial Timber Corporation v. Court of Appeals
(1994)
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Facts: In the earlier case of Industrial Timber Corporation
v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 83616, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of
the NLRC that the petitioners are the employers of private
respondents and remanded the case for a determination
of the validity of the quitclaim allegedly signed by the
latter. In its resolution dated February 3, 1992, the NLRC
affirmed in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter on February
26, 1987, ordering the petitioners to reinstate the private
respondents, and to pay them back wages and other
benefits. In view of the lapse of time since the
promulgation of the decision, the NLRC likewise directed
the petitioners to pay the private respondents severance
benefits should reinstatement of the private respondents
to their former position be no longer possible.
This resolution became final and executory on
March 9, 1992, and entry of judgment was made on
March 25, 1992. The respondents meanwhile had filed
on March 20, 1992, an ex parte motion for issuance of a
writ of execution with manifestation that from February
26, 1987, up to the present, they have not been
reinstated and thus were entitled to back salaries for the
said period and until actual reinstatement shall have been
made.
Upon computation, the Labor Arbiter held
petitioners liable to the respondents for the total amount
of P387,122.65 for back salaries. The NLRC, on appeal,
only made a slight modification of the amount of the
award and directed the petitioners to pay respondents the
sum of P375,795.20.
Petitioners submit that the recomputation
should not have been allowed because the monetary
awards due the respondents had already been
determined and fixed in the order which became final and
executory. It is argued that to allow the recomputation
and the increase of the monetary award to the
respondents would in effect allow an arbiter to change a
decision that has become final and executory.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can be held liable
for the recomputed amount although the resolution has
already become final and executory.
Held: Yes. It is true that after a judgment has become
final and executory, it can no longer be modified or
otherwise disturbed. However, this principle admits of
exceptions, as where facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust and it
therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice,
to direct its modification in order to harmonize the
disposition with the prevailing circumstances."
In this case, the back wages and other benefits
awarded by Arbiter Solamo to each of the private
respondents in the amount of P24,300.00 correspond
merely to the period between their illegal dismissal on
April 26, 1986, up to the time of the rendition of the
decision on February 26, 1987. There is no dispute that
from April 26, 1986, to this date, the private respondents
have not been reinstated nor has payment of the
monetary awards decreed by the NLRC been made to
them.
It may be true that the amount of backwages
and other benefits due to the private respondents as
recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal import of
the dispositive portion of the decision subject of
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ESGUERRA NOTES
execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that
at the time the recomputation was made in 1992, five (5)
years had already elapsed from the time the Labor Arbiter
rendered his Decision on February 26, 1987. Thus, a
recomputation was necessary to arrive at a just and
proper determination of the monetary awards due the
private respondents.
Supplemental Judgment
Esquivel v. Alegre (1989)
Facts: Spouses Teotimo and Visitacion (“private
respondents”) filed a case for unlawful detainer against
Spouses Cresenciana and Lamberto (“petitioners”). The
trial court ruled in favor of private respondents, which
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. After private respondents secured a writ
of execution in the unlawful detainer case, petitioners
filed a complaint for reconveyance with nullity of
judgment damages and preliminary injunction (the
“second case”) alleging that they had prior possession
over the land subject of the unlawful detainer case.
Notably, the question of prior possession of the land in
question was raised and passed upon in the unlawful
detainer case. Hence, the courts ruled in favour of private
respondents in the second case.
After their motion for reconsideration of the
second case was denied, petitioners filed their notice of
appeal but due to the opposition of private respondents
to the non-inclusion in the record on appeal of certain
pleadings, orders and decisions which they claimed are
relevant to the disposition of the appeal, petitioners were
ordered by respondent court to amend their record on
appeal to satisfy the objections of the private
respondents. In the meantime private respondents
transferred the property in question to the spouses
Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas. Petitioners
must have learned of the sale before they could file their
amended record on appeal, which must have prompted
them to file a motion for supplemental complaint against
the vendees of the property in question, the spouses
Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas which was
admitted by respondent court. As borne by the records of
the case, respondent court ruled in favor of herein
petitioners in the supplemental complaint which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners claim that the decision of respondent
court in the supplemental complaint revised the decision
in the original complaint tantamount to an amendment or
reversal of said original decision of respondent court
penned by a previous presiding judge therein.
Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered by a trial
court in a supplemental complaint modified the decision
of the same branch of the court in the original complaint
and amounts to an amendment of the original decision
Held: No. There is a difference between an amended
judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an amended
and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough
study of the original judgment and renders the amended
and clarified judgment only after considering all the
factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified
decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the
original decision. Following the Court's differentiation of a
supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can
be said that a supplemental decision does not take the
place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its
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very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds
something to the primary decision. A supplement exists
side by side with the original. It does not replace that
which it supplements.
In the instant case no restudy was made by
respondent court of the original decision but only on the
issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The
supplemental decision cannot stand alone as a judgment
on the merits as there was no declaration of the
respective rights and duties of the parties. It only
declared the supplemental defendants as successors-in-
interest of the defendants in the original complaint, "such
that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be
legally binding upon them ...".
The part of the supplemental decision which
petitioners claim to have revised the original, is quoted as
follows:
In the light of the foregoing testimony of the
witnesses presented by supplemental plaintiffs together
with the documentary exhibits supporting the allegations
of the supplemental complaint, the Court finds that the
evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are
preponderantly sufficient to justify and warrant a
judgment in their favor.
There can be no other interpretation of the
above statement of respondent court than that all
documentary and testimonial evidence prescribed by
supplemental plaintiffs, petitioners herein, sufficiently
prove that when supplemental defendants entered into
the contract of absolute sale with the original defendants,
they already had full knowledge of the controversy
between supplemental plaintiffs and the original
defendants in Civil Case No. 4883 such that they must be
adjudged as successors-in-interest of original defendants
Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno. This interpretation
is borne by the statement of respondent court at the end
of the paragraph preceding that which petitioners herein
claim to have revised the original decision, which states:
... One thing, however, clear is that both
supplemental defendants are successors-in-interest of
Teotimo Alaurin The prayer for reconveyance of the
property in question cannot be justified in the light of the
decision of Hon. Jose C. Razo.
It must be pointed out that the dispositive
portion itself of the supplemental decision is clear and
unambiguous. It does not make any declaration or
pronouncement that may be taken to have revised or
amended the original decision. All that it declares is that
the supplemental defendants Wilfredo Encinas and
Patrocinia Dasmarinas are successors-in-interest of
defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such
that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be
legally binding upon them.
Judgments Nun Pro Tunc
Cardoza v. Singson (1990)
Facts: Plaintiffs in Civil Case No.1853 filed for a Motion
for Execution of Judgment on 29 August 1979. The motion
alleged that a decision dated February 7, 1938 of the
Court of First Instance, Leyte which was affirmed with
modification in the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. No. 3645, promulgated on December 6, 1939 had
long been final and executory. Plaintiffs allegedly acquired
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knowledge of the appellate court's decision only in Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the lower
November 11, 1974 because before the death of their courts action—decreeing the entry of a judgment nunc
original counsel in 1944 they were not informed of the pro tunc—was not done arbitrarily nor capriciously. The
said decision. In an order dated September 4, 1979, the petitioner was allowed to oppose the motions in open
trial court directed the plaintiffs-movants to submit their court and was even required to submit a memorandum to
memorandum within fifteen days and for the defendants- support his position. The petitioner, however, failed to
oppositors to file their opposition thereto within the same submit a memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient
period from receipt of the memorandum. evidence to support his claims over the properties in
question.
On May 4, 1980, plaintiffs' counsel filed a
motion to defer the consideration of the motion for
Finally, well settled is the rule that a judgment
execution on the ground that in during one of the
which has become final and executory can no longer be
hearings, they allegedly discovered that no entry of
amended or corrected by the court except for clerical
judgment had been made and that nobody could tell
errors or mistakes. In such a situation, the trial court
whether parties or their counsel received a copy of the
loses jurisdiction over the case except to execute the final
decision of the Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs therefore,
judgment, as in this case.
prayed for the recording of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the book of entries of Judgment.
Law of The Case
On July 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order
According to this principle, whatever is once
that "a nunc pro tunc judgment be entered pursuant to
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A.
decision between the same parties in the case continues
G.R. No. 3545." For the satisfaction of the judgment it
to be the law of the case whether correct on general
likewise ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
On July 21, 1981, the writ of execution was
case before the court. This principle generally finds
issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Southern Leyte
application in cases where an appellate court passes on a
or his deputies to enforce and execute the decision of the
question and remands the case to the lower court for
trial court as modified by the appellate court.
further proceedings. The question there settled becomes
the law of the case upon subsequent appeal (RCPI v.
On January 8, 1982 herein petitioner Juanito
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139763, April 26, 2006).
Cardoza filed the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus
Note: This rule does not apply to resolutions rendered in
and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In his
connection with the case wherein no rationale has been
petition, he alleged inter alia that the respondent judge
expounded on the merits of that action (Jarantilla v. Court
usurped the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when it
of Appeals, G.R. No. 80194, Mar. 21, 1989).
issued the Order of July 6, 1981 directing that "a non pro
tunc' judgment be entered pursuant to the decision of the
Bar By Former Judgment And Conclusiveness Of
Court of Appeals in Civil Case C.A. G.R. No. 3545"
Judgment, Distinguished
because (a) under Section 10 of Rule 5 of the Revised
Rules of Court, its issuance is the ministerial duty of the
Del Rosario vs Far East Bank and Trust Company
Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals; (b) that the trial
(2007)
court erred in granting the application for issuance of a
nunc pro tunc judgment because plaintiffs' inaction to
Facts: On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber
move for the execution of the Judgment 40 years after its
Corporation (DATICOR) and respondent Private
promulgation is a ground for its denial; (c) that private
Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP)
respondents have not adduced evidence to overcome the
entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP
regularity in the performance of official function so that it
extended to DATICOR a foreign currency loan of US
can be presumed that the Clerk of Court of the Court of
$265,000 and a peso loan of P2.5 million or a total
Appeals made the entry of judgment; and (d) that
amount of approximately P4.4 million, computed at the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
then prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with the
deprived petitioner of his property without due process of
peso. The loans were secured by real estate mortgages
law.
over six parcels of land.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed a grave
Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP,
abuse of discretion when it made the entry of judgment
which the latter applied to interest, service fees and
nunc pro tunc and issued the writ of execution.
penalty charges. This left petitioners, by PDCP’s
computation, with an outstanding balance on the principal
Held: Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court
of more than P10 million as of May 15, 1983. By March
of equity, the trial court correctly made the entry of a
31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP
judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for
Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545. In
violation of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and
so doing, the lower court merely ordered the judgment of
damages. The appeal before the Supreme Court was
the, Court of Appeals to be executed.
docketed as G.R. No. 73198.

The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was
recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil.
862 where an order or judgment actually rendered by a
court at a former time had not been entered of record as
rendered. There is no doubt that such an entry operates
to save proceedings had before it was made.
In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its
receivables from petitioners (the receivables) to its co-
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC)
under a Deed of Assignment dated April 10, 1987 for a
consideration of P5,435,000. FEBTC, as assignee of the
receivables, and petitioners later executed a

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Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 8,
1988 whereby petitioners agreed to, as they did pay
FEBTC the amount of P6.4 million as full settlement of the
receivables.
On September 2, 1992, the Supreme Court
promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 73198. It determined
that after deducting the P3 million earlier paid by
petitioners to PDCP, their remaining balance on the
principal loan was only P1.4 million.
Based on the Supreme Court decision,
petitioners filed on April 25, 1994 a Complaint for sum of
money against PDCP and FEBTC before the RTC
of Makati, mainly to recover the excess payment which
they computed to be P5.3 million -- P4.335 million from
PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-1610.
On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 94-1610 ordering
PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 million, to bear
interest at 12% per annum from April 25, 1994 until fully
paid; to execute a release or cancellation of the
mortgages. As for the complaint of petitioners against
respondent FEBTC, the trial court dismissed it for lack of
cause of action, ratiocinating that the MOA between
petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to the Supreme
Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 73198, FEBTC not being a
party thereto.
From the trial court’s decision, petitioners and
respondent PDCP appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50591.
On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, holding that petitioners
outstanding obligation, which the Supreme Court had
determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million, could
not be increased or decreased by any act of the creditor
PDCP. The CA held that when PDCP assigned its
receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR was
the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,
irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC
might have provided in the Deed of Assignment,
DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not
bound by its terms. Citing Articles 2154 and 2163 of the
Civil Code which embody the principle of solutio indebiti,
the CA held that the party bound to refund the excess
payment of P5 million was FEBTC as it received the
overpayment; and that FEBTC could recover from PDCP
the amount of P4.035 million representing its
overpayment for the assigned receivables based on the
terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general
principle of equity.
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its
complaint only the amount of P965,000 from FEBTC, the
CA held that it could not grant a relief different from or in
excess of that prayed for. Finally, the CA held that the
claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the payment of P1.4
million had no basis, DATICORs obligation having already
been paid in full, overpaid in fact, when it paid assignee
FEBTC the amount of P6.4 million. This decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal.
On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the
RTC of Makati a Complaint against FEBTC to recover the
balance of the excess payment of P4.335 million. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540.
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In its Answer, FEBTC denied responsibility, it
submitting that nowhere in the dispositive portion of the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it held liable to
return the whole amount of P5.435 million representing
the consideration for the assignment to it of the
receivables, and since petitioners failed to claim the said
whole amount in their original complaint in Civil Case No.
94-1610 as they were merely claiming the amount
of P965,000 from it, they were barred from claiming it.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the
assailed Decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action.
Issue: Whether in filing an action against FEBTC for the
difference in its original claim and the claim adjudged by
the courts in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, FEBTC forum-
shopped
Held: Yes, the filing of Civil Case No. 00-540 constitutes
forum shopping as the issue raised by petitioner is
covered by the doctrine of res judicata. Section 47 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, on the doctrine
of res judicata, reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final
orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the
same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order whichappears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provision lays down two main
rules. Section 49(b) enunciates the first rule of res
judicata known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by
judgment, which states that the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the parties and their privies to the litigation and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal.
Stated otherwise, bar by former judgment
makes the judgment rendered in the first case an
absolute bar to the subsequent action since that
judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered
and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and which
could have been adjudged therein. It is in this concept
that the term res judicata is more commonly and
generally used as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases.
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The second rule of res judicata embodied in
Section 47(c), Rule 39 is conclusiveness of
judgment. This rule provides that any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is
the same. It refers to a situation where the judgment
in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the
matters actually determined or which were necessarily
included therein.
In determining whether causes of action are
identical to warrant the application of the rule of res
judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action
would suffice to authorize a recovery in the first even in
cases in which the forms or nature of the two actions are
different. Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a
bar to the subsequent action.
There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal
relative to Civil Case No. 94-1610 (that rendered in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not only did it
dispose of the case on the merits; it also became
executory as a consequence of the denial of FEBTCs
motion for reconsideration and appeal.
Neither is there room to doubt that the
judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on the merits for
it determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. To
recall, it was ruled that: (1) DATICOR overpaid by P5.3
million; (2) FEBTC was bound to refund the excess
payment but because DATICORs claim against FEBTC was
only P965,000, the court could only grant so much as the
relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further
claim against DATICOR because its obligation had already
been paid in full. Right or wrong, that judgment bars
another case based upon the same cause of action.
Immutability against Final Judgment
Griffith vs. Estur (2008)
Facts: On 25 July 1997, respondents Estur, Ofalsa,
and Ereve (respondents) filed an amended complaint for
illegal dismissal, nonpayment of legal holiday pay,
13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay against
Lincoln Gerald, Inc. (Lincoln) and petitioner Dominic
Griffith (petitioner).
Lincoln, a corporation owned by
the Griffith family, is engaged in the manufacture of
furniture. Respondents alleged that petitioner Dominic
Griffith, the Vice President for Southeast Asia Operations,
managed the corporation.
On 4 October 1999, Labor Arbiter Vicente
R. Layawen (Labor Arbiter Layawen) decided the case in
favor of respondents. Lincoln filed a notice of appeal on 9
November 1999 but failed to file the required
memorandum of appeal. On 6 July 2001, the decision of
Labor Arbiter Layawen became final and executory, and
the first writ of execution was issued on 2 October 2001.
In February 2002, petitioner received a copy of the first
alias writ of execution dated 7 January 2002, issued by
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Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno (Labor Arbiter Reyno) directed
against him and Lincoln.
On 19 February 2002, petitioner filed a motion
to quash the first alias writ of execution. Petitioner alleged
in his motion that he was unaware of the labor case filed
against him because he was Lincolns Vice President for
Southeast Asia Operations only until 17 September 1997.
Petitioner contended that the addition of the
execution fee in the writ in effect modified Labor
Arbiter Layawens decision, and thus nullified the
writ. Furthermore, petitioner maintained that as an officer
of Lincoln, he was not personally liable to pay the
judgment debt because he acted in good faith and within
the bounds of his authority. Labor Arbiter Reyno denied
the motion in an order dated 24 April 2002. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied on 16 July
2002.
On 11 September 2002, Labor
Arbiter Reyno issued a second alias writ of execution
against petitioner and Lincoln.
Issue: Whether the petitioner Griffith can assail the
decision of Labor Arbiter Layawens based on the defenses
which he raised
Held: No. Labor Arbiter Layawens decision is already final
and executory and can no longer be the subject of an
appeal. Thus, petitioner is bound by the decision and can
no longer impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the
rule that a decision that has attained finality can no longer
be modified even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law. The doctrine of
finality of judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v.
Gallardo:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of
judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus
setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which
is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.
While petitioner can no longer challenge the
decision which has become final and executory, he can
question the manner of its execution especially if it is not
in accord with the tenor and terms of the judgment. As
held in Abbott v. NLRC:
In Sawit v. Rodas and Daquis v. Bustos, we
held that a judgment becomes final and executory by
operation of law, not by judicial declaration. Accordingly,
finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of
the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is
perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution; and
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ESGUERRA NOTES
issuance thereof is a ministerial duty, compellable
by mandamus.
In the instant case, however, what is sought to
be reviewed is not the decision itself but the manner of
its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true
that the decision itself has become final
and executory and so can no longer be challenged, there
is no question either that it must be enforced in
accordance with its terms and conditions. Any
deviation therefrom can be the subject of a proper
appeal.
REMEDIES AGAINST JUDGMENTS OR FINAL
ORDERS
Remedies Before Finality Of Judgment
(1) Motion for reconsideration
(2) Motion for new trial
(3) Appeal
DEFINITION
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 37 is directed
against a judgment or final order. It is not the motion for
reconsideration of interlocutory order, which often
precedes a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It does
not apply to cases that fall under Summary Procedure.
GROUNDS: [Rule 37, Sec. 1]
Grounds for Motion for New Trial:
(1) FAME – Fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence
(a) Conditions:
(i) Which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against; and
(ii) By reason of which such aggrieved party has
probably been impaired in his rights
NOTE: Fraud must be extrinsic fraud which means any
fraudulent scheme executed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial against the losing party who because
of such fraud is prevented from presenting his side of the
case.
(2) Newly discovered evidence
(a) Requisites:
(i) It must have been discovered after the trial
(ii) It could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; and
(iii) The evidence is of such weight that if admitted,
would probably alter the result of the action; and
(iv) It must be material and not merely collateral,
cumulative, or corroborative
Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration:
(1) Damages awarded are excessive
(2) Evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final
order
(3) The decision or final order is contrary to law
WHEN TO FILE:
An aggrieved party may file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal.
The motions are filed with the court which rendered the
questioned judgment or final order.
The period for appeal is within 15 days after notice to the
appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The 15-day period is deemed to commence upon receipt
by the counsel of record, which is considered notice to the
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parties. Service upon the parties themselves is prohibited
and is not considered as official receipt of judgment.
Effect of Filing – The filing of a timely motion interrupts
the period to appeal.
FORM AND CONTENTS [Rule 37, Sec. 2]
Form:
(1) The motion must comply with the provisions of Rule
15 otherwise it will not be accepted for filing and/or will
not suspend the running of the reglementary period.
(2) It shall be made in writing, stating the ground or
grounds therefor
(3) Written notice shall be served by movant on the
adverse party
NOTE: Non-compliance with this requirement would
reduce the motion to a mere pro forma motion, which
shall not toll the period for appeal.
Contents of a motion for new trial
(1) If based on FAME, it shall be supported by an affidavit
of merits
NOTE: An affidavit of merits is one which recites the
nature and character of FAME on which the motion is
based and stating the movant’s good and substantial
cause of action or defense and the evidence he intends to
present if granted
(2) If based on newly found evidence, it shall be
supported by:
(a) Affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is
expected or given; or
(b) Duly authenticated documents which are proposed
to be introduced in evidence
Contents of a motion for reconsideration
(1) Shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions
of the judgment or final order which are not supported by
evidence or which are contrary to law
(2) Make express reference to testimonial or
documentary evidence or provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or conclusions
RESOLUTION OF MOTION AND COURT ACTION
Court action – The court may: [Rule 37, Sec. 3]
(1) Set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial; or upon such terms as may be just
(2) Deny the motion
(3) Amend such judgment or final order accordingly if:
(a) The court finds that excessive damages have been
awarded or that; or
(b) That the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law
Resolution [Rule 37, Sec. 4] – he motion shall be resolved
within 30 days from submission
The 30-day period to resolve the motion is held to be
mandatory [Gonzales v. Bantolo (2006)]
GRANT OF THE MOTION; EFFECT
Grant of motion for reconsideration
The court may amend the judgment or final order
accordingly. The amended judgment is in the nature of a
new judgment, which supersedes the original judgment.
Grant of motion for new trial
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The original judgment shall be vacated, and the action (3) 3. That decision or final
shall stand for trial de novo. The recorded evidence upon order is contrary to law
the former trial shall be used at the new trial without
retaking them (if they are material and competent).

Partial grant
Rule 37, Sec. 7 allows the court to order a new trial or
grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable Second motion may be Second motion from the
without interfering with the judgment or final order upon allowed so long as same party is prohibited.
the rest. based on grounds not The prohibition applies only
existing or available at
to final orders or judgments,
REMEDY WHEN MOTION IS DENIED; FRESH 15-DAY the time the first hence it is allowed in
RULE motion was made interlocutory orders
Effect of Denial of Motion – The judgment or final order If a new trial is granted,
If the court finds that
shall stand as is original judgment or excessive damages have
Single-Motion Rule [Rule 37, Sec. 5] final order is vacated.been awarded or that the
A party shall not be allowed to file a 2nd motion for The case stands for trial
judgment or final order is
reconsideration. de novo and will be contrary to the evidence or
• Follow the Omnibus Motion Rule tried anew law, it may amend such
judgment or final order
NOTE: While a 2nd motion for reconsideration is not accordingly
allowed, a second motion for new trial is authorized Available even on Available against the
• However, it must be based on a ground not appeal but only on the judgments or final orders or
existing nor available when the 1st motion was ground of newly both the trial and appellate
discovered evidence courts
made within the period allowed but excluding
* Both are prohibited motions under Summary
the time during which the first motion had been Procedure
pending.
APPEALS IN GENERAL
Fresh 15-Day Rule: The aggrieved party has a “fresh
period” of 15 DAYS within which to file his appeal. NATURE OF APPEAL
If the motion is denied, the movant has a “fresh period”
of 15 days from receipt or notice of the order denying the (1) Not a natural right nor a part of due process
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration within (2) It is merely a statutory right, and may be exercised
which to file an appeal. [Neypes v. CA, 2005] only in the manner and in accordance with provisions of
the law. It must comply with the requirements; failing to
NOTES: do so, the right to appeal is lost
(1) This fresh period becomes significant only when a (3) Once granted, appeals become part of due process
party opts to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration and should be liberally applied in favor of the right to
(2) This rule does not refer to the period within which to appeal
appeal from the order denying the motion for
reconsideration but to the period within which to appeal JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS SUBJECT TO
from the judgment itself. APPEAL; MATTERS NOT APPEALABLE

Filing of a proper motion for new trial interrupts the Rule 41, Sec. 1, as amended by AM 07-7-12-SC (2007)
running of the period of appeal which begins to run again provides:
from receipt of the notice of the movant of the order
denying his motion (fresh 15 day period) [Phil. (1) Appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Ortiz] that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by the Rules to be
Remedies if Motion is DENIED: appealable
(1) To appeal from the judgment or final order itself
(2) The order denying the motion may itself be assailed (2) No appeal may be taken from:
by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (a) An order denying a petition for relief or any
(3) Rule 37, Sec. 9 says that an order denying a motion similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
for new trial or reconsideration is NOT appealable
(a) NOTE HOWEVER: AM 07-7-12 amended Sec. 1 of (b) An interlocutory order;
Rule 41 by deleting “An order denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration” from the non-appealable (c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
orders.
(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a
Motion for New Trial Motion for judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
Reconsideration the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any
Grounds: Grounds: other ground vitiating consent;
(1) Fraud, accident, (1) Damages awarded are
mistake, or excusable excessive (e) An order of execution;
negligence (2) That evidence is
(2) Newly discovered insufficient to justify the (f) A judgment or final order for or against one or
evidence decision or final order more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party

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ESGUERRA NOTES

complaints, while the main case is pending, unless Furnish RTC and to the lower court
the court allows an appeal therefrom; and adverse party a and adverse party
copy of such
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

NOTE: AM 07-7-12-SC removed from the original list “an

order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.”
NOTE, HOWEVER: Rule 37, Sec. 9 which states that no
appeal can be made from an order denying MR or MNT.

Only final judgments or orders can be appealed as Within 15 days Within 15 days Within 15 days
distinguished from interlocutory judgments or orders from notice of from notice of from notice of
which are not appealable. judgment for decision to be judgment or order
notice of appeal reviewed or from of denial of MFR
Final Order Interlocutory Order and 30 days for denial of a MFR or or MFNT
Disposes of the matter in its Does not dispose of a case records on MFNT
entirety, leaving nothing completely but leaves appeal
more to be done but to something more to be
enforce execution decided upon.
Appealable Not appealable except ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL
through a petition for Appeal is limited to cognizable judgments/issues.
certiorari under Rule 65 The appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a
Must clearly and distinctly No need to comply with judgment which is immediately final and executory by
state the law and the facts such a requirement express provision of law. [Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
on which it is based (2005)]

An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose
of the case, and does not end the court's task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done.
[BPI v. Lee (2012)]
REMEDY AGAINST JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
WHICH ARE NOT APPEALABLE
The aggrieved party may file a special civil action under
Rule 65. [Rule 41, Sec. 1]
MODES OF APPEAL
Rationale: Appeal is merely a privilege conferred by law
upon the litigants.
A party cannot change the theory on appeal. Only issues
pleaded in the lower court and properly raised may be
resolved by the appellate court. [Medina v. CA (1992)]
However, issues which are inferred from or necessarily
connected with the issue properly raised and pleaded may
be resolved by the appellate court. [Espina v. CA (1992)]
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND OTHER
PROCEEDINGS
[Rule 38]

(1) Ordinary appeal – Rule 40 and 41 CONCEPT

(a) Notice of appeal Remedies AFTER finality of judgment
(b) Record on appeal (1) Petition for relief [Rule 38]
(2) Petition for review – Rule 42 (2) Action to Annul Judgment [Rule 47]
(3) Petition for review on certiorari – Rule 45 (3) Collateral Attack of a Judgment that is Void on its Face

A petition for relief from judgment together with a motion

Ordinary Petition for Petition for for new trial and a motion for reconsideration are
Appeal Review Review on remedies available only to parties in the proceedings
Certiorari where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has
Appeal by writ of Rule 42 Rule 45 been held that a person who was never a party to the
error case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail
of a petition for relief from judgment [Alaban v. Cam]
Case is decided Case decided by Case decided by
by RTC in its RTC in the the RTC, CA, CTA, NOTE: This is not applicable to the SC since it is not a trier
original exercise of its and of facts.
jurisdiction appellate Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction RULE 37 v. RULE 38
Appealed to the Petition for review Appealed to the
CA with the CA SC Rule 37 Rule 38
File notice of File a verified File verified Available BEFORE Available AFTER
appeal or record petition for review petition for review judgment becomes final judgment has become
of appeal with with CA. on certiorari with and executory final and executory
court of origin Pay docket and the SC. Applies to judgments or Applies to judgments,
and give a copy lawful fees and Pay docket and final orders only final orders and other
to adverse party P500 as deposit lawful fees and proceedings
for costs with the P500 for costs. Grounds: (1) FAME and Ground: FAME
CA. Submit proof of (2) Newly discovered
service of a copy evidence

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ESGUERRA NOTES
Filed within the time to Filed within 60 days
appeal from knowledge of
judgment and within 6
months from entry of
judgment
If denied, order of denial If denied, order denying
is not appealable; hence, a petition for relief is
remedy is appeal from not appealable; remedy
judgment is appropriate civil
action under Rule 65
Legal remedy Equitable remedy
Motion need not be Petition must be verified
verified
Rule 37 and Rule 38 are EXCLUSIVE remedies.
A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration cannot file a petition for relief after his
motion has been denied.
A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration can no longer file a petition
for relief from judgment after his motion has been
denied. These remedies are mutually exclusive. It is only
in appropriate cases where a party aggrieved by the
judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration that a petition for relief
can be filed. [Francisco v. Puno, 1981]
WHEN PROPER
Rule 38 can be availed of once the judgment has become
final and executory.
The relief provided for by Rule 38 is of equitable character
and is only allowed in exceptional cases, that is where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. A petition
for relief is not regarded with favor and judgment will not
be disturbed where the party complaining has or by his
exercising proper diligence would have had an adequate
remedy at law, as where petitioner could have proceeded
by appeal to vacate or modify the default judgment.
[Manila Electric v. CA (1990)]
Under Sec. 1, it is also available when “any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against the petitioner in
any court through FAME”
Thus, it was held that a petition for relief is also applicable
to a proceeding taken after entry of judgment or final
order such as an order of execution [Cayetano v.
Ceguerra] or an order dismissing an appeal [Medran v.
CA]
WHERE FILED
Rule 38 is not an independent action but a continuation
of the old case. Hence, it is filed with the same court and
same branch which decided the case.
GROUNDS [Rule 38, Sec. 1 and 2]
(1) When judgment or final order is entered or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against petitioner through
FAME
(2) When petitioner has been prevented from taking an
appeal by FAME
PERIOD FOR FILING [Rule 38, Sec. 3]
(1) Within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order, or other proceeding to be set aside; AND
(2) Not more than 6 months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken
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The two periods for the filing of a petition for relief are
not extendible and never interrupted. Both periods must
be complied with. [Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Ariaga]
Reckoning points:
(1) The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party
acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or
proceeding. Not from the date he actually read the same
[Perez v. Araneta]
(2) 6-months period is computed from the date of entry
of the order or judgment
FORM AND CONTENTS OF THE PETITION
(1) The petition for relief must be verified
(2) The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit
showing the FAME relied upon; and
(3) The affidavit of merit accompanying the petition must
also show the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense as the case may be
The absence of an affidavit of merits is a fatal defect and
warrant denial of the petition [Fernandez v. Tan Tiong
Tick].
However, it is not a fatal defect so long as the facts
required to be set out also appear in the verified petition
[Fabar Inc. v. Rodelas].
When Affidavit of Merit is not necessary:
(1) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the defendant;
(2) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(3) When judgment was taken by default;
(4) When judgment was entered by mistake or was
obtained by fraud; or
(5) Other similar cases.
ORDER TO FILE ANSWER
[Rule 38, Sec. 4]
An order to answer shall issue only if petition is sufficient
in form and substance.
If petition is sufficient in form and in substance, the court
shall issue an order requiring the adverse party to answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof.
PROCEEDINGS AFTER ANSWER IS FILED [Rule 38,
Sec. 6]
After filing of answer or expiration of the period therefor,
court shall hear the petition.
If the court finds that the allegations are not true –
Petition is dismissed.
If the court finds that allegations are true:
(1) It shall set aside the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding complained of upon such terms as may be just
(2) Thereafter, case shall stand as if such had never been
rendered, issued, or taken
(3) The court shall then proceed to hear and determine
the case as if timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration has been granted by it
REMEDY FOR DENIAL OF PETITION FOR RELIEF.
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Civil Procedure
ESGUERRA NOTES
Appeal from an order denying a petition for relief is no
longer available under the present rules.
The remedy against a denial of a petition for relief is
certiorari under Rule 65, when proper.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS
AND RESOLUTIONS
[Rule 47]
Annulment of Judgment is a remedy in law independent
of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
was rendered and may be availed of though the judgment
has been executed.
Rule 37
New Trial or Reconsideration
Grounds and nature (Rule 37, Sec. 1)
Motion for New Trial
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment
or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the
following causes materially affecting the substantial rights
of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence (FAME) which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against and by reason of which such
aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would
probably alter the result.
Distinguish from motion to reopen trial
A motion to reopen the trial is different and distinct from
a motion for new trial.
For one thing, a motion to reopen may properly be
presented only after either or both parties have formally
offered, and closed their evidence, but before judgment.
On the other hand, a motion for new trial is proper only
after rendition or promulgation of judgment.
For another, a motion for reopening, unlike a motion for
new trial, is not specifically mentioned and prescribed as
a remedy by the Rules of Court. There is no specific
provision in the Rules of Court governing motions to
reopen. It is albeit a recognized procedural recourse or
device, deriving validity and acceptance from long,
established usage.
A motion for new trial in civil or criminal actions may be
applied for and granted only upon specific, well-defined
grounds, set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1) and
121 (Section 2). On the other hand, the reopening of a
case for the reception of additional evidence after a case
has been submitted for decision but before judgment is
actually rendered is, it has been said, controlled by no
other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice,
resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial
Court; and its concession, or denial, by said Court in the
exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal
unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. A brief review of
precedents treating of the matter of reopening a trial
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provides a clearer insight into the nature of the remedy,
and is not inutile at this point. (Alegre v. Reyes, G.R. No.
L-56923, 9 May 1988)
Motion for Reconsideration
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also
move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the
damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence
is insufficient to justify the decision or final order,
or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
Periods
For filing - Within the period for taking an
appeal
Effect of motion for extension of time
- The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Not required for appeal
Second motion for new trial
Sec. 5. Second motion for new trial.
A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then
available and those not so included shall be deemed
waived. A second motion for new trial, based on a ground
not existing nor available when the first motion was
made, may be filed within the time herein provided
excluding the time during which the first motion had been
pending.
Second motion for reconsideration
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Milan (2010)
Facts: The instant case was commenced on February 18,
2000, upon the filing of a Complaint for Sum of Money[6]
by petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing)
against herein respondents Antonio C. Milan (Antonio)
and Laura M. Milan. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-00-40010 in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
226.
On March 2, 2000, the RTC issued summons to
respondents, addressed to their place of residence as
stated in the complaint, which is at No. 47 San Ildefonso
Drive, Torres Village, Novaliches, Quezon City.
On March 10, 2000, the process server of the RTC filed
his Officers Return, stating that he went to the
aforementioned address on two occasions to serve the
summons and the copy of the complaint to the
respondents. At both times, however, the process server
was told by the people he encountered there that
respondents had already transferred to an unknown
location. The summons and the copy of the complaint
were, thus, returned unserved.
In view of the above situation, PCI Leasing filed on April
10, 2000 a Motion to Archive Civil Case No. Q-00-40010,
asserting that it was then conducting an investigation in
order to ascertain the whereabouts of the respondents.
PCI Leasing prayed that the case be archived, subject to
its reinstatement after the whereabouts of the
respondents was determined.
In an Orderdated April 13, 2000, the RTC denied the
Motion to Archive given that the circumstances of the case
were not within the purview of the provisions of
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paragraph II (c) of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92
(Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases
Subsequently, on July 13, 2000, the RTC issued an
Order,[16] directing PCI Leasing to take the necessary
steps to actively prosecute the instant case within ten
days from receipt under pain of dismissal of the case for
lack of interest.
On July 31, 2000, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance
of Alias Summons.[17] Said motion was, however, denied
by the RTC via an Order[18] dated August 3, 2000 on the
ground that the same was a mere scrap of paper for
apparently containing a defective notice of hearing.
On September 5, 2000, PCI Leasing filed another Motion
for Issuance of Alias Summons, which the RTC scheduled
for hearing on October 13, 2000. During the hearing of
the motion on said date, there was no appearance from
both counsels of PCI Leasing and respondents.
Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order dated October 13,
2000 dismissing the instant case.
PCI Leasing sought a reconsideration of the above
Order. In a Resolution dated January 4, 2001, the RTC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On January 26,
2001, PCI Leasing filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Reconsideration, once more seeking a reconsideration of
the dismissal of its case. Given the alleged amount of the
respondents liability, PCI Leasing stressed that it had a
valid cause of action against the former and it never lost
interest in the prosecution of its case. PCI Leasing then
implored the RTC to revisit the Order dated October 13,
2000 and the Resolution dated January 4, 2001 to make
the dismissal without prejudice, in order for PCI Leasing
to maintain its right to re-file its legal claim against
respondents.
The RTC denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration
in a Resolution dated April 6, 2001. The trial court
observed, inter alia, that the Ex Parte Motion was already
the second motion for reconsideration filed by PCI
Leasing. Also, the RTC made mention of the provisions of
Section 3, Rule 17of the Rules of Court relating to the
dismissal of a case due to the fault of a plaintiff.
On May 11, 2001, PCI Leasing filed a Notice of Appeal in
an attempt to challenge the Order dated October 13, 2000
of the RTC, as well as the Resolutions dated January 4,
2001 and April 6, 2001. On August 3, 2001, the RTC
rendered a Resolution dismissing the Notice of Appeal,
given that the same was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
Held: No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order. A second
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.
For resolution
Sec. 4. Resolution of motion.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be resolved
within thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted for
resolution.
Contents
In General
Sec. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration
and notice thereof.
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The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or
grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served
by the movant on the adverse party. A motion for new
trial shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of
motions. A motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph
(a) of the preceding section shall be supported by
affidavits of merits which may be rebutted by affidavits.
A motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph (b) shall
be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such
evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated
documents which are proposed to be introduced in
evidence.
A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically
the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order
which are not supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions
of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or
conclusions.
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
not toll the reglementary period of appeal.
Sec. 3. Contents.
A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained and
the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by
these Rules or necessary to prove facts alleged therein,
shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other
papers.
Motion for new trial
A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner
provided for proof of motions. A motion for the cause
mentioned in paragraph (a) of the preceding section shall
be supported by affidavits of merits which may be
rebutted by affidavits. A motion for the cause mentioned
in paragraph (b) shall be supported by affidavits of the
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be
given, or by duly authenticated documents which are
proposed to be introduced in evidence.
Motion for reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically
the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final order
which are not supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions
of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or
conclusions.
Pro forma motion and its effects
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
not toll the reglementary period of appeal.
Marina Properties Corp. v. CA (1998)
Facts: Petitioner Marina Properties Corporation (MARINA
for short) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of real estate development. Among its projects
is a condominium complex project, known as the MARINA
BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT consisting of 10
building clusters with 31 housing units to be built on a
parcel of land at Asiaworld City, Coastal Road in
Paranaque, Metro Manila. The area is covered by T.C.T.
No. (121211) 42201 of the Registry of Deeds of the same
municipality.
The construction of the project commenced sometime in
1988, with respondent H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc.
(H.L. CARLOS for brevity) as the principal contractor,
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particularly of Phase III. CARLOS to purchase a
condominium unit therein known as Unit B-121. Thus, on
October 9, 1988, the parties entered into a Contract to
Purchase and to Sell covering Unit B-121 for
P3,614,000.00. H.L. CARLOS paid P1,034,200.00 as
downpayment, P50,000.00 as cash deposit and
P67,024.22 equivalent to 13 monthly amortizations.
After paying P1,810,330.70, which was more than half of
the contract price, H.L. CARLOS demanded for the
delivery of the unit, but MARINA refused. H.L. CARLOS
filed the instant complaint for specific performance with
damages against MARINA with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In its answer, MARINA claimed that its cancellation of the
Contract to Purchase and Sell is justified since H.L.
CARLOS has failed to pay its monthly installment since
October 1989 or for a period of almost two (2) years; that
H.L. CARLOS abandoned its work on the project as of
December 1989; and that the instant case should have
been suspended in view of the pendency of Civil Case No.
89-5870 for damages in the Makati RTC involving the
same issues.
On February 21, 1992, the HLURB, through Atty.
Abraham N. Vermudez, Arbiter, rendered a decision,
declaring the cancellation of the subject Contract to Sell
as null and void.
Whereupon, MARINA interposed an appeal to the Board
of Commissioners of HLURB (First Division) which
affirmed the assailed decision. On further appeal to the
Office of the President, the decision of the Board of
Commissioners (First Division) was affirmed.
MARINA filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
The Court of Appeals sustained MARINA as regards the
award of actual damages, finding that no evidence was
presented to prove the P30,000.00 award as monthly
rental for the condominium unit. However, as to the
pronouncement of the Office of the President that
MARINAs motion for reconsideration was merely pro-
forma, the Court of Appeals noted that MARINA did not
raise any new issue in its motion for reconsideration. In
the same vein, respondent court ruled that MARINA was
not deprived of its right to appeal.
The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside MARINAs
assertion that the complaint should have been dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia.
There is no dispute that the case at bench and Civil Case
No. 89-5870 for damages at the Makati RTC involves the
same parties although in the civil case, the officers of
MARINA have been impleaded as co-defendants. While
the first requisite obtains in this case, the last two are
conspicuously absent.
It will be observed that the two cases involve distinct and
separate causes of action or rights asserted. Civil Case
No. 89-5870 is for the collection of sums of money
corresponding to unpaid billings and labor costs incurred
by H.L. CARLOS in the construction of the project under
the Construction Contract agreed upon by the parties.
Upon the other hand, the case at bench is for specific
performance (delivery of the condominium unit) and
damages arising from the unilateral cancellation of the
Contract to Purchase and to Sell by MARINA.
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Moreover, the reliefs sought are also different. In the civil
case, H.L. CARLOS prays for the award of P7,065,885.03
representing unpaid labor costs, change orders and price
escalations including the sum of P2,000,000.00 as
additional compensatory damages. In the instant case,
H.L. CARLOS seeks not only the awa[r]d of actual and
exemplary damages but also the delivery of the
condominium unit upon MARINAs acceptance of the
monthly amortization on the remaining balance, the
execution of a final deed of sale and the delivery of the
title to the said private respondent.
MARINAs claim that the present complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of splitting a cause of action,
deserves scant consideration. The two complaints did not
arise from a single cause of action but from two separate
causes of action. It bears emphasis that H.L. CARLOS
cause of action in the civil case stemmed from the breach
by MARINA of its contractual obligation under the
Construction Contract, while in the case at bench, H.L.
CARLOS cause of action is premised on the unilateral
cancellation of the Contract to Purchase and Sell by
MARINA.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of
the Office of the President but deleted the award of actual
damages.
Held: Although a motion for reconsideration merely
reiterate the issues already passed upon by the court,
that by itself does not make it pro forma and is immaterial
because what is essential is compliance with the
requisites of the Rules. An aggrieved party is allowed one
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision or final
order before he may file a petition for review with the CA.
Republic v. ICC (2006)
Facts: On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a
legislative franchise under Republic Act (RA) No. 7633 to
operate domestic telecommunications, filed with the NTC
an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity to install, operate, and maintain an
international telecommunications leased circuit service
between the Philippines and other countries, and to
charge rates therefor, with provisional authority for the
purpose.
In an Order dated June 4, 1996, the NTC approved the
application for a provisional authority subject to
conditions. Respondent ICC filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the Order insofar as the same
required the payment of a permit fee. In a subsequent
Order dated June 25, 1997, the NTC denied the motion.
Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on a petition for certiorari
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, questioning the NTC's
imposition against it of a permit fee of P1,190,750.50 as
a condition for the grant of the provisional authority
applied for.
In its original decision dated January 29, 1999, the CA
ruled in favor of the NTC whose challenged orders were
sustained, and accordingly denied ICC's certiorari
petition
In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the
CA, in its Amended Decision dated September 30, 1999,
reversed itself. Petitioner NTC filed a motion for
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reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated January 24, 2000.
Held: The mere fact that a motion for reconsideration
reiterates issues already passed upon by the court does
not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion. Among the
ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed
is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is
erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or evidence.
The movant has to dwell of necessity on issues already
passed upon.
Action by court
Options in general
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order
and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or
may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final
order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend
such judgment or final order accordingly.
Grant of motion for new trial
Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial.
If a new trial is granted in accordance with the provisions
of this Rule, the original judgment or final order shall be
vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but
the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, in so
far as the same is material and competent to establish
the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking
the same.
Partial new trial or reconsideration
Sec.7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.
If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the
court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all
of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less than all,
of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or
grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable
without interfering with the judgment or final order upon
the rest.
Sec. 8. Effect of order for partial new trial.
When less than all of the issues are ordered retried, the
court may either enter a judgment or final order as to the
rest, or stay the enforcement of such judgment or final
order until after the new trial.
Denial Remedy
Sec. 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration.
An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration
is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.
APPEAL
ORDINARY APPEAL
Rule 40
MTC to RTC
Where to appeal
Sec. 1. Where to appeal.
An appeal from a judgment or final order of a Municipal
Trial Court may be taken to the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the area to which the former
pertains. The title of the case shall remain as it was in the
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court of origin, but the party appealing the case shall be
further referred to as the appellant and the adverse party
as the appellee.
When to appeal
Sec. 2. When to appeal.
An appeal may be taken within fifteen (15) days after
notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order
appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days after notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
How to appeal
Sec. 3. How to appeal.
The appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court that rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from.
The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the
appeal, the judgment or final order or part thereof
appealed from, and state the material dates showing the
timeliness of the appeal.
A record on appeal shall be required only in special
proceedings and in other cases of multiple or separate
appeals.
The form and contents of the record on appeal shall be
the following:
(Section 6, Rule 41)
a. Full names of all the parties to the
proceedings shall be stated in the caption of
the record on appeal;
b. Include the judgment or final order from
which the appeal is taken;
c. In chronological order, copies of only such
pleadings, petitions, motions and all
interlocutory orders as are related to the
appealed judgment or final order for the
proper understanding of the issue involved;
d. Together with such data as will show that the
appeal was perfected on time.
e. Every record on appeal exceeding twenty
(20) pages must contain a subject index.
Copies of the notice of appeal and the record on appeal
where required, shall be served on the adverse party.
Perfection of appeal
Sec. 5. Notice of appeal.
The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the
appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof
appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal is
being taken, and state the material dates showing the
timeliness of the appeal.
Appeal is deemed perfected (Rule 41, Sec. 9):
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a. By notice of appeal: as to him, upon
the filing of the notice of appeal in due
time; and
b. By record on appeal: as to him, with
respect to the subject matter thereof,
upon the approval of the record of
appeal filed in due time.
Appellate court docket and other lawful fees
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate
court together with the original record or the record on
appeal. N.B Same as (Rule 41, Sec. 4)
Procedure in RTC
Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.
(a) upon receipt of the complete record or the record on
appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall
notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be
the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which
shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court,
a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse
party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee,
or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be
considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial
Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda as are filed.
Appeal from MTC order dismissing case
a. Without Trial on the Merits
Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial;
lack of jurisdiction.
If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the
Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case
may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal
is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional
Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the
case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with
it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for
further proceedings.
b. With Trial on the Merits
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional
Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in
accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice
to the admission of amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice.
MTC without jurisdiction
Encarnacion v. Amigo (2006)
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Facts: On April 11, 1995, petitioner became the owner of
a parcel of land by virtue of a waiver of rights executed
by his mother-in-law, which he thereafter subdivided into
two lots.
Sometime in 1985, respondent allegedly entered the
premise and took possession of a portion of the property
without the permission of the predecessor-in-interest of
the said property.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for
ejectment (unlawful detainer) with the MTC after his
February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding
that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded.
The letter was received by the respondent on February
12, 2001.
Respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession
and occupation of a portion of the subject land since
1968.
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but
the RTC dismissed the case on appeal, on the ground that
the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence the latter
acquired no appellate jurisdiction over thereof.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, which remanded the case to the RTC for the
proper action.
Held: The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case.
If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on
appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try
the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the
basis of the evidence presented in the lower court,
without prejudice to the admission of the amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of
justice.
MTC with jurisdiction
Canlas v. Tubil (2009)
Facts: On June 9, 2004, a complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed by respondent Iluminada Tubil against
petitioners Rodolfo Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad
Canlas and spouses Pablo and Charito Canlas before the
MTC. The pertinent allegations read:
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC
is without jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that
the case was not prosecuted in the name of the real
parties in interest.
On September 14, 2004, the MTC denied the motion
because the grounds relied upon were evidentiary in
nature which needed to be litigated.
Thus, petitioners filed their answer where they denied the
allegations in the complaint. They claimed that together
with their predecessors-in-interest, they had been in
open, continuous, adverse, public and uninterrupted
possession of the land for more than 60 years; that
respondents title which was issued pursuant to Free
Patent No. 03540 was dubious, spurious and of unlawful
character and nature; and that respondents cause of
action was for an accion publiciana, which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the MTC.
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On October 23, 2006, the MTC rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer because
respondent failed to show that the possession of the
petitioners was by mere tolerance.
Respondent appealed to the RTC which rendered its
Decision on April 11, 2007 affirming in toto the judgment
of the MTC. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied in an Orderdated June 8, 2007.
Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, which rendered the assailed decision on June 12,
2008, which reversed the Regional Trial Courts Decision.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its September 1, 2008
Resolution.
Held: If the case was tried on the merits by the lower
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case
if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
case in accordance with the preceding section, without
prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.
Rule 41
RTC to CA
Subject of appeal
Sec.1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar
motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more
of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
crossclaims and third-party complaints, while the main
case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Non-appealable orders
AM 07-7-12-SC dated 4 December 2007
Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58, and 65
RULE 41
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a
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particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
1. An order denying a petition for relief or any similar
motion seeking relief from judgment;
2. An interlocutory order;
3. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
4. An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
5. An order of execution;
6. A judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main
case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and
7. An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action as
provided in Rule 65.
RULE 45
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may
seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion
filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
its pendency.
RULE 58
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception.
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing
and prior notice to the party or persons sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said
party or person to show cause at a specified time and
place, why the injunction should not be granted. The court
shall also determine, within the same period, whether or
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding
sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the
presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte
a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section
as to service of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two
(72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether
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the temporary restraining order shall be extended until
the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In
no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction
is denied or not resolved within the said period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order
is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration
to that effect, and no court shall have authority to extend
or renew the same on the same ground for which it was
issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member
thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective
for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the
Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective
until further orders.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbyan
or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against a lower court, board,
officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall decide the main case
or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the
writ.
RULE 65
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition.
The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall
be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the
notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a
municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with
the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether
or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission
of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases
involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a
regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively
with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief.
The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case, unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal
case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for
certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to
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proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an
administrative charge.
Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed.
After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has
expired, the court may hear the case or require the
parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or
filing of memoranda or upon the expiration of the period
for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the
petition are true, it shall render judgment for such relief
to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the
same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or if the questions raised herein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the
court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs
solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition
to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under
Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa
loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on
erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious
petitions for certiorari.
Denial of motion for reconsideration of order
dismissing a complaint not an interlocutory order
Silverio, Jr. v. CA (2009)
Facts: On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of
the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject
estate. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also
filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the
appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order
granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr.
as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January
3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed
an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the
Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without
Authority from this Honorable Court.
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an
Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005
and denying private respondents motion for
reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also
authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the
order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of
the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia
S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia,
Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order.
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the
Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2005 of the
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Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an
Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by
private respondent on December 22, 2005.
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December
12, 2005 also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the
intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005,
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October
31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the
sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the
late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes,
penalties, interests and other charges due thereon.
Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-
Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006 from
the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on
Appeal dated January 20, 2006 was filed on January 23,
2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Executionagainst the appeal of Nelia
Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was
filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
denying the appeal on the ground that it was not
perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further
issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to
vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3,
Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was
later issued on April 17, 2007 and a Notice to Vacatewas
issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent to
leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10)
days.
Held: An interlocutory order is one which does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to
be decided upon. It is only after judgment has been
rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the
judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot
be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only
when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
Test for Determining whether a Judgment or Order
is Final or Interlocutory
Garrido v. Tortogo (2011)
Facts: On 23 June 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in
the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with
prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict
several defendants, including the respondents herein,
from his properties. However, he died and was
substituted by Angelina Pahila-Garrido, his surviving
spouse. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. The respondents herein appealed the dismissal
to the Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
143458), but the Court rejected their recourse and issued
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an entry of judgment on October 20, 2000. In the
meantime, on 16 February 2000, the MTCC amended its
decision to correct typographical errors in the description
of the properties involved. None of the parties objected
to or challenged the corrections. On 5 April 2000, the
MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s
motion and was duly served. The respondents filed a
motion to quash against the writ of execution and its
aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the
decision, which were denied on 4 May 2001.
The story would have ended then but more than
a year after the writ of execution was served upon the
defendants, the respondents, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order) in the RTC
Negros Occidental, which TRO was granted. The petitioner
sought a clarificatory order, moving that the TRO be
vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days
and because such effectivity could neither be extended
nor be made indefinite. On 12 November 2002, the RTC
issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction. The petitioner then directly came to the Court
through her so-called "petition for review on certiorari,"
seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC pursuant to its
order dated 12 November 2002.
Issue: Whether the judgment rendered on 12 November
2002 was a final order.
Held: No. The order was only interlocutory.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or
a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or
judgment leave something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order
or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. 12
November 2002 order, which granted the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory,
not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an
appeal. The remedy against an interlocutory order not
subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Sec.2. Modes of appeal
(a) Ordinary appeal - The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall
be required except in special proceedings and other cases
of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review - The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari - In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall
be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Period of ordinary appeal
Sec.3. Period of ordinary appeal
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The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Motion for Reconsideration filed on last day of 15-
day period
Manila Memorial Park v. CA (2000)
Facts: On 04 June 1975, respondents filed an action for
reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against
petitioner Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., and its
co-defendants United Housing Corporation, Victorino
Hernandez, heirs of Aurelio de Leon, and heirs of Nicolas
Gatchalian.
After a protracted litigation, the trial court,
through then Presiding Judge Efricio B. Acosta, dismissed
the complaint in a decision, dated 17 June 1983.
Respondents received a copy of the decision on 04 July
1983. On 19 July 1983, the last day of the prescribed
fifteen-day period for appeal, private respondents filed a
motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. The motion
was denied by the trial court in its order of 03 October
1989. A copy of the order was received by respondents
on 28 November 1989.
On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a
notice of appeal and, on 11 December 1989, the trial
court gave due course to the appeal and directed the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals. The records of the case, however, were not
transmitted to the appellate court due to missing
transcript of stenographic notes. On 23 April 1996, the
trial court required the parties to appear in conference.
Almost a year had lapsed but the missing stenographic
notes were still not submitted to the trial court.
On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a
motion for new trial for the retaking and presentation of
testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that
the reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was
no longer possible considering that the court
stenographers who had transcribed the testimony of
witnesses by then since retired from the service, their
whereabouts unknown.
On 22 April 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for
new trial filed by respondents contending that the appeal
was filed out of time and that the remedy for new trial
could not be availed of since it was filed long after the
reglementary period to appeal had lapsed.
The trial court, in its order of 16 July 1997
granting the Motion for New Trial and denying the Motion
to Dismiss of Manila Memorial Park.
The trial court ratiocinated that the final
resolution of the case could not be held in abeyance
indefinitely nor could petitioner's motion to dismiss the
appeal still be entertained after their having waited for
eight years before raising the issue.
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Petitioner moved to reconsider, but to no avail,
the trial court's order of 16 July 1997. Dissatisfied,
petitioner elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari
to the Court of Appeals insisting that the trial court had
acted capriciously and whimsically, as well as with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in holding that it was barred from assailing
the timeliness of the appeal and in granting respondent's
motion for new trial long after the decision of the trial
court had already become final and executory.
Held: In an ordinary appeal from the final judgment or
order of a MeTC or MTC to the RTC, and from the RTC to
the CA in actions or proceedings originally filed in the RTC,
the 15-day period for appeal prescribed by Section 39 of
BP 129 and Sec. 19(a) of the Interim Rules is interrupted
or suspended by a motion for new trial or reconsideration
duly filed, and if the motion for new trial or
reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the
remaining period from notice of denial within which to file
a notice of appeal.
New rule on appeal after denial of Motion for
Reconsideration or Motion for New Trial
Neypes v. CA (2005)
Facts: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC
against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the
trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid
the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the
notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too
was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a
petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed
that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary
period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or
the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate
court, the order was the “final order” appealable under
the Rules.
Held: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
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in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
When appeal allowed even if period to appeal has
expired
Trans International v. CA (1998)
Facts: Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for
damages against respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR for brevity) and two of its principal officers
arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply and
delivery of woodpoles before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-
20960.
On May 22, l996, the trial court rendered a
decision sustaining the claim of petitioner corporation. It
awarded to petitioner the following amounts:
$1,325,703.65 representing the amount of profit which it
could have enjoyed had the contract been observed;
$10,000.00 for expenses incurred by petitioners local
agent in the preparation and execution of the contract;
P932,102.53 representing the combined premium paid by
petitioner for the bidders bond, performance bond and
surety bond; and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees.
A copy of the aforesaid decision was received by
respondents on June 6, l996. On June 19, l996,
respondents filed their motion for reconsideration alleging
in the main that certain facts were overlooked, ignored or
wrongly appreciated by the trial court. An opposition to
said motion was filed by petitioner on July 11, l996. On
August 2, l996, the trial court issued an order denying the
motion for reconsideration. A copy of the aforesaid order
was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCORS office
on August 23, l996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald
T. Lapuz, a clerk assigned at the office of the VP-General
Counsel.
Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz
placed the said order inside the drawer of his table.
However, on August 26 and 27, l996 (Monday and
Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report for
work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the
extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was
retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the
27th and was immediately forwarded to the secretary of
Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At
3:10 p.m. that same day, respondents thru counsel filed
their notice of appeal.
On August 29, l996, petitioner filed a motion for
execution before the trial court contending that its
decision dated May 22, l996 had become final and
executory since respondents failed to make a timely
appeal and praying for the issuance of an order granting
the writ of execution. On the other hand, respondents
filed an opposition thereto alleging therein that the cause
of their failure to make a timely appeal was due to
unforeseeable oversight and accident on the part of their
employee who was unable to report for work because of
illness. On September 9, l996 petitioner filed a reply to
said opposition. On September 11, l996 respondents
counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the motion for
execution attaching thereto the affidavit of Lapuz. Finally,
on September 18, l996, respondents filed their rejoinder
to said reply.
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On September 13, l996, the trial court issued an
order denying respondents notice of appeal and granting
the motion for execution filed by petitioner.
On September 20, l996, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
questioning the validity of the issuance of the aforesaid
order on the ground that the denial of their notice of
appeal was on the basis of a mere technicality and that
the writ of execution should not have been issued since
there are strong considerations which militate the strict
application of the rules on procedure. Petitioner
corporation filed its comment to the petition dated
September 25, l996 claiming that the event which
happened in respondents office does not amount to an
honest mistake nor an unavoidable accident that would
legally excuse their neglect.
Held: For a party to seek exception for its failure to
comply strictly with the statutory requirements for
perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as
serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave
miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant
the Court’s suspension of the rules.
RTC cannot dismiss appeal on ground that only
questions of law involved
Kho v. Camacho (1991)
Facts: In payment of attorney's fees resolved against
him, petitioner Narciso Kho, a businessman, issued in
favor of private respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho six (6)
postdated Manila Bank checks in the total sum of
P57,349.00. One of the checks, in the amount of
P10,000.00, was lost by Atty. Camacho who promptly
notified petitioner. When the other five (5) checks were
negotiated by Camacho with the Philippine Amanah Bank,
the same were returned uncleared because Manila Bank
had been ordered closed by the Central Bank.
Because of petitioner's refusal to replace the
Manila Bank checks or pay his obligation, Camacho
instituted an action for a sum of money against petitioner
before respondent trial court.
In his answer, petitioner alleged that he was
under no obligation to replace the lost check for
P10,000.00, arguing that Camacho should have executed
a sworn statement that he lost the check issued to him
and furnished both the drawer and the bank with said
statement so that the bank could place on the check
"under alarmed," instead of merely informing petitioner.
Petitioner also refused to issue new checks
maintaining that the closure of Manila Bank (in which he
had an outstanding deposit of P581,571.84 which was
more than enough to cover the cost of the five checks)
was beyond his control and therefore he was in no
financial position to pay Camacho unless and until his
money in that beleaguered bank was released.
Contending that petitioner's answer failed to
tender a genuine issue, Camacho moved for a judgment
on the pleadings which respondent Judge Leviste granted
in his order of February 12, 1988. In said order,
respondent Judge directed petitioner to pay Camacho
P57,349.00 "minus the P10,000.00 pertaining to the lost
check, or a total of P47,349.00 with interest at the legal
rate of 6% from June 2, 1987, until fully paid, with costs
or attorney's fees."
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On February 25, 1988, petitioner seasonably
filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing the
February 12, 1988 order to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Judge duly approved said notice in his order
of February 29, 1988.
On the other hand, despite the reduced money
judgment, Camacho made no move to contest the award.
Instead, he filed a motion/manifestation praying that
petitioner's notice of appeal be stricken off the record as
a mere scrap of paper.
Acting on the aforesaid motion, respondent
Judge issued the assailed order of March 29, 1988 setting
aside the previously approved notice of appeal and
adopting Camacho's view that the proper remedy from a
judgment on the pleadings was a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court.
Held: Issues that involve pure questions of law are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the SC. However, Rule 41
does not authorize the trial court to disallow an appeal on
the ground that there is no question of fact, but only a
question of law, involved. Whether an appeal involves
only question of law or both questions of fact and law, this
question should be left for the determination of an
appellate court, and not by the court which rendered the
subject decision appealed from.
Appellee who has not appealed may not obtain
affirmative relief from appellate court
Custodio v. CA (1996)
Facts: On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the
grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio,
Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C.
Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and
assigned to Branch 22 thereof.
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered
by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and
Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access - ingress and egress, to the
public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay
defendants Custodios and Santoses the
sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000)
as indemnity for the permanent use of
the passageway
. issued was really paid by Marine Midland on December
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation
expenses.
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff
represented by his heirs, herein private respondents,
went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier
stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court with
modification.
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On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then
took the present recourse to us, raising two issues,
namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein
private respondents is proper, and whether or not the
award of damages is in order.
Held: An appellee in a civil case, who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the
decision of the lower court.
When there is solidarity obligations
Citytrust Banking Corporation v. CA (1991)
Facts: Samara purchased from Citytrust a bank draft for
$US40,000.00, the payee being Thai International
Airways and the drawee is a US bank, Marine Midland.
Several days after said purchase, Samara executed a
stop-payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust
to inform Marine Midland about the order through telex.
Citytrust complied with Samara’s instruction and
informed Marine Midland about the stop-payment order.
Marine Midland acknowledged receipt of Samara’s stop-
payment order and informed Citytrust that it did not pay
the bank draft.
Due to the non-payment of the draft, Citytrust
credited Samara’s account for $US40,000.00 due to the
non-payment. However, seven months after, Citytrust re-
debited Samara’s account upon discovering that Marine
Midland had already debited Citytrust’s despite the Marine
Midland’s statement that it did not pay the bank draft.
Due to Citytrust’s act of re-debiting Samara’s account, the
latter filed a complaint for the recovery of sum of money
against the two banks.
The RTC found both banks jointly and severally
liable to Samara in the amount of US$40,000.00. From
the RTC’s decision the two banks filed separate appeals.
Citytrust’s appeal was dismissed for having been filed out
of time. Accordingly, Citytrust questioned the CA’s
dismissal of his appeal before the SC. Citytrust argued
that his appeal was not filed out of time since Marine
Midland filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
according to Citytrust, inured to its benefit.
Issue: Whether or not Marine Midland’s appeal inured to
Citytrust’s benefit?
Held: No. It must be noted that the two defendants,
Marine Midland and Citytrust, filed cross claims against
each other in their answer. Citytrust alleged that the
proximate cause of the injury should be attributed to co-
defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to
promptly inform Citytrust that the demand draft Citytrust
22, 1980. For its part, Marine Midland alleged that
Citytrust did not properly advise it of the actual
circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the
draft and of the receipt by the latter of the stop-payment
instructions. The rights and liabilities of both parties
concerned are not so interwoven in such a manner that
their defenses are similar and that a reversal of the
judgment as to one should operate as a reversal to the
other. Furthermore, a perusal of the decision appealed
from shows that Marine Midland, though jointly and
severally liable with petitioner, is the one ultimately held
responsible for the damages incurred by the private
respondent inasmuch as the trial court ordered
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"defendant Marine Midland to reimburse defendant
Citytrust of whatever amount the latter will be made to
pay the plaintiff by reason of this judgment and costs."
The Court is of the considered view that it was
the trial court judgment that created a joint and several
obligation to pay the private respondent certain sums. No
solidary liability as between them existed from the
drawer-drawee relationship in the draft transaction.
The trial court judgment, however, does not
alter the fact that the respective defenses of the co-
defendants are distinct on trial and even on appeal.
Citytrust and Marine Midland were not in privity with each
other in a transaction involving payment through a bank
draft. A bank draft is a "bill of exchange drawn by a bank
upon its correspondent bank, . . . issued at the solicitation
of a stranger who purchases and pays therefor" (Kohler
v. First National Bank, 289 P 47, 49, 157 Wash. 417
[1930]). It is also defined as an "order for payment of
money." (Polotsky v. Artisans Savings Bank, Del. 180 A.
791, 792, 7 WW. Harr 142 [1935]).
In the case at bar, Citytrust from which Samara
purchased the bank draft, was the drawer of the draft
through which it ordered Marine Midland, the drawee
bank, to pay the amount of US $40,000.00 in favor of
Thai International Airways, the payee. The drawee bank
acting as a "payor" bank is solely liable for acts not done
in accordance with the instructions of the drawer bank or
of the purchaser of the draft. The drawee bank has the
burden of proving that it did not violate. Meanwhile, the
drawer, if sued by the purchaser of the draft is liable for
the act of debiting the customer's account despite an
instruction to stop payment. The drawer has the duty to
prove that he complied with the order to inform the
drawee.
The fact that the petitioner previously filed a
cross-claim against Marine Midland does not make the
former a party in the latter's appeal where all reliefs
granted to the plaintiff and/or to the petitioner who was
a co-defendant are up for review. The rights and liabilities
of Citytrust as a defensive cross-claimant, which alleged
that the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff was
the wrongful action of Marine Midland, have already been
litigated before the trial court which ordered full
reimbursement in favor of Citytrust. Until petitioner
Citytrust appeals for the review of the trial court decision
either in part or in toto, its rights and obligations as pre-
determined cannot generally be affected by an appeal of
a co-defendant. The respondent appellate court made this
clear in its decision dated February 23, 1989, when it
stated that even assuming that the petitioner may be
considered an appellee, "such a standing was only with
respect to the cross-claim against (appellant Marine
Midland) and not with respect to its (petitioner's) liability
in favor or private respondent Samara", the judgment on
which had already become final and executory as to the
Petitioner. The petitioner cannot now present a subverted
interpretation of what the appellate court meant.
Perfection of appeal
Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof
A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected
as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due
time. A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed
perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in
due time.
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Loss of jurisdiction
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in
due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties. In appeals by record on appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
Residual powers
Residual power/jurisdiction of the court after losing
jurisdiction but prior to the transmittal of the original
record or record on appeal:
a.) Order execution pending appeal under
Rule 39, Sec. 2 (motion for execution
was filed before the expiration of the
period of appeal);
b.) To issue orders for the preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not
involve matters litigated by appeal;
c.) To approve compromise prior to the
transmittal of the record;
d.) Permit appeal by an indigent;
e.) Allow withdrawal of the appeal.
The concept of residual jurisdiction of the trial court is
available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed
to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. There is no residual jurisdiction to
speak of where no appeal or petition has even been filed.
(Fernandez vs. CA, G.R. No. 131094, 16 May 2005).
Atty. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals (2005)
FACTS: Complaint for Unlawful Detainer was filed by
private respondent Concepcion Olivares against the
herein petitioner Jesus Fernandez. Olivares appealed.
Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) latter reversed the lower
court’s decision, ordering Fernandez to pay rental
arrearages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and other
costs. Fernandez received a copy of the decision.
Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial before the RTC
Manila, citing newly discovered evidence of receipts
proving his rental payments.
In view of his Motion for New Trial, Fernandez,
filed in the Court of Appeals (“CA”) a Motion to Withdraw
his Petition for Review which the court duly noted in its
resolution. Meanwhile, RTC denied the Motion for New
Trial, explaining that when Fernandez went to the CA and
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review, and the CA accordingly acted on the same by
granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the CA over
the parties and the subject matter had already attached.
Fernandez filed a Motion to Reconsider, while Olivares
moved for the execution of the judgment of the RTC. The
RTC granted the Motion for Execution and denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. A writ of execution was in fact
issued by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether by filing a motion for extension of time
to file petition for review, RTC was automatically divested
of its residual jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new
trial.
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HELD: No.
The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is
available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed
to have lost jurisdiction over the case involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original
records or the records on appeal. Considering that no
appeal was perfected in this case and the records of the
case have not yet been transmitted to the CA, the case
has not as yet attained the residual jurisdiction stage so
as to say that the trial court already lost the jurisdiction
it first acquired and that it is left with only its residual
powers. The CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
case because Fernandez merely filed a motion for
extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself.
The foregoing considered, the inevitable recourse would
have been to remand this case to the trial court for
hearing on his motion for new trial.
Dismissal of appeal
Sec. 13. Dismissal of appeal.
Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record
on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu
proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for:
a. having been filed out of time; or
b. non-payment of docket and other lawful fees
Julian v. DBP (2011)
FACTS: On 23 December, 1980, Thelma obtained a
housing loan from Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) in the amount of ₱99,400.00. To secure payment,
she executed in favor of the respondent a Real Estate
Mortgage on the same land registered under her name.
Because of arrearages in the monthly amortizations,
respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property. Spouses
De la Cruz refused to vacate the premises compelling
respondent to file an "Unlawful Detainer" case against
them. Judgment was rendered in favor of respondent. The
petitioner filed for the cancellation of respondent’s TCT.
Series of postponements were made at the instance of
both parties due to an impending amicable settlement.
Eventually, the parties were able to reach a settlement.
However, almost two years passed without the parties
complying with the said Order.
The RTC dismissed the case for failure of the
parties to comply for an unreasonable length of time.
Despite the extensions, however, no compromise
agreement was filed in court. RTC directed the parties to
show cause within 15 days from notice why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The RTC
dismissed the instant case for failure of parties to comply
with the Order. Petitioner, through his new counsel,
timely filed a Notice of Appeal on April 26, 2004 but failed
to pay the docket and other lawful fees.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in strictly applying
the rules on the payment of docket fees.
HELD: Yes.
Payment of full docket fees within the
prescribed period for taking an appeal is mandatory. It is
well-established that "[t]he right to appeal is a statutory
privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of the law." "Thus, one
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who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly
comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to
do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal."
The Court has consistently ruled in a number of
cases that the payment of the full amount of docket fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal
to be perfected and only then can a court acquire
jurisdiction over the case. The requirement of an appeal
fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and
should not be undermined except for the most persuasive
of reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no
appeal being filed thereby rendering the challenged
decision, resolution or order final and executory.
Rule 42
RTC to CA
Appeal from RTC decision rendered in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction
Rose Rica Sales Center v. Ong (2005)
Facts: Rose Rica Sales Center (RRSC) filed a complaint
for ejectment against the spouses Ong (the
“respondents”). The MTC, in resolving the ejectment
case, ruled in favor of RRSC and ordered the respondents
to vacate the subject property. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the MTC’s Decision in its entirety. Subsequently,
respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The
day after respondents filed their Notice of Appeal, they
field before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
RTC gave due course to respondents’ Notice of Appeal,
however, it denied their MR.From the denial of
respondents’ MR, respondents filed a Petition for Review
with the CA. The CA granted respondents’ petition. As
such, RRSC appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of a notice of appeal is
the proper remedy to appeal a decision rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction?
Held: No. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with
the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, RRSC should have filed
a Petition for Review with the CA and not a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have
been remedied by the timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration the day after said Notice of Appeal was
filed.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the
Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from
the receipt of the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File
Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals.
Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day
request for additional period, it is clear that respondents
filed their Petition for Review on time.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before
the CA is the proper mode of appeal form a decision of
the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is
erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
An appeal from the decision of the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court, is made by way of Rule 42
of the Rules of Court
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Landbank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals (2011)
FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Diaz filed a complaint
against the petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines and
the DAR before the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC), praying that a higher value for just
compensation be fixed for the expropriation of
respondent’s agricultural land. The SAC adopted DAR’s
evaluation. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. She then elevated the case to the CA.
During the pendency of the appeal, Land Bank
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee’s
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, maintaining that the appeal
should be dismissed because it is the wrong remedy. The
CA denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether Land Bank’s motion to dismiss should be
granted.
HELD: Yes.
Following Land Bank of the Philippines v De
Leon, the proper mode of appeal from decisions of
Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not
through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The Court, in
the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that
“before the instant case reached us, Land Bank of the
Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to
appeal decisions of SACs considering the seemingly
conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6557,”
held that “Sec. 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically
states that the said mode of appeal (petition for review)
should be adopted.”
Pure questions of law may be raised
Sec.2. Form and contents
The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with
the original copy intended for the court being indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall:
(a) State the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading
the lower courts or judges thereof either
as petitioners or respondents;
(b) Indicate the specific
material dates showing that it was filed
on time;
(c) Set forth concisely a jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme
statement of the matters involved, the
issues raised, the specification of errors of
fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by
the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons
or arguments relied upon for the allowance
of the appeal;
(d) Accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate originals or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition a certification under oath that he has not
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commenced any other action involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there
is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
days therefrom.
Macawiwili Gold Mining v. CA (1998)
Facts: Philex Mining (PM) filed a complaint for
expropriation against Macawiwili Gold Mining (MGM)
before the RTC. The RTC, however, dismissed PM’s
complaint. Accordingly, PM moved for reconsideration,
however, the same was likewise denied. As such, it
appealed the case to the CA. While the case was pending
before the CA, MGM filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
the ground that only questions of law were involved and,
therefore, the appeal should be to the SC. MGM’s said
motion was denied.
Issue: Is MGM correct in contending that PM should have
filed its appeal directly to the SC since its appeal merely
raises questions of law?
Held: Yes. The first four arguments advanced by PM raise
the sole issue of whether it has, under Presidential Decree
No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining
areas where petitioners mining claims are located. On the
other hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether
the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action
in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of Court are
applicable to special civil actions. These are legal
questions whose resolution does not require an
examination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented by the parties but a determination of what the
law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise
questions of law, which should be the subject of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with
the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals committed a
grave error in ruling otherwise.
Under Rule 41, judgments of the regional trial
courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to
be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases where the
appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. However, appeals from judgments of the
regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions
of law.
On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that
appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to
the Court of Appeals, whether the appellant raises
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.
Effect of failure to comply with the
requirements
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof
of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
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documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Action by court
Sec. 4. Action on the petition.
The Court of Appeals may:
a. Require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a
motion to dismiss, within ten (10)
days from notice; or
b. Dismiss the petition if it finds the
same to be:
1. Patently without merit;
2. Prosecuted manifestly for
delay; or
3. That the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial
to require consideration.
The grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Rule
50, Sec. 1 is discretionary upon the appellate court.
Mercury Drug Corp. v. De Leon (2008)
FACTS: Respondent Raul De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner Mercury Drug and Aurmela
Ganzon for being negligently given the wrong medicine
for an irritated eye. The RTC rendered judgment in favor
of respondent. Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA
but respondent moved for the dismissal of the appeal
based on technical grounds.
The CA issued a resolution which granted De
Leon’s motion and dismissed the appeal, stating that:
“…the Statement of Facts, Statement of the Case,
Assignment of Errors/issues, Arguments/Discussions in
the Brief makes no references to the pages of the records.
We find this procedural lapse justify the dismissal of the
appeal, pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure…”
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal based on the ground
under Section 1, Rule 50 was proper.
HELD: No.
In several cases, this Court stressed that the
grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule
50 are discretionary upon the appellate court. The very
wording of the rule uses the word “may” instead of “shall”.
This indicates that it is only directory and not mandatory.
Sound discretion must be exercised in consonance with
the tenets of justice and fair play, keeping in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.
The absence of page reference to the record is
a ground for dismissal. It is a requirement intended to
ultimately aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and
proper conclusion of the case. However, such dismissal is
not mandatory, but discretionary on the part of the
appellate court.
In the case under review, although there were
no page references to the records, Mercury Drug and
Ganzon referred to the exhibits, TSN, and attachments of
the case. Despite its deficiencies, the brief is sufficient in
form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of
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the essential facts, nature of the case, the issues raised,
and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same.
When petition given due course
Sec. 6. Due course.
If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings
as the court may allow or require, or after the expiration
of the period for the filing thereof without such comment
or pleading having been submitted, the Court of Appeals
finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the appealed decision, it may accordingly
give due course to the petition.
Prima facie finding that lower court has committed
errors of fact or law warranting reversal or
modification.
Petition dismissed for late filing after finding the
same prima facie meritorious
Ditching v. CA & Motas (1996)
Facts: Ditching and Bacani (collectively, the
“petitioners”) as co-owners of a parcel of land situated in
Laguna, filed an ejectment case against Motas (the
“respondent”) before the MTC. The MTC found that there
existed a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent. As such, it dismissed petitioners’ complaint.
Petitioners thus, appealed the case before the RTC, which
affirmed in toto the MTC’s decision. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), which
was granted by the RTC. However, when a new judge took
over as presiding judge of the RTC where the case was
pending, he reversed the previous judge’s order granting
petitioners MR.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a
petition for review. In a resolution dated 23 June 1992,
the CA stated that the petition filed with it was prima facie
meritorious. Subsequently however, the CA dismissed
said petition on the ground that it was belatedly filed.
Issue: Whether or not the CA can be faulted for stating
in its resolution dated 23 June 1992 that the petition filed
with it was prima facie meritorious, only to dismiss it
thereafter for being filed out of time?
Held: No. Where no timely appeal was taken, the
judgment becomes final, and the legality of the allowance
of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court. Further, the
respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the
petition on the ground that it was filed late, inasmuch as
the recognition of the merit of the petition did not carry
with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely
filed.
Under Section 1(a) Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the CA motu proprio or on motion of the appellee
may dismiss the appeal for inter alia:
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face
that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed
by these rules.
Perfection of appeal
Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof
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(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the
payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful
fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner.
Loss of jurisdiction
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
Residual powers
Residual power/jurisdiction of the court after losing
jurisdiction but prior to the transmittal of the original
record or record on appeal:
a.) Order execution pending appeal under
Rule 39, Sec. 2 (motion for execution
was filed before the expiration of the
period of appeal);
b.) To issue orders for the preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not
involve matters litigated by appeal;
c.) To approve compromise prior to the
transmittal of the record;
d.) Permit appeal by an indigent;
e.) Allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Effect of appeal
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, the appeal shall stay the judgment
or final order unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or
these Rules shall provide otherwise.
Rule 43
Quasi-Judicial Agencies to CA
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 43
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals
from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
National Telecommunications Commission, Department
of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken
from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It
cannot be taken into account where an original action for
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certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for
judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
Whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
a specific provision to that effect is included in the law
creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter,
any special statutory court.
Fabian v. Desierto (1998)
Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major
stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation, which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin
was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding
for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried
to terminate their relationship, private respondent
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent
of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. Accordingly, Fabian filed the an administrative
case against Agustin in a letter-complaint dated July 24,
1995.
The complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin
for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the
Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the
case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in
favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private
respondents from the administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial
of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court?
Held: No. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize
an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear
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when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final
judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not
include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Ombudsman criminal cases – Supreme Court via
Rule 65
Lanting v. Ombudsman (2005)
Facts: Lanting filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint charging Atienza,
Sison and Rumbo (collectively, the “respondents”) for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. She
alleged that the respondents unlawfully appointed
Ernesto Saw, a Chinese citizen working in Taiwan, and
brother-in-law of Rumbo, to the position of Researcher in
the City Council.
In a resolution, Graft Investigator Ramos
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The
recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Desierto.
Subsequently, Lanting filed an MR, which was eventually
denied by the Ombudsman. Aggrieved, Lanting filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, however,
dismissed said petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing
Lanting’s petition?
Held: No. Lanting’s complaint-affidavit before the Office
of the Ombudsman is for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an administrative
complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege
administrative offenses, such as dishonesty or
misconduct on the part of respondents.
It bears stressing that the allegations in
petitioners complaint describe respondents actuations as
willful, felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable
criminal activities. In her motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s Resolution, petitioner claimed that
Graft Investigator Ramos skirted the issue of
falsification of public documents which is crystal
clear in my complaint. Likewise, in her petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54274, petitioner sought to nullify the
resolution of the Honorable Ombudsman dated April 8,
1999 dismissing petitioners complaint for anti-graft and
falsification of public documents and to direct
respondent Ombudsman to give due course to the
complaint.
Considering that petitioners complaint is
criminal in nature, this Court has the sole authority to
review the Ombudsmans Resolutions on pure question of
law as expressly mandated in Section 14, 2nd paragraph
of R.A. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. x x x.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for
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remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on pure
question of law.
In Fabian vs. Desierto, we held that only appeals
from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 (of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). We reiterated this
ruling in Namuhe v. Ombudsman and recently in Barata
v. Abalos, Jr. and Coronel v. Aniano Desierto.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals, in issuing its
questioned Resolutions, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over petitioners
criminal action. As earlier mentioned, jurisdiction lies with
this Court.
Cases not covered
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 43
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not
apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines.
St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC (1998)
Facts: Private respondent Aricayos worked as St. Martin
Funeral Home’s (the “petitioner”) operations manager.
When petitioner’s owner discovered that there were
arrears in the payment of taxes and other government
fees, she made some changes in the business operation.
Among those changes was the owner’s decision to
disallowing Aricayos from participating in the
management of the business. Aggrieved, Aricayos filed a
complaint against petitioner for illegal recruitment.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor
arbiter’s decision. Accordingly, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Issue: Is a petition for certiorari the proper remedy to
question the decision of the NLRC?
Held: Yes. When the issue was raised in an early case on
the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary
of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate
review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that
thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions
of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is
that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by
subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which
said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty
days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the
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10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may
already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of
the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within
the reglementary period under Rule 65.
However, in observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, the petition for certiorari should be
filed in the Court of Appeals and not directly to the SC.
Decisions of DOJ Sec. in petitions for review
prosecutors’ resolutions – Petition for Certiorari to CA
under Rule 65
Alcaraz v. Gonzales (2006)
Facts: Intending to use the skyway, Alcaraz signaled and
proceeded to the right-most lane. Gonzales who was on
the right-most lane at that time, was forced to swerve his
car to the right to avoid colliding with Alacaraz. As such,
Gonzales nearly hit the concrete island.
Aggrieved, Gonzales chased after Alcaraz, opened his
windows and shouted at Alcaraz. Subsequently, Alcaraz
fired two gunshots towards Gonzales car and hurriedly
drove away from the scene. However, PNCC guards were
able to intercepe Alcaraz at the Skyway tollgate.
Gonzales reported the matter to the Parañaque
City Police and filed a criminal complaint for attempted
homicide against Alcaraz. After the Office of the City
Prosecutor conducted an inquest, an information for
attempted homicide was filed with the MeTC of Parañaque
City. Thereafter, Alcaraz filed a motion to conduct a
preliminary investigation. Such motion was granted.
However, after the conducting a preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor still found
probable cause against Alcaraz.
Dissatisfied with the prosecutor’s resolution,
Alcaraz filed an MR, which was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Alcaraz filed a petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ). The SOJ, granted said petition
and ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the information.
From the SOJ’s Resolution, Gonzales filed an MR
and subsequently a petition for review under Rule 43
before the CA. The CA ruled that the petition for review
under Rule 43 was meritorious. Accordingly, Alcaraz
appealed the case with the SC.
Issues: Is a petition for review under Rule 43 the proper
remedy to assail the decision of the SOJ in cases involving
the determination of probable cause?
Held: No. We agree with petitioner's contention that
respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
It bears stressing that in the determination of
probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the
executive branch of government has full discretionary
authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss
the criminal complaint against the private respondent is
necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the
Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice. Courts are not empowered to
substitute their own judgment for that of the executive
branch.
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The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is
subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
control and supervision over said Investigating
Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or
modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the CA
may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may
do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
It bears stressing that the Resolution of the
Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the
resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under
the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000
National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals),
resolutions in preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution,
except the aggrieved party, has no more remedy of
appeal to file a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution of such motion if it is denied by the said
Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
since there is no more appeal or other remedy available
in the ordinary course of law.
In the present case, respondent filed a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the resolutions of the Justice Secretary. Instead of
dismissing the petition, however, the CA gave due course
to it and thereafter granted the petition, on its finding that
the Justice Secretary erred in reversing the resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor which found probable cause
against petitioner for attempted homicide. Patently, the
ruling of the CA is incorrect.
Not applicable where there is error of jurisdiction
Fortich v. Corona (1998)
Facts: Aggrieved by the Office of the President’s (OP)
Decision which approved the conversion of 144-hectare
land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area, farmers staged a hunger strike in front of the DAR
compound.
Said hunger strike led the Office of the
President, through Executive Secretary Corona
(“Corona”) issued a “Win-Win Resolution” which
substantially modified its earlier decision despite it being
already final and executory.
Aggrieved by said modification, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the SC and prayed for the annulment
of said Win-Win Resolution.
Issue: Did petitioners avail of the proper remedy in
assailing the Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of
the President?
Held: Yes. It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,
including the Office of the President, may be taken to the
Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment,
final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.
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However, we hold that, in this particular case,
the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable
considering that the present petition contains an
allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal
and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond
his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction
when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final
and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised
here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of
judgment, which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule
43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside
the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done.
Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person
aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified
petition (for certiorari) in the proper court.
Under Section 4 of Rule 65, the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these
three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition
must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with
the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or
the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter
of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et.
al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance),
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part
of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the
Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latters competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (inferior) courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations
omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to
it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial
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policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,
Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and Advincula
vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Courts time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding
of the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to
take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations
so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy
which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed
resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file
their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only
result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its
own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we
said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are
but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the
instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the
proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the
case."
Where to appeal
Sec. 3. Where to appeal
An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Pure questions of law may also be raised.
Period of appeal
Sec. 4. Period of appeal.
Fifteen (15) days from:
1. Notice of the award, judgment, final order
or resolution; or
2. Date of publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity; or
3. Denial of petitioner’s MNT or MR. (only 1
MR shall be allowed)
The CA may grant additional 15 days only within which to
file the petition for review, upon proper motion and
payment in full of docket fee.
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ESGUERRA NOTES
No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case shall exceed 15 days.
How appeal taken
Sec. 5. How appeal taken
1. By filing a verified petition for review in 7 legible
copies;
2. With proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo;
3. Pay to the clerk of court of CA docket and other
lawful fees; and
4. Deposit the sum of P 500 for costs.
Forms and contents
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition.
1. State the full names of the parties to the case;
2. Set forth concisely a statement of the facts and
issues involved and the grounds relied upon for
review;
3. Accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution appealed
from;
4. Certificate of non-forum shopping;
5. State the specific material dates showing that it
was filed on time.
Effect of failure to comply with requirements
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof
of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Action by court
Sec. 8. Action on the petition.
The Court of Appeals may:
a. Require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a motion
to dismiss, within ten (10) days from
notice; or
b. Dismiss the petition if it finds the same
to be:
1. Patently without merit;
2. Prosecuted manifestly for
delay; or
3. That the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial
to require consideration.
When petition given due course
Sec. 10. Due course.
If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings
or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court
of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the
filing thereof, and on the basis of the petition or the
records the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that
the court or agency concerned has committed
errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or
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modification of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due
course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the
same. The findings of fact of the court or agency
concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall
be binding on the Court of Appeals.
Effect of appeal
Sec. 12. Effect of appeal.
The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of
Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may
deem just.
General rule: appeal does not stay award, judgment, final
order, or resolution
Exceptions:
a. when CA directs otherwise; or
b. when the law directs otherwise
(additional exception)
The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right
to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it
the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise,
the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory. The general rule
is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become
executory only after it has become final and executory,
execution pending appeal being an exception to this
general rule.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the
decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final
and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so
provides. Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be
interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the
award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law
directs otherwise. (Lapid v. CA, GR 142261, June 29,
2000)
NOTE: Lapid v. CA and Ombudsman v. Laja no
longer apply due to Resolution dated 5 October
2010
Ombudsman v. Samaniego (2010)
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 dated 15 September 2003
provides:
…
An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against such officer
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ESGUERRA NOTES
An Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty
of suspension for one year is immediately executory
pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of
an appeal to the CA. Respondent cannot successfully rely
on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal—The appeal shall not
stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
In the first place, the Rules of Court may apply
to cases in the Office of the Ombudsman suppletorily only
when the procedural matter is not governed by any
specific provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the
Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection,
Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also
provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power
to promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions and
duties and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of
justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary
injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to
encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the
injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes
the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in
an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The
provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is
a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules
of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply
to a particular case, that which was specially designed for
the said case must prevail over the other.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Rule 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court
Distinction between certiorari under Rule 45 as a
mode of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 as a
special civil action
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA
(2000)
Facts: The instant case originated from the sale by Banco
Filipino to Tala Realty of four (4) lots in Iloilo City, covered
and described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and
62274, for two million one hundred ten thousand pesos
(P2,110,000.00). Tala Realty then leased them back to
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Banco Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one
thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a period of twenty (20)
years and renewable for another twenty (20) years. The
lease contracts of the other branch sites sold to Tala
Realty have substantially similar terms and conditions,
except for the amount of the rent.
Banco Filipino alleges that a trust was created
by virtue of the above transactions. Tala Realty was
allegedly established to serve as a corporate medium to
warehouse the legal title of the said properties for the
beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and to purchase
properties to be held in trust for the latter.
However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty
demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and
goodwill from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in
case of failure to comply thereto. On April 20, 1994, some
stockholders of Banco Filipino filed a derivative suit
against Tala Realty before the SEC for the reconveyance
of the properties sold by the former to the latter.
However, on March 6, 1995, the SEC dismissed the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Due to Banco Filipinos failure to comply with
Tala Realtys terms, the latter carried out its threat by
filing numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino.
This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995,
an action for recovery of real properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of
breach of trust. Incidentally, during the period from
August to September 1995, Banco Filipino also filed
sixteen (16) other complaints for recovery of real
properties which it had previously sold to Tala Realty.
These complaints, including the one filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 28, were
uniformly worded in their material allegations.
As regards Banco Filipinos complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Tala Realty filed on
October 9, 1995 a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds: (1) forum-shopping; (2) litis pendentia; (3) pari
delicto; (4) failure to implead indispensable parties; and
(5) failure to state a cause of action. On the same date,
private repondents Pilar D. Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma,
Dolly W. Lim and Rubencito del Mundo filed a separate
motion to dismiss in the same case on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) litis pendentia; and (3) failure to state a cause of
action. Likewise, on November 10, 1995, private
respondent Nancy L. Ty filed a separate motion to
dismiss, alleging the same grounds as those invoked by
private respondents Ongking, et. al.
These motions to dismiss alleged, among
others, that aside from the said suit before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 28, other suits involving
certain Quezon City, Lucena City, Malolos and Manila
branches of Banco Filipino are also pending in other
Regional Trial Courts.
Banco Filipino filed separate oppositions, dated
October 14, 1995, October 31, 1995 and November 21,
1995 respectively, to the motions to dismiss. After a
protracted exchange of pleadings, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on April 22, 1996.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied Banco
Filipinos motion for reconsideration. Banco Filipino
received a copy of said order of denial on July 5, 1996 but
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instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals. Banco Filipino alleged in its petition that the trial
courts decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion
because it did not comply with the constitutional mandate
on the form of decisions.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed Banco
Filipinos petition on the ground, among others, that the
"[p]etitioners recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court is patently malapropos." It reiterated the rule that
a special civil action for certiorari may be resorted to only
when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Banco
Filipinos failure to appeal by writ of error within the
reglementary period and its belated recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court
of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to
resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals debunked Banco
Filipinos theory that the assailed order of the RTC did not
comply with the substantive requirements of the
Constitution, and was thus, rendered with grave abuse of
discretion.
On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino received
a copy of the Court of Appeals decision dismissing its
petition thereby prompting the latter to file a motion for
reconsideration on January 10, 1997. The Court of
Appeals denied the said motion for reconsideration on
December 19, 1997 in a resolution, a copy of which was
received by Banco Filipino on January 7, 1998. Banco
Filipino then filed with this Court its subject petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on
March 9, 1998.
Held: Without need of delving into the merits of the case,
this Court hereby dismisses the instant petition. For in
filing a special civil action for certiorari instead of an
ordinary appeal before this Court, Banco Filipino violated
basic tenets of remedial law that merited the dismissal of
its petition.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper
if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
We have said time and again that for the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion, must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and personal hostility.
The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy
of a petition for review from the decision of the Court of
Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a
petition for certiorari. This Court has often enough
reminded members of the bench and bar that a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when
there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite
the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal
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and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive.
The antithetic character of the remedies of
appeal and certiorari has been generally observed by this
Court save only in those rare instances where appeal is
satisfactorily shown to be an inadequate remedy. In the
case at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any valid
reason why the issues raised in its petition for certiorari
could not have been raised on appeal. To justify its resort
to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it
erroneously claims that an appeal is not a speedy and
adequate remedy because further delay in the disposition
of this case would effectively deprive Banco Filipino of the
full use and enjoyment of its properties. However, the
further delay that would inadvertently result from the
dismissal of the instant petition is one purely of Banco
Filipinos own doing. We cannot countenance an
intentional departure from established rules of procedure
simply to accommodate a case that has long been
pending in the courts of law because of the partys own
fault or negligence.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the
lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco Filipinos recourse
to a special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of
the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the
resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but
simply because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this
Court. This observation is shared by the Court of Appeals,
which was quick to point out that when Banco Filipino filed
its petition for certiorari assailing the RTC order, the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals had already lapsed.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for
certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the
higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed
well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition
for review and without offering any reason therefor.
What to file; from what courts
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.
Remedies of appeal and certiorari mutually
exclusive; Rule 45 distinguished from Rule 65;
Petition for Certiorari treated as Petition for
Review
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative nor successive. The
distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide.
However, the most apparent is:
RULE 45 – Petition for review on
certiorari (appeal by certiorari)
- involves correction of errors and judgment
- mode of appeal
RULE 65 – Petition for certiorari (special
civil action for certiorari)
- involves error of jurisdiction
- special civil action
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ESGUERRA NOTES

