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The Daodejing’s View on War and Peace jore_532 473..502
Ellen Y. Zhang
ABSTRACT
The Daodejing (DDJ) is an ancient Chinese text traditionally taken as a
representative Daoist classic expressing a distinctive philosophy from the
Warring States Period (403–221 BCE). This essay explicates the ethical
dimensions of the DDJ paying attention to issues related to war and peace.
The discussion consists of four parts: (1) “naturalness” as an onto-
cosmological argument for a philosophy of harmony, balance, and peace; (2)
war as a sign of the disruption of the natural pattern of things initiated by
the proliferation of desire; (3) defensive war and appropriate war conduct
required when one has to be involved in warfare; and (4) the natural and
spontaneous way of living that would prevent war from happening in the
first place. This essay attempts to show that what makes the DDJ different
from other military texts, or what is called the “art of war corpus” in China
is that the discourse of war and warfare in the DDJ is presented via its
unique understanding of peace at the personal and social levels. The DDJ is
meant to be an inquiry into an effective method to prevent war from
happening amid a world full of selfish interests and excessive desires. It
proposes that peace is not only a condition in which there is freedom from
war and overt violence, but a state of harmony that marks human life and
its betterment.
KEY WORDS: Daodejing, dao, naturalness, harmony, peace, war, ethics of war
1. Introduction
The Daodejing ( , hereafter, DDJ), also known as the Laozi, is an
ancient Chinese text about 5,000 characters long, traditionally taken as a
representative Daoist classic expressing a distinctive philosophy from the
Warring States Period (403–221 BCE).1 It is one of the most influential
examples of its genre in the intellectual tradition of China with hundreds
Dr. Ellen Y. Zhang is an associate professor in the Department of Religion and Philosophy
at Hong Kong Baptist University. She is also a research fellow at the Centre for Applied
Ethics attached to the university. Her research interests and publications include Chinese
philosophy (Daoism and Buddhism) and comparative philosophy of religion and ethics. Ellen
Y. Zhang, Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Ethics, Hong Kong Baptist University, 224
Waterloo Road, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, eyzhang@hkbu.edu.hk
1
The DDJ is commonly translated as the Classic of the Way and Virtue (for example,
Lynn 1999).
that the DDJ’s viewpoint of peace and war cannot be properly understood
without explicating its philosophical arguments on “naturalness” and a
spontaneous way of living.
2
The English translation of the DDJ chapters used in this essay is my own. I have
consulted the translations by Ames and Hall 2003, Ivanhoe 2003, Moeller 2006, Porter (aka.,
476 Journal of Religious Ethics
The chapter gives no specific information about the dao except to say that
the dao does not “model” anything other than ziran, which means in this
context “things-as-they-are,” or “naturally/spontaneously so.” That is,
letting things (actions) undergo transformations according to their own
courses. Liu has pointed out that ziran here refers to the principles of the
dao, which in turn govern the principles of humanity (Liu 2006, 289–93).
Most recent English translations of the term ziran have followed this kind
of thinking, such as “spontaneously so” (Ames and Hall 2003), “self-so”
(Moeller), and “the natural” (Sawyer 1999). Therefore, the human world
and the dao are intrinsically connected through what is natural. As a
result, all social issues, including war, should be viewed within the
framework of such a cosmic totality.
Apart from highlighting the idea of naturalness in the last line, there
is also a hierarchical structure in the humans-earth-heaven-dao pattern
in that the dao is a “primordial order” of the universe upon which the
other three “great ones” (humanity, earth, and heaven) actualize their
primordial nature in perfection. In other words, the way for humanity to
flourish, according to the statement above, is to follow the principle of
naturalness or self-so-ness. The notion of “primordiality” here also entails
an idea of an onto-cosmological “origin,” “which is already there” before
the creation, and as such the DDJ gives ziran as well as the ziran-ized dao
an onto-cosmological priority.
Derived from the first ontological argument, the second meaning of
ziran is further expanded to the domain of human activities when the
notion of self-so or naturally-so is used in contrast to coercively-so or
artificially-so. Applying this principle to politics, or the way of governing,
ziran then means ruling without interference or coercive actions. In
chapter 17, we read:
Of the best of all rulers,
People will only know that he exists.
The next best is the one they will love and praise.
The next is the one they will fear.
And the worst is the one they will disparage . . .
When the work is accomplished and the job completed,
People all say: “We have done it naturally (ziran)”
The first part of the chapter still assumes the necessity for a hierarchical
socio-political structure, with rulers above and the common people below.
