You are on page 1of 30

WEAPONS ARE NOTHING BUT OMINOUS

INSTRUMENTS
The Daodejing’s View on War and Peace jore_532 473..502

Ellen Y. Zhang

ABSTRACT
The Daodejing (DDJ) is an ancient Chinese text traditionally taken as a
representative Daoist classic expressing a distinctive philosophy from the
Warring States Period (403–221 BCE). This essay explicates the ethical
dimensions of the DDJ paying attention to issues related to war and peace.
The discussion consists of four parts: (1) “naturalness” as an onto-
cosmological argument for a philosophy of harmony, balance, and peace; (2)
war as a sign of the disruption of the natural pattern of things initiated by
the proliferation of desire; (3) defensive war and appropriate war conduct
required when one has to be involved in warfare; and (4) the natural and
spontaneous way of living that would prevent war from happening in the
first place. This essay attempts to show that what makes the DDJ different
from other military texts, or what is called the “art of war corpus” in China
is that the discourse of war and warfare in the DDJ is presented via its
unique understanding of peace at the personal and social levels. The DDJ is
meant to be an inquiry into an effective method to prevent war from
happening amid a world full of selfish interests and excessive desires. It
proposes that peace is not only a condition in which there is freedom from
war and overt violence, but a state of harmony that marks human life and
its betterment.
KEY WORDS: Daodejing, dao, naturalness, harmony, peace, war, ethics of war

1. Introduction
The Daodejing ( , hereafter, DDJ), also known as the Laozi, is an
ancient Chinese text about 5,000 characters long, traditionally taken as a
representative Daoist classic expressing a distinctive philosophy from the
Warring States Period (403–221 BCE).1 It is one of the most influential
examples of its genre in the intellectual tradition of China with hundreds

Dr. Ellen Y. Zhang is an associate professor in the Department of Religion and Philosophy
at Hong Kong Baptist University. She is also a research fellow at the Centre for Applied
Ethics attached to the university. Her research interests and publications include Chinese
philosophy (Daoism and Buddhism) and comparative philosophy of religion and ethics. Ellen
Y. Zhang, Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Ethics, Hong Kong Baptist University, 224
Waterloo Road, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, eyzhang@hkbu.edu.hk
1
The DDJ is commonly translated as the Classic of the Way and Virtue (for example,
Lynn 1999).

JRE 40.3:473–502. © 2012 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.


474 Journal of Religious Ethics

of commentaries, written over two millennia. There have been many


Western studies of the text over the past one-hundred years either from
a philosophical or religious point of view which offer a wide range of
interpretations due to the laconic and polysemic nature of the text, as well
as the hermeneutical interests of contemporary readers. There are,
though, no substantive works dealing exclusively with the DDJ’s views
about military ethics. All that we have are isolated comments on some
specific chapters in the DDJ, and none of these put the DDJ into
conversation with the contemporary discourse on war and peace.
In contrast, one of the crucial interpretative traditions seen throughout
the history of China takes the DDJ as a military text, or at least a
military-oriented text (yanbing zishu, ). For instance, The Annals
of Sui Classics (Suishu jingjizhi, ) includes a volume entitled
The Military Book According to Laozi (Laozi bingshu, ). Wang
Zhen ( , ninth century CE) of the Tang Dynasty in his The Outline of
the Military Strategies According to the Daodejing (Daodejing lunbing
yaoyi, ) claims that every chapter of the DDJ has a military
orientation and point. Zheng Jiao ( , 1104–1162 CE) of the Song
Dynasty in his Outline of the Comprehensive Record (Tongzhilue, )
clearly categorizes the DDJ within the military genre. Wang Fuzhi
( , 1619–1692 CE), a Confucian scholar of the Qing Dynasty, also
views the author of the DDJ as the “forefather of the military treatise”
who is “the teaching guide for all who write on war” (Jiang 2006, 145).
Nevertheless, what makes the DDJ distinctive from other military texts,
or what is called the “art of war corpus” in China, is that the discourse on
war in the DDJ is presented via its unique understanding of peace at the
personal and social levels. The text is meant to be an inquiry into a
method to prevent war from happening amid a world full of selfish
interests and excessive desires. Although the DDJ does discuss how to
wage war, including various tactics and strategies, it actually uses
warfare to express a philosophy of peace, balance, and harmony. As a text
on political philosophy, the DDJ also seems to address the ruler or the
ruling elite, explaining to them the ideal government of the Daoist sage.
Nevertheless, the DDJ, like many other ancient Chinese classics, has
no definitive interpretation or simple set of lessons to teach. Although the
DDJ condemns weapons and warfare, tempting many to identify the DDJ
with pacifism, such a reading does not completely square with the complex
dimensions of the text. In the same way, understanding the DDJ as a
treatise primarily focused on the art of political deception in general and
military deception in particular is also misleading. This essay will attempt
to show that while the DDJ is firmly committed to peace and harmony it
also recognizes the need to employ force of arms when there is no other
choice. Moreover, it speaks of taking necessary measures to avoid
unwanted violence and its inevitable repercussions. It is my contention
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 475

that the DDJ’s viewpoint of peace and war cannot be properly understood
without explicating its philosophical arguments on “naturalness” and a
spontaneous way of living.

2. Naturalness: A Way-Making Harmony and Peace


One of the central themes of the DDJ is expressed through the term
ziran ( ) which in turn is connected to the central idea of the dao ( ).
The literal translation of ziran is “self-so,” meaning the thing as it is
naturally. Thus ziran basically means natural or naturalness, spontane-
ous or spontaneity. In DDJ studies, ziran is taken to be a key concept for
it speaks to both the philosophical and ethical aspects of human life
envisioned by the DDJ’s author and later Daoists. Yet interpretation of the
concept of ziran has always been problematic. Does it mean a kind of
naturalism by which humans act according to their impulses? How does
one distinguish “natural” from “unnatural” action? Why is being “natural”
better than being “unnatural”? Questions like these are crucial for our
understanding of how war and peace are viewed, particularly if we take
ziran as a kind of “ideal theory” for Daoism in general and the DDJ in
particular.
Liu Xiaogan, one of the leading scholars of Daoist philosophy today, has
paid special attention to the idea of ziran and offered a detailed analysis
of its significance as the central theme of the DDJ. He argues that ziran
should not be understood simply as “biological nature” or the “natural
world”; rather it refers to a state of “naturalness” characterized by
harmony and spontaneity. The status of “naturalness,” according to Liu,
indicates the highest value and central principle for the human world
advocated by the DDJ (Liu 2006, 289–93).
The term ziran appears in five chapters in the DDJ, four of which
suggest relevant aspects of its meaning. The most significant and fre-
quently cited is chapter 25:
The dao is great.
Heaven is great.
Earth is great.
The king is also great.
There are “four great ones” in the world
and the king is one of them.
Human beings model themselves after earth;
Earth models itself after heaven;
Heaven models itself after the dao;
The dao models itself after what is natural (ziran)2

2
The English translation of the DDJ chapters used in this essay is my own. I have
consulted the translations by Ames and Hall 2003, Ivanhoe 2003, Moeller 2006, Porter (aka.,
476 Journal of Religious Ethics

The chapter gives no specific information about the dao except to say that
the dao does not “model” anything other than ziran, which means in this
context “things-as-they-are,” or “naturally/spontaneously so.” That is,
letting things (actions) undergo transformations according to their own
courses. Liu has pointed out that ziran here refers to the principles of the
dao, which in turn govern the principles of humanity (Liu 2006, 289–93).
Most recent English translations of the term ziran have followed this kind
of thinking, such as “spontaneously so” (Ames and Hall 2003), “self-so”
(Moeller), and “the natural” (Sawyer 1999). Therefore, the human world
and the dao are intrinsically connected through what is natural. As a
result, all social issues, including war, should be viewed within the
framework of such a cosmic totality.
Apart from highlighting the idea of naturalness in the last line, there
is also a hierarchical structure in the humans-earth-heaven-dao pattern
in that the dao is a “primordial order” of the universe upon which the
other three “great ones” (humanity, earth, and heaven) actualize their
primordial nature in perfection. In other words, the way for humanity to
flourish, according to the statement above, is to follow the principle of
naturalness or self-so-ness. The notion of “primordiality” here also entails
an idea of an onto-cosmological “origin,” “which is already there” before
the creation, and as such the DDJ gives ziran as well as the ziran-ized dao
an onto-cosmological priority.
Derived from the first ontological argument, the second meaning of
ziran is further expanded to the domain of human activities when the
notion of self-so or naturally-so is used in contrast to coercively-so or
artificially-so. Applying this principle to politics, or the way of governing,
ziran then means ruling without interference or coercive actions. In
chapter 17, we read:
Of the best of all rulers,
People will only know that he exists.
The next best is the one they will love and praise.
The next is the one they will fear.
And the worst is the one they will disparage . . .
When the work is accomplished and the job completed,
People all say: “We have done it naturally (ziran)”

