Zhong Huis Laozi Commentary and The Debate On Capacity and Nature in Thirdcentury China

ZHONG HUTS LAOZI COMMENTARY AND
THE DEBATE ON CAPACITY AND NATURE IN

THIRD-CENTURY CHINA*
Alan K.L. Chan
Introduction
Zhong Hui I I H (A.D. 225-264) was a major, albeit neglected figure in
third-century Chinese intellectual history. Author of a Laozi 3£-f- com-
mentary, a work on the relationship between "capacity" (cai Jf) and
"nature" (xing f4), two treatises on the Yijing fj$f, and other writings,
Zhong Hui played a significant role in the development of xuanxue 3£
P (learning of the mysterious Dao), which, as is well known, came into
prominence during the Zhengshi IE#p reign (240-249) of the Wei H dy-
nasty (220-265) and dominated the Chinese intellectual scene well into
the sixth century. Zhong Hui was highly regarded by his contemporaries
and rivaled Wang Bi 3ZJJB3 (226-249) as one of the brightest "stars" among
the cultural and political elite. Politically, Zhong was, in fact, a far more
important figure than Wang Bi. Political ambition, however, exacted a
heavy price—at the end of a successful military campaign against the
kingdom of Shu HJ, Zhong Hui attempted to march against the ruling
Sima W| H regime itself, which cost him his life.1
* I would like to thank Professor Robin D.S. Yates and two anonymous readers for
their comments. Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National
University of Singapore (R-106-000-005-112). An earlier version in Chinese was read at
the Institute for Research in the Humanities, Kyoto University, in May, 2001. I thank
Professor Mugitani Kunio | ? ^ # [ 5 ^ for his kindness and assistance in facilitating my
visit.
1. Zhong Hui's biography is found in the Sanguo zhi H 11,15 (Beijing: Zhonghua,
1982), 28.784-95, and will be discussed later (all references to the standard or "dynastic"
histories are to the Zhonghua shuju (Beijing) punctuated edition and will be cited by juan
^j and page numbers). Xuanxue, translated as "Neo-Daoism" in some Western sources,
is a large topic. The word xuan, literally "dark red," is used in the Laozi (especially ch. 1)
to describe the sublimity and mystery of the Dao. Toward the end of the Han period,
political instability, the rampant abuses of the official appointment system and other
forms of corruption seriously weakened the hold of the Han Confucian orthodoxy
and provided the necessary impetus for a reexamination of the classical heritage. Han
scholarship was seen to have given rise to a fragmented and thus distorted view of the
Early China 28, 2003
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102 ZHONG HUI'S LAOZI COMMENTARY
In discussions of Wei-Jin thought, Zhong Hui often appears as a mar-

ginal figure. Sometimes he is portrayed as a villain, whose accusations
led to the death of Xi Kang %&%£ (223-262), one of the most cherished
leaders of the xuanxue movement. Some recent studies give a more posi-
tive assessment. Wang Xiaoyi BEBHiiS, for example, emphasizes Zhong's
contribution to the debate on the relationship between "capacity and
nature," which helped define the contours of early xuanxue philosophy.2
Ogami Masami, in her study of Wei-Jin literature, characterizes Zhong
Hui as a "tragic figure."3 It is unfortunate that nearly all of Zhong's writ-
teachings of the ancient sages, which were unified in their understanding of the Dao
as the source and principle of the natural and sociopolitical order. Under the relatively
favorable conditions during the Zhengshi reign, with a measure of stability at the center
and a strong interest in reform, a new hermeneutic of the Dao began to flourish.
In this context, the emergent learning of the "mysterious" Dao represents a broad
philosophical front and is not a partisan or sectarian "Daoist" movement. Confucius
remained the ideal sage; indeed, he is seen by some to have "embodied" the Dao in his
very being. The Yijing and other Confucian classics must not be neglected, although
the Laozi and the Zhuangzi Hli 1 should be recognized also for their profound wisdom.
Through philosophical debates (e.g., on the relationship between "capacity" and "na-
ture") and a reinterpretation of the classical tradition (e.g., by composing commentaries
to the Lun yu mta, the Laozi, and the Yijing), philosophers of the early Wei thus sought
to discern the "true" meaning of the Dao and its implications for government. Later,
during the fifth century, xuanxue became a subject in the official curriculum, with a
sharpened focus on the Yi jing, the Laozi, and the Zhuangzi, which were collectively
described as the "Three Treatises on the Mysterious (Dao)" (sanxuan Hj£). The term
"xuanxue" was then applied retrospectively to the intellectual currents that emerged
during the early Wei period. In this discussion, I distinguish xuanxue as a general
philosophical hermeneutic with crisscrossing currents from "Xuanxue" as a subject of
official learning. On this point, see further discussion in the text and n.82 below.
During the early Wei period, philosophical debates and criticism became a main-
stay of elite culture. "Pure conversation" (qingtan iflf!&)—which may be described as
a structured form of social gathering in which the host and invited guests debated on
specific philosophical topics—acquired a commanding presence on the intellectual
stage. I consider xuanxue in the general sense defined above to be the substance of "pure
conversation," providing the participants with the topics, vocabulary, and content of
debate. There is a sizeable literature on xuanxue and qingtan. Some of the relevant stud-
ies will be cited in the notes below. In English, Rudolf G. Wagner, The Craft of a Chinese
Commentator: Wang Bi on the Laozi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000),
and Alan K.L. Chan, Two Visions of the Way (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1991) both contain a general discussion of the Zhengshi intellectual context and an
extensive bibliography.
2. Wang Xiaoyi, WangBipingzhuan ZESffiPff (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue, 1996), 112. See
also Wang's earlier studies, Zhongguo wenhua de qingliu 41 H ~$C i t W ?H Si (Beijing: Zhong-
guo shehui kexue, 1991); and "Zhong Hui yu zaoqi xuanxue" i l # ®l -^ j£E] S ¥ , Zhongguo
zhexueshiyanjiu c j a H S ^ i t S f ^ (1987), 28-32.
3. Ogami Masami ;<c±IE#j, "Sho Kai ron" ^^^m,Aoyamagakuin daigaku bungakubu
kiyd ffLLjOTx^PiPgÊg 30 (1988), 17-29. This essay has been collected into
ALAN K.L. CHAN 103
ings have been lost. This paper examines Zhong Hui's Laozi commentary,
reconstructed on the basis of quotations preserved in the Wen xuan 3£
jiH and two other sources. Comparison with Wang Bi's interpretation
provides an additional avenue to understanding Zhong Hui's thought.
On this basis, the debate on "capacity and nature" may also be explored.
The evidence available is limited, I should make clear at the outset, which
necessitates some degree of conjecture as well as discipline in guarding
against overstating one's case. Given that little research on Zhong Hui is
available and in view of the possible role of "family learning" (jiaxue | c
<P) in his intellectual development, I propose to begin with a biographical
and historical introduction.
Zhong Hui:
The Making of a Statesman and Xuanxue Philosopher
The Zhong family came from Yingchuan Mi 11 (modern Henan province),
which was an important center of learning during the Later Han period.
It gained prominence especially with Zhong Hao il&p (ca. 88-156), who
was closely associated with the qingyi )1f IS (pure criticism) political
reform movement and commanded considerable influence among the
literati as a teacher and model of integrity.4 Because of the proscriptions
Ogami's recent book, Gen Seki Kei Ko no bungaku PiififiSlSfCD^t^ (Tokyo: Sobunsha,
2000).
4. Zhong Hao is accorded a short biography in the How Han shu '\%a JH U (Beijing: Zhong-
hua, 1973), 62.2064-65. See also Scmguo zhi 13.391-92nl. Zhong Hao is often mentioned in
historical sources with another intellectual luminary of Yingchuan, Xun Shu 15 iS (83-149),
a descendant of Xunzi 15 -f, father of Xun Shuang 15 $L the noted Yijing scholar, and
grandfather of Xun Yue 151£, author of the Shenjian ^ H , and Xun Yu 15 s|. See Xun
Shu's biography in Hou Han shu 62.2049. Xun Yu (163-212), in particular, was a key figure
in late Han and early Wei politics. See lang Changru Hf JS Jff, "Dong Han moqi de daxing
mingshi" 3lSl3fc{$lft±*££±, in his Wei Jin Nan Bei chao shilun shiyi g l t ^ t ^ l t
in JB (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 25-52. Among the associates and students of Zhong Hao
and Xun Shu were Li Gu $ @ , Li Ying ^M, and Chen Shi Wt.- All three were leaders
of the qingyi movement that pitted the literati against both the eunuchs and the maternal
relatives of the imperial family. Li Gu was killed in 147 by Liang Ji WM, supreme com-
mander and brother of two empresses, while Li Ying, who was also a native of Yingchuan,
died in prison at the height of the purges or proscriptions against the qingyi "faction"
(danggu W.M) in 169. Li Ying's aunt was the wife of Zhong Hao's brother, whose son, in
turn, married Li Ying's sister. Li Gu's and Li Ying's biographies are found in Hou Han shu
63.2073-89 and 67.2191-97, respectively. Chen Shi (104-187), another famous son of Ying-
chuan, was known especially for his fairness and integrity; he was implicated during the
proscriptions but was spared a violent death. See his biography in Hou Han shu 62.2065-69.
Qingyi is translated as "righteous protest" in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 1, The
Ch'in and Han Empires, ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 797; 327-30 discusses the danggu proscriptions. Also relevant is
104 ZHONG HUTS LAOZI COMMENTARY
against members of the reform party, neither Zhong Hao nor his two
sons served the central government. After the proscriptions had come to
a close, however, the Zhong family began to take an active part in national
politics. Zhong Hao's grandson (or great-grandson), Zhong You §1 US (d.
230), came to be a trusted lieutenant of Cao Cao WfH (155-220) and rose
to become one of the leading statesmen in the early Wei government. 5
Zhong You was the father of Zhong Hui.
The Zhong family is known especially for its expertise in law (xinglti fl-IJ
t$). As a teacher, Zhong Hao is said to have specialized in both poetry
and law.6 Zhong You, too, is remembered especially for his views on law
and government. Specifically, Zhong You was a strong proponent for
reinstating certain forms of corporal punishment involving dismember-
ment and mutilation (rouxing |£] JflJ), which were abolished during the
Former Han dynasty. The issue first surfaced in 216, when Cao Cao set
out to reform the justice system and asked Chen Qun Pj|p (d. 236) to
Ch'i-yiin Ch'en, Hstin Yiieh (AD. 148-209): The Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval
Confucian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
5. See Zhong You's biography in Sanguo zhi 13.391-99, as well as Xun Yu's in Sanguo zhi
10.307-17 and How Han shu 70.2280-90. Both began their political careers in the Yingchuan
provincial administration (Sanguo zhi 13.392n2). In 191, Xun Yu left Yuan Shao J t IS for
Cao Cao. A few years later, Xun recommended Zhong You to Cao Cao (Sanguo zhi 10.311).
Zhong You, having risen quickly in 216 to the position of Chief Minister or "Counselor-in-
chief" (xiangguofll[H), suffered a political setback in 219—following the chronology in the
biography of Cao Cao, Sanguo zhi 1.52—but was reinstated when Emperor Wen J t of Wei
(Cao Pi W:E, r. 220-226) ascended the throne. According to Zhong Hao's biography in
the Hou Han shu (62.2065), Zhong You was the grandson of Zhong Hao. The commentary
to Zhong You's biography in the Sanguo zhi, however, identifies Zhong You as Zhong Hao's
great-grandson (13.392nl). The name "Zhong You" may also be pronounced "Zhong Yao." I
follow the standard reading here, although the second reading seems to find support from
the Shishuo xinyu tSlftlff fp, which contains an interesting entry relating how Emperor
Wen of Jin (the posthumous title of Sima Zhao W) , 1 Bg [211-265]) made fun of Zhong Hui
by alluding to his father's name using the word "yao" ill. See Yang Yong fHH, Shishuo
xinyu jiaojian tSISIf I P K H (Hong Kong: Dazhong, 1969), 25.2,586; cf. Richard Mather,
Shih-shuo Hsin-yii: A New Account of Tales of the World, by Liu l-ch'ing with Commentary by
Liu Chun (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), 401. All quotations from the
Shishuo xinyu are taken from Yang Yongfs edition and will be cited by their chapter and
section numbers. Zhong You was also a noted calligrapher. See Howard L. Goodman,
"The Calligrapher Chung Yu (ca. 163-230) and the Demographics of a Myth," Journal of
the American Oriental Society 114.4 (1994), 555-71. Goodman traces in great detail the family
history of Zhong You and suggests that he was likely Zhong Hao's great-grandson. The
translation, "Counselor-in-chief," is taken from Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official
Titles in Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985).
6. The Hou Han shu relates, "Zhong Hao, styled Jiming 5JS Bfi, was a native of Changshe
H:tt in Yingchuan. The family was a distinguished one in the commandery; and for
generations it had been good at l a w . . . [Zhong Hao] taught the Shi | # and law to over a
thousand students" (62.2064); cf. Sanguo zhi 13.391nl.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 105
develop his father's (Chen Ji Pj||2) view on criminal punishment. At