Yet the ruler maintains a low profile so that the people below only know
Red Pine) 2009, Chang 1975, and Sawyer 1999. Modifications in wording were done in order
to be consistent with the major themes of this essay. The Chinese version employed in the
essay is based on the Wang Bi version ( ) though the Mawangdui version
( ) was also consulted.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 477
that there is a ruler above them and nothing more.3 Wang Zhen, a
ninth-century commentator, sees this chapter as a critique of a political
regime that has devolved “from virtuous minimal rule to brutally oppres-
sive government marked by harsh punishments, onerous taxes, and
unendurable labor services” (Sawyer 1999, 114). According to the principle
of naturalness, best of all is a Daoist ruler who reigns without ruling.
Second best is a Confucian ruler who is benevolent to his people, and
receives love and praise from them. Third best is a Legalist ruler whose
strict laws and punishments make people fearful. The worst kind of ruler
is a tyrant. Therefore, the DDJ claims that “A sage-ruler helps all things
remain natural (ziran) / He dares not act (64).” What is suggested here is
that social harmony or political order emerges from the bottom up and
proceeds in accordance with its own internal rhythms without external,
top-down, or coercive action. Therefore, in chapter 37, we read the fol-
lowing argument:
The natural dao does not do anything
yet it leaves nothing undone . . .
All things will be self-transforming (zihua),
And self-transforming, should their desires stirred
I could make them still by the nameless uncarved wood,
they would leave off desiring.
In not desiring, they would be at peace.
and the world would be self-ordering (zizheng, ).
It should be noted that according to the Mawangdui edition, this is the
final chapter of the entire DDJ, and thus is a kind of concluding chapter.
In this context, self-transforming (zihua, ) and self-ordering (zizheng)
are derived from the key concept of self-unfolding naturalness (ziran). The
metaphor of “uncarved wood” implies the notion of primordial naturalness
and simplicity that is free from any man-made trace. “Uncarved wood”
could also be interpreted as the Daoist art of governing, which advocates
the idea of “doing nothing but leaving nothing undone.” In chapter 51, the
self-transformative and self-ordering nature of the dao is linked to the
ultimate principle of the cosmological creation:
Therefore, the ten thousand things honor the dao
and cherish the de ( , virtue)
The dao is honored and the de is cherished without
anyone’s order.
So it just happens spontaneously (ziran).
Neither dao nor de coerces or controls the ten thousand things. Again, the
DDJ here suggests a correlation between onto-cosmological self-ordering
3
In his comments on chapter 17, P. J. Ivanhoe has pointed out that in the DDJ the best
rulers are described as a “shadowy presence” (2003, 17).
478 Journal of Religious Ethics
As the passages cited above indicate, harmony does not simply mean
“sameness,” since if there is no difference, things cannot transform and
balance themselves. In worldly affairs, balancing requires people to get
along well with each other by being willing to make adjustments and
compromises when necessary. The modern Chinese term hejie ( )
means “harmonization through compromises”; another term hemu ( )
means a “friendly and harmonious co-existence among people.” Both
terms are extensions of the word “harmony.” The expression “harmonious
energies” (heqi, ), which is still in use in modern Chinese, derives
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 479
from the DDJ’s notion of the perfect integration of the cosmos. Again, the
DDJ shows how social harmony and peace can be maintained by saying:
In bringing harmony (he) to a situation of intense resentment,
There is sure to be some animosity remaining.
How can such reconciliation be considered a success?
Therefore, the sage-ruler holds on to the right portions of the tally
but does not burden people with it.
The virtuous takes care of tallies;
The non-virtuous takes charge of taxes.
The way of heaven is impartial.
It is on the side of people who are good in their relationships. (chap. 79)
Here the term “tallies” is the metaphor for virtue and trust. That is why
the DDJ speaks of the importance of the character of the ruler who is able
to “requite enmity with virtue” (chap.63). The passage above advises the
ruler what he needs to do in order to avoid the arising of conflicts and
disputes in the first place—just as the best way to deal with war is to
prevent it from happening. Thus in chapter 63, we have this statement:
Act upon the difficult while it is still easy;
Deal with the large while it is still tiny.
The most difficult affairs in the world originate with the easy;
The largest issues originate with the tiny.
Such notions of holism and the self-organizing dao have clear political
implications. They suggest that there is something “sacred” about human-
ity that defies external intrusion, including the threat of weapons and
coercive actions. The DDJ puts it: “If the common people are at all afraid
of dying, how can one frighten them by threatening to kill them?” (chap.