The first part of the chapter still assumes the necessity for a hierarchical
socio-political structure, with rulers above and the common people below.
Yet the ruler maintains a low profile so that the people below only know

Red Pine) 2009, Chang 1975, and Sawyer 1999. Modifications in wording were done in order
to be consistent with the major themes of this essay. The Chinese version employed in the
essay is based on the Wang Bi version ( ) though the Mawangdui version
( ) was also consulted.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 477

that there is a ruler above them and nothing more.3 Wang Zhen, a
ninth-century commentator, sees this chapter as a critique of a political
regime that has devolved “from virtuous minimal rule to brutally oppres-
sive government marked by harsh punishments, onerous taxes, and
unendurable labor services” (Sawyer 1999, 114). According to the principle
of naturalness, best of all is a Daoist ruler who reigns without ruling.
Second best is a Confucian ruler who is benevolent to his people, and
receives love and praise from them. Third best is a Legalist ruler whose
strict laws and punishments make people fearful. The worst kind of ruler
is a tyrant. Therefore, the DDJ claims that “A sage-ruler helps all things
remain natural (ziran) / He dares not act (64).” What is suggested here is
that social harmony or political order emerges from the bottom up and
proceeds in accordance with its own internal rhythms without external,
top-down, or coercive action. Therefore, in chapter 37, we read the fol-
lowing argument:
The natural dao does not do anything
yet it leaves nothing undone . . .
All things will be self-transforming (zihua),
And self-transforming, should their desires stirred
I could make them still by the nameless uncarved wood,
they would leave off desiring.
In not desiring, they would be at peace.
and the world would be self-ordering (zizheng, ).
It should be noted that according to the Mawangdui edition, this is the
final chapter of the entire DDJ, and thus is a kind of concluding chapter.
In this context, self-transforming (zihua, ) and self-ordering (zizheng)
are derived from the key concept of self-unfolding naturalness (ziran). The
metaphor of “uncarved wood” implies the notion of primordial naturalness
and simplicity that is free from any man-made trace. “Uncarved wood”
could also be interpreted as the Daoist art of governing, which advocates
the idea of “doing nothing but leaving nothing undone.” In chapter 51, the
self-transformative and self-ordering nature of the dao is linked to the
ultimate principle of the cosmological creation:
Therefore, the ten thousand things honor the dao
and cherish the de ( , virtue)
The dao is honored and the de is cherished without
anyone’s order.
So it just happens spontaneously (ziran).

Neither dao nor de coerces or controls the ten thousand things. Again, the
DDJ here suggests a correlation between onto-cosmological self-ordering

3
In his comments on chapter 17, P. J. Ivanhoe has pointed out that in the DDJ the best
rulers are described as a “shadowy presence” (2003, 17).
478 Journal of Religious Ethics

and the order of human society. Self-ordering is also conceived of as


“harmony” (he, ) in the DDJ, which argues that the natural nourishment
of the dao can serve as a paradigm for human society to eliminate conflict
and strife. Wang Bi (226–249 CE), one of the most important commenta-
tors of the DDJ, discusses the above passage, saying that the very reason
that the dao is considered having “profound virtue” is that the dao
nourishes all things yet does not function as their steward (Lynn 1999,
150). The moral vision based on naturalness as a normative ideal is
clearly articulated here.
Self-transformative and self-ordering naturalness indicates the idea of
balance. Accentuation on balance in the DDJ points to a natural condition
of the perpetual operation of things in the world, of a continual changing
of events that is always adjusting to the shifting flow of surrounding
situations. This means that harmony entails the notion of flexibility and
accommodation. In modern Chinese, the term “peace” (heping, )
entails the meanings of harmony (he) and balance (ping, ), or to put it
another way, harmony is achieved through balance. The early graph that
is the ancestor for the character ping meaning “peace” and “balance”
depicts a set of scales. The DDJ states, “Knowing how to be harmonious,
we endure” (chap. 55). There are several places in the DDJ where the
word “harmony” is used: “Everything carries the yin on its back and the
yang in its arms / And blends these vital energies together to make them
/ Harmonious” (chap. 42). Therefore, the primary idea of harmony is based
on the spontaneous interactive relationship between the yin and the yang
and their mutual dependence and creativity. These two opposing yet
complementary energies denote a complicated coordination of multiplicity
and diversity in the creative process of the ten thousand things in the
world. Thus the DDJ says:

Growing in its wholeness, and keeping its vitality in its


perfect integration.
It howls and screams all day long without getting hoarse,
for it embodies perfect harmony (he).
Knowing how to be harmonious, we endure.
Knowing how to endure, we have wisdom. (chap. 55)

As the passages cited above indicate, harmony does not simply mean
“sameness,” since if there is no difference, things cannot transform and
balance themselves. In worldly affairs, balancing requires people to get
along well with each other by being willing to make adjustments and
compromises when necessary. The modern Chinese term hejie ( )
means “harmonization through compromises”; another term hemu ( )
means a “friendly and harmonious co-existence among people.” Both
terms are extensions of the word “harmony.” The expression “harmonious
energies” (heqi, ), which is still in use in modern Chinese, derives
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 479

from the DDJ’s notion of the perfect integration of the cosmos. Again, the
DDJ shows how social harmony and peace can be maintained by saying:
In bringing harmony (he) to a situation of intense resentment,
There is sure to be some animosity remaining.
How can such reconciliation be considered a success?
Therefore, the sage-ruler holds on to the right portions of the tally
but does not burden people with it.
The virtuous takes care of tallies;
The non-virtuous takes charge of taxes.
The way of heaven is impartial.
It is on the side of people who are good in their relationships. (chap. 79)

Here the term “tallies” is the metaphor for virtue and trust. That is why
the DDJ speaks of the importance of the character of the ruler who is able
to “requite enmity with virtue” (chap.63). The passage above advises the
ruler what he needs to do in order to avoid the arising of conflicts and
disputes in the first place—just as the best way to deal with war is to
prevent it from happening. Thus in chapter 63, we have this statement:
Act upon the difficult while it is still easy;
Deal with the large while it is still tiny.
The most difficult affairs in the world originate with the easy;
The largest issues originate with the tiny.

What is emphasized in this passage is that the sage-ruler should take


precautions against potential problems like war before they becomes
obvious. Trying to keep harmony and peace is the way to avoid calamity
and destruction. Quite obviously, the DDJ presupposes a sense of cosmic
harmony and thus the ideal is to maintain a state of peace and harmony;
war is seen as a perversion of this norm. That is to say, harmony is the
way things should be in their primordial state, and conflict and war
signify a situation in which things are out of balance and order. The
way-making dao is self-unfolding characterized by a process of self-
transformation without external interference or coercive action.

3. War-Waging: A Sign of Disruption of Naturalness


If there is something “natural” then there must be something “unnatu-
ral.” The unnatural tendencies, if followed, result in strife, unrest, coer-
cive action, and social disorder. There are several occasions in the DDJ
where it is made clear that nothing is more catastrophic than war since
it brings about killing, mutilation, and widespread devastation. In chapter
31, one finds an explicit anti-militaristic statement: “Weapons are nothing
but ominous instruments (buxiang zhiqi) / Not the instruments of the
cultured and refined / They are used only when there is no other
480 Journal of Religious Ethics

alternative.” The phrase “ominous instruments” (buxiang zhiqi, )


was adopted by later military texts after the DDJ and was sometimes
referred to as “instruments of evil” (xiongqi, . Ryden 1998, 55). In
English, the term buxiang has usually been translated as “misfortune” or
“inauspicious.” Yet it is better translated as “ominous” or “ill omen” to
indicate a much stronger feeling. As such, military weapons and war
should be carefully handled instead of being recklessly employed. Other-
wise, they will bring great disaster and suffering to individuals and
society. More complicated than buxiang, the word xiong possesses poly-
valent meanings, indicating the idea of ill-omen, misfortune, disaster,
destruction, curse, evil, murder, calamity, and death, all of which suggest
that war is destructive and thus a horrible thing. The word is often
employed in contrast to ji ( ), a word representing the idea of good and
auspiciousness. At the same time, the DDJ contrasts “military weapons”
as “ominous instruments” to the human world as a “sacred instrument”
(shenqi, ):
All under the heaven is a sacred instrument (shenqi) that
cannot be acted upon
Acting upon leads to failure.
Those who would act upon it defeat it;
Those who would hold it lose it. (chap. 29)

“Acting upon” can be understood as manipulation or coercion. The notion


of “a sacred instrument,” also translated as a “spiritual vessel” or “sacred
vessel,” directs attention towards humanity’s embodiment of the way-
making dao, which cannot be manipulated, controlled, or reinforced. Ames
and Hall translate the above passage as follows:
The world is the sacred vessel,
And is not something that can be ruled.
Those who would rule it ruin it;
Those who would control it lose it. (Ames and Hall 2003, 194)