CERTIORARI UNDER CERTIORARI UNDER 65
RULE 45
Petition is based on Petition raises the issue as to
questions of law. whether the lower court acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
It is a mode of appeal. It is an original action.
Involves the review of the Directed against an interlocutory
judgment award or final order of the court or where there is
order on the merits. no appeal or any other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy.
Must be made within the Filed not later than 60 days from
reglementary period. notice of judgment, order or
resolution appealed from.
Stays the judgment or Unless a writ of preliminary
order appealed from. injunction or temporary restraining
order is issued does not stay the
challenged proceeding.
The appellant and the The parties are the aggrieved party
appellee are the original against the lower court or quasi-
parties to the action, and judicial agency and the prevailing
the lower court or quasi- parties.
judicial agency is not
impleaded.
Motion for reconsideration Motion for reconsideration or for
is not required. new trial is required;
If a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is filed, the period shall
not only be interrupted but another
60 days shall be given to the
petitioner. ( SC Admin. Matter 02-
03 )
The court is in the exercise Court exercises original jurisdiction.
of its appellate jurisdiction
and power of review.
denied GFB’s MR. Accordingly, GFB filed a Notice of
Appeal, to which petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for
being filed late. Said Motion to Dismiss was granted. GFB
then elevated the case before the CA. The CA ruled in
GFB’s favor hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the SC.
Issue: Are petitioners’ mode of appeal (petition for
certiorari under Rule 65) the proper remedy to elevate
the CA’s decision before the SC?
Held: No. Petitioners and counsel confuse their petition
as one Petition for Review under Rule 45 with a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65. For while they treat it as one
for Review on Certiorari, they manifest that it is filed
pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in relation to Rule 45 of the New Rules of Court.
In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein
petitioner described her petition as an appeal under
Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, this Court, in frowning over what it described as a
chimera, reiterated that the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor
successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45
and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is
that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of
judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for
review under Rule 45.
This Court, however, in accordance with the
liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as
having filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review.

Nuez v. GSIS Family Bank (2005)
Facts: Petitioners are heirs of Leonilo who, during his
lifetime, obtained loans from GSIS Family Bank (GFB). All
these loans were secured by a real estate mortgage. On
the maturity of said loans, Leonilo executed a promisory
note. 19 years after the promisory note matured, GFB
undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the properties
which secured the loans. During the auction sale, GFB was
the highest bidder thus, a certificate of sale was issued in
its favor.
Subsequently, Leonilo filed a complaint with the
RTC against GFB for the Annulment of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance and Cancellation of
Encumbrances. Leonilo alleged that GFB no longer had
the right to file its petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
since prescription had already set in.
The RTC found for Leonilo who died during the
pendency of the trial thus, he was substituted by
petitioners. GFB filed an MR on the last day of the 15-day
period within which it could interpose an appeal, but it did
not comply with the rules on notice of hearing. As such,
petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out MR with Motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution.
GFB filed an Opposition with Motion to Admit its
MR, attributing its failure to incorporate the notice of
hearing to inadvertent deletion. Eventually, the RTC
The records show that the petition was filed on
time both under Rules 45 and 65. Following Delsan
Transport, the petition, stripped of allegations of grave
abuse of discretion, actually avers errors of judgment
which are the subject of a petition for review.
Only questions of law may be raised in Rule 65
Exceptions:
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
25 September 2007
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final
judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from
the date of notice of the adverse judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
corpus cases.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC
22 January 2008
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the
judgment or final order to the Supreme Court under