the time, Zhong You served as Commissioner of Justice (dali ^ c S ) and
proposed with Chen Qun to reintroduce the ancient practice of rouxing.
The proposal did not come to pass, because of opposition from other high
officials and also because of more pressing military concerns. When Cao
Pi ascended the throne, he asked that Zhong You's view be reconsidered,
but again it had to be set aside for lack of support. Later, Zhong You, then
Grand Tutor (taifu ;fcfH), raised the issue a third time to Emperor Ming
Hfl (Cao Rui Wf? r. 227-239) at the start of the Taihe ;fcfn reign period
(227-232). Over a hundred officials reportedly participated in this debate,
the majority of whom opposed Zhong's position. Although the argument
for rouxing is rhetorically framed as a "benevolent" means by which death
sentences may be commuted and consequently a much needed increase
in population may be realized, the context suggests that Zhong You was
above all concerned with tightening the penal code to curb disorder.7
Zhong You's eldest son, Zhong Yu MM (d. 263) later occupied the same
justice post once held by his father and was responsible for the prosecu-
tion of Xiahou Xuan and Li Feng i p H in 254.8
7. Sanguo zhi 13.397-99; also see Sanguo zhi 22.634, biography of Chen Qun. From the
start, Wang Lang 3: ££j had argued against the reinstatement of rouxing. Wang clearly saw
the real intent of Zhong You's proposal, because death sentences could be commuted even
under existing law. Given that Wang Lang died in 228, the debate before Emperor Ming
must have taken place between 227 and 228. Wang Lang's biography indicates that both
he and Zhong You were known for their expertise in judging criminal cases. Whereas
Wang Lang emphasized caution in applying punishment, that heavy punishment should
be avoided whenever doubt existed (zuiyi congqing ff Hffi H), Zhong You was discerning
in his judgment and meted out punishment proportionate to the crime (mingcha dangfa
Bfl^Hiffi). See Sanguo zhi 13.407. The reinstatement of rouxing was evidently a hotly
debated topic at thetime—seealso, for example, Sanguo zhi 9.302n6, biography of Xiahou
Xuan HfieS (209-254), who authored a treatise on corporal punishment; and Jin shu
If i i 30.921-26, "Treatise on Punishment and Law," which explains that the motivation
for reinstating rouxing lay in the ineffectiveness of existing laws to fight the rising crime
rate. The Sanguo zhi 10.321n2 also mentions a debate on rouxing between Kong Rong |L
U (d. 208) and Xun Qi i5#f cf. Hou Han shu 70.2266, for Kong Rongfs view on this issue.
My concern here is simply whether Zhong You's emphasis on the rule of law would find
expression in Zhong Hui's Laozi learning. The fact that Chen Qun was asked to develop
his father's view may also serve as an indication of the place of family learning in early
third-century China. Incidentally, Chen Qun's grandfather, Chen Shi, was a close friend of
Zhong Hao (see n.4 above). For a summary of the debate on corporal punishment during
the early Han period, see Han shu MW 23.1097-1105.
8. Zhong Yu also introduced new laws allowing sons to clear the name of their deceased
fathers and prohibiting remarriage for wives of the aristocrats. See Zhong Yu's brief biogra-
phy attached to Zhong You's in Sanguo zhi 13.399-400. The official title dali was changed to
tingwei ££ I t at the start of the Wei dynasty. Whereas Xiahou Xuan was an acknowledged
leader of the Wei elite, Li Feng, as we shall see, participated in the debate on "capacity
and nature." Li Feng plotted with Xiahou Xuan against Sima Shi W] HSU (208-255) and
The Zhong family evidently took a strong interest also in the Laozi and
the Yijing. Zhong You authored a Laozi xun 45 •?• IM as well as a commen-
tary to the Yijing.9 Neither is extant, but given Zhong You's emphasis on
the rule of law, it may be asked whether his interpretation of the Laozi
would highlight the more practical insights of statecraft. According to
Zhong Hui, his mother (nee Zhang 3J|, d. 257) was also a dedicated
student of the Laozi and the Yijing.10 In view of the importance of fam-
ily traditions in classical learning in early imperial China, the possible
influence of Zhong You on Zhong Hui's thinking cannot be discounted.
Besides the focus on law, as we shall see, Zhong You's view on the role
of the "sage" in politics may also warrant attention in this connection.
Zhong Hui, styled Shiji ± =p, was a precocious child, as both the Sanguo
zhi and the Shishuo xinyu tell us.11 Zhong You must have had big plans for
his youngest son, for he sent Zhong Hui, who was only five (Chinese sui
|§), to see Jiang Ji M?M (d. 249), an influential official then in charge of
military appointments and famous for his view that to "know a person"
(zhiren £P A)—i.e., to determine if someone is capable and worthy of offi-
cial appointment—one only needs to look into his eyes. On seeing Zhong
Hui, Jiang Ji immediately pronounced that he was "extraordinary."12
This may have been said out of respect for Zhong You, but it is clear that
was killed immediately; the fate of his family, however, came under Zhong Yu's purview.
The incident is reported in detail in Sanguo zhi 9.299-302, biography of Xiahou Xuan,
where it is also mentioned that Zhong Hui wanted to befriend Xiahou Xuan after the
latter had been arrested but was rebuffed (9.302n4). On this incident, see also Shishuo
xinyu 5.6.
9. Zhong You's Laozi and Yijing commentaries are mentioned by Liu Jun %L\]t$i (462-
521) in his commentary to the Shishuo xinyu 2.11. This reference has been omitted in
Richard Mather's translation. Zhong Hui also refers to his father's Yijing commentary
(Sanguo zhi 28.785nl).
10. Zhong Hui composed a biography of his mother, which has been preserved in the
commentary to his biography in Sanguo zhi 28.784nl and 785-86nl. When Zhong Yu was
a provincial governor toward the end of the Zhengshi reign, he engaged Guan Lu If $g
(209-256), the famous diviner, in a discussion of the Yijing. The Sanguo zhi commentator,
Pei Songzhi IH&i. (372-451) relates that Zhong Yu challenged Guan on over twenty
matters concerning the Yijing and adds that he thought the difficulties Zhong had raised
were truly exceptional. This would suggest that Zhong Yu at least thought of himself as
a Yijing expert. See Sanguo zhi 29.821-22, biography of Guan Lu.
11. Sanguo zhi 28.784. The Shishuo xinyu reports two instances in which Zhong Yu and
especially Zhong Hui showed their quick wit (2.11 and 2.12). The latter reference tells the
story that Zhong Yu and Zhong Hui stole wine when they were young. A similar story
is attributed to the two sons of Kong Rong; see Shishuo xinyu 2.4.
12. Sanguo zhi 28.784. A similar account is recorded in the commentary to the Shishuo
xinyu 2.12, which gives an abbreviated version of Zhong Hui's biography. See also San-
guo zhi 14.452, for Jiang Ji's rise in officialdom. Sanguo zhi 9.299nl gives an account of the
widespread corruption that plagued the appointment of military officials, a problem to
which Jiang Ji is said to have contributed.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 107
Zhong Hui held much promise and was carefully groomed to follow
in his father's footsteps in establishing a distinguished political career.
Zhong Hui himself recounts that he began his formal education under
the guidance of his mother with the Xiaojing # 1 1 at the age of four sui.
This was followed by the Lun yu at seven; the Shijing at eight; the Shang
shu jcfi fl' at ten; the Yijing at eleven; the Chun qiu Zuozhuan^fXtc M and
the Guo yu H i p at twelve; the Zhou li jWllf and the Liji JliE at thirteen;
and his father's commentary on the Yijing at fourteen. At fifteen, he was
then sent to the imperial academy to further his studies.13
During the Zhengshi era, Zhong Hui began his official career as an
assistant in the palace library (mishu lang l&dUP). Reputed for his wide
learning and skill in disputation, he was soon promoted to be a deputy
secretary at the Central Secretariat (zhongshu shilang ÎHTfllP). The
Sanguo zhi reports that he and Wang Bi both enjoyed fame even before
they turned twenty.14 Wang Bi's biography further relates that the two
were on good terms.15 As Wang Baoxuan j E ^ I £ argues, there is reason
to believe that during the Zhengshi period Zhong Hui identified him-
self initially with the faction led politically by Cao Shuang WM (d. 249)
and intellectually by He Yan M S (d. 249).16 On the philosophical front,
13. Sanguo zhi 28.785nl; cf. Richard Mather, "The Controversy over Conformity and
Naturalness during the Six Dynasties," History of Religions 9 (1969-70), 167. Zhong Hui also
acquired good calligraphic skills and had on more than one occasion forged documents to
advance his interests. See Sanguo zhi 28.787 and 791-92; see also Shishuo xinyu 21.4.
14. Sanguo zhi 28.795. The Chinese text reads, "$), t^MUlU^SEikfa^ •"
15. Wang Bi's biography by He Shao f5J 8J (d. ca. 300) is preserved in the commentary
to Zhong Hui's; see Sanguo zhi 28.795-96nl. One of Wang Bi's forebears, Wang Chang
3:$§ (d. 169), was a student of Xun Shu and was presumably known to Zhong Hao as
well; see Sanguo zhi 10.307nl. From a distinguished family in Shanyang commandery,
Wang Chang was the son of Wang Gong 3E B , who came to associate with the leaders
of the qingyi reform movement when he was governor of Runan feM, another lead-
ing center of learning near Yingchuan. In particular, Wang Gong became close to Chen
Fan PiEHf (d. 168), who would later bring Wang Chang into politics; see Hou Han shu
56.1819-26 and 66.2159. Wang Chang's son ended up serving under He Jin fBJil (d. 189),
the strongman in government at the time. See Sanguo zhi 21.597-99, biography of Wang
Can 3E|R (d. 217), grandson of Wang Chang, for further details. Family connection may
have been one reason why Wang Bi became a protege of He Yan, grandson of He Jin,
although this should not undermine Wang Bi's philosophical talent or He Yan's ability
to identify and appreciate such talent. Similarly, it is possible that family history had
brought Zhong Hui together with He Yan and Wang Bi. In this context, another young
contemporary, Xun Rong 15116, Xun Yu's grand-nephew, may be mentioned. The com-
mentary to the biography of Xun Yu (Sanguo zhi 10.316nl), citing the "Family Records
of the Xun Clan" (Xun shijiazhuan IrJ F£f£'($) reports that Xun Rong, "styled Boya 16
iffi, was much celebrated (as a young intellectual) with Wang Bi and Zhong Hui.... He
debated with Wang Bi and Zhong Hui on the meaning of the Laozi and the Yijing."
16. Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue IE£p ~&^ (Jinan: Qilu, 1987), 148. As is well known,
Cao Shuang dominated the Zhengshi political scene; in 249 Sima X\ f ] , | i S (179-251)
108 ZHONG HUI'S LAOZ1 COMMENTARY
Zhong Hui was drawn especially to He Yan's view that "sages do not
have emotions" and is said to have developed it in his own thinking.17
The question that needs to be addressed later is whether this is reflected
in Zhong Hui's Laozi commentary.
The fall of Cao Shuang and He Yan at the hands of Sima Yi in 249
marked a turning point in Wei politics. Zhong Hui was present with
the Wei emperor and Cao Shuang at the imperial cemetery when the
coup took place, but he managed to keep out of harm's way despite his
apparent association with the Cao faction. In 244, Zhong Yu had lost
favor with Cao Shuang when he criticized Cao's campaign against Shu.18
Zhong's mother also had warned that Cao's hold on power might not
last long.19 Perhaps Zhong Hui saw the winds of change and did not tie
his political fortunes entirely to the Cao faction. In any case, after 249
Zhong Hui was able to retain his post at the Central Secretariat and soon
emerged as a key member of the Sima regime. He accompanied Sima Shi
on his last military campaign; and when the latter died in 255, Zhong
helped facilitate the transition of power from Sima Shi to his brother
Sima Zhao. Rising then from Palace Attendant (huangmen shilang ft H
{rfJtP) to Metropolitan Commandant (sili xiaowei WHtfJM) and in the
winter of 262 to General of the Pacification of the West (zhenxijiangjun ®
jftj^ljl), Zhong Hui achieved spectacular success in the political arena.
In 263, in recognition of his role in the conquest of Shu, he was made
Chief Minister of Culture and Instruction (situ W] ££), one of the "Three
Excellencies" (sangong H & ) of state. At the height of his power, Zhong
Hui "considered his own achievement and fame to be unsurpassed in
the world and that he could no longer serve under anyone."20 Calculat-
ing that he had control of a formidable army and that he could at least
claim the land of Shu even should he fail to conquer the entire country,
Zhong Hui decided to turn against Sima Zhao. He was killed by his own
troops in the first month of 264.
After Zhong Hui's death, a collection of writings in twenty sections
engineered a takeover that led to the death of Cao Shuang, He Yan, and other members of
the faction. After Sima Yi's death, control of the Wei government came into the hands of
his two sons, Sima Shi and Sima Zhao. In 265, the latter's son, Sima Yan W] ,fb |£ (236-290)
formally ended the reign of Wei and established the Jin dynasty (265-420).
17. Sanguo zhi 28.795nl. "He Yan maintained that the sage does not have (such basic
emotions as) fondness, anger, sorrow, and joy. His views were extremely cogent, on which
Zhong Hui and others elaborated."
18. Sanguo zhi 13.400; cf. Sanguo zhi 9.283. Subsequently, Zhong Yu was removed from
the capital to serve as governor of the Wei commandery, where he met Guan Lu (see
n.10 above).
19. Sanguo zhi 2B.786nl.
20. Sanguo zhi 28.791.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 109
(pian H ) was found at his home. "Written in a style close to Zhong Hui's,"
they are entitled "Discourses on the Dao" (Dao lun Mm)', but, we are also
told, they actually reflected the teachings of the school of xingming ffl ^
(punishment and names).21 The meaning of xingming will be addressed
later. Assuming that these were Zhong Hui's writings, it is not clear
whether they included his Laozi commentary, treatise on the "capacity
and nature" debate, and studies on the Yijing. If they did, then Zhong's
interpretation of the Laozi should also reflect the centrality of "punish-
ment and names."
Zhong Hui seems to have written two essays on the Yi jing. The Sui
shu p f * identifies these as the Zhou Yi jinshen lun M^Mffimi in one
book (juari) and the Zhou Yi wu huti lun jS| Jj H S H I i in three.22 Zhong's
biography confirms that he worked on the latter. Judging from the titles,
whereas the former affirmed that the Yijing could "exhaust" (jin § ) or
render completely transparent the meaning of "spirituality" (shen |$)
and by extension the mystery of the Dao, the latter challenged the older
method of Yijing divination involving the transformation of hexagrams
by reconfiguring the individual lines.23 This may suggest that, like Wang
Bi, Zhong Hui focused on the "meaning and principle" (yili HS1) of the
hexagrams, as opposed to their application in divination, in his interpre-
tation of the Yijing. A member of the Yingchuan Xun clan, Xun Yi Iffiil
(d. 274), criticized Zhong Hui on this point.24 Coming from the Xun family,
21. Sanguozhi2B.795.
22. Sui shu 32.910.
23. The method of huti S f i , which Richard Lynn translates as "overlapping trigrams,"
became current during the Han dynasty and was associated with such scholars as Zheng
Xuan $ ! £ (127-200) and Yu Fan fgffl (ca. 170-ca. 239). A hexagram is formed by two
trigrams; i.e., lines 1-3 and lines 4-6. To understand a hexagram, one can thus focus on the
basic meaning of the two constituent trigrams. The method of "overlapping trigrams," how-
ever, takes lines 2-4 and 3-5 to form another two trigrams, in terms of which the hexagram
under examination may be explained more fully. Leaving aside the technical details, this
serves above all to expand the field of external referents, to which the individual lines of
the hexagram are seen to refer, in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding
of the cosmos. See Richard Lynn, trans., The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I
Chingas Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 32.
24. Sanguo zhi 10.319n2; also see Jin shu 39.1150, biography of Xun Yi. Xun was the
son of Xun Yu and brother-in-law of Chen Qun. Wang Bi, in his shorter writing on the
Yijing, also criticizes the method of "overlapping trigrams" and other attempts to reduce
meaning to objective referents. See Lynn, ibid. Yet in his commentary on the Yijing, there
are instances where he seems to have made use of the method. For example, it was sug-
gested as early as the Song dynasty that Wang Bi's reading of the third line of hexagram
38, kui^k, took lines 3-5 to refer to the trigram kan fK. • See Jian Boxianffi}ffl?f}, Wei Jin sijia
Yiyanjiu MWVSMUnW'R. (Taipei: Wenshizhe, 1986), 108. In general, however, consistent
with his emphasis on unity, Wang Bi's understanding of the Yijing hinges on the idea
that the meaning of each hexagram is determined by one line. A useful introduction to
which did much to bring the numerological and divinatory interpretation

of the Yijing to a new height, it is perhaps understandable that Xun Yi
would want to resist any departure from that tradition.25 But the details
of Zhong Hui's Yijing learning can no longer be reconstructed.
The debate on "capacity and nature" (caixing) contributed vitally to
the development of xuanxue, thanks in no small measure to Zhong Hui's
endeavor. During the fifth century, as Wang Sengqian jEtltlS (426-485)
observed, caixing was one of the basic topics that every intellectual was
expected to be able to speak something about.26 Fu Jia fUSi (209-255), who
criticized He Yan during the Zhengshi reign and later acted as a major
policy maker in the Sima administration, is generally acknowledged to be
the principal in this venture. Zhong Hui, who became a junior associate
of Fu Jia after 249, is said to have "collected and discussed" the latter's
deliberation on the "identity and difference of capacity and nature" (cai-
xing tongyi Tj'ti [W] H). 27 Zhong's work presents four views on the subject,
including his own, and is given the title, "On the Four Views of the Fun-
damental Relationship between Capacity and Nature," or more literally,
"On the Four Roots of Capacity and Nature" (Caixing siben lun yj"f40
^•m). In Chinese sources, it is often referred to simply as the Siben lun.
the Yijing learning of the Xun family is Ch'i-yun Ch'en, "A Confucian Magnate's Idea of
Political Violence: Hsiin Shuang's (128-190 A.D.) Interpretation of the Book of Changes,"
T'oung Rto 54 (1968), 73-115.
25. As mentioned, Xun Rong, Xun Yi's nephew, also debated with WangBi and Zhong
Hui on the meaning of the Laozi and the Yijing (Sanguo zhi 10.316nl). In particular, he took
exception to Wang Bi's interpretation of the "number of the great expansion" (dayan zhi shu
J\\fi£LW) in the Yijing (Sanguo zhi 28.795nl), which traces all phenomena to a necessary
ontological foundation. See Richard Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 60-61; for a discussion of
Wang Bi's departure from Han interpretations, see A. Chan, Two Visions of the Way, 29-32;
and Tang Yongtong, "Wang Bi's New Interpretation of the / Ching and the Lun-yii," trans.,
Walter Liebenthal, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 10 (1947), 124-61.
26. In his Jiezi shu I S ^ S , Wang Sengqian identifies the caixing debate and Xi Kang's
famous discussion on music as basic to the repertoire of every learned speaker in philo-
sophical debates; see Wang's biography in Nan Qi shu M 5? II 33.598-99. On Wang's work,
see Yu Yingshi £?5?I3F, "Wang Sengqian Jiezi shu yu Nanchao qingtan kaobian" 3iflt)8i$
^•m^mmmm^m,2.hongguowenzheyanjiujikan^m^.mm%m^\ 3(1993), 173-96.
See also Yu's "Preface" to Tang Yiming Jf M Hfl, Wei Jin qingtan gglfif i< (Taipei: Dongda,
1992). The Shishuo xinyu also attests to the importance of the caixing debate; see 4.5,4.34,
4.51, and 4.60, thefirstof which will be discussed later.
27. Sanguo zhi 21.627-28, biography of Fu Jia. The name "Fu Jia" is pronounced "Fu
Gu" in modern Chinese; "Jia" seems to be the older pronunciation—see Shuowen jiezi zhu
iSJtffi^ffi (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1986), 88. Fu Jia recognized Zhong Hui's sharp
mind and befriended him, but he also warned Zhong not to be proud, after the latter had
gained the trust of Sima Zhao. See Sanguo zhi 21.627 and 628nl. Zhong Hui's biography
also mentions that he "at one time discussed the identity and difference of caixing"; see
Sanguo zhi 28.795.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 111
Despite its evident popularity in Wei-Jin China, other than the general
position of the four views and the individuals who held them, which
will be discussed later, we have no further knowledge of this work.
According to Wang Baoxuan, Zhong Hui's Laozi commentary and
studies of the Yijing should be dated to the Zhengshi reign. Whereas the
former reflected the influence of He Yan and should be placed between
240 and 247, the latter was probably completed during the last two years
of the Zhengshi era. Because Zhong Hui did not become close to Fu Jia
until after 249, Wang Baoxuan thus considers Zhong's work on caixing
a later product.28 The evidence is uncertain; Wang Xiaoyi, for example,
traces it to the Zhengshi period.29 Zhong's treatise on caixing was com-
pleted before Xi Kang's death in 262, for the Shishuo xinyu relates that after
Zhong Hui had finished the work, he wanted to show it to Xi Kang.30 For
28. Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 152-53. Wang suggests that the work was prob-
ably completed in 256, because in that year, according to the Sanguo zhi (4.134), Zhong
summarized a discussion on the relative merits of certain ancient kings that transpired
at a banquet hosted by the Wei emperor. Although there may be overlaps, the two topics
seem nonetheless too different to be collapsed into one treatise on caixing.
29. Wang Xiaoyi, Wang Bi pingzhuan, 113. See also Zhu Xiaohai (Chu Hsiao-Ha [sic] £fc
B$ tS, "Caixing Siben lun ceyi" •% f£ 0 if ft M^., Journal of Oriental Studies (Hong Kong) 18
(1980), 207-24. The suggestion is that because Wang Guang 3E B5, whose view forms a part
of the Siben lun, died in 251, Zhong's work should be dated before that time. It is difficult
to say when the written work was completed, although it may be assumed that the four
views themselves were established before Wang's death. This is because, as I shall argue,
Wang Guang seems to have been the last to step into the debate, taking aim especially
at Zhong Hui's position. It is not necessary to assume that there was actually a debate
involving all the four proponents; conceivably, Fu Jia was the first to make known his view,
which was circulated and against which the other three reacted separately.
30. According to the Shishuo xinyu 4.5, Zhong Hui went to Xi Kang's house, but fearing
that Xi Kang might criticize his work he "threw" it inside and ran away. This may suggest
that Zhong Hui was then still relatively young and not fully secure in his political career.
Perhaps the work may be placed between 245 and 254, after which Zhong Hui seems
fully preoccupied with political developments. On another occasion, perhaps not long
after 249, Zhong Hui was snubbed by Xi Kang. Whether this has contributed to Zhong's
damaging views against Xi Kang later is, of course, a matter of conjecture. But Zhong's
role in the eventual execution of Xi cannot be denied, for which see Sanguo zhi 21.606nl
and 28.787; Shishuo xinyu 6.2 commentary and 24.3; and Jin shu 49.1373. There is no need
to try to "rehabilitate" Zhong Hui; his contribution to xuanxue stands on its own. What
may be worth mentioning is that although Zhong was snubbed by Xi Kang, his reply
was really quite brilliant. Taking the Shishuo xinyu account (24.3), Xi Kang refused to
acknowledge Zhong Hui when the latter visited him. When Zhong was about to leave,
Xi Kang asked, "What had you heard that made you come? And what have you seen
that makes you leave?" Zhong replied, "Having heard what I had heard, I came; having
seen what I have seen, I am (therefore) leaving." Cf. Richard Mather, Shih-shuo Hsin-yu,
393. Zhong Hui has also been accused of trying to bring harm to Ruan Ji M.W (210-263);
see Jin shu 49.1360.
present purposes, the question that bears directly on the issue at hand
is whether Zhong Hui's Laozi commentary preceded or followed Wang
Bi's commentary, which Wang Baoxuan also dates to no later than 247.31
Historical sources are silent on this point. From the surviving fragments of
Zhong Hui's commentary, there is no indication that he had knowledge
of or was reacting against Wang Bi's interpretation.
Zhong Hui's Laozi zhu

Zhong Hui's commentary, entitled simply the Laozi zhu %-?-$., is re-
corded as a work in two juan in the "bibliographical" chapter of the Sui
shu, and similarly in that of the two Tang histories.32 According to one
report, it was included in the collection of Laozi commentaries compiled
by the Tang Daoist master Zhang Junxiang UJlitffl .33 Zhong's commen-
tary was known to Du Guangting f±3t]Il (850-933), who remarked that
He Yan, Wang Bi, and Zhong Hui all attempted in their interpretations
of the Laozi to make clear "the way of ultimate emptiness and nonaction,
and of governing the family and the country."34 However, it is not listed
in the Song shi 5|5 j£i; presumably it was no longer extant after the end of
the Song dynasty.35
A number of quotations from Zhong's work have been preserved, as
Tang Yongtong pointed out, in a Laozi commentary by the 12th-century
Daoist master Li Lin $ U .M Several brief references to Zhong's commen-
31. Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 165-66. Wang Xiaoyi, Wang Bi pingzhuan, 364-65,
traces Wang Bi's Laozi commentary to about 244.
32. Sui shu 34.1000; }iu Tang shu ffilfS 47.2027; Xin Tang shu §f |§fij 59.1514.
33. This is reported in Chao Gongwu M ^ S , Junzhai dushu zhi t P H i f S s g (Taipei:
Guangwen, 1967), 11.4b. Zhang Junxiang's compilation originally included thirty com-
mentaries. It has been suggested that the Daode zhenjing zhushu M W. M $2&. Wi, attributed
to Gu Huan Sigjt, a noted Daoist master of the fifth century, is in fact an incomplete
version of Zhang's work; see Wang Zhongmin 3i JtK, Laozi kao %t~?-^ (Beijing, 1927;
reprint, Taipei: Dongxing, 1981), 92-94. However, the present Dao zang MM edition of
the work (Harvard-Yenching Index no. 710), in Dao zang (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian,
1996), 13.274-356, does not contain any reference to Zhong Hui.
34. Du Guangting, Daode zhenjing guang shengyi J i l l jMIlIf I l f l (Harvard-Yenching
Index no. 725), 5.12b; in Dao zang, 14.340.
35. The Sui shu (35.1060) mentions also a Zhong Hui ji fl # H (Collected Works) in nine
juan, to which a catalogue had been added during the Liang dynasty (502-557); and under
the "miscellaneous" section (34.1006), a Churao lun HJîli in live juan, a few lines from
which have been preserved in the Song encyclopedic work, Taipingyulan ^W-'MW- See
YanKejun$njt=),QuanSanguowen^.EM'X (Beijing:Zhonghua, 1995),25.1191.Zhong
Hui was also an accomplished poet; a few fragments of his poetry in ihefu IS style have
been preserved in various sources; see Quan Sanguo wen, 25.1188.
36. Tang Yongtong MfflFfc, "Du Dao zang zhaji" MMM^lsi, reprinted in Tang Yong-
tong xueshu lunwenji $§ffl BWM i i X H (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 407-8. Li Lin's work,
ALAN K.L. CHAN 113
tary can also be found in Lu Deming's H£tii Bfl (556-627) Laozi yinyi 4^-f1
if H , which compares Wang Bi's text with other versions of the Laozi and
provides concise pronunciation guides and semantic glosses for selected
terms. On the basis of these sources, Fujiwara Takao has put together a
reconstructed version of Zhong Hui's commentary.37 A total of eighteen
quotations have been identified by Tang Yongtong and Fujiwara. They are
incomplete, however; as the Qing scholar Yao Zhenzong MJSZK (1842-
1906) noted, citing the Wen xuan lixue quanyu ^CMM^WtM by Wang
Shihan H S f f l (b. 1707), Zhong Hui's work is quoted also in Li Shan's
^ # seventh-century commentary to the Wen xuan. Yao further remarks
that "family learning" (jiaxue) plays an important role in Zhong Hui's
interpretation of the Laozi.38
Zhong Hui is cited five times in Lu Deming's Laozi yinyi. One quotation
simply indicates that the Laozi text (ch. 73) accompanying Zhong Hui's
commentary has a variant character.39 A second gives Zhong's reading
as to how a certain word should be pronounced (ch. 15).40 It is worth
the Daode zhenjing qushanji illii jUifSfKHrlfl, in twelve juan, is collected in the Dao zang
(Harvard-Yenching Index no. 718). All citations from Li Lin's work are from the Dao zang
edition, 13.844-942.
37. FujiwaraTakao^|Iifi^,"ShuitsuR6sWkochuhen''$|i^î'-i'tt^,inrflfajmflfsu
kogyo koto senmon gakko kenkyu kiyo i§1gISiSIWH^M£57f 5ESE®, 1 (1966). I thank
Professor Fujiwara for sending me an offprint of his work. According to Wang Zhongmin,
the Qing scholar Yan Kejun had collected fragments of Zhong's commentary; but it seems
that the work was never put to print. See Wang Zhongmin, Laozi kao, 57.
38. Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi H H E 3t i£, in Shishi shanfang congshu Bif E lil JS ^
£
E5 (Shanghai: Kaiming, 1936), 68; cf. Wang Shihan, Wen xuan lixue quanyu (Taipei: Guang-
wen, 1966), 2A.35b. After the Song period, scholars do quote from Zhong Hui occasionally.
For example, the Ming scholar Jiao Hong M $k (1541-1620) cites Zhong's interpretation of
chapter 25 in his commentary to the Laozi; the Qing scholar Wei Yuan itJH (1794-1856)
also refers to Zhong once in his commentary, the Laozi benyi ^-p$SSi|. But in all likeli-
hood they were relying on the three sources identified here. In what follows, citations
from Lu Deming's Laozi yinyi are from the Sibu beiyao HnPtitl? edition, appended to
Wang Bi's Laozi commentary (Taipei: Zhonghua, 1981). Quotations from the Wen xuan
refer to the Taiwan reprint of the Qing dynasty "Master Wan" M'fcffli edition, which is
in turn based on a Song edition (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1971). For ease of reference, I will
also give the corresponding page numbers in the readily available 6-volume edition of
the Wen xuan (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1986). The Wen xuan zhu yinshu yinde 'XMfe^ I
E?2) I !#/ Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series, no. 26 (Peiping: Harvard-Yenching
Institute, 1935), 117, gives a partial list of citations from Zhong's Laozi zhu. A full list is
given in Tominaga Kazutaka UTK—1L Monzen Ri Zen chu insho sakuin ~%JSÛQ:^ IS?
jf 31 (Tokyo: Kenbun, 1996), 81.
39. On the phrase #5#$MHfl in the current version of the Wang Bi Laozi, Lu De-
ming remarks that Zhong Hui's text and several others' have the word ifl in place of
iff. See Shima Kunio fiblflffi, Roshi Kosei fg^Jr&IE (Tokyo: Kyukoshoin, 1973), 208-9,
for a list of the variants.
40. On the word bi (§5 in chapter 15 of the current Laozi, Lu Deming remarks, "jfttjj:
noting that whereas Han commentaries in general often provide help