Such notions of holism and the self-organizing dao have clear political
implications. They suggest that there is something “sacred” about human-
ity that defies external intrusion, including the threat of weapons and
coercive actions. The DDJ puts it: “If the common people are at all afraid
of dying, how can one frighten them by threatening to kill them?” (chap.
73).4 According to Wang Zhen, manipulation here means “mobilization and
deployment of troops (jubing, ).” That is, the world cannot be

4
Ames and Hall think that the passage here may refer to “sanctioned violence” upon
which the DDJ argues that “foreclosing on the lives of people is properly the province of our
natural circumstances and real reliance upon this corporal strategy for enforcing order will
usually backfire to one’s own detriment” (2003, 194).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 481

ultimately controlled by military means: “Those who use the dao to


minister to the ruler do not seek to make him the strongest in the world
by force of arms” (chap. 30). If we put together all the chapters in the DDJ
that deal directly with anti-war themes, we can come up with three basic
arguments that postulate the idea that war is ominous:
(1) The onto-cosmological argument: War poses a disruption of the
natural pattern of things in the world.
(2) The moral argument: Preserving life is morally right and killing is
morally wrong.
(3) The political argument: It is wrong to employ war as a means to
political gain since warfare will inflict great sorrow upon the state
and its people, as well as the ruler.
All three points are presented from both deontological and utilitarian
perspectives. The first two are made clear in chapter 30 where it says,
“After a great battle, there is an ominous year of famine.” The phrase “an
ominous year” (xiongnian, ) refers to a year of calamity when farm
horses were used as war horses and farmers were drafted to become
soldiers. Most commentators tend to view this statement as a utilitarian/
economic argument against war.5 In his work Yantielun ( , Debates
on Salt and Iron), Huan Kuan ( ) (first century BCE) describes the
contrasting scenes of farmers’ lives between peacetime and wartime:
Farmers used horses to till the field, and the common folk did not ride or use
them to pull carriage. At that time, they regulated coursers to producing
manure, but later, when armies were repeatedly dispatched, war horses
became insufficient, so even mares on foal were enlisted in the ranks, which
resulted in colts being born out on the battlefield. Because the six domestic
animals were neither raised in the homes nor the five grains cultivated in
the fields, the common folk did not have enough of even the coarsest food to
eat. (Lynn 1999, 141)

The description here echoes exactly the concern expressed by the state-
ment in chapter 30 that speaks of war in terms of the disruption of
natural patterns of life. But the statement in the DDJ goes further than
an economic consideration since it holds an onto-cosmological argument as
well when it claims that nothing is more “unnatural” than war due to its
capacity to disrupt the reproductive course of nature like farming that
leads to the destruction of harmony and social order:
When the (natural) dao prevails in the world,
Horses are used in the farm;
When the (the natural) dao does not prevail in the world,
War horses are bred just outside the city walls. (chap. 46)
5
For instance, Wang Zhen also interprets the statement in terms of economic concerns,
such as the expenses of using farm horses and manpower.
482 Journal of Religious Ethics

As Michael LaFargue has correctly pointed out, “heavy-handed intrusion


can throw everything out of balance, stirring up even the ghosts of the
dead to roam around to do mischief . . . Violence is the extreme case of
something extraneous imposed on given reality from without” (LaFargue
1994, 491–93). “War horses” vis-à-vis farming horses signify a disrupted
natural state of life when farmers have ample means for life, weapons are
set aside, and horses work in the fields. Quite obviously, the DDJ presents
war here as a deviation from the primordial state of peacefulness.
Moreover, warfare is likely to generate negative impacts even if it may
be well intentioned at the beginning. Thus it tends to create a chain of
negative consequences which will transform into “a vicious cycle.” In his
comment on chapter 30, Wang Zhen contends that the sage-ruler would
not rule the world in a coercive way through the might of weapons because
such action “easily rebounds” and creates a chain of negative conse-
quences (Wang 1987, 39). The DDJ emphasizes that those who are
coercive and violent will end their life in the same way. This statement
can be interpreted as the Daoist law of causality.6 That is to say, unnatural
actions will lead to unnatural ends: “whatever departs from the way of
things (self-so-ness) will come to an un-timely end/death” (chap. 30).
Forced or coercive success is always short lived. “Those that live by the
sword die by sword,” for violence always comes back to visit violence.
The moral argument is based on the notion that war as a violent act is
categorically bad because it violates the fundamental principle of the dao,
namely “preserving life” (yangsheng, ): “It (the dao) gives life and
nurtures them” (chap. 10). According Fung Yu-lan, one of the most
eminent Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century, the original
concern of philosophical Daoism is “how to preserve life and avoid harm
and danger in the human world” (Fung 1966, 99). Therefore, action that
aims at preserving life is morally right, and action that aims at killing is
morally wrong. War not only harms humans, it also hurts non-humans.
Here, the moral claim on “preserving life” is linked to the onto-
cosmological claim about the motherly nature of the dao. As it has been
hinted earlier, the human world should model itself after the dao to be the
producer and preserver of life, and not the destroyer of life:

It nourishes but does not possess;


It acts but does not make claims;
It sustains but does not control,
This is what is meant by “profound virtue.” (chap. 51)

6
For instance, in his commentary on the DDJ, modern Chinese scholar Zhang Mosheng
refers the idea of “rebound” to “cyclical revenge,” contending that the force of arms cannot
conquer the people by heart. They will always look for opportunities for revenge (1988,
39–40).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 483

The notion of “being non-possessive” denotes the idea that the dao does
not create the world in order to control and manage it. This quality of the
dao that is seen as a “profound virtue” (xuande, ), argues the DDJ,
provides a model for the human world to reduce strife and conflict.7 The
correlation between the onto-cosmic nature of the dao and the political
nature of the de is established in the light of preservation and nourish-
ment. The description here explicates the kind of organic process of life
envisioned by the DDJ.
From another perspective, the political argument can be seen as a
pragmatic one which focuses on the great sorrow warfare will inflict upon
the state and its people, as well as the ruler. One should keep in mind that
the DDJ and many other ancient texts on warfare were written during a
time in China when wars and uprisings were the norm. The negative
impact of war on life is a special concern for the author of the DDJ. Then,
what is the major reason for violence and war? The proliferation of desire,
as the DDJ puts it. Although fighting a battle per se may display both
virtue and vice in terms of personal character, the employment of force of
arms as an aggressive action is a gesture of self-aggrandizement and the
proliferation of desire.8 The DDJ talks about three kinds of desire that
would lead to aggressive behaviors: (1) the desire to possess more
(wealth); (2) the desire to be recognized by others (name); and (3) the
desire to control others (power).9 In fact, quite a few texts after the DDJ
have expressed similar ideas. For instance, one of the “three vices” that is
mentioned in the Jingfa ( , The Canonical Law) is “being led astray by
the heart’s desires” (Ryden 1998, 55). According to the DDJ, the prolif-
eration of desire is a sign of human greed and avarice that engenders
competitiveness and aggressiveness: “There is no crime greater than greed
/ No misfortune more devastating than discontentment /No calamity more
disastrous than the desire of conquering” (chap. 46). The teaching of
contentment is no doubt a reaction against the human obsession with the
attractions of the senses, the enslavement to endless desires, and the
misfortune of discontentment that plagued social and political life. Con-
tentment means knowing when and where to stop. The DDJ was written
at a time when military campaigns, warfare, and conquest occurred