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Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law
or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) work days from the
date of notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas
corpus and amparo cases.
Questions of law and questions of fact
distinguished; if no questions of fact, Rule 45
petition
A question of law exists when there is doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or
when the query necessarily invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other
and to the whole and probabilities of the situation.
Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal
involves only questions of law or both questions of law
and fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts
as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved
in favor of the Court of Appeals.
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is
not the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. (China Road and
Bridge Corp. v. CA, GR 137898, December 15, 2000)
Time for filing
Sec. 2. Time for filing; extension
The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served,
with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days
only within which to file the petition.
Docket and other lawful fees
Sec. 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of
petition.
Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner shall pay
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the
clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the
amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of
the petition.
Proof of service
Proof of service of a copy thereof on the lower court
concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted
together with the petition.
Contents of and documents to accompany petition
Sec. 4. Contents of petition.
1. State the full names of the appealing party as
the petitioner and the adverse party as
respondent;
2. Indicate the specific material dates showing that
it was filed on time;
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3. Set forth concisely a statement of the:
a. Matters involved;
b. Reasons or arguments relied upon for the
allowance of the appeal;
4. Accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original
or certified true copy of the judgment or final
order or resolution;
5. Certificate of non-forum shopping.
Effect of failure to comply with requirements
Sec. 5. Dismissal or denial of petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Denial moto proprio
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the
petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or
is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
Review discretionary
Sec. 6. Review discretionary.
A review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will
be considered:
(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so
far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call
for an exercise of the power of supervision.
Pleadings and documents that may be required
Sec. 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required;
sanctions.
For purposes of determining whether the petition should
be dismissed or denied pursuant to section 5 of this Rule,
or where the petition is given due course under Section 8
hereof, the Supreme Court may require or allow the filing
of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it
may deem necessary within such periods and under such
conditions as it may consider appropriate, and impose the
corresponding sanctions in case of non-filing or
unauthorized filing of such pleadings and documents or
noncompliance with the conditions therefor.
Sec. 8. Due course; elevation of records.
If the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court
may require the elevation of the complete record of the
case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days
from notice.
Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases
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Sec. 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases.
The mode of appeal prescribed in this Rule shall be
applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death.
Questions of law and questions of fact
distinguished; if no questions of fact, Rule 45
petition.
China Road and Bridge Corp v. CA (2000)
Facts: China Road and Bridge Corp (CRBC), is a
corporation organized under the laws of China, which is
duly licensed by the SEC to do business in the Philippines.
It was awarded by the Philippine Government the contract
to construct the EDSA Shaw Overpass. To which, it
subcontracted High Quality Builders and Traders (HQBT),
a domestic corporation.
The president of HQBT executed a Continuing
Suretyship in favor of Jade Bank binding herself to pay
the obligation of HQBT arising from all credit
accommodations executed by Jade Bank to HQBT.
Subsequently, HQBT executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of Jade Bank in consideration of a 5Million pesos
loan. Said Deed was with the approval of CRBC.
Thereafter, HQBT obtained several loans secured by
various promisory notes. HQBT also indorsed different
checks covering the amount released by Jade Bank.
When Jade Bank deposited the checks for
payment, they were all dishonored. Jade Bank demanded
HQBT to pay its obligations, however, the same were
unheeded. Accordingly, Jade Bank filed a case for
collection against HQBT, HQBT’s president, and CRBC.
CRBC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of cause of action, which was granted by the RTC. Its
MR having been denied, Jade Bank appealed to the CA
under Rule 41. Subsequently, CRBC filed with the CA a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal asserting that the determination
of whether the ultimate facts in a Complaint state a cause
of action against defendant is a pure question of law and
does not involve any question of fact. As such, the proper
mode of appeal must be under Rule 45 and not Rule 41.
The CA denied CRBC’s motion to dismiss. Aggrieved,
CRBC elevated the case before the SC.
Issue: Is a petition for review under Rule 45 the proper
mode of appeal in this case since the issues raised by Jade
Bank are purely questions of law?
Held: Yes. Jade Bank in its Appellant's Brief raised the
following questions, which it erroneously designated as
questions of fact, in an attempt to place its appeal within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals:
4.1.1. Whether or not the amended complaint
together with the Annexes attached and forming an
integral part thereof, states a sufficient cause of action
against the defendant-appellee;
4.1.2. Whether or not there was an unwarranted
reversal of the Honorable Regional Trial Court's Orders
stating that the complaint states a sufficient cause of
action;
4.2.1. Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss the
complaint can be considered also as a Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.
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We fail to see how these issues raised by
JADEBANK could be properly denominated questions of
fact. The test of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. Applying the test
to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent
raises pure questions of law which are not proper in an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by
way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
In resolving the issue it is necessary to
determine only if private respondent's appeal to the Court
of Appeals involved purely questions of law, in which case
the proper mode of appeal would be a petition for review
on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45; or
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, in
which case the proper mode would be by ordinary appeal
under Rule 41.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or
when the query necessarily invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other
and to the whole and probabilities of the situation.
Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal
involves only questions of law or both questions of law
and fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts
as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved
in favor of the Court of Appeals. However, in the instant
case, we find that there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Court of Appeals, hence, we grant
the petition.
The ground for dismissal invoked by petitioner
is that the complaint of JADEBANK before the trial court
stated no cause of action, under Sec. 1, par. (g), Rule 16,
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is well
settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause
of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the
allegations assuming them to be true. The court does not
inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare them
to be false, otherwise it would be a procedural error and
a denial of due process to the plaintiff. Only the
statements in the complaint may be properly considered,
and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or
hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. To
put it simply, the test for determining whether a
complaint states or does not state a cause of action
against the defendants is whether or not, admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in
the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief
demanded in the complaint.
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state
a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or
"doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts,"
simply because there are no findings of fact in the first
place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law
to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such
allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal
therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based
on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes
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a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is
the legal and logical opposite of the other.
Asian Terminals, Inc v. Simon Enterprises, Inc
(2013)
FACTS: Respondent Simon Enterprises, Inc. filed an
action for damages against petitioner Asian Terminals,
Inc. for shortages in two shipments the respondent
received which the petitioner, as a carrier, handled. The
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, which
the CA affirmed.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for review under Rule 45
was proper.
HELD: Yes.
The matters raised by petitioner ATI involve
questions of fact which are generally not reviewable in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as the Court is not
a trier of facts.
A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
The rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions
of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad
and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of
absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.
The Court finds justification to warrant the
application of the fourth exception. The CA
misapprehended the following facts: (1) the respondent
failed to prove that the subject shipment suffered actual
shortage, as there was no competent evidence to prove
that it actually weighed 3300 metric tons at the port of
origin; (2) the shortage, if any, may have been due to the
inherent nature of the subject shipment or its packaging
since the subject cargo was shipped in bulk and had a
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moisture content of 12.5%; and (3) respondent has not
proven any negligence on the part of the petitioner.
Leoncio v. De Vera (2008)
FACTS: Petitioners filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of
Ownership with Damages against respondents. The RTC
dismissed the case for lack of merit, holding that
petitioners failed to introduce in evidence any deed of
transfer involving the subject lot and that the tax
declarations were subsequently cancelled. The CA
affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for review should be
granted.
HELD: No.
It is a well-established doctrine that in petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, only questions of law may be raised by parties
and passed upon by this Court. Thus, this Court defined
a question of law as distinguished from a question of fact,
to wit:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of
law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is
a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
A perusal of the grounds raised entails the
review of the evidence presented, thus, requiring an
inquiry into questions of fact. In sum, petitioners seek this
Court’s determination of the weight, credence, and
probative value of the evidence presented which were
adequately passed upon by the RTC and the CA. Without
doubt, the matters raised are essentially factual in
character and, therefore, outside the ambit of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioners ought to remember that this Court
is not a trier of facts. It is not for this Court to weigh these
pieces of evidence all over again.
Rule 38
Relief from Judgments, Orders or
Other Proceedings
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 38
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order,
or other proceedings. — When a judgment or final order
is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition
in such court and in the same case praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
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Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. —
When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court
in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented
from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the appeal be given
due course.
* The phrase “any court” refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
Purcon vs. MRM Philippines, Inc. (2008)
Facts: Petitioner was hired by respondent MRM
Philippines, Inc as a seaman on January 28, 2002. On
June 2002, petitioner felt an excruciating pain in his left
testicle. After being examined, he was diagnosed with
hernia. Subsequently, petitioner was repatriated due to
his ailment. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner
was again examined by the company physician and the
latter declared that he was fit to resume work. When
petitioner reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be
re-hired for another contract, he was told that there was
no vacancy for him. Petitioner a complaint filed by
petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses,
sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with
prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbiter. However,
the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for utter lack of
merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the
labor arbiter. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals(CA). However, the CA dismissed the
case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Subsequently, the CA
resolution became final and executory. Petitioner filed
with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for
certiorari. In Our Resolution dated July 16, 2007, We
denied the petition. Thus, petitioner filed the instant
petition for relief from judgment.
Issue: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure from the resolution denying his petition for
review?
Held: We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from
judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme
Court. First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that
when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any
court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule
must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme
Court. A petition for relief from judgment is not included
in the list of Rule56 cases originally cognizable by this
Court. Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court,"
it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial
Courts. Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme
Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of
Court. Neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal
Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in
the CA. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making
the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court.
The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the
exception of Rule 45which pertains to the Supreme Court,
identifies the remedies available before said Court such
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as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions
(Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new
trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule
38mentioned.If a petition for relief from judgment is not
among the remedies available in the CA, with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the
Supreme Court. A petition for relief raises questions of
facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
Grounds
(1) When judgment or final order is entered or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against petitioner through
FAME
(2) When petitioner has been prevented from taking an
appeal by FAME
* Requires final judgment or loss of appeal
* Only available against a final and executory judgment
Valencia v. CA (2001)
Facts: Rufino Valencia entered into a lease agreement
with the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM)
involving a fishpond. The people of Barrio Sta. Cruz,
Paombong filed a complaint against RCBM for declaration
of nullity of the title of the fishpond alleging ownership of
the fishpond and that RCBM was a mere trustee. They
prayed for the issuance of an injunction to prevent RCBM
from leasing the fishpond or in case it had already been
leased, from implementing the lease.
The RTC rendered judgment upholding the
validity of RCBMs title and its lease contract with
petitioner. However, he dismissed petitioners
counterclaim for lack of evidence. Upon belatedly learning
of said judgment, petitioner moved for execution pending
appeal, contending that since the trial court found him
entitled to possession of the fishpond, it is unfair to
deprive him thereof. Meanwhile, he filed a petition for
relief from the portion of the judgment dismissing his
counterclaim, where he alleged that his failure to move
for reconsideration of or appeal from said judgment was
due to a mistaken belief of his former counsel that he was
no longer interested to pursue the counterclaim.
The RTC deferred action on the petition for
relief. The trial court also said that a grant of the petition
for relief during the pendency of the appeal would pre-
empt the appellate court’s ruling in case private
respondents would appeal. The court added that they
were entitled to have their appeal given due course,
otherwise, the grant of the petition might bring
incalculable harm to them. Petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus
contending that it was grave abuse of discretion for the
trial court to defer action on his petition for relief.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus
concludin that there was nothing capricious or whimsical
in the trial court’s decision to defer action on the petition
for relief on the ground that it would pre-empt the ruling
of the Court of Appeals. Lastly, since the petition for relief
remained to be resolved by the trial court, the Court of
Appeals did not deem it appropriate to pass upon the
issue of whether the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim
was a violation of his right to due process.
Hence, this petition for review.
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Issue: WON the trial court should have allowed the
petition for relief.
Held: Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred
in refusing to compel the trial court to act on the petition
for relief. According to him, the trial courts duty under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, except sections 4 & 6
thereof, is ministerial such that upon finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the judge must order the
other party to answer, conduct a hearing and decide
whether to grant or deny the petition. The judge was
therefore remiss in his duty when he deferred action on
the petition, since his only role was either to dismiss or
grant it, according to petitioner.
Private respondents argue that the trial court
was correct in deferring action on the petition for relief,
in the interest of justice and equity. To grant the petition
pending private respondents appeal, they aver, would
pre-empt the Court of Appeals. This, they say, is not
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find no merit in petitioners argument. A
petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against
a final and executory judgment. In this case, the trial
courts judgment subject of the petition for relief has not
yet attained finality because of the timely appeal by
private respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot require
the judge to follow the procedure laid down in Rule
38. The judge did not err nor abuse his discretion when
he deferred action on the petition.
Fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence
Gomez v Montalban (2008)
Facts: Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez
in the amount of P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on
her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed
to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint
in the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but
despite her receipt, she still failed to file an Answer. She
was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered
a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment alleging that there was no proper service
of summons since there was no personal service. She
alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized
to receive summons and that her failure to file an Answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but
counsel for respondent failed to appear before the court
hence the dismissal of the Petition.
Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration
of the dismissal of the Petition stating that counsel’s
failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC
granted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for
Reconsideration.
Issue: WON the granting of Petition for Relief from
Judgment by the RTC is proper.
Held: NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A
Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is only available against
a final and executory judgment and the grounds include
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
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When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal
from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was
not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal,
he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Discussion on Grounds:
"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law,
which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which
grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was
never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court
might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be
corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in
the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been
prevented from interposing an appeal.
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved
party from having a trial or presenting his case to the
court,or was used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy. This is not present in the
case at hand as respondent was not prevented from
securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to
present her case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" must
be excusable and generally imputable to the party
because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on
the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to
disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the
mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved
litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against
the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the
court's ruling.
In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature
of a Petition for Relief from Judgment:
“A petition for relief from judgment is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available to him, which
may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal,
he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will
not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition
for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which
had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.”
In the case, Montalban contended that
judgment was entered against her through mistake or
fraud because she was not duly served summons.
However, under the discussion of the following grounds,
the SC sees no merit in her petition. Petition for Relief
from Judgment is set aside.
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 38
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and
verification. — A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed
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within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or
final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken,
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be.
(1) Within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order, or other proceeding to be set aside; AND
(2) Not more than 6 months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken
The two periods for the filing of a petition for relief are
not extendible and never interrupted. Both periods must
be complied with. [Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Ariaga]
Reckoning points:
(1) The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party
acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or
proceeding. Not from the date he actually read the same
[Perez v. Araneta]
(2) 6-months period is computed from the date of entry
of the order or judgment
* Strictly followed
Victory Liner, Inc. v. Michael Malinias
(2007)
Facts: A vehicular collision occurred between a bus
owned by petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. and an Isuzu Truck
used by respondent Michael Malinias. Nobody died, but
both vehicles were damaged from the accident. A
complaint for sum of money and damages was instituted
by respondent against petitioner and the bus driver.
In the course of trial, respondent finished
presenting his evidence and rested his case. In the
meantime, counsel for petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, but the same was denied by the MTC
as the motion did not bear any signature of conformity
from the petitioner. When the case was called for the
reception of petitioner’s evidence, no appearance was
made for the bus company. Respondent thus immediately
moved that petitioner be declared to have waived its right
to adduce evidence in its favor and that the case be
deemed submitted for judgment. The MTC found merit in
respondent’s contention, and ordered the case be deemed
submitted for decision.
Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with a defective Notice of
Hearing. Accordingly, the MTC declared that its earlier
judgment had become final and executory. In the same
order and upon the same predicates, the MTC also
granted the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed
by respondent.
Petitioner responded to the foregoing
developments by filing a Notice of Appeal which was
however denied, the MR being defective and not having
tolled the reglementary period for appeal.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with
the MTC which was denied by the MTC on the ground that
it had been filed out of time. The MTC explained that the
petition for relief from judgment must have been filed
either within sixty (60) days from the date petitioner’s
new counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty (60) days
after learning that the Motion for Reconsideration had
been denied for having been filed out of time. Neither
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circumstance was met by petitioner. Subsequently, the
MTC likewise denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner.
Second, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the RTC. The petition for certiorari was
dismissed by the RTC agreeing with the MTC that the
Petition for Relief from Judgment had been belatedly filed.
Petitioner filed an MR, which was again denied. Petitioner
filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari to
Annul Judgment" under the aegis of Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Interestingly, based on the first
paragraph and the express relief prayed for in this
petition, the "judgment" sought to be annulled was not
the final and executory judgment of the MTC, but rather,
the two orders of the RTC which successively dismissed
the special civil action for certiorari, and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
respondent. However, in explaining the "nature of the
petition," petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul
the judgment and orders of both the RTC and the
MTC, although the issues identified in the petition pertain
only to "serious errors" and "grave abuse of discretion"
on the part of the RTC. There is a general allegation that
the acts of the RTC in granting the motion for execution
even before petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
acted upon constituted an extrinsic fraud, but no
particular arguments were offered to explain why that
was so.
The Court of Appeals further held that it was
clear that the ground of extrinsic fraud raised by
petitioner had already been availed of in its earlier
petition for relief from judgment before the MTC. Such
circumstance contradicted Section 2 of Rule 47, which
provides that "extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
(for annulment of judgment) if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition
for relief."
Issue: What should have been the remedy pursued by
petitioner?
Held: A proper remedy for the petitioner is found under
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs petitions for relief from judgment. Indeed,
Section 2, Rule 38 finds specific application in this case,
as it provides that "[w]hen a judgment or final order is
rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has
been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a
petition [for relief from denial of appeal] in such court and
in the same case praying that the appeal be given due
course." Such petition should be filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment or final
order, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered. The facts of this case
indicate that petitioner could have timely resorted to this
remedy.
Notably, it was only after the Notice of Appeal
was denied that the petitioner had pursued the two
remedies it could have undertaken from the MTC Order
declaring its motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap
of paper. First, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the MTC. The problem with this remedy
was the utter belatedness in the resort thereto. Section 3
of Rule 38 requires that said petition must be filed within
sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order was entered. Neither benchmark was met by the
petitioner, since the petition was filed only on 25 October
1999, or some sixteen (16) months after the rendition of
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the judgment sought to be set aside, and around fourteen
(14) months after such judgment was declared final and
executory. Petitioner had opportunely learned of both the
rendition of the judgment and the Order refusing to give
cognizance to the motion for reconsideration. Had it
simply consulted the rulebook, it should have realized
that a petition for relief from judgment was a remedy
available to it, and certainly one more appropriate than
the Notice of Appeal it ultimately resorted to.
Contents
Affidavit of merit (Sec. 3)
FORM AND CONTENTS OF THE PETITION
(1) The petition for relief must be verified
(2) The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit
showing the FAME relied upon; and
(3) The affidavit of merit accompanying the petition
must also show the facts constituting the petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense as
the case may be
• The absence of an affidavit of merits is a fatal
defect and warrant denial of the petition
[Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick].
• However, it is not a fatal defect so long as the
facts required to be set out also appear in the
verified petition [Fabar Inc. v. Rodelas].
When Affidavit of Merit is not necessary:
(1) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant;
(2) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter;
(3) When judgment was taken by default;
(4) When judgment was entered by mistake or
was obtained by fraud; or
(5) Other similar cases.
When motion for reconsideration considered as petition
for relief
Action of court before answer
Power to deny (Sec. 4)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 38
Section 4. Order to file an answer. — If the petition
is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the
court in which it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the
adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt thereof. The order shall be served
in such manner as the court may direct, together with
copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits.
Preliminary injunction pending proceedings (Sec. 5)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 38
Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending
proceedings. — The court in which the petition is filed may
grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for
the preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the
filing by the petitioner of a bond in favor of the adverse
party, conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or the
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petitioner fails on the trial of the case upon its merits, he
will pay the adverse party all damages and costs that may
be awarded to him by reason of the issuance of such
injunction or the other proceedings following the petition,
but such injunction shall not operate to discharge or
extinguish any lien which the adverse party may have
acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner.
Order to file answer (Sec. 4)
Procedure
Availability of preliminary injunction (Sec. 5)
Proceedings after answer is filed (Sec. 6)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 38
Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. — After
the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period
therefor, the court shall hear the petition and if after such
hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are not true,
the petition shall be dismissed; but if it finds said
allegations to be true, it shall set aside the judgment or
final order or other proceeding complained of upon such
terms as may be just. Thereafter the case shall stand as
if such judgment, final order or other proceeding had
never been rendered, issued or taken. The court shall
then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely
motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been
granted by it.
Where denial of appeal is set aside (Sec. 7)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 38
Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal
is set aside. — Where the denial of an appeal is set aside,
the lower court shall be required to give due course to the
appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as
if a timely and proper appeal had been made.
Action of court after giving due course
Grant of petition for relief (Sec. 7)
Denial of petition for relief (Rule 41, Sec. 1 (b))
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
…
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment.
…
* Appeal from an order denying a petition for relief is no
longer available under the present rules. The remedy
against a denial of a petition for relief is certiorari under
Rule 65, when proper.
Remedies after petition for relief expires
Reopening not allowed
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Alvendia v. IAC (1990)
Facts: A simple collection suit was filed by Bonifacio
Bonamy against the spouses Alvendia. Thereafter, both
parties submitted to the trial court a "Compromise
Agreement." Subsequently, Bonamy moved for execution
of judgment. The court ordered the issuance of the writ
prayed for. The Alvendias did not move for
reconsideration nor did they elevate the matter to the
higher courts. Bonamy sought the issuance of an alias
writ of execution, the first writ having been returned
unsatisfied. Pursuant to the alias writ , the provincial
sheriff levied on the Alvendias "leasehold rights" over a
fishpond. Thereafter, a certificate of sale over said
leasehold right was executed by the Sheriff in favor of
Bonamy. More than a year later, the spouses moved for
the quashal and annulment of the writ of execution, levy
and sale.
A final deed of sale was executed and registered
with the Register of Deeds. In an order, the trial court
denied the spouses' motion to quash and ordered instead
the issuance of a writ of possession in Bonamy's favor.
The possession of the fishpond was delivered to Bonamy.
In a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the spouses Alvendias sought the annulment of the
writ of execution, the levy made upon the leasehold rights
and the writ of possession.
The IAC dismissed the aforesaid petition. The
Alvendias filed an urgent motion for reconsideration.
Pending action thereon, the spouses manifested to the
court, thru motion, their willingness to immediately pay
to Bonamy the remaining balance of the judgment sought
to be enforced. The IAC issued two resolutions,
denominated as Resolutions I and II.
Resolution I denied the Alvendias' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Resolution II granted
their motion to satisfy the judgment sought to be
enforced in cash thereby directing the parties to submit
to the court an agreement duly signed by both parties
regarding full satisfaction of the judgment but only after
the total amount involved in said judgment had been
tendered and delivered to Bonamy. The Alvendias then
tendered payment to Bonamy in the form of a cashier's
check. Bonamy refused said tender of payment, and
instead moved for a reconsideration of Resolution II.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying for the annulment of respondent
court's Resolution I and II alleging that respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
Alvendias' motion that they be allowed to pay the
judgment debt in cash. Petitioner claims that the assailed
resolutions are in effect an annulment of the assailed
Orders and Writs of the Bulacan Regional Trial Court, the
Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of Sale of the
Leasehold Rights over the Foreshore Lands;
Issue: WON the writs and orders may be annulled or at
least reopened.
Held: No. The writs and orders of the lower court sought
to be annulled or at least reopened are already final and
executory and in fact already executed. The judgment
which was executed was a compromise judgment, duly
approved by the court and therefore, final and
immediately executory. Bonamy was clearly entitled to
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execution since the Alvendias failed to pay on time the
judgment.
It is axiomatic that there is no justification in law
and in fact for the reopening of a case which has long
become final and which has in fact been executed. Time
and again this Court has said that the doctrine of finality
of judgments is grounded on fundamental consideration
of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error the judgments of courts must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.
The Alvendias cannot invoke equity as a ground
for reopening the case and making the payment of the
judgment in cash possible. The records show that they
had all the opportunity to make such payments on four
occasions but failed. The Alvendias failed to pay on time
the judgment of which the execution sale was a necessary
consequence. They also failed to redeem the property
within the required period despite the fact that the Final
Deed of Sale was issued long past the aforesaid period;
undeniably showing a lack of intention or capability to pay
the same.
Rule 47
Annulment of Judgment
I. When remedy available
• An action for annulment of judgment is a
remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
• Annulment of judgment is resorted to in cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner, and is based on only
two grounds, extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. (Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470
SCRA 697)
a. Where applicable
• Annulment of judgment does not apply to
judgments rendered by quasi-judicial
bodies. It does not also apply to decisions
or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases whose decisions or
orders may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. (Macalalag v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 147995, 5 March
2004)
II. Grounds (Sec. 2)
1. Extrinsic fraud or collateral fraud
• is trickery practiced by the prevailing party
upon the unsuccessful party, which
prevents the latter from fully proving his
case. It affects not the judgment itself but
the manner in which said judgment is
obtained. (People v. Bitanga, G.R. No.
159222, 26 June 2007)
• must emanate from an act of the adverse
party, and the fraud must be of such nature
as to have deprived the petitioner of its day
in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act
was committed by the petitioner's own
counsel. (Pinausukan Seafood House,
Roxas Boulevard, Inc. v. Far East Bank &
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Trust Company, G.R. No. 159926, 20
January 2014)
• must be sought within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud, which fact should be
alleged and proven; the particular acts and
omissions constituting extrinsic fraud must
be clearly established. (People v. Bitanga,
supra)
2. Lack of jurisdiction
• petitioner must show not merely an abuse
of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute
lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of
jurisdiction as a ground to annul a
judgment does not embrace abuse of
discretion. (Antonino v. The Register of
Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, 20
June 2012)
Cosmic Lumber Co v. CA (1996)
Facts: Cosmic Corporation, through its General Manager,
executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing Paz G.
Villamil-Estrada (“Estrada”) as attorney-in-fact to initiate,
institute and file any court action for the ejectment of
third persons and/or squatters of the entire lot 9127 and
443 for the said squatters to remove their houses and
vacate the premises in order that the corporation may
take material possession of the entire lot, one of which is
respondent Isidro Perez (“Perez”). Estrada, by virtue of
her power of attorney, instituted an action for the
ejectment of private respondent Isidro Perez and recover
the possession of a portion of lot 443 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC).
Estrada entered into a Compromise Agreement
with Perez. Although the agreement was approved by the
trial court and the decision became final and executory, it
was not executed within the 5 year period from date of
its finality allegedly due to the failure of Cosmic Lumber
to produce the owner’s duplicate copy of title needed to
segregate from lot 443 the portion sold by the attorney-
in-fact, Paz Estrada to Perez under the compromise
agreement. Respondent filed a complaint to revive the
judgment. Petitioner sought the annulment of the
decision of the trial court based on the compromise
agreement, alleging that it had no knowledge of the
compromise agreement.
Issue: Whether the annulment of the decision of the trial
court must be sustained.
Held: Yes. Nowhere in the authorization was Estrada
granted expressly or impliedly any power to sell the
subject property nor a portion thereof. Neither can a
conferment of the power to sell be validly inferred from
the specific authority to enter into a compromise
agreement because of the explicit limitation fixed by the
grantor that the compromise entered into shall only be so
far as it shall protect the rights and interest of the
corporation in the aforementioned lots.
It is therefore clear that by selling to respondent
Perez a portion of petitioners land through a compromise
agreement, Villamil-Estrada acted without or in obvious
authority. The sale ipso jure is consequently void. So is
the compromise agreement. This being the case, the
judgment based thereon is necessarily void. Antipodal to
the opinion expressed by respondent court in resolving
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the nullity of the
settlement between Villamil-Estrada and Perez impaired
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the jurisdiction of the trial court to render its decision
based on the compromise agreement.
Under authority of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129,
a party may now petition the Court of Appeals to annul
and set aside judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Thus,
the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
shall exercise x x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over action for annulment of judgments of the Regional
Trial Courts x x x x However, certain requisites must first
be established before a final and executory judgment can
be the subject of an action for annulment. It must either
be void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process
of law, or it has been obtained by fraud.
Conformably with law and the above-cited
authorities, the petition to annul the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. D-7750 before the Court of Appeals
was proper. Emanating as it did from a void compromise
agreement, the trial court had no jurisdiction to render a
judgment based thereon.
It would also appear, and quite contrary to the
finding of the appellate court, that the highly
reprehensible conduct of attorney-in-fact Villamil-Estrada
in Civil Case No. 7750 constituted an extrinsic or collateral
fraud by reason of which the judgment rendered thereon
should have been struck down.
For sure, the Court of Appeals restricted the concept
of fraudulent acts within too narrow limits. Fraud may
assume different shapes and be committed in as many
different ways and here lies the danger of attempting to
define fraud. For man in his ingenuity and fertile
imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the
unwary.
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec.
9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real
contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was
procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to
any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent,
as by keeping him away from court, a false promise
of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat; these and similar cases which show that there
has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the
case for a new and fair hearing.
III. Where petition filed (Secs. 1, 10)
Judgments, Final Judgments, Final
Orders of Resolutions Orders or Resolutions
of RTC of MTC
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Filed with the Court of Filed with the RTC
Appeals
Basis: It has exclusive Basis: RTC as a court of
original jurisdiction over general jurisdiction
said action under Sec. 9 under Sec. 19 (6) of B.P.
(2) of B.P. 129 129
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 47
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 47
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders
of Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a judgment
or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former.
It shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and sections
2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable thereto.
IV. Annulment of MTC judgment should be
filed with RTC
Victory Liner v. Malinias (2007)
Facts: On 17 July 2001 petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari to Annul Judgment"
under the aegis of Rule 47. In explaining the "nature of
the petition," petitioner claimed that it was seeking to
annul the judgment and orders of both the RTC and the
MTC, although the issues identified in the petition pertain
only to "serious errors" and "grave abuse of discretion"
on the part of the RTC. There is a general allegation that
the acts of the RTC in granting the motion for execution
even before petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
acted upon constituted an extrinsic fraud, but no
particular arguments were offered to explain why that
was so. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was the
proper venue for the petition.
Held: Section 2 of Rule 47 does disqualify extrinsic fraud
as a valid ground "if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief," and such provision would have found
incontestable relevance had the clear object of the
petition for annulment been the MTC judgment. But
petitioner’s action for annulment of judgment did not
provide clarity in that regard, and in fact does devote
considerable effort in imputing errors on the part of the
RTC with the objective of annulling, in particular, the RTC
decision. If that were so, reliance on Section 2 of Rule 47
would have been misplaced, since the judgment subject
of the petition for relief was different from the decision
subject of the action for annulment of judgment. Still,
given the confused nature of the petition for annulment
of judgment, blame could hardly be attributed to the RTC.
All told, even if we were to hold that the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
perceived defect in the verification and certification
requirements, the appellate court would have been left
with an action stigmatized by error upon error
interminably. Most frustratingly, for every procedural
misstep committed by petitioner, there existed a
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corresponding viable alternative which would have
necessitated a ruling on the merits, and which petitioner
could have chosen with ease. Instead of filing a Notice of
Appeal, it could have instead filed a special civil action for
certiorari or a petition for relief from judgment. Instead
of filing the no longer timely petition for relief from
judgment, it could have instead by then filed a petition
for annulment of judgment. When it did file a petition for
annulment with the Court of Appeals, it could have
instead filed a more feasible petition for annulment with
the RTC.
V. Period for filing (Sec. 3)
Extrinsic Fraud Lack of
Jurisdiction
Period for Four (4) years from Before it is barred by
filing discovery laches or estoppel.
• Laches
➢ A party may be barred by laches from
invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first on
time on appeal for the purpose of
annulling everything doen in the case,
with the active participation of said party
invoking the plea. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
G.R. No. L-21450, 15 April 1968)
Marcelino v. Court of Appeals (1992)
Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners of the land
in Tarlac but even before WWII respondents have been
and still are in possession of these lands and the titles.
Petitioners demanded the restitution to them of the
physical possession and titles of the property but was
refused by the respondents. RTC dismissed the case on
the ground of laches. CA upheld the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether petitioners are guilty of laches.
Held: Yes. Laches in a general sense, means the failure
or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
In the case at bar, the petitioners admitted in
their complaint, that the private respondents had been
occupying the parcels of land in question even before
World War II, and that they (private respondents) have
in their possession the titles thereof. For almost 50 years,
or until June 20, 1988 no action had been taken by the
petitioners, or their predecessors-in-interest, to recover
possession of the land and the titles thereof.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the petitioner's long
inaction in asserting their right to the contested lots bars
them from recovering the same. The law serves those
who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep
when the law requires them to act.
Although the parcels of land in question are
registered under the Torrens System, it is nevertheless
settled in this jurisdiction that the ownership of registered
land may be lost through laches. The doctrine of laches
or of "stale demands" is based on grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims. Unlike the statute of
limitations, laches is not a mere question of time but is
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principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a stale right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
The individual elements of laches were
sufficiently and thoroughly discussed by the appellate
court in its decision. We find no need to make any further
disquisition on the matter.
VI. Parties and contents (Sec. 4)
The action for annulment of judgment shall
be commenced by filing:
1. Verified petition alleging therein:
a. With particularity the facts and the law
relied upon; and
b. Petitioner’s good and substantial
cause of action or defense.
2. Filed in seven (7) legible copies together
with sufficient copies corresponding to the
number of respondents.
3. Certified true copy of the judgment or final
order or resolution shall be attached to the
original copy of the petition.
4. Affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action or defense;
and
5. Certificate of non-forum shopping.
➢ May be filed by a non-party to the
judgment
➢ The petitioner need not be a party to
the judgment sought to be annulled.
What is essential is that the petitioner
is one who can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained and
that he was affected thereby. (Alaban
v, Court of Appeals, supra)
➢ Available even if judgment has been
executed (Sec. 9)
➢ The judgment of annulment may
include the award of damages,
attorney's fees and other relief.
➢ If the questioned judgment or final
order or resolution had already been
executed the court may issue such
orders of restitution or other relief as
justice and equity may warrant under
the circumstances. (n)
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. vs. Court of
Appeals (1989)
Facts: Da Sila, mortgagor and petitioner, mortgagee,
executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a land in Cubao as
security for a 1 million promissory note. Upon default,
petitioner filed for foreclosure with the RTC. Parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement that the land will
be transferred to petitioners. The title was then
transferred in the name of the petitioner. Araneta filed
with the RD a notice of lis pendens in connection with the
ejectment case filed by petitioner against Araneta but was
later on withdrawn by the petitioner. Araneta filed a
notice of adverse claim in connection with the case filed
by da Silva against Araneta. Both lis pendens and adverse
claim were annotated on the title. Petitioner filed a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession
against Araneta and for the cancellation of the 2
annotations. Pending said case, heirs of Araneta filed in
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the CA a petition to annul the judgment in the foreclosure
case. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case before
the CA on the ground that the decision in the foreclosure
proceeding had already been executed and that the heirs
were not a party to the proceedings before the lower
court.
Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
is proper.
Held: There can be no question as to the right of any
persons adversely affected by a judgment to maintain an
action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a
nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in
the very matter of obtaining the judgment when such
fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in
the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such
judgment.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a
person need not be a party to the judgment sought
to be annulled. What is essential is that he can
prove his allegation that the judgment was
obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he
would be adversely affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of
Araneta are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither
are they principally nor secondarily bound by the
judgment rendered therein. However, their petition filed
with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and
connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas
and the Council as would adversely affect them. This
allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of
evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of the civil
case.
Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of
annulment of judgment applies only to final and
executory judgment and not to that which had already
been fully executed or implemented. The Council’s
contention is devoid of merit. In Garchitorena v. Sotelo,
the Court affirmed the trial court’s annulment of the
judgment on foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that
ownership of the house and lot subject of the mortgage
had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the
mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to
a person who bought the same and finally to another
individual in whose name the Torrens certificate of title
stood by the time the case reached this Tribunal. (An
action for annulment of judgment may be availed of
even if the judgment sought to be annulled had
been fully executed and implemented.)
VII. Action by the court.
Two Stages:
• Should the court find no substantial
merit in the petition, the same may be
dismissed outright with specific reasons
for such dismissal.
• Should prima facie merit be found in the
petition, the same shall be given due
course and summons shall be served on
the respondent. (Sec. 5, Rule 47)
VIII. Procedure.
• The procedure in ordinary civil cases
shall be observed. Should trial be
necessary, the reception of the evidence
may be referred to a member of the
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court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
(Sec. 6, Rule 47)
IX. Effect of judgment. (Sec. 7)
Extrinsic Fraud Lack of
Jurisdiction
Effect of Court may on Set aside
judgment motion, order the questioned
trial court to try the judgment and render
case as if a timely the same null and
motion for new trial void, without
had been granted. prejudice to
original action being
re-filed in the proper
court.
X. Suspension of prescriptive period
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 47
Section 8. The prescriptive period for the refiling of
the aforesaid original action shall be deemed suspended
from the filing of such original action until the finality of
the judgment of annulment. However, the prescriptive
period shall not be suspended where the extrinsic-fraud
is attributable to the plaintiff in the original action.
Rule 65
Certiorari
Constitutional provisions on judicial power
¤ 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Petition for certiorari, in general
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 65
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy
of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46.
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Distinction between without jurisdiction, in excess
of jurisdiction and grave of abuse of
discretion
a. Without jurisdiction – the court has no
jurisdiction from the beginning; there is an
absolute want of jurisdiction.
the b. In excess of jurisdiction – if the court has acted
beyond the limits of its authority.
c. Grave abuse of discretion – too patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty,
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
the or an act in contemplation of law, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility; does not encompass an error of law
nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation
of the contending parties’ respective evidence
or the evaluation of their relative weight.
Remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction
Jamer v. NLRC (1997)
Facts: Petitioners worked as store cashiers at
respondents’ Isetann Department Store. Their work as
store cashiers is to accumulate, at the end of daily
operations, the cash sales receipts of the selling floor cash
register clerks. Thereafter, petitioners will reconcile the
cash sales with the tally sheets to determine shortages
and deposit the same with the bank depositor of Isetann.
Petitioners discovered a shortage
of P15,353.78. It was complainant Corazon Jamer who
first discovered the shortage. She informed her co-store
cashier, complainant Cristina Amortizado, about the
shortage. Amortizado also reconciled and re-counted the
sale and she also confirmed that there was a discrepancy
or a shortage of P15,353.78. They did not immediately
report the shortage to management hoping to find the
cause of the shortage but to no avail. Hence, they had no
other alternative but to report the same to the
management.
Respondents placed both petitioners under
preventive suspension for the alleged shortages.
Thereafter, respondents conducted an administrative
investigation. Finding the explanation of the complainants
to be unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the
complainants on the alleged ground of dishonesty.
Aggrieved, complainant instituted an action for illegal
dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor
of herein petitioners, finding that petitioners had been
illegally dismissed. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the latter
rendered the challenged decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. Hence the
present petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that petitioners were validly
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Held: At the outset, the Court notes petitioners
inexcusable failure to move for the reconsideration of
respondent NLRCs decision. Thus, the present petition
suffers from a procedural defect that warrants its outright
dismissal. While in some exceptional cases we allowed the
immediate recourse to this Court, we find nothing herein
that could warrant an exceptional treatment to this
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petition. Moreover, The unquestioned rule in this
jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent. In the case at bench, the plain and adequate
remedy referred to in Rule 65, Section 1, is a motion for
reconsideration of the challenged decision and the
resolution thereof.
Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it reversed
the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.
In asserting that there was grave abuse of
discretion, petitioners advert to alleged variances in the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the respondent
NLRC. This is inept and erroneous. Firstly, errors of
judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are
not within the province of a special civil action
for certiorari. Secondly, a careful reading of the records
of this case would readily show that if there is any error
by public respondent in its analysis of the facts and its
evaluation of the evidence, it is not of such a degree as
may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is
rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily
follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere
variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and
that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so
warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC's
decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the
records, deserves respect from the Court.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. The rationale for this rule is
simple. When a court exercises its jurisdiction an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive
it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not countenance such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctible through the original special civil action
of certiorari.
On the merits, there is substantial evidence
exists to warrant the finding that petitioners were validly
dismissed for just cause and after observance of due
process. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of
the public respondent that the herein petitioners were
guilty of acts of dishonesty by incurring several
occurrences of shortages in the amounts
of P15,353.78, P1,000.00, P450.00 andP70.00 which
they failed to turnover and account for/and in behalf of
respondent Isetann. The failure of petitioners to report
the aforequoted shortages and overages to management
as soon as they arose resulted in the breach of the
fiduciary trust reposed in them by respondent company,
thereby causing the latter to lose confidence in them. This
warrants their dismissal.
The NLRC, therefore, did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in declaring that petitioners were
legally dismissed from employment. The failure of
petitioners to report to management the aforementioned
irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust
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reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized
representative one of the just causes in terminating
employment as provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282
of the Labor Code, as amended.
Distinction between error of jurisdiction and error
of judgment
a. When court without jurisdiction and it rendered
decision, committed error of jurisdiction -
decision null and void even if correct, and remedy
is certiorari.
b. When court with jurisdiction and rendered
decision, but decision not correct, committed
error of judgment – decision valid even if wrong,
and remedy is appeal
Questions of fact cannot be raised
Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City (1990)
Facts: Petitioner Victorino Day is the registered owner of
a parcel of land in Zamboanga City. Respondent Go Chu
is the owner of a building constructed on said lot.
Petitioner asked respondent to peacefully vacate and
remove the latter’s building on the former’s lot. Due to
private respondent’s refusal to vacate the premises, on
April 17, 1982, petitioner instituted a formal complaint
against respondent with the Office of the Barangay
Chairman. As no amicable settlement could be reached,
the Barangay Chairman issued a certification that
conciliation of the dispute at the barangay level had
failed.
On January 15, 1985, petitioner again made
another demand on respondent to remove the building.
Because of respondent’s adamant and continued refusal
to vacate the disputed lot, petitioner filed with the MTC
on March 25, 1985 an action for unlawful detainer with
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory. Petitioner
did not use the former Barangay Certification in
commencing the said suit against respondent. The MTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, ordering
defendant to vacate the premises and remove the portion
of his building over petitioner’s property. The MTC
considered the April 1982 certification to file action as
sufficient compliance with the provision of P.D. No. 1508
requiring prior conciliation proceedings.
Respondent filed an original action for certiorari
with the RTC. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari,
setting aside the decision of the MTC. Hence the present
petition for review assailing the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not procedural questions or questions
of facts or substance may be entertained in a petition
for certiorari.
Held: No. The RTC has no jurisdiction in a certiorari case
to entertain procedural questions or questions of facts or
substance already passed upon by the lower court. The
barangay certificate of 1982 was admitted and found to
be sufficient by the MTC after considering the
circumstances surrounding its issuance. This is a
procedural question or a question of fact which cannot be
raised or corrected in a certiorari case, but should be
assigned as error and reviewed in the appeal properly
taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the
merits of the case. Admissibility of evidence is a matter
that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
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(the MTC in this case). Such being the case, no potent
reason existed to justify respondent RTC’s substitution of
the lower court’s judgment with its own judgment.
"Questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action
for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts can be
considered." (Rubio v. Reyes, Et Al., L-24581, May 27,
1968)
It is therefore clear that respondent court erred
in reversing the lower court’s findings regarding the
sufficiency of the Barangay Certificate of 1982. It was an
error for the respondent court to rule upon a question of
fact or procedural question already decided by the lower
court.
Furthermore, only errors of jurisdiction are
correctible by certiorari. Clearly, the only grounds which
may serve as the basis for the respondent court to raise
the writ of certiorari are lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion by the lower court or that the said lower
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its
appreciation of the barangay certification as constituting
sufficient compliance with P.D. No. 1508. In the
ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondent, the
lower court undoubtedly acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the respondent.
Thus, it cannot be said that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to render the decision set aside by respondent
court. Assuming that the lower court committed a mistake
on the merits of the case, it was in the exercise of such
jurisdiction. The error, if at all, is at most one of judgment
and not of jurisdiction, which cannot be the object of a
petition for certiorari. The proper remedy in such case
was appeal. Errors in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has
acquired jurisdiction over a case, are correctible only by
appeal.
Neither can it be said that the lower court
committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its
jurisdiction when it appreciated the barangay certification
as sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508. In the petition
for certiorari filed by respondent before the respondent
court, he did not allege that the lower court’s decision was
outside or in excess of its jurisdiction, or was issued in
grave abuse of discretion. Respondent merely alleged
that the lower court "erroneously" appreciated facts and
evidence, issued interlocutory orders, and appreciated
the issues. He also challenged the soundness of the
decision. These do not constitute excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion.
Neither questions of fact nor of law entertained
Romy’s Freight Service v. Castro (2006)
Facts: In 1975, respondent Castro was hired by
respondent as a mechanic, and later as supervisor. In
1994, he suffered a stroke and had to take a leave of
absence from work. While on leave, petitioner sent him
several demand letters urging him to work. Later he was
asked to show cause why he should not be disciplined for
prolonged absence. Cruz also filed complaints
for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of
these, Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal
dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruzs acts
constituted constructive dismissal. Respondent Veloria
was hired in 1977 as a carpenter, and later as a senior
mechanic. Sometime in 1995, he figured in an accident.
He was forced to absent himself from work to undergo
recuperation. During his absence, he received several
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letters from Cruz. One letter required him to explain the
loss of several tools, another ordered him to pay his loan
and still another required him to explain his absences. He
was later charged for qualified theft of the missing tools.
Because of petitioner’s acts against him, Veloria joined
Castro in filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal
against petitioner.
The labor arbiter ruled that petitioner was guilty
of illegal dismissal. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC
set aside the labor arbiter’s ruling. Finding respondents
guilty of abandonment of work, the NLRC dismissed their
complaint for illegal dismissal. Aggrieved, respondents
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA granted the petition and reinstated the
decision of the labor arbiter. Hence the present petition
for certiorari, faulting the CA for reversing the decision of
the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not the issues of illegal dismissal,
abandonment and entitlement to backwages and benefits
are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
Held: No. The issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether
respondents were illegally dismissed (as the CA and the
labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the NLRC
held) and whether they were entitled to backwages,
unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees, are
not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. They
involve an inquiry into factual matters.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more
so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are
entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object
of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. The phrase grave abuse of discretion
has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion
too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and personal hostility. It does not
encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake
in the appreciation of the contending parties respective
evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight. The
Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented
by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them all
over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-judicial
agency and the appellate court were correct in according
superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one
party or the other. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is
the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of
public respondents evaluation of the evidence and the
factual findings based thereon. Therefore, the present
petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the
affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor
arbiter that private respondents were illegally dismissed,
entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid benefits,
separation pay and attorney’s fees.
Only issue involved is jurisdiction, either want of
or excess thereof
Gerardo vs. De la Pena (1990)
Facts: Angel Gerardo owned three parcels of lots.
Filomina, Berta, and Santiago were his children. Filomina
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and Berta were both survived by their respective children,
herein respondents. Santiago was also survived by his
children, herein petitioners.
Before the cadastral hearing involving the
subject parcels of lots could commence, Angel Gerardo
died. Subsequently, Santiago filed the corresponding
answers for the three lots in question. It was alleged in
said answers that he (Santiago) was the heir of Angel
Gerardo and that said three lots were being claimed by
him as his inheritance from his late father, Angel Gerardo.
Consequently, after hearing, the lots were registered in
Santiago’s name.
About sixteen (16) years later, or on April 28,
1960, respondents instituted an action for ownership,
partition and accounting against the petitioners. The
case, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3191-11,
prayed for the cancellation of title in the name of
Santiago. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondents, declaring all the petitioners and
respondents as legal heirs of Angel Gerardo and co-
owners of the subject lots. Petitioners elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the same.
Thus, the judgment became final and executory on
October 11, 1965.
Several years later, or on March 18, 1982,
petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance of
properties, annulment of judgment and damages in the
lower court against respondents. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
According to the lower court, all the elements or res
judicata are present: (1) the judgment in Civil Case No.
3191-II became final on October 11, 1965; (2) the court
in taking cognizance of the case had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment was
rendered on the merits of the case; and (4) in both cases,
the same parties and properties and the same causes of
action are involved.
Hence, petitioners elevated the case to the
Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court committed a grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Held: No. The Supreme Court possesses no authority to
rule upon non-jurisdictional issues in a When the petitioners learned of these, they filed
certiorari proceeding. The only question involved
in Certiorari is jurisdiction; either want of or in excess
thereof. In the case at bar, respondent Judge correctly
dismissed the complaint in based on res judicata
considering the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 3191-11.
There is no question that petitioners have no right at all
to claim exclusive ownership of the properties in question.
Ownership thereof having been settled in favor of both
herein petitioners and private respondents as co-owners
of the subject properties in Civil Case No. 3191-11 which
constitutes res judicata to Civil Case No. 7590.
Grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law. Respondent judge who
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dismisses a complaint on the ground of res judicata does
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Distinction between certiorari under Rule 45 as a
mode of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 as a
special civil action (See Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. CA, supra.)
No appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy
General rule, if appeal available, no certiorari
Fajardo vs. Bautista (1994)
Facts: Private respondents Isabelo Jareño and Purita
Jareño (hereinafter JAREÑOS) are the owners and
developers of a subdivision known as the Calamba Central
Compound. On various dates, they as SELLERS, and the
petitioners as BUYERS signed separate contracts, each
designated as a CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the
considerations therein stated, they bound themselves to
sell to the petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after
the latter shall have paid the purchase price and interest,
to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding
deeds of transfer of title, free from any lien or
encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the
Contract to Sell.
On the other hand, private respondent Fernando
Realty and Development Corporation (hereinafter
FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo
as BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a CONTRACT TO
SELL under which for the considerations therein stated,
FERNANDO agreed to sell to Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No.
3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound
Subdivision, and upon full payment of the agreed price
and interest thereon, to execute a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Fajardo.
It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986,
the JAREÑOS sold the aforesaid lots subject of the
different contracts to sell to private respondent Ruben
Habacon (hereinafter HABACON) under separate
documents denominated as "Kasulatan ng Bilihan." On
18 February 1991, HABACON caused the cancellation of
the certificates of title covering the said lots and the
issuance of new ones in his name.
on 21 June 1991 separate complaints with the court a quo
for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and of
the new certificates of title issued to him, for
reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those
issued to HABACON, and for accounting and damages.
The complaints were docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 1683-
91-C, 11 1684-91-C, 12 1685-91-C, 13 1686-91-C, 14
and 1688-91-C, 15 and were assigned to Branch 37 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba.
On 9 August 1991, HABACON filed a motion to
dismiss the complaints on the ground that the plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) have no legal capacity to sue because
they were not parties to the "BILIHAN."
In its Order of 4 September 1991, 20 the trial
court dismissed the aforesaid civil cases for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order, but the trial court denied this
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ESGUERRA NOTES
in its Order of 20 September 1991. 22 It ruled that while
HABACON may not be the developer, the JAREÑOS are,
and by selling the same lots to HABACON after they were
previously sold to different parties, the JAREÑOS may
have committed an "unsound business practice."
Moreover, it ruled that Section 19(2) of B.P. Blg. 129,
being a general law, should yield to P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1344, which is a special law.
On 24 December 1991, the petitioners filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari to annul the 4
September 1991 and 20 September 1991 Orders of the
trial court on the ground that the judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing their complaints and that they have no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court
has jurisdiction over their complaints.
In the Resolution of 18 November 1991, 23 we
required the respondents to comment on the petition.
Private respondent HABACON filed his comment and
opposition on 27 August 1992 24 while public respondent
Cesar S. Reyes filed his comment on 24 August 1993. 25
Both respondents rely on our pronouncement in Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal and echo the ruling of the trial
court in the questioned orders. The copy of the resolution
sent to the JAREÑOS was returned unserved and in the
Resolution of 21 July 1993, we considered it as served on
them. As required, the petitioners filed a reply to the
comment. On 8 November 1993, we resolved to give due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their memoranda, which the petitioners complied with on
29 December 1993 and the private respondents, on 28
March 1994.
Held: The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly,
although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper
when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted
where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate,
slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party
from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or
where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.
Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost
or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned
by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies.
The petitioners admit that they received a copy
of the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4
October 1991. The instant petition was filed on 24
October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to appeal from
the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to
explain why they were unable to appeal from the
challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil
action then was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or
lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the
exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of
remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or even
indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be
dismissed.
Exceptions
(1) May be availed of even when appeal is available or
period to appeal has expired
Lansang v. CA (1990)
Facts: Private respondent Salangsang filed a complaint
for damages arising from a vehicular accident against
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Spouses Lansang (the “petitioners”) before the RTC of
South Cotabato. During trial, Salangsang was able to
present his evidence. Thereafter, the court issued an
order resetting the hearing. On the date of hearing,
neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared. As such,
on the same day, the Court submitted the case for
resolution. Subsequently, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Salangsang. From said judgment, petitioners filed
a “motion for reconsideration and/or to set aside order or
decision and to allow them to present their evidence.”
Petitioners’ motion was, however, denied.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of
appeal with the RTC. The RTC approved the appeal and
ordered the records of the case to be forwarded with the
appellate court. Later on, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari, wherein they alleged that “they already
perfected their appeal and that they are not abandoning
it, but the same is not an adequate, speedy and plain
remedy due to the P250.00 daily penalty in the RTC’s
award.” Subsequently, the appellate court dismissed
petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari.
According to the CA, petitioners, by filing a
petition for certiorari, in effect abandoned their appeal
and that the perfected appeal is inconsistent with the
remedy of certiorari. Furthermore, the CA held that
petitioners cannot be permitted to first resort to appeal
and then shift the remedy to certiorari.
Issue: Is a perfected appeal inconsistent with the remedy
of certiorari?
Held: No. The purpose of an appeal is to bring up for
review a final judgment or order of the lower court. The
remedy of certiorari is to correct certain acts of any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
performed without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A certiorari proceeding may be
instituted during the pendency of a case or even after
judgment.
If after judgment, the petition for certiorari is
availed of when appeal is plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, then the petition must fail as certiorari may not
be resorted to as a substitute for appeal much less for a
lost one. In such a case, the right to appeal is abandoned.
However, after a judgment had been rendered and an
appeal therefrom had been perfected, a petition for
certiorari relating to certain incidents therein may prosper
where the appeal does not appear to be plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Hence, appeal and certiorari are not
remedies that exclude each other.
Indeed, there are instances when this Court
relaxed the application of Rule 65 on certiorari and
allowed the writ to issue even while appeal was available
in the interest of justice, or due to the dictates of public
welfare and for the advancement of public policy.
In this case, after judgment was rendered,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which is in
effect a motion for the trial. The failure of counsel and
petitioners to appear on November 8, 1985 in order to
present its evidence was duly explained and which may
be considered excusable. The courts are called upon to be
liberal in the assessment of the non-appearance of
counsel or the party if only to promote the greater interest
of justice.
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While it appears that the vehicle of petitioners
hit the car of private respondent while parked it is
contended by petitioners that it was parked in a
prohibited zone. Assuming the petitioners to be at fault,
they contend the additional damage of P250.00 per day
is unconscionable in addition to the actual damage to the
car of P19,500.00 and P10,000.00 attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. They estimate the damage
awarded can run up to the amount of P600,000.00.
These circumstances justify the grant to
petitioners of another day in court. It is a pity that this
case has been pending in court for so long. But this is
what happens when an overly strict and narrow
interpretation of the rules is undertaken. The liberal
application of the rules must always be in the mind of the
courts.
(2) When appeal not adequate, or equally beneficial,
speedy or adequate
Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co. (1982)
Facts: Urbano and Bonifacio Jaca (the “petitioners”) filed
a complaint for Accounting, Return of Price Differentials
and Damages against Davao Lumber (the “respondent”).
The trial court, in resolving the case, rendered judgment
in favor of respondent. Thereafter, petitioners filed an
appeal. Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion for
execution pending appeal, which was granted by the trial
court. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting respondent’s
motion, but the same was denied. As such, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari, contending that the Judge
acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order granting execution pending
appeal, and denying their motion for reconsideration. In
its answer to petitioners’ petition for certiorari,
respondent contends that petitioners, having availed of
the remedy of appeal are barred from filing a petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Are petitioners barred from filing a petition for
certiorari since they already availed of the remedy of
appeal?
Held: No. Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari
may only be invoked when “there is no appeal, nor plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law,” the
rule is not without exception. The availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent a party from making used of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not
an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient. It is the inadequacy—not the mere absence—
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate. It
will not immediately relieve petitioners from the injurious
effect of the order granting execution. The slow and
inexpensive remedy of appeal will not prevent respondent
judge from executing his decision requiring petitioners to
pay the huge amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to
dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner has
already availed of the remedy of appeal will only
aggravate the patent injustice already inflicted on
petitioners.
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Motion for reconsideration required; exceptions
Settled is the rule the rule that, except in some
recognized situations, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of
a petition for certiorari to allow the court an opportunity
to correct its imputed errors. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration before a resort to certiorari is intended to
afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
Some of the recognized exceptions where the special civil
action for certiorari will lie even without first availing of a
motion for reconsideration include:
a. The order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction;
b. The questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
c. There is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the government or of
the petitioner;
d. The subject matter of the action is perishable;
e. Under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
f. Petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is an extreme urgency for relief;
g. In a criminal case, relief from order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable;
h. The proceedings were done ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law; or
j. Where public interest is involved.
Tan v. CA & DPG Development (1997)
Facts: Tan was the lessee of a piece of property in
Sampaloc, Manila when DPG Development (the
“respondent”) acquired ownership over said property
from one Manuel Gonzales. Subsequently, respondent
filed an ejectment suit for non-payment of rentals against
Vermont Packaging, which was managed by Tan.
During the pendency of the ejectment suit, Tan
filed a complaint for the cancellation/annulment of title.
For respondent’s failure to file an answer, Tan moved that
respondent be declared in default. Tan’s said motion was
granted and thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment
in Tan’s favor. From the trial court’s judgment,
respondents filed a motion for new trial, which was denied
by the trial court. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari, which was granted by the CA.
Issue: Did the CA err in not dismissing respondent’s
petition for certiorari considering that no motion for
reconsideration was filed before said petition was resorted
to?
Held: No. The special civil action of certiorari will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its
errors. However, this rule admits of certain recognized
exceptions such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where
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the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial Court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings
in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved. It is exceptive circumstance (b) that justified
DPGs non-filing of a motion for reconsideration, inasmuch
as DPGs petition for certiorari before the CA involved a
similar issue or question passed upon by the trial court in
its November 23, 1990 Order, i.e., the propriety of the
motion for new trial filed by DPGs new counsel (Atty.
Formoso).
It must also be stressed that what is
determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger
of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies. Thus, even when appeal is
available and is the proper remedy, a writ of certiorari has
been allowed when the orders of the lower court were
issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction.
Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would
be slow, inadequate and insufficient and that to strictly
observe the general rule would result in a miscarriage of
justice. This is especially true when the petition, such as
DPGs certiorari petition before the CA, appears to be
meritorious and the trial judge indeed seems to have
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Period for filing (Sec. 4)
Rule 65, Section 4. When and where petition filed. —
The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998;
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)
In filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a
motion for extension is a prohibited pleading;
exceptions
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Adtel, Inc. v. Valdez (2017)
Facts: On 29 May 2006, Adtel terminated respondent
from the company. Respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal.
However, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
NLRC ruled that Adtel illegally dismissed respondent.
Adtel filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the NLRC on 24 December 2008. Adtel received the
NLRC Resolution on 5 February 2009. On 7 April 2009,
the last day for filing its petition for certiorari with the CA,
Adtel filed a motion for extension of time with the CA. On
22 April 2009, fifteen (15) days after the last day for filing
or the 75th day, Adtel filed its petition for certiorari with
the CA. On 28 May 2009, the CA denied the motion for
extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari for
being filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA ruled
that Adtel had until 7 April 2009 to file its petition for
certiorari. Instead of filing the petition for certiorari, Adtel
filed a motion for extension of time on 7 April 2009 and
subsequently filed its petition for certiorari on 22 April
2009, the last day of the extended period prayed for by
Adtel. The CA held that the reglementary period to file a
petition for certiorari can no longer be extended pursuant
to A.M. No. 07- 7-12-SC which amended Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: May the 60-day rule to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 be extended?
HELD: Generally, no.
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. — The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a
municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of
the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion
for reconsideration was timely filed, the filing of a petition
for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration must be made not later than
sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the
motion. In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
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petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
from the notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration. In Laguna Metts Corporation,
this Court stated the rationale for the strict observance of
the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, to wit:
The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and
sufficient time for a party to mull over and to
prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of
discretion by a lower court. The period was
specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay
that would violate the constitutional rights of the
parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60-
day period was non-extendible and the CA no longer had
the authority to grant the motion for extension in view of
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule
65.
However, in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, this Court held that the strict observance
of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is not
absolute. This Court ruled that absent any express
prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for extension is still
permitted, subject to the Court's sound discretion.
Similarly, in Labao v. Flores, this Court recognized that
the extension of the 60-day period may be granted by the
Court in the presence of special or compelling
circumstances provided that there should be an effort on
the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his or her
failure to comply with the rules. Likewise, in Mid-Islands
Power Generation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
a motion for extension was allowed in petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court's sound
discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious
cases.
The exception to the 60-day rule to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was also applied by this Court in
a more recent case in Republic of the Philippines v. St.
Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., to wit: "[u]nder
exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the
sound discretion of the Court, [the] said period may be
extended pursuant to [the] Domdom, Labao and Mid-
Islands Power cases."
Therefore, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65, a motion for extension is a prohibited
pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases,
the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or
compelling reasons.
DEPOSITIONS
Rule 23
Depositions Pending Action
Deposition – definition and purpose.
People vs. Webb (1999)
Facts: Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb (“Webb”) is
one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape
with Homicide. During the course of the proceedings in
the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion
To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition1 praying that Webb
be allowed to take the testimonies of five (5) citizens and
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residents of the United States before the proper consular
officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and
California, as the case may be. Webb alleged that the
taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned
individuals whose testimonies are allegedly "material and
indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime
charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to
the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of
respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases;
2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for
conditional examination of witnesses for the accused
before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction
the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.
In an Order dated 11 June 1997, the trial court
denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the
same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Webb’s
Motion for Reoncisderation having been denied, he
elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals granted Webb’s Petition
for Certiorari, and set aside and annulled the trial court’s
Order dated 11 June 1997. Thus, the People challenged
the Court of Appeals’ Decision before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside the trial court’s Order dated 11 June 1997, denying
Webb’s motion to take testimony by oral depositions in
the United States which would be used in the criminal
case before her Court.
Held: No. As defined, a deposition is —
The testimony of a witness taken upon oral
question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but
in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by
court, or under a general law or court rule on the subject,
and reduce to writing and duly authenticated, and
intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a
civil or a criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device
by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral
questions of the other party or of a witness for the other
party.
The person who is deposed is called the
deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside
of the court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices.
A transcript — word for word account — is made of the
deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing,
under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in
answer to questions or interrogatories . . . and the
purposes of taking depositions are to: (a) give greater
assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury; (b) provide an effective
means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims
and defenses; (c) make available in a simple, convenient
and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be
proved except with great difficulty; (d) educate the
parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their
claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements;
(e) expedite litigation; (f) safeguard against surprise; (g)
prevent delay; (h) Simplify and narrow the issues; and (i)
expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.
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As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a
deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of
discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In
fact, rules on criminal practice — particularly on the
defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the
criminal proceedings against him in the court below —
states that when a person intends to rely on such a
defense, that person must move for the taking of the
deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for
filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent
for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is "to
foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case
may be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and
"219"." This issue has, however, long been rendered moot
and academic by the admission of the aforementioned
documentary exhibits by the trial court in its order dated
10 July 1998.
The Supreme Court ruled that the factual
circumstances of this case only serves to underscore the
immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken
from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely
corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying
respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but
exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a
superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction
thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of
the evidence already on record.
Depositions pending action, when may be taken.
1. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories.
2. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by
the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with
these Rules.
3. The deposition of a person confined in prison may
be taken only by leave of court on such terms as
the court prescribes.
Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. vs. Reyes (1993)
Facts: The American President Lines, Ltd. (“APL”) sued
Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US
$53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-
five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
In one of the hearings for the presentation of its
witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to
take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in
Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a
"commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to
the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic
of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL
filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine
Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of
its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office
set up by the President "presently occupied by Director
Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.,"
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it was necessary — and it therefore prayed — "that
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to
Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian
Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112
Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China,
to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed
persons
The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It
contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in
that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a
person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters
rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be
examined before the Philippine Court;" and (c) the Rules
of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a
witness must be taken orally in open court and not by
deposition."
The trial court granted APL’s Motion. Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied, Dasmarinas
instituted a special civil action of certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, which likewise denied said petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion in granting APL’s motion to take testimonies of
the Taiwanese witnesses.
Held: No. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery.
They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of
facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person
which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
Depositions, and the other modes of discovery
(interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or
things; physical and mental examination of persons) are
meant to enable a party to learn all the material and
relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses
but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's
own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make
it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the
material and relevant facts, from whoever may have
knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or
motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual
foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and
completely laid before the Court, without omission or
suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by
law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of
all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule
be presented for oral examination in open court at the
trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of
evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court.
— The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the
facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of
the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is
hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time
that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that
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opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity
for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the
time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the
deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the
proponent, under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes. These exceptional situations are
governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
The principle conceding admissibility to a
deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to
testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found
in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may
be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or
abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his
deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or
notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a
foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken:
(a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person
or officer as may be appointed by commission or under
letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the
deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the
defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule
24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be
accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law
does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the
court in the process, all that is required being that
"reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other
party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for
taking the deposition and the name and address of each
person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not
known, a general description sufficient to identify him or
the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . "
(Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process
only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time"
stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good
cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or
impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters
shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with
no one present except the parties to the action and their
officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to
terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that
"it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign
country where the Philippines has no "secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only
"before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory.
A commission may be defined as "(a)n
instrument issued by a court of justice, or other
competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take
depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court
or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415,
citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters
rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n
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instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a
judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause
to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause
pending before the former, a witness who is within the
jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are
addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law
Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states
that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated
. . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters
rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial
authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this
connection is the indication in the Rules that letters
rogatory may be applied for and issued only after a
commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is
apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms"
appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the
inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the
following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court
on the ______ day of ______, 19__, to take the
testimony of (here name the witness or
witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in
which the testimony is to be taken), before
_________________ (name of officer),
was returned unexecuted by
__________________ on the ground that
____________, all of which more fully appears
from the certificate of said __________ to said
commission and made a part hereof by
attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show
commission is inadequate or cannot be
executed) (emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has
issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc.
thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies
of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition
(upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said
Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry
(now Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the
Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications"
attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public
and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan
(eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of
the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex
N of the petition for review on certiorari) — a prima
facie showing not rebutted by petitioner.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (1991)
Facts: Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr.
and Dominador R. Santiago — together with Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-
are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the
Sandiganbayan.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion
for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules
of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories
under Rule 25." Basically, they sought an answer to the
question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG
(aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified
the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion
of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" The PCGG
responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to
strike out said motion and interrogatories as being
impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as
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the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper,
impertinent and irrelevant under any guise."
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988,
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for
bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories,
holding them to be without legal and factual basis. It
opined, among others, that service of interrogatories
before joinder of issue and without leave of court is
premature absent any special or extraordinary
circumstances, which would justify the same.
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed
with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion
for Production and Inspection of Documents.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and
August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for
production and inspection of documents (production
being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989),
respectively. PCGG’s Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied, it filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the
motion for production and inspection of documents.
Held: Involved in the present proceedings are two of the
modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court:
interrogatories to parties, and production and inspection
of documents and things. Now, it appears to the Court
that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges),
there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even
outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet
unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to
them — which is a great pity for the intelligent and
adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism,
coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience
of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates,
effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up
adjudication. Hence, a few words about these remedies is
not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone
knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function
is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the
material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from
the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after
that determination of the facts has been completed, by
the application of the law thereto to the end that the
controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and
finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the
adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring
that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for
obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the
basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness
in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the
obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that
this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no
suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion
of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact
material a relevant to the action, or surprised by any
factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the
trial.
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Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v.
Villamor, this Court described the nature and object of
litigation and in the process laid down the standards by
which judicial contests are to be conducted in this
jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled
in the subtle art of movement and position,
entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather
a contest in whicheach contending party
fully and fairly lays before the court the facts
in issue and then brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits,
unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts. There should be no vested right in
technicalities. . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each
contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-
fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the
material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or
concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by
clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of
pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts
within his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts
before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by
the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only
"ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only
the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims
or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that
every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
factson which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts."
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not
observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally
or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity
to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of
particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be
ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a
bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more
particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is
not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the
common perception is that said evidentiary details are
made known to the parties and the court only during the
trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising
from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be
inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial.
Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the
parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the
pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the
facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them
individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other
words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this
ideal possible through the deposition-discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in
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other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before
trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the
most necessary of modern procedure: it not only
eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby
shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to
play the game with the cards on the table so that the
possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably
increased. . ."
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery
procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact
revelation theretofore performed primarily by the
pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery
are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-
trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident
purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus
prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be
covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as
when the interrogated party is called as a witness to
testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which
are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary,
excepting only those matters which are privileged. The
objective is as much to give every party the fullest
possible information of all the relevant facts before the
trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The
principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing
depositions) which generally allows the examination of a
deponent —
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether
relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of
every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those
relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of
"fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,
either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the
disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of
surprise, . . .
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In line with this principle of according liberal
treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such
modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral
examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b)
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests
for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without
leave of court, and generally, without court intervention.
The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is
not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an
answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when
an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction
has been obtained over the defendant or property subject
of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail
of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that
time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts
are not clear.
On the other hand, leave of court is required as
regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of
documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b)
physical and mental examination of persons under Rule
28, which may be granted upon due application and a
showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of
discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the
law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses
to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by
default against the disobedient party; contempt of court,
or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of
the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining
a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters
inquired into as established in accordance with the claim
of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the
disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying
further proceedings.
Of course, there are limitations to discovery,
even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and
without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules
. . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that
the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such
a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person
subject to the inquiry. And . . . further limitations come
into existence when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege."
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery
is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is
made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the
deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of course to
the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in
this case will now be resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories
served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out — as regards
the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File
Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 — that it was
correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories,
because discovery was being availed of before an answer
had been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property subject of the action" but before answer, Section
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1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to
Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to
parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." But there was
no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to
serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated
August 2, 19) after they had filed their answer to the
PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the
Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
The petitioner's first contention — that the
interrogatories in question are defective because they (a)
do not name the particular individuals to whom they are
propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b)
are "fundamentally the same matters . . (private
respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted
Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" — are untenable and
quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is
adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states
that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical
entity such as "a public or private corporation or a
partnership or association," the same shall be "answered
. . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this
proposition should not be applied by analogy to the
interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the
interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without
naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is
utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a
reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the
interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof
competent to testify in its behalf."
Scope of examination.
➢ Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided
by section 16 or 18 of this Rule, the deponent may
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject of the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts.
Use of depositions.
➢ At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions;
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for
the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who
at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by
an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a
party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds:
(1) the witness is dead;
(2) the witness resides at a distance more
than one hundred (100) kilometers from
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the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition;
(3) the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment;
(4) the party offering the deposition has
been unable to procure the attendance
of the witness by subpoena;
(5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony
of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used.
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in
evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is
relevant to the part introduced, and any party
may introduce any other parts.
Effect of substitution of parties.
1. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to
use depositions previously taken.
2. When an action has been dismissed and another
action involving the same subject is afterward
brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all
depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the
former action may be used in the latter as if
originally taken therefor.
Objections to admissibility.
Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule,
objection may be made at the trial or hearing, to receiving
in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason
which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the
witness were then present and testifying.
Effect of taking depositions.
A party shall not be deemed to make a person his own
witness for any purpose by taking his deposition.
Effect of using depositions.
The introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part
thereof for any purpose other than that of contradicting
or impeaching the deponent makes the deponent the
witness of the party introducing the deposition, but this
shall not apply to the use by an adverse party of a
deposition as described in paragraph (b) of section 4 of
this Rule.
Rebutting deposition.
At the trial or hearing any party may rebut any relevant
evidence contained in a deposition whether introduced by
him or by any other party.
Persons before whom depositions may be taken
within the Philippines.
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Within the Philippines depositions may be taken before
any judge, notary public, or the person referred to in
section 14 hereof.
Persons before whom depositions may be taken in
foreign countries.
In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken:
(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed
by commission or under letters rogatory; or
(c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Commission or letters rogatory.
(a) A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued
only when necessary or convenient, on application
and notice, and on such terms, and with such
direction as are just and appropriate.
(b) Officers may be designated in notices or
commissions either by name or descriptive title
and letters rogatory may be addressed to the
appropriate judicial authority in the foreign
country.
Disqualification by interest.
No deposition shall be taken before a person who is:
(a) a relative within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or employee or counsel of any of the
parties;
(b) a relative within the same degree, or employee of
such counsel;
(c) financially interested in the action.
Stipulations regarding taking of depositions.
If the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may be
taken before any person authorized to administer oaths,
at any time or place, in accordance with these Rules and
when so taken may be used like other depositions.
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and
place.
(a) A party desiring to take the deposition of any
person upon oral examination shall give
reasonable notice in writing, to every other party
to the action.
(b) The notice shall state the time and place for taking
the deposition and the name and address of each
person to be examined, if known, and if the name
is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to
which he belongs.
(c) On motion of any party upon whom the notice is
served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or
shorten the time.
Orders for the protection of parties and deponents.
(a) After notice is served for taking a deposition by
oral examination, upon motion seasonably made
by any party or by the person to be examined and
for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending may make an order that:
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1. the deposition shall not be taken;
2. it may be taken only at some designated
place other than that stated in the notice;
3. it may be taken only on written
interrogatories;
4. certain matters shall not be inquired into;
5. the scope of the examination shall be held
with no one present except the parties to the
action and their officers or counsel;
6. after being sealed the deposition shall be
opened only by order of the court;
7. secret processes, developments, or research
need not be disclosed;
8. the parties shall simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the
court;
9. the court may make any other order which
justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression.
Record of examination, oath; objections.
(a) The officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken shall put the witness on oath and shall
personally, or by someone acting under his
direction and in his presence, record the
testimony of the witness.
(b) The testimony shall be taken stenographically
unless the parties agree otherwise.
(c) All objections made at the time of the
examination to the qualifications of the officer
taking the deposition, or to the manner of talking
it, or to the evidence presented, or to the conduct
of any party, and any other objection to the
proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon
the deposition.
(d) Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the
objections. In lieu of participating in the oral
examination, parties served with notice of taking
a deposition may transmit written interrogatories
to the officers, who shall propound them to the
witness and record the answers verbatim.
Motion to terminate or limit examination.
(a) At any time during the taking of the deposition, on
motion or petition of any party or of the deponent,
and upon a showing that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
deponent or party, the court in which the action is
pending or the Regional Trial Court of the place
where the deposition is being taken may order the
officer conducting the examination to cease
forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit
the scope and manner of the taking of the
deposition, as provided in section 16 of this Rule.
(b) If the order made terminates the examination, it
shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of
the court in which the action is pending.
(c) Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent,
the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for
the time necessary to make a notice for an order.
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(d) In granting or refusing such order, the court may
impose upon either party or upon the witness the
requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the
court may deem reasonable.
Submission to witness; changes; signing.
(a) When the testimony is fully transcribed, the
deposition shall be submitted to the witness for
examination and shall be read to or by him, unless
such examination and reading are waived by the
witness and by the parties.
(b) Any changes in form or substance which the
witness desires to make shall be entered upon the
deposition by the officer with a statement of the
reasons given by the witness for making them.
(c) The deposition shall then be signed by the witness,
unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing
or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses
to sign.
(d) If the deposition is not signed by the witness, the
officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact
of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the
witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together
with the reason be given therefor, if any, and the
deposition may then be used as fully as though
signed, unless on a motion to suppress under
section 29 (f) of this Rule, the court holds that the
reasons given for the refusal to sign require
rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.
Certification, and filing by officer.
(a) The officer shall certify on the deposition that the
witness was duly sworn to by him and that the
deposition is a true record of the testimony given
by the witness.
(b) He shall then securely seal the deposition in an
envelope indorsed with the title of the action and
marked "Deposition of (here insert the name of
witness)" and shall promptly file it with the court
in which the action is pending or send it by
registered mail to the clerk thereof for filing.
Notice of filing.
The officer taking the deposition shall give prompt notice
of its filing to all the parties.
Furnishing copies.
Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer
shall furnish a copy of the deposition to any party or to
the deponent.
Failure to attend of party giving notice.
If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition
fails to attend and proceed therewith and another attends
in person or by counsel pursuant to the notice, the court
may order the party giving the notice to pay such other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by
him and his counsel in so attending, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
Failure of party giving notice to serve subpoena.
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If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition
of a witness fails to serve a subpoena upon him and the
witness because of such failure does not attend, and if
another party attends in person or by counsel because he
expects the deposition of that witness to be taken, the
court may order the party giving the notice to pay to such
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred by him and his counsel in so attending, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of
notice and of interrogatories.
(a) A party desiring to take the deposition of any
person upon written interrogatories shall serve
them upon every other party with a notice stating
the name and address of the person who is to
answer them and the name or descriptive title and
address of the officer before whom the deposition
is to be taken.
(b) Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served
may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition.
(c) Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may
serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who
has served cross-interrogatories.
(d) Within three (3) days after being served with re-
direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take
the deposition.
Officers to take responses and prepare record.
A copy of the notice and copies of all interrogatories
served shall be delivered by the party taking the
deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who
shall proceed promptly, in the manner provided by
sections 17, 19 and 20 of this Rule, to take the testimony
of the witness in response to the interrogatories and to
prepare, certify, and file or mail the deposition, attaching
thereto the copy of the notice and the interrogatories
received by him.
Notice of filing and furnishing copies.
When a deposition upon interrogatories is filed, the officer
taking it shall promptly give notice thereof to all the
parties, and may furnish copies to them or to the
deponent upon payment of reasonable charges therefor.
Order for the protection of parties and deponents.
After the service of the interrogatories and prior to the
taking of the testimony of the deponent, the court in
which the action is pending, on motion promptly made by
a party or a deponent, and for good cause shown, may
make any order specified in sections 15, 16 and 18 of this
Rule which is appropriate and just or an order that the
deposition shall not be taken before the officer designated
in the notice or that it shall not be taken except upon oral
examination.
Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions.
(a) As to notice. — All errors and irregularities in the
notice for taking a deposition are waived unless written
objection is promptly served upon the party giving the
notice.
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(b) As to disqualification of officer. — Objection to taking
a deposition because of disqualification of the officer
before whom it is to be taken is waived unless made
before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon
thereafter as the disqualification becomes known or could
be discovered with reasonable diligence.
(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence. —
Objections to the competency of witness or the
competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are
not waived by failure to make them before or during the
taking of the deposition, unless the ground, of the
objection is one which might have been obviated or
removed if presented at that time.
(d) As to oral examination and other particulars. — Errors
and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the
manner of taking the deposition in the form of the
questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the
conduct of the parties and errors of any kind which might
be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted,
are waived unless reasonable objection thereto is made
at the taking of the deposition.
(e) As to form of written interrogatories. — Objections to
the form of written interrogatories submitted under
sections 25 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless served
in writing upon the party propounding them within the
time allowed for serving succeeding cross or other
interrogatories and within three (3) days after service of
the last interrogatories authorized.
(f) As to manner of preparation. — Errors and
irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is
transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed,
certified, sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or
otherwise dealt with by the officer under sections 17, 19,
20 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless a motion to
suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with
reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due
diligence might have been, ascertained.
Rule 24
Depositions before Action or Pending
Appeal
Depositions before action; petition.
A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or
that of another person regarding any matter that may be
cognizable in any court of the Philippines may file a
verified petition in the court of the place of the residence
of any expected adverse party.
Contents of petition.
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner
and shall show:
(a) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an
action in a court of the Philippines but is presently
unable to bring it or cause it to be brought;
(b) the subject matter of the expected action and his
interest therein;
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(c) the facts which he desires to establish by the
proposed testimony and his reasons for desiring to
perpetuate it;
(d) the names or a description of the persons he
expects will be adverse parties and their addresses
so far as known; and
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be
examined and the substance of the testimony
which he expects to elicit from each, and shall ask
for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the
depositions of the persons to be examined named
in the petition for the purpose of perpetuating their
testimony.
Notice and service.
(a) The petitioner shall serve a notice upon each
person named in the petition as an expected
adverse party, together with a copy of the petition,
stating that the petitioner will apply to the court,
at a time and place named therein, for the order
described in the petition.
(b) At least twenty (20) days before the date of the
hearing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be
served on the parties and prospective deponents
in the manner provided for service of summons.
Order and examination.
(a) If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the
testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice,
it shall make an order designating or describing
the persons whose deposition may be taken and
specifying the subject matter of the examination
and whether the depositions shall be taken upon
oral examination or written interrogatories.
(b) The depositions may be taken in accordance with
Rule 23 before the hearing.
Reference to court.
For the purpose of applying Rule 23 to depositions for
perpetuating testimony, each reference therein to the
court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to
refer to the court in which the petition for such deposition
was filed.
Use of deposition.
If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this
Rule, or if, although not so taken, it would be admissible
in evidence, it may be used in any action involving the
same subject matter subsequently brought in accordance
with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 23.
Depositions pending appeal.
(a) If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a
court, including the Court of Appeals in proper
cases, or before the taking of an appeal if the time
therefor has not expired, the court in which the
judgment was rendered may allow the taking of
depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their
testimony for in the event of further proceedings
in the said court.
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(b) In such case the party who desires to perpetuate
the testimony may make a motion in the said court
for leave to take the depositions, upon the same
notice and service thereof as if the action was
pending therein.
(c) The motion shall state (a) the names and
addresses of the persons to be examined and the
substance of the testimony which he expects to
elicit from each, and (b) the reason for
perpetuating their testimony.
(d) If the court finds that the perpetuation of the
testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay of
justice, it may make an order allowing the
deposition to be taken, and thereupon the
depositions may be taken and used in the same
manner and under the same conditions as are
prescribed in these Rules for depositions taken in
pending actions.
Rule 25
Interrogatories to Parties
Interrogation to parties; service thereof
A party may serve written interrogatories:
1. Without leave of court after answer has been
served, for the first set of interrogatories.
2. With leave of court in the following
circumstances: (a) before answer has been
served; and (b) for the second set of
interrogatories for the same adverse party
(Section 4, Rule 25).
Answer to interrogatories
The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and
shall be signed and sworn to by the person making them.
N.B. A judgment by default may be rendered against a
party who fails to answer written interrogatories (Section
3(c), Rule 29).
Objections to interrogatories
Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the
court within 10 days after service thereof, with notice as
in the case of motion. Answers shall be deferred until
objections are resolved, which shall be at the earliest
possible time.
Number of interrogatories
No party may, without leave of court, serve more than
one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same
party.
Scope and use of interrogatories
The scope of interrogatories shall be the matters
mentioned in Sec. 2, Rule 23. The answers may be used
for the same purpose provided in Sec. 4 of the same Rule.
Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories
Unless a party had been served with written
interrogatories, he may not be compelled by the adverse
party (a) to give testimony in open court; or (b) to give a
deposition pending appeal.
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The only exception is when the court allows it for good
cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice.
Rule 26
Admission by Adverse Party
Request for admission
When request may be made:
At any time after the issues have been joined (after the
responsive pleading has been served).
What request may include:
1. Admission of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with
the request; and
2. Admission of the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request.
Implied admission
Each of the matters of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall not be less than
fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion, the party
to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the
party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be
submitted to the court by the party requested within the
period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as
contemplated in his compliance therewith shall be
deferred until such objections are resolved, which
resolution shall be made as early as practicable.
Effect of admission
An admission under this Section is for the purpose of the
pending action only and cannot be used in other
proceedings.
Withdrawal
The party making an admission under this Rule, may be
allowed by the court to withdraw or amend it upon such
terms as may be just.
Effect of failure to file and serve request for
admission
The party who fails or refuses to request the admission of
facts in question is prevented from thereafter presenting
evidence thereon unless otherwise allowed by the court.
Po v. Court of Appeals (1988)
Facts: The petitioner filed a complaint for damages
against the private respondent Jose P. Mananzan as
operator of a banca service for shooting the rapids at
Pagsanjan Falls, arising from an accidental spill into the
water, which she and her friend suffered when the banca
in which they were riding capsized during their trip back
to town. After Mananzan had answered the complaint,
petitioner served upon him a request for admission.
Mananzan failed to file and serve an answer to the request
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for admission. Petitioner thus filed a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that there exists no genuine or
substantial controversy on any issue of fact since
Mananzan has deemed admitted the matters stated in the
request for admission for his failure to answer the same.
Respondent Judge Lustre denied the motion for summary
judgment, observing that "the interrogatories ... are
nothing but a reiteration of a portion of the plaintiffs
allegations in the complaint, which have already been
answered and denied by the defendant in his answer"
hence, they "need not be answered again if asked in the
form of interrogatories."
Issue: Whether or not the material facts in a complaint,
which were made subject to a request for admission, are
deemed admitted upon failure to answer the request
Held: No. A party should not be compelled to admit
matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and
concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be
required to make a second denial of those already denied
in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is
not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should
set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or
documents described in and exhibited with the request,
whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action
or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless,
useless," and "a mere redundancy."
Rule 27
Production or Inspection of Document
or Things
Motion for production or inspection; order
Requisites of the motion for production or inspection:
1. A motion must be filed by a party showing good
cause therefor;
2. The motion must sufficiently describe the
document or thing sought to be produced or
inspected;
3. The motion must be given to all the other
parties;
4. The document or thing sought to be produced
or inspected must constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the
action;
5. The document or thing sought to be produced
or inspected must not be privileged; and
6. The document or thing sought to be produced
or inspected must be in the possession of the
adverse party or, at least under his control.
Rule 28
Physical and Mental Examination
This mode of discovery is available in an action in which
the mental or physical condition of a party is in
controversy.
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Examples of these actions are:
a. An action for annulment of a contract where the
ground relied upon is insanity or dementia;
b. A petition for guardianship of a person alleged
to be insane; and
c. An action to recover damages for personal
injury where the issue is the extent of the
injuries of the plaintiff.
Order for examination
The following are the requisites to obtain an order for
examination:
1. A motion must be filed for the physical and
mental examination;
2. The motion must show good cause for the
examination;
3. The mental or physical condition of a party is in
controversy;
4. Notice to the party to be examined and to all
other parties; and
5. The motion shall specify the time, place,
manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by
whom it is made.
Report of findings
1. The person examined shall, upon request, be
entitled to a copy of a detailed written report of
the examining physician setting out his findings
and conclusions.
2. After such request and delivery, the party causing
the examination to be made shall be entitled upon
request to receive from the party examined, a like
report of any examination previously or thereafter
made, of the same physical or mental condition.
3. If the party examined refuses to deliver such
report, the court on motion and notice may make
an order requiring delivery.
4. If a physician fails or refuses to make such report,
the court may exclude his testimony if offered at
the trial.
Waiver of privilege
Where the party examined requests and obtains a report
on the results of the examination, the consequences are:
1. He has to furnish the other party a copy of the
report of any previous or subsequent examination
of the same physical and mental condition; and
2. He waives any privilege he may have in that action
or any other involving the same controversy
regarding the testimony of any other person who
has so examined him or may thereafter examine
him.
Rule 29
Refusal to Comply with Modes of
Discovery
If a party refuses to answer any question, the
following may be the consequences:
1. The court, may, upon proper application,
compel a refusing deponent to answer (Sec.1).
a. If granted and refusal to answer is
without substantial justification, court
may require the refusing party to pay
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the proponent the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including
attorney's fees.
b. If denied and filed without substantial
justification, court may require the
proponent to pay the refusing party
the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the
order, including attorney's fees.
2. A refusal to answer after being directed by the
court to do so may be considered as contempt
of court (Sec. 2)
If a person refuses to be sworn in as a witness, he
may be cited in contempt of court.
If a person refuses to answer designated questions
or refusal to produce documents or to submit to
physical or mental examination (Sec. 3), the court
may make the following orders:
1. Prohibit the disobedient party to introduce
evidence of physical or mental condition;
2. Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose claims or defenses;
3. Strike out pleadings or parts thereof;
4. Stay further proceedings;
5. Dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof;
6. Render a judgment by default against
disobedient party; and
7. Direct the arrest of any party or agent of a party
disobeying any of such orders except an order
to submit to a physical or mental examination.
If a person denies the genuineness of any document or
the truth of any matter of fact in a request for admission
under Rule 26, and the party requesting for admission
proves said document to be genuine or said fact to be
true, the court may, upon motion, order the party
requested to admit, to pay the expenses incurred in
making such proof unless the court finds that there were
sufficient grounds for the denial.
If a person fails despite due notice to attend a schedule
for deposition-taking, or fails to file his answer to written
interrogatories, the court may:
1. Strike out all or any part of any pleading of
disobedient party;
2. Dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof;
3. Enter a judgment by default against disobedient
party; or
4. Order payment of reasonable expenses incurred
by the other including attorney's fees.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
13 July 2004
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT
JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT
OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-
DISCOVERY MEASURES
The use of pre-trial and the deposition-discovery
measures are undeniably important and vital components
of case management in trial courts. To abbreviate court
proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and
decongest court dockets, and to further implement the
pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular
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No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 and except as otherwise
specifically provided for in other special rules, the
following guidelines are issued for the observance and
guidance of trial judges and clerks of court:
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a
reminder to defendant to observe restraint in filing a
motion to dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof
as defenses in the Answer, in conformity with IBP-OCA
Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12,
2002. A copy of the summons is hereto attached as
Annex "A;" and
1.2 The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to
avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 and
request for admission by adverse party under Rule 26 or
at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23
or other measures under Rules 27 and 28 within five days
from the filing of the answer. A copy of the order shall be
served upon the defendant together with the summons
and upon the plaintiff.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the
plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be
set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said
motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall
issue a notice of pre-trial.
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before
the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs containing the following:
a. A statement of their willingness to enter into an
amicable settlement indicating the desired terms thereof
or to submit the case to any of the alternative modes of
dispute resolution;
b. A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation
of facts;
c. The issues to be tried or resolved;
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the
purpose thereof. (No evidence shall be allowed to be
presented and offered during the trial in support of
a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that
had been earlier identified and pre-marked during
the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good
cause shown);
e. A manifestation of their having availed or their
intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or
referral to commissioners; and
f. The number and names of the witnesses, the substance
of their testimonies, and the approximate number of
hours that will be required by the parties for the
presentation of their respective witnesses.
A copy of the Notice of Pre-trial Conference is hereto
attached as Annex "B." The rule on the contents of the
pre-trial brief must strictly be complied with. The parties
are bound by the representations and statements in their
respective pre-trial briefs.
3. At the start of the pre-trial conference, the judge shall
immediately refer the parties and/or their counsel if
authorized by their clients to the PMC mediation unit for
purposes of mediation if available.5 If mediation fails, the
judge will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial
conference. Before the continuance, the Judge may refer
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the case to the Branch COC for a preliminary conference
to assist the parties in reaching a settlement, to mark the
documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and
copies thereof to be attached to the records after
comparison and to consider such other matters as may
aid in its prompt disposition.
During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall
also ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and
admissions on the genuineness and due execution of the
documents marked as exhibits. The proceedings during
.the preliminary conference shall be recorded in the
"Minutes of Preliminary Conference" to be signed by both
parties and/or counsel, the form of which is hereto
attached as Annex. "C".
The minutes of preliminary conference and the exhibits
shall be attached by the Branch COC to the case record
before the pre-trial.
4. Before the continuation of the pre-trial conference, the
judge must study all the pleadings of the case, and
determine the issues thereof and the respective positions
of the parties thereon to enable him to intelligently steer
the parties toward a possible amicable settlement of the
case, or, at the very least, to help reduce and limit the
issues. The judge should not allow the termination of pre-
trial simply because of the manifestation of the parties
that they cannot settle the case. He should expose the
parties to the advantages of pre-trial. He must also be
mindful that there are other important aspects of the pre-
trial that ought to be taken up to expedite the disposition
of the case.
The Judge with all tact, patience, impartiality and with
due regard to the rights of the parties shall endeavor to
persuade them to arrive at a settlement of the dispute.
The court shall initially ask the parties and their lawyers
if an amicable settlement of the case is possible. If not,
the judge may confer with the parties with the opposing
counsel to consider the following:
a. Given the evidence of the plaintiff presented in his pre-
trial brief to support his claim, what manner of
compromise is considered acceptable to the defendant at
the present stage?
b. Given the evidence of the defendant described in his
pre-trial brief to support his defense, what manner of
compromise is considered acceptable to the plaintiff at
the present stage?
If not successful, the court shall confer with the party and
his counsel separately.
If the manner of compromise is not acceptable, the judge
shall confer with the parties without their counsel for the
same purpose of settlement.
5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of
the pre-trial proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits
or substituted photocopies and admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents;
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts
pending before other courts and order its consolidation if
warranted;
c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the
amendments if necessary;
d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve
the same;
e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties;
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f. Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint,
answer and other pleadings and attachments thereto and
the contents of documents and all other evidence
identified and pre-marked during pre-trial in determining
further admissions of facts and documents. To obtain
admissions, the Court shall ask the parties to submit the
depositions taken under Rule 23, the answers to written
interrogatories under Rule 25 and the answers to request
for admissions by the adverse party under Rule 26. It may
also require the production of documents or things
requested by a party under Rule 27 and the results of the
physical and mental examination of persons under Rule
28;
g. Define and simplify the factual and legal issues arising
from the pleadings. Uncontroverted issues and frivolous
claims or defenses should be eliminated. For each factual
issue, the parties/counsel shall state all the evidence to
support their positions thereon. For each legal issue,
parties/counsel shall state the applicable law and
jurisprudence supporting their respective positions
thereon. If only legal issues are presented, the judge shall
require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
and the court can proceed to render judgment;
h. Determine the propriety of rendering a summary
judgment dismissing the case based on the disclosures
made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the
pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made
during pre-trial;
i. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates for
continuous trial in accordance with Circular No. 1-89
dated January 19, 1989; adhere to the case flow chart
determined by the court, which shall contain the different
stages of the proceedings up to the promulgation of the
decision and use the time frame for each stage in setting
the trial dates. The One-Day Examination of Witness
Rule, that is, a witness has to be fully examined in one
(1) day only, shall be strictly adhered to subject to the
courts' discretion during trial on whether or not to extend
the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable
reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for each party,
he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after
the presentation of his last witness and the opposing
party is required to immediately interpose his objection
thereto. Thereafter, the Judge shall make the ruling on
the offer of evidence in open court. However the judge
has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing
in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132;
j. Determine the most important witnesses to be heard
and limit the number of witnesses (Most Important
Witness Rule). The facts to be proven by each witness and
the approximate number of hours per witness shall be
fixed;
k. At his discretion, order the parties to use the affidavits
of witnesses as direct testimonies subject to the right to
object to inadmissible portions thereof and to the right of
cross-examination by the other party. The affidavits shall
be based on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. The affidavits shall be in question
and answer form, and shall comply with the rules on
admissibility of evidence;
l. Require the parties and/or counsel to submit to the
Branch COC the names, addresses and contact numbers
of the witnesses to be summoned by subpoena;
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m. Order the delegation of the reception of evidence to
the Branch COC under Rule 30; and
n. Refer the case to a trial by commissioner under Rule
32.
During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask
questions on issues raised therein and all questions or
comments by counsel or parties must be directed to the
judge to avoid hostilities between the parties.
6. The trial judge shall schedule the pre-trial in the
afternoon sessions and set as many pre-trial conferences
as may be necessary.
7. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded.
The minutes of each pre-trial conference shall contain
matters taken up therein more particularly admissions of
facts and exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and
their counsel.
8. The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order
within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-
trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of and control the course of the
action during the trial. A sample Pre-Trial Order is hereto
attached as Annex "D."
However, the Court may opt to dictate the Pre-Trial Order
in open court in the presence of the parties and their
counsel and with the use of a computer, shall have the
same immediately finalized and printed. Once finished,
the parties and/or their counsel shall sign the same to
manifest their conformity thereto.
9. The court shall endeavor to make the parties agree to
an equitable compromise or settlement at any stage of
the proceedings before rendition of judgment.
B. Criminal Cases
1. Before arraignment, the Court shall issue an order
directing the public prosecutor to submit the record of the
preliminary investigation to the Branch COC for the latter
to attach the same to the record of the criminal case.
Where the accused is under preventive detention, his case
shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge
to whom the case was raffled within three days from the
filing of the complaint or information. The accused shall
be arraigned within ten days from the date of the raffle.
The pre-trial of his case shall be held within ten days after
arraignment unless a shorter period is provided for by
law.
2. After the arraignment, the court shall forthwith set the
pre-trial conference within thirty days from the date of
arraignment, and issue an order: (a) requiring the private
offended party to appear thereat for purposes of plea-
bargaining except for violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and for other matters
requiring his presence; (b) referring the case to the
Branch COC, if warranted, for a preliminary conference to
be set at least three days prior to the pre-trial to mark
the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties
and copies thereof to be attached to the records after
comparison and to consider other matters as may aid in
its prompt disposition; and (c) informing the parties that
no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered
during the trial other than those identified and marked
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during the pre-trial except when allowed by the court for
good cause shown. A copy of the order is hereto attached
as Annex "E". In mediatable cases, the judge shall refer
the parties and their counsel to the PMC unit for purposes
of mediation if available.
3. During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC
shall assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the civil
aspect of the case, mark the documents to be presented
as exhibits and copies thereof attached to the records
after comparison, ascertain from the parties the
undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and
due execution of documents marked as exhibits and
consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the case. The proceedings during the
preliminary conference shall be recorded in the Minutes
of Preliminary Conference to be signed by both parties
and counsel. (Please see Annex "B")
The Minutes of Preliminary Conference and the exhibits
shall be attached by the Branch COC to the case record
before the pre-trial.
4. Before the pre-trial conference the judge must study
the allegations of the information, the statements in the
affidavits of witnesses and other documentary evidence
which form part of the record of the preliminary
investigation.
5. During the pre-trial, except for violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the trial
judge shall consider plea-bargaining
arrangements. Where the prosecution and the offended
party agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court
shall:
a. Issue an order which contains the plea bargaining
arrived at;
b. Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the
case; and
c. Render and promulgate judgment of conviction,
including the civil liability or damages duly established by
the evidence.
6. When plea bargaining fails, the Court shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of
the pre-trial proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or
substituted photocopies and admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents and list
object and testimonial evidence;
b. Scrutinize every allegation of the information and the
statements in the affidavits and other documents which
form part of the record of the preliminary investigation
and other documents identified and marked as exhibits in
determining farther admissions of facts, documents and
in particular as to the following:
1. the identity of the accused;
2. court's territorial jurisdiction relative to the offense/s
charged;
3. qualification of expert witness/es;
4. amount of damages;
5. genuineness and due execution of documents;
6. the cause of death or injury, in proper cases;
7. adoption of any evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation;
8. disclosure of defenses of alibi, insanity, self-
defense, exercise of public authority and justifying or
exempting circumstances; and
9. such other matters that would limit the facts in issue.
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c. Define factual and legal issues;
d. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and
adhere to the flow chart determined by the court which
shall contain the time frames for the different stages of
the proceeding up to promulgation of decision and use the
time frame for each stage in setting the trial dates;
e. Require the parties to submit to the Branch COC the
names, addresses and contact numbers of witnesses that
need to be summoned by subpoena; and
f. Consider modification of order of trial if the accused
admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense.
7. During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask
questions on issues raised therein and all questions must
be directed to him to avoid hostilities between parties.
8. All agreements or admissions made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements
covering the matters referred to in Section 1 of Rule 118
shall be approved by the court. (Section 2, Rule 118)
9. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded,
the transcripts prepared and the minutes signed by the
parties and/or their counsels.
10. The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within ten
(10) days after the termination of the pre-trial setting
forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference,
the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence
marked, the number of witnesses to be presented and the
schedule of trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit
the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course
the action during the trial.
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Ley
Construction (2006)
Facts: Ley Construction and Development Corporation
(LCDC) filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against
petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation
(Hyatt). LCDC filed an amended
complaint impleading Princeton Development
Corporation (Princeton) as additional defendant.
Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to
take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer
of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and
Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice
to take deposition of Manuel Ley, President of LCDC,
while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of
Manuel and Janet Ley. The RTC ordered the deposition-
taking to proceed. At the scheduled deposition of
Elena Sy on September 17, 1996, Hyatt and Yu prayed
that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-
trial be set instead, contending that the taking of
depositions only delay the resolution of the case. The RTC
agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions
cancelled and pre-trial to take place on November 14,
1996.
Issue: Whether or not deposition as a mode of discovery
should be dispensed with, and the parties to proceed with
pre-trial, to expedite the proceedings of a case
Held: No. A deposition should be allowed, absent any
showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is
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accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of
a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the
matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from
the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle
of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
with leave of court if summons have been served, and
without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and
provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility
exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on
discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the
advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining
the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would
be defeated.
Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well
recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-
SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to
be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in
the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery
measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are
directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for
admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their
discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other
measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the
filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to
submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial
briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the
parties of their having availed or their intention to avail
themselves of discovery procedures or referral to
commissioners.
Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior
to the effectivity of said issuance, however, the
depositions sought by LCDC shall be evaluated based on
the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing, particularly
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides
as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be
taken.--- By leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule
21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with
these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison
may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the
above quoted provision as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of the defendants have
been served. LCDC having complied with the rules then
prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the previously
scheduled depositions.
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial
courts if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in
such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the
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inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon
the recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances,
however are absent in the case at bar.
The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling
the scheduled depositions. While speedy disposition of
cases is important, such consideration however should
not outweigh a thorough and comprehensive evaluation
of cases, for the ends of justice are reached not only
through the speedy disposal of cases but more
importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive
evaluation of the merits of the case. Records also show
that the delay of the case is not attributable to the
depositions sought by LCDC but was caused by the many
pleadings filed by all the parties including petitioners
herein.
The argument that the taking of depositions would cause
unnecessary duplicity as the intended deponents shall
also be called as witnesses during trial, is also without
merit.
The case of Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals which
already settled the matter, explained that:
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in
court does not constitute good cause to justify the courts
order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the
witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds
when the deposition of a witness may be used in court
during the trial. But the same reason cannot be
successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his
deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in
court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost
freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are
imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the
widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties
of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as
may be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva
voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the
remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in
revealing the facts to the parties before trial, drops out of
the judicial picture.
x x x [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the
deposition serves the double function of a method of
discovery - with use on trial not necessarily contemplated
- and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no
limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been
placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the
trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use
of oral testimony wherever practicable.
Petitioner also argues that LCDC has no evidence to
support its claims and that it was only after the filing of
its Complaint that it started looking for evidence through
the modes of discovery.
On this point, it is well to reiterate the Courts
pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit
of information which may be useful in the preparation for
trial, such as the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts
themselves; and the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things. Hence, the deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
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longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding
it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.
It also does not escape this Courts attention that the trial
court, before dismissing LCDCs complaint, gave LCDC
two options: (a) enter into a pre-trial conference, advising
LCDC that what it would like to obtain at the deposition
may be obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus
expediting early termination of the case; and (b)
terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for
deposition later on. The trial court erred in forcing LCDC
to choose only from these options and in dismissing its
complaint upon LCDCs refusal to choose either of the two.
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the
depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance Officer of Hyatt
and Pacita Tan Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not
be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said
deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.
As also pointed out by the CA:
x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during
trial, would defeat the very purpose for which it is
intended, as a pre-trial device. By then, the issues would
have been confined only on matters defined during pre-
trial. The importance of the modes of discovery cannot be
gainsaid in this case in view of the nature of the
controversy involved and the conflicting interest claimed
by the parties.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary
function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between
the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during
the preparation for trial.
Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court
explained that:
The truth is that evidentiary matters may be inquired into
and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is
the purpose and policy of the law that the parties -
before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-
trial - should discover or inform themselves of all
the facts relevant to the action, not only those
known to them individually, but also those known
to their adversaries; in other words,
the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this
ideal possible through the deposition- discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in
other jurisdictions has been the ample discovery before
trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the
most necessary ends of modern procedure; it not only
eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby
shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to
play the game with the cards on the table so that the
possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably
increased.
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was
designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
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cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore
performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant
to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing
under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining
the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is,
to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and
thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
In this case, the information sought to be obtained
through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary
to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be
defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before
pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the
dark --- the very situation which the rules of discovery
seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to
make trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to
the fullest practicable extent.
Rule 39
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of
Judgment
EXECUTION is a process provided by law for the
enforcement of a final and executory judgment.
Enforcement is part of the court’s jurisdiction.
It is a remedy afforded for the satisfaction of a judgment.
Its object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on
which writ is issued (Cagayan de Oro Coliseum v. CA, G.R.
No. 129713, December 15, 1999).
It is the fruit and end of suit (Ayo v. Violago-Isnani, A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1445, June 21, 1999).
Against whom issued: Execution can only issue against
a party and not against one who never had his day in
court (Green Arces Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral, G.R. No.
175542, June 5, 2013).
Writ of Execution
A judicial writ issued to an officer authorizing him to
enforce the judgment of the court in accordance with Rule
39.
General Rule for the Validity of A Writ of Execution:
1. It must conform strictly to the decision or judgment
which gives it life;
2. It must conform strictly to every essential particular
of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may
it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed;
3. It must conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision to be executed (De Leon v. Public Estates
Authority G.R. No. 181970, August 3, 2010).
Exceptions:
1. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed
in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the
land should be considered included in the decision, it
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appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the
possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership
which was rejected (Id).
Reason: It is equally settled that possession is an
essential attribute of ownership.
2. Where there is ambiguity in the dispositive portion,
the body of the opinion may be referred to for
purposes of construing the judgment because the
dispositive part of a decision must find support from
the decision’s ratio decidendi (Mutual Security Ins.
Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. L-47018, September 11,
1987; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v.
Toyota Bel-Air, Inc., G.R. No. 137884, March 28,
2008); and
3. Where extensive and explicit discussion and
settlement of the issue is found in the body of the
decision (Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chung, et al. v.
Chinese National Cereals Oil and Foodstuffs Import
and Export Corp., G.R. No. 131502, June 8, 2000).
When does a judgment become final and
executory?
Judgments and orders become final and executory by
operation of law and not by judicial declaration. The trial
court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as
the same becomes final by operation of law. Its finality
becomes a fact when the reglementary period for appeal
lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period
(Testate of Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan v. Biascan, G.R.
No. 138731, December 11, 2000; Vlason Enterprises v.
CA, G.R. Nos. 121662-664, July 6, 1999; See discussion
under ROC, Rule 36, Sec. 2).
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at
all. It cannot be the source of any right not the creator of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it
can never become final and any writ of execution based
on it is void (Galicia v. Manliquez, G.R. No. 155785, April
13, 2007).
Note: Only final judgments or orders that have become
final and executory can be the subject of execution,
except when a discretionary execution is granted. An
interlocutory order may not be the subject of execution
(See Discussion on Difference between Final Judgments
or Orders and interlocutory orders under ROC, Rule 36).
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
v. CELESTINA B. CORPUZ
412 SCRA 1 (2003)
Facts:
Lu was the defendant in a civil case for ejectment raffled
to Judge Siapno. On 7 September 1995, Judge Siapno
rendered a decision ordering Lu to immediately vacate the
premises and ordered a writ of execution be issued. Lu’s
counsel received the Decision on 13 September 1995 and
filed a Notice of Appeal on even date. Meanwhile, a writ
of execution was issued on 11 September 1995 and was
implemented by Sheriff Lopez on the same date by
forcibly ejecting Lu from the premises.
Held:
Clerk of Court Corpuz issued the writ, and Sheriff Lopez
implemented the same, at least two days before Lu’s
counsel received the MTC decision. Clearly, this is an
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improper procedure because the clerk of court issued the
writ of execution before the losing party received the
decision. The losing party must first receive notice of the
judgment before the court or its personnel can execute
the judgment. The reason is that if such judgment is
immediately executed without prior notice to the losing
party, then such a party has no remedy if the evidence or
law does not support the judgment.
Moreover, even if the MTC decision itself ordered that a
writ of execution be issued, this does not mean that notice
of the motion for execution to the adverse party is
unnecessary. The court cannot direct the issuance of a
writ of execution motu proprio. Section 8, Rule 70
explicitly provides that although execution is immediately
executory, judgment may be stayed by perfecting an
appeal, filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court
and periodically paying the rents during the pendency of
the appeal. A party is not in a position to stay execution
unless he receives notice of the filing of a motion for
execution. After all, a party has 15 days to perfect his
appeal and stay execution by filing a notice of appeal and
supersedeas bond and periodically depositing the rentals.
Unless he receives notice of a motion for execution, he
cannot take these steps to stay execution. While the MTC
decision authorized Corpuz to issue a writ of execution,
its issuance prior to receipt by Lu of the decision was
precipitate and against all sense of fair play. Clearly,
Corpuz abused her authority.
Classes of Execution:
A. As to their nature:
1. Compulsory execution – known as Execution
as a Matter of Right (ROC, Rule 36, Sec.1)
2. Discretionary execution – known as
Execution Pending Appeal (ROC, Rule 36, Sec.
2)
Note: The general rule is that only judgment that have
become final and executory may be enforced by
execution. However, even if judgments have not yet
become final and executory, they may be executed
provided that the prevailing party complied with the
requirements for a discretionary execution or an
execution pending appeal.
B. As to how it is enforced:
1. Execution by motion; or
2. Execution by independent action (ROC Rule 36,
Sec. 6).
SECTION 1. EXECUTION UPON JUDGMENTS AND
FINAL ORDERS
Requisites of Execution as a Matter of Right
1. Prevailing party must file a motion for execution
with the court of origin with notice to the
adverse party;
2. Upon rendition of a judgment or order that
completely disposes of the action or proceeding;
and
3. No motion for reconsideration, new trial, or
appeal of the judgment or final order is filed
within the reglementary period.
Writ of execution shall only issue upon motion
Execution shall issue on motion. Hence a judge may not
order execution of judgment in the decision itself. In fact,
even in judgments which are immediately executory,
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there “must be a motion to that effect and a hearing called
for the purpose (Lou v. Siapno, A.M. MTJ-99-1199, July
6, 2000).” Also, under the Supreme Court Curcular No.
24-94, a motion for issuance of a writ of execution must
contain a notice to the adverse party (Pallado v. RTC of
Kalibo Aklan, Bar. I, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999).
The motion for execution cannot be issued ex-parte.
PEREZ v. MANOTOK REALTY, INC.
G.R. No. 216157, 14 October 2019
Facts:
The judgment sought to be executed is the July 15, 1999,
Decision of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 151271-CV which
approved the Compromise Agreement of the parties. The
writ of execution was issued on May 4, 2001. However, it
could not be enforced by the sheriff because petitioner
filed an Amended Petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a restraining order dated
February 22, 1999 before RTC Branch 47, assailing the
validity of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 151271-CV
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, on July
6, 2004, a copy of the Writ of Execution was served on
petitioner.
Meanwhile, in its Order dated March 9, 1999, the RTC
Branch 47 requested the sheriff of the MeTC to hold in
abeyance any action on the case, such as the
implementation of a writ of execution.
RTC Branch 47 dismissed petitioner's petition, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Because of petitioner's acts, there has been a long delay
in the enforcement of the July 15, 1999, MeTC Decision.
Issues:
Whether respondent’s right for the execution of the
Unlawful Detainer Decision dated 15 July 1999 has
already expired. No.
Whether or not the judgment in favor of respondent can
be executed by a mere motion even after the lapse of five
years. No.
Held:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
judgment may be executed on motion within five years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. After that, a judgment may be enforced
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
However, there are instances where this Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years
upon meritorious grounds.
In the case of Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua et al., this Court
pronounced:
In computing the time limited for suing out of an
execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the
general rule is that there should not be included the
time when execution is stayed, either by agreement
of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the
taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will
extend the time within which the writ may be
issued without scire facias.
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We also subtracted from the five (5)-year period the time
when the judgment could not be enforced due to the
restraining order issued by this Court, and when the
records of the case were lost or misplaced through no
fault of the petitioner.
Also, in Yau v. Silverio, Sr., the writ of execution could
not be enforced for the full satisfaction of the trial court's
judgment within the five-year period by reason of the
petitions challenging the trial court's judgment and the
writ of execution. This Court held that the petitions
suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the
writ.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) v. Serra, RCBC
sought to enforce against Serra a decision that had
already become final and executory. However, to evade
his obligation, Serra transferred the property to his
mother who then transferred it to another person. This
prompted RCBC to file an annulment case. This Court held
therein that the delay in the execution of the decision was
caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the
pendency of the annulment case effectively suspended
the five-year period to enforce the decision through a
motion.
In this case, under the circumstances of the case at bar
where the delays were caused by petitioner for her
advantage, as well as outside of respondent's control, this
Court holds that the five-year period allowed for
enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to
have been effectively interrupted or suspended.
Which court has the authority to issue the writ of
execution?
It is only the court of origin which can issue the writ of
execution. Nothing in this section authorizes the appellate
court which has resolved the appeal to order the
execution of its own judgment. What is authorized is the
execution of the judgment by the court of origin even
before remand to the latter by the appellate court of the
records of the case solely on the basis of the certified true
copy of the judgment of the appellate court and of the
entry thereof (Jason v Ygaa, A.M. No RTJ-00-1543,
August 4, 2000; ROC. Rule 39, Sec. 1, par. 2 and 3)
General Rule: Execution shall issue as a matter of right
on the part of the prevailing party once a judgment
becomes final and executory (Greater Metropolitan Manila
Solid Waste Management Committee v. Jancom
Environment Corporation; G.R. No. 163663, June 30,
2006).
Exceptions:
1. Where the judgment turns out to be Incomplete or
conditional (Del Rosario v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-
25726, November 22, 1926; Ignacio v. Hilario, G.R.
No. L-175; April 30, 1946; Cu Unjieng v. Mabalacat
Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-32644, October 4, 1930);
2. Judgment Novated by subsequent agreement of the
parties (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-25897,
August 21, 1976);
3. Equitable grounds like a change in situation of the
parties which makes execution inequitable
(Supervening facts doctrine) (Bachrach
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 128349, September 25,
1998)
Note: For the supervening event to apply, the
supervening event must happen after the judgment
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has become final and executory (Aboitiz Shipping
Employees Association v. Trajano, G.R. No. 112955,
September 1, 1997).
4. Execution is Enjoined, e.g. Petition for Relief from
Judgment or Annulment of Judgment with TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction;
5. Judgment has become Dormant, except support
which can be executed by motion (Cunanan c CA,
G.R. No. L-25511, September 28, 1968);
6. Execution is Unjust or impossible (Bachrach
Corporation v. CA, supra);
7. When the judgment has already been executed by
the Voluntary compliance thereof by the parties
(Cunanan v. CA, supra);
8. When refusal to execute has become Imperative in
the higher interest of justice (Philippine Veterans
Bank v. International Appellate Court. G.R. No,
73162, 23 October 1989);
9. When the execution is sought against Property
exempt from execution under Sec. 13 of Rule 39.
LEE ARROYO v. CA and BRITO
G.R. No. 202860, 10 April 2019
Facts:
Brito, formerly holding the position of Regional Director
for Region V of the Office of Southern Cultural
Communities of National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), initiated a petition for quo warranto
before the CA to challenge the appointment of Arroyo who
was appointed as the Regional Director of Region V.
Arroyo questioned the standing of Brito to initiate the quo
warranto petition, and argued that Brito was not qualified
to be a Regional Director of the NCIP.
In a Decision dated August 30, 2004, the CA ordered the
reinstatement of Brito as Regional Director. On
September 24, 2004, Arroyo moved for the
reconsideration of this decision by arguing that the
eligibility of Brito is void. Pending the resolution of her
motion, Arroyo filed a Manifestation. Attached to her
manifestation is a certified true copy of the Decision of
the Office of the President affirming the recommendation
of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) to hold
Brito liable for falsifying his scholastic records, or
specifically, his bachelor's degree from NCF.
Issue:
Whether or not the 30 August 2004 Decision of the CA
may still be executed. No.
Held:
It is true that the execution of a court's judgment
becomes a matter of right upon the expiration of the
period to appeal and no appeal was duly perfected.
Generally, therefore, courts may no longer review or
modify a final and executory judgment. This is otherwise
referred to as the principle of immutability of judgments,
which dictates that once a decision becomes final, the
enforcement or execution of the judgment becomes a
purely ministerial act.
This notwithstanding, the doctrine on immutability of
judgments admits of the following exceptions: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire
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after the finality of the judgments rendering execution
unjust and inequitable. The Court applies these
exceptions in order to serve the interests of justice.
A supervening event, in order to apply, must rest on
proven or certain facts. Hence, Arroyo should establish
through competent evidence that there are events, which
transpired after the finality of the decision that altered or
modified the parties' situation in such manner that
renders execution of the judgment inequitable,
impossible, or unfair. It should directly affect the matter
already litigated and settled, or substantially change the
rights or relations of the parties.
The dismissal of Brito from government service because
of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents, as
well as his corollary disqualification from reemployment
in the government, rendered the execution of the CA's
quo warranto judgment impossible, inequitable, and
unjust.
Ministerial Duty of the Court
Finality of judgment has the effect of entitling the
prevailing party to execution as a matter of right. It is
ministerial duty of the court to do and it is compellable by
mandamus. Such ministerial duty finds exception when
subsequent events would render execution of judgment
unjust (Mangahas v. Paredes, G.R. No. 157866, February
14, 2007).
Instances where Execution is a Matter of Right:
1. No appeal; judgment becomes final (ROC, Rule 39,
Sec. 1, par. (1));
2. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
resolved (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 1, par. (2));
3. Judgment in an action for injunction, receivership,
accounting, support, judgment declared to be
immediately executor (ROC, RULE 39, Sec 4);
4. Judgment in cases governed by summary procedure,
including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, since
it is immediately executory (Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, Sec. 21);
5. Judgment in cases governed by small claims
procedure since it is final, executory, and
unappealable (Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases, as amended, Sec. 24).
Remedy of the prevailing party if motion for
execution of judgment is denied:
The remedy of the prevailing party whose motion for
execution has been denied is to
file a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 as the
issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty of the
court and is compellable by mandamus (Mangahas v.
Paredes, supra).
Remedy of the losing party if motion for execution
is granted:
The remedy of the losing party against whom an order of
execution is issued is to either move to quash the writ
of execution or to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 as Rule 41, Sec. 1 [e] expressly provides that
“No appeal can be taken from an order of execution” (1
RIANO, supra at 740).
An order of execution is not appealable otherwise there
would be no end to litigation between the parties (Anama
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v. CA, G.R. No. 187021, Jan. 25, 2012; ROC, Rule 41,
Sec. 1(f)).
Grounds for a motion to quash a writ of execution:
1. A Change in the situation of the parties renders
execution inequitable;
2. Issued against the Wrong party;
3. Issued Without authority;
4. Improvidently issued;
5. Defective in substance;
6. Judgment already Satisfied; and
7. The controversy was never Submitted to the court
(Reburuano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102965,
January 21, 1999).
SECTION 2. DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION
Discretionary Execution as a Matter
Execution of Right
May issue before the Period to appeal has
lapse of period to appeal already lapsed and no
and even during appeal. appeal is perfected.
Discretionary upon the Ministerial duty of the
court, there is inquiry on court provided there are
whether there is good no supervening events.
reason for execution.
Note: Unlike judgments that are final and executory, a
judgment subject to discretionary execution cannot be
insisted upon but simply prayed and hoped for because a
discretionary execution is not a matter of right (1 RIANO,
supra at 740).
Where to file an application for discretionary
execution
1. With the trial court –
a. While it has jurisdiction over the case (before
the expiration of the 15 day or 30 day
reglementary period to appeal, as the case may
be) and while it is in possession of either the
original record of the record on appeal for
judgments (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 2 in relation to
ROC, RULE 41, Sec. 9); or
b. While it has jurisdiction over the case (before
the expiration of the 15 day reglementary
period or extension allowed) and before the
Court of Appeals gives due course to a petition
for review (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 2 in relation to
ROC, Rule 42, Sec. 8).
Verily, the grant of discretionary execution is
pursuant to the trial court’s residual jurisdiction
under ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 9 and Rule 42, Sec. 8.
2. With the appellate court – after the trial court has
lost jurisdiction.
Note: What is allowed under the rules is
discretionary execution of the judgment or final
order of the trial court. The Court of Appeals has no
authority to issue immediate execution pending
appeal of its own decision (Heirs of J.B.L. Reyes v.
CA, G.R. No. 135180-81, August 16, 2000).
Procedure for Discretionary Execution:
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1. There must be a motion filed by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party.
2. There must be a hearing of the motion for
discretionary execution;
3. The motion must be filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession
of either the original record or the record on appeal
or with the appellate court after the trial court has
lost jurisdiction over the case;
4. There must be good reasons to justify the
discretionary execution; and
5. The good reasons must be stated in a special order
after due hearing (Sec. 2, Bangkok Bank Public
Company Limited v. Lee, G.R. No. 159806, January
20, 2006).
The requirement of good reason is important and must
not be overlooked because if the judgment is executed
and, on appeal, the same is reversed, although there are
provisions for restitution, oftentimes damages may arise
which cannot be fully compensated. Accordingly,
execution should be granted only when these
considerations are clearly outweighed by superior
circumstances demanding urgency, and the above
provision requires a statement of those circumstances as
a security for their existence (City of Bacolod v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. L-9775, May 29, 1957).
“Good reasons” consist of compelling circumstances that
justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes
illusory. The circumstances must be superior,
outweighing the injury or damages that might result
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment
on appeal. Lesser reasons would make of execution
pending appeals, instead of an instrument of solitude and
justice, a tool of oppression and inequity (Florendo v.
Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January
20, 2010)
Examples of good reasons that justify discretion
execution:
1. When there is danger of the judgment becoming
ineffectual (Scottish Union v. Macadaeg, G.R. Nos. L-
5717, August 30, 1952);
2. Insolvency of the debtors (Lao v. Mencias, G.R. No.
L-23554, November 25, 1967);
3. To prevent irreparable injury (Fortune Guarantee
and Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 110701, March 12, 2002);
4. The subject of the judgment is perishable goods
(Intramuros Tennis Club Inc. v. Philippine Tourism
Authority, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000);
5. Old age (De Leon v. Soriano, G.R. No. L-7648,
September 17, 1954).
Mere posting of a bond by the successful party is not in
itself a good reason for ordering execution pending
appeal, because it is the combination of circumstances
which is the dominating reason that would justify
immediate execution, the bond being only an additional
factor (International School, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 131109,
June 29, 1999).
Note: An award for actual and compensatory damages
may be ordered executed pending appeal, but not an
award for moral or exemplary damages.
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Reason: Moral and exemplary damages are dependent
on the outcome of the appeal. While the amounts of
actual damages are fixed and certain (Radio
Communications of the Phils., v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-
59311, January 31, 1985).
BALAJONDA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 166032, 28 February 2005
Held:
Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as
to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.
The public policy underlying the suppletory application of
Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to obviate a hollow victory for the
duly elected candidate as determined by either the courts
or the COMELEC. Thus, procedural rules in election cases
are liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
In this case, there are good reasons that justify the
execution of judgment pending appeal, to wit: (1) the
public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2)
the shortness of the remaining period, and (3) the length
of time that the election contest has been pending.
SECTION 3. STAY OF DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION
The party against whom an execution is directed may file
a sufficient supersedeas bond to stay discretionary
execution.
Supersedeas Bond
A bond executed by the party against whom the execution
was issued in favour of the prevailing party conditioned
upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed
to be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole
or in part by the appellate court. Discretionary execution
shall be stayed upon approval of the supersedeas bond.
Note: Supersedeas bond guarantees satisfaction of the
judgment in case of affirmance on appeal. It does not
answer for damage to property pending the appeal.
General Rule: When a defendant puts up a supersedeas
bond, the court shall recall the execution pending appeal
because the discretionary execution is the exception
rather than the rule.
Exception: Notwithstanding the filing of the supersedeas
bond by appellant, execution pending appeal may still be
granted by the court if there are special and compelling
reasons justifying the same outweighing the security
offered by the supersedeas bond, for example, in a
judgment for support (De Leon v. Soriano, supra).
SECTION 4. JUDGMENTS NOT STAYED BY APPEAL
General Rule: Judgment is stayed by appeal.
Exceptions: Instances when judgment is immediately
executory
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1. Injunction
2. Receivership
3. Accounting
4. Support; and
5. Such Other judgments declared to be immediately
executory unless otherwise ordered by the trial court
(e.g. A judgment in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer when favorable to the plaintiff (ROC, RULE
70, Sec. 19).
The judgment in action for support is immediately
executory or enforceable because support is immediately
needed and its delay may unduly prejudice the one in
need of it.
The rule on immediate execution of judgment in an
injunction case does not apply to a judgment in an action
for prohibition (Embroidery & Apparel Control Board v.
Cloribel, G.R. No. L-20024, June 30, 1967).
Principle of Immutability of Final and Executory
Judgments
General Rule: Once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification
is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
the highest court of the land (Abalos v. Philex Mining
Corp. G.R. No. 140374, November 27, 2002.)
Exception: The court may modify or alter a judgment
even after the same has become executory whenever
unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final
and executory (David v. CA, G.R. No. 115821, October
13, 1999) (See Other Exceptions Discussed in ROC, Rule
36)
Reason: The fact that the decision has become final does
not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof
because even with the finality or judgment, when its
execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be
modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice
and the facts (Abalos v. Philex Mining Corporation,
supra).
GRIFFITH v. ESTUR
G.R. No. 161777, 7 May 2008
Held:
The decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen, finding Lincoln and
petitioner solidarily liable to respondents, became final
and executory on 6 July 2001. Petitioner, however,
persists in challenging Labor Arbiter Layawen’s decision
by insisting that the judgment debt should have been the
sole liability of Lincoln. Petitioner maintains that the writ
is defective because it makes him personally liable for the
judgment debt even though he was only a corporate
officer acting in good faith and within the bounds of his
authority.
Labor Arbiter Layawen’s decision is already final and
executory and can no longer be the subject of an appeal.
Thus, petitioner is bound by the decision and can no
longer impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule
that a decision that has attained finality can no longer be
modified even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law.
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SECTION 5. EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED
JUDGMENT
If reversed totally or partially, or annulled (Rule 47), on
appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue
orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity
and justice may warrant under the circumstances.
SECTION 6. EXECUTION BY MOTION OR
INDEPENDENT ACTION
Modes of Enforcement
1. By motion within five (5) years from date of its entry.
2. By independent action for revival of judgment after
lapse of five (5) years from entry and before it is
barred by statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations provides that actions upon a
judgment must be brought within ten (10) years from
entry of such judgment (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1143(3)).
Thus, the independent action for revival of judgment may
still be filed within (5) years from the lapse of the first (5)
within which judgment may be enforced by motion.
What is meant by entry of judgment?
The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be
deemed the date of its entry. (See discussion under Rule
36, Sec. 2).
A dormant judgment is one that was not executed within
five (5) years. The enforcement of a dormant judgment
is in the nature of an ordinary civil action with the object
of (1) reviving the dormant judgment and (2) executing
the judgment reviving it.
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a
procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage
of five years without it being executed upon motion of the
prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue
affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action
for revival of judgment is a new and independent action,
different and distinct from either the recovery of property
case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of
action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action
upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the
assumption that the decision to be revived, either by
motion or by independent action, is already final and
executory (Saligumba v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365,
December 4, 2008).
Which court has jurisdiction over an action for
revival of judgment?
The independent action to revive judgment will not
necessarily be filed with the same court that decided the
case. It shall be filed in the RTC since it is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. It mus also satisfy
requirements of venue in ROC, Rule 4.
Where is the proper venue of an action for revival
of judgment?
The proper venue depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a
real action or a personal action. Applying the rules on
venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, then it
is a real action that must be filed with the court of the
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place where the real property is located. If such action