on pronunciation, Wang Bi's work on the Laozi does not. This raises the
question whether Zhong Hui was still under the influence of the older
style of commentarial writing known as zhangju IpL'Sj (section and sen-
tence), which with its emphasis on explanation of individual words and
phrases dominated the Han exegetical tradition. In other words, is there
a sense in which Zhong Hui may be described as a "transitional" figure
in the development of Laozi learning?41
Excluding these two references from Lu Deming, from the three sources
cited above I count 27 quotations, of which two are identical (no. 16 below)
and one other is partially repeated twice (no. 2 below). In effect, there are
thus 24 items, which should offer a glimpse of Zhong Hui's understanding
of the Daoist classic. In what follows, I will first present these quotations
according to the chapter sequence in the current version of the Laozi.
With the evidence in view, I will then discuss Zhong Hui's comments and
compare them with Wang Bi's.42 To gain a fuller picture, it may be useful
to compare also the Heshanggong M-t£* commentary, which I take to
be a Later Han product.43 The Hanfeizi %% # -^ discusses selected sayings
of the Laozi in two chapters and will be considered where appropriate.
The Laozi commentary by the Former Han recluse Yan Zun 1131 (ca. 80
B.c-10 A.D.) is important, but it is incomplete and bears on Zhong Hui's
interpretation only in a few instances.44 The Xiang er MM commentary,
K"; but he adds that according to Zhong Hui and the Liang emperor Wudi iKSS the
word is pronounced "ll^tSM '
41. Mou Zongsan ^ 5 K H , Caixingyu xuanli ^f^Si^M (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1993), 138,
makes the point that Zhong Hui should be viewed as a "transitional"figureto Wang Bi.
42. Unless otherwise stated, quotations from Wang Bi are translated directly from the
modern critical edition by Lou Yulie JB ^ ^!l, Wang Bijijiaoshi 3E $8 M %ZM, 2 vols. (Beijing:
Zhonghua, 1980). Compare Richard Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation
of the Tao-te ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999); Paul J. Lin, trans., A Translation of Lao-tzu's Tao-te ching and Wang Pi's Commentary
(Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1977); and Ariane Rump
and Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1979).
43. Heshanggong is a legendary figure depicted as a teacher to Emperor Wen of Han
(r. 179-157 B.C.). Modern Chinese scholars generally agree in dating the commentary to
the Later Han period, although some Japanese scholars maintain that it is a later product
of the Six Dynasties. See also n.53 below.
44. The commentary by Yan Zun, entitled the Laozi zhigui % -f la Si, now contains only
chapters 38-81 of the current Laozi. The best edition of the Laozi zhigui is that contained in
the Dao zang (Harvard-Yenching Index no. 693), which clearly indicates that the work had
originally thirteen juan, the first six of which have been lost. Judging from the available
evidence, it can be accepted as a Han product. The Laozi text that accompanies Yan Zun's
commentary agrees in many instances with the wording of the Mawangdui manuscripts.
See Alan K.L. Chan, "The Essential Meaning of the Way and Virtue: Yan Zun and 'Laozi
ALAN K.L. CHAN 115
which dates to around 200, presents a religious Daoist interpretation of

the Laozi and does not add significantly to an understanding of Zhong
Hui's Laozi learning and xuanxue philosophy.45
1) Laozi, ch. 1
(Wen xt/an, 11.7a, 497, J&mOiMtt\liffi)
On the phrase "youtnei"fflfcfcin Sun Chuo's W& fourth-century "Rhap-
sody on Roaming the Celestial Terrace Mountains" (You Tiantai shanfu M
5^ ~a ill IE),46 Li Shan explains that it refers to the Dao and that according
to Zhong Hui's Laozi zhu, the Dao is "shadowy, dark, dim, and obscure;
it is therefore described as xuan" (youming huimei gu cheng wei xuan ffl^
BSfcfc, r#$?-fe:£)- This is probably taken from Zheng's commentary on
chapter 1 of the Laozi, although the word xuan also appears in chapters
10,51 and 65.47
Learning' in Early Han China," Monumenta Serica, 46 (1998), 105-27; and Isabelle Robinet,
Les commentaires du Tao to kingjusqu'au Vile siecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1977). Quotations from Yan Zun's commentary are translated from the modern critical
edition by Wang Deyou 3EtH W, Laozi zhigui (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1994).
45. The Xiang er commentary, a copy of which was discovered among the Dunhuang
manuscripts (no. 6825 in the Stein collection), is closely linked to the "Way of the Celestial
Masters" and has been ascribed to Zhang Daoling iJJl J!IS/ the founder of the sect, or his
grandson Zhang Lu 3J1H. It is also incomplete; only thefirstpart has survived, beginning
with the middle of chapter 3 and ending with chapter 37 in the current chapter division
of the Laozi. The central thesis of the commentary is that devotion to the Dao in terms of
spiritual self-cultivation and compliance with its ethical precepts would assure boundless
blessings in this life and beyond. On this work, see Rao Zongyi i^^KI, Laozi Xiang er zhu
jiaozheng ^t-f-MWHifftM (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1991); and Stephen Bokenkamp,
Early Daoist Scriptures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
46. Sun Chuo's rhapsody has been translated by David R. Knechtges in Wen xuan,
or Selections of Refined Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982-1996),
2.243.
47. Chapters 10, 51 and 65 all refer to xuande ^tfi, "mysterious virtue" or "profound
virtue." Unless stated otherwise, translations from the Laozi are based on the current Sibu
beiyao edition. Rather than translating the Laozi in the light of Zhong Hui's commentary, I
will generally offer a "minimalist," literal reading so as to highlight the way in which Zhong
Hui exercised his interpretive prerogative and made sense of the Laozi. This would also
allow us to see more clearly how Zhong Hui compares with other commentators in the
discussion that follows. Where appropriate, reference will be made to the following Laozi
translations: D.C. Lau, Chinese Classics: Tao Te Ching (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
1982); Wing-tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); Ellen M. Chen,
The Tao Te Ching: A New Translation with Commentary (New York: Paragon House, 1989);
Robert G. Henricks, Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered
Ma-wang-tui Texts (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989); Michael LaFargue, The Tao of the Tao
Te Ching: A Translation and Commentary (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992);
and Arthur Waley, The Way and its Power (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1980).
2) Laozi, ch. 10
(Wenxuan, 24.20b, 1147, P i ± | f i t t ^ £ $ ^ )
Li Shan refers to the first line of Laozi chapter 10 (fcff AJ&Jfe—tEUSt
^p-), which in W.T Chan's translation reads: "Can you keep the spirit
and embrace the One without departing from them?" The opening
phrase, "zai yingpo" llclf fljt, is difficult. In Chan's translation, yingpo is
taken to mean "spirit," whereas the word zai functions as the main verb.
Similarly, D.C. Lau interprets zai as a verb meaning "carry," reading it
in terms of its cognate, dai He, which is in fact used in the Mawangdui
"B" manuscript.48
Zhong Hui's commentary takes the word zai not as a verb but as an
exclamation that begins the sentence. Indeed, since the Tang dynasty a
number of commentators, including the Tang emperor Xuanzong ]£ ^ ,
have argued that the word zai is an exclamation, which originally formed
the end of the previous chapter but was mistakenly transposed to the
beginning of chapter 10. Zhong Hui did not make that claim, but because
he took zai as a formal particle, he needed a verb to make sense of the
sentence. This he finds in the word, ying, decoupling the term yingpo.
Zhong Hui writes:
Zai is an exclamation particle. To manage and protect is what is

meant by ying; form and vital energy constitute the soul (po). This
means that the soul (hunpo) manages and protects its form and vital
energy, so as to enable it to last long.49
In this light, the Laozi here is probably seen to be asking a rhetorical
question to dramatize the importance of self-cultivation: "Indeed! Can
you look after the po and embrace the One so that they do not depart
(from the body)?" The concept of the "One" will be discussed later. Li
Shan, in his commentary on another work by Lu Ji pj£H£ (Lu Shiheng |5j£
drill, 261-303), similarly cites the first line of Laozi chapter 10 and repeats
partially Zhong Hui's explanation: "jinghu wei ying, xingqi wei po" (Wen
48. On the Mawangdui text, see Henricks, Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching, 206; and Lau, Chinese
Classics: Tao Te Ching, 278.
49. I translate po and hunpo as "soul" in a general sense here. K. E. Brashier, "Han
Thanatology and the Division of 'Souls'," Early China 21 (1996), 125-58, has drawn atT
tention to the imprecision of translating hunpo as "soul." For our purposes, of greater
concern is the concept of qi f|, the vital energy that gives and sustains life, which will be
discussed later. Zhong Hui's language here seems to support Brashier's main argument
that hunpo does not divide into "a tidy dualism of a heaven-bound hun and an earth-
bound po" (p. 158). I am grateful to an anonymous reader for Early China for reminding
me of this. However, it should be noted that Heshanggong's commentary to this passage
distinguishes hunfrompo.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 117
xuan 60.20b, 2600, Ht±ftf ^r>1$M$B3t). The word ying appears also in a
poem by Xie Lingyun i f f l U (385-433) in the Wen xuan (30.9a, 1399-1400),
where Li Shan again refers to Zhong's commentary, "To manage and
protect is what is meant by ying" (MH^t-FUS, IS 18faH "til)- Inciden-
tally, Zhu Xi %:M (1130-1200) considers Wang Bi's and Heshanggong's
reading of this line to be equally misguided. Although it is not known
whether Zhu Xi had seen Zhong Hui's commentary, at least he allows
the possibility of taking the word ying to mean "manage," "operate" or
"put into order" (i.e., in the sense of jingying &f If). 50
3) Laozi, ch. 11
(Li Lin, Daode zhenjing qushan ji, 2.12b-13a, 856)
Finding an apt illustration in a common mode of transportation in early
China, the Laozi announces in chapter 11 that "thirty spokes" join into one
hub; but the use or function of the wheel, and by extension the carriage
or cart as a whole, is not so much dependent on the solid spokes as the
empty space within the hub. Similarly, clay may be shaped and treated
to make vessels, and doors and windows cut out to make a room; but
it is the "emptiness" of the vessel or room that makes possible its use or
function. "Therefore," the Laozi concludes, "having something {you) is
what produces benefit, (but) having nothing {wu) is what produces use"
According to Zhong Hui, the Laozi speaks of carriages, vessels, and

rooms to illustrate the fundamental relationship between you and wu.
Zhong's commentary here also gives an indication of its excellent literary
quality, although the elegance of the original cannot be fully conveyed
in translation.
st. <!*ijffi*if§, J t ^ t n u . mmm&m, mmrn^m, -mm.

(The Laozi) raises the above three matters to bring to light that you
and wu gain from each other, and neither can be neglected. (The
phrase) "Therefore having something is what produces benefit"
(suggests that) benefit lies in the objects; "having nothing is what
produces use" (suggests that) use lies in emptiness. Thus, for objects
to generate benefit externally, it is by capitalizing on the use of
emptiness that they reach their goal; and for emptiness to generate
50. Zhuzi yulei ^ c ^ i g ^ i , 137 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1986), 8.3265-66. For a detailed dis-
cussion of this passage, see Jiang Xichang M % H, Laozi jiaogu ^t^f-tfUk (Shanghai, 1937;
Taipei: Dongxing, 1980), 54-56; and Hatano Taro fi# if ±I|5, Roshi dotokukyo kenkyu %
•7-ilti^Bf 35 (Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1979), 81-82. Wang Bi's and Heshanggong's
interpretation of this line will be discussed later.
use internally, it is on account of the benefit that objects bring that it

reaches fruition. But, benefit and use are mutually dependent, and
none can be dispensed with. Nothing (wu) depends on something
(you) to become of benefit; you relies on wu to be of use. These two
modes (fa) lend support to each other.51
How this compares with Wang Bi's interpretation of you and wu will be
considered later.
4) Laozi, ch. 12
(Li Lin, Daode zhenjing qushan ji, 2.15a, 857)
Chapter 12 of the Laozi warns that the "five colors cause one's eyes to
become blind," and of the other harmful effects that stem from indulg-
ing in one's senses. The Laozi concludes: "Shi yi shengren weifu buwei mu"
(TIIÎSAMM-^fei @), which most translators take to mean, "For this
reason the sage is for or concerned with (wei) the belly and not for the
eyes."52 The word "wei" fa requires explanation here. Zhong Hui relates
it to the being of the sage:
satft*,&B&8I, mmm, &B^%,B. E ^ A ^ H , &m
The genuine vital energy pervades (the sage's) inner being; thus it is
said, (he is) "for the belly." Externally, desires have been eliminated;
thus, it is said, "not for the eyes." "The five tones cause men's ears
to become deaf" (as the Laozi goes on to say). Thus "the sage is for
the belly and not for the eyes." These serve as examples (referring to
the five colors, five sounds, five tastes, etc., mentioned in the Laozi,
which bring out the same point).
Zhong Hui did not say whether the sage has to pursue any special practice
to firm up his vital qi'-energy within, but it seems clear that the sage is
mindful of his (jf-nature in everything he does and certainly does not live
"for the eyes," i.e., to satisfy the senses. As we shall see, the relationship
between the "inner" and the "outer" also merits attention.
51. For a different translation of this passage, see Rudolf G. Wagner, The Craft ofa Chinese
Commentator, 241-42. Zhong Hui's literary accomplishment is mentioned twice in Liu Xie's
MM (ca. 465-522) Wenxindiaolong; see Wenxin diaolongzhuding^'bMM^Hl, ed. Zhang
Lizhai SgiZH (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1979), 20.215 ("Xi Yi" $ $ ) and 43.412 ("Fuhui" fft
# ) . Cf. Vincent Yu-chung Shih, trans., The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons (Hong
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983), 231 and 441.
52. E.g., WT Chan, Lau, Henricks. The two Mawangdui versions are fuller and specify,
"in the government of the sage" (shengren zhi zhi §? A $L fa)—see Henricks, Lao-Tzu Te-Tao
Ching, 211, and Lau, Chinese Classics: Tao Te Ching, 280—but there is no indication that the
additional words are present in the text that Zhong Hui had seen and commented on.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 119
5) Laozi, ch. 14
(Lu Deming, Laozi yinyi)
On the word yi Jl| in chapter 14, Zhong Hui, according to Lu Deming,

offers that it means what is "extinguished" (mie) and "level," "calm" or
"pacified" (ping) ( | I # S , Mill 2 ?til)- These are well established inter-
pretations of the word yi, but it is not entirely clear how they fit with
the general sense of the opening sentence of chapter 14 of the Laozi: "We
look at it but do not see it; we name it yi." Wang Bi did not provide a
reading of the word; to Heshanggong, "What is without color is called
yi."53 The Xiang er commentary defines yi as what is "level and wide"
(ping qie guang ^ HHf).54
6) Laozi, ch. 14
(Wen xuan, 59.5a, 2531-32, 3Effi@HSP£3Ffll£)
Having stated that the Dao cannot be seen, the Laozi goes on to say in
chapter 14 that it cannot be heard or gotten hold of by touch as well.
"These three cannot be inquired into, and hence they merge into one"
(cf. WT. Chan). Furthermore,
-#, n±^m, sr^ft, sra^ww, mnmw).55
As for the One, its upper part is not dazzling; its lower part is not
obscure. Ceaseless, it cannot be talked about. It returns to a state of
not being anything (with discernible characteristics).
The words "upper" and "lower" are potentially ambiguous. They can
also mean the movement of the "One" going upward or downward, as a
number of modern translators have argued (e.g., WT. Chan, E.M. Chen,
and Waley). In Zhong Hui's account, the "One" is
53. Quotations from the Heshanggong commentary are based on two modern criti-
cal editions: Zheng Chenghai $|S/5Jc$i, Laozi Heshanggong zhu jiaoli ^ ^ - M - h f i f l i S f f l
(Taipei: Zhonghua, 1971); and WangKa 3E"R, Laozi Daode jingHeshanggongzhangju ^zf-
HW.&W ±.&m-G] (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1993). Also see Wang Qingxiang 3Efi? ft, Laozi
Heshanggong zhu zhiyanjiu ^ ^ ? 5 J _h :£££;£. iff 5x (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1994). Translations
are my own. Compare Eduard Erkes, Ho-shang Kung's Commentary on Lao-tse (Ascona:
Artibus Asiae, 1958).
54. Rao Zongyi, Laozi Xiang er zhu jiaozheng, 16.
55. Translated from the Wen xuan. The received texts of Heshanggong and Wang
Bi do not contain the words, "as for the One" (yi zhe — H ) . The Wen xuan quotation,
however, agrees with the Mawangdui manuscripts and the so-called "ancient version"
{guben cij^). See Henricks, Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching, 214-15; and Lau, Chinese Classics: Too
Te Ching, 284. The Wen xuan version seems to contain one mistake; it reads, "Ceaseless,
it cannot be talked about {yari)." In place of yan U , most versions read ming =8; i-e-, "it
cannot be named." Li Shan also cites Laozi chapter 21 here.
bright but not glowing; dull but not obscure. Ceaseless, indeed,
(yet) it does not have any ties; overflowing, (yet) it does not become
diminished. Subtle and wondrous, it is difficult to name it. In the
end, it returns to a state of not being anything (with discernible
characteristics).
Though seemingly within grasp, the "One" ultimately cannot be regarded
as an object. Is it, then, the same as the Dao? Fortunately, we do have
Zhong Hui's answer to this question (no. 21 below).
7) Laozi, ch. 16
Chapter 16 of the Laozi begins, "Attain utmost emptiness; maintain com-