7
Liu Xiaogan has observed that the concept of “profound virtue” refers to the quality of
a sage-ruler who is able to govern without coercive action (2009, 509).
8
See Ivanhoe 2007, 310–13.
9
It is noteworthy that Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, has a similar observation when he
refers to the cause of the war as “quarrel” which has three origins: (1) competition or pursuit
of gain; (2) desire for safety; and (3) desire for recognition (Samaddar and Reifeld 2001, 21).
Interestingly, the second origin mentioned by Hobbes, that is, desire for safety, is not one
considered by the DDJ. For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war. This marks a crucial
difference between the two traditions in that the former sees conflict as primordial whereas
the latter sees harmony as primordial.
484 Journal of Religious Ethics

frequently due to the unconstrained appetite for wealth, power, and glory
of those political leaders. That is why the DDJ speaks of discarding “the
extremes, the extravagant, and the excessive” (chap. 29). There are many
terms in the DDJ that deal with the problem of the proliferation of desire
and self-aggrandizement, such as non-desire, non-mind, non-business,
dropping extremes, dropping extravagance, dropping excessiveness,
no-action, no-contentiousness, no-fight, no-glory, no-anger, etc. Most of
those terms are expressed in negative terms, which indicates the DDJ’s
critique of existing value judgments.10
War or warfare (zhanzheng, ) in modern Chinese means “conten-
tiousness or competition through fighting or force of arms.” As it is known,
one of the DDJ’s persistent arguments is that problems of various kinds
arise when people are too contentious and too aggressive. The DDJ offers an
alternative way of approaching the possibility of harmony and peace, that
is, no-contentiousness (buzheng, ).11 No-contentiousness, like many
other negations in the DDJ such as non-action, non-desire, non-name,
non-knowledge, no-thing, no-mind, no-authority, no-contentiousness,
no-martial action, no-anger, and so on, marks a fundamental moral vision
that centers on a conscious critique of societal competitions and the heroic
ideal of being the strongest through an employment of extreme means.12
Lying behind such a view is the DDJ’s affirmation of femininity, softness,
and yielding, as well as the idea of wuwei ( ), that is no-action. No doubt
wuwei is a term with polyvalent meanings, but if we take the DDJ as a text
that addresses the issues of rulers and their advisors, as it has long been
seen, wuwei means taking no action that is coercive, purposive, egocentric,
and contrary to naturalness. Perhaps, nothing is more “coercive,” “purpo-
sive,” “egocentric,” and “contrary to naturalness” than the employment of
forces of violence. Therefore, in the DDJ one reads: “Is it not because one
strives without / contentiousness (wuzheng) that / no one in the world is able
to contend with him” (chap. 66)? And the DDJ ends with the following
concluding remarks: “Thus, the dao of heaven is to benefit without harming

10
To correspond to the DDJ’s critique of proliferation of desire, the Wenzi, a text
conceived traditionally by a disciple of Laozi, points out: “Examples of losing the dao are
extravagance, indulgence, complacency . . . forming grudges, becoming commanders of
armies, and becoming leaders of rebellions. When small people do these things, they
personally suffer great calamities. When great people do these things, their countries perish”
(Cleary 1991, 56).
11
It should be noted that the DDJ sees no-contentiousness as a kind of virtue that has
its own powerfulness and efficaciousness. Thus it insists that “the soft can overcome the
strong” (chap. 78). In fact, “Being soft” is an attitude that applies to every aspect of human
life, including warfare.
12
When speaking of those negative terms in the DDJ, Liu Xaogan contends, “All these
phrases imply an attitude that apparently runs contrary to common knowledge, custom,
values, and method, but motivates one toward higher values and better results that can be
approached only through an extraordinary manner and method” (2009, 232).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 485

/ The dao of the sages is to do without contending (buzheng)” (chap. 81). At


the first glance, no-contentiousness sounds quite passive, yet it entails a
profound moral sensibility and wisdom. It indicates that peace of mind
among the people and a peaceful society can only be attained when
self-control is maintained: “(D)ao is to the world as the ruler ought to be to
the people. Dao—the discernible rhythm and regularity of the world as it
unfolds around and through us—is nonimpositional: ‘Way-making (dao)
really does things non-coercively.’ This attitude is carried over into the
human world” (Ames and Hall 2003, 23). The DDJ argues that the practice
of coercion is dangerous particularly if it is undertaken by a state leader.
Ames and Hall are right on the target when they associate the desires and
contentiousness of a ruler with coercive actions and see waging war as the
worst possible outcome of a failed leader and failed politics: “Those who
control others are forceful / Those who control themselves are powerful /
Those who know contentment are wealthy” (chap. 33). Heshang Gong
( ), a legendary figure depicted as a teacher to the Han Emperor Wen
(179–157 BCE), says in his commentary on this passage: “If someone can
conquer others, it is only by using force; if someone can conquer their own
desires, no one in the world can compete with them. Hence we call them
powerful” (Liu 2004, 145). That is why the author of the DDJ says:
“Knowing when enough is enough is to always have enough” (chap. 46).
Desires and desiring, if they occur appropriately, are part of existential
experience. But what is troubling is when there is no limit or boundary
because this is dangerous for both an individual and a state. Thus the text
asks: “Fame or life: Which matters more? / Life or wealth: Which is more
precious? / Gain or loss: Which is more painful” (chap. 44)? The DDJ
maintains that the ideal society is one in which people live in simplicity,
harmony, and contentment, and are not bothered by ambition, desire, or
competitive striving. “Forcing life and trying to get too much out of it is as
bad as squandering it,” as Ames and Hall have put it (Ames and Hall 2003,
195). The notion of “forcing” is the very act of “un-naturalness” that will
eventually lead to destruction.
Furthermore, the notion of no-contentiousness is also argued in the
light of the idea of being soft and weak which reverses the conventional
way of thinking that privileges the strong and the hard:
When alive, people are soft and supple;
When dead, people are hard and rigid.
When alive, the ten thousand things and the grass and trees
are soft and tender;
When dead, they are withered and dried out.
Thus it is said: the hard and rigid are the companions of death,
The soft and the tender are the companions of life.
If a weapon is rigid, it will not prevail,
If a tree is rigid, it will snap.
486 Journal of Religious Ethics

Thus, the hard and rigid dwell below,


While the soft and supple dwell above. (chap. 76)

Here the soft and hard, respectively, refer to the qualities of being alive and
dead. These two qualities exist in the lives of animals, plants, and human
beings. From this analogy, the DDJ speaks of weapons and war as having
the quality of being hard and rigid, and hence linked to death. When
explaining the concluding two sayings, Bill Porter makes an interesting
comment when he says: “How different this world would be if our leaders
spent as such time in their garden as they do in their war room” (Porter
2009, 153). The principle that “the weak overcomes the strong” is used to
resolve problems in the process of social interaction. Using negative force
(that is, weakness) to treat positive force (that is, strength) is an example
of a “correlative way of thinking,” which is meant to transcend the
confinement of dualistic opposites.
Notice that the DDJ pays much attention to harmony-making or
peace-making as a means of preventing war from happening. Therefore,
one sees that many chapters in the DDJ are devoted to the discussion of
fewer desires, harmony via balance, mutual complementariness, and
reconciliation. Clearly there is an urgent need for the DDJ author to
re-conceptualize the definition of peace amid a world full of selfish inter-
ests and excessive desires.

4. The “Natural Way” of a Self-Defensive War


Although the DDJ is more concerned with peace-making, it accepts the
fact that in the human world war is inevitable and that war is necessary in
dire circumstances. When it cannot be avoided, it has to be dealt with and
its harm has to be reduced to the minimum. Stirred by the great sorrow
warfare has inflicted upon the state and its people, the DDJ maintains that
the prosecution of the war is always of a losing battle, and thus should be
undertaken only when “there is no other alternative” (budeyi, , chap.
31). It is in this sense we say that the DDJ does not reject war categorically,
and the author of the DDJ is not a pacifist. Nevertheless, it emphasizes that
war has to be dealt with a special caution, and the sole purpose of war is to
restore the primordial naturalness.
Since Daoism is quite skeptical about any kind of offensive acts, the
warfare the DDJ talks about is defensive war, that is, war for the purpose
of self-defense. Meanwhile, the DDJ advises that the sage-leader should
try to win the war with the least possible damage. The idea of “self-
defense” is expressed through a metaphorical comparison between playing
a role of a “host” and “playing a role of a ‘guest’”:
In warfare there is a saying:
“I do not dare to be the host (zhu)
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 487

and rather be the guest (ke)


I do not dare to take an inch,
and rather retreat a foot.”
This is called:
Taking the operation of no-operation,
Bearing the arms of no-arms,
Charging the enemy of no-enemy,
Carry the weapons of no-weapons . . . (chap. 69)