does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then
a personal action that may be filed with the court of the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides (Infante v.
Aran Builders, Inc. G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007).
General Rule: A final and executory judgment must be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from its entry.
Otherwise, it becomes a dormant judgment which may
only be enforced through an independent action for
revival of judgment.

Exception: A final and executory judgment may still be
enforced by motion after the five (5) year period from
entry if:
1. Delay is attributable to the judgment debtor as
when he employs legal maneuvers to block the
enforcement of the judgment (Republic v. CA,
G.R. No. 91885, August 7,1996); and
2. Agreement of the parties to suspend the
enforcement of the judgment (Macias v. Lim,
G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004).
There have been many instances where the Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years
upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one
common denominator, and that is, delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage (Republic v. CA, G.R.
No. 91885, August 7, 1996).
A revived judgment is a new judgment thus another five
or ten (5/10) year period to execute and revive is given
the party.That second revived judgment can again be
enforced under Sec. 6 (Philippine National Bank v.
Bondoc, G.R. No. L-20236, July 30, 1965).
ROC, RULE 39, Section 6 does not apply to:
1. Judgments for support which do not become
dormant and which can always be executed by
motion because the obligation is a continuing one
and the court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the
same (Canonizado v. Benitez, G.R. No. 72746, May
7, 1987);
2. Special proceedings, such as land registration and
cadastral cases wherein the right to ask for a writ of
possession does no prescribe (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio,
G.R. No. 168913, March 14, 2007);
3. Contempt orders in unauthorized re-entry on the
land by ejected defendant.
Illustration:
In 2000, the judgment in a civil case became final and
executory. The plaintiff has until 2005 or 5 years from the
date of entry of the first judgment to enforce the same by
motion. If the plaintiff fails to have the judgment enforced
by motion within the said period the judgment becomes
dormant and he has until 2010 to revive the judgment by
independent action before it becomes barred by
prescription under the CIVIL CODE, Art. 1144.
If in 2008, the plaintiff was able to revive the dormant
judgment via an independent action, he has until 2013 or
5 years from the date of entry of the second judgment to
enforce it by motion. If he again fails to enforce the
judgment by motion within the latter period, he again has
5 years or until 2018 to have the judgment revived and
enforced by independent action.
SECTION 7. EXECUTION IN CASE OF DEATH OF
PARTY
A. In case of death of the judgment obligee:
Execution will issue in any case upon the application
of his executor, or successor in interest.
B. In case of death of judgment obligor:
1. Before levy:
Execution will issue if the action is for the recovery
of real or personal property or any lien thereon.
Execution will not issue if the action is for the
recovery of a sum of money. In this situation, the
judgment obligee should file a claim against the
estate of the judgment obligor under Rule 86.
2. After levy:
Execution will continue even in money judgment.
The property may be sold for the satisfaction of the
judgment obligation, and the officer making the sale
shall account to the corresponding executor or
administrator for any surplus in his hands.
Reason: After a valid levy, the property is already
separated from the estate of the deceased and is
deemed in custodia legis.
SECTION 8. ISSUANCE FORM AND CONTENTS OF A
WRIT OF EXECUTION
The writ of execution shall:
1. Issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
from the court which granted the motion;
2. State the name of the court, the case number and
title the dispositive part of the subject judgment or
order; and
3. Require the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it
is directed to enforce the writ according to its terms.
SECTION 9. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR
MONEY, HOW ENFORCED
If award is for payment of money:
1. Immediate payment on demand;
2. Satisfaction by levy; or
3. Garnishment of debts and credits.
The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, or certified bank
check payable to the judgment obligee or any other form
of payment acceptable to the obligee (ROC, RULE 39, Sec.
9, par. (b)).
Levy is an act by which an officer sets apart or
appropriates a part or the whole property of the judgment
debtor for purposes of the execution sale (Fiestan v. CA
G.R. No. 81552, May 28, 1990).

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Levy is a pre-requisite to the auction sale. In order that
an execution sale may be valid, there must be a previous
valid levy. A sale not preceded by a valid levy is void and
the purchaser acquires no title (Valenzuela v. De Aguilar,
G.R. No. L-18083-84, May 31, 1963).
The sheriff can validly levy any property of the judgment
obligor which may be disposed for value but not exempt
from execution. The judgment obligor has the option to
choose which property to levy upon.
If he does not exercise the option, the officer shall first
levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the
real properties if the personal properties are insufficient
to answer for the judgment (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 9, par.)
Levy by the sheriff may be done only if the judgment
obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or through other modes acceptable
to the prevailing party. If payment can be done, a levy is
unnecessary (Villarin v. Munasque, G.R. No. 169444,
September 17, 2008).
Real or personal property or any interest in either may be
levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a
writ of attachment.
Real Property: By filing with the Register of Deeds a
copy of the order together with the description of the
property and a notice that it is attached (ROC, RULE 57,
Sec 7 par. (a))
Personal Property: If capable of manual delivery, by
taking and safely keeping it in the custody of the sheriff
after issuing the corresponding receipt therefore (ROC,
RULE 57, Sec.7(b)).
Money judgments are enforceable only against
property of judgment debtor
For purposes of levy, a property is deemed to belong to
the judgment debtor if he holds a beneficial interest in
such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of for
value. Thus, a mortgaged property may still be levied
upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debtor’s
obligations (Golden Sun Finance Corporation v. Albano,
A.M. No.P-11-2888, July 27, 2011).
Garnishment is an act of appropriation by the court
when property of debtor is in the hands of third persons.
It is a species of attachment for reaching any property or
credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor.
The sheriff may levy on debts due the judgment obligor
and other credits, including bank deposits, financial
interests, royalties, commissions and other personal
property not capable of manual delivery in the possession
or control of third parties (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 9, par.
(c)).
The garnishee or the 3rd person who is in possession of
the property of the judgment debtor is deemed a forced
intervenor.
Procedure for Garnishment:
1. The sheriff will serve a notice upon the person owing
such debts (garnishee);
2. The garnishee shall make a written report to the
court within five (5) days stating whether or not the
judgment obligor has sufficient funds;
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3. The garnished amount shall be delivered directly to
the judgment obligee within ten (10) days from
service of notice.
Attachment Garnishment
It refers to corporeal It refers to money,
property in the stocks, credits and other
possession of the incorporeal property
judgment debtor. which belong to the
judgment debtor but is in
the possession or under
the control of a third
person.
DAGOOC v. ERLINA
A.M. No. P-04-1857 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-
1429-P), 16 March 2005
Facts:
In this case, the court rendered a money judgment by
compromise agreement which became final and
executory in favor of the complainant. The writ of
execution was endorsed to respondent deputy sheriff
Erlina for execution. The defendants therein, however,
could not pay the money judgment. Erlina, instead of
levying their properties of the defendants, asked the
defendants to execute a promissory note in favor of the
complainant. Afterwards, complainant filed a complaint
for misconduct against Erlina for allowing defendants to
satisfy the money judgment through the execution of a
promissory note.
Held:
The law mandates that in the execution of a money
judgment, the judgment debtor shall pay either in cash,
certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or
any other form of payment acceptable to the latter.
Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a
form of payment. The only exception is when such form
of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it
was obviously not acceptable to complainant, otherwise
she would not have filed this case against respondent
sheriff.
If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the money
judgment shall be satisfied by levying on the properties
of the judgment debtor.
SECTION 10. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR
SPECIFIC ACT
1. Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific
acts, vesting title;
When the party refuses to comply: The court can
appoint some other person at the expense of the
disobedient party and the act done shall have the
same effect as if the required party performed it. The
court, by an order, may also divest title of any party
in real or personal property situated in the
Philippines and vest it in others, which shall have the
same effect of a conveyance executed in due form of
law.
2. Sale of real or personal property;
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3. Delivery or restitution of real property (e.g. In
ejectment cases): The officer shall demand from the
judgment obligor to vacate peaceably within three
(3) working days, and restore possession of the
property to the judgment obligee.
If the party refuses to vacate the property:
The remedy is NOT contempt because the writ of
execution did not direct the judgment debtor to do
anything; instead it was directed to the sheriff. The
Sheriff must oust the party and if after
dispossession, the judgment debtor should execute
acts of ownership or possession, then and only then
may he be punished for contempt (Pascua v. Heirs of
Segundo Simeon, G.R. No. L-47717, May 2, 1988).
A writ of execution directing the sheriff to cause the
defendants to vacate is in the nature of a habere
facias possessionem and authorizes the sheriff to
break open the premises where there is no occupant
therein (Arcadio v. Ylagan, A.C. No. 2734, July 30,
1986).
Note: Habere Facias Possessionem – the name of
the process commonly resorted to by the successful
party in an action of ejectment, for the purpose of
being placed by the sheriff in the actual possession
of the land recovered.
4. Removal of improvements on property subject
of execution
There must be a special order (Writ of Demolition)
issued:
a. Upon motion of the judgment obligee;
b. After due hearing; and
c. After the judgment obligor has failed to remove
the improvements within a reasonable time
fixed by the court.
5. Delivery of personal property.
General Rule: The judgment debtor cannot be cited
in contempt of court. Generally, contempt is not a
remedy to enforce a judgment.
Exceptions:
a. Refusal to perform a particular act or Special
Judgments under ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 11 where
he may be cited in contempt; and
b. In case of the provisional remedy of support
pendente lite under ROC, RULE 61, the
judgment debtor may still be cited for contempt
even if the decision is not a special judgment
and requires the latter to pay money.
WRIT OF DEMOLITION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION
Writ of Possession
In the case of LZK Holdings v. Planters Development Bank
(G.R. No. 167998, 27 April 2007), a Writ of Possession is
defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands
the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to
the person entitled under the judgment. It may be issued
in case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by
Act No. 4118.
A writ of possession may be issued to the purchase in a
foreclosure sale either within the one-year redemption
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period upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond.
It is the trial court’s ministerial duty to grant a writ of
possession. No discretion is left to the trial court in its
issuance.
A writ of possession may also be issued after
consolidation of ownership of the property in the name of
the purchaser. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of sale. The owner is entitled
to the possession of the property and can demand it at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate
of title; where, in such case, the bond that was mentioned
earlier under Section 7 is no longer necessary.
In the case of Joven v. CA (G.R. No. 80739, 20 August
1992), it was discussed that the RTC may issue as a
matter of course in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser
during the redemption period, provided that the proper
motion has been filed, a bond is approved, and no third
person is involved.
Writ of Demolition
A writ of demolition is ancillary to the process of execution
and is logically also issued as a consequence to the writ
of execution earlier issued (Vargas v. Cajucom, G.R. No.
171095, 22 June 2015).
It can be found on Section 10 (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. — When the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after the hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by
the court
In the case of Guario v. Ragsac (A.M. No. P=-08-2571,
27 August 2009), it was discussed by the Court
Administrator that “if demolition is necessary, there must
be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to
the parties for the issuance of a special order of
demolition.” It explained that this requirement of a special
order of demolition is “based on rudiments of justice and
fair play.” The immediate demolition therefore of any
property and destroyed without an order of demolition will
amount to grave abuse of authority.
SECTION 11. EXECUTION OF SPECIAL JUDGMENTS
Special Judgment is one which can only be complied
with by the judgment obligor because of his personal
qualifications or circumstances.
When judgment requires the performance of any act
other than judgment for money and judgments for
specific act, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
attached to the writ.
The writ of execution shall be served upon the party
required to obey the same and such party may be
punished for contempt if he disobeys.
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the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the

Note: A special judgment may be enforced by contempt
if the defendant refuses to comply with the judgment
because the writ is already directed to the judgment
obligor.
SECTION 12. EFFECT OF LEVY ON EXECUTION AS
TO THIRD PERSONS.
judgment cannot be enforced in full within 30 days, the
officer must make a report to the court every 30 days
thereafter on the proceedings taken thereon until the
judgment is satisfied in full. The lifetime of such will
correspond to the period within which the judgment may
be enforced by motion, that is, within 5 years from entry
thereof.

The levy on execution creates a lien in favor of the SECTION 15. NOTICE OF SALE OF PROPERTY ON
judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the EXECUTION
judgment obligor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. Notice of requirement
A. If perishable property - By posting written notice
SECTION 13. PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION. of the time and place of the sale in 3 public places,
preferably in conspicuous areas of the municipal or
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the city hall, post office and public market where the sale
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from is to take place, for such time as may be reasonable,
execution: considering the character and condition of the
property;
1. The judgment obligor’s Family home as provided by
law, or the homestead in which he resides, and land
B. Other personal property - By posting similar
necessarily used in connection therewith;
notice in three (3) public places above- mentioned
2. Ordinary tools and implements personally used by
for not less than five (5) days;
him in his trade, employment, or livelihood;
3. Three (3) horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, C. If real property - By posting for twenty (20) days
or other beasts of burden, such as the judgment in three (3) public places particularly describing the
obligor may select necessarily used by him in his property and stating where the property is to be sold,
ordinary occupation; and if the assessed value of the property exceeds
4. His necessary Clothing and articles for ordinary P50,000, by publishing a copy of the notice once a
personal use, excluding jewelry; week for two (2) consecutive weeks in one (1)
5. Household Furniture and utensils necessary for newspaper selected by raffle (whether in English,
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the Filipino, or any major regional language published,
judgment obligor and his family, such as the edited and circulated or, in the absence thereof,
judgment obligor may select, of a value not having general circulation in the province or city).
exceeding 100,000 pesos; Note: In all cases, a written notice of the sale shall be
6. Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for 4 given to the judgment obligor, at least three (3) days
months; before the sale, except as provided in par (a) hereof
7. The professional Libraries and equipment of judges, where notice shall be given at any time before the sale.
lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, dentists,
engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and SECTION 16. PROCEEDINGS WHERE PROPERTY IS
other professionals, not exceeding 300,000 pesos in CLAIMED BY THIRD PERSON
value;
8. One (1) fishing boat and accessories not exceeding Third party claim Third party complaint
the total value of 100,000 pesos owned by a As to involvement of the principal action
fisherman and by the lawful use of which he earns Filed by third-party Filed by third-party
his livelihood; claimant who is a plaintiff who is a
9. So much of the Salaries, wages, or earnings of the stranger to principal defendant in the principal
action where the writ was action
judgment obligor for his personal services within the
issued.
4 months preceding the levy as are necessary for the
support of his family;
As the filing
10. Lettered gravestones; Shall be filed or served to Shall be filed with the
11. Monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or the sheriff enforcing the clerk of court like any
in any manner growing out of any life insurance; writ. other pleadings.
12. The Right to receive legal support, or money or
property obtained as such support, or any pension or As to effect
gratuity from the Government; The filing of the third The third-party defendant
13. Properties specially Exempted by law. party claim will discharge is made a party to the
the sheriff from the duty principal action.
But no article or species of property mentioned in this of keeping the property to
section shall be exempt from execution issued upon a serve the purpose of the
judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of writ.
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.

SECTION 14. RETURN OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION Remedies of a third-party claimant

1. Summary hearing before the court which authorized
Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the same must the execution;
be enforced within 30 days and returned to the court after

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2. Terceria or third party claim filed with the sheriff; The following are liable for actual and punitive damages:
3. Action for damages on the bond posted by judgment 1. An officer selling without the notice prescribed by
creditors; or Sec. 15; and
4. Independent reivindicatory action. 2. A person willfully removing or defacing the notice
posted, if done before the sale, or before the
The remedies are cumulative and may be resorted to by satisfaction of judgment if satisfied before the sale.
the third party claimant independently of or separately
from the others (Spouses Sy v. Discaya, G.R. No. 86301, Punitive damages: In the amount of Php5,000 pesos.
January 23, 1990).
Actual and punitive damages may be recovered by motion
If the winning party files a bond, it is only then that the in the same action.
sheriff can take the property in his possession. If there is
no bond, the sale cannot proceed. SECTION 18. NO SALE IF JUDGMENT AND COSTS
Note: The officer shall not be liable for damages to any PAID
third-party claimant if such bond is filed for the taking or
keeping of the property. At any time before the sale of property on execution, the
judgment obligor may prevent the sale by paying the
However, the judgment obligee can claim damages amount required by the execution and the costs that have
against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or been incurred therein.
plainly spurious claim, and such damages may be
recovered by the judgment obligee in the same or SECTION 19. HOW PROPERTY SOLD ON
separate action. EXECUTION; WHO MAY DIRECT MANNER AND
ORDER OF SALE
Note: The timing of the filing of the third party claim is
important because the timing determines the remedies All sales of property under execution must be made:
that a third party is allowed to file. A third party claimant 1. At public auction;
under Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil 2. To the highest bidder;
Procedure may vindicate his claim to the property in a 3. To start at the exact time fixed in the notice.
separate action, because intervention is no longer allowed
as judgment has already been rendered. A third party After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
claimant under Section 14 of Rule 57 of the same Rules, execution, no more shall be sold and any excess shall be
on the other hand, may vindicate his claim to the property promptly delivered to the judgment obligor or his
by intervention because he has a legal interest in the authorized representative, unless otherwise directed by
matter in litigation (Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. v. the judgment or order of the court.
Yllas Lending, Corp. G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008).
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ORDINARY SALE AND
Difference between Terceria in Execution, SALE IN JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
Preliminary Attachment and Replevin
Rule 39, Rule 57, Rule 60, Ordinary Sale on Sale in Judicial
Section 16 Section 14 Section 7 Execution (Rule 39) Foreclosure of
When to file Mortgage (Rule 68)
At any time the At any time the Within 5 days As to confirmation of certificate of sale
sheriff is still in sheriff is still in after the taking Need not be confirmed by Must be confirmed by the
possession of possession of of the property the court. It is merely court in order to divest
the property the property by the sheriff provisional. the rights in the property
levied on levied on because the of the parties and to vest
execution. attachment. sheriff is bound the rights in the
to deliver the purchaser.
property after
such period to As to existence of right of redemption
the applicant. Right of redemption exist There is no right of
when the subject matter redemption only equity of
Where Third Party Claimant may vindicate his of execution is real redemption, except
claim to the property property. where the mortgagee is a
In a separate In a separate In a separate bank or a banking
action because action or in the action or in the institution.
he may no same same
longer file a proceeding by proceeding by As to how title is acquired
pleading-in- filing a filing a Title acquired after the Title acquired upon entry
intervention complaint-in- complaint-in- expiration of the f the confirmation and
since judgment intervention. intervention. redemption period when registration of the
has already final deed of conveyance foreclosure sale.
been rendered is executed.
in the main
case.
SECTION 20. REFUSAL OF PURCHASER TO PAY

The officer may again sell the property to the highest

SECTION 17. PENALTY FOR SELLING WITHOUT bidder and shall not be responsible for any loss
NOTICE, OR REMOVING OR DEFACING NOTICE occasioned thereby.

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But the court may order the refusing purchaser to pay Contents of the certificate of sale: (DEW-R)
into the court the amount of such loss, with costs, and 1. A particular Description of the real property sold;
may punish him for contempt if he disobeys the order. 2. The price paid for Each distinct lot or parcel;
The officer may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of 3. The Whole price paid by him;
such purchaser who refuses to pay. 4. A statement that the Right of redemption expires
one (1) year from the date of the registration of the
SECTION 21. JUDGMENT OBLIGEE AS PURCHASER certificate of sale.
When the purchaser is the judgment obligee, and no third
Note: Confirmation of the sale is not needed unlike in
party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount
judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The certificate of sale is
of the bid if it does NOT exceed the amount of his
merely provisional (Raymundo v. Sunico, G.R. No. 8241,
judgment. If it does, he shall pay only the excess.
September 27, 1913).
SECTION 22. ADJOURNMENT OF SALE
May the validity of an auction sale be attacked?
General Rule: No, because of the presumption of regular
1. If with written consent of the judgment obligor
performence of duty by the sheriff.
and obligee or their duly authorized
representative: To any date and time agreed upon. Exceptions:
2. If without such agreement: From day to day if it 1. When from the nature of the irregularity or from
becomes necessary to do so for lack of time. intrinsic facts, injury resulted (Somera Vda. de
Navarro v. Navarro, C.A. No. 501, February 11,
SECTION 23. CONVEYANCE TO PURCHASER OF 1946);
PERSONAL PROPERTY CAPABLE OF MANUAL 2. When the price obtained is shockingly inadequate
DELIVERY
and it is shown that a better price can be obtained at
a resale (Barrozo v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. L-1282, April
SECTION 24. CONVEYANCE TO PURCHASER OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY NOT CAPABLE OF MANUAL 25, 1949).
DELIVERY
Exception to the Exception: The rule that you can
How Title is Conveyed to Purchaser of Personal question the validity of the auction sale if the price
Property obtained is shockingly inadequate does not apply when
the property sold is real property (Ramos v. Pablo, G.R.
Personal property Personal Property not No. L-53692, November 26, 1986).
capable of manual capable of manual
delivery delivery Reason: The lower the purchase price, the easier it would
As to requirement of certificate of sale be for the judgment obligor to redeem his property.
When purcahser pays the When the purchaser pays
SECTION 26. CERTIFICATE OF SALE WHERE
purchase price, the the purchase price, the
PROPERTY CLAIMED BY THIRD PERSON
personal property, officer making the sale
capable of manual must execute and deliver
The certificate of sale to be issued shall make express
delivery, must be to him a certificate of
mention of the existence of such third-party claim.
delivered to him and if sale.
desired execute and
SECTION 27. WHO MAY REDEEM REAL PROPERTY
deliver to him a certificate
SO SOLD.
of sale.
SECTION 28. TIME AND MANNER OF, AND AMOUNTS
As to act which conveys the judgment obligor’s
PAYABLE ON, SUCCESSIVE REDEMPTIONS; NOTICE
rights to the purchaser
TO BE GIVEN AND FILED.
The sale or delivery of the The execution and
personal property delivery of the certificate
Redemption: This right of redemption is transferable and
conveys to the purchaser of sale conveys to the
may be voluntarily sold, but it cannot be levied upon by
all the rights which the purchaser all the rights
the judgment creditor so as to deprive the judgment
judgment obligor had in which the judgment
debtor of any further rights to the property.
such property as of the obligor had in such
date of levy on execution property as of the date of
Right of Redemption:
or preliminary levy on execution or
1. Personal Property – none; Sale is absolute.
attachment. preliminary attachment.
2. Real Property – There is a right of redemption.