plete tranquility" {^{.MW^fWM)- According to Zhong Hui, "Attain'
means to reach; (that is to say) eliminate emotions and worries to reach
the ultimate of emptiness. The mind is always quiet, so as to maintain
complete tranquility" (®, Mtil. Bfclf JtMififfitiJ. 'fc r t & ^ S S S i i l ) .
8) Laozi, ch. 18
Chapter 18 of the Laozi challenges the Confucian conception of filial piety

by arguing that it is only "when the six relations are not in harmony, are
there filial piety and compassion" ( A I I - ^ f P W ^ M ) - The phrase xiaoci
may mean filial children or generally people who are filial and kind, but
Zhong Hui seems to take it in the sense of general filial virtues: "If the
nine generations of the family are all in accord, then love and respect will
have no cause to be applied. 'When the six relations are not in harmony',
then filial piety and compassion will become conspicuous" (^=r flWMMf
56. I believe that "fan"fljshould be the correct reading, although the character resembles
si ?E, which suggests stagnant water and does not seem to fit the imagery. Fan has the
sense of water overflowing, orflowingendlessly, in addition to its more common meaning
of "floating" along. Cf. Laozi ch. 34.
57. The "nine generations" extend from one's great-great-grandfather to one's great-
great-grandson. However, during the Han period "new text" scholars often take the
phrase;'i«2M % Jj£ to refer to nine branches of the family involving relatives of one's father,
mother, and wife. See Anne Cheng, "Filial Piety with a Vengeance: the Tension between
Rites and Law in the Han," in Filial Piety in Chinese Thought and History, ed. Alan K.L. Chan
and Sor-hoon Tan (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2004).
ALAN K.L. CHAN 121
9) Laozi, ch. 19
(Li Lin, Daode zhenjing qushan ji, 3.19a-19b, 865)
The critique of Confucianism is carried further in chapter 19, where

the Laozi declares: "Remove sagacity and discard wisdom; then the
people will benefit a hundredfold" (BWM^Rfi\~gin)- Zhong Hui
comments,
m*B, m\ttzm, mmmz®, xn^mmm, tnmmi%. AF
# £ H E , Mmzm®. wwzx, mmm, mum^, mm&±
Remove the (kind of) sagacity that institutes and creates things;
discard the wisdom that plots and schemes. The people would
then turn back to simplicity and revert to innocence. This is why
its benefit will be a hundredfold. (The ability) to create is what is
meant by sagacity (here), and to initiate things is what is meant by
wisdom. Men of sagacity and wisdom instituted laws and regula-
tions, and introduced decrees and orders, because they wanted to
suppress the wicked and stop the violent. Little did they know that
as the laws were issued, (new forms of) wickedness also came into
the world; when the decrees came down, (new forms of) deception
arose also. (In this process) the people lost what is genuine in their
nature and existence; day by day they edged closer to the realm of
treachery and aggression. If such laws and decrees were removed
and discarded, then the people would turn back to what is con-
stant and return to simplicity. The benefit of this is surely not only
a hundredfold. Zhuangzi says, "Cudgel and cane the sages and let
the thieves and bandits go their way; then the world will at last be
well ordered."58
10) Laozi, ch. 21 (Lu Deming, Laozi yinyi)
Chapter 21 of the Laozi begins with the phrase, "kong de zhi rong" (JLlff
£.%}). According to Wang Bi, kong means what is "empty" (kong ?£). It
is only when one embraces "emptiness," takes it as "virtue" (de), can one
58. See Zhuangzi, ch. 10; as translated in Burton Watson, The Complete Works ofChuang
Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 109; cf. Zhuangzi, ch. 16, and Laozi,
ch. 57. The Laozi bamboo text discovered at Guodian gives a significantly different
version of Laozi 19, but it does not impact on the present discussion. Zhong Hui's com-
mentary suggests that the text at his disposal agrees in this instance with that of the
Sibu beiyao edition.
follow the Dao. To Heshanggong, however, the word kong means "great,"
and the phrase suggests that a man who has great virtue can take or bear
(rong ^ ) all things, including defilement and humble circumstances. It
is not clear how Zhong Hui understands the word kong ?L but accord-
ing to Lu Deming, for the remaining three words, de zhi rong, Zhong
Hui takes them to mean "law" or "model" ( D g ; ^ . fiSfe-til). In this
instance, Zhong Hui may be simply taking the word rong in its common
sense of appearance; i.e., the appearance or expression of virtue is law. I
will come back to this point later.
11) Laozi, ch. 22

In chapter 22, the Laozi makes use of an ancient expression—"bent, then

preserved whole" (qu ze quan EffifPJJfe)—to illustrate the central Daoist
insight of "reversal." The secret to preservation or fulfillment lies not
in self-aggrandizement or aggressive action but in self-effacement and
non-contention. If one could embrace humility and the way of "yielding,"
then "chengquan er guizhi" (J&^ffnll§*L). In Zhong Hui's interpretation,
the Laozi is saying, "Truly, everything will return to him."
The Laozi text is ambiguous. It may be saying that the person is thus
"preserved" (quan) and "returns" (gut) to the Dao (e.g., E.M. Chen; cf.
LaFargue). The word quan may also mean "wholeness" (e.g., Waley and
Henricks) or "everything." Zhong Hui clarifies, "If one is truly able to
keep being yielding, everything (quan) will certainly return to him" (i&tb
TF Eft / Jfe j&§§£)—that is to say, all successes and benefits will as a matter
of course come or belong to him. The interpretation of an ambiguous pas-
sage may in some cases give insight into the interpreter's hermeneutical
perspective or overall understanding of the text.
12) Laozi, ch. 23

(Li Lin, Daode zhenjing qushan ji, 4.11 a, 871)
The last line of chapter 23 in the current Laozi states: "When trust is not
sufficient, there will be mistrust" ( f § ^ ^ W-T"fit)-59 In the present editions
of their commentaries, both Wang Bi and Heshanggong understand this
59. This is based on Li Lin's version, which bypasses the differences in the received
texts of Wang Bi and Heshanggong. This line also appears in ch. 17 of the current Wang
Bi text, and partially in the Heshanggong Laozi. For textual details, see Ma Xulun Miiftt.
fj§, Laozi jiaogu ig^pfftiS, revised edition (Beijing, 1956; Hong Kong: Taiping, 1965), 66,
84; and Hatano, Roshi dotokukyo kenkyu, 123-24,169. Because the Mawangdui versions do
not contain this line in ch. 23, some scholars believe that the line originally belonged to
ch. 17 and was inserted into ch. 23 by mistake. But Heshanggong, Zhong Hui, and Wang
Bi all commented on this line in ch. 23.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 123
in a political context. Wang Bi writes: "If loyalty and trust are insufficient
(among the people) below, then there will be mistrust." The Heshanggong
commentary attributes the cause of mistrust explicitly to the ruler: "If the
ruler does not have sufficient trust in (the people) below, then they will
respond to the ruler with mistrust."60 Zhong Hui makes a more general
point and links this passage to the chapter as a whole:
If I do not have sufficient trust in the Dao, the Dao in response will
likewise not have any trust in me. Consequently, both will lose. Only
those who are one with the Dao, the Dao will have them; those who
put their trust in the Dao, the Dao wiU trust them; and those who
are one with (the way of) loss, the Dao will lose them. Thus, "When
trust is not sufficient, there will be mistrust."
13) Laozi, ch. 25

(Lu Deming, Laozi yinyi)
Chapter 25 of the Laozi describes the Dao as "silent and void" (Lau). Ac-
cording to Lu Deming, in place of the word mo H ("void") Zhong Hui's
text uses a variant character (liao IS).62 As Lu further relates, Zhong Hui
takes this to mean "what is empty and without substance" (kongshu wuzhi
ye QMfflM-tiL)-
14) Laozi, ch. 25

The Dao, according to chapter 25 of the Laozi, "stands on its own and
does not change" (Henricks). Standing on one's own (duli $HiZ) can imply
being independent (as in W.T. Chan's translation: the Dao "depends on
60. The Sibu congkan E3 ofl W. f'J edition reads, "If the ruler does not have sufficient trust
in (the people) below, then they will respond to the ruler insufficiently (buzu -ÂE)-" In
the light of other editions and Heshanggong's commentary on Laozi ch. 17, "buzu" should
be emended to read "buxin" ^{ff (mistrust). See Zheng Chenghai, Laozi Heshanggong zhu
jiaoli, 157, and Wang Ka, Laozi Daode jing Heshanggong zhangju, 95.
61. In place of "those who are one with (the way of) loss, the Dao will lose them" |nj
fi^^, if & £ , both the Wang Bi and Heshanggong texts have "|S| £*•&#, £jftggf#
£_." The Mawangdui versions read, "WUfcifcH, Mi/f^zZ."; see Henricks, Lao-Tzu Te-Tao
Ching, 234-35.
62. The present Wang Bi text has "ji xi liao xi" M^W-^- In place of liao, Lu Deming" s
version has mo J|. Many scholars have argued that mo should be the original wording
in Wang's text; but the difference is relatively minor. Wei Yuan, Laozi benyi (Taipei: Han-
jing wenhua, 1980), 28, reports also, "3g, $ t # f F l l " which is likely a quotation from Lu
Deming.
nothing") or being alone (Lau translates: "stands alone"). Zhong Hui's

interpretation agrees more with the latter: "Solitary, without a mate
(kuoran wuou M%$Mi$i), it is therefore said to be 'standing on its own'"
(guyun duli #to#iliZ). Furthermore, Zhong Hui writes, "From antiquity
to the present, it is always one and the same; thus it is stated, 'does not
change'" (gujin changyi shiyue bugai 7&4"&~ H H ^ S ) . 6 3
15) Laozi, ch. 25

(Li Lin, Daode zhenjing qushan ji, 4.14b, 872)
The Dao not only "stands on its own and does not change," but as chap-
ter 25 goes on to say, it "operates everywhere and is free from danger"
(zhouxing er budai Mlffffl-T^; W.T. Chan). Zhong Hui and Wang Bi
both understand zhouxing to mean that the Dao reaches or penetrates
everything and everywhere, and not "going round" in a circular motion
as some modern translators have suggested (e.g., Lau and E.M. Chen).
Because it reaches everywhere and nothing can obstruct it, the Dao is
therefore "free from danger." Zhong Hui's commentary reads:
stands, * smi.ffifc^n,i&mfcft.
There is no place that the Dao is not present; it is (thus) described
as "operating everywhere." Where it is present, it penetrates every-
thing; thus it is without danger.
16) Laozi, ch. 25

(Wenxuan, 11.5a, 495, ^ H f i j l ^ l i l l t and
40.14a-14b, 1819, * § t i i f f l g « M l i l )
According to the Laozi, "Heaven models itself after the Dao. The Dao
models itself after what is naturally so (ziran)." On these famous conclud-
ing words of chapter 25, Wang Bi comments: "'Naturally so' is a term for
that which cannot be designated; it is an expression for the ultimate" ( §
f&%Mffi2.W, JBSi£l*ill)- 64 According to Zhong Hui, the reason why
the Dao is described as ziran is that "no one knows whence it comes; it
is therefore called 'naturally so'" (mozhi suochu gu yue ziran H £TJ fft tti, fifc
B § f&). In terms of literary quality, this compares well with Wang Bi's
formulation, although Wang's emphasis on language may suggest a dif-
ferent approach to the Dao.
63. ]iaoHong,Laoziyi^:IfM,Congshujichengchubianî,^^fiS.yjS edition (Shang-

hai: Shangwu, 1940), 3.55, cites Zheng's commentary here and gives a slightly different
wording; but the differences are minor.
64. This follows the present edition of Wang Bi's commentary; quotations from
Wang Bi's commentary to this chapter in a couple of traditional sources give a slightly
different reading. See Lou Yulie, Wang Bijijiaoshi, 68n28.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 125
17) Laozi, cb. 27

According to the Laozi (ch. 27), "One who is good at traveling leaves no
track or trace" (WHMM^) (WT. Chan; Lau). What does "traveling"
(xing ff)—the word "zhe" $1 yields the image of tracks left behind by a
wheel—mean in this context? Zhong Hui interprets this as a metaphor:
"For someone who is good at putting the Dao into practice, his success
and fame will not be conspicuous" ( # f T i l # , Sj^-f-il)- The concern
with "success and fame" recalls Zhong Hui's reading of Laozi chapter 22
cited above (no. 11).
18) Laozi, ch. 28

Chapter 28 of the Laozi states: "When the uncarved block (pu) scatters, it
becomes vessels" (£li£Il)fe§§). Does this suggest a state of affairs to be
remedied, because something whole has been "broken up" (W.T. Chan) or
"shattered" (Lau)? Zhong Hui writes, "'Uncarved block' refers to the Dao.
If kept intact, it remains the Dao that is undifferentiated in its substance.
If scattered, it becomes vessels that nourish the people" (HI, jJtttl- ^fM
19) Laozi, ch. 36

The Laozi states: "The yielding and weak will overcome the hard and
strong" (fjSilil^Mijil). In this instance, Zhong Hui draws out the practi-
cal implications of Laozi's remarks: "If one wishes to control the hard
and strong, one assumes the appearance of being submissive and weak.
Stretch it first, then shrink it afterwards; (the outcome) win or lose, is
certain" (frMMfti, * ¥ £ § § . %W&^, BM. * « .
20) Laozi, ch. 38

(Wen xuan, 59.18b, 2550, i f c t t X & S f c ^ B S a E f f l X )
Chapter 38 of the Laozi is particularly concerned with the concept of
"virtue" (de t!§). It begins by saying that "superior virtue is not virtuous;
this is why it has virtue" ( ± t l ; f t i , H J->1 W t l ) . The word "has" (you) and
the context as a whole suggest that the subject of the sentence should
be "the man of superior virtue," and this is how most commentators
have understood it. Zhong Hui seems to be making a similar point: "(He
who) embodies the wondrous and subtle spirit (shenmiao) to preserve
the transformations (of nature) is (the man of) superior virtue" (f§}$ftj>
21) Laozi, ch. 39

(Wen xuan, 59.5b, 2532, 3EJBf@SBPfZ3FW:£)
In the Wen xuan commentary, Zhong Hui is quoted to have said that
"the One is also the Dao" ( i t # EL —^Fjltil). Since this is offered as an
explanation of the phrase "to obtain the One" (deyi |#—), which figures
prominently in chapter 39 of the Laozi, this is likely a quotation from
Zhong's commentary to that chapter.
22) Laozi, ch. 41

(Li Lin, Daode zhenjing qushan ji, 7.10b, 895)
Chapter 41 declares that "the great image does not have any form" tyM-
MM)- Zhong Hui comments, "There is no image that does not respond
to it; this is what is called the 'great image'. Since it does not have any
bodily shape, how can it have any form or appearance?" (MM^M, I I
£ * f t . WLMMWt, I W I I . ) The concept of "response" (ying M), we
may recall, figures also in Zhong's commentary on Laozi chapter 23 (no.
12 above).
23) Laozi, ch. 42

(Wen xuan, 11.5a, 495, B g » f i & ^ & | l | I K )
The image of the Dao "breaking up" and "scattering" into the multiplicity
of things mentioned in chapter 28 recurs in Zhong Hui's commentary on
chapter 42, where the Laozi states that "the three gave birth to the myriad
things." It is not certain what Zhong Hui considers the "three" in ques-
tion to mean, but his commentary is straightforward enough: "(They)
scattered and became the myriad things" (Sitffff^M^/iJl).
24) Laozi, ch. 65

(Wen xuan, 53.6b, 2293, ffim&m±lm)
In chapter 65, the Laozi seems to be saying, "Mysterious virtue is indeed
deep and far-reaching. Returning (to the Dao) together with things, one
then reaches great harmony" ( S t i ^ ^ ^ ^ . f f l ^ S ^ ^ S ^ H I ) . 6 5 T h e
word fan is usually taken to mean "return" and is therefore so translated
here. This is how Wang Bi understands it: fan means "return to what is
genuine in them." But the word could also mean being "opposite" or
65. This follows the Wen xuan wording. In the Sibu beiyao edition, the last line of ch.
65 reads, "ranhou naizhi dashun" jfc'&TjJOi^M- Like the Wen xuan, the two Mawangdui
manuscripts also do not have the words "ranhou." The Heshanggong Sibu congkan edi-
tion reads: "TlMlftXM"
ALAN K.L. CHAN 127
turning one's back to things. Both Heshanggong and Zhong Hui have
this reading.
According to the former, "The man of mysterious virtue is opposite
to and different from the myriad creatures. Whereas the myriad crea-
tures desire to benefit themselves, mysterious virtue is directed toward
others. (The man of) mysterious virtue is . . . thus able to realize great
harmony, (which means) to follow the principle of heaven." Zhong Hui
is less specific, but the idea that fan suggests a mode of being different
from the ordinary and mundane is equally explicit: "Turning one's back
to the vulgar or mundane so as to enter the Dao, one then realizes great
harmony" (JxfS jy.XM, ^ T ' j M S ^ ^ I I t i l ) . In this sense, the Laozi is not
saying that the person of mysterious virtue "returns (to the Dao) together
with things" (y« wufan yi); rather, in Zhong Hui's reading, to obtain mys-
terious virtue and thus to realize great harmony one must "turn one's
back to things," that is to say, to the ways of the world, which are driven
by desire.
Zhong Hui's Approach to the Laozi

Judging from the material presented above, Zhong Hui's approach to
the Laozi appears similar to Wang Bi's in some respects. The similarities
concern their general understanding of the Dao as "mysterious" or "dark"
(xuan ]£) and as "nothing" (wu &E). When xuanxue became an established
trend during the Jin dynasty, its supporters looked back to the Zhengshi
period rather nostalgically as the "golden age" of philosophical debate
and criticism. The concept of wu is often singled out as the key to this
new learning: "During the Zhengshi period, He Yan, Wang Bi, and others
propounded the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi. They established the
view that heaven and earth and the myriad things are all rooted in wu."66
In view of the surviving fragments of Zhong Hui's Laozi commentary, he
should be included among the "others" who sought to reformulate clas-
sical learning by focusing on the mysterious Dao, on the basis of which
government and society may be restructured to establish lasting peace
and order. What needs to be made clear is that xuanxue is not monolithic.
The concept of wu generates a new focus, but it is subject to interpreta-
tion, with different ethical and political implications.
The concept of wu is difficult. At one level, it serves to bring out the
mystery of the Dao, which is "nameless" and "formless" and as such
transcends language and sensory perception. The Dao cannot be seen, ac-
66. Jin shu 43.1236, biography of Wang Yan 3Effi (256-311); the wording here follows
the emendation proposed by the Zhonghua shuju editors; see 43.1248n9.
cording to Zhong Hui, as if it were something "extinguished" or "leveled,"