The DDJ proposes a defensive policy that is firmly based on its negative
attitude toward warfare. Here “host” (zhu, ) means an offensive war
vis-à-vis “guest” (ke, ) as a defensive one.13 The defensive position
expresses the idea of going to war because there is no other choice. In a
chaotic time such as the Warring States period, a nation may keep military
weapons, but they should only be used for defensive purposes, as is said in
the DDJ: “Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them”
(chap. 80).14 In Wang Zhen’s commentary, one reads, “In warfare, we say
that the one who acts first is the host and the one who responds is the guest.
The sage-ruler goes to war only when there is no other choice” (Wang 1987,
88). Wang Zhen expands upon this argument with examples of previous
rulers in the Chinese dynasties, including Qin Shihuang who conquered the
world through force of arms but failed to have a long-lived dynasty.15
Although the Chinese tradition generally stresses the importance of
avoidance of war, the notion of “just war” or “righteous war” (yizhan, )
for the sake of maintaining order in the world, or as a mean of justifying
legitimate and sanctioned acts of violence (for example, punishing the
enemies of the public order) is by no means absent in the time when the
DDJ was composed.16 For example, Moism, another influential philosophi-
cal school in the Warring States Period, takes a position of non-offensive
13
The host/guest statement here in the DDJ has also been understood as a philosophy
of warfare similar to that advocated in the Sunzi (The Art of War). Namely, the prosecution
of war is always a risky business. Some scholars even suggest that the host/guest statement
indicates three concrete military strategies: (1) wait at one’s ease for the exhausted
opponents; (2) defend in order to attack; and (3) retreat in order to advance.
14
The discussion on the host/guest difference has also been interpreted, from a military
perspective, as a discussion on tactical guidelines. A winning strategy rests on defense and
evasion. This is consistent with the DDJ’s argument on “acting non-action but nothing left
undone.”
15
But Heshang Gong, in his commentary, also expresses a similar idea by saying that
“we should avoid to be the first to mobilize the army” but he also adds that “we should go
to war only after receiving heaven’s blessing.” Yet this notion of “divine blessing” does not
exist in the DDJ.
16
The idea of “just war” in terms of “attacking tyranny and preventing disorder” has been
repeatedly mentioned in the ancient texts including the “Art of War corpus” where one can
find such sayings like “to prevent tyranny and save the state from disorder” (Wuzi), “to
punish tyranny and disorder in order to prevent injustice” (Weiliaozi), “to attack tyranny and
disorder” (Weiliaozi), and “to attack disorder and prevent tyranny (Sijing). Apart from the
488 Journal of Religious Ethics

war in the chapter on Against Aggression, but at the same time articulates
the notion of “righteous war,” contending that the wars initiated by three
sages, namely Yu, Tang, and Wu, are not to be called “attacks” (gong, )
but “punishments” (zhu, ). In the Mozi ( , the Book of Master Mo)
there is a distinction between “aggressive attack” and “offensive punish-
ment”: the former deploys forces for the purpose of profit whereas the
latter deploys forces for the purpose of preserving the established order
(Watson 2003, 58–60).17
The DDJ, however, does not seem to make any such distinction. There
is nothing in the DDJ that implies the idea of waging a war for a noble
cause. I think its silence on the issue of just war is closely linked to its
philosophical distrust of the very notion of “righteousness” as such a
notion can be employed as a rhetorical device to serve the person who uses
it. The DDJ does not present the idea of “righteous war” since the very
notion entails the idea that such a war is good and the DDJ seems to
reject such a judgment.18 That is why the DDJ insists on “getting rid of
righteousness” (chap. 19). It follows that the DDJ would reject the employ-
ment of any kind of offensive campaign, including those today called
“humanitarian interventions,” since the concept of “humanitarian inter-
vention” itself is derived from just war theory. The non-offensive gesture
is made clear when the DDJ says: “Daring to act means death / Daring not
to act means life” (chap. 73). The word “daring” (gan, ) contravenes the
DDJ’s preference to restraint, as the notion of “not dare to be the first”
(bugan wei tianxiaxian, ) in the “three treasured virtues”
(sanbao, ). “Not daring” (bugan) denotes deference and humility:
For those who know not daring to act (bugan wei)
There will be nothing that is not ordered. (chap. 3)
Not daring (bugan) to be the powerful. (chap. 30)
Sages help all things remain natural
They dare not (bugan) act. (chap. 64)

idea of “righteous war”, there is also a concept of “righteous armies” (yibing) in the early
Chinese tradition that goes with “righteous war.” For more information on this topic, please
see Lo 2012 in this focus issue.
17
The Mozi holds the view that attacks on small states should be seen a case of theft or
murder. Yet a war that aims at preventing small states from being attacked is the act of
“righteousness” (yi).
18
Moeller goes even further by arguing that Daoist philosophy is non-anthropocentric, so
war is not “presented in humanistic terms as a moral issue, as a fight between good and evil
forces, between just and unjust interests, between heroes and villains. Many chapters in the
Daodejing either explicitly or implicitly mention warfare, but none deals with it moralisti-
cally in terms of right and wrong” (2009, 156). Though Moeller’s argument is quite
interesting, it goes too far to say there are no ethical implications in the DDJ’s rejection of
the discourse on rightness and wrongness. In fact, the DDJ does hold its own ethical values
while suspending all other conventional moral judgments.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 489

Those who are courageous in daring result in death;


Those who are courageous in not-daring (bugan) result in life. (chap. 73)

The argument on “daring-not” is also expressed by the idea of “staying in


the low place” (chuxia, ). The DDJ insists that the state should “place
itself low”; at the place where the water accumulates (chap. 61): “A large
state is like the lower reaches of / water’s downward flow / It is the female
of the world” (chap. 61). The low reaches of a river here symbolizes the
virtue of modesty and humility. The DDJ maintains that the sage-ruler
dares by not-daring. The paradoxical idea of “not-daring,” like all other
negativities in the text entails the DDJ’s paradigm shift in its way of
thinking: “One has success without using force.” In fact, the DDJ directs
us to a plethora of reversals of priorities in chains of opposite pairs such
as yin/yang, strong/weak, masculine/feminine, hard/soft, doing something/
doing nothing, etc. In instructing the weak, the soft, and not-daring in the
strategy of survival, the DDJ offers a way of life that defies the conven-
tional way of thinking, namely being strong, aggressive, and competitive.
The reversals in the DDJ have deconstructed the mentality that one can
conquer the world only via military might.
Although the DDJ is critical of war, it acknowledges the significance of
appropriate war conduct when one has to be engaged in war. Since
fighting a battle per se may display both virtue and vice in terms of
personal character, the DDJ emphasizes the need to act in ways that
correspond to the overall spirit of the dao. Three major principles that
should accompany wartime activities are recommended by the DDJ: (1) to
maintain a humble attitude; (2) to fight with compassion; and (3) to know
when to stop to avoid committing unnecessary violence.19 All three prin-
ciples direct us towards the issue of implementing the dao in the course
of warfare so that we can preserve peoples’ lives.

4.1 To maintain a humble attitude


Seeing war as permissible but only when there is “no other alternative”
determines that military action should never be employed as a means of
achieving one’s political ambitions and that one should fight with a humble
attitude. No arrogance, no pride, and no bragging are allowed. This means
(1) not fighting as a gesture of self-glorification and self-empowerment
(fight with a proper attitude) and (2) fighting in a non-self-assertive way
that is less confrontational. Both of these points target the problem of
self-gain and self-promotion. Thus Wang Zhen has made the following
comments: “Thus, it is appropriate that the ruler should be decisive and
implement the dao (Tao) of not exploiting his power, not boasting about his

19
There is a kind of in bello element here.
490 Journal of Religious Ethics

achievements, and not taking pleasure in killing men. Placidity is upper-


most; even victory is not glorified. This is the meaning of achieving results
and not exploiting strength” (Wang 1987, 40; Sawyer 1999, 142).

4.2 To fight with compassion


At first glance, fighting and compassion seem wholly incompatible.
What does the DDJ mean by compassion here? In fact, the word compas-
sion (ci, ) is an important concept in the DDJ. It is one of “three
treasured virtues,” that is, compassion, frugality, and deference (daring to
be first in the world) and humility, (DDJ, chap. 67).
Compassion implies the notion of “empathy” (min, ). Another word
linked with the word ci is “remorseful” or “pity” (ai, ). Wang Bi’s
comment on the word “remorseful” says, “Those who are remorseful
sympathize with their opponents. They try not to take advantage but
avoid injury. In so doing, they always win the battle” (Liu 2004, 283).
Other well-known sayings in the DDJ with regard to the idea of compas-
sion include:
“One overcomes one’s opponents through compassion (ci) (chap. 67)
Compassion (ci) will give one victory in fighting the war.” (chap. 67)
“It is because of one’s compassion (ci), one can be courageous.” (chap. 67)
“Those who are compassionate (ai) will win the war.” (chap. 69)

The DDJ maintains that “those who enjoy killing will never be successful
in the world” and that “One who does not delight in killing rules the
world” (chap. 31). Thus in a sense the DDJ’s notion of compassion (ci) is
similar to the Confucian notion of benevolence (ren). For instance, In the
Mengzi ( , The Book of Mencius): we read, “Benevolence has no enemy”
(Mengzi, 7B.4). In the Mengzi there is a passage in which when asked how
the kingdom can be pacified and who can unify the kingdom, Mengzi
replies: “One who does not have a taste for killing people can unify it”
(Mengzi, 1A. 6).20 Since all those killed in a war are actually one’s fellow
human beings within the context of the dao, how can one take pleasure in
killing his own men? Here both the Confucian text and the DDJ have
expressed a similar idea that virtue, even in the context of warfare, could
attract and subdue all enemies.
At the same time, compassion in the DDJ also entails a feminine
character with its emphasis on maternal care and subtle sensibilities that

20
Mengzi 7B.4 also has this statement: “Mengzi said, ‘There are people who say, ‘I am
good at arranging military formations,’ or ‘I am good at waging war.’” These are great crimes”
(Van Norden 2008, 186). There is a possibility the Mengzi was influenced by the DDJ. For
more discussion on Mengzi and the Confucian view on war, please see Twiss and Chan 2012
in this focus issue.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 491

show the soft side of dao. This feminine quality enables one to have a
better (affective) understanding of a relationship between oneself and the
enemy. The point here is that even under conditions of war, soft feelings,
such as compassion, can overcome hard feelings like those that underlie
warfare. Hence, to combine compassion with fighting, or to combine
compassion with courage explicates the DDJ’s view on the mutual entail-
ment of opposites: “Compassion yields victory in warfare / and security in
defending your ground” (chap. 67). In his commentary on the above
passage, Wang Zhen explains that compassion shows the “vastness of the
dao’s embodiment” (Wang 1987, 85).