Who may redeem (Sec. 27)

Note: This is the reason why there is no right of
1. Judgment obligor, or his successor in interest,
redemption of personal property is because tilte passes to
the purchaser upon delivery or execution of certificate of
sale.
SECTION 25. CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY;
CERTIFICATE THEREOF GIVEN TO PURCHASER AND
FILED WITH REGISTRY OF DEEDS
The officer must give to the purchaser a Certificate of Sale
in the whole or any part of the property; or
Successor in interest – includes a person to whom
he has transferred his right of redemption, or one to
whom he has conveyed his interests in the property
for purposes of redemption, or one who succeeds to
his properly by operation of law, or a person with a
joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs

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(Magno v. Viola, G.R. No. 37521, December 22,
1934).
2. Redemptioner who is a creditor having a lien by
virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage
on the property sold, subsequent to the lien
under which the property was sold.
Note: If his lien is prior to the judgment, he is not
a redemptioner because his interests in his lien are
fully protected (relate to Section 12).
WHEN can redemption be made: (Sec. 28)
1. By the judgment obligor - Within one (1) year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.
2. By the first redemptioner - Within one (1) year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale;
or
3. By all subsequent redemptioners - Within sixty
(60) days from the last redemption, provided that
the judgment debtor has not exercised his right of
redemption.
Note: Written notice of any redemption must be given to
the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with
the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments
or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or
acquires any lien other than that upon which the
redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner
be given to the officer and filed with the registry of deeds;
if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed
without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.
General Rule: In all cases the judgment obligor shall
have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of
the registration of the sale to redeem the property. If the
judgment obligor redeems, no further redemption is
allowed and he is restored to his estate (Sec. 29).
Exception: Sec. 47 of the General Banking Act provides
that in case of extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage notwithstanding Act 3135, judicial persons shall
have the right to redeem the property until, but not after,
the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with
the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be
more than three (3) months after the foreclosure,
whichever is earlier.
The period of redemption is not suspended by an
action to annul the foreclosure sale.
Note: The periods for redemption are not extendible or
interrupted. The parties may, however, agree on a longer
period, in such case, it would be a conventional
redemption (Lazo v. Republic Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. L-27365, January 30,1970).
The parties cannot enter into an agreement to reduce the
period of redemption. Any agreement to that effect is a
void agreement.
REDEMPTION PRICE (Sec. 28)
A. BY THE JUDGMENT OBLIGOR OR FIRST
REDEMPTIONER:
1. Purchase price;
2. 1% interest thereon, up to the time of redemption;
3. Any amount of assessments or taxes which the
purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase and
interest on such last named amount at the same
rate;
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4. If the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien
to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment
under which such purchase was made, the amount
of such other lien, with interest.
B. BY SUBSEQUENT REDEMPTIONERS:
1. Amount paid on the last redemption;
2. 2% interest thereon;
3. Any amount of assessments or taxes which the last
redemptioner may have paid thereon after
redemption by him with interest on such last-named
amount;
4. Amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner
prior to his own, with interest.
The redemption price for subsequent redemption
shall be the same (redemption price becomes higher
and higher).
May redemption be paid in any form other than
cash?
Yes. The rule is construed liberally in allowing redemption
(aid rather than defeat the right) and it has been allowed
in the case of a cashier’s check, certified bank checks and
even checks.
The offer to redeem must be accompanied with a bona
fide tender or delivery of the redemption price.
However, a formal offer to redeem with a tender is not
necessary where the right to redeem is exercised through
the filing of a complaint to redeem in the courts, within
the period to redeem.
Principle of Successive Redemption
The first redemptioner may redeem the property within
one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate
of sale which may again be redeemed within sixty (60)
days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum
paid on the last redemption. This is predicated on the
assumption that there are several redemptioners.
Illustration: Supposing there are three (3)
redemptioners and the first redemptioner redeemed the
property at the last day of the 1-year period. The second
redemptioner may still redeem the property within sixty
(60) days from the last redemption which may still be
redeemed within the same period by the third
redemptioner. The period of redemption is effectively
extended by one hundred twenty (120) days. In this case,
there can be a valid legal redemption beyond the one (1)-
year redemption period.
SECTION 29. EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BY
JUDGMENT OBLIGOR, AND A CERTIFICATE TO BE
DELIVERED AND RECORDED THEREUPON; TO
WHOM PAYMENTS ON REDEMPTION MADE
The person to whom the redemption payment is made
must execute and deliver to him a notarized Certificate of
Redemption.
Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the registry
of deeds of the place in which the property is situated and
the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the
margin of the record of the certificate of sale.
The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding
sections may be made to the:
1. purchaser;
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2. redemptioner; or
3. for him to the officer who made the sale.
SECTION 30. PROOF REQUIRED OF REDEMPTION
Redemptioner must produce to the officer, or person from
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice to
the officer:
1. A copy of the judgment or final order under which he
claims the right to redeem certified by the clerk of
court wherein the judgment or final order is entered;
or
2. If he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a
memorandum of the record thereof, certified by the
Register of Deeds; or
3. An original or certified copy of any assignment
necessary to establish his claim; and
4. An affidavit executed by him or his agent showing
the amount then actually due on the lien.
Note: When the original owner wants to redeem, there is
no need for him to prove his right as a judgment debtor.
SECTION 31. MANNER OF USING PREMISES
PENDING REDEMPTION; WASTE RESTRAINED
Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption,
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the
property by injunction under Rule 58, on the application
of the judgment obligee or highest bidder.
SECTION 32. RENTS, EARNINGS AND INCOME OF
PROPERTY PENDING REDEMPTION
Rights of the Judgment Debtor until the expiration
of the period of redemption
1. Use the property in the same manner it was
previously used (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 31);
2. Use it in the ordinary course of husbandry (ROC,
RULE 39, Sec. 31);
3. Make necessary repairs to buildings thereon while
he occupies the property (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 31);
4. Collect rents, earnings and income derived from the
property until the expiration of period of
redemption (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 32);
5. Remain in possession of the property since it is only
after the expiration of the period of redemption that
the highest bidder or last redemptioner becomes
entitled to conveyance and possession of the
property (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 33).
SECTION 33. DEED AND POSSESSION TO BE GIVEN
AT EXPIRATION OF REDEMPTION PERIOD; BY
WHOM EXECUTED OR GIVEN
After the expiration of the period of redemption, the
purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to a deed of
possession of the property.
He is thereby substituted to and acquires all the rights,
title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property at the time of levy. The purchaser’s right
retroact to the date of levy.
Two (2) Documents which the Sheriff Executes in
case of Real Property:
1. Certificate of Sale – After the auction sale, he will
execute in favor of the purchaser the certificate of
sale under Section 25. From the registration of the
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said certificate, the one year period of redemption
starts.
2. Deed of Conveyance – If after one (1) year there
is no redemption a deed of conveyance is executed
(Sec. 33).
The deed of conveyance is what operates to transfer to
the purchaser whatever rights the judgment debtor had
in the property. The certificate of sale after execution sale
merely is a memorial of the fact of sale and does not
operate as a conveyance.
The purchaser acquires no better right than what the
judgment debtor had in the property levied upon. Thus, if
the judgment debtor had already transferred the property
executed prior to the levy and no longer has an interest
in the property, the execution purchaser acquires no right
(Pacheco v. CA, G.R. No. L-48689, August 31, 1987). The
remedy of the purchaser will be that in Sec. 34.
When a third person is in possession: The
procedure is for the court to order a hearing and
determine the nature of such adverse possession.
SECTION 34. RECOVERY OF PRICE IF SALE IS NOT
EFFECTIVE; REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT
The purchaser may recover the purchase price
when:
1. The purchaser or his successor-in-interest fails to
recover possession of the property; or
2. The purchaser is evicted due to:
a. Irregularities in the proceedings concerning the
sale; or
b. Judgment has been reversed or set aside (e.g.
on appeal, when discretionary execution is
granted); or
c. The property sold was exempt from execution;
or
d. A third person has vindicated his claim to the
property.
When the sale was not effective under the
circumstances in this section, the purchaser may:
1. File a motion in the same action or file a separate
action to recover from the judgment creditor the
price paid;
2. File a motion for revival of judgment in his name
against the judgment debtor.
Revival of Judgment in Revival of Judgment in
Sec. 6 Sec. 34
As to commencement
The action is commenced By filing a motion for
by filing a complaint for revival of judgment
revival of judgment for it before the court which
is an independent civil rendered the judgment
action. sought to be revived.
As to execution of judgment by mere motion
It is no longer possible to The judgment sought to
execute the judgment by be revived in the name of
mere motion because five the highest bidder was
(5) years have already actually executed by
lapsed from entry mere motion within five
thereof. (5) years from entry.
As to person who avails the remedy
The judgment creditor The highest bidder in the
himself, or his assignee, public auction sale.
or successors-in-interest.
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As to purpose
Filed to revive a judgment Filed to revive judgment
which has become in the name of the higest
dormant in order that it bidder in order that he
may again be executed may recover from the
by mere motion. judgment debtor because
he was not able to acquire
the property he
purchased at the auction
sale yet the price he paid
was delivered to the
judgment creditor in
discharge of the
obligation.
SECTION 35. RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION OR
REIMBURSEMENT
REMEDIES OF THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR IN AID OF
EXECUTION
1. If the execution is returned unsatisfied, he may
cause examination of the judgment debtor as to his
property and income (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 36);
Note: The order of examination of the judgment
obligor shall be issued only by the court which
rendered the judgment.
2. He may cause examination of the debtor of the
judgment debtor as to any debt owed by him or to
any property of the judgment debtor in his
possession (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 37);
3. A party or other person may be compelled, by an
order or subpoena, to attend before the court or
commissioner to testify as provided in Secs. 36 &
37(ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 38);
4. If the court finds property of the judgment debtor or
money due him, not exempt from execution, either
in his own hands or that of any person, the court may
order the property applied to the satisfaction of the
judgment (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 40);
5. If the court finds the earnings of the judgment debtor
for his personal serviced are more than sufficient for
his family’s needs, it may order payment in fixed
monthly installments. Failure to pay any such
installments when due without good excuse, may be
punished by indirect contempt (ROC, RULE 39,Sec.
40);
6. The court may appoint a receiver for the property of
the judgment debtor not exempt from execution or
forbid a transfer or disposition or interference with
such property. (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 41 in relation to
ROC, RULE 59, Sec. 1, par. (c));
7. If the court finds that the judgment debtor has an
ascertainable interest in real property either as
mortgagor, mortgagee, or otherwise, and his
interest can be ascertained without controversy, the
court may order the sale of such interest. (ROC,
RULE 39, Sec. 42);
8. If the person alleged to have the property of the
judgment debtor or the reason indebted to him,
claims an adverse interest in the property, or denies
the debt, the court may authorize the judgment-
creditor to institute an action to recover the property,
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forbid its transfer and may punish disobedience for
contempt (ROC, RULE 39, Sec. 43).
Note: The person indebted to the judgment obligor may
pay to the sheriff holding the writ of execution the amount
of his debt or so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy the judgment, and the sheriff’s receipt shall be a
sufficient discharge for the amount so paid or directed to
be credited by the judgment obligee on the executtion.
SECTION 44. ENTRY OF SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT BY CLERK OF COURT
SECTION 45. ENTRY OF SATISFACTION WITH OR
WITHOUT ADMISSION
SECTION 46. WHEN PRINCIPAL BOUND BY
JUDGMENT AGAINST SURETY
When a judgment is rendered against the surety, the
principal debtor is also bound by the judgment from the
time he has notice of the action or proceeding, and an
opportunity at the surety’s request to join the defense.
SECTION 47. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT OR FINAL
ORDERS
This refers to judgments which are considered as
conclusive, either against the whole world (action in rem),
which is governed by Sec. 47, par. (a), or between the
parties to the action or proceeding only (action in
personam), which is governed by Sec. 47, par. (b).
Two parts:
1. Res Judicata – also known as bar by former
judgment or direct estoppel by judgment. It covers
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 47.
2. Conclusiveness of Judgment – also known as
estoppel by verdict or estoppel by record, or
collateral estoppel by judgment or preclusion of issue
or rule of auter action pendant. It covers paragraph
(c) of Rule 47.
RES JUDICATA (A Matter Adjudged)
It is a rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim, demand or, causes of action.
(Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26,
2010).
Requisites of res judicata or bar by prior judgment:
1. A final judgment or order – The judgment must
be final and executory which is beyond the power of
the court to alter (Hubanib v. Insular Drug, G.R. No.
L-43549, February 19, 1937);
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties by the court rendering it - If the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties, the judgment is void and cannot be
invoked as res judicata (Republic Planters Bank v.
Molina, G.R. No. L-54287, September 28, 1988);
3. Judgment upon the merits;
General Rule: A dismissal without a trial is not an
adjudication upon the merits
Exceptions:
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a. Dismissal with prejudice on the ground of willful
and deliberate forum shopping (ROC, RULE 7,
Sec. 5);
b. Dismissal with prejudice on the ground of res
judicata, prescription, payment,
unenforceability under the statue of frauds
(ROC, RULE 16, Sec. 5);
c. Second order of dismissal on notice of the
plaintiff (ROC, RULE 17, Sec. 1);
d. Dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply
with the rules or an order of the court (ROC,
RULE 17, Sec. 3);
e. Dismissal with prejudice for failure to attend the
pre-trial or submit a pre-trial brief (ROC, RULE
18, Sec. 5 and 6).
4. Between the two cases:
a. There is identity of parties – Identity of
parties exists when (1) the parties in both
cases are the same, or (2) the actions are
between those in privity with them, as
between their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the
action, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity, or (3)
where there is substantial identity even if there
are additional parties.
There is also identity of parties even if the
defendant in the first case becomes the
plaintiff, and vice-versa (HSBC v. Aldecoa &
Co., G.R. No. L-8437, March 23, 1915).
b. Identity of subject matter – e.g. the actions
involve the same contract, promissory note or
land;
c. Identity of cause of action – There is identity
of causes of action when the two actions are
based on the same delict or wrong committed
by the defendant even if the remedies are
different (Quiogue v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-
13159, February 2, 1962).
The rule is that a mortage-creditor has a single cause of
action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the
debt. The mortgagor-creditor has the option of either
filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or
instituting a real action to foreclosure on the mortgage
security. The two remedies are alternative and each
remedy is complete by itself. If the mortgagee opts to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action
for the collection of the debt, and vice versa (Flores v.
Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011).
A rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal
action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged
property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so
offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity, but
also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being
sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of
the plaintiff, and them again in the place where the
property lies (Id).
NOTE: No res judicata in:
1. Revival of Judgment
Cause of action is for revival of dormant judgment.
2. Annulment of Judgment.
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Cause of action is extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction; Subject matter is the judgment itself.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, no matter how
or erroneous a judgment may be, once it becomes final, it
cannot be corrected.
Res Judicata by Conclusiveness of Judgment
Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which a judgment or decree
is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or
demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits
are the same (Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, supra).
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such
material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the
parties. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when
an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them (Id).
Thus, it has the effect of preclusion only of issues. The
parties in both actions may be the same but the causes
of action are different.
Summary of Differences between Res Judicata or
Bar by Former Judgment and Res Judicata by
Conclusiveness of Judgment
Bar by Former Conclusiveness of
Judgment Judgment
There is identity of There is only identity of
parties, subject matter parties and subject
and cause of action. matter.
The first judgment The first judgment is
constitute as an absolute conclusive only as to
bar to all matters directly matters directly adjudged
adjudged and those that and actually litigated in
might have been the first action. The
adjudged. second action can be
prosecuted.
It has the effect of It has the effect of
preclusion of claims. preclusion only of issues.
DEL ROSARIO v. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY
G.R. No 150134, 31 October 2007
Held:
There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to
Civil Case No. 94-1610 (that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No.
50591) was a final judgment. Not only did it dispose of
the case on the merits; it also became executory as a
consequence of the denial of FEBTCs motion for
reconsideration and appeal.Neither is there room to doubt
that the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on the
merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the
parties. To recall, it was ruled that: (1) DATICOR overpaid
by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC was bound to refund the
excess payment but because DATICOR’s claim against
FEBTC was only P965,000, the court could only grant so
much as the relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further
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claim against DATICOR because its obligation had already
been paid in full. Right or wrong, that judgment bars
another case based upon the same cause of action.
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action, it cannot be gainsaid that the first
case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought by petitioners
to recover an alleged overpayment of P5.3
million, P965,000 from FEBTC and P4.335 million from
PDCP. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by
the same petitioners, was for the recovery of P4.335
million, which is admittedly part of the P5.3 million earlier
sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. 94-1610. This
time, the action was brought solely against FEBTC which
in turn impleaded PDCP as a third party defendant.
In determining whether causes of action are identical to
warrant the application of the rule of res judicata, the test
is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second action would suffice to
authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in which
the forms or nature of the two actions are
different. Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a
bar to the subsequent action.
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same
alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and refusing
to return an amount in excess of what was due it in
violation of their right to a refund. The same facts and
evidence presented in the first case, Civil Case No. 94-
1610, were the very same facts and evidence that
petitioners presented in Civil Case No. 00-540.
(Hacienda Bino v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 150478, Apri 15,
2005).
Doctrine of Law of the Case
According to this principle, whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the case continues to be the
law of the case whether correct on genaral principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. This principle generally finds application in cases
where an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for futher
proceedings. The question there settled becomes the law
of the case upon subsequent appeal (RCPI v. CA, G.R. No.
139762, April 26, 2006).
Note: This rule does not apply to resolutions rendered in
connection with the case wherein no rationale has been
expounded on the merits of that action (Jarantilla v. CA,
G.R. No. 80194, March 21, 1969).
Immutability of Judgments
Once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The decisions of the court
must be immutable at some definite period of time, no
matter how erroneous a judgment may be. Otherwise,
there would be no end to litigation. (See Rule 36 for
Exceptions)
Res Judicata vs. Law of the Case vs. Stare Decisis
(Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 134284, December 1,
2000)

Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed Civil Case Res Judicata Law of the Case
No. 00-540 on the ground of res judicata. The judgment The ruling in one case is Operates only in the
in Civil Case No. 94-1610 operated as a bar to Civil Case carried over to another particular and single case
No. 00-540. case between the same where the ruling arises
parties. and is not carried into
Bar by former judgment makes the judgment rendered other cases as a
in the first case an absolute bar to the subsequent action precedent.
since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the
matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to
any other matter which might have been offered for that Law of the Case Stare Decisis
purpose and which could have been adjudged therein. It The ruling adhered to in Once a point of law has
is in this concept that the term res judicata is more the particular case need been established by the
commonly and generally used as a ground for a motion to not be followed as a court, that point of law
dismiss in civil cases. precedent in subsequent will, generally, be
litigation between other followed by the same
The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section parties, neither by the court and by all courts of
47(c), Rule 39 is conclusiveness of judgment. This appellate court which lower rank in subsequent
rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue made the decision cases where the same
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the followed on a subsequent legal issue is raised.
determination of an action before a competent court in appeal in the same cases,
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is nor by any other court.
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject SECTION 48. EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT OR
matter of the two suits is the same. It refers to a situation FINAL ORDERS
where the judgment in the prior action operates as an Public Policy Principle
estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or A judgment by a court is enforceable only within its
which were necessarily included therein. territorial jurisdiction

Effect of Foreign Judgments: Provided that the foreign

Rule of Stare Decisis
This rule holds that when the Supreme Court has laid
down a principle of law applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply to it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same
tribunal had jurisdiction:
1. In case of judgment against a specific thing,
the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing; or