73).4 According to Wang Zhen, manipulation here means “mobilization and
deployment of troops (jubing, ).” That is, the world cannot be
4
Ames and Hall think that the passage here may refer to “sanctioned violence” upon
which the DDJ argues that “foreclosing on the lives of people is properly the province of our
natural circumstances and real reliance upon this corporal strategy for enforcing order will
usually backfire to one’s own detriment” (2003, 194).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 481
The description here echoes exactly the concern expressed by the state-
ment in chapter 30 that speaks of war in terms of the disruption of
natural patterns of life. But the statement in the DDJ goes further than
an economic consideration since it holds an onto-cosmological argument as
well when it claims that nothing is more “unnatural” than war due to its
capacity to disrupt the reproductive course of nature like farming that
leads to the destruction of harmony and social order:
When the (natural) dao prevails in the world,
Horses are used in the farm;
When the (the natural) dao does not prevail in the world,
War horses are bred just outside the city walls. (chap. 46)
5
For instance, Wang Zhen also interprets the statement in terms of economic concerns,
such as the expenses of using farm horses and manpower.
482 Journal of Religious Ethics
6
For instance, in his commentary on the DDJ, modern Chinese scholar Zhang Mosheng
refers the idea of “rebound” to “cyclical revenge,” contending that the force of arms cannot
conquer the people by heart. They will always look for opportunities for revenge (1988,
39–40).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 483
The notion of “being non-possessive” denotes the idea that the dao does
not create the world in order to control and manage it. This quality of the
dao that is seen as a “profound virtue” (xuande, ), argues the DDJ,
provides a model for the human world to reduce strife and conflict.7 The
correlation between the onto-cosmic nature of the dao and the political
nature of the de is established in the light of preservation and nourish-
ment. The description here explicates the kind of organic process of life
envisioned by the DDJ.
From another perspective, the political argument can be seen as a
pragmatic one which focuses on the great sorrow warfare will inflict upon
the state and its people, as well as the ruler. One should keep in mind that
the DDJ and many other ancient texts on warfare were written during a
time in China when wars and uprisings were the norm. The negative
impact of war on life is a special concern for the author of the DDJ. Then,
what is the major reason for violence and war? The proliferation of desire,
as the DDJ puts it. Although fighting a battle per se may display both
virtue and vice in terms of personal character, the employment of force of
arms as an aggressive action is a gesture of self-aggrandizement and the
proliferation of desire.8 The DDJ talks about three kinds of desire that
would lead to aggressive behaviors: (1) the desire to possess more
(wealth); (2) the desire to be recognized by others (name); and (3) the
desire to control others (power).9 In fact, quite a few texts after the DDJ
have expressed similar ideas. For instance, one of the “three vices” that is
mentioned in the Jingfa ( , The Canonical Law) is “being led astray by
the heart’s desires” (Ryden 1998, 55). According to the DDJ, the prolif-
eration of desire is a sign of human greed and avarice that engenders
competitiveness and aggressiveness: “There is no crime greater than greed
/ No misfortune more devastating than discontentment /No calamity more
disastrous than the desire of conquering” (chap. 46). The teaching of
contentment is no doubt a reaction against the human obsession with the
attractions of the senses, the enslavement to endless desires, and the
misfortune of discontentment that plagued social and political life. Con-
tentment means knowing when and where to stop. The DDJ was written
at a time when military campaigns, warfare, and conquest occurred
7
Liu Xiaogan has observed that the concept of “profound virtue” refers to the quality of
a sage-ruler who is able to govern without coercive action (2009, 509).
8
See Ivanhoe 2007, 310–13.
9
It is noteworthy that Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, has a similar observation when he
refers to the cause of the war as “quarrel” which has three origins: (1) competition or pursuit
of gain; (2) desire for safety; and (3) desire for recognition (Samaddar and Reifeld 2001, 21).
Interestingly, the second origin mentioned by Hobbes, that is, desire for safety, is not one
considered by the DDJ. For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war. This marks a crucial
difference between the two traditions in that the former sees conflict as primordial whereas
the latter sees harmony as primordial.