probably in the sense of not having any distinguishable characteristics
(commentary to ch. 14, no. 5 above). It is "empty and without substance"
(ch. 25, no. 13), which is why the Laozi states that the Dao is "silent and
void." According to Wang Bi, what the Laozi means here is that the Dao
is "without form or body" (wu xingti MMWL)-67
At this level, there is little to disagree about. Featured so centrally in the
Laozi, the idea that the Dao is "nameless" (wuming M&) and "formless"
(wuxing MM) must be recognized. As Zhong Hui understands it, the Dao
is "shadowy, dark, dim, and obscure" (ch. 1, no. 1), and for this reason
may be described as xuan. For Wang Bi, "xuan means what is dark, what
is silent and not having any (characteristics of) being."68 Similarly, on the
concept of "mysterious virtue" (xuande Stlf)/ Wang Bi writes, "it issues
from the shadowy and dark (youming ffl^)" (chs. 10, 51). The phrase
youming also features in the Laozi commentary by Yan Zun, highlighting
the transcendence of the Dao.69 The Heshanggong commentary generally
takes xuan to refer concretely to "heaven" (tian 3z); but on two occasions,
it also relates that the virtue or power of the Dao is "mysterious, dark,
and cannot be seen" (chs. 10,51).
The theme of transcendence is amplified by the assertion that the Dao
"stands on its own (dull) and does not change" (ch. 25). According to
Zhong Hui, this means that the Dao is "solitary (and) without a mate"
and that "from antiquity to the present it is always one and the same" (no.
14). To Wang Bi, the Dao "stands on its own" because nothing can match
or be compared with it. In its ceaseless transformations, the Dao "does
not lose its constancy"; it is therefore said to be without change. Further,
the Laozi emphasizes that the Dao "operates everywhere (zhouxing) and
is free from danger" (ch. 25). Wang Bi explains, "zhouxing means that
there is no place that (the Dao) does not reach." This is close to Zhong
Hui's interpretation that "there is no place that the Dao is not present"
(no. 15).70
67. See n.62 above. Whether the Wang Bi text originally has mo or liao does not af-
fect the interpretation that the Dao is formless and transcends the realm of things. In
this instance, the Heshanggong commentary makes explicit that the Dao is here said
to be "without sound" (wu yinsheng M If IS) and "empty without shape" (kong wuxing
68. This follows the wording of the current Sibu beiyao edition of Wang Bi's commentary:
3J#:Sr1i!,iR#S^Wti!; the Wen xuan commentary to Sun Chuo's "Rhapsody on Roaming
the Celestial Terrace Mountains" (11.9b, 500) offers a more concise version: "xuan means
dark, silent, and not having any (characteristics of) being" (;£^-11!$WtiZ)-
69. Commentary to Laozi ch. 51, in Wang Deyou, Laozi zhigui, 46.
70. Wang Bi does not make the point here, as Zhong Hui does, that the Dao is "free
from danger" because it is able to "penetrate" or go through (tong j§) everything; but
ALAN K.L. CHAN 129
Dark, incomparable, and not limited by time and space, the Dao is
indeed "subtle and wondrous" and therefore "difficult to name" (ch. 14,
no. 6). Without ties and inexhaustible, as Zhong Hui further explains, the
Dao, or "One," transcends all phenomena. The concept of the "One" will
be discussed shortly. Wang Bi's commentary on chapter 14 emphasizes
both the formlessness and namelessness of Dao, which entails that it
cannot be "determined" {ding /£). Commenting on chapter 21, Wang Bi
also stresses that the Dao is without ties or attachments, which calls to
mind Zhuangzi's idea that virtues are often bound, tied up, or enslaved
by desires and emotional attachments.71 As we shall see, this bears directly
on Wang Bi's approach to the debate on whether sages have "emotions,"
in which Zhong Hui also participated.
These are general similarities. They indicate that Zhong Hui and Wang
Bi are equally sensitive to the text's emphasis on the transcendence or
"nothingness" (ivu) of the Dao. They do not tell us, however, what they
understand that to mean. In what sense can the Dao be said to be per-
vasive and ubiquitous if it is "nothing"? Despite the meager evidence at
our disposal, it may be possible to discern the broad approach of Zhong
Hui's Laozi learning.
Dao as Wu (Nothing)
An important aspect of Wang Bi's interpretation of the Laozi is the identifi-
cation of the "One" with the Dao. Commenting on Laozi chapter 39, Wang
Bi takes the "One" to mean "the beginning of numbers and the ultimate of
things," which can only be another way of describing the Dao. In contrast,
both Yan Zun and Heshanggong define the "One" as the "son" of the
Dao (ch. 39). Zhong Hui agrees with Wang Bi that the Dao is also called
the "One" in the Laozi (ch. 39, no. 21), but the agreement seems super-
ficial. The available evidence suggests that Zhong remains committed to
elsewhere Wang does emphasize that the Dao permeates all levels of existence (e.g.,
chs. 14, 43). The Heshanggong commentary to ch. 25 is more specific, identifying the
perceived referents of Laozi's remarks: the Dao pervades heaven and earth; it does not
get "burned" even when it is in the hottest place, or literally in the yang place; nor does
it "rot" even in the dampest, most yin corner. Thus, it is "free from danger."
71. Zhuangzi, ch. 23. Heshanggong's commentary on chapter 14 reads: "(Laozi) is
saying that when the One is up in the heavens, it is not dazzlingly bright.... When the
One is (down here) below heaven, it is not indistinct or becomes obscure and dark....
'Ceaseless' means that its movement is endless and without limits. 'Cannot be named'
means that it is not of any color . . . sound . . . shape . . . [and thus cannot be distin-
guished or measured by them]." It is worth noting that the word "dull" (zhuo $3), which
Zhong Hui uses in his commentary on this passage, is often used in Heshanggong's
commentary and Han cosmological writings in general to suggest a "turbid" form of qi
with a heavier yin concentration.
a "cosmological" interpretation of the Laozi that is more characteristic of

Han exegesis than Wang Bi's version of xuanxue learning.
The Laozi is clear in its emphasis on both the transcendence and creative
power of the Dao. Formless and nameless, the Dao is also the "beginning"
and "mother" of all beings (e.g., chs. 1,42). Indeed, according to the Laozi,
"All things under heaven are born of you (something); you is born of wu
(nothing)" (ch. 40). This obviously requires explanation. In a cosmologi-
cal reading, the solution lies in identifying the Dao as the source of the
essential "vital energy" (qi) that generated the yin and yang energies at
the "beginning." Through a process of further differentiation, the created
order then came into being. This is what the Laozi "really" has in mind
when it says, "The Dao gave birth to the One. The One gave birth to the
Two. The Two gave birth to the Three. The Three gave birth to the myriad
things" (ch. 42). The Heshanggong commentary clearly subscribes to this
view: the "One" is "what the Dao gave birth to at the beginning," which
in turn "gave birth to Yin and Yang" (ch. 42). In this sense, it also describes
the "One" as the "kernel" or "essence" (yao W) of the Dao (ch. 1); more
precisely, the "One" is "the essential qi of the great harmony" (ch. 10). The
language of Yan Zun's commentary is more sophisticated—its construal
of the "three" in Laozi's cosmogonic formula (ch. 42) and of the notion of
"superior virtue" (ch. 38) will be cited below—but it remains essentially
a cosmological reading.
As the origin of the essential energy or cosmic "breath" that makes life
possible, the Dao is indeed formless and nameless, and for this reason
may be described as "nothing" (wu). However, wu does not mean a kind
of metaphysical "nothingness," negation, or absence. From Wang Bi's per-
spective, this view fails to capture the radical transcendence of Dao. This
does not necessarily mean that Wang Bi finds no value in cosmological
explanation. The point is rather that, to him, the Laozi is concerned with
a "higher" level of discourse. Fundamentally, the chain of being requires
an ontological foundation, but the source of being cannot be itself a be-
ing; otherwise, the problem of infinite regress would render the logic of
the Laozi suspect. On this premise, the Laozi can only be saying that the
multiplicity of beings presupposes conceptually a prior ontological unity,
just as "two" would be unintelligible without the idea of "one." But the
Laozi is not saying that the Dao refers to some primordial, undifferenti-
ated substance. In this sense, Wang Bi defines "One" as wu (ch. 42), which
in effect renders "One" a metaphysical concept apart from the category
of numbers.72 For the same reason, "beginning" signifies logical priority
72. Commenting on what the Yijing calls the "number of the great expansion/' Wang
Bi writes, "(One) is not a number but because of it numbers are made complete. This can
be regarded as the great ultimate of change." Lou Yulie, Wang Bijijiaoshi, 547-48.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 131
rather than temporal reference; that is, as opposed to saying that the Dao
"gave birth" to the created order in the past tense, a metaphysical reading
would focus instead on the logic of creation. Wang Bi thus offers a strong
reading of the concept of wu, which may be translated as "nonbeing"
to accentuate its philosophical usage—the Dao by definition "does not
have (any characteristics of) being (wuyou M^)" (ch. 1). Whereas other
commentators may be concerned with explaining the sense in which the
Dao, understood as the original substance, may be said to be "nothing,"
Wang Bi's point is that "Dao" is a name—hermeneurkally powerful and
suggestive, it remains but one designation of wu (ch. 25) P
The Structure of the Daoist World:

Names and Actuality
Wang Bi's interpretation deserves fuller discussion, but this should suf-
fice to provide a context in which Zhong Hui's understanding of the
Laozi may be placed. As we have seen, according to the Laozi, the Dao is
great and "models after ziran." This is because "no one knows whence
it comes," according to Zhong Hui (ch. 25, no. 16). Moreover, the Laozi
observes, "The great image does not have any form" (daxiang wuxing)
(ch. 41). The context suggests that the "great image" is a metaphor for
the Dao, and this is how Zhong Hui has understood it (no. 22): "There
is no image that does not respond to it; this is what is called the 'great
image'. Since it does not have any bodily shape, how can it have any
form or appearance?" To Wang Bi, however, the Laozi is making a point
about the indivisibility and limitlessness of Dao. What has shape or form
must necessarily have distinctions (fen 53")- Distinctions set boundaries
and entail limits; "nonbeing," in contrast, is without limits and does not
admit of divisions. Thus, Wang Bi concludes, "An image that has form
is not the great image." Although the notion of "response" (ying) plays
an important role in Wang Bi's commentary elsewhere, the emphasis
here is on the logical inadmissibility of distinctions and ultimately on
73. See A. Chan, Two Visions of the Way, ch. 2 for a fuller discussion; cf. A. Chan, "A
Tale of Two Commentaries," in Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching, ed. Livia Kohn and Michael
LaFargue (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 89-117. Recently, Rudolf
Wagner argues with precision that "Wang Bi reads the cosmogonic and ontogonic lan-
guage in the Laozi as a metaphor for a structural relationship between the That-by-which
and the entities"; see Wagner, Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy in China: Wang
Bi's Scholarly Exploration of the Dark (Xuanxue) (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2003), 143. The "that-by-which" refers to that which makes the "ten thousand kinds
of entities" what they are, i.e., the Dao, understood as wu, which Wagner translates as
"negativity." Against the "cosmogonic or ontogonic approach" that places "the Dao or ai
at the beginning," Wagner also emphasizes that Wang Bi "reads all of this time sequence
as a metaphor for logical sequence" (169); the same point is made on p. 187.
wu. Similarly, Wang Bi's comment that ziran is "an expression for the
ultimate" or "a term for that which cannot be designated" reflects the
same critical awareness of what nonbeing or transcendence entails (ch.
25). In contrast, Zhong Hui seems more concerned with delineating the
"greatness" of the Dao, a point that ties in well with the other surviving
fragments from his Laozi commentary.74
The relationship between "names" (ming =£) and "actuality" (shi jf)
forms an important topic in early Chinese philosophy.75 The suggestion
here is that whereas Wang Bi places greater emphasis on "names," Zhong
Hui's approach privileges "actuality." The priority of "names" conveys an
intellectual orientation that takes understanding as the basis for action; it
does not suggest any disregard for "actuality."76 It stems from Wang Bi's
understanding of wu, which dispenses with the conception of a formless
vital energy that generates and nourishes all beings. Zhong Hui, on the
other hand, is evidently guided by the concept of qi in his approach to
the Laozi. This gives rise to a conception of the Daoist world that is quite
different from Wang Bi's.
On the cosmological level, the created order is dependent on the opera-
tion of Yin and Yang, which brings into being the multiplicity of things.
In saying that "the three gave birth to the myriad things," according to
Heshanggong, the Laozi (ch. 42) is referring specifically to Yin, Yang, and
the "harmonious" blending of these two forms of vital energy, which
produced heaven, earth, and human beings, respectively. Yan Zun identi-
fies the "three" with original substance, spiritual luminosity (shenming ffi
Bfl, in this reading, a pure form of qi), and harmonious qi. Wang Bi does
mention the "blending of qi," a phrase which appears in the Laozi text
itself; but his commentary here, borrowing from chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi,
is chiefly concerned with the metaphysical unity of being. According to
74. Yan Zun's commentary on the "great image" also emphasizes the greatness of
the Dao. The Heshanggong commentary in this instance links the "great image" to the
Daoist sage, who acts as a model to the world: "The man who is the great model (faxiang
feUl) is simple by nature like an uncarved block and does not have any (ostensible)
shape or appearance."
75. See John Makeham, Name and Actuality in Early Chinese Thought (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994).
76. Thus, Wang Bi also subscribes to the view that in the realm of phenomena, "names
arise from forms" (ming sheng yu xing &t£jfc JfJ). This does not detract from Wang Bi's
methodological point that "principle" (li M) and "actuality" cannot be discussed and
understood unless one is able to "distinguish names" (bianmingffi&).Names render
possible the meaningful differentiation of phenomena and are a condition for under-
standing, without which forms cannot be determined and their basis or reason of being
understood. See Wang Bi's shorter writing on the Laozi, the Laozi zhiliie ^ ^ f i t l ^ , in Lou
Yulie, Wang Bi ji jiaoshi, 199.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 133
Zhong Hui, the Laozi is asserting that "(the three) scattered (san iS{) and
became the myriad things" (ch. 42, no. 23).
The idea that things "scatter" or disperse poses a problem for Wang Bi
because of his emphasis on unity. The Laozi states, "When the uncarved
block (pu) scatters, it becomes vessels" (ch. 28). Wang Bi comments,
"Uncarved block" means what is genuine. When what is genuine
becomes scattered, the myriad ways in behavior issue forth and
the different types (of things and people) come into being. This is
like (the making of) vessels. On account of their separateness (fen)
and dispersal (sari), the sage thus instituted officials for them . . .
changed their ways and transformed their customs, so that they
would return to One.
Compared with Zhong Hui's commentary—"'Uncarved block' refers
to the Dao. If kept intact, it remains the Dao that is undifferentiated in
its substance. If scattered, it becomes vessels that nourish the people"
(ch. 28, no. 18)—it seems clear that Wang Bi is working with a different
philosophical agenda. "Scattering" or dispersal suggests disorder and
alienation from the Dao, which according to Wang is precisely the prob-
lem that needs to be overcome.
It is noteworthy that whereas Zhong Hui identifies the "uncarved
block" with the Dao, Wang Bi defines it as what is "genuine" or "authentic"
(zhen j(). Given that "Dao" is but a name for "nonbeing" in Wang Bi's
account, it would not do to explain one name with another and worse,
to give the impression that "Dao" has material substance. To Zhong Hui,
the "scattering" of the Dao is a creative act and should be celebrated;
"vessels," taken positively as referring to the multiplicity of things and
not as a metaphor for alienation or the loss of what is genuine, serve a
beneficial function in nourishing the people. This is but another way of
describing the differentiation of qi and the resultant plenitude and order
of the Daoist universe.77
Derived from the Dao, the world reflects a pristine order. In this ideal
world, order finds expression in constant "responses." According to
Zhong Hui, "Those who are one with the Dao, the Dao will have them;
those who put their trust in the Dao, the Dao will trust them" (ch. 23,
no. 12; cf. ch. 41, no. 22). From Wang Bi's perspective, however, being
77. Heshanggong shares this basic interpretation, although he provides specific

cosmological details: "When the undifferentiated substance {pu) of the myriad things
scatters, it turns into vessels ready for use. In the case of the Dao, when it scattered it
became a spiritual luminosity (shenming), which flowed and became the sun and the
moon, and differentiated into the five agents" (commentary to ch. 28).
"one with Dao" does not mean being united with "something" other
and distinct; in the light of the concept of nonbeing, it points rather to
an ideal state in which all things "realize what is genuine in them" (de qi
zhen | # S I , ch. 23).
In an Utopian world, as Zhong Hui understands it, filial love and respect
would have been entirely spontaneous and thus unremarkable, which is
why the Laozi regards filial piety as having arisen only after the decline
of the Dao (ch. 18, no. 8). Wang Bi attempts to reconstruct the reasoning
of the Laozi:
The most beautiful of names are derived from the most ugly or
grotesque. This is what is meant by "beauty and ugliness belonging
to the same house." The six relations are father and son, elder and
younger brothers, and husband and wife. If the six relations were in
harmony of their own accord, and the family and the country were
in order of their own accord, then we would not know where the
filial and loving sons and loyal ministers are.
Deliberate effort at bringing love and respect into the world proves
necessary only after natural filial affection has been lost. In this respect,
Zhong Hui and Wang Bi agree on the centrality of "naturalness" (ziran).
But Wang Bi's commentary here also draws attention to chapter 2 of
the Laozi, in which aesthetic and moral categories such as "beauty" and
"ugliness," and "good" and "bad" are shown to be meaningful only in
relation to each other. Wang Bi concludes his commentary to Laozi chapter
18 with a story from the Zhuangzi: fish only become "virtuous" and try
to keep one another wet when they end up on dry land and no longer
enjoy the freedom of swimming in rivers and lakes where they simply
"forget" one another.78 This seems different from the point that Zhong
Hui is trying to make. If something is naturally, say, sweet, then there is
no need to add sugar. For Wang Bi, however, what needs to be recognized
is that sweetness is meaningful only when there is bitterness, which is
a point about "names." "Names serve to determine forms," as-Wang Bi
argues elsewhere in his Laozi commentary (ch. 25). Given that Dao is
without form and name, transcending all distinctions, the Daoist ideal
finds its proper home in a realm of "forgetfulness." This kind of analysis
is not found in the available quotations from Zhong Hui's commentary.
78. Wang Bi's commentary here is probably corrupt; see Lou Yulie, Wang Bijijiaoshi, 45n8
and Lynn, Classic of the Way and Virtue, 81-82n5. But the general point is clear enough. The
Zhuangzi reads, "When the springs dry up and the fish are left stranded on the ground,
they spew each other with moisture and wet each other with spit—but it would be much
better if they could forget each other in the rivers and lakes" (ch. 6); Watson, The Complete
Works ofChuang Tzu, 80. The story is repeated in Zhuangzi, ch. 14; Watson, ibid., 163.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 135
What we do find points instead to a basic assumption that there is an

ideal order.79
You (Something) and Wu (Nothing)

The interplay between you and wu ensures the proper functioning of the
Daoist world. According to the Laozi, whereas you generates "benefit"
(li ÎJ), it is wu that makes possible,the "use" (yong ffl) or functioning
of things (ch. 11). The Heshanggong commentary does not discuss the
relationship between you and wu but breaks up the passage into two
halves. On the first clause, "Therefore having something (you) is what
produces benefit," Heshanggong explains,
"Benefit" refers to things (li wu ye filffij-fo). Benefit is derived from
the use of (material) forms.80 There are things in the vessel, and there
are people in the room. One fears that the house may be damaged.
There are spirits in the belly; one is afraid that the (physical) form
may disintegrate and disappear.
By defining "benefit" as things, Heshanggong is simply taking this
clause to mean that there are things. Linking this to the examples of
vessels and rooms mentioned previously in chapter 11 of the Laozi, the
commentator thus arrives at the conclusion that there are things in the
vessel and that there are people in the room. What is significant is that
Heshanggong never considers you to be an abstract concept signifying
"being" in general. The commentary emphasizes rather the need to
carefully nourish and preserve one's body, the "home" of indwelling-
spirits. This effectively shifts the focus to the theme of self-cultivation.
The second half of the passage, "having nothing (wu) is what produces
use," is treated as an independent unit: "This means that what is vacuous
and empty can be used to receive the myriad things. Thus, it is said that
79. It is, of course, possible that the limited evidence presents a partial view; none-
theless, taken as a whole, these fragments seem to reflect a consistent approach to the
Laozi. To Heshanggong, who seeks to map out Laozi's meaning in terms of concrete
objects and actions, the point of ch. 18 is that "when the six threads (of family relations)
are severed, relatives are not in harmony. Then, there are filial and compassionate men
who adopt and help one another." The Sibu congkan text contains an error; emended in
the light of several other versions. See Zheng Chenghai, Laozi Heshanggong zhu jiaoli,
119; and Wang Ka, Laozi Daode jing Heshanggong zhangju, 74nll. The "six threads" of
family relations are traditionally defined as elders, brothers, clansmen, maternal uncles,
teachers, and friends.
80. In six editions, this sentence reads more simply, "Things are beneficial because
of their form." See Zheng Chenghai, Laozi Heshanggong zhu jiaoli, 69; Wang Ka, Laozi
Daode jing Heshanggong zhangju, 42.
136 ZHONG HUT'S LAOZI COMMENTARY
what is vacuous and void can control what has form. The Dao is what is
empty."
Wang Bi focuses on the priority of wu:
Wood, clay, and wall are what make these three things [wheel, vessel,
and room], but they all take nonbeing as (the basis of their) func-
tion. To speak of nonbeing (is to show that) the reason why things
are beneficial is because they are all dependent on nonbeing as the
basis of their function.81
This contrasts sharply with the view of Heshanggong, for whom wu
describes the formlessness of the Dao as original substance but has little
philosophical meaning. For Zhong Hui, as we have seen, the point is
rather that you and wu are interdependent—they "gain from each other,
and neither can be neglected" (ch. 11, no. 3).
The differences among the three commentators are instructive. Three
points may be made in this regard. First, at the meta-interpretive level
Zhong Hui's commentary appears closer to Wang Bi's than Heshang-
gong's. The language of you and wu, in particular, signals a new ap-
proach to Laozi learning. Hermeneutically, whereas Heshanggong locates
meaning in reference and sees the task of interpretation as consisting
in identifying the concrete objects to which a text is seen to refer, both
Zhong Hui and Wang Bi seek to decipher a text's meaning by drawing
out the ideas that underlie it. In a referential framework, "being" always
means "something," be it a "vessel," "room," or "spirit"; for Zhong Hui
and Wang Bi, in contrast, sense may not be reduced to reference—you
and wu are concepts that open a view into the origins and structure of
the order of ziran.
Although Zhong Hui may have adopted a new language and approach
to the Laozi, he remains indebted to Han cosmological thinking. At first
glance, there is thus a sense in which Zhong Hui may be described as a
"transitional" figure in the passage from Han scholarship dominated by
zhangju learning and cosmological interests to Wang Bi's xuanxue with
its signature emphasis on "nonbeing." However, xuanxue is not reducible
to Wang Bi's interpretation of nonbeing. As an intellectual current that
emerged in the third century and challenged the Confucian orthodoxy,
xuanxue is complex and dynamic. It is characterized by philosophical
81. According to Hatano, Roshi dotokukyo kenkyu, 94, the phrase "to speak of nonbeing"
is superfluous; the sentence should read, "This is to say that things (you) are beneficial
because they are all dependent on nonbeing as the basis of their function." Cf. Lynn,
Classic of the Way and Virtue, 69. It should be pointed out that although Wang Bi assigns
conceptual priority to nonbeing, he also recognizes that the meaning of wu cannot be
understood without the mediation of being. See Lou Yulie, Wang Bijijiaoshi, 548.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 137
debates and encompasses a range of philosophical positions. Changes