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2. In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors-in-
interest by a subsequent title.
Note: The judgment of foreign tribunal cannot be
enforced by execution in the Philippines. Such judgment
only creates a right of action and its non-satisfaction, a
cause of action, and it is necessary that a suit be brought
upon said foreign judgment in our local courts.
Judgments of foreign courts may only be enforced in the
Philippines through an action validly heard in the RTC.
Thus, it is actually the judgment of the Philippine court
enforcing the foreign judgment that shall be executed
(U.P. Law Complex, Suggested Answers to the 2007 Bar
Examination in Remedial Law).
A foreign arbitral award cannot be enforced in the
Philippines under the rules on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. A foreign arbitral
award is not a foreign judgment, and pursuant to the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 (R.A. 9285), in
relation to 1958 New York Convention of the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the
recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral
awards shall be in accordance with the rules of procedure
promulgated by the Supreme Court. At present, the SC is
yet to promulgate rules of procedure on the subject
matter (U.P. Law Complex, Suggested Answers to the
2007 Bar Examination in Remedial Law).
Where to file
The suit upon the foreign judgment is considered as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore it must
be filed in the RTC.
There are two ways of giving effect to a foreign judgment:
(a) an ordinary action to enforce the foreign judgment
may be filed in court or (b) it may be pleaded in an answer
or a motion to dismiss (2 HERRERA, supra at 531).
Note: In both instances, the judgment may be repelled
by evidence of.
1. Want of Jurisdiction;
2. Want of Notice;
3. Collusion;
4. Fraud; or
Clear mistake of law or fact
Rule 57
Preliminary Attachment
I. Nature of attachment
• A preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy
by virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may,
at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party
taken into the custody of the court as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered. (Davao Light and Power, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 93262, 29 December
1991)
• Preliminary attachment is designed to:
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(a) seize the property of the debtor before final
judgment and put the same in custodia legis
even while the action is pending for the
satisfaction of a later judgment; or
(b) to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the res or the property subject of the action in
cases where service in person or any other
service to acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant cannot be effected.
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
(1991)
Facts: Davao Light & Power Co. (“Davao Light”) filed a
complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages
against Queensland Hotel (“Queensland”) and Teodorico
Adarna (“Adarna”), with an ex parte application for a writ
of preliminary attachment. The court granted the ex parte
application and fixed the attachment bond in the amount
of Php4,600,513.37. Thereafter, the summons and a copy
of the complaint, together with the writ of attachment,
were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna, and
pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized properties
belonging to the latter.
Queenland and Adarna filed a motion to
discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue
the same because at the time the order of attachment
was promulgated and the writ was issued the trial court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over
the persons of the defndants. The trial court denied said
motion to discharge. Queensland and Adarna filed a
petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s Order
denying the motion to discharge before the Court of
Appeals, which annulled said Order.
Issue: Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment
may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquisition
of jurisdiction of the latter’s person.
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that writs of attachment may
properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied
that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by
the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require
prior hearing on the application with notice to the
defendant; but that levy on the property pursuant to the
writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless
preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service on the defendant of summons, a copy of
complaint, the application for attachment, the order of
attachment, and the plaintiff’s attachment bond.
BPI v. Lee (2012)
FACTS: Carlito Lee filed a complaint for sum of money
with damages and application for the issuance of a writ of
attachment against Trendline and Buelva before the RTC,
seeking to recover his total investment. The RTC issued a
writ of preliminary attachment whereby the Check-O-
Matic Savings Accounts of Trendline with Citytrust
Banking Corporation, Ayala Branch, were garnished.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision finding
defendants jointly and severally liable to Lee. The
defendants appealed the RTC decision to the CA. In the
interim, Citytrust and BPI merged, with the latter as the
surviving corporation.
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The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of
the RTC, which had become final and executory. Hence,
Lee filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC which was
granted. Upon issuance of the corresponding writ, he
sought the release of the garnished deposits of Trendline.
However, on the manifestation of BPI that it cannot locate
the defendants' bank records with Citytrust, the RTC
denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to locate the bank
records of a garnished deposit is a ground for the
dissolution of the writ of attachment.
HEiLD: No.
The RTC is not permitted to dissolve or discharge a
preliminary attachment or garnishment except on
grounds specifically provided in the Revised Rules of
Court, namely, (a) the debtor has posted a counter-bond
or has made the requisite cash deposit; (b) the
attachment was improperly or irregularly issued as where
there is no ground for attachment, or the affidavit and/or
bond filed therefor are defective or insufficient; (c) the
attachment is excessive, but the discharge shall be
limited to the excess; (d) the property attachment is
exempt from preliminary attachment; or (e) the
judgment is rendered against the attaching creditor.
Evidently, the loss of bank records of a garnished deposit
is not a ground for the dissolution of garnishment.
Consequently, the obligation to satisfy the writ stands.
Valdevieso v. Damalerio (2005)
FACTS: Valdevieso bought from spouses Uy a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. T-30586. The deed of sale was
not registered, nor was the title of the land transferred to
petitioner. After sometime, Spouses Damalerio filed with
the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money against spouses
Uy with application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment. The trial court issued a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment by virtue of which the property,
then still in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which had already
been sold to petitioner, was levied. The levy was duly
recorded in the Register of Deeds and annotated upon
TCT.
Subsequently, TCT No. T-30586 in the name of Lorenzo
Uy was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-74439
was issued in the name of petitioner. This new TCT carried
with it the attachment in favor of respondents. Petitioner
then filed a third-party claim in to discharge or annul the
attachment levied on the property covered by TCT No. T-
74439 on the ground that the said property belongs to
him and no longer to Lorenzo and Elenita Uy.
ISSUE: Whether or not a registered writ of attachment
on the land is a superior lien over that of an earlier
unregistered deed of sale.
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HELD: The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly
registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact
that the property involved was duly covered by the
Torrens system which works under the fundamental
principle that registration is the operative act which gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not
diminished even by the subsequent registration of the
prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a
proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property,
enforceable against the whole world. The attaching
creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property
which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very
dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a
proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is
an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay
the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid,
or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or
until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
II. When issued; grounds
1. Action for recovery of specified amount
• The cause of action is for money or
damages, on a cause of action arising from
law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or
quasi-delict.
• A writ of preliminary attachment cannot be
issued for moral and exemplary damages
and other unliquidated and contingent
claims. (Insular Savings Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 123638, 15 June 2005)
• The writ can only be issued against a party
about to depart from the Philippines or with
intent to defraud his creditors.
2. Action involving embezzled property
• The defendant may be a public officer, a
corporate officer, an attorney, a factor,
broker, agent, a clerk or any other person
acting in a fiduciary capacity; he may also
be a person who acted in a manner as to
willfully violate his duty not to embezzle,
fraudulently misapply, or not to convert
money or property for his own use.
• The allegations of fraud, embezzlement
and misappropriation must be
substantiated. (Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 115678, 23 February 2011)
3. Action to recover property fraudulently
taken
• It must be alleged and shown that the
property involved or any part thereof has
been concealed, removed or disposed of to
prevent its being found or taken by the
applicant or an authorized person.
• The property unjustly or fraudulently
taken, detained and converted by the
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defendant may also be a real property,
since the rule makes no distinction.
(Philippine Commercial International Bank
v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 175587, 21
September 2007)
4. Action involving fraud in contracting or
performing obligations
• The fraud may either be dolo causante or
dolo incidente.
• Dolo causante is fraud used to induce
another to enter into a contract. (Art. 1338,
Civil Code) while dolo incidente is the fraud
employed by a party in the fulfillment of his
obligation or after the obligation has been
contracted. (Art. 1344, Civil Code)
• There could also be fraud in contracting the
obligation where the debtor has a
preconceived plan not to pay the creditor
but fraudulent intent by the debtor cannot
be inferred from the mere inability to pay.
(Philippine Bank of Communications v.
Court of Appals, supra)
5. Action against party who has removed or
dispensed of property to defraud creditors
• Two elements required: (a) there is a
removal or disposal of the property; and
(b) the removal or disposal must be with
intent to defraud the creditor.
6. Action against non-resident defendant
• The attachment is intended to enable the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the res by
converting the action in personam to an
action quasi in rem and thus, justifying
summons by publication and other modes
of summons under Sec.15 of Rule 14.
• When the property located in the
Philippines of a non-resident who at the
same time is outside the Philippines is
attached, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res and in that event, the
jurisdiction over the person of said
defendant is not essential. (Philippine
Commercial International Bank v.
Alejandro, supra)
III. Issuance and contents of order
• An order of attachment may be issued either ex
parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by
the court in which the action is pending, or by
the Court of Appeals of the Supreme Court and
must require the sheriff of the court to attach so
much of the property in the Philippines of the
party against who it is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant’s demand, unless such party makes
deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided
in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy
the applicant’s demand or the value of the
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property to be attached as stated by the
applicant, exclusive of costs. (Sec.2, Rule 57)
• Sections 3 and 4, Rule 57, merely require
that an applicant for an order of
attachment file an affidavit and a bond. The
affidavit to be executed by the applicant
himself or some other person who
personally knows the facts and to show
that:
(1) there is a sufficient cause of action;
(2) the case is one of those mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 57;
(3) there is no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced; and
(4) the amount claimed in the action is
as much as the sum for which the order
is granted above all legal counterclaims;
The bond, on the other hand, must be "executed to
the adverse party in an amount fixed by the judge,
not exceeding the applicant's claim, conditioned that
the latter will pay all the costs which may be
adjudged to the adverse party and all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the attachment,
if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant
was not entitled thereto."
IV. Attachment bond required
• The bond posted by the attaching creditor
answers for the damages and costs which may
be adjudged to the adverse party arising from
and by the reason of the attachment. (Carlos v.
Sandoval, 471 SCRA 266)
V. Writ may issue ex parte; prior or
contemporaneous service of summons
required for enforcement
• An application for an order and writ of execution
may be granted ex parte because it is possible
that during the course of the hearing, the party
against whom the writ is sought may dispose of
his property or abscond before the writ is
issued. (Filinvest Credit v. Relova, 117 SCRA
420)
• The writ of preliminary attachment may be
issued ex parte and even before the summons
is served upon the defendant. However, the writ
may not be enforced and may not be validly
implemented unless preceded by a service of
summons upon the defendant, or
simultaneously accompanied by service of
summons, a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the order of
attachment, and the attachment bond. (Davao
Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 204
SCRA 343)
VI. Belated service of summons not allowed
• Implementation of the writ of attachment
without the required jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is null and void. (BAC Mfg. &
Sons Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 130)
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Torres v. Satsatin (2009)
Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money
against respondents. Thereafter, petitioners filed an Ex-
Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment,
which the trial court granted. A copy of the writ of
attachment was served upon respondents and the
appointed sheriff levied real and personal properties of
respondents. Thereafter, summons, together with a copy
of the complaint, was served upon respondents.
Respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of
Attachment (“Motion to Discharge”) because, among
others the writ of attachment was issued before the
summons was received by the respondents.
The trial court denied respondents’ Motion to
Discharge, which respondents moved for reconsideration.
Via Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals found
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying respondents’ Motion to Discharge, and ordered
the lifting of the writ of attachment.
Issue: Whether or not the lifting of the writ of attachment
is proper.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court sustained the lifting of the
writ of attachment. The grant of the provisional remedy
of attachment involves three stages: first, the court
issues the order granting the application; second, the writ
of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the
writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two
stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once
the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any
order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to
apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the
serving of the writ of attachment, service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for
attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the
order must be served upon him.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the
trial court validly issued the writ of attachment on
November 15, 2002, which was implemented on
November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, was served only on
November 21, 2002.
Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of
attachment was validly issued, although the trial court
later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service
of the summons upon them, such belated service of
summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have
cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The
trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on
respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their
person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the service of summons
on the defendant whether by personal service,
substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
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circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of
summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person because the law does not
allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
VII. When attachment may be enforced without
service of summons
• Prior or contemporaneous service of summons may
NOT apply when:
(a) Summons could not be served personally or
by substituted service;
(b) Defendant is a resident of the Philippines
temporarily absent therefrom;
(c) Defendant is a non-resident; and
(d) The action is one in rem or quasi in rem.
Valmonte v. Court of Appeals (1996)
Facts: Respondent Rosita Dimalanta (“Rosita”) filed a
complaint for partition of real property and accounting of
rentals against petitioners Lourdes Valmonte (“Lourdes”)
and Alfredo Valmonte (“Alfredo”) before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 48. Summons was served upon
Alfredo, who accepted the summons insofar as he was
concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his
wife, Lourdes, who was abroad, on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf.
Thereafter, Alfredo file dhis Answer with
Counerclaim. Lourdes, however, did not file her Answer.
Thus, Rosita moved to declare her in default, which the
trial court denied. Rosita’s motion for reconsideration
having likewise been denied, she filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which granted said
petition and declared Lourdes in default.
Issue: Whether or not Lourdes was validly served with
summons.
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there was no
valid service of process on Lourdes. Rosita’s action which
is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is
essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's
interest in a specific property and not to render a
judgment against him.
As Lourdes is a nonresident who is not found in
the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be
effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1)
by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court should be sent by registered mail
to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any
other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons
upon Lourdes was not done by means of any of the first
two modes, the question is whether the service on her
attorney, Alfredo, can be justified under the third mode,
namely, "in any . . . manner the court may deem
sufficient."
The Supreme Court hold it cannot. This mode of
service, like the first two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the
foreign country where the defendant resides. Moreover,
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there are several reasons why the service of summons on
Alfredo cannot be considered a valid service of summons
on Lourdes. In the first place, service of summons on
Alfredo was not made upon the order of the court as
required by Rule 14, §17 and certainly was not a mode
deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare
Lourdes in default for her failure to file an answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted
manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of
the trial court as required also in Rule 14, §17. As
provided in §19, such leave must be applied for by motion
in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some
person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the
application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there
was no order granting such leave, Lourdes was not given
ample time to file her Answer which, according to the
rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an
action against a resident defendant differs from the period
given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant
who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the
period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while
in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone
can assure observance of due process. That is why in one
case, although the Court considered publication in the
Philippines of the summons (against the contention that
it should be made in the foreign state where defendant
was residing) sufficient, nonetheless the service was
considered insufficient because no copy of the summons
was sent to the last known correct address in the
Philippines.
VIII. Discharge of attachment
1. Upon giving counterbond
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 57
Section 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving
counterbond. – At anytime after an order of attachment
has been granted, the party whose property has been
attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may,
upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the
judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court
in which the action is pending, for an order discharging
the attachment wholly or in part on the security given.
The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the
attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond
executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of
the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court
where the application is made, in an amount equal to
the value of the property attached as determined by the
judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the
filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith
be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon
the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the
provisions of this section the property attached, or the
proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the
party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or
the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or
counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property
so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be
found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party
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furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-
bond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order
of attachment.
2. On other grounds
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 57
Section 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or
irregular issuance. - The party whose property has been
attached may also, at any time either before or after the
release of the attached property, or before any
attachment shall have been actually levied, upon
reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the
judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court
in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge
the attachment on the ground that the same was
improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made
on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has
been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor
may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other
evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was
made. After hearing, the judge shall order the discharge
of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or
irregularly issued and the defect is not cured forthwith.
3. Judgment rendered against attaching party –
dismissal of principal action
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 57
Section 19. Disposition of attached property where
judgment is for party against whom attachment was
issued. – If judgment be rendered against the attaching
party, all the proceeds of sales and money collected or
received by the sheriff, under the order of attachment,
and all property attached remaining in any such sheriff’s
hands, shall be delivered to the party against whom
attachment was issued, and the order of attachment
discharged.
IX. Third party claim
1. Same procedure as in Sec.16, Rule 39 in levy
of property on execution claimed by third
party
• Third person may avail of the remedy called
terceria by making an affidavit of his title
thereto or his right to possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title. The
affidavit must be served upon the sheriff and
the attaching party.
• Upon service of the affidavit upon him, the
sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property
under attachment except if the attaching party
files a bond approved by the court. The sheriff
shall not be liable for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property, if such bond shall be
filed.
• A third party claim may be filed with the sheriff
while he has possession of the properties levied
upon, this being the only time fixed for the
purpose. (Mangaoang v. Provincial Sheriff of La
Union, G.R. No. L-4869, 26 May 1952)
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Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court (1984)
Facts: Traders Royal Bank (“TRB”) filed a complaint for
the recovery of a sum of money, docketed as Civil Case
No. 9894, against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc.
(“REMCO”) before the RTC,Branch 110, Pasay City (“RTC-
Pasay”), and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment against the assets and properties of REMCO.
Pursuant to said writ, Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago
(“Sheriff Santiago”) levied among others about 4,600
barrels of aged or rectified alcohol found inside REMCO’s
premises. A third party claim was filed by respondent La
Toñdena, Inc. (“La Toñdena”), claiming ownership over
the attached property. Thereafter, La Toñdena filed a
complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 9894. La
Toñdena also filed a “Motion to Wirthdraw” praying that it
be allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from
REMCO’s Distillery Plant, which motion was granted by
RTC-Pasay.
Thereafter, La Toñdena filed a complaint before
the RTC, Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan (“RTC Malolos”),
docketed as Civil Case No. 7003, in which it asserted its
claim of ownership over the properties attached in Civil
Case No. 9894, and likewise prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC-Malolos declared
La Toñdenato be the owner of the disputed alcohol and
granted the latter’s application for injunctive relief. Thus,
Sheriff Victorino Evangelista (“Sheriff Evangelista”)
issued on Sheriff Santiago of RTC-Pasay the
corresponding writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC-Pasay ordered Sheriff Santiago to enforce the writ of
preliminary attachment issued by said court.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the RTC-Bulacan
to issue an injunction enjoining the sale of property
previously levied upon by Sheriff Santiago pursuant to a
writ of attachment issued by RTC-Pasay.
Held: There is no question that the action filed by La
Tondeña, as third-party claimant, before the RTC-Bulacan
in Civil Case No. 7003 wherein it claimed ownership over
the property levied upon by Pasay City Deputy Sheriff
Santiago is sanctioned by Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court. Thus —
If property taken be claimed by any person
other than the party against whom attachment
had been issued or his agent, and such person
makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to
the possession thereof, stating the grounds of
such right or title, and serves such affidavit
upon the officer while the latter has possession
of the property, and a copy thereof upon the
attaching creditor, the officer shall not be bound
to keep the property under the attachment,
unless the attaching creditor or his agent, on
demand of said officer, secures aim against such
claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the
value of the property attached. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the same shall
be decided by the court issuing the writ of
attachment. The officer shall not be liable for
damages, for the taking or keeping of such
property, to any such third-party claimant,
unless such a claim is so made and the action
upon the bond brought within one hundred and
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of
said bond. But nothing herein contained shall
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prevent such third person from vindicating his
claim to the property by proper action ...
The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the
remedy that may be availed of by a person who claims to
be the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz:
to lodge a third- party claim with the sheriff, and if the
attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor of the
sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to
vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45 SCRA
314). And this precisely was the remedy resorted to by
La Tondeña when it filed the vindicatory action before
RTC-Bulacan.
Generally, the rule that no court has the power
to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees
of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction,
is applied in cases where no third-party claimant is
involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the
judgment or process of another court of the same rank or
category, a power which devolves upon the proper
appellate court. The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict
of power between different courts of coordinate
jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth
functioning of their proceedings.
It is further argued that since La Tondeña, had
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of RTC-
Pasay by filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No.
9894-P, the denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a bar
to the present action filed before RTC-Bulacan. The
Supreme Court did not sustain this view. Suffice it to state
that intervention as a means of protecting the third-party
claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not
exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to
bring an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a
third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate
to bar a subsequent independent action by the claimant
to establish his right to the property even if he failed to
appeal from the order denying his original third-party
claim.
X. Satisfaction of judgment out of property
attached
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 57
Section 15. Satisfaction of judgment out of property
attached; return of officer. — If judgment be recovered
by the attaching creditor and execution issue thereon,
the sheriff or other proper officer may cause the
judgment to be satisfied out of the property attached, if
it be sufficient for that purpose, in the following manner:
(a) By paying to the judgment creditor the proceeds
of all sales of perishable or other property sold in
pursuance of the order of the judge, or so much as shall
be necessary to satisfy the judgment;
(b) If any balance remain due, by selling so much
of the property, real or personal, as may be necessary
to satisfy the balance, if enough for that purpose remain
in the officer's hands, or in those of the clerk of the
court;
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(c) By collecting from all persons having in their
possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor, or
owing debts to the latter at the time of the attachment
of such credits or debts, the amount of such credits and
debts as determined by the court in the action, and
stated in the judgment, and paying the proceeds of such
collection over to the judgment obligee.
XI. Claims for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment
• Damages may be awarded on account of
improper, irregular or excessive attachment.
The application for damages must be filed (a)
before the trial, or (b) before appeal is
perfected, or (c) before the judgment becomes
executory. There must be notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties. (Sec.
20, Rule 57)
• Where there is wrongful attachment, the
attachment defendant may recover actual
damages even without proof that the
attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in
obtaining the attachment. However, if it is
alleged and established that the attachment
was not merely wrongful but also malicious, the
attachment defendant may recover moral
damages and exemplary damages as well.
(Spouses Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, 6
February 2007)
• The damages may be awarded only upon proper
hearing. The judgment for damages shall be
included in the judgment of the main case. (Sec.
20, Rule 57)
Pacis v. COMELEC (1969)
Facts: After promulgation of the 28 September 1968
main decision of the Supreme Court Court in this case
confirming the 11 May 1968 resolution of the Commission
on Elections, dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on June 11, 1968 and declaring valid
and subsisting the canvass of votes and the proclamation
of private respondent Anatacio Negre as Mayor-elect of
the Municipality of Sanchez Mira, Province of Cagayan,
the latter, through counsel, moved for assessment and
award of damages sustained by him as a result of the
preliminary injunction issued in favor of petitioner
Pantaleon Pacis, upon the P1,000 cash bond deposited
with this Court by said petitioner, pursuant to Section 9,
Rule 58, in connection with Section 20, Rule 57, of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner opposed, pleaded good faith. A
hearing was conducted by an officer of the Court to
ascertain the amount of damages.
The unrebutted evidence is that private
respondent was enjoined from performing his duties as
Mayor of Sanchez Mira from June 19, 1968, after receipt
of the injunctive writ on June 18, 1968, until October 17,
1968 when judgment in this case became final and
executory, thus depriving him of four months' salaries at
P500 per month totalling a little less than P2,000.
Issue: Whether or not respondent can validly claim
damages in this case.
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Held: It may be well to state at this point that the present
is a motion of private respondent for assessment and
award of damages upon the P1,000 cash bond. The
reglementary period within which to file the appropriate
motion is before the main judgment becomes executory.
The judgment dissolving the preliminary
injunction issued in favor of petitioner and dismissing the
main cause became final and executory on October 17,
1968. The motion herein was filed on October 16. It can
be seen from the procedure laid out in the Rules of Court
for proceeding against an injunction bond that the motion
of private respondent barely missed the statutory period.
Section 9 of Rule 58 on preliminary injunctions directs
that the procedure in Section 20 of Rule 57 on attachment
be followed, viz:
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of illegal
attachment. — If the judgment on the action be
in favor of the party against whom attachment
was issued, he may recover, upon the bond given
or deposit made by the attaching creditor, any
damages resulting from the attachment. Such
damages may be awarded only upon application
and after proper hearing, and shall be included in
the final judgment. The application must be filed
before the trial or before appeal is perfected or
before the judgment becomes executory, with
due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety
or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his
right to damages and the amount thereof.
If the judgment of the appellate court be
favorable to the party against whom the
attachment was issued, he must claim damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal by
filing an application with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his
surety or sureties, before the judgment of the
appellate court becomes executory. The
appellate court may allow the application to be
heard and decided by the trial court.
The foregoing remedy has been said to be
exclusive such that no claim for recovery of damages may
be filed after the judgment has become final and
executory.
Good faith on petitioner’s part in obtaining the
injunction because the main cause was then undecided by
this Court, petitioner deposits, is fatal to any claim for
damages.
The foregoing question entails an expansive discussion on
the principles governing recovery of damages sustained
as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction.
The practice of issuing restraining orders (used here in its
generic term as referring to all types of "status
quo"orders) started as a common-law equitable relief in
the English courts to preserve the status quo of a case
pending the final determination of the relative rights of
the parties. Since these orders cause damages to the
restrained party if his rights were later affirmed — more
than what would be occasioned him as an ordinary party
litigant if no restraining order were issued — a system by
which he was recompensed evolved.
Damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully
obtained injunction may be recovered upon the injunction
bond required to be filed with the court. This principle of
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recovery of damages has been recognized in our
jurisdiction in the early case of Molina vs. Somes (1913),
24 Phil. 49, 61-62.
The filing of a bond before the issuance of an injunction
has been made a reglementary requisite under the same
rule which permits the issuance of an injunction. It is this
same rule therefore which must first be examined in
determining whether good faith is a proper defense
against a claim for damages.
The statutory undertaking of the bond is that it
shall answer for all damages which the party to be
restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction "if the
court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not
entitled thereto." Malice or lack of good faith is not an
element of recovery on the bond. This must be so,
because to require malice as a prerequisite would make
the filing of a bond a useless formality. Too, it is axiomatic
that probable cause is necessary before an injunction may
be ordered, and if good faith were tenable as a defense,
it would rule out practically all relief from actual damages
sustained as a result of an injunction.
Jurisprudence, evolved from jurisdictions where
this equitable relief originated and expanded, supports
the view we just expressed. The holding is that the
dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was
obtained in good faith, "amounts to a determination that
the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of
action on the injunction bond immediately accrues to the
defendant." 4 The dissolution of the injunction because of
the failure of petitioner's main cause of action, therefore,
is an "actionable wrong," so to speak, for the purpose of
recovery upon the bond.
The foregoing background paves the way for a
discussion whether private respondent can recover
damages in excess of the amount of the bond.
As stated, this present proceeding is upon a
motion for assessment of damages on the bond. There is
nothing in the Rules of Court which allows recovery of
damages other than upon the bond pledged by the party
suing for an injunction.
Recovery of private respondent must therefore
be limited to the amount of the bond. Where the bond is
insufficient in amount, the law expressly gives the party
affected the recourse of excepting thereto and provides
for the dissolution of the injunction if "a bond sufficient in
amount with sufficient sureties approved after
justification is not filed forthwith."
Because petitioner's bond is only for P1,000.00,
it will not be sufficient to satisfy even the actual damages
suffered by private respondent. So it is that there is no
imperative need to discuss petitioner's assertion that only
actual damages may be allowed.
The Court thus ruled that private respondent
Atanacio Negre is entitled to recover only upon the P1,000
cash deposit of petitioner.
Rule 58
Preliminary Injunction
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1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 1. Preliminary Injunction defined; – A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Injunction as a main action
Hernandez v. NAPOCOR (2006)
Facts: On 9 March 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects of
exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and
safety to themselves and their families, petitioners,
through the instant case, sought what they had failed to
achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and
prayed, inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the
transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay
issued an order in Civil Case No. 00-352,
which temporarily restrained the respondent from
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through the said project. By order of 15 March 2000, the
trial court extended the restraining order for 18 more
days.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the above
order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing
Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases
Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource
Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by,
the Government, particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly
sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack
jurisdiction.
In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000,
the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against NAPOCOR. The trial court articulated
that an injunction was necessary to stay respondent
NAPOCORs activation of its power lines due to the
possible health risks posed to the petitioners. Asserting
its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the
view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence
proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects do
not find application in the case at bar because of the
health risks involved.
The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR
from further preparing and installing high voltage cables
to the steel pylons erected near petitioners homes and
from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric
current through said cables while the case is pending final
adjudication, upon posting of the bond amounting
to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that petitioners
will pay all the damages the NAPOCOR may sustain by
reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide
that the petitioners are not entitled thereto.
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In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order. In the
Court of Appeals rationale, the proscription on injunctions
against infrastructure projects of the government is
clearly mandated by the above-quoted Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1818, as reiterated by the
Supreme Court in its Circulars No. 2-91 and No. 13-93,
dated 15 March 1991 and 5 March 1993, respectively.
As their motion for reconsideration was met
with similar lack of success, petitioners, in a last attempt
at vindication, filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Held: For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued,
the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in
violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the
Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue
as a provisional remedy, which is different from injunction
as a main action where one needs to establish absolute
certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
Nature and purpose of preliminary injunction
Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals (1994)
Facts: As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to
different countries during his successive tours of duties,
petitioner Samson T. Sabalones (the “petitioner”) left to
his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones
(the “respondent”), the administration of some of their
conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Petitioner retired as ambassador in 1985 and
came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their
children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17
Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila,
belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he
was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone
without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of
the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization
and medical treatment.
In her answer, respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was
being occupied by her and their six children and that they
were depending for their support on the rentals from
another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes
Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also
informed the court that despite her husband's retirement,
he had not returned to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio
Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng
and their three children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the
decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of
their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's
share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed
that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a)
disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and
b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal
properties.
After trial, the judge found that petitioner had
indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5,
1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned
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upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The
court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses
and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to
support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Pendente lite, respondent wife filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
petitioner from interfering with the administration of their
properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She
alleged inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the
Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease
would not be renewed. She also complained that
petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal
properties in the United States in favor of his paramour,
to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children.
Petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own
motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new
contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its
present tenant, or with future tenants, without his
consent. After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order
dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction
prayed for by his wife.
Petitioner now assails this order, arguing that
since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no
injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated. He further notes that
the Court of Appeals failed to appoint an administrator of
the conjugal assets as mandated by Art. 61 of the Code.
Held: The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of
injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties
and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these
matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue
doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain
and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be
rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff. Injunction is
primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford
relief against future acts which are against equity and
good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing in
the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to
punish for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue
to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been
violated.
Nature and purpose of preliminary injunction
Ulang v. Court of Appeals (1993)
Facts: On 8 February 1989, a motion for issuance of a
writ of execution was filed by Valentina Salazar before the
trial court in Civil Case No. 2380-0. On 6 March 1989, the
motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued.
However, before the writ of execution could be carried
out, petitioner Roberto Ulang filed an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and for Suspension of Implementation of
the Writ of Execution dated 6 March 1989." Due to the
intervening death of Valentina Salazar, a motion for
substitution by her lone heir, Nelia Salazar, was filed. On
8 May 1989, the lower court issued two (2) orders in Civil
Case No. 2380-0, one granting the substitution of
Valentina Salazar as party plaintiff by her daughter Nelia
Salazar and at the same time denying Roberto Ulang's
motion for reconsideration and suspension of
implementation of the writ of execution, and the other
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allowing an Alias Writ of Execution to issue. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari to annul these two (2) orders
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
17938. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
On 17 July 1990, petitioner Ulang filed a suit for
foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction and
damages against Nelia Salazar and the Sheriff of Branch
LXII of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The new
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 383-0-90. Both cases
(Civil Case No. 2380-0 and Civil Case No. 383-0-90)
pertain to one and the same property.
On 17 July 1990, or on the day the suit for
foreclosure of mortgage was filed, the court a quo issued
a restraining order enjoining Nelia Salazar and the
respondent sheriff from ejecting Roberto Ulang pending
the hearing of his application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On 20 August 1990, the court a quo issued the
Order denying Ulang's prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that the foreclosure proceeding
was still pending and the issue as to whether petitioner is
justified to foreclose the mortgage had not yet been
determined. His motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on 18 September 1990 for being moot and
academic because on 28 August 1990, respondent sheriff
succeeded in evicting petitioner Ulang from the premises
in question and placed private respondent in possession
thereof pursuant to the second alias writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 2380-0, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Delivery and Certificate of Acceptance.
On 29 September 1990, petitioner filed before
respondent court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction directed against the
issuance by Judge Esther Nobles Dans of the abovesaid
Orders dated 20 August 1990, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 22944, where the
resolution rendered on 28 February 1991 is now the
subject of this appeal.
As aforesaid, the respondent Court of Appeals
denied due course to the petition and dismissed the same.
The respondent court likewise reiterated the rulings in
AC-G.R. CV No. 01089 and CA-G.R. SP No. 17938 to the
effect that the deed of sale between the deceased
Valentina Salazar and Brigida Julian was absolute and the
transfer of ownership unto the deceased Salazar was not
conditioned upon full payment of the purchase price.
Petitioner interposed the present appeal on the
main contention that respondent court erred in ruling that
once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution because
such ruling admits of an exception.
Held: Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and
which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does
not give rise to a cause of action. The complainant's right
or title, moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for
equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of suits to
establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by
injunction where the complainant's title or right is
doubtful or disputed. The possibility of irreparable
damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing
right, is no ground for an injunction, being mere damnum
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absque injuria. Injunction will not lie to defeat execution
of final judgment so as to take property out of successful
party’s possession.
Which court may issue writ
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction; –
A preliminary injunction may be granted by the court
where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action
or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in
the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or
any member thereof.
Territorial jurisdiction to issue writ
Decano v. Edu (1980)
Facts: On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary
of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico
Decano, herein petitioner-appellee, a temporary
appointment to the position of janitor in the Motor
Vehicles Office, Dagupan City Agency, with
compensation at the rate of P1,440.00 per annum. The
appointment having been approved by the Commissioner
of Civil Service, the said appointee assumed office on
September 10, 1962 and he served therein for almost
four years, or until April 29, 1966 when herein
respondent-appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting
Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan
City, received a telegram from respondent-appellant
Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting
Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC),
terminating his (Decano's) services effective as of the
close of business on that day.
Shortly thereafter, the aggrieved petitioner-
appellee filed before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction"
claiming that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted
without power and in excess of authority in removing him
from the service, and therefore praying of the court to
declare as null and void the order for his removal, to
declare him entitled to the position, to compel his
reinstatement and payment of his regular salary, and to
enjoin, preliminary, and then permanently, respondents
from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting him from
his position as janitor.
As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by the trial court at the commencement of the
proceedings commanding respondents "to desist and
refrain from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting
the petitioner from his position as janitor in the Land
Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to
pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date
of notice of said preliminary injunction, until further
orders from the Court."
After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu
that petitioner's appointment as janitor was temporary
and therefore the latter could be ousted from his position
at any time with or without cause, the lower court
nevertheless declared in its judgment of October 29, 1968
that petitioner's removal was null and void upon the
ground that under the law, respondent Commissioner of
Land Transportation was not the appointing authority
insofar as the position of petitioner and another minor
positions in his office were concerned; and thus lacking
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the power of appointment, said respondent had neither
the power of removal.
Held: In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision,
respondents make capital of the fact that the petition for
mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office
in Quezon City which, they claim, is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the said court. Respondents cite the long
line of cases from the 1960 case of Acosta vs. Alvendia
where this Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of the Judiciary
Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and/or section 2 of Rule 58, ruled that a
court of first instance has no jurisdiction to require or
control the execution of an act committed beyond the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. These cases invariably
involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control
the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent courts of first instance
where said petitions had been filed. The Acosta ruling of
non-jurisdiction does not apply, however, to the facts and
circumstances at bar.
Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment
of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu,
mandamus and injunction being then merely coronary
remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to
be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by
preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the
termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the
order of dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it
was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his
subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the
LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as
respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the
services of respondent was a fait accompli and this he had
done without authority, as earlier discussed. The
injunction is question, consequently, must be taken only
to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's order
by his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan
City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial court's
jurisdictional district.
Thus, in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, et al., 9 in which the
acts sought to be controlled by "Injunction with
Preliminary Injunction" were relative to the establishment
of a local telephone system being done within the
territorial boundaries of the judicial district of the Court of
First Instance of Roxas, the Court similarly upheld the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Roxas over
the petition, although two of the respondents named
therein the Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications,
and the Regional Superintendent of Region IV of the
Bureau of Telecommunications — had their official
stations at Manila and Iloilo City, respectively.
As in the above-cited case of Aligaen, the
national official stationed at Quezon City, namely,
respondent Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as
respondent in the Pangasinan court for a complete
determination of the issues involved, the legality of Edu's
order of dismissal being the pivotal issue to determine the
merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the
petition. In other words, Mr. Edu was joined as
respondent not for injunction purposes but mainly for
testing the legality of his dismissal order and his
transmittal thereof to his correspondent registrar at
Dagupan City to implement the same and terminate the
services of the petitioner in Dagupan City.
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Grounds for issuance
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 3. A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a)That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act
or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of
an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c)That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual
Australian Professional Realty v. Municipality of
Padre Garcia, Batangas (2012)
FACTS: A Memorandum of Agreement was executed
between APRI and respondent for the construction of a
shopping complex. Respondent initiated a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with
Damages before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring the MOA null and
void and forfeiting the structures found within the
unfinished Padre Garcia Shopping Center. After learning
of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, which was denied by the RTC.
Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition. Petitioners likewise filed before the CA a
Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion
for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied said motion.
Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari, claiming that the amount of APRI’s investment
in the Padre Garcia Shopping Center is estimated at
₱30,000,000, the entirety of which the RTC declared
forfeited to respondent without just compensation.
ISSUE: Is the loss of ₱30,000,000 considered irreparable
for an injunctive relief to issue?
HELD: No.
A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency
that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise
unless it is issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rule of Court, a TRO may be issued only if it
appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would
be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary
injunction could be heard.
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy. In this case, petitioners have alleged that the
loss of the public market entails costs of about
₱30,000,000 in investments, ₱100,000 monthly revenue
in rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified – but not
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unquantifiable – in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of
APRI’s employees and potential suits that may be filed by
the leaseholders of the public market for breach of
contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are
capable of pecuniary estimation. Any loss petitioners may
suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and,
if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted.
Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi-
Resources, Inc. (2003)
FACTS: Respondent, a corporation engaged in the
importation of used motor vehicles sued the government
in the RTC to declare invalid EO 156, which imposes a
partial ban on the importation of used motor vehicles.
Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin,
litis pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156. Acting on
respondents application for preliminary injunctive
remedy, the trial court granted relief, initially by issuing
a temporary restraining order followed by a writ of
preliminary injunction. On petitioners motion, however,
the trial court reconsidered its Order and lifted the
injunctive writ. Respondent elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals in a certiorari petition. The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari. The appellate court held that the
implementation of EO 156 "would put petitioner in a
financial crisis."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
granting preliminary injunctive relief to respondent to
enjoin enforcement of EO 156?
HELD: Yes.
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law
that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues
only upon a showing of the applicants "clear legal right"
being violated or under threat of violation by the
defendant. "Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule
58, contemplates a right "clearly founded in or granted by
law." Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal
right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.
For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with
the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for
preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such
laws or issuances.
In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals
dwelt on the "grave and irremediable" financial losses
respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156s
enforcement, finding such prejudice "inequitable." No
doubt, by importing used motor vehicles in contravention
of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining
losses. Such risk, however, was self-imposed. Having
miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to
courts for injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses
which are in the nature of damnum absque injuria.
Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a
litigant will sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal
right entitling the litigant to protection.
Acts consummated may not be enjoined
Versoza v. Court of Appeals (1998)
Facts: Private respondent Uson was the owner of a parcel
of land which she mortgaged to Versoza. She failed to pay
the loan, thus, Versoza caused the foreclosure of the land.
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To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from
proceeding with the foreclosure sale, and while she was
still in possession of the subject land, Uson filed with the
RTC a complaint against Verzosa and the Provincial
Sheriff for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (the
“Complaint”). This was dismissed for not having been
verified by Uson. On motion for reconsideration, she was
allowed to file an amended complaint, to include the
required verification (the “Amended Complaint”).
Meanwhile, during the period between the dismissal of the
Complaint and the filing of the Amended Complaint,
Versoza proceeded with the foreclosure, and the land was
sold to the highest bidder. After the foreclosure sale was
completed, and the title to the property transferred to
Martinez, the court granted Uson’s prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and directed Versoza to
cease and desist from entering, making constructions and
performing any act of possession or ownership over the
land.
Versoza argued that the status quo ante which
the writ of preliminary injunction must refer to was the
sale of the land to Martinez. Versoza argued that the relief
of preliminary injunction cannot apply to consummated
acts.
Issue: From what point should a status quo ante be
reckoned if the original complaint was amended to include
the proper verification of the complainant?
Held: The status quo ante refers to situation when the
Complaint was filed. The status quo is the last actual
peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy, and its preservation is the office of an
injunctive writ. In this case, Uson although the Complaint
was subsequently amended, the controversy began when
the first Complaint was filed. Further, the amendment did
not include a new or different cause of action or demand
so as to consider the Complaint entirely superseded.
As to the issue of supposedly enjoining a
consummated act, the same is without merit. Uson was
still the owner and was in possession of the property at
the time the Complaint was filed. The rule is that a court
should not by means of preliminary injunction transfer the
property in litigation from the possession of one party to
another where the legal title is in
dispute and the party having possession asserts owners
hip thereto. When private respondent filed the original
Complaint, she had title to and possession of the property
and was asserting ownership thereto.
Where the acts have been performed prior to
the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that
consummated acts can no longer be restrained by
injunction. However, where the acts are performed after
the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as a
matter of right proceed to perform the acts sought to be
restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the
injunction will not lie because he has performed these
acts before final hearing has been had, but after the
beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his
peril. It has been held that the general rule of law is
that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning
of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and
before the issue of any final order or decree,
the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a
mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former
condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an
advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where a
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defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he
proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action
is pending may compel a restoration of the former status
or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper.
When injunction is improper
Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals (1994)
Facts: Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. (SCLC), obtained a
loan from private respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, SCLC
mortgaged some of its properties, among which was a
vessel, MV Sta. Clara I. Upon SCLC's failure to pay the
loan, the mortgage was foreclosed. On 18 August 1982,
the Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff Ex-Officio of
Sultan Kudarat conducted an auction sale and sold the
vessel to DBP. He thereafter issued a certificate of sale
dated 18 August 1982 in favor of DBP. However, DBP did
not register with the Philippine Coast Guard the
mortgage; neither the foreclosure nor the auction sale.
In 1986, the MV Sta. Clara I was again
subjected to foreclosure by petitioner to satisfy a
judgment against SCLC.
Upon being informed of the execution sale to
petitioner, DBP filed a complaint for annulment of the
execution sale, recovery of possession, damages and
attorney's fees with prayer for restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction, cause of action
and/or legal personality to sue on the part of DBP. The
court denied the motion to dismiss but granted DBP's
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the denial but said motion
was likewise denied.
In 1987, the trial court issued a decision which,
among other matters, declared that DBP was the lawful
owner of MV Sta. Clara I and that the public auction sale
conducted and the resultant certificate of sale in favor of
petitioner were null and void.
In questioning the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the court in favor of DBP,
petitioner vigorously maintains that the failure of DBP to
register its title to MV Sta. Clara I with the Philippine
Coast Guard is fatal to its claim of ownership. Petitioner
also assails the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the
writ.
Issue: Whether DBP’s failure to register its title over the
vessel is fatal to its claim for ownership, such that it
cannot avail of the relief of preliminary injunction
Held: No. Petitioner’s contention was already denied by
the Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. No. 78383, where it
held in part that: “A certificate of registration of
ownership of a vessel is only presumptive evidence that
the registered owner has a legal title to the vessel. DBP's
failure to register with the Philippine Coast Guard its prior
acquisition of the vessel is not fatal to its ownership of
said vessel, vis-a-vis petitioner herein, who similarly
failed to register the alleged subsequent sale of the vessel
to himself in an execution sale.”
The general rule that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of
another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies
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only when no third-party claimant is involved. When
a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim
over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate
his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court
which may stop the execution of the judgment on
property not belonging to the judgment debtor.
Spouses Laus v. Optimum Security Services (2016)
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
application for a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction against respondent, alleging that
on three (3) separate occasions, they were prevented by
armed security guards working for respondent from
entering the eight (8) parcels of land in Mabalacat,
Pampanga belonging to them. Thus, petitioners prayed
that, among others, a TRO and WPI be issued directing
the respondent and the other defendants to refrain from
interfering with the exercise of their rights as owners of
the subject properties. Opposing petitioners' application
for TRO and WPI, respondent and Marivalles countered
that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and WPI
prayed for because they do not own the subject
properties.
The RTC granted the application for WPI. On appeal, the
CA reversed the RTC ruling and thereby, lifted the WPI.
In so ruling, the CA observed, inter alia, that the WPI was
intended to oust respondent and the other defendants
from the subject properties, which, under prevailing
jurisprudence, is not allowed where the claimant's title
has not been clearly established by law, as in this case
where petitioners' titles are under contest and they have
failed to establish their prior possession of the subject
properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the an injunctive relief may lie in
favor of the applicant whose right to a property is not
clearly established by law
HELD: No.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that right must be
shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued
only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action.
When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.
Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy
to take property out of the possession and control of one
party and to deliver the same to the other party where
such right is being disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary
injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last
actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.
Laws prohibiting injunction
• P.D. No. 385 - Requiring Government Financial
Institutions to Foreclose Mandatorily All Loans qith
Arrearages, Including Interest and Charges Amounting to
at least Twenty (20%) Percent of the Total Outstanding
Obligation (31 January 1974)
o Section 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent
injunction shall be issued by the court against any
government financial institution in any action taken by
such institution in compliance with the mandatory
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foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof, whether such
restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is
sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties,
except after due hearing in which it is established by the
borrower and admitted by the government financial
institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the
outstanding arrearages has been paid after the filing of
foreclosure proceedings.
In case a restraining order or injunction is
issued, the borrower shall nevertheless be legally
obligated to liquidate the remaining balance of the
arrearages outstanding as of the time of foreclosure, plus
• R.A. No. 8975 - An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
interest and other charges, on every succeeding thirtieth
(30th) day after the issuance of such restraining order or
injunction until the entire arrearages have been
liquidated. These shall be in addition to the payment of
amortization currently maturing. The restraining order or
injunction shall automatically be dissolved should the
borrower fail to make any of the above-mentioned
payments on due dates, and no restraining order or
injunction shall be issued thereafter. This shall be without
o Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary
prejudice to the exercise by the government financial
institutions of such rights and/or remedies available to
them under their respective charters and their respective
contracts with their debtors, nor should this provision be
construed as restricting the government financial
institutions concerned from approving, solely at its own
discretion, any restructuring, recapitalization, or any
other arrangement that would place the entire account on
a current basis, provided, however, that at least twenty
percent (20%) of the arrearages outstanding at the time
of the foreclosure is paid.
All restraining orders and injunctions existing as
of the date of this Decree on foreclosure proceedings filed
by said government financial institutions shall be
considered lifted unless finally resolved by the court
within sixty (60) days from date hereof.
• P.D. No. 605 - Banning the Issuance by Courts of
Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Concessions,
Licenses, and Other Permits Issued by Public
Administrative Officials or Bodies for the Exploitation of
Natural Resources (12 December 1974)
o Section 1. No court of the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or
disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body
on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public
grants of any kind in connection with the disposition,
exploitation, utilization, exploration, and/or development
of the natural resources of the Philippines.
• P.D. No. 1818 - Prohibiting Courts from Issuing
Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases
Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource
Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by,
the Government (16 January 1981)
o Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
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project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural
resource development project of the government, or any
public utility operated by the government, including
among others public utilities for the transport of the goods
or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental
official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution
or implementation of any such project, or the operation
of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.
Implementation and Completion of Government
Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from
Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions,
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other
Purposes. (7 November 2000)
Restraining Orders, Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions.
– No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any
person or entity, whether public or private acting under
the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel
the following acts:
a. Acquisition, clearance and development of the
right-of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
b. Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the
national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
c. Commencement prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or
project;
d. Termination or rescission of any such
contract/project; and
e. The undertaking or authorization of any other
lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or
controversies instituted by a private party, including but
not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such
contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the
matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed
by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the
government if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
In after due hearing the court finds that the award of
the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate
under the circumstances, award the contract to the
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qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the
same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty
party may incur under existing laws.
o Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. – Any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3
hereof is void and of no force and effect.
Exception to prohibition under P.D. No. 1818
Hernandez v. National Power Corporation (2006)
Facts: Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the
construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers
with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables. Said transmission line passes through the
Sergio Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the
perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmariñas Village
proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’ homes
are.
On 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint for Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects of exposure
to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to
themselves and their families, petitioners prayed for
damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to
Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order and later, extended its
effectivity. Subsequently, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued.
Citing P.D. No. 1818, NAPOCOR filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the above order by the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may issue a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to
enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-
shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR,
notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818
Held: Yes. While its sole provision would appear to
encompass all cases involving the implementation of
projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not
absolute as there are actually instances when Presidential
Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of
cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion
in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this
dimension and involving questions of law, this Court
declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.
In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims
to avert is the untimely frustration of government
infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional
remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by
disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or
frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.
Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to
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be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the
fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a
community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
land.
Verified application and bond
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 4. Verified application and bond for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. -
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when:
(a)The application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court the applicant files
with the court where the action or proceeding is pending,
a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay to such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.
(c)When an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in
a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed
in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice
to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person
to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be
preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service of summons, together with a copy of the
complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's
affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the
Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
(d)The application for a temporary restraining order
shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted
within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff's return
of service and/or the records are received by the branch
selected by raffle and to which the records shall be
transmitted immediately.
Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; exception
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; exception. - No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the
court to which the application for preliminary injunction
was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined,
except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to
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show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the
same period whether or not the preliminary injunction
shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the
preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala
court or the presiding judge of a single sala court may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective
for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he
shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining
order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the
total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining
order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary
injunction is denied or not resolved within the said
period, the temporary restraining order is deemed,
automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is not extendible without need of any
judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have
authority to extend or renew the same on the same
ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a
member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall
be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party
or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining, order
issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall
be effective until further orders.
Distinction between RTC, CA and SC TROs
Federation of Land Reform Farmers of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals (1995)
Facts: Private respondent Torres was ordered by then
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to vacate a
parcel of land located in Antipolo, Rizal. He refused to
leave the premises, claiming that he had been in actual
possession thereof for more than 30 years. Thus, his case
was referred to the Secretary of Justice, who ruled that
Torres failed to show proof that the land was validly
transferred to him, and thus, he could be ejected
therefrom as a squatter and be prosecuted for unlawful
occupation of forest lands under Section 69 of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines.
On the strength of said opinion, the DENR
formally demanded that private respondent vacate the
land. Again, he refused to heed the demand. Instead, he
filed a complaint for injunction before the RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal to enjoin the DENR from ejecting him, wherein he
alleged that he had a pending application for registration
of title of the property. On 8 August 1988, the court
issued a temporary restraining order, directing the parties
to maintain the status quo and enjoining the DENR from
ejecting Torres. On 23 August 1988, upon the agreement
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of the parties, the trial court ordered that the status quo
be maintained and created a committee, composed of
representatives of the court, the DENR and private
respondent, to conduct a survey and ocular inspection for
the purpose of pinpointing the areas allegedly titled in
private respondent’s name
Meanwhile, petitioner Federation of Land
Reform Farmers of the Phils. (“FLRP”) filed a motion for
intervention, on the ground that it had entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with DENR for the lease of
the subject parcel of land. The court denied FLRP’s
motion. Subsequently, FLRP filed a motion to declare
without force and effect the 23 August 1988 Order of the
court arguing that said order had long become functus
officio because under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised
Rules of Court a temporary restraining order has a
lifespan of only 20 days and that by its failure to decide
whether to grant the writ of preliminary injunction within
said period, the trial court could no longer grant the said
writ.
Issue: Whether the trial court could extend the
temporary restraining order beyond the 20-day period.
Held: Counted from 8 August 1988, the temporary
restraining order automatically expired on 28 August
1988, the end of the twentieth day from its issuance.
Thus, when the trial court issued the Order of 23 August
1988 directing the maintenance of the status quo upon
agreement of the parties, the temporary restraining order
was still in full force and effect.
Ordinarily, the efficacy of a temporary
restraining order is non-extendible and the courts have
no discretion to extend the same considering the
mandatory tenor of the Rule. However, there is no reason
to prevent a court from extending the 20-day period when
the parties themselves ask for such extension or for the
maintenance of the status quo.
The questioned order of 23 August 1988 was
necessary for an orderly resolution of the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction. It states: "Upon
agreement of parties, the status quo is hereby
maintained. As further agreed by the parties in
connection with the verification, relocation or ocular
inspection the Court hereby appoints a Committee which
is composed of the Court Interpreter and Legal
Researcher representing the Court, Geodetic Engineer
Romulo Unciano representing the defendants and Junco
Surveying Office representing the plaintiffs and the
parties are directed to be present in the premises starting
August 29, 1988 at 1:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon and
every afternoon until it is finished.”
Said Survey and ocular inspection is for the
purpose of pinpointing the area allegedly titled in the
name of Torres, the area of Marikina Watershed
Reservation, the disposable and alienable area not yet
titled in favor of any other person and the area for the
townsite reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 1283
now being claimed by the Federation of Land Reform
Farmers and earmarked by the government for them."
Clearly then, this Order was issued to maintain the status
quo while the committee ascertained facts necessary in
resolving whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction
should be issued. By issuing said Order, the trial court
should be deemed as merely exercising its inherent power
under Section 5(b), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of
Court "to enforce order in proceedings before it" in the
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absence of any showing that it has gravely abused its
discretion in so doing.
Dissolution of injunction or TRO
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of
dissolution of, injunction or restraining order. – The
application for injunction or restraining order may be
denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency. The
injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if
granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon
affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which
may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits.
It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be
dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the
applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining
order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case
may be, would cause irreparable damage to the
party or person enjoined while the applicant can
be fully compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount
fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the
denial or the dissolution of the injunction or
restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too
great, it may be modified.
Counterbond – person enjoined will pay all damages
which applicant may suffer by the denial or dissolution of
the injunction or restraining order.
Judgment to include damages against party and
sureties
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 8. Judgment to include damages against
party and sureties. – At the trial, the amount of damages
to be awarded to either party, upon the bond of the
adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and
awarded under the same procedure prescribed in section
20 of Rule 57.
N.B. Same procedure as in Sec. 20, Rule 57
When final injunction granted
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 9. When final injunction granted. – If after
the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is
entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final
injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act
or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Rule 59
Receivership
Receiver defined
Pilar M. Normandy v. Calixto Duque, et. Al (1969)
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Facts: Ramon E. Saura appointed receiver of the World
War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (“WARVETS”). During
his term, he went to Japan by authority of the lower
court's order for the purpose of checking on the reported
undervaluation of goods shipped to the WARVETS and of
preparing the shipment of the goods which had not yet
been committed.
When Saura resigned from his post as receiver,
he prayed that the lower court accept it and at the same
time fix the amount of his fees and compensation as
receiver. Thereafter, he was discharged as receiver and
his compensation was fixed at P10,000.00. Subsequently,
one Atty. Anacleto Magno, on his own behalf, presented
before the lower court a motion for the payment of
attorney's fees to him in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
alleged services as legal counsel for Saura when he was
still a receiver. Saura, himself, filed another motion for
the payment and cancellation of his receiver's bond and
for the reimbursement to him as premium for said bond
which he paid out of his personal funds The court granted
both motions. Saura filed another motion for
reimbursement, this time for the amount he allegedly
paid as compensation of a clerk whom he employed when
he was still a receiver.
Issue: Whether or not he is not entitled to
reimbursement of the salaries paid by him to his clerk as
receiver of the WARVETS.
Held: No. He is now estopped from claiming any further
amount as compensation for alleged clerical services
employed by him as such receiver without prior approval
or authority of this Court." The employment of a clerk was
made without prior leave of court.
A receiver is a representative of the court
appointed for the purpose of preserving and
conserving the property in litigation and prevent its
possible destruction or dissipation if it were left in
the possession of any of the parties. The receiver is
not the representative of any of the parties but of all of
them to the end that their interests may be equally
protected with the least possible inconvenience and
expense. It is inherent in the office of a receiver not only
that he should act at all times with the diligence and
prudence of a good father of a family but should also not
incur any obligation or expenditure without leave of the
court and it is the responsibility of the court to supervise
the receiver and see to it that he adheres to the above
standard of his trust and limits the expenses of the
receivership to the minimum. For these reasons, it is
generally the receivership court that is in a better position
to determine whether a particular expenditure is
reasonable and satisfied or not and its ruling thereon may
not be disturbed by this Court.
Appointment of receiver
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Section 1. Appointment of Receiver. – Upon a verified
application, one or more receivers of the property
subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by
the court where the action is pending, or by the Court of
Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof,
in the following cases:
(1) When it appears from the verified application and
other proof that the applicant has an interest in the
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property or fund which is the subject of the action or
proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a
receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
(2) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for
the foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in
danger of being wasted or dissipated or materially
injured, and that its value is probably insufficient to
discharge the mortgage debt, or that the parties have so
stipulated in the contract of mortgage;
(3) After judgment, to preserve the property during
the pendency of an appeal, or to dispose of it according
to the judgment, or to aid execution when the
execution has been returned unsatisfied or the
judgment obligor refuses to apply his property in
satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to carry the
judgment into effect;
(4) Whenever in other cases it appears that the
appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving, administering, or
disposing of the property in litigation.
Receivership other than that under Rule 58
1. Receivership in aid of execution of judgment under
Rule 39, Sec. 1
2. Bank receivership
3. Receivership in petitions for insolvency under
the Insolvency Law
Notice and hearing required
• incumbent upon applicant to present evidence to
establish condition precedent that property is in
danger of being lost.
• removed or materially injured unless a receiver
is appointed to guard and preserve it
Oath and bond of receiver (Secs. 2,4)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Section 2. Bond on appointment of receiver. —
Before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court
shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the
party against whom the application is presented, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay such party all damages he may sustain
by reason of the appointment of such receiver in case
the applicant shall have procured such appointment
without sufficient cause; and the court may, in its
discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an
additional bond as further security for such damages.
Section 4. Oath and bond of receiver. — Before
entering upon his duties, the receiver shall be sworn to
perform them faithfully, and shall file a bond, executed
to such person and in such sum as the court may direct,
to the effect that he will faithfully discharge his duties in
the action or proceeding and obey the orders of the court
Denial of application or discharge of receiver
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Section 3. Denial of application or discharge of
receiver. — The application may be denied, or the
receiver discharged, when the adverse party files a bond
executed to the applicant, in an amount to be fixed by
the court, to the effect that such party will pay the
applicant all damages he may suffer by reason of the
acts, omissions, or other matters specified in the
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application as ground for such appointment. The
receiver may also be discharged if it is shown that his
appointment was obtained without sufficient cause.
1. Upon motion and prior notice, receivership may be
discharged if it shown that his appointment was
obtained without sufficient cause;
2. Adverse party files a counterbond – will pay applicant
all damages he may suffer by reason of acts,
omissions, or other matters specified in the
application as ground for such appointment.
(Compare to counter-bond in injunction).
General powers of receiver
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Section 6. General powers of receiver. — Subject to
the control of the court in which the action or proceeding
is pending a receiver shall have the power to bring and
defend, in such capacity, actions in his own name; to
take and keep possession of the property in controversy;
to receive rents; to collect debts due to himself as
receiver or to the fund, property, estate, person, or
corporation of which he is the receiver; to compound for
and compromise the same; to make transfers; to pay
outstanding debts; to divide the money and other
property that shall remain among the persons legally
entitled to receive the same; and generally to do such
acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.
However, funds in the hands of a receiver may be
invested only by order of the court upon the written
consent of all the parties to the action.
No action may be filed by or against a receiver without
leave of the court which appointed him.
Judgment to include recovery against sureties (Sec.
9)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Section 9. Judgment to include recovery against
sureties. — The amount, if any, to be awarded to any
party upon any bond filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained,
and granted under the same procedure prescribed in
section 20 of Rule 57.
• Same procedure as in Rule 57, Sec. 20
See Rule 58, Sec. 8:
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 8. Judgment to include damages against
party and sureties. — At the trial, the amount of
damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond
of the adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and
awarded under the same procedure prescribed in section
20 of Rule 57.
Rule 60
Replevin
Replevin defined
BA FINANCE CORP. v. CA (1996)
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Facts: Spouses Manahan executed a promissory note
binding themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc. P83,080.00
in 36 monthly installments. To secure the payment,
spouses Manahan executed a deed of chattel mortgage
over a motor vehicle, Ford Cortina. Carmasters, Inc. later
assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to BA
Finance with the conformity of spouses Manahan.
BA Finance filed a complaint for replevin with alternative
prayer for the payment of sum of money because of the
failure of spouses Manahan to heed the demands of BA
Finance. It also paid a bond which caused the issuance of
the writ of replevin. The service of summons addressed
to spouses Manahan had the name and signature of Reyes
indicating he received a copy of the summons and the
complaint. BA Finance issued a certification that they
have received from the sheriff the vehicle seized from
Reyes.
BA Finance filed a notice of dismissal and the
withdrawal of the replevin bond. The RTC noted the
dismissal and denied the motion to withdraw the replevin
bond considering that it has been implemented.
Upon motion, RTC set aside the dismissal of the case and
ordered the service of summons on the Spouses Manahan
but were subsequently declared in default.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Reyes is merely an ancillary debtor and the spouses
Manahan, being the principal debtors, then BA Finance
has no cause of action against them.
In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, BA Finance
asserted that a suit for replevin aimed at the foreclosure
of the chattel is an action quasi in rem which does not
necessitate the presence of the principal obligors as long
as the court does not render any personal judgment
against them.
Issue: Whether or not the presence of spouses Manahan
is a requisite for replevin to prosper
Held: No. Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of
principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer
either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of
personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the
plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that
would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the
pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The
action is primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right
possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed
action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in
rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is
concerned, and in personam as regards to damages
involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin
action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of
specific personal property by reason of his being the
owner or of his having a special interest therein.
Consequently, the person in possession of the property
sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only
necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not
required to so join as defendants other persons claiming
a right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule
60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the
immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff
must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title
thereto, for seeking such interim possession.
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Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the
specific property is so conceded or evident, the action
need only be maintained against him who so possesses
the property.
Nature
Rivera v. Vargas (2009)
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
and several John Does before the RTC, for the recovery
of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya,
Quezon. In his complaint and affidavit, Vargas claims
ownership of the said equipment. The equipment was
allegedly entrusted to petitioner’s husband, Jan T. Rivera,
who died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of
respondent’s construction aggregates business. The
complaint was accompanied by a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond. Summons
was served upon petitioner. However, the writ of replevin
was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo,
the security guard on duty in petitioner’s crushing plant
in Sariaya, Quezon, contrary to the sheriff’s return stating
that the writ was served upon Rivera.
ISSUE: May the writ of replevin be served upon any
person other that the adverse party?
HELD: No.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin
in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon
receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of
the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse
party (petitioner, in this case) together with the
application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond.
If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was
instead merely handed to a person who is neither an
agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to
receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof
is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of
the statutory and constitutional requirements. The
service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served
without the required documents. Under these
circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the
property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both
unlawful and unconstitutional.
The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ
or order of replevin comply with all the requirements as
to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of
Court. The writ must also satisfy proper service in order
of
to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the
officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be
served upon the person who not only has the possession
or custody of the property involved but who is also a party
or agent of a party to the action.
Advent Capital And Finance Corporation V. Roland
Young (2011)
FACTS: Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142
(rehabilitation court). The rehabilitation court approved
the rehabilitation plan submitted by Advent. Included in
the inventory of Advent’s assets was a 1996 Mercedes
Benz E230 with plate number UMN-168, which remained
in Young’s possession at the time.
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Because Young refused to return the subject car, despite
repeated demands, Advent filed a replevin case against
him. The trial court issued an Order dismissing the
replevin case without prejudice for Advent’s failure to
prosecute. Upon appeal, however, the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Young and annulled the assailed rulings
of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in (1) directing the return of the seized
car to Young; and (2) ordering the trial court to set a
hearing for the determination of damages against the
replevin bond.
HELD: The petition is partially meritorious.
(1) On returning the seized vehicle to Young, the
Court of Appeals is correct in directing the trial court to
return the seized car to Young since this is the necessary
, consequence of the dismissal of the replevin case for
failure to prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal
of the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the writ of
seizure, which is merely ancillary in nature, became
functus officio and should have been lifted. There was no
adjudication on the merits, which means that there was
no determination of the issue who has the better right to
possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain
possession of the subject car considering that it was not
adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy
of replevin.
(2) On the damages against the replevin bond,
Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court19 governs
claims for damages on account of improper or irregular
seizure in replevin cases. It provides that in replevin
cases, as in receivership and injunction cases, the
damages to be awarded upon the bond "shall be claimed,
ascertained, and granted" in accordance with Section 20
of Rule 57.
The above provision essentially allows the application to
be filed at any time before the judgment becomes
executory. It should be filed in the same case that is the
main action, and with the court having jurisdiction over
the case at the time of the application. In this case, there
was no application for damages against Stronghold
resulting from the issuance of the writ of seizure before
the finality of the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
prosecute. Thus, Young is barred from claiming damages
against the replevin bond.
Application
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 1. Application. — A party praying for the
recovery of possession of personal property may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time before
answer, apply for an order for the delivery of such
property to him, in the manner hereinafter provided.
Affidavit and bond
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
who personally knows the facts:
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(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property
claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the
adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken
for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized,
that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the
adverse party in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of
the property to the adverse party if such return be
adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of
such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the
action
Foreclosure of chattel mortgage
Northern Motors, Inc. v. Herrera (1973)
Facts: Manila Yellow Taxicab purchased from Northern
Motors 200 Holden Torana Cars and executed chattel
mortgages on the case in favor of the latter. The
mortgages were then assigned to Filinvest Credit Co.
Tropical obtained a judgment against Manila
Yellow Taxicab and part of the judgment was assigned to
Ong. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on 20
taxicabs. 8 of which were mortgaged to Northern Motors
and 12 to Filinvest Credit Co. Northern and Filinvest filed
third-party claims with the sheriff but the taxicabs were
still sold. 35 more taxicabs were sold at auction which
were also mortgaged to Northern and Filinvest. The RTC
ruled that the chattel mortgagee were not entitled to the
possession of the taxiabs by the mere fact of the
execution of the mortgage and that the mortgage lien
followed the chattel whoever might be its actual
possessor.
Issue: whether or not Northern Motor’s chattel mortgage
lien over the taxicabs, which were levied upon by the
mortgagor's unsecured judgment creditor, Tropical
Commercial, could be asserted in the same case where
the judgment was rendered
Held: Yes. We hold, under the facts of this case, that
Northern Motors, Inc., as chattel mortgagee and unpaid
vendor, should not be required to vindicate in a separate
action its claims for the seven mortgaged taxicabs and for
the proceeds of the execution sale of the other eight
mortgaged taxicabs.
Inasmuch as the condition of the chattel
mortgages had already been broken and Northern Motors,
Inc. had in fact instituted an action for replevin so that it
could take possession of the mortgaged taxicabs (Civil
Case No. 20536, Rizal CFI), it has a superior, preferential
and paramount right to have possession of the mortgaged
taxicabs and to claim the proceeds of the execution sale
(See Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Summers, 42 Phil. 3;,
Northern Motors, Inc. vs. Herrera, L-32674, February 22,
1973, 49 SCRA 392)
Respondent sheriff wrongfully levied upon the
mortgaged taxicabs and erroneously took possession of
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them. He could have levied only upon the right or equity
of redemption pertaining to the Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co., Inc . as chattel mortgagor and judgment debtor,
because that was the only leviable or attachable property
right of the company in the mortgaged taxicabs
Replevin does not issue against property in
custodia legis
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 3. Order. — Upon the filing of such affidavit
and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order
and the corresponding writ of replevin, describing the
personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and
requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into
his custody.
Where writ may be served (anywhere in the Phils.) Is
hearing required? (Compare to preliminary attachment
and preliminary injunction)
N.B. Unlike in attachment and injunction which is
usually issued only after hearing, with certain exceptions,
order for delivery of personal property as a provisional
remedy is issued ex parte and, given the requisites for its
issuance, is granted as a matter of course.
Return of property
* Counterbond – double the value of the property, for
delivery thereof to the applicant, if such be adjudged, and
for payment of such sum as may be recovered against the
adverse party
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 5. Return of property. — If the adverse party
objects to the sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of
the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately
require the return of the property, but if he does not so
object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the
property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by
filing with the court where the action is pending a bond
executed to the applicant, in double the value of the
property as stated in the applicant's affidavit for the
delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be
adjudged, and for the payment of such sum, to him as
may be recovered against the adverse party, and by
serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.
Disposition of property by sheriff
- property seized not to be delivered immediately to
plaintiff but must retain it in custody for 5 days and
shall return it to the defendant if the latter files a
counterbond and requires its return
- counterbond must be filed within 5 days from taking
of property; period mandatory, so that a lower court
which approves a counterbond filed beyond the
period acts in excess of jurisdiction
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. — If
within five (5) days after the taking of the property by
the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the
sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court
affirms its approval of the applicant's bond or approves
a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return
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of the property but his bond is objected to and found
insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved
bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If
for any reason the property is not delivered to the
applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
Third party claim
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 7. Proceedings where property claimed by
third person. — If the property taken is claimed by any
person other than the party against whom the writ of
replevin had been issued or his agent, and such person
makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and
serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has
possession of the property and a copy thereof upon the
applicant, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the
property under replevin or deliver it to the applicant
unless the applicant or his agent, on demand of said
sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than
the value of the property under replevin as provided in
section 2 hereof. In case of disagreement as to such
value, the court shall determine the same. No claim for
damages for the taking or keeping, of the property may
be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor
is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the
taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-
party claimant if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property, or
prevent the applicant from claiming damages against a
third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly
representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as
a result of the replevin, he shall be represented by the
Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated
for the purpose.
See Rule 39, Sec. 16;
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 39
Section 16. Proceedings where property claimed by
third person. — If the property levied on is claimed by
any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of
such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer
making the levy and copy thereof, stating the grounds
of such right or tittle, and a serves the same upon the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the
judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep
the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand
of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to
indemnity the third-party claimant in a sum not less than
the value of the property levied on. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
determined by the court issuing the writ of execution.
No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the
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property may be enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the
taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained
shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action,
or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages
in the same or a separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly
representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued
for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be
represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall
be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as
may be appropriated for the purpose.
Rule 57, Sec. 14
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 57
Section 14. Proceedings where property claimed by
third person. — If the property attached is claimed by
any person other than the party against whom
attachment had been issued or his agent, and such
person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to
the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right
or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while
the latter has possession of the attached property, and
a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff shall
not be bound to keep the property under attachment,
unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of
the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than
the value of the property levied upon. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment. No
claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property may be enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the
taking or keeping of such property to any such third-
party claimant, if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property, or
prevent the attaching party from claiming damages
against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly
representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as
a result of the attachment, he shall be represented by
the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the
actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by
the National Treasurer out of the funds to be
appropriated for the purpose.
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Judgment to include recovery against sureties (Sec.
10)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Section 10. Judgment to include recovery against
sureties. — The amount, if any, to be awarded to any
party upon any bond filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained,
and granted under the same procedure as prescribed in
section 20 of Rule 57.
Same procedure as in Rule 57, Sec. 20
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 57
Section 20. Claim for damages on account of
improper, irregular or excessive attachment. — An
application for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before
the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the
judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties setting forth
the facts showing his right to damages and the amount
thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after
proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on
the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to
the party against whom the attachment was issued he
must claim damages sustained during the pendency of
the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court,
with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment
was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment
of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate
court may allow the application to be heard and decided
by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party
against whom the attachment was issued from
recovering in the same action the damages awarded to
him from any property of the attaching party not exempt
from execution should the bond or deposit given by the
latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.
See Rule 58, Sec. 8;
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 58
Section 8. Judgment to include damages against
party and sureties. — At the trial, the amount of
damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond
of the adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and
awarded under the same procedure prescribed in section
20 of Rule 57.
Rule 59, Sec. 9
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Section 9. Judgment to include recovery against
sureties. — The amount, if any, to be awarded to any
party upon any bond filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained,
and granted under the same procedure prescribed in
section 20 of Rule 57.
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Rule 61
Support Pendente Lite
Support during pendency of action for support
• “Pendente lite” – pending or during litigation
• N.B. The amount is temporarily fixed by the court in favor
of the persons entitled thereto during the pendency of the
action for support.
Support pendente lite in other actions
1. Habeas corpus filed by the mother on behalf of a minor
child against the father, where the father has recognized
the child as his own and has not been giving him support
2. Rape cases for the offspring of the accused as a
consequence thereof
Buenaventura San Juan v. Hon. Manuel E.
Valenzuela, Judge Of The Court Of First Instance
Of Rizal And Dorotea Mejia (1982)
FACTS: On September 16, 1981, the marriage between
respondent Mejia and petitioner San Juan was declared
null and void by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on the
ground of a prior and subsisting marriage between
petitioner and one Isabel Bandin. Respondent instituted
the instance action against petitioner, seeking support for
herself and her two minor children. The respondent judge
ordered petitioner to give support pendente lite to
respondent and her minor children.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above order
on the grounds that (1) the amount is grossly
disproportionate to petitioner's means; (2) petitioner is
not obliged to support respondent Mejia as their marriage
is null and void; and (3) no evidence was presented as to
petitioner's present resources, was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge erred in granting
the action for support
HELD: The petitioner's willingness to pay the amount of
support pendente lite in the mariner indicated in his
manifestation, and the approval thereof by the
respondent Judge have rendered this petition moot and
academic.
Pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed with the
trial court a manifestation, proposing to settle his
obligation of P15,000.00, representing the amount of
support which accrued from January to June, 1982, and
to pay the same in three equal installments, the first to
be paid upon approval by the court of his scheme of
payment, and the balance within a period of two (2)
months thereafter. This proposal was approved by the
court. In the same manifestation, petitioner sought the
reduction of the amount of support pendente lite on the
ground that the amount previously fixed by respondent
judge is now beyond his means to pay. According to
private respondent, the court had not yet acted on
petitioner's request for reduction of the monthly support
because the respondent judge left for abroad.
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 61
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Section 6. Support in criminal cases. — In criminal
actions where the civil liability includes support for the
offspring as a consequence of the crime and the civil
aspect thereof has not been waived, reserved and
instituted prior to its filing, the accused may be ordered
to provide support pendente lite to the child born to the
offended party allegedly because of the crime. The
application therefor may be filed successively by the
offended party, her parents, grandparents or guardian
and the State in the corresponding criminal case during
its pendency, in accordance with the procedure
established under this Rule.
Rule 62
Interpleader
Rule 62, Section 1
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves. (Rule 62, Section 1)
Interpleader, defined
Beltran v. People’s Homesite & Housing
Corporation (1969)
Facts: Plaintiffs, in their own behalf and in behalf of all
residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, filed an interpleader
suit, praying that the two defendant-government
corporations, the People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation (PHHC) and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) , be compelled to litigate and
interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting
claims involving said Project 4.
Plaintiffs alleged that since they first occupied in
1953 their respective housing units at Project 4, under
lease from PHHC and paying monthly rentals therefor,
they were assured by competent authority that after five
years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to
purchase said units. Subsequently, the PHHC announced
that the management, administration and ownership of
Project 4 would be transferred by the PHHC to the GSIS
in payment of PHHC debts to the GSIS. The tenants
signified their conformity thereto. Thereafter, the PHHC
announced in another circular that all payments made by
the tenants would be considered as amortizations or
installment payments. The PHHC furthermore instructed
the Project Housing Manager to accept as installments on
the selling price the payments made.
On December 27, 1961, the agreement of
turnover of administration and ownership of PHHC
properties, including Project 4 was executed by PHHC in
favor of GSIS. Subsequently, however, PHHC through its
new Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused
to recognize all agreements and undertakings previously
entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal
rights to enforce the said agreements. Plaintiffs thus
claimed that these conflicting claims between the
defendants-corporations caused them great
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ESGUERRA NOTES
inconvenience and incalculable moral and material
damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay
the monthly amortizations or payments.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for
interpleader for failure to state a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint for interpleader was
properly dismissed by the trial court.
Held: Yes, the dismissal was proper. As borne by the
records of the case, the GSIS has no objection that
payments on the monthly amortizations from the
residents of Project 4 be made directly to PHHC. In so far
as payments are concerned, GSIS has expressed its
conformity that they be made directly to PHHC. Whatever
dispute, if any, may exist between the two corporations
over the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments made
to the PHHC will not and cannot in any way affect or
prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will
be credited by either of the two defendants.
Rule 63, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court
(formerly Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element
that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
"who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the claimants." While the two defendant corporations may
have conflicting claims between themselves with regard
to the management, administration and ownership of
Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the
plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No
allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation
other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to
their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any
claim or demand for payment of the rentals or
amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in
their complaint concerning the enforceability, and
recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of
the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961 between
the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their
action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely
so-called, are between the two corporations and not
against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in
conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial
court that the monthly payments and amortizations
should be made directly to the PHHC alone.
Clearly, there were no conflicting claims by
defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which
they may properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to
interplead and litigate among themselves. Both defendant
corporations were agreed that PHHC should continue
receiving the tenants' payments, and that such payments
would be duly recognized even if the GSIS should
eventually take over Project 4 by virtue of their turnover
agreement of December 27, 1961. As held by this Court
in an early case, the action of interpleader is a remedy
whereby a person who has property in his possession or
has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that
the defendants who have made upon him conflicting
claims upon the same property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation be required to litigate among themselves in
order to determine who is entitled to the property or
payment of the obligation. "The remedy is afforded not to
protect a person against a double liability but to protect
him against a double vexation in respect of one liability."
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The trial court, therefore, did not err in ordering
the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader.
Arreza v. Diaz (2001)
Facts: Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is the owner
of a housing unit in Quezon City. In the course of a case
involving a conflict of ownership between petitioner Edgar
H. Arreza and respondent Montano M. Diaz, Jr., BDC filed
a complaint for interpleader. The trial court resolved the
conflict in favor of Arreza. The decision became final and
was duly executed with Bliss executing a Contract to Sell
the aforementioned property to petitioner Arreza.
Respondent Diaz was constrained to deliver the property
with all its improvements to petitioner.
Thereafter respondent Diaz filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC Makati)a complaint
against BDC, Arreza, and Tapay seeking to hold them
liable for reimbursement to him of P1,706,915;58
representing the cost of his acquisition and improvements
on the subject property with interest at 8% per annum.
Petitioner Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case, citing as grounds res judicata or conclusiveness of
the judgment in the interpleader case as well as lack of
cause of action. The motion was denied for lack of merit.
Arreza filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether there is identity of causes of action as
the former involved a complaint for interpleader while the
latter now involves an action for a sum of money and
damages
Held: There is an identity of causes of action. Respondent
Diaz's cause of action in the prior case, now the crux of
his present complaint against petitioner Arreza, was in the
nature of an unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which
is now barred. In a complaint for interpleader, the court
shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties
and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights,
obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put
forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an
interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims,
third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto,
"as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph was
added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional
pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest
of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its
incidents.
Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should have
filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the
interpleader action. This he failed to do. Having failed to
set up his claim for reimbursement, which is a compulsory
counterclaim, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.
Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation
and Philippine Bank Communications
G.R. No. 193494, 12 March 2014
Facts: Lui Enterprises and Zuellig entered into a 10-year
lease contract over a parcel of land in Davao. The
Philippine Bank Communications (PBC) demanded rental
payments from Zuellig. Because Zuellig did not know
whom to pay between Lui Enterprises and PBC, Zuellig
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ESGUERRA NOTES
filed an Interpleader with the RTC Makati. Lui Enterprise
moved to dismiss the Interpleader case but it was filed
four days late. Consequently, Zuellig moved to declare Lui
Enterprises in default, which the RTC Makati granted. One
year after being declared in default, Lui Enterprises
moved to set aside the order declaring it in default. Both
the RTC Makati and the CA found that Lui Enterprises
failed to show that there was excusable negligence on its
part.
ISSUE: Whether RTC erred in declaring Lui Enterprises in
default
Held: No. Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a person may file a special civil action for
interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or
her over a subject matter in which he or she has no
interest. The action is brought against the claimants to
compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among
themselves. Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against a person who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed bythe claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel
them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a
lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the
rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the
lessee to protect him or her from "double vexation in
respect of one liability." He or she may file the
interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay
rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants’
dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to
litigate among themselves.
In this case, Zuellig filed the interpleader case
to extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose in
filing the interpleader case "was not defeated" when the
RTC declared Lui Enterprises in default.
At any rate, an adverse claimant in an
interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule
62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
claimant who fails to answer within the required period
may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence
of the default is that the court may "render judgment
barring [the defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect
to the subject matter." The Rules would not have allowed
claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default
if it would "ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit."
The RTC Makati declared Lui Enterprises in
default when it failed to answer the complaint within the
required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside
order of default without an acceptable excuse why its
counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove
the excusable negligence. Thus, the RTC Makati did not
err in refusing to set aside the order of default.
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Rule 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies
Rule 63, Section 1
Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument,
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this Rule.
Declaratory Relief, defined
Board of Optometry v. Hon. Angel Colet (1996)
Facts: R.A. No. 8050, entitled "An Act Regulating the
Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating
Optometrists, and for Other Purposes," otherwise known
as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was approved into
law on 7 June 1995. The private respondents filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaratory
relief and for prohibition and injunction to restrain the
implementation and enforcement of R.A. No. 8050. In
support of the petition, respondents alleged that: (1)
there was an unauthorized insertion of provisions in the
reconciled bill which vitiated legislative consent; (2) the
law violates the fundamental right of Filipinos to
safeguards against violation of life, liberty, and property;
(3) it violates the principle against undue delegation of
legislative power when it provides for a penalty of
imprisonment for a maximum of eight years and a fine
not exceeding P40,000.00; (4) it suppresses truthful
advertising concerning optical goods and services in
violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press;
and (5) employs vague ambiguous terms in defining
prohibitions and restrictions and is void for vagueness.
The trial court issued the challenged order,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved,
the petitioners then filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, arguing the absence of a
valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or
prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief
may prosper.
Held: No. As a special civil action for declaratory
relief, its requisites are: (1) the existence of a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination. On this score, we find no difficulty holding
that at least the first and fourth requisites are wanting.
There is the unbending rule in constitutional law
that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question unless the following requisites are
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first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict or rights susceptible of
judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question
must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the resolution of the case.
An actual case or controversy means as existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. There is
yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of
the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of
the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or
obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because
Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief.
Moreover, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and
SMOAP have not sufficiently established their locus
standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050 for failure
to show that they are juridical entities
Hence, respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No.
8050, as well as of the Code of Ethics promulgated
thereunder. Even if there was before him a case involving
the law, prudence dictated that the respondent Judge
should not have issued the writ with undue haste, bearing
in mind the pronouncement in Drilon v. Lim that every
court is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that
the measure was first carefully studied by the executive
and legislative departments and determined by them to
be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally approved. Respondent Judge was directed to
dismiss the petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. v. CA (2003)
Facts: PDIC filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC Iloilo because it had reservations in recognizing
respondents’ Golden Time Deposits with Manila Banking
Corporation (MBC) as deposit liability. PDIC’s reservations
were based on the MBC’s deputy receiver’s report that
prior to the Central Bank’s take-over of the assets and
liabilities of MBC, there were unusually heavy movements
in terms of volume and amount for all types of deposits
and trust accounts. PDIC claims that these transactions
show that respondents already knew of the impending
receivership of MBC, and thus, engaged in deposit
splitting to maximize the availment of PDIC’s insurance
coverage.
Issue: Whether the RTC and CA erred in ordering PDIC to
pay respondents, since the intant petition stemmed from
a petition for declaratory relief which does not essentially
entail an executory process, and the only relief that
should have been granted by the trial court is a
declaration of the parties' rights and duties.
Held: No. While a petition for declaratory relief does not
essentially entail an executory process, there is nothing
in its nature that prohibits a counterclaim from being set
up in the same action.
There is nothing in the nature of a special civil
action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a
counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or
contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is
after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil
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action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of
the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a
special subject matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity between their
fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing
ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil
actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to
supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing
special civil actions.
Adlawan v. IAC (1989)
Facts: There were two cockpits operating in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu: (1) the Coliseum, and
(2) the Gallera. Following the promulgation of the
Cockfighting Law of 1974, which provided for the “one
cockpit for every municipality rule,” the Municipal Council
recommended the retention of the Gallera as the
municipal cockpit of Minglanilla. Aggrieved, the owners of
the Coliseum filed an action for declaratory relief with
injunction and prayed for the interpretation of their rights
under all pertinent laws governing cockpits. CFI of Cebu
ruled in favor of the Coliseum, and ordered the following:
(1) Mayor to issue of a license-permit in favor of
Coliseum; (2) Sangguniang Bayan to pass a Resolution
confirming the license-permit issued by the Mayor; (3)
Philippines Gamefowl Commission to register the
Coliseum’s cockpit; and (4) the immediate closure of the
Gallera cockpit. The Gallera’s owner filed an appeal from
this decision.
Issue: Whether the CFI erred in its decision.
Held: No. On the substantive aspect of this case, the
Supreme Court held that R.A. No. 1224 provides that the
distance of cockpits from public buildings shall be left to
the municipal council’s discretion. However, R.A. No.
1224 also specifically prohibits the retroactive application
of any such municipal ordinance to cockpits already
existing at the time of its enactment. Since the Coliseum
was established in 1955 whereas Municipal Ordinance No.
4 was passed only in 1969, the Ordinance cannot
adversely affect the existence and operation of the
cockpit.
After ruling on the substantive aspect, the
Supreme Ccourt noted that this action was initiated on a
petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration
of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws
and ordinances involved therein or invoked by them.
Consequently, in such special civil action, the judgment
does not essentially entail an executory process since
generally, other than a declaration of such rights and
duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood
in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent.
However, the Court has held that although the action is
for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the
complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific
performance or recovery of property with claims for
damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the
trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action
availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as
may be warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule
applies to this case.
Dupasquier v. Ascendas (Philippines) Corp
G.R. No. 211044, 24 July 2019, supra
Facts: The Net Group, represented by petitioners Jacques
A. Dupasquier and Carlos S. Rufino, and respondent
Ascendas (Philippines) Corp. entered into a Memorandum
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of Understanding (MOU), for the acquisition of the entire
issued and outstanding shares of stock of the Net
Corporations. The parties stipulated that the Closing Date
of the MOU shall be after 2 calendar weeks from the
signing of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) but not
later than 31 March 2007. The MOU provided an
arbitration clause, as part of Clause 14, wherein any
dispute arising out of or in connection with the MOU shall
be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration. Likewise
in Clause 14 of the MOU, the parties provided that upon
the termination or lapse of the MOU, the MOU shall cease
to have any force and effect except for Clause 14(e)
[Confidentiality].
Because of Ascendas’s failure to execute the
MOA by the Closing Date, the Net Group informed
Ascendas that they deemed the MOU as lapsed as of 1
April 2007. In turn, Ascendas wrote a letter to the Net
Group specifying that the parties have until 28 September
2007 to resolve the disputes between them, otherwise,
Ascendas will refer the dispute to arbitration.
The Net Group filed a petition for declaratory
relief, pleading for a judicial declaration that the
arbitration agreement contained in the MOU be declared
ineffective and that Net Group can no longer be compelled
to submit to arbitration because the Arbitration Clause
would not survive the lapse of the MOU on 31 March 2007
since the parties agreed that only the confidentiality
clause would survive the termination or lapse of the MOU.
Issue: Whether the petition for declaratory relief is proper
considering that there was no breach of the MOU which
was the subject thereof.
Held: YES. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by a
person interested under a deed, will, contract, or other
written instrument whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question or construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief
are: (i) the subject matter of the controversy must be a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (ii) the terms
of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial construction; (iii) there must have
been no breach or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse; (iv) there must be
an actual controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; (v) the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (vi)
adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.
In the petition, it is clear that The Net Group is
merely seeking for the interpretation of the MOU on two
counts: (i) the applicability of the Arbitration Clause vis-
à-vis the Effectivity Clause; and (ii) the nature of the Due
Diligence L/C — whether The Net Group may
automatically appropriate it under the tenor of the MOU.
There is nothing in the petition which connotes breach of
contract. In so far as the wordings of the petition are
concerned, its allegations properly fall within the RTC's
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief.
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Petition for Declaratory relief may be treated as one
for prohibition or mandamus
Diaz v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 193007, 19 July 2011
Facts: Petitioners Diaz and Timbol filed a petition for
declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending
imposition of the value-added tax (VAT) by the BIR on the
collection of tollway operators and argued that the
Congress did not intend to include toll fees within the
meaning of “sales of services” that are subject to VAT
when it enacted the NIRC. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the implementation of the VAT. Later, the Court
issued another resolution treating the petition as one for
prohibition.
Issue: Whether the Court may treat the petition for
declaratory relief as one for prohibition
Held: Yes. There are precedents for treating a petition for
declaratory relief as one for prohibition if the case has far-
reaching implications and raises questions that need to
be resolved for the public good. Also, a petition for
prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts
of executive officials that amount to usurpation of
legislative authority.
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-
reaching implications. Its imposition would impact, not
only more than half a million motorists who use the
tollways every day, but more so on the government’s
effort to raise revenue for funding various projects and
for reducing budgetary deficits.
Declaratory relief distinguished from interpleader
• Interpleader is filed by a person who claims no
interest whatsoever in the subject matter, whereas
in declaratory relief, the party seeking relief has a
legal interest in the controversy
When remedy is improper – where there is a breach
of contract, or violation of statute or right
Ollada v. Central bank (1962)
Facts: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant,
having passed the examination given by the Board of
Accountancy, and is duly qualified to practice his
profession. Subsequently, by reason of a requirement of
the Import-Export Department of the Central Bank that
CPAs submit to an accreditation under oath before they
could certify financial statements of their clients applying
for import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's
previous accreditation was nullified.
Assailing said accreditation requirement on the
ground that it was (a) an unlawful invasion of the
jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (b) in excess of
the powers of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional
in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of
one's trade, Ollada, for himself and allegedly on behalf of
numerous other CPAs, filed a petition for Declaratory
Relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify
said accreditation requirement. Ollada also applied for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the respondent
Central Bank of the Philippines from enforcing the
accreditation requirement aforesaid until final
adjudication.
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ESGUERRA NOTES
In a memorandum submitted by respondent
Central Bank opposing the issuance of the writ, it
manifested that it was willing to delete paragraph 13 from
its CB-IED Form No. 5, and to modify paragraph 14, the
objectionable features of the assailed Central Bank
requirement. Upon compliance with said undertaking, the
trial court dismissed the petition for declaratory relief for
having become groundless upon the elimination of said
objectionable features.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for
declaratory relief was proper.
Held: Yes. Without deciding the question of whether the
petition under consideration has, in reality "become
groundless", we believe that, upon the facts appearing of
record, said petition was correctly dismissed. Petitioner
himself alleged that his petition:
has sufficiently alleged ultimate facts which
violated his right as a duly qualified and
accredited Certified Public Accountant by the
Board of Accountancy (which is the only
Government body with absolute powers to
regulate the practice of CPAs), and in addition
to such allegations, he has also alleged that by
virtue of the violation of his right and that of
numerous CPAs, he has suffered serious injury
in that the questioned requirement which is
collaterally attacked by this action (in the
honest belief of the petitioner that the same) is
an unlawful restraint of the fee pursuit and
practice of petitioner's profession as a CPA; and
also that the action of the respondent Central
Bank of the Philippines complained of, is also an
unlawful invasion into the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board of Accountancy as the sole body
vested by our laws to lay down rules and
regulations for the practice of public
accountancy in the Philippines. . .
Petitioner submits that the respondent's
requirement complained of (CB-IED Forms Nos.
5 and 6) is an act of constituting a violation of
the Constitution and also a violation of the
petitioners right to freely practice his profession
anywhere and in any government office in the
Philippines ... It is undisputed that the only body
that can regulate the practice of accountancy in
the Philippines is the Board of Accountancy. The
action thus of the respondent in requiring the
accreditation of CPAs before they can practice
with the Central Bank of the Philippines is an
unlawful invasion into the exclusive jurisdiction
of the said Board of Accountancy. Why was
petitioner's right as a CPA violated by the
respondent? Because the respondent's placing
of a ban to CPAs including the petitioner with
respect to certification of financial statements of
their clients applying for dollar(s) allocation in
the Central Bank of the Philippines has resulted
in the unlawful restraint in the practice of CPAs
in the office of the Central Bank of the
Philippines.
Petitioner commenced this action as one for
Declaratory Relief. On the question of when a special civil
action of this nature would prosper, we have already held
that the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if
filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached
or violated. In the present case such is precisely the
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situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for
declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner
himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his
right and caused him injury — all these giving him a
complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding. The dismissal of the
action was, therefore, proper in the light of our ruling
in De Borja vs. Villadolid, 47 O.G. (5) p. 2315,
and Samson vs. Andal, G.R. No. L-3439, July 31, 1951,
where we held that an action for declaratory relief should
be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such
action, that there had been a breach — which would
constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action
for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is
not available through the means of other existing forms
of action or proceeding.
Reyes v. Ortiz (2010)
Facts: In a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership of Real Property (Recovery Case) filed with the
RTC Caloocan, respondents Segundo Bautista and
spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster
from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes, which form part
of the Tala Estate, the spouses Rene and Rosemarie
Matienzo and Sergio Abejero. Shortly thereafter, a
separate but related action involving the Tala Estate was
initiated by the Republic of the Philippines for Annulment
of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against
Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities
of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon.
Thereafter, the Quezon City RTC in the
Annulment/Reversion case issued a Preliminary
Injunction (Injunction) freezing all pending ejectment
cases involving the Tala Estate. Believing that the
Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC can be
beneficial to them in the Recovery case, spouses Rene
and Rosemarie Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the Recovery case. Said motion was
denied by the RTC Caloocan.
The second case, an ejectment complaint, was
commenced by spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl on
June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan
City MeTC (Ejectment Case). Erlinda Reyes moved for the
suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of
these cases citing the Injunction issued by the QC RTC.
This motion was also denied.
The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases
converged when petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and
Erlinda Reyes joined in filing directly with this Court the
instant petition denominated as "Declaratory
Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition," mainly assailing the
denial of their respective motions for suspension.
Petitioners Matienzo and Reyes asked that the
proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery
case be declared null and void for violating the Injunction
order of the Quezon City RTC.
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that
petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that
the action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the
statute, deed, or contract has not been violated. Hence,
where the law or contract has already been breached prior
to the filing of the declaratory relief, courts can no longer
assume jurisdiction since this action is not geared towards
the settling of issues arising from breach or violation of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
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ESGUERRA NOTES
deed, and contract, but rather it is intended to secure an
authoritative statement for guidance in their enforcement
or compliance of the same.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ resort to a petition for
declaratory relief was proper.
Held: No. Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition
for declaratory relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules
of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet
title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The foregoing section can be dissected into two
parts. The first paragraph concerns declaratory relief,
which has been defined as a special civil action by any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument or whose rights are affected by a
statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to
determine any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action
to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership
in a sale with a right to repurchase.
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63
enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a
declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, a statute, executive order or
regulation, or any government regulation. This Court, in
Lerum v. Cruz declared that the subject matters to be
tested in a petition for declaratory relief are exclusive.
The foregoing holding was reiterated in Natalia Realty,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, wherein this Court stressed that
court orders or decisions cannot be made the subject
matter of a declaratory relief, viz:
[A] court decision cannot be interpreted as included
within the purview of the words "other written
instrument," as contended by appellant, for the simple
reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the
ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be
corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the
expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 63].
In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes
and Rosemarie Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial
courts denying their motions to suspend proceedings.
This recourse by petitioners, unfortunately, cannot be
countenanced since a court order is not one of those
subjects to be examined under Rule 63. The proper
remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized
from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in
the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for
reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for
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certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should
have filed a special civil action on certiorari also under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her
motion by the Caloocan City RTC.
At all events, even if this petition delves on
questions of law, there is no statutory or jurisprudential
basis for according to this Court original and exclusive
jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only
questions of law. Finally, while a petition for declaratory
relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far
reaching implications and raises questions that need to
be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner
tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ.
Conversion into ordinary action
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 63
Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. — If
before the final termination of the case, a breach or
violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation should take place, the action may thereupon
be converted into an ordinary action, and the parties
shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be
necessary or proper.
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction; SC has no
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 63 par. 1
Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder…
Rule 64
Review of Judgments and Final
Orders or Resolution of COMELEC and
COA
What may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
Garces v. CA (1996)
Facts: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of
Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was
to replace Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in
turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service
Commission, both appointments were to take effect upon
assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to
transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces, on the
other hand, was directed by the Office of Assistant
Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But
she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum
issued by Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador
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Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in
Gutalac as the same is not vacant.
On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by
the same Office of Assistant Director to defer her
assumption of the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she
received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance
Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for
the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was
addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga
del Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as
superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since
respondent Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac
office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment
to Liloy.
Garces filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a petition for mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages
against Empeynado and Concepcion, among others.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution
dated 3 June 1988, resolved to recognize respondent
Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac, and
ordered that the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and
of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.
The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by
Empeynado contending that this is a case or matter
cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the
1987 Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the
appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac,
he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter
court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC
resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A. The RTC,
thereafter, dismissed the petition for mandamus on two
grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy,
and (2) that the cases or matters referred under the
constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal
of the case.
Issue: Whether or not this case is cognizable by the
COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
and therefore may be raised only on certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not before the RTC.
Held: The case is not cognizable by the COMELEC under
Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution as there was no
case or matter filed before the COMELEC. Thus, it may
not be raised on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Sec.
7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules
of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
On the contrary, it was the COMELECs
resolution that triggered this Controversy. The case or
matter referred to by the Constitution must be something
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must
pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that
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decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7
Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELECs exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials. In this case,
what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an
appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an
administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an
agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule
otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial
administrative questions that are best ventilated before
the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The phrase “except as hereinafter provided” under
of this Rule specifies that any petition for certiorari
filed under this Rule follows the same requisites as
those of Rule 65, except for certain provisions
found only in Rule 64. One of these provisions
concerns the time given to file the petition
The Law Firm of Laguesma, Magsalin,
Consulta and Gastardo v. COA
G.R. No. 185544, 12 January 2015
Facts: The Clark Development Corporation (CDC)
engaged the services of the petitioner for CDC’s labor
cases. The Commission on Audit (COA), however,
disallowed the payment of retainer fees to the petitioner