484 Journal of Religious Ethics
frequently due to the unconstrained appetite for wealth, power, and glory
of those political leaders. That is why the DDJ speaks of discarding “the
extremes, the extravagant, and the excessive” (chap. 29). There are many
terms in the DDJ that deal with the problem of the proliferation of desire
and self-aggrandizement, such as non-desire, non-mind, non-business,
dropping extremes, dropping extravagance, dropping excessiveness,
no-action, no-contentiousness, no-fight, no-glory, no-anger, etc. Most of
those terms are expressed in negative terms, which indicates the DDJ’s
critique of existing value judgments.10
War or warfare (zhanzheng, ) in modern Chinese means “conten-
tiousness or competition through fighting or force of arms.” As it is known,
one of the DDJ’s persistent arguments is that problems of various kinds
arise when people are too contentious and too aggressive. The DDJ offers an
alternative way of approaching the possibility of harmony and peace, that
is, no-contentiousness (buzheng, ).11 No-contentiousness, like many
other negations in the DDJ such as non-action, non-desire, non-name,
non-knowledge, no-thing, no-mind, no-authority, no-contentiousness,
no-martial action, no-anger, and so on, marks a fundamental moral vision
that centers on a conscious critique of societal competitions and the heroic
ideal of being the strongest through an employment of extreme means.12
Lying behind such a view is the DDJ’s affirmation of femininity, softness,
and yielding, as well as the idea of wuwei ( ), that is no-action. No doubt
wuwei is a term with polyvalent meanings, but if we take the DDJ as a text
that addresses the issues of rulers and their advisors, as it has long been
seen, wuwei means taking no action that is coercive, purposive, egocentric,
and contrary to naturalness. Perhaps, nothing is more “coercive,” “purpo-
sive,” “egocentric,” and “contrary to naturalness” than the employment of
forces of violence. Therefore, in the DDJ one reads: “Is it not because one
strives without / contentiousness (wuzheng) that / no one in the world is able
to contend with him” (chap. 66)? And the DDJ ends with the following
concluding remarks: “Thus, the dao of heaven is to benefit without harming
10
To correspond to the DDJ’s critique of proliferation of desire, the Wenzi, a text
conceived traditionally by a disciple of Laozi, points out: “Examples of losing the dao are
extravagance, indulgence, complacency . . . forming grudges, becoming commanders of
armies, and becoming leaders of rebellions. When small people do these things, they
personally suffer great calamities. When great people do these things, their countries perish”
(Cleary 1991, 56).
11
It should be noted that the DDJ sees no-contentiousness as a kind of virtue that has
its own powerfulness and efficaciousness. Thus it insists that “the soft can overcome the
strong” (chap. 78). In fact, “Being soft” is an attitude that applies to every aspect of human
life, including warfare.
12
When speaking of those negative terms in the DDJ, Liu Xaogan contends, “All these
phrases imply an attitude that apparently runs contrary to common knowledge, custom,
values, and method, but motivates one toward higher values and better results that can be
approached only through an extraordinary manner and method” (2009, 232).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 485
Here the soft and hard, respectively, refer to the qualities of being alive and
dead. These two qualities exist in the lives of animals, plants, and human
beings. From this analogy, the DDJ speaks of weapons and war as having
the quality of being hard and rigid, and hence linked to death. When
explaining the concluding two sayings, Bill Porter makes an interesting
comment when he says: “How different this world would be if our leaders
spent as such time in their garden as they do in their war room” (Porter
2009, 153). The principle that “the weak overcomes the strong” is used to
resolve problems in the process of social interaction. Using negative force
(that is, weakness) to treat positive force (that is, strength) is an example
of a “correlative way of thinking,” which is meant to transcend the
confinement of dualistic opposites.
Notice that the DDJ pays much attention to harmony-making or
peace-making as a means of preventing war from happening. Therefore,
one sees that many chapters in the DDJ are devoted to the discussion of
fewer desires, harmony via balance, mutual complementariness, and
reconciliation. Clearly there is an urgent need for the DDJ author to
re-conceptualize the definition of peace amid a world full of selfish inter-
ests and excessive desires.
The DDJ proposes a defensive policy that is firmly based on its negative
attitude toward warfare. Here “host” (zhu, ) means an offensive war
vis-à-vis “guest” (ke, ) as a defensive one.13 The defensive position
expresses the idea of going to war because there is no other choice. In a
chaotic time such as the Warring States period, a nation may keep military
weapons, but they should only be used for defensive purposes, as is said in
the DDJ: “Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them”
(chap. 80).14 In Wang Zhen’s commentary, one reads, “In warfare, we say
that the one who acts first is the host and the one who responds is the guest.
The sage-ruler goes to war only when there is no other choice” (Wang 1987,
88). Wang Zhen expands upon this argument with examples of previous
rulers in the Chinese dynasties, including Qin Shihuang who conquered the
world through force of arms but failed to have a long-lived dynasty.15
Although the Chinese tradition generally stresses the importance of
avoidance of war, the notion of “just war” or “righteous war” (yizhan, )
for the sake of maintaining order in the world, or as a mean of justifying
legitimate and sanctioned acts of violence (for example, punishing the
enemies of the public order) is by no means absent in the time when the
DDJ was composed.16 For example, Moism, another influential philosophi-
cal school in the Warring States Period, takes a position of non-offensive
13
The host/guest statement here in the DDJ has also been understood as a philosophy
of warfare similar to that advocated in the Sunzi (The Art of War). Namely, the prosecution
of war is always a risky business. Some scholars even suggest that the host/guest statement
indicates three concrete military strategies: (1) wait at one’s ease for the exhausted
opponents; (2) defend in order to attack; and (3) retreat in order to advance.