and innovation may have been introduced, but continuity with earlier
tradition should also be expected. From this perspective, rather than see-
ing Zhong Hui as a "lesser" xuanxue philosopher when compared with
Wang Bi, it may be argued more simply that not all xuanxue philosophers
have understood the concept of wu in the same way. Perhaps one may
describe Zhong Hui's approach as a "centrist" position, in view of its at-
tempt to balance you and wu, especially in the context of the later debate
in xuanxue philosophy between those who "exalt being" (chongyou ^ W )
and those who "value nonbeing" (guiwu j | t e ) . 8 2
Second, Zhong Hui and Wang Bi seem to be working with different
philosophical assumptions. For Wang Bi, the relationship between wu
and you is essentially a relationship between "roots" (ben $ , literally
the base of a tree) and "branches" (mo 5|5). The importance of benmo as a
guiding theme in Wang Bi's philosophy is well known.83 Nonbeing is the
more fundamental ben, which accounts for all beings and functions. The
"branches" may reflect the luxuriant flourishing of the Dao, but they can
also represent superficiality and alienation from the Dao. This ambiguity
is carried over into Wang Bi's political philosophy.84
82. Whereas the "valuing nonbeing" position is associated principally with He Yan
and Wang Bi, the opposite camp is represented by Guo Xiang ijffl^ (d. 312) and Pei Wei
Hî (267-300). The latter was the author of two treatises entitled Chongyou and Guiwu;
Sanguo zhi 23.673n2. See Tang Yongtong, Wei Jin xuanxue lungao | $ H S ^ a i ^ l , collected
in Tang Yongtong xueshu lunwenji, 191-306. Also see Xu Kangsheng rFStÊ, et al., Wei Jin
xuanxue shi MWZ^£. (Xian: Shaanxi shifan daxue, 1989); and Zhao Shulian ffi%}M,
Wei Jin xuanxue tanwei WMr£.^W'0& (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1992), chapters 3 and
5. When "Xuanxue" was established as a subject in the official curriculum during the fifth
century, Wang Bi's Yijing commentary served as required reading. On this development,
see especially Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 2-7. However, as mentioned earlier (see
n. 1 above), this is to be distinguished from xuanxue as a general term referring to a broad
intellectual front that emerged during the Zhengshi reign and sought to lay bare the
meaning of the mysterious Dao, especially with the view of arriving at a recipe for ideal
government, which hinges on an understanding of such key concepts as wu and ziran. No
doubt, Wang Bi's contribution is extremely important, but the point remains that xuanxue
is complex and mulufaceted.
83. For example, see Yu Dunkang ^%M., fie Yan Wang Bi xuanxue xintan H§|3E$i
£#*$? S (Jinan: Qilu, 1991), 159-62. Three recent studies on xuanxue that address this
issue are Gao Chenyang H JS Wi, Ru Dao huitong yu Zhengshi xuanxue WiM1l!)M%l]E!th'&
#1 Qinan:QHu,2mO),ch.6;XuBin^M.,WeiJinxuanxuexinlunMW^^:^Mi (Shanghai:
Shanghai guji, 2000), ch. 4; and Gao Huaping MMW-, Wei Jin xuanxue rengemei yanjiu f$l
W%¥A.ffi$tW9i (Chengdu: Bashu, 2000), esp. ch. 2.3.
84. A. Chan, Two Visions of the Way, 77-80; Wang Xiaoyi, Wang Bi pingzhuan, 265-74;
and Rudolf Wagner, Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy in China, 151-152,163,211.
Cultivation of the "roots" must of course be encouraged—Wang Bi focuses especially on
quietude, tranquility, and having few desires to preserve what is "genuine" in oneself;
In Zhong Hui's commentary, however, you-ivu is subsumed under

the relationship between the "outer" (wai #h) and the "inner" (nei [^).
Recall that, according to Zhong Hui, "for objects to generate benefit
externally, it is by capitalizing on the use of emptiness that they reach
their goal; and for emptiness to generate use internally, it is on account
of the benefit that objects bring that it reaches fruition" (ch. 11, no. 3).
As a philosophical metaphor, the "inner-outer" (neiwai) relation is more
complex than benmo, although there is overlap between the two. If there
were no roots, there would not be any branches; the former is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for the latter. The neiwai relation may be
interpreted also in this way, although unlike benmo, which usually entails
an unequal relationship, it does not follow that the inner is necessarily
more important than the outer. For example, one might argue that in eth-
ics consequence is more important than intention. Thus, whereas Wang
Bi assumes that the roots are always more important than the branches,
Zhong Hui tries to balance the inner and the outer. Moreover, unlike the
benmo relation, it is uncertain that the inner always forms the basis of the
outer. For example, conceivably learning might alter a person's nature.
Philosophers of the early Wei were keenly aware that positions of author-
ity in government may be occupied by those without ability and that
many with a fine reputation may turn out to be without "substance." In
this context, the "inner-outer" relation reflects the concern with "names
and actuality" and is crucially important to the debate on "capacity and
nature," about which more will be said later.
Third, it is significant, I think, that Zhong Hui makes use of the concept
of fa ^ in describing the interdependence of you and wu: "wu depends
on you to become of benefit; you relies on wu to be of use. These two fa
lend support to each other." I have translated fa generally as "modes"
above, but of course it has a more precise meaning as law or standard.
In the ideal Daoist world, order finds expression in fa, be they cosmic
laws in the heavens or the laws of nature. In other words, the inter-
in politics, abiding by "nonaction" (wuwei MM) would translate into policies that allow
the people to live in peace, enjoy the plenitude of nature, and be true to themselves. The
ruler may be likened to the base or main trunk of a tree, and in this sense the ruler must
enable the people, the "branches," toflourish.But, the "branches" also suggest artificiality,
alienation, deviancy, and other opposites of wuwei; and the ruler has a responsibility to put
them to rest. The idea of "honoring the roots and putting to rest the branches" (chongben
ximo J^$,|,7f?) derives from Han political philosophy. The Later Han scholar Wang Fu
3E^J (d. 157), for example, argues that the key to proper governance lies in "cultivating
the roots and curbing the branches" {wuben yimo |g ^f #P 7)?) and that creating wealth for
the people and education are the "roots" and foundation of great peace. Wang Fu, Qianfu
lun 1.2, ("Wuben" ^ $ ) , in Qianfu lunjtinjkozhmgW3^miWz.$i.lE,Xinbkn zhuzijicheng
ffifii¥llfiK edition (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985), 14.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 139
dependence of you and wu represents an intrinsic "law" or principle in

a Dao-centered universe. Moreover, the word fa also gives the sense of
method or procedure, as well as laws that regulate human affairs. This
is especially important in a world that has fallen from the pristine order
of the Dao.
Restoring Order: Qi and Self-Cultivation

The pristine Daoist order has been lost. Whether one starts from names
or actuality, the goal is to restore or atleast to approximate this order in
which the two coincide. For Zhong Hui, the process of recovery begins
with self-cultivation, which requires careful tending of one's (ji-energy.
According to Zhong Hui, "the soul (hunpo) manages and protects its form
and qi, so as to enable it to last long" (ch. 10, no. 2). This is what the Laozi
means by "looking after the soul (yingpo) and embracing the One."
Aligned with the yin-yang cosmological theory, the idea that human
beings are constituted spiritually and physically by qi was well estab-
lished by the third century. It may be useful to recall generally that this
conception does not entail a bifurcation of "soul" and "body." Both are
constituted by qi, although the "qi of the blood" may be less "pure" when
compared with the more subtle qi of the soul or spirit. In this context,
self-cultivation involves both nourishing and purifying the vital energy.
Zhong Hui follows the "mainstream" of early Wei thought in his use of
the concept of qi, which again points to an emphasis on "actuality" and
has implications for an understanding of the debate on capacity and
nature.
The Heshanggong commentary provides additional information:
"Yingpo means the soul (hunpo). Man lives by virtue of the fact that he
is borne by his soul. Thus, one should treasure and nourish i t . . . . The
hun-soul is situated in the liver, and the po-soul in the lungs. Fine wine
and rich food will only spoil man's liver and lungs." Zhong Hui may not
have subscribed to these details, but he would agree with Heshanggong
that the "essential breath or energy (jingqi %MM.) of the great harmony"
must be carefully nourished. If it is properly nourished so that it does
not leave the body, "then one will live long" (ch. 10).85
Zhong Hui, as mentioned, takes zai (Jc, the opening word of Laozi
chapter 10 to be an exclamation. For Wang Bi, zai means chu J i , "dwell."
85. Compare the commentary on Laozi ch. 60 in the Hanfeizi ch. 20, "Jie Lao" M^
(Explaining the Laozi), which points out that the loss of "virtue" stems from confusion
in one's "essence and spirit" (jingshen ifS-W), which in turn is caused by the departure
of one's "soul" (hunpo). Chen Qiyou KffSJ;, Hanfeizi jishi ^ f l ^ S I f ? (Hong Kong:
Zhonghua, 1974), 357.
140 ZHONG HUI'S LAOZl COMMENTARY
The compound yingpo is explained as "the dwelling place where man

constantly resides." The meaning becomes clear when one realizes that
Wang Bi is taking this to be an illustration of the concept of "One," which
he considers "what is genuine in a person." Thus, Laozi's point is that "if
a person could dwell in his constant abode, embrace 'One' and purify
his spirit, without departing from it, then the myriad creatures will all
come and submit to him of their own accord." The concluding phrase is
borrowed from chapter 32 of the Laozi, and Wang Bi's commentary there
makes essentially the same point.
The concept of qi plays little role in Wang Bi's Laozi learning, which
follows from his reading of nonbeing. The reason why the Laozi consid-
ers the sage to be "for the belly and not for the eyes" (ch. 12), according
to Wang, has nothing to do with the fullness of his qi'-energy; rather, it is
because
Those who are "for the belly" take things to nourish themselves,
(whereas) those who are "for the eyes" allow themselves to be driven
by things. This is why the sage is "not for the eyes."
The Heshanggong commentary, sensing that the Laozi is referring to
specific acts rather than general attitudes here, specifies that "for the
belly" means, "Guard the five natures, rid the six feelings, regulate the
will, and nourish the spirit." The phrase "not for the eyes" is also seen
to suggest a deliberate act on the part of the sage: "The eyes do not look
wantonly; look wantonly and the essence will be dispersed outside."
The point of the Laozi, according to this reading, is that self-cultivation
involves both the purification of qi and the elimination of desires. Zhong
Hui's understanding of the nature of the sage requires closer examina-
tion, but generally he seems to share a similar concern: "The genuine
vital energy pervades (the sage's) inner being; thus it is said, (he is) 'for
the belly'. Externally, desires have been eliminated; thus, it is said, 'not
for the eyes'" (ch. 12, no. 4). The complementarity of the "inner" and the
"outer" again claims its place in Zhong Hui's Laozi commentary.
On the opening sentence of Laozi chapter 16—"zhi xu ji shou jing du"
( S t H i n f i l l ) — W a n g Bi writes, "This means that 'attain emptiness'
is the ultimate (nature) of things; 'maintain tranquility' is the true (na-
ture) of things" (WSUi, fyZMM. <F W, fy£.KE.&). In this reading,
the Laozi is not saying, as in Zhong Hui's interpretation, "Attain utmost
emptiness; maintain complete tranquility"; rather, it should be translated,
"Attain emptiness is the ultimate; maintain tranquility is the true (nature
of things)." A number of scholars have suggested that Wang Bi's com-
mentary here may be corrupt, for it seems rather odd that he would take
the word "utmost" (ji ^ ) and its parallel in the second half as referring to
the nature of things. Although the possibility of textual corruption cannot
ALAN K.L. CHAN 141
be discounted completely, Wang Bi's interpretation is consistent with his

general emphasis on returning to what is genuine in nature. Given the
importance of purifying one's qi-condition, Zhong Hui proposes a more
straightforward reading: "'Attain' means to reach; (that is to say) eliminate
emotions and worries to reach the ultimate of emptiness. The mind is
always quiet, so as to maintain complete tranquility" (ch. 16, no. 7).86
Ethical and Political Implications

Self-cultivation translates into certain effects or ways of doing things at
both the personal and political levels. The Laozi points out, "One who is
good at traveling leaves no track or trace" (ch. 27). According to Zhong
Hui, "traveling" is a metaphor for putting the Dao into practice. For
those who are good at this, success and fame can be expected, although
they will not be "conspicuous" (no. 17). From Wang Bi's perspective, the
Laozi is saying that if we "act in accordance with the course of natural-
ness (zirari), without making or instituting things, then things will reach
their end, leaving no trace or track." That is to say, everything will attain
its proper end or fulfillment without any trace of artificial or arbitrary
intervention. This seems fundamentally different from Zhong Hui's
interest in "success and fame."87
The Laozi states: "The yielding and weak will overcome the hard and
strong" (ch. 36). For Heshanggong, the simple reason is that whereas "the
yielding and weak lasts long, the hard and strong perishes first." Wang
Bi did not comment on this particular sentence, but his interpretation
of the chapter as a whole focuses on the idea that, in government, the
"Legalist" sense of punishment must above all be avoided; instead, the
ruler should "follow the nature of things" (yin wu zhi xing H ^ ^ t t ) .
In this same chapter, the Laozi also suggests, "If you would have a
thing shrink, you must first stretch it" (Lau). In Wang Bi's view, again
this means that if one wishes to destroy the violent and the lawless, there
is no better way than to "follow the nature of things," so that their vio-
lence and lawlessness would lead to their own destruction. This may be
a reference to chapter 42 of the Laozi, which warns that "the violent will
not come to a natural end" (Lau). But the more important point, as Wang
86. Differences in interpretive details notwithstanding, the idea that emotions and
desires pose an obstacle to attaining "emptiness" is also high on Heshanggong's agenda:
"He who has obtained the Dao diminishes his emotive appetite and gets rid of his
desires. Hisfiveviscera are all clear and tranquil; he reaches the ultimate of emptiness.
He maintains tranquility, and acts with seriousness" (commentary to Laozi ch. 16).
87. Heshanggong's commentary to Laozi ch. 27 reads: "One who is good at putting
the Dao into practice seeks it within himself. He does not go down to the outer chamber
or go out of doors; thus, he leaves no track or trace."
Bi repeatedly emphasizes, is that the Legalist insistence on punishment

is contrary to ideal rulership. The Hanfeizi takes "reward" and "punish-
ment" to be the main concern of the Laozi in this instance, on which the
ruler depends for maintaining control.88 Reflecting perhaps a keen sense
of political strategy also, Zhong Hui comments: "If one wishes to control
the hard and strong, one assumes the appearance of being submissive
and weak. Stretch it first, then shrink it afterwards; (the outcome) win
or lose, is certain" (ch. 36, no. 19). This is not to suggest that Zhong Hui
subscribes to a Legalist position, although he is apparently not con-
vinced that "following the nature of things" alone would bring an end to
disorder.
"If one is truly able to keep being yielding," according to Zhong Hui,
"everything (quart) will certainly return to him" (ch. 22, No. 11). On the
last line of Laozi chapter 22 (cheng quarter gui zhi), Heshanggong explains
that no harm will come to those who follow yieldingness in preserving
their body. Wang Bi did not comment on this line, but in explaining this
chapter he offers the analogy that the way of naturalness is like a tree.
The more its branches twist and turn, the farther they stray from their
"roots," i.e., what is genuine in the order of ziran. At the practical level,
this implies that one should "return" (fan) to one's "roots." Wang Bi makes
the same point in his commentary to Laozi chapter 65: it is only when
things return to their true nature that great harmony may be realized.
To Zhong Hui, fan in this context means that one must "turn one's back"
to the ways of the mundane world in order to "enter the Dao" (no. 24).
The difference between Wang Bi and Zhong Hui in this instance goes
beyond the interpretation of a particular word. The idea of returning to
what is genuine is central to Wang Bi's philosophy. In contrast, Zhong
Hui seems preoccupied with certain practices that would distinguish
the man of Dao and enable him to realize the Utopian state of "great
harmony." Both Wang Bi and Zhong Hui are concerned with the res-
toration of the pristine order of the Dao, but whereas Wang Bi's view
of nonbeing commits him to a reading of ziran as being true to one's
nature—there is "nothing" outside that one can model after—Zhong Hui
directs attention to the desired outcome of Daoist practice and the way to
achieve it.
The person who fully embodies the Dao, who possesses "superior
virtue," is a sage. The sage, in the words of Zhong Hui, "embodies the
wondrous and subtle spirit" and is able "to preserve the transforma-
tions (of nature)" (ch. 38, no. 20). Heshanggong explains that the phrase
88. See Hanfeizi ch. 21, "Yu Lao" Bfig (Illustrating the laozi), 392; see also ch. 31,570,
which alludes to Laozi ch. 36.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 143
"superior virtue" (shangde _htli) refers to "the ruler of high antiquity who
is without name or title."89 Yan Zun also focuses on the "ruler of superior
virtue" (shangde zhijun _hiH £. Hi) in his discussion of Laozi chapter 38. The
ruler of superior virtue is one who fully embodies the Dao in the sense
that "his nature has received the delicate wonders of the Dao" and that
"his being has obtained the subtle essence of the One," which suggests
an extraordinary qi-endowment.90 Wang Bi, however, is convinced that
the Laozi is saying something rather different:
Virtue means to obtain. It means constant attainment without loss . . .
Therefore it is called "virtue." How can virtue be obtained? It is by
following Dao. How can virtue be fully realized? It is by taking wu
as (the basis of) function . . . Though sages and kings are great, they
take emptiness as their master.
The Hanfeizi also defines "virtue" (de t l ) in terms of its homonym, de f#,
"to obtain"; but it sees "virtue" as the "inner," and what one has "obtained"
as the "outer." In this view, the Laozi is saying that "one's spirit (shen)
remains intact within and one's body is thus preserved."91
The sage occupies a pivotal position in the project of restoring order.
But the Laozi also says, "Remove sagacity (sheng IS) and discard wisdom;
then the people will benefit a hundredfold" (ch. 19). Zhong Hui's long
commentary here, in the light of his other comments on the Laozi, it seems
to me, attempts to narrow the field of meaning of sheng (sagacity, sage) to
distinguish it from the "true" sage who embodies the Dao: "Remove the
(kind of) sagacity that institutes and creates things; discard the wisdom
that plots and schemes" (ch. 19, no. 9). Wang Bi in this instance focuses on
the inadequate cultural "expressions" (wen ~$Q of sagacity and wisdom.
Nevertheless, he also distinguishes perfect "sageness" from artificial at-
tempts to impose order on society elsewhere in his commentary (e.g.,
chs. 10, 38, 65). In the next section, we will consider Zhong Hui's and
Wang Bi's views on the nature of the sage.92
89. In Heshanggongfs interpretation, shangde should be rendered the "highest virtue,"

for the ruler's virtue is so great that none can surpass it. Paradoxically, the highest virtue
is "not virtuous." This is because the ruler "does not use virtue to teach the people";
"his virtue is not visible, and this is why (Laozi) says, 'not virtuous'." The ruler's virtue,
in fact, "merges with heaven and earth"; as a result, "the harmonious qi flourishes and
the people are thus able to be preserved and made complete."
90. Wang Deyou, Laozi zhigui, 4.
91. Hanfeizi 20.326.
92. According to Heshanggong, Laozi ch. 19 is referring to ancient history: "Remove
the inventions instituted by the sages, and return to the beginning and safeguard the
origin. The Five Emperors dispensed the heavenly images and Cang Jie invented writ-
ing; but they are not as good as the Three Sovereigns, who knotted cords (to record
For Zhong Hui, ideally "laws and decrees," like filial piety (ch. 18,
no. 8), would be unnecessary if the pristine order of the Dao prevailed.
Ideally, once artificiality and ambition were removed, "the people would
turn back to what is constant and return to simplicity." This agrees with
Wang Bi's interpretation and shows that Zhong Hui is sensitive to the
emphasis on simplicity and "nonaction" (ivuwei) in the Laozi. However,
on the whole, it seems that Zhong Hui favors a more structured and
"proactive" approach to establishing order.
As indicated earlier, Zhong Hui takes the phrase, de zhi rong £!;£.#,
in chapter 21 of the Laozi to mean that the expression or appearance of
virtue is "law" or "model" (fa) (no. 10). For Wang Bi, this reading would
not be meaningful because "virtue," defined as "constant attainment" (ch.
38)—i.e., complete self-realization—does not denote anything external to
and other than what is genuine or "naturally so." Zhong Hui's reading,
however, has the support of the Later Han commentator Gao You iHj|j§
(fl. 205), who defines rong as fa in his commentary to the Lu shi chunqiu
S R^'X-93 Interpreters generally concentrate on certain basic issues in
their approach to texts. It is my suggestion that Zhong Hui's reading of
the Laozi is also guided by certain basic concerns, one of which is fa.
Sages and Laws