4.3 To know when to stop to avoid committing unnecessary violence


Since war is a misfortune, the army should reduce the harm it does to
the minimum (that is, less is better), and there is a need to know when
to stop to avoid committing unnecessary violence. There is no specific
account of this point in the DDJ, but the basic idea is there when it says
that military victory “is not a thing of beauty” and that “one who does not
delight in killing rules the world” (chap. 31). The DDJ is warning against
any kind of excessive behaviors since extremes always mean reversal to
its opposite. Moreover, the author of the DDJ is aware of “the vicious
cycle” brought about by warfare, so the idea of “stopping when it is
appropriate” (shike erzhi, ) is crucial. As soon as a thing reaches
its extreme, it reverses course. Therefore, it is said in the DDJ:
Those who are good soldiers are not militant;
Those who are good at battling are not belligerent;
Those who are good at defeating their enemies
do not engage them;
Those who are good at employing others
place themselves beneath them. (chap. 68)

It should be noted that the virtue of compassion not only matters under war
conditions, it also affects the post-war attitude towards the past violence:
When the casualties are high,
Inspect the battleground with grief and remorse;
When the war is won,
Treat it as you would attend a funeral.
While at funerals, we honor the right.
Analogously, the lieutenant commander stands to the left
And the supreme commander takes up his position on the right.
They positioned as they would be at a funeral. (chap. 31)21

21
This could be understood as a kind of post bellum argument. Wang Zhen gives a
detailed explanation of this ritual practice and is saddened by the fact that this tradition has
492 Journal of Religious Ethics

Those who win a war are required to go the battleground to self-reflect


and should feel grief and sorrow. The event is treated as a funeral as
military victory is not a thing of beauty. The DDJ states that winning the
war is no different than attending a funeral for the occasion entails more
sadness than joy, more regret than glory. In terms of the ritual, the
chapter points out that the left side is associated with the fortunate
whereas the right side with misfortune.22 Weapons are said to be ominous
instruments and so warfare corresponds to the right. The event is one of
grief and sorrow, not an occasion of triumph and delight. Ralph Sawyer
has observed that the purpose of this ritual involves:
eroding the warrior mentality by returning soldiers to civilian life through
appropriate ceremonies—in this case, the rites of mourning to emphasize the
gravity and pain of the experience . . . . Furthermore, when forced to grapple
with reality of evil, the ruler or commander should maintain his equanimity,
the detached emotional uninvolvement that will not only preclude rash error
but also . . . prevent antagonizing men and spirits through displaying inap-
propriate exhilaration at the conquest. (Sawyer 1999, 147)
Li Rong, a Daoist master who comments on this passage, has observed,
“The ancients used weapons with compassion. They honored them for
their virtue and disdained them as tools. Once the enemy was defeated,
the general put on plain, undyed clothes, presided over a funeral cer-
emony, and received the mourners” (Porter 2009, 63).23 It is worth noting
that Daoist philosophy, in contrast to Confucianism, has a general ten-
dency to undermine the significance of the ritual ceremony of the past, yet
the DDJ here follows exactly the ancient tradition. It shows that the
author takes war and post-war reflection very seriously. Wang Zhen in his
commentary has offered a detailed explanation of this post-war ritual
practice and is saddened by the fact that the tradition has been ignored
by later generations (Wang 1987, 39–40).
As noted above, the anti-militaristic position of the DDJ does not lead
it to reject all combat and warfare or prevent it from providing descrip-
tions of appropriate military conduct. J. J. Clarke makes an excellent
point when he contends:
It would certainly be false to maintain that Daoists have never been involved
in, or even that they were pacifists in principle, but it is important to note
been ignored by later generations: “Since those killed were all their own fellow men, how
could they not carry out the rites of mourning for them? Later ages unfortunately did not
behave this way” (Wang 1987, 41).
22
According to the Zuozhuan (Commentary According to General Zuo), it was a custom
in antiquity in the southern kingdoms (such as Chu where the DDJ was developed) to honor
the left over the right, in the northern kingdoms however, there is a reverse of the custom.
23
On his comment on the DDJ (chap. 31), Li Rong points out, “Military weapons can be
employed, but they tend to be destructive. So they are instruments of the lower people but
not the political leader” (Dong 2002, 191).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 493

that their concern with military and pugilistic methods was based on a
recognition of the inevitability of violence rather than its desirability, and
was associated with the attempt to formulate means of dealing with conflict
in the least destructive of ways and on the refinement of defensive tech-
niques which minimize the use of force. (Clarke 2000, 109)

In other words, the DDJ takes quite a realistic view about how to deal
with the inevitability of war by engaging in warfare, reducing the damage
to the minimum, and talking about appropriate war and post-war conduct.
This kind of attitude makes more sense than pacifism in its principled and
absolutized forms since the DDJ’s anti-warism is not confined to an
ideological cage of any kind. Hence when we say that the DDJ has a
pacific sentiment, we have to be careful not to label it as “pacifism”
without qualification.
The natural philosophy of the DDJ defies any dogmatic doctrines but
embraces the idea of “responsiveness” (ying, ) which requires appropri-
ate actions in certain specific situations as well as recognizing the trans-
formative nature of things in the world. Responsiveness emphasizes the
ability of adjusting to the shifting flow of things in the world. Thus,
despite the fact that the DDJ considers war to be something unnatural, it
also suggests that not dealing with war in dire situations is equally
unnatural. Simply doing nothing when confronted by the great evil of war
or the extinction of one’s family and state is to fail to be responsive and
responsible.

5. Naturalness: Going beyond Wen and Wu


As mentioned earlier, the statement “Military weapons are ominous
instruments, not the instruments of the cultured and refined” reflects an
anti-militaristic sentiment in the DDJ. At the same time, the statement
has given rise to another important issue in ancient China that may go
beyond the DDJ itself, namely the contrasting (but sometimes also
complementary) concepts between wen ( , cultured, civilized) and wu ( ,
military, force of arms). As we know, wen is intrinsically connected to the
Confucian ethical system and ritual practices and as such has always
been valued higher than wu in the Confucian tradition.24
If we say that wen indicates the civil and refined side of humanity, the
word wu, in contrast to wen, indicates the military and destructive side of
humanity. For instance, one can find such expression as “stopping the wu
and cultivating the wen” (yanwu xiuwen, ) in the Shangshu (The

24
The Chinese word wen has multiple meanings, such as patterns, ornaments, refine-
ment, writings, and culture—all the elements that denote the civil side of humanity. Ryden
has observed that in Han China, the priority is to be given to civil measures (wen) rather
than military measures (wu) (1998, 16).
494 Journal of Religious Ethics

Book of Document).25 As a matter of fact, the word wu originally means


“stopping war or weapons” (zhige weiwu, ), but this meaning is
later changed in that it becomes a kind of deviation from wen and hence
is associated more with violence and war. The original meaning of wu may
entail the meaning of “using war to stop war.” The question we want to
ask here is: Does the DDJ’s anti-militaristic sentiment suggest that it is
pro-wen like the Confucian tradition? The answer is no. Instead, the DDJ
holds a position that is critical of both the cultured/civilized (wen) and the
military (wu): it speaks of dropping both “sharp and military instruments”
(liqi, ) and “civilized and cultured skillfulness” (jiqiao, ) (chap.
57). The DDJ claims that those defined as wen are simply ornaments,
decoration, and external adornments, so they are not good enough. We
read:
Drop wisdom and abandon knowledge
and people will benefit a hundredfold.
Drop benevolence and abandon righteousness
and people will return to their filial piety and compassion.
Drop skillfulness and abandon all gain,
and there will be no thieves and robbers. (chap. 11)
These three sayings are still ornaments (wen)
and thus do not yet suffice.
So let these be added:
Manifest plainness and embrace simplicity,
Reduce selfishness and limit one’s desires. (chap. 19)