14
The discussion on the host/guest difference has also been interpreted, from a military
perspective, as a discussion on tactical guidelines. A winning strategy rests on defense and
evasion. This is consistent with the DDJ’s argument on “acting non-action but nothing left
undone.”
15
But Heshang Gong, in his commentary, also expresses a similar idea by saying that
“we should avoid to be the first to mobilize the army” but he also adds that “we should go
to war only after receiving heaven’s blessing.” Yet this notion of “divine blessing” does not
exist in the DDJ.
16
The idea of “just war” in terms of “attacking tyranny and preventing disorder” has been
repeatedly mentioned in the ancient texts including the “Art of War corpus” where one can
find such sayings like “to prevent tyranny and save the state from disorder” (Wuzi), “to
punish tyranny and disorder in order to prevent injustice” (Weiliaozi), “to attack tyranny and
disorder” (Weiliaozi), and “to attack disorder and prevent tyranny (Sijing). Apart from the
488 Journal of Religious Ethics
war in the chapter on Against Aggression, but at the same time articulates
the notion of “righteous war,” contending that the wars initiated by three
sages, namely Yu, Tang, and Wu, are not to be called “attacks” (gong, )
but “punishments” (zhu, ). In the Mozi ( , the Book of Master Mo)
there is a distinction between “aggressive attack” and “offensive punish-
ment”: the former deploys forces for the purpose of profit whereas the
latter deploys forces for the purpose of preserving the established order
(Watson 2003, 58–60).17
The DDJ, however, does not seem to make any such distinction. There
is nothing in the DDJ that implies the idea of waging a war for a noble
cause. I think its silence on the issue of just war is closely linked to its
philosophical distrust of the very notion of “righteousness” as such a
notion can be employed as a rhetorical device to serve the person who uses
it. The DDJ does not present the idea of “righteous war” since the very
notion entails the idea that such a war is good and the DDJ seems to
reject such a judgment.18 That is why the DDJ insists on “getting rid of
righteousness” (chap. 19). It follows that the DDJ would reject the employ-
ment of any kind of offensive campaign, including those today called
“humanitarian interventions,” since the concept of “humanitarian inter-
vention” itself is derived from just war theory. The non-offensive gesture
is made clear when the DDJ says: “Daring to act means death / Daring not
to act means life” (chap. 73). The word “daring” (gan, ) contravenes the
DDJ’s preference to restraint, as the notion of “not dare to be the first”
(bugan wei tianxiaxian, ) in the “three treasured virtues”
(sanbao, ). “Not daring” (bugan) denotes deference and humility:
For those who know not daring to act (bugan wei)
There will be nothing that is not ordered. (chap. 3)
Not daring (bugan) to be the powerful. (chap. 30)
Sages help all things remain natural
They dare not (bugan) act. (chap. 64)
idea of “righteous war”, there is also a concept of “righteous armies” (yibing) in the early
Chinese tradition that goes with “righteous war.” For more information on this topic, please
see Lo 2012 in this focus issue.
17
The Mozi holds the view that attacks on small states should be seen a case of theft or
murder. Yet a war that aims at preventing small states from being attacked is the act of
“righteousness” (yi).
18
Moeller goes even further by arguing that Daoist philosophy is non-anthropocentric, so
war is not “presented in humanistic terms as a moral issue, as a fight between good and evil
forces, between just and unjust interests, between heroes and villains. Many chapters in the
Daodejing either explicitly or implicitly mention warfare, but none deals with it moralisti-
cally in terms of right and wrong” (2009, 156). Though Moeller’s argument is quite
interesting, it goes too far to say there are no ethical implications in the DDJ’s rejection of
the discourse on rightness and wrongness. In fact, the DDJ does hold its own ethical values
while suspending all other conventional moral judgments.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 489
19
There is a kind of in bello element here.
490 Journal of Religious Ethics
The DDJ maintains that “those who enjoy killing will never be successful
in the world” and that “One who does not delight in killing rules the
world” (chap. 31). Thus in a sense the DDJ’s notion of compassion (ci) is
similar to the Confucian notion of benevolence (ren). For instance, In the
Mengzi ( , The Book of Mencius): we read, “Benevolence has no enemy”
(Mengzi, 7B.4). In the Mengzi there is a passage in which when asked how
the kingdom can be pacified and who can unify the kingdom, Mengzi
replies: “One who does not have a taste for killing people can unify it”
(Mengzi, 1A. 6).20 Since all those killed in a war are actually one’s fellow
human beings within the context of the dao, how can one take pleasure in
killing his own men? Here both the Confucian text and the DDJ have
expressed a similar idea that virtue, even in the context of warfare, could
attract and subdue all enemies.