citing CDC’s failure to secure a prior written concurrence
of the COA and the approval of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC). COA further
ruled that it was not the government’s responsibility to
pay the legal fees incurred by CDC but rather the
government officials who violated the regulations on the
matter. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to
annul COA’s decision.
Issue: Whether the petition was filed on time.
Held: No. Section 2 of Rule 64 specifies that a judgment
or resolution of the COMELEC or COA may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 “except as
herein provided.” The phrase “except as herein provided”
specifies that any petition for certiorari filed under Rule
64 follows the same requisites as those of Rule 65 except
for certain provisions found only in Rule 64. One of these
provisions concerns the time given to file the petition.
Section 3 of Rule 64 provided that a party may
file a petition for review on certiorari within 30 days from
notice of the judgment being assailed. This reglementary
period includes the time taken to file the motion for
reconsideration and is only interrupted once the motion is
filed. If the motion is denied, the party may file the
petition only within the period remaining from the notice
of judgment. The differences between Rule 64 and Rule
65 are: (1) under Rule 64 a petition for review on
certiorari may be filed within 30 days from notice of the
decision while Rule 65 provided for 60 days from notice;
and (2) under Rule 64, if the motion for reconsideration
is denied, the party may file the petition only within the
period remaining from the notice of judgment unlike the
fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides.
In this case, petitioner received the COA
decision on 16 October 2007. It filed a motion for
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reconsideration on 6 November 2007 (or after 21 days).
It received a notice of the denial of its motion on 20
November 2008. The receipt of this notice gave petitioner
9 days or until 29 November 2008 to file a petition for
certiorari. Since the deadline fell on a Saturday, petitioner
could still have filed on the next working day, or on 1
December 2008. However, petitioner only filed on 19
December 2008 which was well beyond the reglementary
period.
Fresh period rule not applicable
Pates v. Comelec (2009)
Facts: The petitioner argued that his petition for
certiorari assailing a Resolution of the COMELEC was
seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by
the Supreme Court in a number of cases. He claims that,
historically, the fresh period rule was the prevailing rule
in filing petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court, he
continues, changed this rule when it promulgated the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98,
which both provided for the filing of petitions within the
remainder of the original period, the remainder being the
original period less the days used up in preparing and
filing a motion for reconsideration. He then points out that
on 1 September 2000 or only three years after, the
Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC
bringing back the fresh period rule. According to the
petitioner, the reason for the change, was the
tremendous confusion generated by Circular No. 39-98.
Issue: Is the fresh period rule applicable in Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court?
Held: No. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
provides that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for
certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as
hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to
Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They
exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as
discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference
between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule
64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a special
period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period
is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of
the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening
period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration
deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of
the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
In harking back to the history of the fresh period
rule, what the petitioner apparently wants for reasons of
uniformity and convenience is the simultaneous
amendment of Section 3, Rule 64 and the application of
4 In The Matter Of the Amendment to Rules 23, 24, And 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure for Purposes of The 13 May 2013
National, Local And ARMM Elections And Subsequent Elections.
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his proposed new rule to his case. To state the obvious,
any amendment of this provision is an exercise in the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules on
practice and procedure as provided by Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution. Rulemaking is different
from the Supreme Court’s adjudicatory
function. Rulemaking is an act of legislation, directly
assigned to the Supreme Court by the Constitution, that
requires the formulation of policies rather than the
determination of the legal rights and obligations of
litigants before us. As a rule, rulemaking requires that the
Supreme Court consult with its own constituencies, not
necessarily with the parties directly affected in their
individual cases, in order to ensure that the rule and the
policy that it enunciates are the most reasonable that we
can promulgate under the circumstances, taking into
account the interests of everyone not the least of which
are the constitutional parameters and guidelines for our
actions. Thus, the Supreme Court’s adjudicatory powers
should not be confused with its rulemaking prerogative.
The avoidance of confusion through the use of
uniform standards is not without its merits. No less than
the Constitution requires that motions for reconsideration
of [division] decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. Thus, the ruling of the
Commission en banc on reconsideration is effectively a
new ruling rendered separately and independently from
that made by a division. Counterbalanced against these
reasons, however, are other considerations no less
weighty, the most significant of which is the importance
the Constitution and the Supreme Court, in obedience to
the Constitution, accord to elections and the prompt
determination of their results. Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution expressly requires that the COMELECs
rules of procedure should expedite the disposition of
election cases. The Supreme Court labors under the same
command, as the proceedings are in fact the
constitutional extension of cases that start with the
COMELEC.
Motion for reconsideration of decision of COMELEC
Division required; not of COMELEC En Banc
• Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure
states:
What Pleadings are not Allowed. - The following
pleadings are not allowed:
... ... ...
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases;
N.B. MR of COMELEC Division ruling should first be
filed with COMELEC En Banc, whose decision may
be brought on certiorari to SC. Exc. when division
committed grave abuse of discretion, in which case
the aggrieved party may directly file a petition for
certiorari with SC.
• Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended
by Resolution No. 9523,1 provides:
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Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. — A
motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or
Ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
receipt thereof and upon the payment of filing fee in the
amount of P1,000.00. Such motion, if not pro-forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the
Decision, Resolution, Order and Ruling. The movant shall
be required to furnish a copy of his motion for
reconsideration to the adverse party prior to filing the
same with the Office of the Clerk of Commission.
Within forty-eight (48) hours from the filing
thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2)
days thereafter certify the case to the Commission En
Banc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the
Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission En Banc within three (3) days from the
certification thereof without need of comment from the
adverse party.
Rule 65
Prohibition and Mandamus
Prohibition
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 65 par. 1
Section 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
Nature and purpose
1. The principal purpose for the writ of
prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess,
usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an
inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted when
it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or multiplicity of actions.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, for that matter, are
intended to annul or void proceedings in order to insure
the fair and orderly administration of justice. (Longino v.
General, G.R. No. 147956, 16 February 2005).
2. For a party to be entitled to a writ of
prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a)
it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board
or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b)
the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. (Id.)
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3. A special civil action of prohibition is
an original and independent action and not merely a
continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition
of the judgment or order complained of. Neither is such
an action ancillary or substitute to the action against
which the supervisory authority of the appellate court is
sought and directed. It bears stressing that an action for
prohibition or certiorari, for that matter, does not divest
the inferior or trial court of its jurisdiction validly acquired
over the case pending before it; it is merely an invocation
for the exercise of its supervisory power over the lower
court to insure that the lower court acts within its
jurisdiction. If the lower court errs in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
appeal in due course from an adverse judgment of the
trial court, absent grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (Mayon Estate
Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, 18 October
2004).
Vergara v. Rugue (1977)
Facts: Abraham Rugue (“Rugue”) filed a complaint for
the annulment of sale against Alfonso Vergara in whose
favor the Land Tenure Administration sold a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 59274";. After trial, the lower court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but ordering
the Land Tenure Administration to refund to Abraham
Rugue all the payments that he has made on the
property, as well as to reimburse him for whatever
improvement he has made on the property. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court. Thereafter, Rugue filed with the lower court a
motion for execution of the Court of Appeals’ Decision,
which the lower court granted.
Thus, Vergara filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for "prohibition with mandatory injunction,
seeking to: (a) restrain respondent Judge, the Sheriff,
and the Register of Deeds, from enforcing the order of
execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals; (b)
declare Vergara as the rightful owner of the lot and to
order Rugue to pay petitioner P29,000.00 as attorney's
fees and moral damages as may be determined by the
court. In his petition, Vergara argued, among others, that
the Court of Appeals erred when it honored the sale of the
questioned lot in favor of Abraham Rugue.
Issue: Whether or not Vergara’s petition for prohibition
may prosper.
Held: No. The Supreme Court denied Vergara’s petition
for prohibition. It explained that the office of the
extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct
errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation
by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the
limitation of their jurisdictions. It is a preventive remedy.
Its function is to restrain the doing of some act to be
done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts
already accomplished. This remedy will lie only to
"prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or
improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an
inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent some great
outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure;
but, if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the
person and subject-matter of the controversy, the writ
will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in
procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an
enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or even in cases
of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power
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ESGUERRA NOTES
or the improper assumption or jurisdiction, where an
adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error,
certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are
available." It may be safely asserted as a settled law, that
"unless the court sought to be prohibited is wanting in
jurisdiction over the class of cases to which the pending
case belongs or is attempting to act in excess of its
jurisdiction in a case of which it rightfully has cognizance,
the writ will be denied."
The writ of prohibition does not lie against the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor
(2006)
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the "National Government Center (NGC)
Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."
Issue: May a writ of prohibition be issued to enjoin an
exercise of a quasi-legislative function?
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled a petition for
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition
is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within
its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
"respondents are performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ
of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Mandamus
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 65
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
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use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46.
Mandamus will not issue to compel a discretionary
act
Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals
(1991)
Facts: This case involves the aborted sale of the
Garchitorena estate to the Government in connection with
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). On
27 April 1988, United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
entered into a Contract to Sell said property to Sharp
International Marketing, the agreement to be converted
into a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment by the latter
of the full purchase price of P3,183,333.33. On 14 May
1988, even before it had acquired the land, the petitioner,
through its President Alex Lina, offered to sell it to the
Government for P56,000,000.00, (later increased to
P65,000,000.00).
Subsequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed between UCPB and Sharp by virtue of which the
former sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated
consideration of P3,183,333.33. Thereafter, or on 29
December 1988, DAR Secretary Philip Ella Juico issued an
order directing the acquisition of the estate for the
recommended amount of P62,725,077.29. Thus,
Secretary Juico and petitioner Lina signed the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
The LBP received a copy of the order issued by
Secretary Juico. However, LBP President Deogracias
Vistan, upon discovery that Sharp had acquired the
property from UCPB for only P3.1 million, requested
Secretary Juico to reconsider his 29 December 1988
order. Meantime, Vistan informed Juico that LBP would
not pay the stipulated purchase price. Sharp then filed a
petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel
the DAR and LBP to comply with the contract, prompting
Juico to issue an order for a reevaluation and reappraisal
of the subject property, in view of the findings that the
value of P62,725,077.29 is definitely too high as a price
for the property in question.
The petition was referred to the Court of
Appeals, which dismissed the same, ruling that
mandamus did not lie because the LBP was not a mere
rubber stamp of the DAR and its signing of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not a merely ministerial act.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a
writ of mandamus to compel the LBP President
Deogracias Vistan to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 9, 1989.
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Held: No. It is settled that mandamus is not available to
control discretion. The writ may issue to compel the
exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself.
Mandamus can require action only but not specific
action where the act sought to be performed involves the
exercise of discretion. Section 18 of RA 6657 reads as
follows:
Sec. 18. Valuation and mode of compensation. — The LBP
shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may
be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the
LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Secs.
16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as
may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land. ...
The act required of the LBP President is not
merely ministerial but involves a high degree of
discretion. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals:
[T]he LBP is an essential part of the government sector
with regard to the payment of compensation to the
landowner. It is, after all, the instrumentality that is
charged with the disbursement of public funds for
purposes of agrarian reform. It is therefore part, an
indispensable cog, in the governmental machinery that
fixes and determines the amount compensable to the
landowner… If the LBP agrees on the amount stated in
the DAS, after its review and evaluation, it becomes its
duty to sign the deed. But not until then… Inversely, if
the LBP, after review and evaluation, refuses to sign, it is
because as a party to the contract it does not give its
consent thereto. This necessarily implies the exercise of
judgment on the part of LBP, which is not supposed to be
a mere rubber stamp in the exercise…
Under the facts, SHARP is not entitled to a writ of
mandamus. For, it is essential for the writ to issue that
the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform
the act required. The legal right of the plaintiff to the thing
demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the
required act must also be clear and specific …
Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise
of judgment and discretion, especially where
disbursement of public funds is concerned. It is
established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to
control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial,
duties, that is, to compel a body discharging duties
involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular
way or to approve or disapprove a specific application.
Moreover, without the signature of the LBP
President, there was simply no contract between Sharp
and the Government. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 9
January 1989 was incomplete and therefore had no
binding effect at all. Consequently, Sharp cannot claim
any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a
petition for mandamus.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of
an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty
Henares v. LTRFB and DOTC (2006)
Facts: Petitioners challenge the Supreme Court to issue
a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
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Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters
(PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life.
Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel
emissions from engine combustion when these react to
other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with
hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with
sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric
acid and harmful nitrates. To counter the aforementioned
detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners
propose the use of CNG.
The Solicitor General counters that nothing in
Rep. Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the "Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999” that petitioners invoke prohibits
the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor
vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General,
Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence
of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law
is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs,
the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as
alternative fuel.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be compelled
to require public utility vehicles to use compressed natural
gas through a writ of mandamus.
Held: No. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1)
against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board
or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally
entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held:
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of
conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of
discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed,
it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the
Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for
issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
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respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative
fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not
specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public
vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing
the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport
(NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program
recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning
alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to
produce substantially lower pollutants. Paragraph 1.2,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives,
the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport.
Furthermore, one of the components of the program is
the development of CNG refueling stations and all related
facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the
needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks
the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an
implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel
utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas
vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance
of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in
present day major routes and exclusive franchises to
NGVs in newly opened routes…" To a certain extent,
the instant petition had been mooted by the
issuance of E.O. No. 290.
The writ of mandamus is unavailing in this case.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no
law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC
to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most
the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5
(ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of Natural Gas Vehicles based on the results of
the DOTC surveys."
In sum, petitioners are unable to pinpoint the
law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents
that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It
appears that more properly, the legislature should
provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
Exception: When there is grave abuse of discretion
First Philippine Holdings Corporation v.
Sandiganbayan (1996)
Facts: In Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the
respondent Sandiganbayan, the PCGG prays for the
return, reconveyance, accounting and restitution - with
damages - of certain funds and properties which were
allegedly acquired by private respondents through "abuse
of right and power and through unjust enrichment". Part
of these funds and properties are some 6,299,177
sequestered shares of stock in the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIBank) which were allegedly
acquired by the respondent spouses Romualdez, as
beneficial owners, in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and therefore subject
to forfeiture in favor of the Republic for being
"unexplained wealth". Said shares were allegedly
purchased from petitioner by respondent Romualdez
using respondents Equities and Narciso as "his dummy
buyers."
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Petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Admit Complaint in Intervention" in said Civil Case
No. 0035, alleging that the PCIBank shares were obtained
by means of fraud. Thus, petitioner prayed for the
nullification of the Sale of Stocks and Escrow Agreement"
and for the return of the shares to it. However, the
respondent Sandiganbayan denied the motion to
intervene.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an original action for
certiorari and mandamus to review and set aside a
Resolution of the respondent Sandiganbayan denying its
motion to intervene and litigate its claim of ownership
over the shares.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment stated
that petitioner did not have a "legal interest" to intervene
because "(t)he judgment would merely render defendant
Benjamin Romualdez and his corresponding co-
defendants personally obligated to either return or
reconvey said shares of stock to the Republic and would
not bar petitioner’s cause of action to invalidate the "Sale
of Stock and Escrow-Agreement."
Issue: Whether or not the writ of mandamus can be
issued to compel the Sandiganbayan to grant the motion
for intervention.
Held: Yes. First, the FPHC has the right to intervene in
this case. Petitioner has a legal interest in the shares
which are the subject of the controversy. At the very
least, it is "so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or disposition of the (sequestered shares) in
the custody of the court".
Second, the Sandiganbayan has the legal
authority to declare as void the sale of the disputed
PCIBank shares in favor of respondents Narciso and
Equities as alleged dummies of respondent Romualdez.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been clarified
in the case of PCGG vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Peña, etc.,et
al. and subsequent cases as extending not only to the
principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, but also to "all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases," such as the
dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the
issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative
thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be
made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in
another forum.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme
Court resolved that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to
grant a motion for intervention to file an answer in a suit
(similar to the case a quo) pending before the respondent
Sandiganbayan for the reconveyance of (some lots and)
shares of stock. Intervention is not an independent
action, but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation. Since the respondent Sandiganbayan has the
exclusive and original jurisdiction over the principal case,
it has likewise original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
private respondents' action for intervention therein.
From the foregoing, respondent Sandiganbayan
abused its discretion in denying the motion to intervene
because, clearly, the question of ownership of the shares
under sequestration is within its jurisdiction, being an
incident arising from or in connection with the case under
its exclusive and original jurisdiction. With the denial of
its intervention, petitioner is deprived of a remedy in law
to recover its property alleged to have been taken illegally
from it.
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As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2 (b),
intervention shall be allowed "in the exercise of
discretion" by a court. Ordinarily, mandamus will not
prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is
"gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right
to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue.
These exceptions were recognized by this Court
in Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, et al. as follows:
Although, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule
is that, in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be
directed by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or
the other, "yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will
never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception
to the rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of
gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of authority."
In Antiquera vs. Baluyot, et al., such exceptions
were allowed, "because the discretion must be exercised
under the law, and not contrary to law.
Common requisites
1. Verified petition (Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 65);
2. When and where to file petition (Section 4 of
Rule 65)
• The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution.
• In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion.
• The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court
or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,
in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if
it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules,
the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
3. 3. Jurisdiction to issue writ
Fortich v. Corona (1998)
Facts: The strikers protested the 29 March 1996 Decision
of the Office of the President (OP), issued through then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-
C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred
forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the
President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win
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Resolution on 7 November 1997, substantially modifying
its earlier Decision after it had already become final and
executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of
the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the
remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed
to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received
by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B.
Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on 24
November 1997 and, on 4 December 1997, they filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule
58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
Respondents, through the Solicitor General,
opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed
outright on the ground, among others, that the proper
remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition
for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance
with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether petitioners correctly filed the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme
Court?
Held: Yes. It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,
including the Office of the President, may be taken to the
Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment,
final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. However, in this particular case, the remedy
prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary
Renato C. Corona’s) jurisdiction when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of 29 March
1996 which had long become final and executory. In other
words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of
jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable
by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate
remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is
an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
as what the petitioners have correctly done.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to
truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Section
1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the
assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for
certiorari) in the proper court. Under Section 4 of Rule 65,
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the
jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated
in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the
act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition
shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless
otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. The
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Supreme Court clearly discussed this matter of
concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et.
al., thus:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary
writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
Who should be respondents
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 65
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. —
When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions
of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall
join, as private respondent or respondents with such
public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court;
and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to
appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and
in behalf of the public respondent or respondents
affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in
such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be
against the private respondents only, and not against
the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court
where the petition is pending, the public respondents
shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the
petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated
to a higher court by either party, the public respondents
shall be included therein as nominal parties. However,
unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they
shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein.
Contents of petition
• Section 2 of Rule 65 provides that the petition for
prohibition shall be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
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provided in the third paragraph of Section 3 of
Rule 46.
• Section 3 of Rule 65 provides that the petition for
mandamus shall also contain a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 46.
Non-forum shopping certification
Section 3 of Rule 46 provides:
The petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a
concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for
the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall
further indicate the material dates showing when notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution subject
thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the
denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible
copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or
ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the
record as are referred to therein, and other documents
relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be
accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the
court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly
authorized representative. The other requisite number of
copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly
legible plain copies of all documents attached to the
original.
The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition a sworn certification that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
Other common provisions/requisites:
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 65
Section 6. Order to comment. — If the petition is
sufficient in form and substance to justify such process,
the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent
or respondents to comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order
shall be served on the respondents in such manner as
the court may direct together with a copy of the petition
and any annexes thereto.
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In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of section 2,
Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course
thereto, the court may require the respondents to file
their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the
petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a
reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it
may deem necessary and proper.
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive
relief. — The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case.
Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. —
After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has
expired, the court may hear the case or require the
parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or
submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period
for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations
of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for the
relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.
The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds
the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or
judgment. — A certified copy of the judgment rendered
in accordance with the last preceding section shall be
served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such
manner as the court may direct, and disobedience
thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution
may issue for any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with section 1 of Rule 39.
Rule 66
Quo Warranto
Definition
Quo warranto and mandamus distinguished
Lota v. CA (1961)
Facts: Sangalang alleged that he was the caretaker of
the municipal cemetery of Taal, Batangas and he was
unlawfully ousted from office. He filed a case against Lota,
the mayor of tall who allegedly ousted him from office and
appointed Beron.
The CFI declared Sangalang as the legally appointed
cemetery porter. On appeal, Lota contended that the CA
erred in holding that the present action is quo warranto.
Issue: Whether the case was one of quo warranto
Held: Yes. The claim that the instant action is one
of mandamus, not quo warranto, is devoid of basis.
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While quo warranto and mandamus are often concurrent
remedies, however, there exists a clear distinction
between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo
warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or
franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment,
while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties,
not to try disputed titles, 38 C.J. 546; 2 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., 200; that
where here is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo
warranto is the proper remedy, Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez,
36 Phil. 491, and that where the respondent, without
claiming any right to an Office, excludes the petitioner
therefrom, he remedy is mandamus, not quo
warranto. Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. 609; Lino Luna vs.
Rodriguez,supra.
As we analyze the facts in the light of the above rules, the
instant action is clearly one of quo warranto, although
mandamus is also invoked therein as an ancillary remedy.
It also appears that Moises Sangalang alleges in his
complaint that he had the right to the possession and
enjoyment of said office to which he had legally been
appointed, and asks hat Jose Sangalang, who is
occupying it unlawfully, be ousted. The present action,
therefore, is one whose purpose is to try the right or title
to a public office and oust he alleged unlawful holder from
its enjoyment. Such proceeding and remedy could only be
litigated in a quo warranto action according to the
authorities.
Liban v. Gordon (2009)
Facts: Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
Gordon is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordon’s incumbency
as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was
elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February
2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to
be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13,
Article VI of the Constitution
In his Comment, Gordon asserts that petitioners
have no standing to file this petition which appears to be
an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that
Gordon committed an act which, by provision of law,
constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office.
Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office
of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a
public office usurped or unlawfully held by another may
bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the
petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by
prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced
within one year after the cause of the public officers
forfeiture of office.
Issue: Whether the petitioners may legally file this
petitioner against Gordon.
Held: No. Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting
the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the
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Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation
of public office against respondent, a public officer who
allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for
the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action
is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the
Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may
commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to
the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which
case he can bring the action in his own name. The person
instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf
must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the
office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed
at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim
to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly,
petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
Period for filing – within one (1) year from date
petitioner ousted from his position
Galano v. Roxas (1975)
Facts: Roxas was elected mayor of San Mateo, Rizal.
From 2 and 6 January 1968, 24 policemen filed their
resignations and application of their terminal leaves. The
resignations were accepted by the mayor and the
payments on the applications for leave were paid to the
24 petitioners.
On 10 January 1968, Petitioners sent letters to
the Police Commission and CSC complaining that the
mayor threatened them into filing their resignations. The
hearing officer of the Police Commission recommended
that petitioners be reinstated and pay their back salaries.
Issue: Whether their petition will prosper.
Held: No. In order to make the parties aware already of
another fatal and incurable defect of the case of
petitioners and thereby save those concerned from any
further futile effort to pursue any judicial remedy, with
the concomitant waste of money and time, the unbending
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a
petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles
to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the
date the petitioner is ousted from his position.
Accordingly, after said period has lapsed, the
remedy of the aggrieved party, if any, lies exclusively with
administrative authorities. In the case at bar, the theory
of petitioners themselves is that they were separated
from the service thru the ruse of accepting their "courtesy
resignations" between January 2 and 6, 1968 and the
record shows that they were aware of the supposed
illegality of their ouster as early as January 10, 1968, the
date of their separate letters to the Police Commission
and the Civil Service Commission impugning the action of
respondent mayor. It is thus evident that in the premises,
they are beyond the help of the courts, their time to resort
thereto having lapsed.
The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable
that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one
is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies
neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the
right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another
and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file
the proper judicial action within the reglementary period.
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Exception
Cristobal v. Melchor (1977)
Facts: Cristobal was formerly employed as a private
secretary in the President’s Private Office in Malacañang.
On or about the second week of January, 1962, the then
Executive Secretary Mutuc, by means of a letter dated
January 1, 1962, informed Cristobal that his he is being
“terminated effective today”. A similar letter was
addressed by Secretary Mutuc to some other employees
in the Office of the President. The dismissed employees
appealed to the President by means of letters dated
January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a
reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a
letter dated February 27, 1962, their request for
reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting by
authority of the President.
On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who
were separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a civil action
before CFI a complaint against Secretary Mutuc and the
cash disbursing officer of the Office of the President
praying for reinstatement and the payment of their
salaries effective as of January 1, 1962 (Ingles case).
From a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said
employees appealed to the Supreme Court which
rendered a decision promulgated on November 29, 1968
reversing the dismissal of their complaint and declaring
their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law,
and ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their
salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their
actual reinstatement.
Sometime in Ma 1962, when the civil action filed
by Ingles, et als. was still pending in the CFI. the
dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled
to their , without prejudice to the continuation of their
civil action, With respect to the other employees who
were not reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary
Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañang so
that they may be re-employed. Cristobal was one of those
who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to
any positions as befits his qualifications.
He waited for Secretary Mutuc to make good his
assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until
Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance
to be reemployed at "the opportune time."
After the decision of the of the Supreme Court
of the Ingles case on November 29, 1968, Cristobal
addressed a letter to the Office of the President dated
January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former
position and the payment of salary from January 1, 1962
up to the time of actual reinstatement, supposedly in
accordance with the Ingles case. This request was denied
repeatedly by the Office of the President in successive
letters addressed to the plaintiff dated September 1,
1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970,
and May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter
"definitely closed."
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Having received the letter of May 19, 1971,
from the Office of the President, Jose Cristobal filed on
August 10, 1971, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a complaint
Issue: Whether the case is barred for Cristobal’s failure
to file the case within the 1 year prescriptive period
Whether plaintiff can seek judicial relief for not
having filed his complaint within one year?
Held: Yes. There are certain exceptional circumstances
attending which take this case out of the rule enunciated
above and lead Us to grant relief to appellant. Thus —
There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the
part of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his
right to reinstatement in office.
We lay stress on the findings of the trial court
based on the uncommitted evidence of plaintiff Cristobal
that upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962,
advising him of his separation from the service, Cristobal,
with the other dismissed employees, sought
reconsideration in a letter dated January 3, 1962, calling
inter alia the attention of then Executive Secretary
Amelito Mutuc that he (Cristobal) was a civil eligible
employee with eight years of service in the government
and consequently entitled to security of tenure under the
Constitution. This was followed by another letter of
January 26, 1962.
Reconsideration having been denied, a
complaint was filed on March 24, 1062, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila entitled "Raul R. Ingles, et al. vs.
Amelito R. Mutuc, et al.", (Civil Case 49965) which prayed
for reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January
1, 1962. The trial court dismiss this complaint but upon
appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed
in a Decision promulgated on November 29, 1968, in G.R.
L-20390, the Court holding that the removal of the
plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to law and
that they were entitled to be reinstated with payment of
their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their
actual reinstatement.
Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil
case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his
cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case
Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement
together with the other employees who had filed the
complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will
be shown more in detail later.
More importantly, Cristobal could be expected
— without necessarily spending time and money by going
to court — to relied upon the outcome of the case filed by
his co-employees to protect his interests considering the
similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein
and the Identifical relief being sought.
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does
not apply to quo warranto cases against persons
who usurp an office in a private corporation
Calleja v. Panday (2006)
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Facts: Panday et al. filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court (“RTC”) of San
Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto under Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court against Calleja et al., alleging that from
1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court,
they had been members of the board of directors and
officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime
in May 2005, Calleja et al., who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation,
forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the
powers which supposedly belonged to Panday et al.
The RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur issued an
Order transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City, since
the verified petition showed Panday et al. to be residents
of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action
for quo warranto should be brought in the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the
respondents or any of the respondents resides. However,
the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive
the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto,
stating that improper venue is not a ground for
transferring a quo warranto case to another
administrative jurisdiction.
In its assailed Order, the RTC of San Jose,
Camarines Sur ruled in part that:
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs cause of
action involves controversies arising out of intra-
corporate relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which
originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11,
1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and
decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated
functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA
8799…, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were
transferred []to the Court of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over these cases. Pursuant to this
mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court…, promulgated
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC…designat[ing] certain branches of
the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and
Exchange Commission Cases arising within their
respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the
National Capital Region and within the respective
provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial
Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur,
(Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo
M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as special court (Section
1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).
… … …
In the light of the above-noted observations and
discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates
that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section
8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of
the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is
hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court
Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
has been designated as special court to try and decide
intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
Issue: Whether it was proper for the RTC of San Jose,
Camarines Sur to order the transfer of venue of the case
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to RTC Naga based on Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
considering that the case involved an alleged usurpation
in the offices, powers and functions of duly elected
members of the board of directors.
Held: No. It should be noted that allegations in a
complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped
the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members
of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for
an intra-corporate controversy. Prior to the enactment of
R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose
Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of
Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to actions of quo warranto against
persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise;
public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated, while [a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a
corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and are governed by its
rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended).
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section
5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.
xxx
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against
persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not
change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against
persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads
thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against
individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;
xxxx
As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a)
of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the
phrase or an office in a corporation created by authority
of law which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the
present Rule 66 only applies to actions
of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers
who forfeit their office; and associations which act
as corporations without being legally incorporated
despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore,
the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the
Interim Rules) which applies to the petition
for quo warranto filed by Panday et al. before the trial
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court since what is being questioned is the authority of
Calleja et al. to assume the office and act as the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
Showing of clear right
General v. Urro (2011)
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (“President
Arroyo”) appointed Imelda C. Roces (“Commissioner
Roces”) as Commissioner of the National Police
Commission on 20 September 2004. Under the law, she
was supposed to serve said position for six (6) years, had
it not been for her untimely demise in September 2007.
As a result, President Arroyo appointed petitioner
General’s appointment as acting Commissioner on 21 July
2008.
Later, President Arroyo appointed respondent
Urro to take the place of General. Urro’s appointment
paper was dated 5 March 2010. In a letter dated 19 March
2015, the Chief of Staff of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) expressed his congratulations
to Urro and attached his appointment paper to said letter.
Urro took his oath of office as NAPOLCOM Commissioner
on 25 March 2010.
On 22 March 2010, General filed the present
petition for quo warranto, and certiorari and/or
prohibition questioning the validity of Urro’s appointment
on the ground, among others, that the appointment
issued to him was really a regular appointment since R.A.
No. 6975 does not allegedly allow an appointment of a
NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity. As a
regular appointee, the petitioner argues that he cannot
be removed from office except for cause.
Issue: Whether Atty. General has clearly shown his
right to the position of Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM.
Held: No. There is nothing in the provisions of R.A. No.
6975 which prevents the president from appointing
NAPOLCOM commissioners in an acting capacity. Given
the wide latitude of the President’s appointing authority
(and the strict construction against any limitation on or
qualification of this power), the prohibition on the
President from issuing an acting appointment must either
be specific, or there must be a clear repugnancy between
the nature of the office and the temporary appointment.
No such limitation on the Presidents appointing power
appears to be clearly deducible from the text of R.A. No.
6975. There is also nothing in the enumeration of the
functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would
be subverted or defeated by the President’s appointment
of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the
selection and qualification of a permanent appointee.
General’s appointment in an acting capacity was
subject to the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called to do so by the appointing authority, the
president of the Republic of the Philippines. His separation
from the service does not import removal but merely the
expiration of his term a mode of termination of official
relations that falls outside the coverage of the
constitutional provision on security of tenure since no
removal from office is involved. Thus, General’s
appointment as Acting Commissioner ipso facto expired
on July 21, 2009 when it was not renewed either in an
acting or a permanent capacity. With an expired
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appointment, he technically now occupies no position on
which to anchor his quo warranto petition.
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with
respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo
warranto proceedings are commenced by the
Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may
commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the
public office allegedly usurped by another. We stress that
the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his
own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in
dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any
stage.
Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 of the
same Rules requires the
petitioner to state in the petition his right to the
public office and the respondent’s unlawful
possession of the disputed position.
As early as 1905, the Court already held that for
a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing
private individual must show a clear right to the contested
office. His failure to establish this right warrants the
dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action; it is not
even necessary to pass upon the right of the
defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in
the undisturbed possession of his office.
Since General merely holds an acting
appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does
not have a cause of action to maintain the present
petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its
temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time
by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo
warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an
office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation,
must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to
succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
Republic v. Sereno (2018)
FACTS: After having served as professor at the U.P.
College of Law until 2006, and thereafter as practitioner
in various outfits including as legal counsel for the
Republic until 2009, the respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court in July 2010. In support of her application
as Associate Justice, respondent submitted to the Office
of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) her SALN for the year 2006.
Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P.
HRDO, the Ombudsman and the ORSN of the JBC stand,
the only SALNs available on record and filed by
respondent were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989,
1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and
2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-year
government service in U.P. No SALNs were filed from
2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel
for the Republic. Neither was there SALN filed when she
resigned from U.P. College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and
when she supposedly re-entered government service as
of August 16, 2010.
Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to
the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
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Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the present
Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and
altogether exclude respondent therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over Quo Warranto cases against impeachable
officers?
HELD: Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part,
provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court,
the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court provides that the venue of an action for quo
warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is
either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the
Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs, direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed
when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the
instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified
considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than Member of the Court. The
issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises public office is matter of
public concern over which the government takes special
interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or
impostor to occupy public position.
The instant petition is case of transcendental
importance
While traditionally, the principle of
transcendental importance applies as an exception to the
rule requiring locus standi before the Courts can exercise
its judicial power of review, the same principle
nevertheless, finds application in this case as it is without
doubt that the State maintains an interest on the issue of
the legality of the Chief Justice's appointment.
Further, it is apparent that the instant petition
is one of first impression and of paramount importance to
the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and
appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest
official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an
action for quo warranto. The Court's action on the present
petition has far-reaching implications, and it is paramount
that the Court make definitive pronouncements on the
issues herein presented for the guidance of the bench,
bar, and the public in future analogous cases. Thus, the
questions herein presented merit serious consideration
from the Court and should not be trifled on.
Policy and ethical considerations likewise
behoove this Court to rule on the issues put forth by the
parties. This Court has always been vigilant advocate in
ensuring that its members and employees continuously
possess the highest ideals of integrity, honesty, and
uprightness. More than professional competence, this
Court is cognizant of the reality that the strength of Our
institution depends on the confidence reposed on Us by
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the public. As can be gleaned from Our recent decisions,
this Court has not hesitated from disciplining its members
whether they be judges, Justices or regular court
employees. This case should not therefore be treated
merely with kid gloves because it involves the highest
official of the judicial branch of the government. On the
contrary, this is an opportune time for this Court to exact
accountability by examining whether there has been strict
compliance with the legal and procedural requirements in
the appointment of its Members.
Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed
independently and simultaneously
Aside from the difference in their origin and
nature, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed
independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable
rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4)
limitations.
The term "quo warranto" is Latin for "by what
authority." Therefore, as the name suggests, quo
warranto is writ of inquiry It detennines whether an
individual has the legal right to hold the public office he
or she occupies.
In review, Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Action by Government against individuals. An
action for the usurpation of public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by verified petition brought
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or
franchise;
(b) public officer who does or suffers an act
which, by the provision of law, constitutes ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as corporation
within the Philippines without being legally incorporated
or without lawful authority so to act.
Thus, quo warranto proceeding is the proper
legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office or to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to
offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the
eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment,
what is determined is the legality of the appointment.
The title to public office may not be contested
collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. In the past, the Court held that title to public
office cannot be assailed even through mandamus or
motion to annul or set aside order. That quo warranto is
the proper legal vehicle to directly attack title to public
office likewise precludes the filing of petition for
prohibition for purposes of inquiring into the validity of
the appointment of public officer. Thus, in Nacionalista
Party v. De Vera, the Court held:
"[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed
against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers,
cannot be treated as substitute for quo warranto or be
rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of
the writ. If there is court, judge or officer de facto, the
title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned
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by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of judicial
office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief
through writ of prohibition commanding the alleged
intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in
its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by
which to determine the title to an office."
As earlier discussed, an action for quo warranto
may be commenced by the Solicitor General or public
prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to
the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
That usurpation of public office is treated as
public wrong and carries with it public interest in our
jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that
where the action is for the usurpation of public office,
position or franchise, it shall be commenced by verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines through the Solicitor General or public
prosecutor.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may suspend or turn down
the institution of an action for quo warranto where there
are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of case certified
to him, the Solicitor General may start the prosecution of
the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he
may choose not to file the case at all. The Solicitor
General is given permissible latitude within his legal
authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only
by the national interest and the government policy on the
matter at hand.
The instance when an individual is allowed to
commence an action for quo warranto in his own name is
when such person is claiming to be entitled to public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. Feliciano v. Villasin reiterates the basic principle
enunciated in Acosta v. Flor that for quo warranto petition
to be successful, the private person suing must show no
less than clear right to the contested office.
In case of usurpation of public office, when the
respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising public office, position or
franchise, the judgment shall include the following:
(a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded
from the office;
(b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be,
shall recover his costs; and
(c) such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires.
The remedies available in quo warranto
judgment do not include correction or reversal of acts
taken under the ostensible authority of an office or
franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and
may not be imposed retroactively upon prior exercise of
official or corporate duties.
Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not
mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed
simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against
the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing
quo warranto proceeding.
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Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by
which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office
Respondent anchors her position that she can
be removed from office only by impeachment on the
Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenco v.
Fernan, In Re Gonzales,Jarque v. Desierto and Marcoleta
v. Borra. It should be stressed, however, that none of
these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable
officer's appointment. Lecaroz involved criminal charge
against mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest
were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers
principally for acts done during their tenure in public
office. Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held
his office or whether his appointment was void was not
an issue raised before the Court. The principle laid down
in said cases is to the effect that during their incumbency,
impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for
an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and
if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar
to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with
disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions
assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he
or she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as
authority to hold that quo warranto action can never be
filed against an impeachable officer. In issuing such
pronouncement, the Court is presumed to have been
aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution does not foreclose quo warranto
action against impeachable officers. The provision reads:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
It is settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the
language under consideration is plain, it is neither
necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like
the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation.
The provision uses the permissive term "may"
which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and
cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. We have
consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of
that opportunity is vested with right or faculty which he
has the option to exercise. An option to remove by
impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting
the removal.
Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable
offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be complete statement
of the causes of removal from office.
Neither can the Court accept respondent's
argument that the term "may" in Section 2, Article XI
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qualifies only the penalty imposable at the conclusion of
the impeachment trial, such that conviction may result in
lesser penalties like censure or reprimand. Section 3(7),
Article XI of the Constitution specifies the penalty of
"removal from office" and "disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines" in
impeachment cases.169 There is nothing in the said
provision that deliberately vests authority on the
impeachment court to impose penalties lower than those
expressly mentioned. Also, respondent has not shown
that such was authority was intended by the framers of
the 1987 Constitution. The ultimate penalty of removal is
imposed owing to the serious nature of the impeachable
offenses.
The courts should be able to inquire into the
validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To
hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where
Bar membership is qualification, when he or she
fraudulently represented to be member of the Bar. Unless
such an officer commits any of the grounds for
impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue
discharging the functions of his office even when he is
clearly disqualified from holding it Such would result in
permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to
continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive
sovereign functions until they are successfully removed
from office through impeachment. This could not have
been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
Rule 67
Expropriation
Distinction between eminent domain and
expropriation
Eminent domain - one of the inherent powers of the
state; it is the right to take or reassert dominion over
property within the state for public use or to meet a public
exigency and is said to be an essential party of
governance even in its most primitive form
Expropriation - process by which the power of eminent
domain is carried out; taking as of private owned
property, by government under eminent domain
Stages of expropriation; Period to appeal from
order of expropriation
Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia (1989)
Facts: The expropriation suit involved in this case was
commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Biñan,
Laguna filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna and City
of San Pablo, presided over by respondent Judge Jose Mar
Garcia. The complaint named as defendants the owners
of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan. The land
sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the
new site of a modern public market and the acquisition
was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Biñan approved on April 11, 1983.
One of the defendants, Erlinda Francisco, filed a
"Motion to Dismiss" on the following grounds; (a) the
allegations of the complaint are vague and conjectural;
(b) the complaint violates the constitutional limitations of
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law and jurisprudence on eminent domain; (c) it is
oppressive; (d) it is barred by prior decision and
disposition on the subject matter; and (e) it states no
cause of action. She also filed a "Motion for Separate
Trial," alleging that she had, among other defenses, "a
constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing
approved Locational Clearance” which supposedly
constitutes a legal bar against the right of plaintiff
Municipality to expropriate the said property.
Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an
Order dated July 27, 1984, dismissing the complaint as
against defendant Francisco and amending the Writ of
Possession so as to exclude therefrom and from its force
and effects said defendant and her property. On even
date, the notice of Order was served on the Municipality.
The Municipality filed on August 17, 1984 a
Motion for Reconsideration. It argued, among others,
that the locational clearance did not mean that other
persons are already prevented from filing locational
clearance for the same project, and so could not be
considered a bar to expropriation. Francisco filed an "Ex-
Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order,"
contending that the Order of July 27, 1984 had become
final and executory on August 12, 1984 for failure of the
Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal within the reglementary period, 14 i.e fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order appealed
from.
The respondent court issued an Order declaring
the Municipality's motion for reconsideration dated
August 15, 1984 to have been filed out of time.
Issue: Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration
was filed out of time.
Held: No. There are two (2) stages in every action of
expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. 19 It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of
course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action
is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken."
This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. 23 The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and
leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. A dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order
by taking an appeal therefrom.
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A similar two-phase feature is found in the
special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule
69 of the Rules of Court.
This Court has settled the question of the finality
and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition
or recovery of property and/or accounting. In Miranda v.
Court of Appeals, it was held that a decision or order of
partition is not final because it leaves something more to
be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of
the case, i.e, the appointment of commissioners, the
proceedings for the determination by said commissioners
of just compensation, the submission of their reports, and
hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition. As
pointed out in Miranda, imperative considerations of
public policy, of sound practice and adherence to the
constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action require that
judgments for recovery (or partition) of property with
accounting be considered as final judgments, duly
appealable. This, notwithstanding that further
proceedings will still have to be rendered by the party
required to do so, it will be ventilated and discussed by
the parties, and will eventually be passed upon by the
Court.
No reason presents itself for different
disposition as regards cases of eminent domain. On the
contrary, the close analogy between the special actions of
eminent domain and partition already pointed out, argues
for the application of the same rule to both proceedings.
The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent
domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two
(2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from
an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted
from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen
(15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably
with the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing
Rules to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings
in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the
period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of
appeal being required.
The municipality's motion for reconsideration
filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely presented,
well within the thirty-day period laid down by law
therefor; and it was error for the respondent court to have
ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order
sought to be considered had become final and executory.
Meaning of just compensation
“Just compensation” is the full and fair equivalent
of the property sought to be expropriated
Republic of The Philippines v. Hon. Gingoyon
(2005)
Facts: This case stemmed from the promulgation of the
Court’s decision in the 2003 case of Agan v. PIATCO. This
decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III"
entered into between the Philippine Government
(Government) and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), on the ground, among
others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of
PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity
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when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the
agreement was contrary to public policy.
At the time of the promulgation of the 2003
Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by
PIATCO and were nearing completion. However,
the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA
3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as
well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for
its expenses. Thus, in its 2004 Resolution, the Supreme
Court held that since the structures comprising the NAIA
IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have
been spent by PIATCO in their construction, the
government, for it to take over the facility, has to
compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures.
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan,
the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO. Thus, the Government filed a complaint for
expropriation with the RTC. The Government deposited
the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 in Cash with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3
terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.
The respondent Judge noted that under
Republic Act No. 8974, otherwise known as "An Act to
Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location
for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For
Other Purposes", the Government is required to make
immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to
make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No.
8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated
in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, the Government was prohibited from
performing acts of ownership prior to full payment of just
compensation.
The Government insists that Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in
this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other
hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which
does apply
Issue: Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act
No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this
case.
Held: The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is
especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely:
(i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law and
equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking
over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid. Thus,
as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the
Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was
preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just
compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which
eminent domain may be exercised by the Government.
Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary
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guideline through which the State may expropriate
private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local
Government Code governs as to the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain
through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act
No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a
procedure eminently more favorable to the property
owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
when the national government expropriates property "for
national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if
expropriation is engaged in by the national government
for purposes other than national infrastructure projects,
the assessed value standard and the deposit mode
prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the
Government commences expropriation proceedings
through the filing of a complaint. The most crucial
difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974
concerns the particular essential step the Government
has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession.
Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with
an authorized government depositary the assessed value
of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a
writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974
requires that the Government make a direct payment to
the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover,
such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR
in the case of land, the value of the improvements or
structures under the replacement cost method, or if no
such valuation is available and in cases of utmost
urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
Clearly, the staging of expropriation
proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67
would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3
facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes the 2004
Resolution in Agan, since under Rule 67, all the
Government need do to obtain a writ of possession is to
deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with
an authorized government depositary. Applying Rule 67
herein would violate the Court’s requirement in the 2004
Resolution that there must first be payment of just
compensation to PIATCO before the Government may
take over the property.
As regards the proper amount which should be
paid to PIATCO by the Government before the writ of
possession may issue under Rep. Act No. 8974. The BIR
zonal valuation under Rep. Act No. 8974 cannot apply in
this case since zonal valuations are only for parcels of
land, not for airport terminals, and PIATCO cannot be
reimbursed or justly compensated for the value of the
parcel of land on which NAIA 3 stands, not being the
owner of said land. Nevertheless, Rep. Act No. 8974
permits an expedited means by which the Government
can immediately take possession of the property without
having to await precise determination of the valuation of
the improvements and structures. Section 4(c) of Rep.
Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a
government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency
and importance, and there is no existing valuation of
the area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred
value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed
in Section 5 [of the law].
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In this case, the Court sees no impediment to
recognize the sum of P3 Billion which the Government has
deposited as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of
Rep. Act No. 8974. However, while the Court agrees
that P3 Billion should be considered as the correct
proffered value, still the Government cannot be
considered to have faithfully complied with Rep. Act No.
8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the
property owner, and not a mere deposit with the
authorized government depositary. Without such direct
payment, no writ of possession may be obtained. Rep.
Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from
previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Rule 67 and
the Local Government Code merely provided that the
Government deposit the initial amounts antecedent to
acquiring possession of the property with, respectively,
an authorized Government depositary or the proper
court. In both cases, the private owner does not receive
compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the
other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate
payment of the initial just compensation prior to the
issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
Government.
Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21
December 2004 should be held in abeyance, pending
proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of
the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities, which
totals P3,002,125,000.00.
Writ of possession
Republic Of The Philippines V. Tagle (1998)
Facts: Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels
of land (the “subject land”) in Cavite. On 30 March 1983,
Benitez signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(“PHRDC”) which provides, among others, that Benitez
undertakes to lease within the period of twenty (20) years
and/or sell a portion of that property in favor of PHRDC.
Accordingly, a lease contract was executed. After the
expiration of the lease contract, negotiations began on
the purchase of the subject land. However, for reasons
known only to her, Benitez did not sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell
the lot in question. Thereafter, Benitez demanded PHRDC
the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises.
Subsequently, Benitez filed an unlawful detainer case
against PHRDC. Meanwhile, due to its failure to acquire
the subject land through negotiated sale, PHRDC, through
the Department of Trade and Industry (the “petitioner”),
instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain. Subsequently,
the petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession, which was granted. Aggrieved, Benitez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (“MR”). Said MR was granted,
thus the Writ of Possession previously issued was
quashed. The judge quashed the Writ of Possession on
the ground that the petitioner is already occupying the
property sought to be expropriated.
Issue: May a judge quash a writ of possession on the
ground that the expropriating agency is already
occupying the property sought to be expropriated?
Held: No. It is undisputed that the expropriation
proceeding in the case at bar involves a development
project covered by EO 1035. Section 7 of EO 1035
provides:
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SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree
in negotiation of the sale of the land as provided in the
preceding section, the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to
immediately institute expropriation proceedings through
the Office of the Solicitor General, as the case may be.
The just compensation to be paid for the property
acquired through expropriation shall be in accordance
with the provisions of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give
priority to the adjudication of cases on expropriation and
shall immediately issue the necessary writ of possession
upon deposit by the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount
equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of just
compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533; Provided,
That the period within which said writ of possession shall
be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5) days
from the date such deposit was made.
Under this statutory provision, when the
government or its authorized agent makes the required
deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a
writ of possession.
The expropriation of real property does not
include mere physical entry or occupation of land.
Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of
title, there may also be compensable taking of only some,
not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights
that constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the
petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of
eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner
intended to acquire not only physical possession but also
the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the
subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and
occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title,
which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation,
which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not
by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of
ownership. Its right to possess did not attend its initial
physical possession of the property because the lease,
which had authorized said possession, lapsed. In short,
petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but
possession de jure as well.
It would be circuitous, if not legally absurd, for
this Court to require petitioner to first vacate the property
in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer
case, and soon afterwards, order the trial court to issue
in petitioners favor a writ of possession pursuant to the
expropriation proceedings. Such a scenario is a
bureaucratic waste of precious time and resources. This
precisely is the sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay
of government infrastructure or development projects,
which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the
immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly,
said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere
physical possession that is gained by entering the
property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim
of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess,
the expropriated property.
Conflicting claims on the property
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion
Development Authority, et al. (2011)
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Facts: In late 2003, Bases Conversion Development
Authority (“BCDA”) filed several expropriation actions
before the various branches of the RTC of Angeles City for
the acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the
Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project. Upon learning of
the expropriation cases, Philippine Veterans Bank (the
“petitioner”) filed motions to intervene in all the cases
with attached complaints-in-intervention. Petitioner
alleged that the properties subject of expropriation
actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial
Development Corp., which mortgage the lands to
petitioner in 1976. Petitioner had since foreclosed on the
mortgages and bought the same at public auction in
1982. Unfortunately, petitioner had been unable to
consolidate ownership in its name.
In its Order dated 18 August 2004, however, the
RTC denied petitioner’s motion for intervention on the
ground that the intervention amounts to a third-party
complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and
that the intervention would delay the proceedings in the
cases before it. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case
before the CA, which affirmed the RTC’s Order denying
petitioner’s motion for intervention. Meanwhile, the RTC
issued separate decisions granting the expropriation of
the subject properties.
Issue: Did the CA erred in ruling that petitioner is not
allowed to intervene in the expropriation cases?
Held: Although under Section 9, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court adjudicating
the expropriation case to hear and decide conflicting
claims regarding the ownership of the properties
involved, such rule obviously cannot apply to petitioner
because at the time petitioner tried to intervene in the
expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer
beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating
from such titles were already pending before Angeles City
RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. As
such, Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62
of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were
already pending before it.
While petitioner withdrew the actions it filed with Branch
62 after the CA dismissed its petition, the same cannot
still authorize Branch 58 to decide the conflicting claims
because jurisdiction over the annulment of the individual
defendants CLOAs and EPs (which titles if annulled would
leave PVBs titles to the lands unchallenged) lies with the
DARAB. Accordingly, Branch 58 would still have no power
to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by the
PVBs intervention.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10752, otherwise known as
“The Right-of-Way Act
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10752, otherwise known as “The
Right-of-Way Act," which was enacted on 7 March 2016,
effectively repealed R.A. No. 8974. R.A. No. 10752 covers
the acquisition of real properties needed as right-of-way,
site or location for national government.
The salient provisions of R.A. No. 10752 are as follows:
Section 3
SEC. 3. National Government Projects. – As used
in this Act, the term “national government
projects” shall refer to all national government
infrastructure projects and its public service
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facilities, engineering works and service
contracts, including projects undertaken by
government-owned and -controlled corporations,
all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise
known as the “Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law”,
and other related and necessary activities, such
as site acquisition, supply or installation of
equipment and materials, implementation,
construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and
rehabilitation, regardless of the source of
funding. Subject to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991”, local government
units (LGUs) may also adopt the provisions of this
Act for use in the acquisition of right-of-way for
local government infrastructure projects.
Section 4
SEC. 4. Modes of Acquiring Real Property. – The
government may acquire real property needed as
right-of-way site or location for any national
government infrastructure project through
donation, negotiated sale, expropriation, or any
other mode of acquisition as provided by law. xxx
Section 5
SEC. 5. Rules on Negotiated Sale. – The
implementing agency may offer to acquire,
through negotiate sale, the right-of-way site or
location for a national government infrastructure
project, under the following rules.
(a) The implementing agency shall offer to the
property owner concerned, as compensation
price, the sum of:
1) The current market value of the land,
2) The replacement cost of structures and
improvements therein; and
3) The current market value of crops and trees
therein.
xxx xxx xxx
If the property owner does not accept the price
offer, the implementing agency shall initiate
expropriation proceedings pursuant to Section 6
hereof.
The property owner is given thirty (30) days to
decide whether or not to accept the offer as
payment for his property. Upon refusal or failure
of the property owner to accept such offer or fails
and/or refuses to submit the documents
necessary for payments, the implementing
agency shall immediately initiate expropriation
proceedings as provided in Section 6 herein.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Upon the execution of a deed of sale, the
implementing agency shall pay the property
owner:
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1) Fifty percent (50%) of the negotiated price
of the affected land, exclusive of taxes remitted
to the LGU concerned under subparagraph (d)
herein; and
2) Seventy percent (70%) of the negotiated
price of the affected structures, improvements,
crops and trees, exclusive of unpaid taxes
remitted to the LGU concerned under
subparagraph (d) herein.
(g) The implementing agency shall, at the times
stated hereunder, pay the property owner the
remaining fifty percent (50%) of the negotiated
price of the affected land, and thirty percent
(30%) of the affected structures, improvements,
crops and trees, exclusive of unpaid taxes
remitted to the LGU concerned under
subparagraph (d) herein. xxx
Section 6.
SEC. 6. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.
– Whenever it is necessary to acquire real
property for the right-of-way site or location for
any national government infrastructure through
expropriation, the appropriate implementing
agency, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel, or their deputize government or private
legal counsel, shall immediately initiate the
expropriation proceedings before the proper
court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter, and after due notice to the defendant,
the implementing agency shall immediately
deposit to the court in favor of the owner the
amount equivalent to the sum of:
1) One hundred percent (100%) of the value
of the land based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) issued not more than three (3) years prior
to the filing of the expropriation complaint
subject to subparagraph (c) of this section;
2) The replacement cost at current market
value of the improvements and structures.
3) The current market value of crops and trees
located within the property as determined by a
government financial institution or an
independent property appraiser to be selected as
indicated in subparagraph (a) of Section 5
hereof.
Upon compliance with the guidelines
abovementioned, the court shall immediately
issue to the implementing agency an order to
take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project.
If, within seven (7) working days after the
deposit to the court of the amount equivalent to
the sum under subparagraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3) of
this section, the court has not issued to the
implementing agency a writ of possession for the
affected property, the counsel of the
implementing agency shall immediately seek
from the court the issuance of the writ of
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possession. The court shall issue the writ of
possession ex parte; no hearing shall be
required.
The court shall release the amount to the owner
upon presentation of sufficient proofs of
ownership.
(b) In case the owner of the property cannot be
found, if unknown, or deceased in cases where
the estate has not been settled, after exerting
due diligence, or there are conflicting claims over
the ownership of the property and improvements
and structures thereon, the implementing agency
shall deposit the amount equivalent to the sum
under subparagraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3) of this
section to the court for the benefit of the person
to be adjudged in the same proceeding as
entitled thereto.
Upon compliance with the guidelines
abovementioned, the court shall immediately
issue to the implementing agency an order to
take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project.
If, within seven (7) working days after the
deposit to the court of the amount equivalent to
the sum under subparagraphs (a)(1) to (a)(3) of
this section, the court has not issued to the
implementing agency a writ of possession for the
affected property, counsel of the implementing
agency shall immediately seek from the court the
issuance of the writ of possession.
The court shall release the amount to the person
adjudged same expropriation proceeding as
entitled thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) With reference to subparagraph (a)(1) of this
section, in case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no land classification or
no existing zonal valuation of the area concerned
or the zonal valuation has been in force for more
than three (3) years, the implementing agency
shall use the BIR zonal value and land
classification of similar lands within the adjacent
vicinity as the basis for the valuation.
(e) In any of the cases in subparagraphs (a) to
(d) of this section, upon its receipt of the writ of
possession issued by the court, the implementing
agency may take possession of the property and
start the implementation of the project.
(f) In the event that the owner of the property
contests the implementing agency’s proffered
value, the court shall determine the just
compensation to be paid the owner within sixty
(60) days from the date of filing of the
expropriation case. When the decision of the
court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid and
the just compensation as determined by the
court.
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(g) With regard to the taxes and fees relative to
the transfer of title of the property to the
Republic of the Philippines through expropriation
proceedings, the implementing agency shall pay
the documentary stamp tax, transfer tax and
registration fees, while the owner shall pay the
capital gains tax and any unpaid real property
tax.
In the 2018 case of Felisa Agricultural Corporation v.
National Transmission Corporation, et al., the Supreme
Court, citing R.A. No. 10752, in an obiter dictum declared
that:
The Court reminds the government and its agencies that
it is their obligation to immediately initiate eminent
domain proceedings whenever they intend to take private
property for any public purpose, which includes the
payment of the provisional value thereof.
The Supreme Court cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 10752 as
a footnote when it referred to the determination and
payment of the provisional value of the property taken by
the government.
In the 2020 case of Republic v Posadas, while the
Supreme Court mentioned that R.A. 10752 repealed R.A.
No. 8974, such repeal did not affect the Republic’s
obligation to deposit the land’s zonal value plus the value
of the improvements therein. R.A. No. 10752
substantially retained the deposit requirement under R.A.
No. 8974.
The Supreme Court in Posadas sustained the dismissal of
the case by the trial court because the Republic failed to
file an amended complaint. The order of dismissal
therefore effectively divested the respondents Posadas of
their property without imposing on the Republic the
concomitant constitutional obligation to pay just
compensation. However, since the records of the case do
not show exactly: (a) how much (area) of the property
was taken, and when (time) the actual taking took place,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court
for its determination, and in order to properly compute
the amount of just compensation due to respondents
Posadas. The Supreme Court thereafter discussed
relevant principles to guide the trial court in determining
just compensation.
For easy reference, a digest of the case of
Posadas is as follows:
Republic v. Posadas III
G.R. No. 214310, February 24, 2020
FACTS: On July 4, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed a complaint for expropriation before the
RTC of Makati against 181 individuals and corporations
owning land situated along Sucat Road in Parañaque. The
properties were earmarked by the DPWH for a road-
widening project. However, out of all the named
defendants, only Alfonso Cruz and the respondents,
namely: Estela Marfori Posadas, Maria Elena Posadas, and
the Estate of Juan Maria Posadas III (respondents),
appeared to oppose the complaint.
In the complaint, it was stated that the DPWH needed
15,554 square meters of the respondents' land for the
project. The Republic alleged that the property had an
appraised value of P18,664,800.00, but the Estate of Juan
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Maria Posadas III contested such valuation in its answer,
arguing that the land was worth much more.
On January 8, 1991, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive
Order No. 1035, the Republic deposited with the Escolta
Branch of the Philippine National Bank the amount of
P1,866,480.00, representing 10% of the value of the
property. It then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of possession so that it could take possession of the land.
The record, however, does not show the exact date of the
Republic's entry into the property.
The respondents contested neither the public purpose
behind the taking of their property nor the propriety of
the deposit. Accordingly, on July 16, 1993, they filed a
joint motion to withdraw deposit, which the RTC allowed.
Nonetheless, since the respondents were contesting the
property's value, the trial court ruled that the final
amount of just compensation was still subject to the
outcome of the case. On August 6, 1993, the respondents
filed another Joint Motion to Withdraw Deposit, this time
praying for the payment of P16,798,320.00, representing
the balance of the property's provisional value. However,
despite the grant of the motion and subsequent orders
directing the disbursement of the balance, the Republic
never paid.
In a letter, DPWH said that it would be occupying a
different portion of the respondents' property for the
project, which it sought to pursue under a different plan.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the submission of an
amended complaint to reflect the new area used by the
road-widening project. Instead of amending its complaint,
the Republic filed a manifestation and motion stating that
respondent Maria Elena Posadas had died. Accordingly, it
prayed for the suspension of the period to file its amended
complaint, contending that it could not make the required
amendments without the name of her substitute.
The respondents orally moved for the dismissal of the
case in open court. They maintained that the Republic had
no justification for failing to comply with the RTC's order
directing the amendment of the complaint. Agreeing with
the respondents, the RTC dismissed the case for failure to
comply with an order of the court. On appeal, the CA held
that the RTC did not commit any reversible error in
dismissing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a substitute for
the late Maria Elena Posadas justified the Republic's
failure to amend its complaint.
HELD: No.
It bears noting that the RTC based its order of dismissal
on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The provision
contemplates certain instances where the complaint may
be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he or she
fails to appear during a scheduled hearing, especially on
the date for the presentation of his or her evidence in
chief; (2) if he or she fails to prosecute his or her action
for an unreasonable length of time; (3) if he or she fails
to comply with the rules; or (4) if he or she fails to comply
with any order of the court. Thus, failure on the part of
the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with
any order of the court may result in the dismissal of the
complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the
defendant.
Here, the trial court dismissed the case after Atty. Luis M.
Posadas, counsel for the Estate of Juan M. Posadas III,
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orally moved for dismissal on the ground that the Republic
had failed to comply with the order directing the filing of
an amended complaint.
The trial court issued an order directing Atty. Antonio
Pesigan, Maria Elena Posadas's counsel of record, to name
his client's substitute. It appears, however, that a
representative was never named in the proceedings a
quo. In accordance with the rules, it thus became
incumbent on the trial court to direct the Republic to
procure an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased litigant. Yet, this was never done. The Republic
capitalized on this circumstance, ascribing its failure to
file an amended complaint to the fact that a
representative was never named.
Atty. Pesigan's failure to name a substitute did not justify
the non-submission of the amended complaint. The order
directing the designation of a substitute and the order
directing the amendment of the complaint were
completely independent of each other. The first was solely
between the trial court and Atty. Pesigan, while the
second was directed exclusively to the Republic, which
cannot simply shift the blame to the respondents.
For the sake of emphasis, the RTC directed the
amendment of the complaint so that the records of the
case would accurately reflect the area expropriated under
the DPWH's new plan. It goes without saying that the
Republic did not need the name of Maria Elena Posadas's
representative to show the trial court the new land area
it was going to condemn.
NOTE: The Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC
for determination of just compensation as records do not
show exact area of the property taken and the specific
date of taking. While the Supreme Court mentioned that
R.A. 10752 repealed R.A. No. 8974, such repeal did not
affect the Republic’s obligation to deposit the land’s zonal
value plus the value of the improvements therein. R.A.
No. 10752 substantially retained the deposit requirement
under R.A. No. 8974. In determining just compensation,
the Supreme Court laid down the following principles:
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court succinctly
provides the answer, viz.:
Section 4. Order of expropriation.— If the objections to
and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may
issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
In this regard, the Court, in National Power Corp. v.
Ibrahim, ruled:
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing
of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings
of this Court have equated just compensation with the
value of the property as of the time of filing of the
complaint consistent with the above provision of the
Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes
entry to the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
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UP College of Law
In other words, just compensation is, as a general rule,
based on the price or value of the property at the time
the complaint for expropriation was filed. By way of
exception, National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville
Development Corporation instructs that when the
government takes the property before initiating the
expropriation case, the property's value at the time of the
prior taking must be used as the basis for determining
just compensation.
To be sure, this is in consonance with the Court's ruling
in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., where the Court held:
Normally, of course, where the institution of an
expropriation action precedes the taking of the property
subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the
time of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by
the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the
expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposit
with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of
the property as provisionally ascertained by the court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings.
There are instances, however, where the expropriating
agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation
suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the case at bar is
quite extraordinary in that possession was taken by the
expropriator more than 40 years prior to suit. In these
instances, this Court has ruled that the just compensation
shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the
time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
In this case, since the Republic initiated expropriation
proceedings before taking the subject property, it follows
that the land's value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, i.e., June 25, 1990, should be used as the
basis for just compensation.
Necessarily, just compensation cannot be arrived at
arbitrarily. It must be determined only after an evaluation
of several factors. The assessment of these factors is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who
must enlist commissioners tasked to receive and appraise
evidence on the property's value.
It has been held in a long line of cases that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial function,
one that is best addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. In this respect, the Court, in Alfonso v. Land Bank
of the Philippines, et al., elaborated, thus:
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."
The right of a landowner to just compensation for the
taking of his or her private property is a legally
demandable and enforceable right guaranteed by no less
than the Bill of Rights, under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution. The determination of just compensation in
cases of eminent domain is thus an actual controversy
that calls for the exercise of judicial power by the courts.
x x x.
The trial court, however, should not be without aid in the
ascertainment of what constitutes just compensation. For
this purpose and as alluded to earlier, the rules direct the
court to appoint not more than three competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to it the value of the property sought to be taken.
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The commissioners may then determine just
compensation based on the evidence presented before
them, and, for the same purpose, they are also authorized
to enter and inspect the property and its surroundings.
Finally, after the reception and scrutiny of the evidence,
the commissioners have the responsibility of reporting
their findings to the trial court.
It has been held that trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right. Therefore, the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a
mandatory requirement in expropriation cases.
However, this does not mean that the commissioners'
determination of just compensation is final and binding on
the parties. Because such determination is ultimately a
judicial function, the trial court is given the discretion to
either accept or reject the commissioners' findings in
whole or in part. If the court rejects their report, it may
require them to render a supplemental report on facts yet
to be taken up, or it may appoint another set of
commissioners to provide it with an entirely new report.
The trial court is also allowed to disregard the findings of
the commissioners and use its own estimate of the
property's value. However, it may only do so for valid
reasons, such as when the commissioners apply illegal
principles to the evidence, when they disregard a clear
preponderance of evidence, or when the amount allowed
is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Once the trial
court is satisfied with the amount of just compensation, it
may render judgment ordering payment thereof to the
property owner.
In eminent domain cases, just compensation entails not
only the determination of the proper amount to be paid
to the owners of the property, but also the payment of
such amount within a reasonable time.
In National Power Corporation v. Manalastas
(Manalastas), the Court held that the just compensation
payable to the property owner amounts to an effective
forbearance on the part of the government — a proper
subject of interest, viz.:
[I]f property is taken for public use before compensation
is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on
its just value to be computed from the time the property
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking
of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s]
accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good
as (but not better than) the position he was in before the
taking occurred.
In that case, the Court awarded interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the time of taking up to June 30,
2013 and, thereafter, 6% per annum from July 1, 2013
until full satisfaction, pursuant to Section 1 of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas — Monetary Board Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013.
As mentioned earlier, the record of the instant case does
not disclose the exact time of taking. Without this date,
there is no way to determine the proper amount of
interest due on the condemned property. Hence, before
the trial court calculates interest, the date of entry must
be established by competent evidence. Only then will the
trial court be able to reckon the proper sum of interest in
accordance with the Court's ruling in Manalastas.
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UP College of Law
Taking the foregoing into account and to encapsulate the
Court's pronouncements, upon the remand of the instant
case, the trial court shall designate not more than three
commissioners to aid it in determining the fair market
value of the respondents' property back when the
complaint was filed in 1990. Then, after it satisfies itself
of the amount of just compensation, it shall ascertain the
exact date of entry into the property. It shall then impose
legal interest on the property's value at the rate of 12%
per annum from the time of taking up to June 30, 2013
and, thereafter, six percent per annum from July 1, 2013
until complete payment. Lastly, the trial court shall
subtract P1,866,480.00 from the sum awarded, since the
Republic had previously paid this amount.
Rule 68
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 68
Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. — In
an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other
encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set
forth the date and due execution of the mortgage; its
assignments, if any; the names and residences of the
mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the
mortgaged property; a statement of the date of the note
or other documentary evidence of the obligation secured
by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid
thereon; and the names and residences of all persons
having or claiming an interest in the property
subordinate in right to that of the holder of the
mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in the
action.
Section 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or
sale. If upon the trial in such action the court shall find
the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the
mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other
charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order
that the same be paid to the court or to the judgment
obligee within a period of not less than ninety (90) days
nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the
entry of judgment, and that in default of such payment
the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
Section 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. When
the defendant, after being directed to do so as provided
in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of
the judgment within the period specified therein, the
court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold
in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 and
other regulations governing sales of real estate under
execution. Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons
holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part
thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court,
also upon motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in
the property of all the parties to the action and to vest
their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by law.
Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon
the expiration of the period of redemption when allowed
by law, the purchaser at the auction sale or last
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redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession
of the property unless a third party is actually holding
the same adversely to the judgment obligor. The said
purchaser or last redemptioner may secure a writ of
possession, upon motion, from the court which ordered
the foreclosure.
Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. The
amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of
the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage,
and when there shall be any balance or residue, after
paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid
to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to
be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such
encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after
payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly
authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.
Section 5. How sale to proceed in case the debt is not
all due. If the debt for which the mortgage or
encumbrance was held is not all due as provided in the
judgment, as soon as a sufficient portion of the property
has been sold to pay the total amount and the costs due,
the sale shall terminate; and afterwards, as often as
more becomes due for principal or interest and other
valid charges, the court may, on motion, order more to
be sold. But if the property cannot be sold in portions
without prejudice to the parties, the whole shall be
ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire
debt and costs shall be paid, if the proceeds of the sale
be sufficient therefor, there being a rebate of interest
where such rebate is proper.
Section 6. Deficiency judgment. If upon the sale of
any real property as provided in the next preceding
section there be a balance due to the plaintiff after
applying the proceeds of the sale, the court, upon
motion, shall render judgment against the defendant for
any such balance for which, by the record of the case,
he may be personally liable to the plaintiff, upon which
execution may issue immediately if the balance is all due
at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise,
the plaintiff shall be entitled to execution at such time
as the balance remaining becomes due under the terms
of the original contract, which time shall be stated in the
judgment.
Section 7. Registration. A certified copy of the final
order of the court confirming the sale shall be registered
in the registry of deeds. If no right of redemption exists,
the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall
be cancelled, and a new one issued in the name of the
purchaser.
Where a right of redemption exists, the certificate of
title in the name of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled,
but the certificate of sale and the order confirming the
sale shall be registered and a brief memorandum thereof
made by the registrar of deeds upon the certificate of
title. In the event the property is redeemed, the deed of
redemption shall be registered with the registry of
deeds, and a brief memorandum thereof shall be made
by the registrar of deeds on said certificate of title.
If the property is not redeemed, the final deed of sale
executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale shall be registered with the registry of
deeds; whereupon the certificate of title in the name of
the mortgagor shall be cancelled and a new one issued
in the name of the purchaser.
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UP College of Law
Section 8. Applicability of other provisions. The
provisions of sections 31, 32 and 34 of Rule 39 shall be
applicable to the judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages under this Rule insofar as the former are not
inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the latter.
Indispensable and necessary parties in a
foreclosure complaint
- mortgagor and mortgagee (plaintiff)
Modes of foreclosure of REM
Judicial – Rule 68
Extrajudicial – Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118
Modes of foreclosure of chattel mortgage
Judicial – Rule 68; Replevin under Rule 60may be availed
of to secure possession of property as preliminary to its
sale
Extrajudicial – Sec. 14, Act 1508
Equity of redemption
Equity of redemption, means "the right of the
mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his
default in the performance of the conditions of the
mortgage but before the sale of the property or the
judicial) confirmation of the (Sheriffs) sale.
The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different
from and should not be confused with the right of
redemption. The right of redemption in relation to a
mortgage-understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-
acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale exists only in the case of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized
in a judicial foreclosure except
only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank
or a bank or banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially,
Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption
within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs
certificate of foreclosure sale.
Limpin vs. IAC (1988)
Facts: The proceedings concern two (2) lots, then
covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, which, together
with two (2) others, were originally mortgaged in 1973 to
herein private respondent Ponce by their former owners,
the Spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino. These two lots
were afterwards sold in 1978 by the same Aquino
Spouses to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation. Against
this corporation herein petitioner Limpin obtained a
money judgment in 1979; and to satisfy the judgment,
the two lots were levied on and sold at public auction in
1980, Limpin being the highest bidder. Limpin later sold
the lots to his co-petitioner, Sarmiento.
Earlier however or a day before levy was made
on the two lots in execution of the judgment against
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation. Ponce had initiated
judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage
over said two (2) lots (together with the two (2) others
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ESGUERRA NOTES
mortgaged to him Judgment was rendered in his favor
and became final; and at the ensuing foreclosure sale, the
lots were acquired by Ponce himself as highest bidder.
Ponce then moved for confirmation of the foreclosure
sale, but the Court confirmed the sale of only two lots,
refusing to do so as regards the two which had been
subject of the execution sale in Limpin's favor (i.e., those
covered TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837).
On March 11, 1988-nine months or so after
entry of the judgment recognizing his equity of
redemption as successor-in-interest of the original
mortgagors that Sarmiento finally be stirred himself to
attempt to exercise his unforeclosed equity of
redemption. On that day he filed a motion with the Court
presided over by Hon. Judge Antonio Solano, manifesting
that he would exercise the right and asked the Court to
fix the redemption price. The Court opined that "this
should be the subject of the agreement between Ponce
and Sarmiento.
Sarmiento then wrote to Ponce on March 23,
1988 offering "P 2.6 million as redemption price for the
two lots originally covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and
92837, now 307100 and 307124. Ponce's answer, dated
March 25, 1988, rejected the offer said averred "that the
period within which ... (Sarmiento) could have exercised
such right ... (had) lapsed. Sarmiento reacted by filing a
motion with the Solano Court, dated March 29, 1988,
asking it to "fix the redemption price ... and that the
implementation of the writ of possession be provisionally
deferred. An opposition was promptly filed by Ponce
under date of May 4, 1988 in which he argued that
"Sarmiento's right to exercise his equity of redemption
over those lots had long expired," the opportunity to
exercise it having presented itself but not availed of "(i)
after ... default in the performance of the conditions of
the mortgage and (ii) before the Sheriffs sale of the
property and the judicial confirmation thereof." According
to Ponce, "from October 17, 1982, ... (when) Sarmiento's
predecessors-in-interest defaulted in their obligations
over the mortgaged properties, up to June 17, 1987,
when this ... (Trial) Court confirmed the auction sale of
those properties, Sarmiento could (and should) have
exercised his 'equity of redemption.'" Judge Solano did
not share this view, and ruled accordingly
Held: The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different
from and should not be confused with the right of
redemption.
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage-
understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire
mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure
sale- exists only in the case of the extrajudicialforeclosure
of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in
a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is
the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking
institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extra-judicially, Act 3135
grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within
one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs
certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no
equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares
that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an
order of the court, shall operate to divest the rights of all
the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may
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UP College of Law
be allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally "allowed by
law" (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the
court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine
National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General
Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment
creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the
property sold on foreclosure-after confirmation by the
court of the foreclosure sale-which right may be exercised
within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of
Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case
of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is
not the PNB or a bank or banking institution.
No right of redemption in judicial foreclosure of
REM except when allowed by law
In Judicial Foreclosure:
General Rule: No right of redemption only equity
redemption.
Exception: Those granted by banks or banking
institutions as provided by the General Banking Act.
Hence, if a mortgagee is a bank, the mortgagor may
exercise a right of redemption and this rule applies even
if the foreclosure is judicial in accordance with Rule 68 of
the Rules of Court.
In Extrajudicial Foreclosure:
General Rule: Mortgagor has the right to redeem the
property.
Period: Within one (1) year from the registration of the
deed of sale.
Except: Sec. 47 of the General Banking Act provides that
in case of extrajudicial foreclosure, notwithstanding ACT
3135, juridical persons shall have the right to redeem the
property until, but not after, the registration of the
certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register
of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3)
months after foreclosure, whichever is higher.
Right of redemption in extrajudicial foreclosure
Rosales v. Yboa (1983)
Facts: By virtue of the foreclosure of real estate
mortgage duly executed by the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio
in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines, as
security for the payment of the amount of P12,000.00,
Deputy Sheriff of Samar Peregrin Yboa, sold at public
auction to Rosales, the highest bidder, for the total
amount of fourteen thousand five hundred pesos
(P14,500.00). The corresponding Sheriff's certificate of
sale was issued in favor of plaintiff-appellant, which
certificate was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Samar on February 3, 1970.
On January 23, 1971, after the mortgagor Pedro
Oliverio had served notice in writing of the redemption
and had paid on said date to defendant-appellee Deputy
Sheriff the principal amount of P14,500.00 plus
P1,691.00 representing the one (1 %) per centum
interest per month, the latter executed a Deed of
Certificate of Redemption restoring, conveying and
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ESGUERRA NOTES
assigning unto the said mortgagor, his heirs and assigns
all the estate, right, title and interest on said foreclosed
property.
Rosales filed the instant complaint for
cancellation of certificate of redemption alleging that no
valid redemption was effected because the mortgagor
failed to tender payment of 1) the full interest on the
purchase price, while should be P1,715.84, instead of
Pl,691.00 actually paid by the mortgagor, thereby leaving
a deficiency in the sum of P24.84; 2) the sum of P3.00
representing the registration fee of the certificate of sale,
plus interest thereon of P0.04; 3) the delinquent real
estate taxes of the subject property for the years 1960 to
1970 amounting to P745.47; and 4) the Sheriff's
commission in the sum of P99.82.
The RTC declared that the Certificate of
Redemption of the property sold at public auction is valid
and legal "without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff-
appellant to recover from the redemptioner the
deficiencies.
Issue: Whether or not a valid and legal redemption was
made by the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio of his titled
property.
Held: The requisites for a valid redemption are: 1) the
redemption must be made within twelve (12) months
from the time of the registration of the sale in the Office
of the Register of Deeds; 2) payment of the purchase
price of the property involved, plus 1% interest per month
thereon, if any, paid by the purchaser after the sale with
the same rate of interests; and 3) written notice of the
redemption must be served on the officer who made the
sale and a duplicate filed with the Register of Deeds of the
province.
There is no dispute, that in the case at bar, the
mortgagor Pedro Oliverio tendered payment of the
purchase price well within the redemption period of
twelve (12) months after the registration of the sale on
February 3,1970 and that defendants-appellees Deputy
Sheriff of Samar and the Register of Deeds of Samar were
duly notified in writing of the mortgagor's desire to
redeem the subject property. Equally beyond question is
the fact that mortgagor Pedro Oliverio tendered the sum
of P14,500.00 corresponding to the purchase of the
property, and the amount of P1,691.00 representing the
1% monthly interest thereon, although the trial court
found a deficiency of P0.67 due and owing to the plaintiff-
appellant. The mortgagor, therefor, has substantially
complied with the requirements of the law to effect
redemption, for which reason a Certificate of Redemption
was issued in his favor by defendant-appellee Deputy
Sheriff.
The failure of the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio to
tender the amount of P745.47 representing the
delinquent real estate taxes of the subject property, the
registration fee of P3.00 and the interest thereon of
P0.04, the Sheriff's Commission in the sum of P99.82, and
the deficiency interest on the purchase price of the
subject property, will not render the redemption in
question null and void, it having been established that he
has substantially complied with the requirements of the
law to effect a valid redemption, with his tender of
payment of the purchase price and the interest thereon
within twelve (12) months from the date of the
registration of the sale.
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UP College of Law
Filing of court action to enforce redemption has
effect of preserving redemptioner’s rights and
“freezing” expiration of one year period.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. CA
(2005)
Facts: Santiago (Isabela) Memorial Park, Inc. filed a
complaint for redemption and specific performance
against Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, alleging,
among others, that SMP Inc. made manifest its interest
to exercise its right of redemption through numerous
communications and negotiation with the defendant.
Also, SMP Inc. alleges that the delay of Banco Filipino in
the finalization of the terms of redemption did not in any
manner alter the right of plaintiff to redeem the property.
Banco Filipino filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a cause of
action. It alleges that assuming that the allegations in the
complaint are true and correct, still there was no
redemption effected within one year from the date of
registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale with the
Register of Deeds on January 21, 1991, thus private
respondent had lost its right to redeem the subject land.
Petitioner claimed that the letter cited was a mere offer
to redeem the property which was promptly answered by
a letter dated August 28, 1991, which categorically denied
private respondent’s offer and stated that when it comes
to redemption, the basis of payment is the total claim of
the bank at the time the property was foreclosed plus
12% thereof and all litigation expenses attached thereto
or its present appraised value whichever is higher; that
the letter mentioned was about negotiation and special
arrangement and not redemption for at that stage the
period of redemption had already expired;
The RCT ruled in favor of Banco Filipino. The CA
however reversed and set aside the order of the RTC,
declaring SMP Inc. entitled to repurchase the property in
question within THIRTY (30) days from CA’s notice.
Issue: Whether SMP Inc.’s offer and negotiation with
Banco Filipino for the redemption is sufficient to stall the
running of the redemption period.
Held: Clearly, the right of redemption should be
exercised within the specified time limit. The
redemptioner should make an actual tender in good
faith of the full amount of the purchase price. In case of
disagreement over the redemption price, the
redemptioner may preserve his right of redemption
through judicial action which in every case must be filed
within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the
court action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a
formal offer to redeem, would have the effect of
preserving his redemptive rights and "freezing" the
expiration of the one-year period. In this case, the period
of redemption expired on January 21, 1992. The
complaint was filed on December 20, 1992.
Moreover, while the complaint alleges that
private respondent made an offer to redeem the subject
property on August 6, 1991, which was within the period
of redemption, it is not alleged in the complaint that there
was an actual tender of payment of the redemption price
as required by the rules. It was alleged that private
respondent merely made an offer of P700,000.00 as
redemption price, which however, the redemption money
was the total bank claim of P925,448.17 plus lawful
interest and other allowable expenses incident to the
foreclosure proceedings. Thus, the offer was even very
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much lower than the price paid by petitioner as the
highest bidder in the auction sale.
In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Veloso, we
held: The general rule in redemption is that it is not
sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests his
desire to do so. The statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. This constitutes the exercise of the right to
repurchase.
Prescriptive period to file action for deficiency in
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
* Ten (10) years (Arts. 1144 and 1142, Civil Code)
Article 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten
years. (1964a)
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding -
no need for notice to adverse party
De Vera v. Agloro (2005)
Facts: The Spouses Salvador F. De Vera and Feliza V. De
Vera secured a loan from the BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc. (“BPI”). To secure the payment thereof, the Spouses
executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their property.
When the Spouses failed to pay their loan, the property
was extrajudicially foreclosed, with BPI being the highest
bidder in the public auction.
The Bank filed an Ex Parte Petition for Writ of
Possession with the RTC impleading the Spouses as
respondents The trial court ruled that the purchaser of the
foreclosed property, upon ex parte application and the
posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire
possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-
month redemption period. According to the trial court,
this is sanctioned under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118. The trial court also declared
that considering that the redemption period had already
expired, the Bank as purchaser, can, and with more
reason, demand for a writ of possession. The trial court
emphasized that it is its ministerial duty to issue the writ
of possession in favor of a purchaser at public auction.
The Spouses filed a motion for reconsideration
which was however denied. Aggrieved, the Spouses De
Vera filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction before the CA, which was again denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was denial of due process
when the RTC took cognizance of the ex parte petition for
a writ of possession without prior service of copies of the
petition and of the notice of hearing thereof on the
Spouses.
Held: The bare fact that the petitioners were impleaded
in the ex parte petition for a writ of possession filed by
the respondent did not alter the summary nature of the
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proceedings in Act No. 3135. Indeed, there was no need
for the respondent to implead the petitioners as parties-
respondents in its petition with the RTC. Hence, the
petitioners cannot claim that they were denied due
process when the RTC took cognizance of the
respondent’s petition without prior service of copies of the
petition and of the notice of hearing thereof on them.
An ex parte petition for the issuance of a
possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not,
strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated in
Article 433 of the Civil Code.34 It is a judicial proceeding
for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit
filed in court, by which one party "sues another for the
enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." It is a non-litigious
proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. It is
brought for the benefit of one party only, and without
notice to, or consent by any person adversely
interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted
without an opportunity for the person against whom the
relief is sought to be heard. No notice is needed to be
served upon persons interested in the subject property.
Hence, there is no necessity of giving notice to the
petitioners since they had already lost all their interests
in the property when they failed to redeem the same.
Writ of possession is like a writ of execution
PNB v. SANAO MARKETING CORPORATION (2005)
Facts: Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado
A. Sanao and Soledad F. Sanao and the spouses William
(Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao, as joint and solidary
debtors, obtained a loan from PNB secured by a real
estate mortgage of several parcels of land. For failure of
respondents to fully pay the loan upon its maturity, PNB
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. A
Provisional Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB.
Respondents filed a complaint to declare
the Provisional Certificate of Sale and the auction and
foreclosure proceedings null and void. PNB filed a Motion
for execution pending appeal. The RTC granted PNB’s
petition for issuance of a writ of possession over seven
(7) parcels of land and directed the execution pending
appeal of such writ of possession. The CA however
annulled the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this Petition for
Review
Issue: Whether or not PNB is entitled to the writ of
possession pending appeal
Held:
A writ of possession is "a writ of execution
employed to enforce a judgment to recover the
possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter
the land and give possession of it to the person
entitled under the judgment."
A writ of possession may be issued under the
following instances: (1)in land registration proceedings
under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged
realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) in execution sales
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(last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court).
The present case falls under the third instance.
Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within
the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond,
or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond. The purchaser in a foreclosure sale may
apply for a writ of possession during the redemption
period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral
proceeding in the case of property covered by a Torrens
title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of
the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms
directs the court to issue the order for a writ of
possession.
A writ of possession may also be issued after
consolidation of ownership of the property in the name of
the purchaser. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled
to the possession of the property and can demand it any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name
and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title. In
such a case, the bond required in Section 7 of Act No.
3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of the land then
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial
duty of the court.
An action to invalidate the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale is not a valid ground to oppose
issuance of writ of possession.
Arquiza vs. CA (2005)
Facts: The petitioners, spouses Godofredo V. Arquiza and
Remedios D. Arquiza, obtained a loan from private
respondent Equitable PCIBank. To secure the payment
thereof, the petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage
over their parcel of land. When the spouses defaulted in
the payment of their loan, the private respondent filed a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage. A public auction was held and a Certificate of
Sale over the property was issued in favor of the private
respondent. This was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City.
Following the expiry date of the redemption period
without the petitioners having exercised their right to
redeem the property, the private respondent consolidated
its ownership over the subject property. As a
consequence, the Registry of Deeds issued TCT No. N-
221650 in the name of the private respondent, canceling
the petitioners former title.
The petitioners filed a complaint against the private
respondent and the sheriffs with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of the nullity of the promissory note,
real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale and
damages with a plea for injunctive relief for the
suspension redemption period.
Thereafter, Equitable PCIBank filed an Ex
Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of Equitable
PCIBank. The CA rendered judgment affirming the
appealed decision. The CA held that the rule requiring the
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highest bidder to be placed in possession of the property
is founded on the right of ownership, which becomes
absolute after title thereto has been issued in favor of the
new owner, and that the court must aid in effecting its
delivery.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari ,
contending, among others, that the writ of possession
should not have been issued considering the pendency of
a complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure sale
Issue: Whether or not the writ of possession may be
opposed on the ground of a pendency of a proceeding for
the annulment of the foreclosure sale.
Held: The petition is denied for lack of merit. As a rule,
any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the
issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or
not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage
or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ
of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual
outcome of said case.
Rule 69
Partition
Partition defined
Villamor v. CA (1988)
Facts: Special Proceedings, which relates to the intestate
estates of Eugenia, Casimira Florencio, Braulia, Margarita
and Barbara, all surnamed Cortes was filed. This
proceeding evidently did not include a brother, Rufino
Cortes. A scramble over the control and possession of the
properties ensued between the heirs of Barbara Cortes,
and the Rufino Cortes line. A project of partition was
entered into by all the heirs of decedent.
Issue:
1. May the heirs of Rufino participate in
the partition?
2. Definition of partition
Held: The lower courts erred in relying on the alleged
absence of evidence showing that Rufino Cortes had at
any time been declared an owner of the lands in question
for taxation purpose poses. The records show that before
the project of partition was executed the contending
parties in Special Proceedings had been fighting for eight
years because the properties listed in the inventories
submitted by the administrators were Identical. To settle
their differences amicably, the parties who all claim to be
the heirs of decedents, all children of Victor Cortes and
Maria Castañeda, decided to partition the properties.
Partition is defined as a division between two or
more persons of real or personal property which they own
as co-partners, joint tenants or tenants in common,
effected by the setting apart of such interests so that they
may enjoy and possess it in severalty. The purpose of
partition is to put an end to the common tenancy of the
land or co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interest of each joint owner vesting in each a
sole estate in specific property and giving to each one the
right to enjoy his estate without supervision or
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interference from the other. And a partition by deed is a
recognized method of effectuating a separation of interest
in property held in common.
It is clear therefore that a partition presupposes
that the thing to be divided is owned in common. It is
immaterial in whose name the properties were declared
for taxation purposes for it is presumed beforehand that
the parties to the partition admit the fact of co-ownership
and now want to effect a separation of interest.
MTC may have jurisdiction in actions for partition
1. Real property - P20,000.00/P50,000.00
2. Personal property – P300,000.00/P400,000.00
Any of the co-owners of the undivided property may
demand partition. It can be made anytime and the
right to demand partition is imprescriptible
Bautista v. Grino-Aquino (1988)
Facts: Petitioner is the daughter of Manuel Bautista with
his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo. Respondents are heirs
of the late Juliana Nojadera, Manuel Bautista’s first wife.
Respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of
the land registered in the name of Manuel Bautista which
he inherited from his father. Consequently, a new TCT
was issued upon the registration of said Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition. Thereafter, respondents entered
into two sale transactions which resulted in various TCTs
over the land to be issued in their name.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an action to declare
the extrajudicial partition, the deeds of absolute sale and
TCTs issued, null and void.
Issue: Whether the extra judicial partition and all
subsequent transactions involving the same property are
null and void.
Held: Yes. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides that an
extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the
estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and
with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives. If the property does not belong to the
estate of the decedent, it cannot be the subject matter of
an extrajudicial partition.
The land in this case is the exclusive property of
Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father.
To include the land in the extrajudicial partition would be
to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without
due process of law. Said partition also effectively resulted
in the preterition of petitioner as compulsory heir of
Manuel Bautista, being his daughter from his second
marriage.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot
constitute a partition of the property during the lifetime
of its owner. Partition of future inheritance is prohibited
by law.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as
the petitioner’s right to sue her co-owners for the partition
of the property is imprescriptible.
Nature of Partition
Valmonte v. CA (1996, supra)
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Held: Respondent’s action for partition and accounting
under Rule 69 is in the nature of an action quasi in rem.
Such action is for the purpose of affecting defendant’s
interest in a specific property and not to render a
judgment against him. The action quasi in rem differs
from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as a defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by
attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in
a general way thus designated. The judgment rendered
in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
As Lourdes is a non-resident who is not found in
the Philippines, service on summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14 Section 17, i.e., (1) by personal
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and the
order of the court should be sent by registered maul to
the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any
other manner which the court may deem sufficient. The
service of summons on her husband does not satisfy even
the third mode of service, which like the first two, must
be made outside the Philippines, such as through the
Philippines embassy. There was likewise no prior leave of
court or an order granting such leave.
Final order decreeing partition and accounting
appealable
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 69
Section 2. Order for partition and partition by
agreement thereunder. — If after the trial the court finds
that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the
partition of the real estate among all the parties in
interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such
partition, together with the order of the court confirming
the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the
place in which the property is situated.
A final order decreeing partition and accounting may
be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
* Appeal period – 30 days
Action for partition raises two issues
1. whether plaintiff is co-owner of property
2. assuming plaintiff is co-owner, how to divide the
property between plaintiff and defendant
or among the co-owners
Two stages in every action for partition
First Stage: Determination of the propriety of partition
This involves a determination of whether the subject
property is owned in common and whether all the co-
owners are made parties in the case.
The order may also require an accounting of rents and
profits recovered by the defendant. This order of partition
is appealable. [Miranda v. Court of Appeals (1976)]
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If not appealed, then the parties may partition the
common property in the way they want. If they cannot
agree, then the case goes into the second stage.
However, the order of accounting may in the meantime
be executed. [De Mesa v. CA (1994)]
Second Stage: Actual partitioning of the subject property
This is also a complete proceeding and the order or
decision is appealable.
When there was a prior partition, the fact that the share
of each co-heir has not been technically described and the
title over the whole lot remains uncancelled does not
negate such partition.
There can be no partition again because there is no more
common property. [Noceda v. CA (1999)]
Dadizon v. Bernadas (2009)
Facts: Petitioners and respondents are heirs of Spouses
Bernadas. Respondents filed a complaint for partition of
the conjugal share left by their late father. During trial,
both parties manifested that they have an ongoing
negotiation for the extrajudicial partition of the properties
to end their differences once and for all. Thereafter,
respondents’ counsel filed a Project of Partition which was
not signed by all of the heirs. On the next hearing, the
Project of Partition was discussed by both parties and the
RTC ordered petitioners to submit their comment thereon.
However, petitioners did not file any comment. The RTC
subsequently issued an Order approving the Project of
Partition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the RTC denied, noting that, despite its order,
petitioners failed to file any comment on or objection to
the Project of Partition. Petitioners filed an appeal with
the CA, which was dismissed as CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.
Issue: Whether the CA and the RTC erred in approving
the project of Partition.
Held: Yes. There are two stages in every action for
partition: (1) the first stage is the determination of
whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is
proper and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interest in the property; (2) the second stage
commences when it appears that the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition directed by the court – in such
event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. Hence, there are two ways in which
partition can take place under Rule 69: (1) by agreement
under Section 2; and (2) through commissioners when
such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3 and
6.
RTC departed from the foregoing procedures.
The Project of Partition did not bear the signatures of
petitioners, hence it should not have been approved and
the RTC should have ordered the appointment of
commissioners. Only a document signed by all of the
parties can signify that they agree on a partition. A party’s
failure to file any comment or suggestion as to the
manner of distribution does not justify RTC’s non-
observance of Rule 69. In partition proceedings, reference
to commissioners is required as a procedural step in the
action and is not discretionary on the part of the court.
Who are indispensable parties
* All the co-owners (Rule 3, Sec. 7)
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1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 69
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Who may file complaint; who should be made
defendants [Rule 69, Sec. 1]
Who May File: A person having the right to compel
partition of real estate, or of personal property, or both
real and personal property [Sec. 1, Sec. 13]
Venue: An action for partition should be filed in the RTC
of the province where the property or part thereof is
situated.
Parties:
(1) The plaintiff is the person who is supposed to be a
co-owner of the property
(2) Defendants are all the co-owners, who are
indispensable parties
(3) Creditors or assignees of co-owners may also
intervene and object to the partition
Who may effect partition
Alejandrino v. CA (1998)
Facts: Spouses Labunos left their six children named
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and
Abundio properties in Cebu. Mauricia allegedly purchased
Gregorio's share Ciriaco's share and Abundio's share. It
turned out, however, that a third party named Licerio
Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased
portions of the property from Laurencia and from
Gregorio, Marcelino and Abundio through Laurencia.
However, Laurencia later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages against private
respondent Nique in Civil Case No. CEB-7038 wherein the
trial court declared Nique owner of the properties. Nique
filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the
property pursuant to said judgment.
Meanwhile, Mauricia filed a complaint for
redemption and recovery of properties with damages
against private respondent Nique that was docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-11673.
Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed before the
CA. The CA dismissed the petition stating that the
respondent court was merely performing its job of seeing
to it that execution of a final judgment must conform to
that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.
Issue: Whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino
property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions
thereof to a third party.
Held: Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different
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persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than
that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every
co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition
to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property
of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-
owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate
right. With respect to properties shared in common by
virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion
thereof to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her
hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share.
However, because the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could be identified as
yet and delineated as the object of the sale. A co-owner
has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-
owned property even without the consent of the other co-
owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot
alienate the shares of the other co-owners.
As there is no pending administration
proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino spouses can
only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an
extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on
the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before
the trial court and it became the basis for the order for
segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia does
not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions
its validity on account of the absence of notarization of
the document and the non-publication thereof.
It appears that when a co-owner sells his
inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his
intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-
heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced
by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over
the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect,
Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate the co-
owner by selling her share to private respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate reflected the intention of both
Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically divide the
property.
On the part of Laurencia, the court found that
she had transmitted her rights over portions she had
acquired from her brothers to private respondent Nique.
The sale was made after the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate that private
respondent himself witnessed. The extrajudicial
settlement of estate having constituted a partition of the
property, Laurencia validly transferred ownership over
the specific front portion of the property with an area of
146 square meters.
Extrajudicial partition by heirs (Sec. 1, Rule 74)
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1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 74
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there
is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation
in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or
stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in
the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of
the personal property involved as certified to under oath
by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under section
4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the death of the
decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the nest
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.
Partition of personal property (Sec. 13, Rule 69)
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 69
Section 13. Section 13. Partition of personal
property. — The provisions of this Rule shall apply to
partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of
both real and personal property, in so far as the same
may be applicable.
Rule 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Rule 70, Section 1
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns
of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may,
at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action
in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs
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All cases of forcible entry RTC has jurisdiction if value of