When Chen Guying comments on this chapter, he holds that the first part
of it describes the social ills the author of the DDJ observed, and hence “the
chapter proposes possible measures to cure them” (Chen 1984, 138–39). For
the DDJ author, these polished and decorated “moral ideas,” like sharp
swords and spears, can equally be harmful and damaging if used improp-
erly. Moeller further points out, that instead of cultivating human morality,
the DDJ speaks of “cultivating a more natural way of being that is void of
Confucian adornments” (Moeller 2006, 48). For Moeller, the “social ills”
spoken of by Chen are more specific, directing us towards the Confucian
value system and the institutions that endorse this system.
As for wu, since weapons are artifacts, there is nothing more “unnatu-
ral” or “artificial” than a murdering tool. Thus wu indicates overt violence
and military adventurism. War is in conflict with harmony in the world,
and the way of things, as the waging of a war out of desires and
competition is a clear sign that one has departed from the natural course

25
In his comment on the DDJ, chapter 2, Wang Zhen also cites this phrase from the Book
of Document, saying that by doing so “benefits are nourished and harms are eliminated”
(1987, 44).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 495

of dao. In chapter 80, a picture of worldly peace and social harmony is


depicted through a small and pacifist village-state with minimal govern-
ment of antiquity:
There is a state that is small with a minimal population
Even though there are ships and chariots,
There is no occasion to use them.
Even though there are armor and weapons,
There is no occasion to display them.
Even though there are ships and chariots,
There is no occasion to use them.
Even though there are armor and weapons,
There is no occasion to display them. . . .
The people there enjoy fine delicates
and find beauty in their garments,
They are happy with their residences
and pleased with their customs.
Although the neighboring states are within eyesight,
And the sounds of their dogs are cocks are within earshot,
The people there live their whole life without traveling to and fro. (chap. 80)

This passage is usually interpreted as the vision of a Daoist utopia of a


communal life of a small state, or of a primitive past that is remote from
civilization.26 As such the chapter has sometimes been criticized for at best
advocating a return to nature romanticism, and a nostalgic dream of a lost
paradise, and at worst of promoting an attitude of primitivism and a
reactionary disposition to human progress. While this kind of reading may
have some merit, it fails to see a more subtle argument behind the account
revealing the author’s frustration with the state of people who have lost
track of dao understood in terms of a simplified economic lifestyle. As
Chang Chung-yuan in his commentary on the DDJ puts it:
When the Great Tao (dao) prevails, people enjoy their lives. They are well
satisfied with their food, their clothes, their lodgings, and their cultural
traditions. When people are really able to enjoy their lives, their being and
their thinking are totally identified. It is through this deep, underlying
harmony that people are freed from the intention of war. Therefore, their
weapons are put aside. (Chang 1975, 194)

The simple life is one that is plain wherein self is minimized, profit
ignored, cleverness abandoned, and desires reduced. According to Chang’s
reading, human beings are an integral part of the cosmic dao and, by
nature, are in harmony with its operations. Unfortunately, they have
“fallen” from this primordial condition of peacefulness into self-assertive,

26
Joseph Needham, for instance, uses the phrase “primitive collectivism” to refer to the
Daoist political ideal, which has, he insists, “a pacifist tendency” (1956, 127).
496 Journal of Religious Ethics

aggressive, and competitive actions that lie outside the natural harmony
of all things. Thus, the ills of the world are produced in that people inflict
violent and harmful acts on their neighbors. If we say that for a Confu-
cian, the complex and well-developed life is taken to be the ideal, the DDJ,
on the contrary, considers the ideal life to be simple and harmonious.
It is in this sense that we say the DDJ rejects both the cultured (wen)
and the martial (wu), and looks for a third way, that is, the natural way.
This natural way, according to Liu Xiaogan, points to the human world
rather than the naturalistic, non-human world (Liu 2009, 509). That is to
say, the natural way implies a value judgment characterized by what Liu
calls “humanistic naturalness” (renwen ziran, ). Here Liu’s inter-
pretation differs from those (Moeller for example) who hold that the DDJ’s
view is completely non-anthropocentric.27 Therefore, what the DDJ is
cautious against is the excessiveness of human civilization while privi-
leging a primordial state of existence in which “one’s tools have not been
sharpened” (chap. 9) both in terms of wen and wu. In other words, the
DDJ prefers a society that has not yet developed a need for fixed socio-
political norms (that is, rule-ethics) by which ideologies are imposed upon
people or sophisticated technological tools by which people are led to crave
for more. This is why the DDJ advocates an ideal state in which people act
harmoniously self-so (ziran). In a way the DDJ shows a skeptical view
about the civilization of the Warring States period because of a plethora
of social ills such as never-ending wars, continuing disorder, governmental
oppression, high taxation, and the lofty values of human culture. It
considers wen with its utility of the artificiality and over-refinement of
civilization as no less dangerous than wu with its employment of sanc-
tioned violence. When governmental control is limited by following the
principle of spontaneous order, it can help cultivate an environment in
which people can pursue happiness and practice virtue. It should be
pointed out, however, that the DDJ is not opposed to technical and social
contrivances altogether, neither does it completely dismiss morality and
virtue. Nevertheless, it worries that civilization may engender a false
sense of progress that in turn generates self-aggrandizement and the
proliferation of desire.28 Thus an ideal political leader “Acts without
publicity / Succeeds without making merit / Desires not to show saga-
ciousness” (chap. 77). The DDJ also challenges the conventional ways in
which virtue is perceived by arguing that naturalness, that is, non-
virtuous virtue, is a highest form of virtue:
27
According to Moeller’s reading, Daoist philosophy presented in the DDJ is non-
anthropocentric and does not look at humans as the measure of all things (2009, 157).
28
In his book the Laozi, Liu Xiaogan contends that the author of the DDJ is not simply
antagonistic to human civilization or progress; instead he intends to raise legitimate
questions with regard to negative aspects of human civilization and progress and what one
needs to do to correct those problems (2006, 82).
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 497

Higher virtue is not virtuous


Thus it possesses virtue;
Lower virtue is not without virtue
Thus it possesses no virtue.
Higher virtue is non-active and non-intentional,
Higher benevolence is active yet non-intentional,
Higher justice is active and intentional . . .
Virtue appears when the dao is lost,
Benevolence appears when virtue is lost,
Justice appears when benevolence is lost . . . (chap. 38)

I think what is argued here is that the military (wu) is not the only source
of disorder, so is the cultured and civilized (wen). In so doing, the DDJ
presents a critique of the Confucian cardinal virtues their interpretation
of moral excellence: benevolence, justice or righteousness, and ritual
propriety.29 Those ornamented moral principles, as the DDJ sees it, have
become too artificial when they are standardized and codified, and thus
have lost the authentic nature of the dao. True virtue should be from
within, not imposed from without, since anything, including morality, if
forced and coercive, turns into something violent, much like the force of
arms.30 In other words, a person with true virtue never claims to have
virtues, neither would he/she impose them on other people. Two interre-
lated problems the DDJ is addressing here are: (1) the corruption of
spontaneous moral sentiments, and (2) imposing morality upon others.
When Heshang Gong comments on this passage, he says, “Because higher
virtue follows naturalness . . . its virtuous qualities are invisible” (Chen
1984, 212; Liu 2004, 150). Ames and Hall have made a similar observa-
tion, pointing out that the DDJ is concerned about the problem that arises
when morality “becomes increasingly instrumentalized, reduced to means
to some ulterior end” (Ames and Hall 2003, 137).
In fact, the DDJ has raised a crucial issue regarding the cause of
war-waging. That is, people become violent because they think they are on
the moral side. No animals except human beings wage a war simply
because they hold different ideologies or moral beliefs. If we take a look at
what has happened throughout human history and what is happening at
present in the world, we will understand the position held by the author
of the DDJ. Thus the DDJ proposes that aggressiveness and a desire for
controlling others are to be overcome by maximum inner peace, that is,

29
Some scholars such as Ames and Hall and Moeller have translated de as efficacy
instead of virtue in order to differentiate it from the Confucian notion of de which has specific
moral connotation. For instance, Moeller has pointed out, “True virtue is beyond virtue is not
moral—it becomes pure efficacy” (2009, 90).
30
The DDJ also calls true virtue “goodness” which is like water, an important metaphor
in the DDJ for naturalness and spontaneity.
498 Journal of Religious Ethics

through the tranquility of the mind. The virtue of no-self via the tranquil
mind is explored in the DDJ through interrelated metaphors such as
empty wheels, vessels, the valley, and so on. This inner peace, then, can
be transformed into an outer peace when there is less contentiousness in
society. The DDJ’s notion of “tranquility qua non-action” (qingjing wuwei,
) entails the following chains of transformations: personal inner
peace → intra-personal peace → in-group peace → out-group peace → the
great peace.
That is to say, great peace in the world starts with the inner peace of
an individual person and then extends to the world as a whole. Peace here
refers primarily to an inner peace that comes from personal cultivation.
And this personal peace (pinghe, ) can be expanded to peace in society
at large (heping, ). In modern Chinese, when this phrase “peace”
(heping) is reversed as pinghe, it references one’s own personal character
and disposition. This progressive structure from the private to the public
is translated into the following statement in the DDJ:
Thus you use your person to survey other persons,
Your family to survey other families,
Your village to survey other villages,
Your state to survey other states,
and your world to survey worlds past and yet to come. (chap. 54)

As many commentators have pointed out, this chapter echoes the well-
known passage in the Daxue ( , The Great Learning), a Confucian
classic where one reads:
The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would
first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states
would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families
would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their
personal lives would first rectify their minds. (Chan 1973, 86)31

Although the DDJ differs from the Confucian tradition in terms of the
means of cultivation, they share quite similar views with regard to the
impact of personal virtue upon community and society. Hence, both
the DDJ and Confucianism view the individual body, the social community,
and nature as a whole as interconnected and mutually transformative.
Meanwhile, what makes the DDJ distinctive from other military texts in
China is that the discourse of war and warfare given by the DDJ is
presented via its unique understanding of peace at both the personal and
social levels.