At the same time, compassion in the DDJ also entails a feminine
character with its emphasis on maternal care and subtle sensibilities that
20
Mengzi 7B.4 also has this statement: “Mengzi said, ‘There are people who say, ‘I am
good at arranging military formations,’ or ‘I am good at waging war.’” These are great crimes”
(Van Norden 2008, 186). There is a possibility the Mengzi was influenced by the DDJ. For
more discussion on Mengzi and the Confucian view on war, please see Twiss and Chan 2012
in this focus issue.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 491
show the soft side of dao. This feminine quality enables one to have a
better (affective) understanding of a relationship between oneself and the
enemy. The point here is that even under conditions of war, soft feelings,
such as compassion, can overcome hard feelings like those that underlie
warfare. Hence, to combine compassion with fighting, or to combine
compassion with courage explicates the DDJ’s view on the mutual entail-
ment of opposites: “Compassion yields victory in warfare / and security in
defending your ground” (chap. 67). In his commentary on the above
passage, Wang Zhen explains that compassion shows the “vastness of the
dao’s embodiment” (Wang 1987, 85).
It should be noted that the virtue of compassion not only matters under war
conditions, it also affects the post-war attitude towards the past violence:
When the casualties are high,
Inspect the battleground with grief and remorse;
When the war is won,
Treat it as you would attend a funeral.
While at funerals, we honor the right.
Analogously, the lieutenant commander stands to the left
And the supreme commander takes up his position on the right.
They positioned as they would be at a funeral. (chap. 31)21
21
This could be understood as a kind of post bellum argument. Wang Zhen gives a
detailed explanation of this ritual practice and is saddened by the fact that this tradition has
492 Journal of Religious Ethics
that their concern with military and pugilistic methods was based on a
recognition of the inevitability of violence rather than its desirability, and
was associated with the attempt to formulate means of dealing with conflict
in the least destructive of ways and on the refinement of defensive tech-
niques which minimize the use of force. (Clarke 2000, 109)
In other words, the DDJ takes quite a realistic view about how to deal
with the inevitability of war by engaging in warfare, reducing the damage
to the minimum, and talking about appropriate war and post-war conduct.
This kind of attitude makes more sense than pacifism in its principled and
absolutized forms since the DDJ’s anti-warism is not confined to an
ideological cage of any kind. Hence when we say that the DDJ has a
pacific sentiment, we have to be careful not to label it as “pacifism”
without qualification.
The natural philosophy of the DDJ defies any dogmatic doctrines but
embraces the idea of “responsiveness” (ying, ) which requires appropri-
ate actions in certain specific situations as well as recognizing the trans-
formative nature of things in the world. Responsiveness emphasizes the
ability of adjusting to the shifting flow of things in the world. Thus,
despite the fact that the DDJ considers war to be something unnatural, it
also suggests that not dealing with war in dire situations is equally
unnatural. Simply doing nothing when confronted by the great evil of war
or the extinction of one’s family and state is to fail to be responsive and
responsible.
24
The Chinese word wen has multiple meanings, such as patterns, ornaments, refine-
ment, writings, and culture—all the elements that denote the civil side of humanity. Ryden
has observed that in Han China, the priority is to be given to civil measures (wen) rather
than military measures (wu) (1998, 16).
494 Journal of Religious Ethics
When Chen Guying comments on this chapter, he holds that the first part
of it describes the social ills the author of the DDJ observed, and hence “the
chapter proposes possible measures to cure them” (Chen 1984, 138–39). For
the DDJ author, these polished and decorated “moral ideas,” like sharp
swords and spears, can equally be harmful and damaging if used improp-
erly. Moeller further points out, that instead of cultivating human morality,
the DDJ speaks of “cultivating a more natural way of being that is void of
Confucian adornments” (Moeller 2006, 48). For Moeller, the “social ills”
spoken of by Chen are more specific, directing us towards the Confucian
value system and the institutions that endorse this system.
As for wu, since weapons are artifacts, there is nothing more “unnatu-
ral” or “artificial” than a murdering tool. Thus wu indicates overt violence
and military adventurism. War is in conflict with harmony in the world,
and the way of things, as the waging of a war out of desires and
competition is a clear sign that one has departed from the natural course
25
In his comment on the DDJ, chapter 2, Wang Zhen also cites this phrase from the Book
of Document, saying that by doing so “benefits are nourished and harms are eliminated”
(1987, 44).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 495
The simple life is one that is plain wherein self is minimized, profit
ignored, cleverness abandoned, and desires reduced. According to Chang’s
reading, human beings are an integral part of the cosmic dao and, by
nature, are in harmony with its operations. Unfortunately, they have
“fallen” from this primordial condition of peacefulness into self-assertive,
26
Joseph Needham, for instance, uses the phrase “primitive collectivism” to refer to the
Daoist political ideal, which has, he insists, “a pacifist tendency” (1956, 127).