The question of law forms a part of the larger issue of sociopolitical order.
Ideally, as Confucius remarks, society should be free from litigation (Lun
yu 12.13). In the government of the true sage, penal laws and punishment
do not apply, for the sage is able to transform the people through "non-
action," guiding them to regain their natural simplicity. This is the reign
of "great peace" (taiping ^k.¥~) as envisaged by the majority of xuanxue
scholars, in which virtues would naturally abound and family relations
would be in complete harmony. Can great peace be attained? There is no
question that a sage can realize the taiping ideal; but the more pertinent
question, given the rarity of sages, is whether sages alone can bring about
great peace. Can it be realized by worthy and able rulers and ministers,
who are committed to the way of the sage but are not sages? I believe
that Zhong Hui was acutely concerned with this question, which began
events) without (using) written language." "Discard wisdom" highlights the need to
"return to nonaction"; and "the people will benefit a hundredfold" means that "in
agriculture, cultivate the public (good) without self-interest."
93. Lu shi chunqiu, 26.1, "Shi rong" i § ; see Chen Qiyou, Lii shi chunqiu jiaoshi S ft #
%kW$ (Shanghai: Xuelin, 1990), 1697nl5. The "officer" (shi) is not biased or cliquish. This
forms an important aspect of the rong of an officer of the state. Chen Qiyou suggests that
rong means "attitude" (taiduffljiJS),which has a certain "standard" and "model" (fafan ££
|g); ibid., 1691nl.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 145
to surface during the Han period and continued to attract debate during
the early years of the Wei dynasty. In fact, Zhong Hui's father, Zhong
You, asserts unequivocally that sages are necessary for the realization of
great peace.94
If sages are necessary for peace, the question that arises, then, is
whether one can become a sage. Indeed, how should "sagehood" be
understood? Is it inborn, or can it be acquired through effort? This must
have been a major topic of discussion also among the Wei elite. The
prevalent position in early xuanxue seems to be that sages are born, not
made. This relates directly to a cosmological understanding of the Daoist
world and particularly to the deciding role of qi in the nature and destiny
of human beings.
In a cosmological interpretation, the Dao informs all beings, provides
them with a "share" of its potent energy, to borrow a term from Guo
Xiang's commentary to the Zhuangzi, which accounts for their lifespan, ca-
pacity, and all other aspects of their being.95 Sages are exceptional beings,
whose (ji'-endowment is extraordinarily pure and abundant. Both Yan Zun
and Heshanggong share this view.96 For He Yan, this forms the basis of
his "extremely cogent" theory that sages are without emotions (qing flf)/
which attracted a substantial following during the Zhengshi period.97
Fondness, anger, sorrow, and joy—these are "impure" qi-agitations that
disturb the mind and render impossible the work of sagely government.
The sage, blessed with the finest and richest energy that arises from the
"One," is free from such (ji'-imperfections, which enables him to "pen-
etrate" all things, to leave no trace or track in his action, and to accomplish
all the wonders that the Laozi and other classics have intimated. The sage,
in other words, is utterly different from ordinary human beings. In He
Yan's view, this is a basic difference in gi-constitution, which amounts to
a difference in kind and not in degree.
The concept of qi also underlies the belief that it is possible to identify a
person's capacity by looking into his eyes. Jiang Ji's estimation of Zhong
Hui has been cited above. The Shishuo xinyu also relates that accord-
ing to Pei Kai §|f|| (237-291), looking at Zhong Hui is like viewing an
94. The Chinese text reads: " ^ S A ^ f f t l t t W Sanguo z/ii 15.468, biography of
Sima Lang W] HJ$, elder brother of Sima Yi. Sima Lang's own view will be introduced
shortly.
95. This is a recurrent theme in Guo Xiang's commentary; see, for example, Guo
Qingfan ?|SJg?f, Zhuangzi jishi jffi 1 !!!? (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985), 58nl5,115nl and
311-14nnl-6.
96. Heshanggong's commentary on Laozi ch. 1 reads, "The received energy may be
thick or thin. If the received energy is harmonious and rich, it gives birth to great men and
sages." Yan Zun's view of the sage has been mentioned earlier; see n.90 above.
97. Sanguo zhi 28.795nl; see n.17 above.
"armory"—"one only sees spears and lances."98 This kind of assessment

is predicated on the assumption that one's "inner" gi-constitution natu-
rally finds expression in one's appearance, bearings, speech, and action.
Zhong Hui accepts a cosmological reading of the Daoist world, agrees
with He Yan on the nature of the sage, and prides himself on his ability
to "know men" (zhiren). There is thus sufficient reason to believe that
he also considers "sagehood" to be a sage nature that is inborn and not
an accomplished goal that is attainable through learning and repeated
effort.
Wang Bi disagrees with He Yan on the nature of the sage. Sages are
not without emotions; they differ from ordinary human beings only in
their heightened "spiritual luminosity" (shenming).99 Human feelings and
emotions, after all, form a part of the order of ziran and as such must be
recognized; what is decisive is that the sage is not "bound" or "burdened"
(lei H ) by them. In this context, shenming does not refer to a brilliant and
subtle fji-formation but rather signifies complete self-realization and
spiritual enlightenment. This agrees well with Wang Bi's key philosophic
concern, for the idea that sages have a completely different inborn nature
would undermine the emphasis on naturalness and the call to return to
what is genuine in one's nature. This also implies that for Wang Bi, it is
possible to become a sage.
If Zhong Hui is of the view that sage nature is inborn and not achiev-
able through effort, why does he emphasize the practice of self-cultivation
to fortify the qi within and to eliminate emotions and desires (ch. 12, no. 4
and ch. 16, no 7)1 Indeed, Zhong Hui affirms that the "soul," if properly
managed and protected, can "last long" (ch. 10, no. 2). Does this show that
98. Shishuo xinyu 8.8; cf. Mather, Shih-shuo Hsin-yu, 212. A similar account is repeated
in Jin shu 35.1050. Pei Kai was the son of Pei Hui H$i! (fl. 227-249), a key figure in early
Wei intellectual history, whose discussion with Wang Bi provides important insight for
our understanding of Wang's philosophy; see Wagner, The Craft of a Chinese Commentator,
129-33. Zhong Hui's expertise in identifying talent and assessing a person's character is
also recognized. He later recommended Pei Kai to office based on his assessment that Pei
was "pure and penetrating" (qingtong^ j||); see Shishuo xinyu 8.5 and 8.6; cf. 1.17; Sanguo
zhi 23.674n2; Jin shu 35.1047. The idea that a person's "inner" being can be judged by the
"brightness" of his eyes has a long history—see, for example, Mencius, 4A15 and 7A21.
Mencius, too, seems to work with the assumption that human nature is fundamentally
constituted by qi; see esp. Mencius 2A2. A recent article on this issue is Alan K.L. Chan,
"A Matter of Taste: Qi and the Tending of the Heart (Xin) in Mencius 2A2," in Mencius:
Contexts and Interpretations, ed. Alan K.L. Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2002), 42-71. "Knowing men," of course, forms an important topic also in the Lun yu (e.g.,
2.10); when integrated with a qi theory, it yields fresh possibilities for an understanding of
nature and capacity, which bears directly on law, official appointment, and sociopolitical
order at large.
99. Sanguo zhi 28.795nl.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 147
he believes in the existence of "immortals" (xianftlj)and that it is possible

to attain immortality? In afu poem on the chrysanthemum (Juhuafu 3$
TE1S), Zhong Hui writes, "Thus, the chrysanthemum is of merit on five
scores . . . (if ingested) it flows within and renders the body light; it is the
food of immortals" ( r # £ ^ W £ H £ f • • • S K ^ M , WM^-til). Further,
in the same poem, Zhong rhapsodizes, "Those who ingest it would live
long, and those who consume it would find their spirit unobstructed"
( H ; i # : K £ , ^ ^ I f S W )• ZhongHui also wrote afu on grapes (Putaofu
M^} IS), in which he described the fruit as "having embodied the finest
c\i in nature."100
It is not clear whether Zhong Hui, like He Yan, found value in taking
certain drugs.101 Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that he accepts
the existence of immortals.102 Whether it is an immortal or a sage, the
same reasoning applies. Only a select few are endowed at birth with the
100. Yan Kejun, Quan Sanguo wen, 25.1188.

101. "He Yan once said, 'Whenever I take a five-mineral powder [wushi san E E
$!£], not only does it heal any illness I may have, but I am also aware of my spirit and
intelligence becoming receptive and lucid'." Shishuo xinyu 2.14; as translated in Mather,
Shih-shuo Hsin-yii, 36. The commentator Liu Jun adds, "Although the prescription . . .
originated during the Han period, its users were few . . . It was . . . He Yan who first
discovered its divine properties, and from his time on it enjoyed a wide currency in
the world." On the use of drugs by the literati during the Wei-Jin period, see the classic
study by Lu Xun ^ jfl, "Wei Jin fengdu ji wenzhang yu yao ji jiu zhi guanxi" MWM.&
& £ ^ § a § i R H ; £ . P ^ , in his Eryi ji M E H (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 1972), 77-93. This
work can also be found in vol. 3 of the Lu Xun quanji § - J H ^ ^ (Collected Works of Lu
Xun) (Beijing: Renmin wenxue, 1981).
102. The possibility of "deathlessness" (changsheng busi HÊ^FJE) is recognized in
the Heshanggong commentary (ch. 54). Proper Daoist cultivation can bring about "long
life and lasting presence" (changsheng jiushou MîXM), a state in which the iji-energy
has become exceedingly pure such that it would enable the man of Dao to "return to the
infinite" (ch. 28). However, the commentary does not recommend any active striving for
it, which would contravene the ideal of naturalness. Rather, "the myriad things ought to
follow their (allotted) time of life and death, and must not only want to live perpetually
for time without end" (ch. 10; translation adapted from William Boltz, "The Lao-tzu Text
that Wang Pi and He-shang Kung Never Saw," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies, 48 [1985], 493-501). The Xiang er commentary emphasizes repeatedly the ideal
of an extraordinary "longevity" enjoyed by "perfected beings" or "immortals" (xianshou
ftllSP) (e.g., chs. 6, 7,13, 30; see also chs. 16, 33) and argues that immortality can be at-
tained through effort (ch. 19). To be sure, there were scholars who denied the existence
of immortals during the Han and early Wei periods. Yang Xiong jfj WE (53 B.C.-A.D. 18), for
example, had already raised doubts about such claims, and Wang Cheng's H t (27-ca.
100) even more critical views were probably a source of influence for Wang Bi, to whom
immortality was not an issue. Perhaps this is a feature of the scholarship of the Jingzhou
"MW academy, to which Wang Bi's xuanxue learning has been traced. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears that the belief in the existence of immortals enjoyed widespread support. Yu Fan,
the noted Yijing scholar and author of a Laozi commentary, was openly critical of the claim
of immortals, for which he was exiled to the far south; see Sanguo zhi 57.1321.
necessary (ji-constitunon to develop into a sage or immortal. An ordinary

human being cannot learn to become a sage, who is a different kind of
being, but it is possible to nourish and purify one's gi-endowment by
means of certain substances and practices. In other words, although com-
plete "transcendence" may be beyond reach, one can remove obstacles
to personal fulfillment, prevent corruption of one's nature, ensure that
one's capacity is developed to the fullest, and perhaps even "improve"
one's capacity to some degree. In this regard, Zhong Hui seems to align
himself with the view of Xi Kang.103
Although sagehood cannot be achieved through effort, self-cultivation
thus remains important. Although only a sage can realize the reign of
great peace, it does not follow that disorder should be allowed to wreak
havoc in the world. According to Sima Lang (d. 217), contrary to what
Zhong You has argued, it is possible to attain great peace even without
the intervention of sages. What is crucial is that we learn from the ancient
sages. If able and worthy individuals such as Yi Yin ffi'p of the Shang
dynasty and Yan Yuan H ^ , the exemplary disciple of Confucius, were
entrusted with governing the country, and if their policies were to con-
tinue for several generations, then great peace might be realized.104
This view seems to suggest that the difference between a sage, espe-
cially in the person of Confucius, and "worthies" (xian If), such as Yan
Yuan, is a matter of degree. However, if one believes that the sage is of a
special breed, absolutely pure and without emotions or cognitive-affective
(jf-disturbances, it would not make much sense to say that even those who
are not sages could realize the reign of great peace. The uniqueness of
the sage would then be inconsequential. Zhong Hui believes that sages
are gifted with an extraordinary qf-constitution, and, given that his father
had argued that only sages could bring about lasting peace, it may be
103. Xi Kang is explicit in saying that immortals embody thefinestqi-energy and in his
emphasis on self-cultivation. See Horiike Nobuo W<ftLis%:, Han Gi shisoshi kenkyu SHHiS
fikW^. (Tokyo: Meiji, 1988), 503-24; Xu Kangsheng, et al., Wei Jin xuanxueshi, 194-233;
Robert Henricks, trans., Philosophy and Argumentation in Third-Century China: The Essays
ofHsi K'ang (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), especially 21-70; and Donald
Holzman, La Vie et la Pensee de Hi Kang (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1957), ch. 3. Perhaps this is one
reason why Zhong Hui wanted to befriend Xi Kang and to show him his work on caixing.
In any case, it should not be assumed that because Zhong Hui opposed Xi Kang politically,
the two therefore must have held rival philosophical views; see, for example, Ogami,
"Sho Kai ron," 24. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that Zhong Hui considered
Xi Kang to be a political foe during the Zhengshi period, or even during the Jiaping §J
^P reign (249-254) that immediately followed, despite the fact that Xi Kang had refused
his friendly overtures.
104. Sanguo zhi 15.468, biography of Sima Lang. Siding with Zhong You in arguing that
only a true sage like Confucius could realize great peace was Wang Can. See also Sanguo
zhi, 468nl, for Sun Shengfs J£§| attempt to resolve the debate in the fourth century.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 149
concluded that Zhong Hui also regarded taiping to be an ideal realizable

only by true sages.
Furthermore, the view of Sima Lang suggests that we can learn from
the sages and worthies. This signals a Confucian approach to government
and education. Benevolent government requires men of integrity and
talent to serve the public good. Education is necessary to transmit the
teaching of the sages and to lay a strong moral foundation. Bearing in
mind Mencius' dictum that a sage would not kill an innocent person to
win the empire (Mencius 2A2), care and compassion are required in the
administration of justice. Step by step, with rulers and ministers serv-
ing as examples, the transformative power of Confucian virtues would
instill benevolence and propriety in the hearts of the people or at least
render them willing and obedient subjects. In this way, lasting order and
peace may be secured. The Sanguo zhi offers that Sima Lang governed
with generosity and beneficence; "he did not rely on the whip and the
cane, but the people did not violate any prohibitions."105 Zhong You,
on the other hand, we recall, is known especially for his ability to bring
the guilty to justice and for his proposal to bring back certain forms of
corporal punishment.
No doubt, both camps considered Confucius to be the ideal sage. But
whereas to some, Confucius was a great sagely teacher, to others he em-
bodied the best of heaven and earth. It would be impossible to be like
Confucius in every respect, according to the latter view; the assertion that
taiping could be realized by able and worthy men would undermine the
supramundane status of Confucius, who was such an exalted figure as
to exclude the possibility of someone else matching his attainment. The
sage is fundamentally different from "mere" mortals, and the sage alone
can realize lasting peace. This implies a certain distrust of the nature and
capacity of the people, who are driven by desires. It is important thus to
curb one's desires and to maintain tranquility. But this, too, can only be
achieved by a few. For the majority, laws and models (fa) seem neces-
sary. They serve as the "outer" instruments that would complement the
attempt to embrace "emptiness" within.
The concept of fa should not be taken narrowly, for it is not limited to
criminal justice. The concern with "punishment and names" (xingming
ffl ^S) extends beyond penal law and addresses the larger question of the
relationship between "names" and "actuality." In other words, although
xing (punishment) is important, it may be understood in terms of the
broader concept of xing ffc (form) in this context, as the two words are
often used interchangeably in early Chinese writings. What is at issue is
105. Sanguo zhi 15.467.
thus not only punishment in the narrow sense but proper rulership and
sociopolitical order at large. The principles of government must be clearly
delineated for the rule of law to apply. In particular, the various duties
and functions of the officials must be carefully defined, so that what is
entailed in the title of an office will be matched in actuality, and the per-
formance of the officials can be measured. This emerged as a key issue
from the second half of the Later Han dynasty. Wang Su 3E i t (195-256),
for example, had emphasized its importance in government, although
he disagreed with Zhong You on the place of law in political practice.106
Once forms and names coincide, names and reputation would not be
lacking in "substance," official positions and duties would be occupied
and performed by the right persons, laws and punishment would be
appropriate, and in all aspects the "inner" and the "outer" would attain
their proper balance.
The Jingfa #f $ j , one of the silk manuscripts discovered at Mawangdui,
begins with an account of the origin of law:
The Dao produces law. Law is what draws the line between gain and
loss, and makes clear the curved and the straight. He who grasps the
Dao, therefore, produces law and does not venture to transgress it,
establishes law and does not venture to oppose it.107
Zhong Hui's major writings, entitled Dao lun Mm, are said to belong to
the school of "punishment and names." If the centrality of fa in Zhong
Hui's Laozi learning is recognized, this seems a fitting description of his
reformulation of Daoist philosophy.
The Debate on Capacity and Nature

The evidence at our disposal does not allow a complete reconstruction
of Zhong Hui's Laozi learning and xuanxue philosophy. Nevertheless,
a consistent approach seems to emerge from the surviving fragments
of Zhong Hui's commentary. Guided by a hermeneutic that equates
the emptiness of the Dao with the fullness of qi, Zhong Hui focuses on
"actuality." "Names" are important, but they must match the underlying
reality that defines them. This does not invalidate the general assertion
106. Reforming the official appointment system was then seen as an urgent political
corrective. Wang Su, in one of his memorials to the throne, recommended that offices that
did not have real functions be eliminated. All officials must have their assigned duties
and these duties must be properly discharged. Wang Su was the son of Wang Lang (n. 7
above). See Sanguo zhi 13.415-18.
107. As translated in Robin D. S. Yates, Five Lost Classics: Too, Huang-Lao, and Yin-Yang
in Han China (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997), 51; see also Yates' discussion of this
work and the concept of xingming (forms and names), 21-25.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 151
that names and actuality converge in the ideal order of the Dao. Rather,
it is precisely in view of the structure of the Daoist cosmos that Zhong
Hui makes sense of the relationship between them. From a cosmological
perspective, the Laozi cannot be saying that wu signifies absolute "non-
being" and consequently that names have an independent logic that
"determines" forms. From the same perspective, wu and you are shown
to be interdependent and correspond with the inner and the outer, which
in a world constituted by qi form a seamless whole. In formulating a blue-
print for order, whereas Wang Bi is hermeneutically compelled to draw
out the implications of nonbeing, Zhong Hui thus gives priority to both
(jf-cultivation and law. The vital energy informs all beings and determines
their fundamental nature. Viewed from the perspective of the individual,
although sagehood is essentially inborn and cannot be attained through
effort, self-cultivation directed at nourishing and purifying one's qi-
energy can enhance significantly one's physical and spiritual being.
The pristine order of the Dao is characterized by intrinsic laws and
standards, which ensure the smooth functioning of the cosmos and
the integrity of sociopolitical institutions. Fa in this sense should be dis-
tinguished from the "laws and decrees" that men of desire engineer to
further their own ambitions (ch. 19, no. 9). Order would flourish in this
ideal world, and remedial action would be superfluous. In a world where
the Dao has declined, only a true sage can realize genuine order and
peace. In the absence of a sage-ruler, there is a need to discern "forms and
names," so that standards will be maintained, the hierarchical structure
of society will be intact, laws will be just, and punishment appropriate.
In the context of early Wei politics, the system of official appointment
would have been of particular concern to those who sought to reestablish
the rule of the Dao. Zhong Hui is said to have been particularly good
at analyzing "names and principles" (mingli & 31). Judging from Zhong
Hui's Laozi commentary and in the light of Zhong You's stance on law
and the role of the sage in bringing about great peace, mingli did not fa-
vor "names" over "actuality" but rather served to ensure that the former
did not deviate from the latter, and as a result that "forms and names"
attained proper measure in government and the world at large.108
108. Sanguo zhi 28.784; also see Shishuo xinyu 2.12, commentary. Wang Bi's biography
relates that Zhong Hui was very good at analyzing different views in disputation, although
he had to acknowledge Wang Bi's superior philosophical reach; see Sanguo zhi 28.795nl.
According to the Wenxin diaolong, "When the Wei housefirstcame into power, intellectual
attention centered on both names (ming) and law {fa). Fu Jia and Wang Can analyzed and
refined 'names and principles' (mingli). Then, during the Zhengshi reign... with He Yan
and his followers, the discourse on 'mystery' (xuan) began toflourish."Wenxin diaolong
zhuding, ed. Zhang Lizhai, 18.183 ("Lun shuo" St aft); cf. Vincent Shih, The Literary Mind
and the Carving of Dragons, 201. Zhong Hui's expertise in mingli should be assessed in this
In this context, the debate on capacity and nature maybe understood.