31
It is sage-ruler’s virtue that enables him to attain great peace—the spiritual perfection
of the leader—in this sense that the DDJ’s vision of a great leader is not that different from
the sage-ruler paradigm in Confucianism. Both traditions emphasize the importance of
having a capacity of self-control particularly in an urgent situation.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 499

6. Conclusion

By delineating the DDJ’s viewpoint on war and peace, this essay has
argued that the ancient Daoist classic takes an anti-war stance from the
perspective of naturalness (ziran) that has onto-cosmological, moral, and
political ramifications. While giving harmony and peace an ontological
priority, the DDJ has challenged the conventional belief that war is a
natural circumstance of human society. The anti-militaristic sentiment of
the DDJ is based on its philosophy of “naturalness” and “non-coercive
actions.” It proposes that peace is not only a condition in which there is
freedom from war and overt violence, but a state of harmony that marks
human life and its betterment.
Ames and Hall have pointed out, “The abstractness of the Daodejing
and the absence of any concrete, illustrative examples trade potential
complexity and intensity that would be provided by these specific cases for
an accommodating width, thus allowing it to be broad in its relevance and
application” (Ames and Hall 2003, 31). No doubt, the relevance of the
ancient Chinese ethics of war and peace can be connected explicitly to the
present situation. It is my contention that the DDJ contains appropriate
recommendations for dealing with conflicts in the world today. There are
four points derived from the ethical argument explicated in the DDJ.
First, the DDJ postulates a life of simplicity, spontaneity, equilibrium,
and softness. Such a teaching obviously discourages the use of violence,
much less reliance on military force. Yet one should not be confined to any
ideological cage. When all other means of reconciliation have been
exhausted, one needs to respond militarily to certain situations in an
appropriate manner under the condition that the employment of military
force does not serve as the only way to sustain lasting social and political
stability. Meanwhile, one should not forget that the discourse on peace
and peace-making in the DDJ functions as a kind of transcendent guide-
line that retains its value as an ever-present critique of war and warfare.
It follows that even the idea of war as “the last choice” functions as an
ever-present critique of any resort to war.
Second, the DDJ emphasizes the virtue of no-contentiousness and
humility particularly at the state level that challenges the prevailing belief
in political philosophy advocating the logic of domination where interna-
tional relations become power politics, and survival of the strongest means
elimination of states that do not adhere to one’s own policies or principles.
On the contrary, the DDJ speaks of accommodating and complementing
which is different from the current practice of “checks and balances,” the
problem of which, from the viewpoint of the DDJ, is to limit consideration
to the perspective of one party’s self-interest. In a broader sense, the DDJ
offers an alternative way of looking at the self/other relationship in that the
otherness of the other should not be reduced to self-sameness.
500 Journal of Religious Ethics

Third, conflict is inevitable but it needs to be prevented and controlled.


The DDJ suggests that it is more important to prevent war from hap-
pening in the first place so that more efforts should be put in peace-
making. The idea of prevention fits into Daoist philosophy in general. As
we know, in traditional Daoist medicine, there are two kinds of medicines:
the upper medicine and the lower medicine: the former is meant to be
preventative (that is, nourishing life) before any diseases can set in
whereas the latter is meant to be remedial in treating specific diseases. To
borrow this medical distinction, war, even if it can be justified, is like a
remedial drug in that it can be poisonous and hence generate side effects,
or even fatal effects. Therefore, the precaution needed to prevent war from
happening is more crucial and effective. The key point to note about the
DDJ is that it is more concerned with peace-making than war-making.
Fourth, the DDJ presents us with a unique perspective on life and the
world with its emphasis on correlative thinking and the transformation of
opposites. The DDJ’s idea of interconnectedness leads to a profound
understanding of the mutual acceptance of the opposing forces under a
certain set of conditions, and a full appreciation of a harmony-based
principle that should be applied to personal, national, and international
affairs. Therefore, the concept of peace in the DDJ is not peace as modus
vivendi in that we refrain from violence simply out of fear, but peace as
true tranquility, harmony, and order.
In summary, the world in the twenty-first century has become more
diverse than ever before, with the voices and vocabularies of many
traditions demanding to be heard and understood. I am not suggesting in
this essay that the DDJ has provided a roadmap to peace. Nevertheless,
like other ancient Chinese classics, the DDJ can contribute to the con-
temporary discourse on war and peace and thus help to shape a new
paradigm of ethical thought and political practice for the world today.32

REFERENCES
Ames, Roger T. and David L. Hall
2003 Daodejing: “Making This Life Significant.” New York: The Ballantine
Publishing Group.
Chan, Wing-Tsit
1973 A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Chang, Chung-yuan
1975 Tao: A New Way of Thinking. New York: Harper & Row.

32
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the insightful remarks and comments given by
Professor P. J. Ivanhoe, Professor Sumner Twiss, and Professor P. C. Lo.
Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments 501

Chen, Guying
1984 Notes and Commentaries on the Laozi . Beijing: Zhon-
ghua Publication House .
Clarke, J. J.
2000 Tao of the West: Western Transformation of the Taoist Thought. New
York: Routledge.
Cleary, Thomas, trans.
1991 Wen-tzu: Understanding the Mysteries, Further Teachings of Lao-tzu.
Shambhala.
Dong, Enlin
2002 The Laozi Studies in Tang Dynasty . Beijing: The China
Social Sciences Academy .
Fung, Yu-lan
1966 A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: The Free Press.
Ivanhoe, P. J.
2003 The Daodejing of Laozi. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing.
2007 Review of Philosophy of the Daodejing, written by Hans-Georg,
Moeller (2006). DAO: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6.3 (Fall):
310–14.
Jiang, Guozhu
2006 A Military History of China : The Pre-Qin Era
. Beijing: The China Social Sciences Academy
.
LaFargue, Michael
1994 Tao and Method: A Reasoned Approach to the Tao Te Ching. Albany,
N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
Liu, Xiaogan
2006 Laozi . 2nd edition. Taibei: Dongda Publishing House
.
2009 Laozi: Past and Today . 2 vols. Beijing: The China Social
Sciences Academy .
2009 “Daoism (I) Laozi and the Dao-De-Jing” See Mou 2009, 209–36.
Liu, Dehan
2004 The Proof Reading and Interpretive Paraphrase of the Laozi
. Taibei: Lexue Publishing House .
Lo, Ping-cheung
2012 “The Art of War Corpus and Chinese Just War Ethics Past and
Present.” Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (3): 404–46.
Lynn, Richard J.
1999 The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te-
ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Moeller, Hans-Georg
2006 Philosophy of the Daodejing. New York: Columbia University Press.
2009 The Moral Fool: A Case for Amorality. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
502 Journal of Religious Ethics

Mou, Bo, ed.


2009 History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Needham, Joseph
1956 Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Porter, Bill (aka. Red Pine)
2009 Lao-Tzu’s Tao Te Ching. Port Townsend, Washington: Capper Canyon
Press.
Ryden, Edmund
1998 Philosophy of Peace in Han China. Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute.
Samaddar, Ranabir and Helmut Reifeld, eds.
2001 Peace as Process. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
Sawyer, Ralph D.
1999 The Tao of War. Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press.
Twiss, Sumner B. and Jonathan K. L. Chan
2012 “The Confucian Understanding of the Legitimate Use of Military
Force.” Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (3): 447–72.
Van Norden, Bryan W.
2008 Mengzi: With selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis,
Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Wang, Zhen
1987 The Outline of the Military Strategies According to the Daodejing
. Taibei: Old Cultural Industries Co.
.
Watson, Burton
2003 Mozi: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press.
Zhang, Mosheng
1988 New Commentaries on the Laozi . Chengdu: Chengdu
Bookshop on Classics .

You might also like