496 Journal of Religious Ethics
aggressive, and competitive actions that lie outside the natural harmony
of all things. Thus, the ills of the world are produced in that people inflict
violent and harmful acts on their neighbors. If we say that for a Confu-
cian, the complex and well-developed life is taken to be the ideal, the DDJ,
on the contrary, considers the ideal life to be simple and harmonious.
It is in this sense that we say the DDJ rejects both the cultured (wen)
and the martial (wu), and looks for a third way, that is, the natural way.
This natural way, according to Liu Xiaogan, points to the human world
rather than the naturalistic, non-human world (Liu 2009, 509). That is to
say, the natural way implies a value judgment characterized by what Liu
calls “humanistic naturalness” (renwen ziran, ). Here Liu’s inter-
pretation differs from those (Moeller for example) who hold that the DDJ’s
view is completely non-anthropocentric.27 Therefore, what the DDJ is
cautious against is the excessiveness of human civilization while privi-
leging a primordial state of existence in which “one’s tools have not been
sharpened” (chap. 9) both in terms of wen and wu. In other words, the
DDJ prefers a society that has not yet developed a need for fixed socio-
political norms (that is, rule-ethics) by which ideologies are imposed upon
people or sophisticated technological tools by which people are led to crave
for more. This is why the DDJ advocates an ideal state in which people act
harmoniously self-so (ziran). In a way the DDJ shows a skeptical view
about the civilization of the Warring States period because of a plethora
of social ills such as never-ending wars, continuing disorder, governmental
oppression, high taxation, and the lofty values of human culture. It
considers wen with its utility of the artificiality and over-refinement of
civilization as no less dangerous than wu with its employment of sanc-
tioned violence. When governmental control is limited by following the
principle of spontaneous order, it can help cultivate an environment in
which people can pursue happiness and practice virtue. It should be
pointed out, however, that the DDJ is not opposed to technical and social
contrivances altogether, neither does it completely dismiss morality and
virtue. Nevertheless, it worries that civilization may engender a false
sense of progress that in turn generates self-aggrandizement and the
proliferation of desire.28 Thus an ideal political leader “Acts without
publicity / Succeeds without making merit / Desires not to show saga-
ciousness” (chap. 77). The DDJ also challenges the conventional ways in
which virtue is perceived by arguing that naturalness, that is, non-
virtuous virtue, is a highest form of virtue:
27
According to Moeller’s reading, Daoist philosophy presented in the DDJ is non-
anthropocentric and does not look at humans as the measure of all things (2009, 157).
28
In his book the Laozi, Liu Xiaogan contends that the author of the DDJ is not simply
antagonistic to human civilization or progress; instead he intends to raise legitimate
questions with regard to negative aspects of human civilization and progress and what one
needs to do to correct those problems (2006, 82).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 497
I think what is argued here is that the military (wu) is not the only source
of disorder, so is the cultured and civilized (wen). In so doing, the DDJ
presents a critique of the Confucian cardinal virtues their interpretation
of moral excellence: benevolence, justice or righteousness, and ritual
propriety.29 Those ornamented moral principles, as the DDJ sees it, have
become too artificial when they are standardized and codified, and thus
have lost the authentic nature of the dao. True virtue should be from
within, not imposed from without, since anything, including morality, if
forced and coercive, turns into something violent, much like the force of
arms.30 In other words, a person with true virtue never claims to have
virtues, neither would he/she impose them on other people. Two interre-
lated problems the DDJ is addressing here are: (1) the corruption of
spontaneous moral sentiments, and (2) imposing morality upon others.
When Heshang Gong comments on this passage, he says, “Because higher
virtue follows naturalness . . . its virtuous qualities are invisible” (Chen
1984, 212; Liu 2004, 150). Ames and Hall have made a similar observa-
tion, pointing out that the DDJ is concerned about the problem that arises
when morality “becomes increasingly instrumentalized, reduced to means
to some ulterior end” (Ames and Hall 2003, 137).
In fact, the DDJ has raised a crucial issue regarding the cause of
war-waging. That is, people become violent because they think they are on
the moral side. No animals except human beings wage a war simply
because they hold different ideologies or moral beliefs. If we take a look at
what has happened throughout human history and what is happening at
present in the world, we will understand the position held by the author
of the DDJ. Thus the DDJ proposes that aggressiveness and a desire for
controlling others are to be overcome by maximum inner peace, that is,
29
Some scholars such as Ames and Hall and Moeller have translated de as efficacy
instead of virtue in order to differentiate it from the Confucian notion of de which has specific
moral connotation. For instance, Moeller has pointed out, “True virtue is beyond virtue is not
moral—it becomes pure efficacy” (2009, 90).