Actions for Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer and unlawful detainer, the property exceeds P20,000
(FEUD) are summary in nature. irrespective of the outside Metro Manila; exceeds
amount of damages or P50,000 within Metro Manila.
• Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy unpaid rentals sought to MTC has jurisdiction if value
laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, be recovered should be of property does not exceed
all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, brought to the MTC. the above amounts
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid However, if not brought (RA 7691 expanded the
rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by within 1 year, RTC has jurisdiction of 1st level courts)
the summary procedure hereunder provided. (Rule jurisdiction
70, Section 3)

• Actions for FEUD are governed by the Revised Rules

of Summary Procedure.
Distinguish the different
possession of real property
1. forcible entry and unlawful detainer
2. accion publiciana
Forcibly Entry
(Detentacion)
Possession of land by
defendant is unlawful from
the beginning as he
acquires possession by
force, intimidation,
strategy, threat, or stealth
No previous demand for
defendant to vacate the
premises is necessary
Plaintiff must prove that he
was in prior physical
possession of the premises
until he was deprived
thereof by defendant
The 1-year period is
generally counted from
date of actual entry on land
The issue centers on who
was in prior possession de
facto.
actions to recover
Unlawful Detainer
(Desahucio)
Possession is inceptively
lawful but it becomes illegal
by reason of the
termination of his right to
possession of the property
under his contract with the
plaintiff
Demand is jurisdictional if
the ground is non-payment
of rentals or failure to
comply with lease contract
Plaintiff need not have been
in prior physical possession
Period is counted from the
date of last letter of
demand
The issue centers on
whether the defendant’s
right to possess has expired
or not.
RTC has jurisdiction where cause of dispossession
not among grounds for FEUD, or possession lost for
more than one year
Natalia Realty, Inc., v. CA (2002)
Facts: Natalia Realty Inc. filed an action (Civil Case No.
359-A) for recovery of possession of two parcels of land,
alleging that Antonio Martinez, Felipe Padua, Mario
Perfecto and Hermito Salodega were occupying and
illegally squatting on certain portions of the subject
property.
RTC dismissed the case for petitioner’s failure to
prosecute. The trial court issued another Order granting
the motions of respondents to order petitioner to
surrender possession of portions of the subject property
to private respondents.
Respondents filed with the trial court a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution. They sought to
enforce the orders of the trial court dated August 26,
1991 and April 20, 1992 that respectively referred to (1)
the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute and
(2) the surrender of possession of portions of the subject
property to respondents. Petitioner opposed the motion
arguing that the decision of the Supreme Court in Natalia
Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform dated August
12, 1993 is a supervening event that prevents the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 359-A.
Issue Whether or not the ruling in Natalia Realty v. DAR
is applicable to the present case

Accion Accion Accion Held: The ruling in Natalia Realty vs. Department of
Interdictal Publiciana Reivindicato Agrarian Reform does not qualify as a supervening
ria event. A plain reading of the decision in that case will
Summary action for A plenary An action for readily reveal that it is not applicable to Civil Case No.
recovery of physical action for recovery of 359-A. The sole issue in Natalia Realty vs. Department of
possession where the recovery of ownership, Agrarian Reform was whether the land registered under
dispossession has not real right of which the name of therein petitioner Natalia, covered by TCT
lasted for more than 1 possession necessarily No. 31527, was within the coverage of the
year when includes the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL for
dispossession recovery of brevity).
has lasted for possession
more than The present case stemmed from a complaint for
one year recovery of possession or accion publiciana filed by
Natalia, herein petitioner. Accion publiciana is a plenary
action to recover possession. When the cause of
dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost
for more than one year and can no longer be maintained
under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint should
be for accion publiciana. The objective of the parties in
accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.

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The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
in Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and
in this case are very different. Natalia Realty vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform did not involve the
question of possession, not even the issue of
ownership. The decision in that case merely resolved the
issue of whether the land covered by TCT No. 31527
should be placed under the coverage of CARL. The Court
in Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian
Reform even underscored the fact that the question of
possession is a separate and distinct issue.
3. accion reivindicatoria
Encarnacion v. Amigo (2006)
Facts: Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner
of lots which he acquired from his mother-in-law.
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises
and took possession of a portion of the property when the
same was still owned by Encarnacion’s father-in-law,
Victoriano Magpantay, without the latter’s permission of
the then owner. Said occupation by respondent continued
even after titles were issued to Encarnacion.
Encarnacion sent a letter demanding that the
respondent vacate the subject property but still refused
to vacate the subject property. Thereafter petitioner filed
a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and
prayer for restraining order with the MTC.
MTC judged in favor of Encarnacion. On appeal,
the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the case, thus RTC acquired no
appellate jurisdiction thereof. The CA held that the proper
action in this case is accion publiciana and not unlawful
detainer as determined by the allegations in the complaint
filed by petitioner.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction.
Held: The action being an accion publiciana, RTC has the
jurisdiction.
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment
proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is
a summary action for recovery of physical possession
where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one
year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for
the recovery of the real right of possession, which should
be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of
ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional
Trial Court.
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the
material element that determines the proper action to be
filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in
this case is the length of time of dispossession. Under the
Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are granted to a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
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or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the
person deprived of the possession to file at any time
within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted for more than
one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the
inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if
the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the
proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which
should be brought to the proper RTC
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears
that the petitioner became the owner of the property on
April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed
by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment
on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the
respondent demanding that the latter vacate the
premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the
demand letter was received by the respondent on
February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the
complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year
from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it
is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of
the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time
deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date
of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of
his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have
elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was
dispossessed of his property made his cause of action
beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively
made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the
one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the
Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a
suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers
to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The RTC does not have jurisdiction over all cases of
recovery of possession regardless of the value of
the property involved
Quinagoran v. CA (2007)
Facts: The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with
Compensation and Damages against Victorino
Quinagoran, alleging that the latter started occupying a
house on the north-west portion of their property by
tolerance of respondents.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. He argued
that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the
contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00,
the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not
be more than the said amount.
The RTC denied petitioner's MTD. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling that where there is no allegation
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that there was denial of possession through any of the
methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, or where there is no lease contract between the
parties, the proper remedy is the plenary action of
recovery of possession or accion publiciana and thus is
within the proper jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of
recovery of possession regardless of the value of the
property involved?
Held: No. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its
denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the
CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or accion
publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of
the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things
now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is
below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila;
andP50,000.00, if within.
The Court has also declared that all cases
involving title to or possession of real property with an
assessed value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro
Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court.
Atuel v. Valdez: Jurisdiction over an accion
publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve x x x
possession of real property." However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila,
and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the
municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over
actions to recover possession of real property.
Atuel v. Valdez (2003)
Facts: Atty. Manuel D. Cab appointed Federico Atuel as
administrator of his Property. Cab leased a portion of his
property to Bernabe Valdez. Cab allowed the Spouses
Federico and Sarah Atuel (Spouses Atuel) and the
Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano (Spouses Galdiano)
to occupy a portion of the Cab Property. The Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano constructed their
respective houses thereon.
The Ministry of Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (MARO) of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed
Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a tenant, and
thus deemed to be the owner of the land he
cultivated. The MARO issued an Emancipation Patent in
favor of Valdez for a portion of Cab’s Property, which
included the portion occupied by the houses of the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
Spouses Valdez filed a complaint for Recovery
of Possession with Damages with the DARAB in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the Spouses Valdez
alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano stealthily and through fraud entered and
occupied a portion of their.
Issue: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction for the
recovery possession of the lots from the Spouses.
Held: The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of
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possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court
may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction. The
Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB
validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
In their complaint for recovery of possession,
the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others, that they are
farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The
Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses Atuel and
the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently occupied
the property. The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite
repeated demands, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession of the
Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez
prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
be ordered to vacate and restore possession of the
Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.
The Spouses Valdez did not allege the
existence of tenancy relations, if any, between
them and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano.
In the instant case, the allegations in the
complaint, which are contained in the decision of the
MARO, indicate that the nature and subject matter of
the instant case is for recovery of possession or
accion publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who
between the Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other,
have a better right to possession of the property. The
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise
the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real
and lawful owner of the Subject Lot.
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the
case, there must exist a tenancy relations between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold
over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.
Canlas v. Tubil (2009)
Facts: On June 9, 2004, a complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed by respondent Iluminada Tubil against
petitioners Rodolfo Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad
Canlas and spouses Pablo and Charito Canlas before the
MTC. The complaint alleged that plaintiff (herein
respondent) is the owner of a residential lot in Guagua,
Pampanga; that sometime ago, the defendants (herein
petitioners) erected their houses in said land and are
presently occupying the same as their residential house;
that said houses were erected by mere tolerance of
plaintiff; that demands were verbally made upon
defendants to vacate and remove their house therefrom,
but defendants just ignored the plea and refused to
remove their houses; and that in light of said refusal, the
plaintiff referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent
defendants demand letters to vacate dated January 12,
2004, but in spite of receipt of the same defendants failed
and refused to vacate and remove their houses.
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The MTC rendered judgment, affirmed by the
RTC, dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer
because respondent failed to show that the possession of
the petitioners was by mere tolerance. The Court of
Appeals reversed and ordered the RTC to decide the case
on the merits.
Issue: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the
instant complaint for unlawful detainer.
Held: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that what determines
the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in
nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought within one year from the date of last demand and
the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action
to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. In other words,
if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out
of possession or defendant’s possession had become
illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal
detainer, but an accion publiciana.
In the instant case, respondent’s allegations in
the complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful
detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MTC over
the subject matter. Respondent alleged that she was the
owner of the land; that the land had been declared for
taxation purposes and she had been paying the taxes
thereon; that petitioners’ entry and construction of their
houses were tolerated as they are relatives; and that she
sent on January 12, 2004 a letter demanding that
petitioners vacate the property but they failed and
refused to do so. The complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed on June 9, 2004, or within one year from the time
the last demand to vacate was made.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
Valdez, Jr. v. CA (2006)
Facts: Petitioners Valdez filed with the MTC a complaint
for unlawful detainer against respondents Fabella,
alleging that they are the registered owners of a piece of
residential lot, that respondents (therein defendants)
Fabella, without any color of title, occupied the lot by
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building their house thereon, and that respondents
refused to vacate despite several demands. The MTC
ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the
respondents to vacate the property. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and ruled that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer for
failure of the petitioners to allege that they had given the
respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they
had tolerated respondents’ possession of the same.
Issue: Whether or not based on the allegations of the
complaint, the MTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for
unlawful detainer.
Held: The MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. To
justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is
later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in
Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals,
tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause
of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land
which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal,
then the action which may be filed against the intruder is
forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is
unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect
the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which
the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face
of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was affected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
proper regional trial court.
In the instant case, the allegations in the
complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title whatsoever
occupies the land in question by building their house in
the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession
thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’
entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between
the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is
fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint.
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Jurisdiction: Municipal Trial Court
Exception: Estoppel by laches
Velarma v. CA (1996)
Facts: Respondent Josefina Pansacola filed an “ejectment
suit” against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mauban, Quezon. In her complaint, she alleged
that sometime in May 1981, petitioner surreptitiously
built his dwelling on a portion of her land registered in the
name of her husband Publio (deceased); (2) that during
several conferences before the barangay captain,
petitioner promised to vacate the land but he still failed
or refused to do so; (3) that she instituted a criminal case
against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law;
(4) that the trial court convicted petitioner of the offense;
and (5) that despite such judgment, and notwithstanding
repeated demands to vacate, petitioner continued
occupying the property.
The RTC ordered petitioner to vacate the subject
land and remove his house therefrom. This was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner noe insists that
respondent had no cause of action against him because
the land on which his house stands belongs to the
government. Allegedly, in the "Minutes of the Meeting of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon" Publio
Pansacola signified before the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mauban his agreement to the transfer of the portion of
the subject land traversed by the new provincial highway
and its shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion
of the old abandoned provincial road. Notably, said
minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan did not
mention the execution of any deed to perfect the
agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the case.
Held: As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the
meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the
execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An
engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned
road, but this act does not in any manner convey title
over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor
extinguish their ownership over the land traversed by the
new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced by
petitioner to show that the survey was actually
undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road
partitioned and conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be
stressed that the agreement to transfer the property was
made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual
transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer
is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted
by the government, private respondent continues to
retain ownership of the land subject of this case.
The Supreme Court noted that the ejectment
suit should have been filed before the MTC, and not the
RTC. The issue of ownership, however, had been
specifically raised before the RTC by petitioner himself,
who at the same time did not move to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he filed his
answer and went to trial. Estoppel by laches has already
set in at this point in time.
Effect of claim of ownership on MTC jurisdiction
Hilario v. CA (1996)
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Facts: Petitioner spouses Hilario purchased a house and
lot in Bulacan from respondent spouses Rosauro Palileo
and Josefina Anastacio under a deed of sale dated March
5, 1986. A separate document, executed on the same day
by the parties, granted petitioners the right to repurchase
the property within one year from said date. Petitioners
further allowed respondents to remain in possession of
the premises on the verbal understanding that the latter
would vacate the same after two years from the date of
the sale. As said period passed without respondents
complying therewith, even after several demands by
petitioners, the latter instituted a complaint for unlawful
detainer with the MTC.
Respondents alleged in their answer that deed
of conveyance was actually a deed of mortgage and since
their corresponding obligation had been extinguished by
payment, they remained as owners of the subject
property.
The MTC ordered respondents to vacate. This
was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed and dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the issue raised by respondents involved the question of
ownership.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of ownership divests the
MTC of jurisdiction over a complaint for ejectment.
Held: No. Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
prescribes the jurisdiction of inferior courts in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trail Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Similarly, the Interim Rules and Guidelines on
the jurisdiction of inferior courts in ejectment cases
provides:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. —
Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
and municipal circuit trial court, without
distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer even if the question of
ownership is raised in the pleadings and the
question of possession could not be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, but the
question of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Republic Act No. 7691 amended pertinent
portions of B.P. Blg. 129. The jurisdiction of the aforesaid
courts as defined in Section 33(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 was,
however, retained by said amendatory Act. As the law
now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over
ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot
be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership;
but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed
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as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the
sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
It is underscored, however that the allegations
in the complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make
out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the
case may be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the
inferior court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is,
after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged
or pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where the
defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in his
or her answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its
jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave the way for the
defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is
summary in nature, as he could easily defeat the same
through the simple expedient of asserting ownership.
Cases that do not prejudice ejectment suit
Wilmon Auto Supply v. CA (1992)
Facts: Petitioners were lessees of a commercial building
and bodegas. The lease contracts provided, among
others, that the lessor reserves the rights to sell or
encumber the property so long as it requires the
purchaser to respect the terms of the lease contract, and
that the lessee shall be duly informed about the lessor’s
plan to sell the property. After the expiration of the period
fixed in the lease agreements, the lessors executed a
public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale," by
virtue of which they sold the leased property to
respondent Star Group Resources and Development Inc.
Subsequently, Star Group brought separate
actions of unlawful detainer in the MTCC against
petitioners. The lessees impugned Star Group’s right to
eject them. They argued that the sale violated their
leasehold rights because they were not accorded their
right of preemption and they were denied the option to
renew their leases upon expiration.
The same propositions were also set out as
causes of action in a complaint filed on by some of them
in the RTC – Iloilo to declare the sale as null and void ab
initio and to allow them to exercise their right of
preemption.
In the unlawful detainer actions, petitioner
lessees prayed for the dismissal of the ejectment suits on
the ground of litis pendentia in view of the action
instituted before the RTC. The motion was denied. On
the other hand, the RTC dismissed the petitions and ruled
that the pendency of an action involving ownership and
annulment of sale does not stay the proceedings in the
ejectment case.
Issue: Whether or not the action for unlawful detainer
filed in the MTC should be abated or suspended until
resolution of the cases in the RTC involving the sale,
ownership and physical possession of the subject
property.
Held: No. It is a question that is far from novel, one that
has been passed upon and resolved by the Court in
numerous cases, and one to which a negative answer has
invariably been given. The relevant precedents are
hereunder outlined:
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1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by
defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal
trial courts or other courts of the first level do not
abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on
consignation of rentals;
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an
ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former;
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is
concededly the principal issue before the Regional
Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution
of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where
the only issue involved is the material possession
or possession de facto of the premises;
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a
bar to an ejectment suit involving the same
property;
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do
not affect ejectment actions;
6. An action for reformation of instrument does not
suspend an ejectment suit between the same
parties;
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion
reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment
suits regarding the same property; and
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or
document affecting property operate to abate
ejectment actions respecting the same property.
The underlying reasons for the above rulings
were that the actions in the RTC did not involve physical
or de facto possession and, on not a few occasions, that
the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition
of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented
in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses
in the ejectment action and there resolved.
As the law now stands, even when, in forcible
entry and lawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding that
issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve
"the issue of ownership … only to determine the issue of
possession."
Forcible Entry distinguished from Unlawful
Detainer
Prior Possession
▪ Forcible Entry – required
▪ Unlawful detainer – not required
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in
unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of
the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess…
Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry,
and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer. (Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, 2
May 2006)
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Possession by tolerance
Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus (2005)
Facts: Rafael Magpily (“Magpily”) is the owner of a parcel
of land planted with fruit-bearing trees and tenanted by
Nazaria Tope (“Tope”). Sometime in July 1978, upon
Tope’s request, Magpily allowed Tope’s nephew, herein
private respondent to construct a house of light materials
on a portion of the land and to gratuitously occupy the
same. The agreement was embodied in a Salaysay duly
signed by the parties. Their relationship, however, turned
sour when private respondent interfered with the
gathering of coconuts and other fruits in the lot. Magpily
requested private respondent to vacate the premises but
the latter refused, prompting him to file the instant
ejectment suit. In his defense, private respondent alleged
that he is a bona fide agricultural tenant, and the case
must be dismissed since the court had no jurisdiction over
the issue. Private respondent argued that the subject
matter involves a tenancy dispute within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Issue: Whether the ejectment suit is proper in this case
Held: Yes. Private respondent failed to discharge the
burden of proving that he was an agricultural tenant of
Magpily and that the instant case involves an agrarian
dispute cognizable by the DARAB. The MTC thus lawfully
took cognizance of the present controversy which
involves the gratuitous occupation of another’s property
which became unlawful by virtue of the owners
withdrawal of consent or tolerance to such occupation.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when
the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner. A person who occupies the
land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy.
Considering that private respondent’s
occupation of the subject land is now unlawful in view of
Magpily’s demand to vacate the premises, ejectment of
private respondent therefrom is warranted.
When to count one year period (prescription to file
the action under Rule 70, Rules of Court)
• In actions for forcible entry, the one year period
should be reckoned from the actual entry, except
where the entry was committed with stealth. If
the entry was done through stealth, the one year
period shall be counted from the date of
discovery of the entry.
Ong v. Parel (2001)
Facts: Spouses Pedro and Veronica Ong (“Spouses Ong”)
are the registered owners of Lot A, having purchased the
property from Spouses Magbag in 1994. Adjacent to Lot
A is Lot B registered under the name of Visitacion Beltran
(“Beltran”), grandmother of respondent Socorro Parel
(“Parel”).
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On 25 May 1995, Spouses Ong filed an action for
forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
against Parel alleging among other things that Parel
through strategy and stealth constructed an overhang
and hollow block wall along the common boundary of the
parties’ adjoining lot, thereby illegally depriving plaintiffs
of possession of the said portion of their lot. Spouses Ong
alleged that they discovered Parel’s illegal possession of
their lot on 23 August 1994 when they had the boundaries
of their lot resurveyed. Finally, Spouses Ong alleged that
they made various demands from Parel to remove the
constructions which he introduced in Lot A, and to vacate
the same, the last of which demands having been made
on 19 December 1994.
Parel denied the material allegations of the
complaint and alleged that the overhang and hollow block
wall had already been in existence since 1956 and that
these structures are within the boundary of Lot B owned
by him. Parel argued that the alleged encroachments
were made by the late Beltran at the time when she still
owned both Lots A and B.
Issues:
a. Can the construction of an overhand and hollow
block wall along a common boundary of
adjoining lots be the subject of an action for
forcible entry?
b. How is stealth defined for purposes for an
action for forcible entry? In cases of entry
through stealth, when should the one-year
period to file an action for forcible entry be
counted?
Held: Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires
that in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly
deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that
the action is filed any time within one year from the time
of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This
requirement implies that in such cases, the possession of
the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning
as he acquires possession thereof by unlawful means. The
plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until he
was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one year
period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry on the
land, except that when entry was made through stealth,
the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
learned thereof. If the alleged dispossession did not occur
by any of the means stated in section 1, Rule 70, the
proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover
possession with the regional trial court.
In their complaint, Spouses Ong aver that
through stealth and strategy Parel constructed the
controversial overhang and hollow block wall along the
common boundary of the parties adjoining lots
which encroached on petitioners’ Lot A. Stealth is defined
as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery
and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of
another without permission. However, petitioners failed
to establish that Parel encroached upon their property
through stealth as it was not shown when and how the
alleged entry was made on the portion of their lot. On the
other hand, Parel’s position that Beltran constructed the
alleged encroachments in 1956, and was present at the
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time Spouses Ong purchased Lot A from spouses Magbag,
was affirmed by the MTC and the Regional Trial Court
since Spouses Ong themselves admitted that they
discovered such encroachment only after a relocation
survey on their lot in 1994.
It becomes clear that this is not a proper case
for forcible entry wherein one party unlawfully deprives
another of possession of the property subject of the
litigation. It is a boundary dispute wherein the adobe wall,
overhang and window grill on the respondents side of the
property encroach petitioners side of the property. The
proper action should either be accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria for which the MTC has no jurisdiction.
• In actions for unlawful detainer, the one year
period is determined from the last demand to
vacate. However, said period shall be counted
from the date of first demand when the
subsequent demands are merely in the nature of
reminders or reiterations of the original demand.
Labastida v. Court of Appeals (1998)
Facts: Private respondents Deleste are the owners of the
subject parcel of land. A portion of said lot was leased to
Labastida. On 6 December 1983, Deleste filed a complaint
against Labastida, alleging that in 1979, Deleste served
notice to Labastida to vacate the leased premises, but the
latter refused to oblige. On 20 February 1983, Deleste
sent another written notice to Labastida to vacate, but to
no avail. Labastida filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
among others that the action has prescribed since no
verbal or written demand to vacate was made by the
Deleste in 1979 or in 1980 .
Issue: Was the complaint filed within the prescriptive
period under Rule 70?
Held: Yes. In case several demands to vacate are made,
the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand.
In this case, several demands to vacate were alleged to
have been made by Deleste, the last of which was dated
20 February 1983. As the complaint was filed on 3
December 1983, that is, within one year from 20 February
1983, it is clear that the case for unlawful detainer was
filed within the prescriptive period under Section 1, Rule
70. As we have already stated, where there are several
demands made, the period of unlawful withholding starts
to run from the date of the last demand on the theory
that if the lessor brings no action shortly after the
demand, it may be because he has agreed to the renewal
of the lease.
N.B. The complaint was denominated as “recovery of
possession” and filed before the Regional Trial Court. The
Supreme Court held that the case should have been a
case for unlawful detainer, cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Court. Aside from ruling that the case was filed
within the period provided by the Rules of Court, the
Supreme Court added that “the Regional Trial Court would
have jurisdiction if the deprivation of possession had been
committed through other means than those enumerated
in Rule 70, or if the period of dispossession under Rule 70
has lasted for more than a year.”
Racaza v. Gozum (2006)
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Facts: Petitioners are the co-owners of a subject
property, which was formerly owned by their father Carlos
Torres. In 1981, respondent occupied the back portion of
the subject property on a monthly rental of P3,500.00 and
continued to occupy the same even after the death of
Carlos Torres.
On 1 July 1995, petitioners sent respondent a
letter demanding that the latter vacate the subject
property but to no avail. On 27 May 1997, petitioners sent
another demand letter on the ground that the verbal
contract of lease over the property had already expired
sometime in July 1995, and the same has not been
renewed and since then, respondent had discontinued
paying the monthly rentals of P3,500.00. When the
second demand was not heeded, on 4 June 1997, the
present complaint for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (RTC).
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the proper complaint should be one for unlawful
detainer within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the Order dated 30 September 1997, the RTC
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that an
unlawful detainer must be filed within one (1) year from
the notice to vacate given as early as July 1, 1995 and
since over two (2) years had passed when the case was
filed, the proper action is accion publiciana and no longer
unlawful detainer. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and dismissed the case, holding that
the lower court had no jurisdiction over the complaint
for accion publiciana considering that it had been filed
before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the last
letter of demand to respondent had been made.
Issue: Was the complaint filed within the prescriptive
period?
Held: Yes. To summarize, petitioners claim that (1) they
are the owners of the property, being the successors-in-
interest of the original owners; (2) their predecessors-in-
interest entered into a verbal lease agreement with
respondent on a month-to-month basis; (3) they decided
to terminate the verbal lease contract upon the expiration
of the last monthly term sometime in 1995; and (4) on 1
July 1995, they demanded that respondent leave the
property, but respondent refused to do so.
Undeniably, the foregoing averments constitute
a cause of action that is based primarily on unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession. Petitioners seek
the recovery of the possession of the leased premises
following the lapse of the term of the verbal lease contract
entered into by petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest with
respondent. The allegation that the contract is on a
month-to-month basis becomes material in this sense
because it signifies that the lease contract is terminable
at the end of every month. Thus, petitioners may exercise
their right to terminate the contract at the end of any
month even if none of the conditions of the contract had
been violated, and such right cannot be defeated by the
lessee's timely payment of the rent or by his willingness
to continue doing so.
Respondent’s right to remain in possession of
the property subject of the lease was extinguished upon
the expiration of the grace period mentioned in the 1 July
1995 demand letter. It thus becomes respondent’s
obligation to turn over the property to petitioners, failing
which petitioners would have the right to immediately
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resort to ejectment action to recover possession. Their
complaint could thus fall under two kinds of ejectment
suits, the first being for unlawful detainer cognizable by
the metropolitan or municipal trial courts under Rule 70
and the second being for accion publiciana cognizable by
the regional trial courts.
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a
person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or
building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other
persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied. This summary action should be filed with the
municipal trial courts within one year after the occurrence
of the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
Beyond the one-year period, the real right of possession
may be recovered through the filing of an accion
publiciana with the regional trial courts.
Notably, demand or notice to vacate is not a
jurisdictional requirement when the action is based on the
expiration of the lease. Any notice given would only
negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend
the period of the lease. The law requires notice to be
served only when the action is due to the lessee’s failure
to pay or the failure to comply with the conditions of the
lease. The one-year period is thus counted from the date
of first dispossession. To reiterate, the allegation that the
lease was on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to
saying that the lease expired every month. Since the
lease already expired mid-year in 1995 as communicated
in petitioners’ letter dated 1 July 1995, it was at that time
that respondent’s occupancy became unlawful.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
a demand or notice to vacate was necessary, a reading of
the letter dated 27 May 1997 shows that petitioners were
merely reiterating their original demand for respondent to
vacate on the basis of the expiration of the verbal lease
contract mentioned in the first letter. The Court has, in
the past, ruled that subsequent demands which are
merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the
original demand do not operate to renew the one-year
period within which to commence the ejectment suit
considering that the period will still be reckoned from the
date of the original demand.
Damages that can be recovered - fair rental value
or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property
Dumo vs. Espinas (2006)
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondents, praying for the payment of actual
damages in the amount of P75,000.00, lost earnings
of P5,000.00 per day, moral damages of P100,000.00
and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00. In its
decision, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), granted the
prayer for damages, the pertinent part of the dispositive
portion reads:
The defendants are likewise ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the amount
of P30,000.00 as actual damages plusP500.00 a day as
lost earning of the premises from October 30, 1996 up to
the time defendants vacate the premises; P30,000.00 as
moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and P30,000.00 as attorneys fee and to pay double cost.
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On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
reversed the MTC’s decision. However, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reinstated with modification the MTC
decision by deleting the awards for actual, moral and
exemplary damages. Petitioners appealed the CA
decision, on the ground among others that the CA did not
have jurisdiction to rule on the matter of damages
because this issue was not raised in the appeal filed
before it.
Issue: What are the forms of damages which may be
awarded in complaints for forcible entry?
Held: There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral
and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that
in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that
of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered
are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use
and occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to his loss of material possession. Although the
MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their
alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, which is
a beach resort, could have been considered as
compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of
the property while it was in the possession of the
respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain
the same. Thus, we find no error in the ruling of the RTC
that the award for lost earnings has no evidentiary or
factual basis; and in the decision of the CA affirming the
same.
Summary nature of FEUD
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
I.
Applicability
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the
summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees
are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
… … …
II.
Civil Cases
Sec. 3. Pleadings. —
A. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed to
be filed are the complaints, compulsory counterclaims
and cross-claims' pleaded in the answer, and the
answers thereto.
B. Verifications. — All pleadings shall be verified.
Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines
that the case falls under summary procedure, it may,
from an examination of the allegations therein and
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ESGUERRA NOTES
such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the
case outright on any of the grounds apparent
therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action. If no
ground for dismissal is found it shall forthwith issue
summons which shall state that the summary
procedure under this Rule shall apply.
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service
of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein
shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory
counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10)
days from service of the answer in which they are
pleaded.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided,
however, that the court may in its discretion reduce
the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for
being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is
without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more
defendants.
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of
parties. — Not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held.
The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be
applicable to the preliminary conference unless
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Judgment immediately executory
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the
preliminary conference shall be a cause for the
dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears
in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with
Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance
with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where
one of two or more defendants sued under a common
cause of action who had pleaded a common defense
shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. — Within
five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the
matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:
a. Whether the parties have arrived at an
amicable settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;
b. The stipulations or admissions entered into
by the parties;.
c. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and
the stipulations and admissions made by the
parties, judgment may be rendered without
the need of further proceedings, in which
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event the judgment shall be rendered within
thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
d. A clear specification of material facts which
remain controverted; and
e. Such other matters intended to expedite the
disposition of the case.
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers.
— Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order
mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties
shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other
evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
together with their position papers setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them.
Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same, the court shall render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to
clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said
period, issue an order specifying the matters to be
clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
other evidence on the said matters within ten (10)
days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of
the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory
procedure to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment.
• Section 19 - when stayed:
Immediate execution of
judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall
issue immediately upon motion unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas
bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract,
if any, as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial
Court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the
judgment of the lower court on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period.
The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by
the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the
action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate
court shall be deposited with said court or
authorized government depositary bank, and
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shall be held there until the final disposition of
the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of
the interested parties, or in the absence of
reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to
withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree
otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make
the payments above prescribed from time to
time during the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and
upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with
respect to the restoration of possession, but
such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal
taking its course until the final disposition
thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the
Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the
court by the defendant for purposes of the stay
of execution shall be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it
appears that the defendant has been deprived
of the lawful possession of land or building
pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of
the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court,
damages for such deprivation of possession and
restoration of possession and restoration of
possession may be allowed the defendant in the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing
of the appeal.
• Section 21 – cannot be stayed:
Immediate execution on appeal to
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. — The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom.
Ejectment case survives death of defendant
Vda. De Salazar v. Court of Appeals (1995)
Facts: Private respondents Nepomuceno filed separate
complaints for ejectment against petitioner’s deceased
husband Benjamin Salazar. The trial court ruled in favor
of Nepomuceno, which decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Almost a year after the termination of that
petitioner assailed the same trial court decision as having
been rendered by a court that did not have jurisdiction
over her and the other heirs of her deceased husband
because notwithstanding the fact that her husband had
already died on 3 October 1991, the trial court still
proceeded to render its decision on 23 August 1993
without effecting the substitution of heirs in accordance
with Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court thereby
depriving her of her day in court.
Issue: Where the defendant in an ejectment case dies
before the rendition by the trial court of its decision
therein, does the trial court's failure to effectuate a
substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment
render such judgment jurisdictionally infirm?
Held: No. Ejectment, being an action involving recovery
of real property, is a real action which as such, is not
extinguished by the defendant's death. The question as
to whether an action survives or not depends on the
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nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the
causes of action which survive, the wrong complained
affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental,
while in the causes of action which do not survive, the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental. There is no
dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a
party, which death did not extinguish the deceased's civil
personality. More significantly, a judgment in an
ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action.
Rule 71
Contempt
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 71
Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. — A
person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so
near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so,
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1)
day, or both, if it be a lower court.
Section 2. Remedy therefrom. — The person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not
appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies
of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the
judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the
court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that
he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
petition be decided against him.
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt;
a.Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
b.Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts
or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
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c.Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
d.Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
e.Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority;
f.Failure to obey a subpoena duly served
g.The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
Section 4. How proceedings commenced. —
Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
propio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall
be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with
the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that
fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Section 5. Where charge to be filed. — Where the
charge for indirect contempt has been committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the
charge may be filed with such court. Where such
contempt has been committed against a lower court, the
charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
place in which the lower court is sitting; but the
proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court
subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such
place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of
this Rule.
Section 6. Hearing; release on bail. — If the hearing
is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may
be released from custody upon filing a bond, in an
amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at the
hearing of the charge. On the day set therefor, the court
shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider
such comment, testimony or defense as the respondent
may make or offer.
Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. — If the
respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine
not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged
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guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he
may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or
both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ
of injunction, temporary restraining order or status
quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete
restitution to the party injured by such violation of the
property involved or such amount as may be alleged and
proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall
issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine
unless the court otherwise provides.
Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When
the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an
act which is yet in the power of the respondent to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court
concerned until he performs it.
Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail
fails to answer. — When a respondent released on bail
fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court
may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond
for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or
both; and, if the bond be proceeded against, the
measure of damages shall be the extent of the loss or
injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the
misconduct for which the contempt charge was
prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and such
recovery shall be for the benefit of the party injured. If
there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and
disposed of as in criminal cases.
Section 10. Court may release respondent. — The
court which issued the order imprisoning a person for
contempt may discharge him from imprisonment when
it appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by
his release.
Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond
for stay. — The judgment or final order of a court in a
case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper
court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment
or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed
by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed
by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned
that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide
by and perform the judgment or final order.
Section 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities.
— Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply
to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies
or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall
have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have
adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to
punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the
place wherein the contempt has been committed shall
have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed
therefor.
Contempt, definition
In Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines (G.R. No.
155849, 31 August 2011), the Supreme Court defined
contempt of court as follows:
Contempt of court has been defined as a
willful disregard or disobedience of a public
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authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so
near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to
impair the respect due to such a body. In its
restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice,
or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court
is generic, embracing within its legal signification
a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically
granted by statute. It lies at the core of the
administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there
ought to be no question that courts have the
power by virtue of their very creation to impose
silence, respect, and decorum in their presence,
submission to their lawful mandates, and to
preserve themselves and their officers from the
approach and insults of pollution. The power to
punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and
for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the
due administration of justice. The reason behind
the power to punish for contempt is that respect
of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution; without such guarantee, the institution
of the courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Distinction between direct and indirect contempt
Atty. Tabujara v. Judge Asdala (2009)
Facts: Atty. Tabujara failed to appear and produce before
the court the body of his son, Carlos Tabujara, who was
the subject of a Petition for Habeas Corpus case filed by
his wife against him. For his failure to appear, Judge
Asdala declared him in contempt of court and issued a
bench warrant for the arrest of Atty. Tabujara “until such
time that he is willing to appear and comply with the order
of this Court...”
Issue: Is the declaration of contempt by respondent
judge proper in this case?
Held: No. Judge Asdala abused her contempt powers. If
at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt and not
direct contempt. Indirect or constructive contempt is
committed outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or
any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any
improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
For not affording complainant the opportunity to
explain why he
should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly
disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. In Lim v.
Domagas where the therein judge declared the therein
complainant guilty of contempt and ordered his arrest for
failure to bring three minors before the court without the
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benefit of a hearing, the Court faulted the therein judge
not only for grave abuse of discretion but also for gross
ignorance of the law.
Prosecutor Baculi v. Judge Belen (2009)
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by
law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed when a person is guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect
contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would
constitute indirect contempt.
Criminal and civil contempt
Remman Enterprises v. Court of Appeals (1997)
Held: The real character of the proceedings in contempt
cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the
dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and
civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial.
In general, criminal contempt proceedings
should be conducted in accordance with the principles and
rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent with the summary nature of
contempt proceedings. Strict rules that govern criminal
prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal
contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the
protections provided in regular criminal cases; and
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be
strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not
required to take any particular form so long as the
substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings, on the other hand, are
generally held to be remedial and civil in nature; that is,
for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a
remedy resorted to, to preserve and enforce the rights of
a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a
judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party
litigant. The rules of procedure governing criminal
contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions,
ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.
An order of direct contempt is not immediately
executory or enforceable
Rodriguez and Tulali v. Blancaflor (2011)
Facts: A criminal case for arson was pending before the
sala of respondent Judge Blancaflor. Atty. Tulali was the
prosecutor in said case. During the pendency of the case,
Atty. Tulali was implicated in a purported bribery
involving Judge Blancaflor’s driver, Awayan, to assure the
acquittal of the accused therein. Tulali then filed an Ex-
Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the
said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and
collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of
the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but
eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before
the Office of the Governor of Palawan. Judge Blancaflor
acquitted the accused.
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Purportedly on the basis of the administrative
complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge
Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali
and heard their testimonies. On 30 July 2009, he issued
an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for
the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining
to his possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-
parte manifestation and the administrative complaint
against Awayan, among others. In another order dated
13 August 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the Rodriguez
and Tulali that he was proceeding against them for direct
contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis
of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation. In his 13 October 2009
Decision, Judge Blancaflor found Rodriguez and Tulali
guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a
public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge
Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice
of law.
Issue: Whether the proceedings for direct contempt
conducted by Judge Blancaflor were proper
Held: No. Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others,
or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required
to do so.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing
the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as
contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It
must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore
Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel
any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused.
Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the
decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way
disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he
should not be held accountable for his act which was done
in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct
contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in,
the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It
was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the
trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint
against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan
Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that
the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters
was purposely filed to discredit the administration of
justice in court, is unfounded and without basis. There
being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct
contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused
his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.
In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the
remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the
Rules on Contempt which provides:
SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal
therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies
of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment
shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which
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rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide
by and perform the judgment should the petition be
decided against him.
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not
immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor
must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or
purge himself of the contempt. Where the person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the
remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the
judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the
court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that
he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
petition be decided against him.
Two ways of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Inc. v.
Valdez (2008)
Facts: On 15 October 1998, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila a complaint for
damages against petitioners. Petitioners filed their
respective motions to dismiss which were denied by the
trial court. On 24 May1999, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals as regards the trial court’s denial of their motions
to dismiss. The Court of Appeals granted a writ of
preliminary injunction, restraining the trial court from
conducting further proceedings.
On 7 December 1999, respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals an “Urgent Notice of Taking of Deposition
Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent Jorge
Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending
Case And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be
Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence.” It
appears that respondent was already 75 years old and
sickly. On 13 December 1999, petitioners filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to cite respondent in contempt
of court, alleging that in filing with the appellate court an
urgent notice of taking his deposition, respondent
violated the preliminary injunction issued by the said
court.
Issue: Was respondent’s insistence to take his
deposition, despite the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals, tantamount to an act of
indirect contempt of court?
Held: No. Contempt of court is a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court: such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law
into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigants or their witnesses during litigation. Succinctly, it
is the despising of the authority, justice, or dignity
of the court. Rule 71 provides for two forms of
contumacious acts direct and indirect.
Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts
perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or
any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any
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improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. It is
governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Before one may be convicted of indirect
contempt, there must be compliance with the following
requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an
opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an
opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. Records
show that these requirements were complied with.
The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56579,
dismissed the charge for indirect contempt, holding that
respondent’s deposition was done in good faith, thus:
It should be emphasized that what triggered the
holding of private respondents deposition last December
14, 1999 was the use by the petitioners of the June 09
and 28, 1999 depositions when at that time no orders
were issued by Us enjoining any proceedings below. The
use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have
been vigorously objected to by the private respondent,
contending that there was a misunderstanding created
when the private respondent was cross-examined by the
counsel for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to
clarify such misunderstanding in the previous
depositions, the December 14, 1999 deposition was
taken.
We see no reason to depart from the foregoing
findings by the appellate court. Moreover, the taking of
respondent’s deposition is not a part of the court
proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not
covered by the writ of injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals. Let it be stressed at this point that we have
always abided by the dogma that courts must exercise
their contempt powers sparingly.
Torcende v. Judge Sardido (2003)
Held: Section 3, Rule 71, of the Revised Rules of Court
provides for the mode of commencing proceedings for
indirect contempt, to wit:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. - After charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an office of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge. . . (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
… … … Held: No. The use of falsified and forged documents is a
Nazareno v. Barnes interpreted a written charge
to mean that either: 1.] an order requiring the person to
be charged with contempt to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt, be issued by the court; or
2.] a petition for contempt by way of a special civil action
under Rule 71 be initiated in order for contempt
proceedings to prosper:
At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt
proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated.
The nature thereof being that of indirect contempt, a
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written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. the written charge may partake
of the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent
(not accused) to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for having committed the
contemptuous acts imputed against him; or (2) a petition
for contempt by way of special civil action under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. The first procedure applies only
where the indirect contempt is committed against a court
or judge possessed and clothed with contempt powers.
The second, if the contemptuous act was committed not
against a court nor a judicial officer with authority to
punish for contemptuous acts.
Strict compliance with the afore-cited guidelines is
mandatory considering that proceedings against a person
alleged to be guilty of contempt, as in this case, are
commonly treated as criminal in nature
Remedies
• Please see Section 2 for direct contempt and
Section 11 for indirect contempt quoted above
Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes
indirect contempt not direct contempt
Judge Dolores Espanol v. Atty. Benjamin Formoso
(2007)
Facts: On 15 April 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines,
Inc. (“Sharcons”) bought the subject parcel of land from
its supposed seller-owner, Morales. Subsequently, a
transfer certificate of title was issued in Sharcons’ name.
However, when Sharcons began to contruct a fence
around the property, they were prevented by the
caretaker of said lot who alleged that the property is
registered under the name of Spouses Mapua. Upon
checking with the Register of Deeds, this fact was
confirmed by the records. Based on these circumstances,
Sharcons filed a case for quieting of title against Spouses
Mapua. In their answer, Spouses Mapua alleged, among
others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons
are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, or on 9 July
2001, Judge Dolores L. Español issued an Order stating
that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer,
respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin
Formoso have used a spurious certificate of title and tax
declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its
complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner
declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court
and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Issue: Whether Sharcons and its representatives may be
held liable for direct contempt
contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect
contempt not direct contempt. Such act is an improper
conduct which degrades the administration of justice.
In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
VI, we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document,
more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent
on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as
such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise
in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule
71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given
to the accused to be heard by himself and
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counsel. Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt

proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding
of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited
jurisdiction. Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules
of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as
far as practicable to those adapted to criminal
prosecutions. Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring
summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt
and ordering their incarceration. She should have
conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.

Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct

contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision in
Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch,
presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall

take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government, and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon, we held that courts are not

authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records of other cases even when such cases have been
tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate
that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision
rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof,
concluded that respondents used falsified
documents (such as land title and tax declaration) when
Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court
of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not
guilty of direct contempt of court.

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