30
The DDJ also calls true virtue “goodness” which is like water, an important metaphor
in the DDJ for naturalness and spontaneity.
498 Journal of Religious Ethics
through the tranquility of the mind. The virtue of no-self via the tranquil
mind is explored in the DDJ through interrelated metaphors such as
empty wheels, vessels, the valley, and so on. This inner peace, then, can
be transformed into an outer peace when there is less contentiousness in
society. The DDJ’s notion of “tranquility qua non-action” (qingjing wuwei,
) entails the following chains of transformations: personal inner
peace → intra-personal peace → in-group peace → out-group peace → the
great peace.
That is to say, great peace in the world starts with the inner peace of
an individual person and then extends to the world as a whole. Peace here
refers primarily to an inner peace that comes from personal cultivation.
And this personal peace (pinghe, ) can be expanded to peace in society
at large (heping, ). In modern Chinese, when this phrase “peace”
(heping) is reversed as pinghe, it references one’s own personal character
and disposition. This progressive structure from the private to the public
is translated into the following statement in the DDJ:
Thus you use your person to survey other persons,
Your family to survey other families,
Your village to survey other villages,
Your state to survey other states,
and your world to survey worlds past and yet to come. (chap. 54)
As many commentators have pointed out, this chapter echoes the well-
known passage in the Daxue ( , The Great Learning), a Confucian
classic where one reads:
The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would
first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states
would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families
would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their
personal lives would first rectify their minds. (Chan 1973, 86)31
Although the DDJ differs from the Confucian tradition in terms of the
means of cultivation, they share quite similar views with regard to the
impact of personal virtue upon community and society. Hence, both
the DDJ and Confucianism view the individual body, the social community,
and nature as a whole as interconnected and mutually transformative.
Meanwhile, what makes the DDJ distinctive from other military texts in
China is that the discourse of war and warfare given by the DDJ is
presented via its unique understanding of peace at both the personal and
social levels.
31
It is sage-ruler’s virtue that enables him to attain great peace—the spiritual perfection
of the leader—in this sense that the DDJ’s vision of a great leader is not that different from
the sage-ruler paradigm in Confucianism. Both traditions emphasize the importance of
having a capacity of self-control particularly in an urgent situation.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 499
6. Conclusion
By delineating the DDJ’s viewpoint on war and peace, this essay has
argued that the ancient Daoist classic takes an anti-war stance from the
perspective of naturalness (ziran) that has onto-cosmological, moral, and
political ramifications. While giving harmony and peace an ontological
priority, the DDJ has challenged the conventional belief that war is a
natural circumstance of human society. The anti-militaristic sentiment of
the DDJ is based on its philosophy of “naturalness” and “non-coercive
actions.” It proposes that peace is not only a condition in which there is
freedom from war and overt violence, but a state of harmony that marks
human life and its betterment.
Ames and Hall have pointed out, “The abstractness of the Daodejing
and the absence of any concrete, illustrative examples trade potential
complexity and intensity that would be provided by these specific cases for
an accommodating width, thus allowing it to be broad in its relevance and
application” (Ames and Hall 2003, 31). No doubt, the relevance of the
ancient Chinese ethics of war and peace can be connected explicitly to the
present situation. It is my contention that the DDJ contains appropriate
recommendations for dealing with conflicts in the world today. There are
four points derived from the ethical argument explicated in the DDJ.
First, the DDJ postulates a life of simplicity, spontaneity, equilibrium,
and softness. Such a teaching obviously discourages the use of violence,
much less reliance on military force. Yet one should not be confined to any
ideological cage. When all other means of reconciliation have been
exhausted, one needs to respond militarily to certain situations in an
appropriate manner under the condition that the employment of military
force does not serve as the only way to sustain lasting social and political
stability. Meanwhile, one should not forget that the discourse on peace
and peace-making in the DDJ functions as a kind of transcendent guide-
line that retains its value as an ever-present critique of war and warfare.
It follows that even the idea of war as “the last choice” functions as an
ever-present critique of any resort to war.
Second, the DDJ emphasizes the virtue of no-contentiousness and
humility particularly at the state level that challenges the prevailing belief
in political philosophy advocating the logic of domination where interna-
tional relations become power politics, and survival of the strongest means
elimination of states that do not adhere to one’s own policies or principles.
On the contrary, the DDJ speaks of accommodating and complementing
which is different from the current practice of “checks and balances,” the
problem of which, from the viewpoint of the DDJ, is to limit consideration
to the perspective of one party’s self-interest. In a broader sense, the DDJ
offers an alternative way of looking at the self/other relationship in that the
otherness of the other should not be reduced to self-sameness.
500 Journal of Religious Ethics
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