Zhong Hui is particularly noted for his contribution to this debate, the
fullest account of which is found in the commentary to the Shishuo xinyu.
Having reported that "Zhong Hui discussed the identity and difference
of capacity and nature" and that his views were "circulated" among the
elite, the commentator Liu Jun adds, "The four fundamental views (siben)
refer to the views that capacity and nature are the same (tong (o[); that
they are different (yi H); that they coincide (he n"); and that they diverge
from each other (li $|)."
Fu Jia was the leading figure in this debate and apparently initiated it
by arguing for the first view.109 Li Feng, who was director of the Central
Secretariat before he was killed in 254 and whom Fu Jia spoke of unflat-
teringly as pretentious and false (shiwei ffpfe), countered that capacity
and nature are "different."110 Zhong Hui and Wang Guang, both junior
officers when they first put forward their views, complete the team by
arguing for the last two positions, respectively. Zhong Hui's treatise,
however, was no longer available by the time Liu Jun wrote his com-
mentary to the Shishuo xinyu in the early sixth century.111
context. Wang Can and Zhong You both maintained that only sages are capable of real-
izing great peace (see n.104 above). Zhong Hui, as we will see presently, developed Fu
Jia's position in the debate on capacity and nature. The Wenxin dtaolong here (18.185)
also praises Fu Jia's discussion on caixing. Wang Fu had earlier observed in his Qianfu
lun (2.7, "Kao ji" #83), "What is of names and principles (mingli) must be verified in
reality. Then indeed no office would abandon its duty, and no position would be filled
by the wrong person"; Qianfu lun jian jiaozheng, 65. Those who were attracted to Wang
Bi's version of xuanxue understandably would find Zhong Hui lacking in his approach
to the mysterious Dao. However, as suggested earlier, this is a value judgment that we
need not make in this discussion. The argument here is simply that Zhong Hui's ap-
proach is consistent and that it represents a major current in early xuanxue philosophy.
109. It may be worth noting that Fu Jia began his political career under Chen Qun; see
Sanguo zhi 21.622. During the Zhengshi reign, Fu Jia incurred the wrath of He Yan and
was removed from office. However, Sima Yi took him into his staff; cf. n.27 above. The Jin
shu 39.1150 reports that Xun Yi 10 gjf played a role in Fu Jia's rescue.
110. Fu Jia's criticism of Li Feng is recorded in Sanguo zhi 21.628n4, which also mentions
that Fu Jia was on good terms with Zhong Yu. During the Zhengshi reign, Li Feng tried
to stay clear of the conflict between Cao Shuang and Sima Yi. In the second month of 254,
his plan to unseat Sima Shi was uncovered; see Sanguo zhi 9.299 and 301n3.
111. Shishuo xinyu 4.5; cf. Mather, Shih-shuo Hsin-yii, 94-95. See also 19.9, commentary,
which mentions Wang Guang's participation in the debate. Wang Guang was the son of
Wang Ling 3Egl, who plotted to enthrone another member of the Cao clan and thus to
establish a rival regime against the Sima government after 249. Wang Ling committed
suicide in the fifth month of 251, and Wang Guang was killed shortly after. Wang Guang,
whom Jiang Ji had praised highly, died in his forties; see Sanguo zhi 28.757-61 and 4.124.
I have examined the caixing debate more closely in a separate article, "What are the Four
Roots of Capacity and Nature?" which will appear in a memorial volumeforJulia Ching
edited by Vincent Shen. Here, I focus on the main argument, leaving aside the historical
ALAN K.L. CHAN 153
In an influential study, Chen Yinque Pit JS t§ argues that politics draws

the dividing line in this debate.112 Whereas Fu Jia and Zhong Hui (i.e.,
before his attempted revolt) sided with the Sima regime, both Li Feng and
Wang Guang were struck down by it. This is an important observation,
although it has been pointed out that Zhong Hui was associated closely
with the Cao faction during the early years of the Zhengshi era. Indeed,
it is also unclear whether Wang Guang had opposed Sima Yi.113 While
noting the possible political divide, my main concern is philosophical.
What does it mean to say that capacity and nature are identical or the
same? In what sense can they be said to "coincide"? The "inner-outer"
relation, the nature of the sage, and the concept of qi discussed earlier
should enable a tentative reconstruction of these positions.
The first position, that capacity and nature are the same, seems
relatively straightforward in the light of the concept of ^"-energy. Since
the Han dynasty, if not earlier, the concept of "nature" {xing) has been
understood generally as what is inborn (sheng £.). He Yan, for example,
affirms in his commentary to the Lun yu (5.12) that "nature is what human
beings receive (at birth from heaven), which enables them to exist (ft #
A££/f^J^:3i#'til)-'' 1 1 4 This is a general definition; it does not specify
the content of xing. One possibility is that what is inborn can be under-
stood in terms of one's innate "capacity" (cai), which encompasses one's
physical, intellectual, moral, psychological, and spiritual endowments.
It is generally agreed that the Mencius, for example, uses cai in this sense
(Mencius 6A6); in Zhu Xi's commentary, following a longstanding view,
cai is defined as "material or substance" (caizhi £f ff): "If a person has
such a xing, then he will have such a cai."115
details and the issues relating to appointment of officials and the perceived concentration
of power at the Personnel Secretariat (libu J£UP).
112. Chen Yinque, "Shu Shishuo xinyu wenxuelei Zhong Hui zhuan Siben lun shibi tiao
hou" ffiittlftf? mJtmmmtmVSlfmtthmmk, in Chen Yinque xiansheng lunwen ji W.
H t S f t ^ f t X I l , vol. 2 (Taipei: Sanrenxing, 1974),601-7.
113. When Wang Ling told Wang Guang about his plan, the latter reportedly advised
his father against it, citing the shortcomings of Cao Shuang and He Yan. Thus, according
to Wang Guang, Sima Yi enjoyed widespread support for his action. Moreover, the Sima
administration was able to appoint able and worthy individuals to office and had control
of the military. For these reasons, it would be ill advised to oppose the Sima clan. See
Sanguo zhi 28.759nl, citing the Han Jin chunqiu $| !F#$C; Pei Songzhi, however, doubted
the veracity of this report.
114. He Yan, Lun yujijie jUgftfl?, Shisan jing zhushu edition (Taipei: Shijie, 1963), 45.
Compare Guo Xiang's well-known statement, "The nature that each person receives from
heaven has its own proper allotment. One cannot escape from it; nor can one add to it."
See Zhuangzi jishi, ch. 3,128n4.
115. Zhu XL Mengzijizhu jg-p SaQi, Sibu beiyao edition (Taipei: Zhonghua, 1973), 6.4ab.
D.C. Lau translates cai as "native endowment"; see Lau, Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese
In Fu Jia's account, then, both capacity and nature are determined by

qi-endowment. Whereas nature is the inner substance, cai reaches out-
ward and translates into ability (neng #&) as well as moral conduct. This
view finds eloquent support in the "Treatise on Capacity and Nature"
(Caixinglun ^"14Ira) by another third-century scholar, Yuan Zhun 3 t ¥ ,116
All beings that exist in heaven and earth, according to Yuan, can be either
excellent or of a bad quality. Whereas the former is endowed with a "pure
qi" (qingqi ?jf la), the latter is constituted by a "turbid qi" (zhuoqi )f)|l). It
is like a piece of wood, Yuan adds: whether it is crooked or straight is a
matter of nature, on the basis of which it has a certain capacity that can
be made to serve particular ends. The same is true for human beings,
who may be "worthy" (xian If) or "unworthy" (buxiao ^ N) by nature.
Whereas xing describes the "substance" (zhi 1H) of a thing, cai describes
its "function" {yongffl).117 To argue that nature and capacity are the same
or identical, Fu Jia cannot but maintain also that sageness is inborn. The
same reasoning dictates that the richness or poverty of one's <jf-allotment,
in terms of which one's natural capacity may be measured, cannot but
show itself, especially through the "brightness" of one's eyes. During the
Jin dynasty, Ruan Yu $x$i (fl. 330) finds Fu Jia's view to be the strongest
of the four.118
Li Feng proposes that capacity and nature are different. According
to Wang Xiaoyi, xing should be understood as virtuous conduct in this
context, such that the distinction is between moral character, on the one
University Press, 1984), 229. Compare W.A.C.H. Dobson, Mencius (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1963), 113 ("natural endowment"), and James Legge, The Works ofMencius
(New York: Dover Publications, 1970), 402 ("natural powers"). Kwong-loi Shun explains,
"That is, ts'ai [cai] is an endowment that enables one to attain certain accomplishments";
see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997),
219. The word "cai" is defined in the Shuowen as "plants and trees at their first stage of
growth"; Shuowen jiezi zhu, 272.
116. Yuan Zhun, a friend of Xi Kang, was the son of Yuan Huan j!|$<;, who served
under Cao Cao; see Sanguo zhi 11.335-36nl.
117. Yuan's remarks on caixingare preserved in the Yiwen leiju H^CSI/S?, 21, and col-
lected by Yan Kejun in Quan Jin wen j^WSt (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1995), 54.1769. The concern
with capacity and nature also figures prominently in the third-century work, Renwu zhi A
tyOTt-, by Liu Shao gljffl); translated by John Shryock as The Study of Human Abilities (New
Haven: American Oriental Society, 1937). Besides the study by Chen Yinque and those
mentioned in nn.28-29 above, see especially Okamura Shigeru fsjfJSS, "Sai sei shihon
ron no seikaku to seiritsu" s$~%ii\!3^$-mcD%5i$kt.$tiL, Nagoya daigaku bungakubu kenkyu
ronshu £ S M A I p X ^ g W ^ i i i ^ 28, Bungaku £lji 10 (1962), 29-42, which examines
the views of Tang Changru and Aoki Masaru WÎE5S on this debate. See also Horiike
Nobuo, Kan Gi shisoshi kenkyu, 432-34.
118. Jin shu 49.1368, biography of Ruan Yu; see also Nan shi j^fife 75.1875, biography of
Gu Huan, for Gu's assessment of the debate toward the end of thefifthcentury.
ALAN K.L. CHAN 155
hand, and the ability to govern on the other.119 This is possible, and at-
tractive in the light of Cao Cao's famous edicts that individuals who lack
moral accomplishment but demonstrate leadership abilities should not be
left out of office.120 Nevertheless, if Li Feng is simply arguing from defini-
tion, the assertion that capacity and nature are different seems arbitrary,
if not trivial—apples are different from oranges, and that is that. If the
argument is that those who are morally accomplished cannot be strong
political leaders, it would imply that cai is by definition detrimental to
morality. This seems unlikely, for few would dispute that "kingliness
without," as the Zhuangzi (chapter 33) phrases it, stems from a deeper
"sageliness within," although what is inner need not be equated with
what is inborn. More likely, Li Feng is saying that Fu Jia had misconstrued
the relationship between capacity and nature, because whereas xing may
be inborn, cai is shaped by learning. In other words, Li Feng is not say-
ing that xing should be defined exclusively in moral terms; rather, he is
primarily concerned with the implied neglect of learning and effort in
Fu Jia's position.
To argue that nature and capacity are different is to suggest that any
accomplishment, moral or political, is ultimately dependent on effort. Fu
Jia is evidently committed to affirming that a person may be born good
or bad, strong or weak, bright or dull, depending on his or her ^'-endow-
ment. Li Feng's counterview, however, seems to proceed on the premise
that nature is "neutral" or unmarked, morally and in all other respects.
What is endowed at birth is simply the biological apparatus or faculties
to grow, to learn, and to interact with the external environment, but the
person one becomes is a matter of learning and putting into practice the
teachings of the sages. Yu Huan JUM-, the noted third-century historian
and author of the Wei liie S1P!§, provides a helpful analogy to explain the
point: the effect of learning on a person is like adding color to a piece of
plain silk (su ^ ) ; thus, even Confucius would not consider himself to
have been "born with knowledge" (Lun yu 7.20).121 This should align with
the view that sagehood can be achieved through effort and that sages are
not necessary to realizing great peace, given the perceived transforma-
tive power of learning. If Li Feng had offered a substantive critique of
the identity of caixing, as opposed to an argument from definition, then
Zhong Hui's position may be seen as an attempt to mediate between
these two extremes.
119. Wang Xiaoyi, Zhongguo wenhua de qingliu, 98. This represents the prevalent inter-
pretation of the caixing debate. The issue, it seems to me, is not definition but rather the
"root" or source of caixing.
120. For example, see Sanguo zhi 1.32,44,49nl.
121. As cited in Sanguo zhi 13.422n3.
Given Zhong Hui's understanding of qi and the nature of the sage, it

is not surprising that he sided principally with Fu Jia in this debate. Yet,
the "identity" thesis seems to assume that what is endowed is both neces-
sary and sufficient. Although native endowment is necessary for realized
capacity, Zhong Hui seems to be saying, it is not sufficient. Thus, when
capacity is said to "coincide" with nature, Zhong Hui is in effect propos-
ing that what is endowed is potential, which must be carefully nurtured
and brought to completion. For immortals and sages, who are different
in kind because of their exceptional qi-endowment, what is inner in the
sense of innate capacity naturally manifests itself completely in extra-
ordinary achievements. For ordinary human beings, however, nature
does not amount to actual ability but only furnishes certain dispositions
or directions of development. To be sure, if the native endowment is of an
extremely poor quality, there is not much that can be done. Nevertheless,
the real challenge to the identity thesis is that an excellent endowment
may go to waste because the person succumbs to desire and does not
learn. The inner provides the capital, but it requires external control to
maintain its value, to generate profit, and to bring the investment to a
successful close. This affirms also the need to "eliminate emotions and
worries to reach the ultimate of emptiness" (ch. 16, no. 7) and to rely on
fa to ensure accomplished virtue and order.
If Li Feng's view can be seen as a direct critique of Fu Jia's position,
then Zhong Hui is offering a modified identity thesis that takes into ac-
count the place of learning and effort. Although having the "right stuff,"
as it were, is not sufficient, one must have some material to begin with in
order to achieve the desired result. Thus, it cannot be said that the latter
has nothing to do with the former. In this context, Wang Guang adds a
fourth view, which is stronger than Li Feng's and appears to be directed
especially against Zhong Hui's position. Inborn nature does not provide
the necessary fertile ground for cultivation; rather, it needs to be rectified
by learning. Human beings are naturally driven by desire and therefore
must rely on rituals and instruction to become responsible individuals.
In this sense, capacity and nature do not "coincide" but "diverge" from
each other.122
122. Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 402-3, suggests that it was Li Feng who started
the debate on caixing, followed in turn by Fu Jia, Wang Guang, and finally Zhong Hui.
Given the lack of historical evidence and on logical grounds, I see little reason not to accept
the sequence as reported in the commentary to the Shishuo xinyu. Wang Guangfs father,
Wang Ling, incidentally, was a friend of Sima Lang from his youth; see Sanguo zhi 28.758.
Another figure that deserves attention is Lu Yu SM.M (d. 257), who was appointed libu
shangshu |£ §|3 in] Q (Director of the Personnel Secretariat) in charge of civil appointments
in 236. He was replaced by He Yan in that key post at the start of the Zhengshi reign; see
Sanguo zhi 22.652, biography of Lu Yu. The Sanguo zhi elsewhere relates that He Yan and
ALAN K.L. CHAN 157
At the political level, the debate on capacity and nature joins with the
issue of names and actuality, especially as it relates to official appoint-
ments. Finding the right people to serve in public office is always difficult,
but what made the situation worse was the monopoly of official positions
by the elite. If capacity and nature were identical, individuals with inborn
ability and moral qualities, which could be readily identified by the expert,
should be appointed. This, of course, tended to favor the elite, who sup-
plied both the judges of character and the candidates for appointment.
Bright prospects from distinguished families like Zhong Hui and Wang
Bi would have been identified from their youth as promising "material"
and accorded a "reputation" for moral integrity or intellectual talent, or
both. If nature and capacity were different or divergent, in place of lineage
and reputation, effort and performance would be the deciding factors.
This would tend to widen the pool of talents for official appointment.
From this perspective, Zhong Hui was perhaps also applying a "centrist"
position, in introducing reforms to the system of official appointment
without sacrificing the interests of the elite.
The debate on caixing demonstrates the richness and complexity of
xuanxue. The debate may have had particular political relevance, but it
presupposes an understanding of the origin and structure of the cosmos,
the role of self-cultivation, the rule of law, the nature of the sage, and
other issues central to Wei-Jin thought. The Siben lun probes the "roots"
his circle of friends had long thought ill of Lu and, when they came into power, tried to
remove him from office (9.284, biography of Cao Shuang). Like Sima Lang, Lu argued
for leniency as a guiding principle in the application of punishment. In the assessment of
individuals and appointment of officials, Lu "first considered their moral integrity (xing-
xing ttfT) before addressing their ability (cai)." When Li Feng, who was then junior to
Lu, asked him why, Lu replied, "Cai is what enables one to do good. Thus, (a person of)
great capacity (should) achieve great goodness, whereas (one of) small capacity achieves
goodness to a small degree. Now, if someone is said to be capable and yet he cannot do
good, this means that (his) capacity does not fit its proper use (^t"P/fJi(.^#'t!l,ift^:^"f3E^C
# , 'bXtfl'bg. ^fiS^W^ffiPFtS&g, m^^f^^-m- U Feng and others conceded
that his argument was sound." Sanguo zhi 22.650-52. This is a difficult passage—whereas
Wang Xiaoyi, Zhongguo wenhua de qingliu, 98, takes it as indicative of Li Feng's position,
Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 409, suggests that it is closer to Fu Jia's identity thesis.
Neither provides explicit justification. My view is that, for Lu Yu, cai is decisive and encom-
passes both moral integrity and ability. In one sense, cai simply refers to a person's ability
to produce results. If cai is divorced from moral integrity, it can do great harm to society.
Thus, priority is given to moral effort, which serves to establish the proper meaning of cai.
However, Lu's argument does not necessarily entail that cai is inborn. The greatest capacity
by definition should yield the greatest good; but it is conceivable that cai could result from
learning. The important point is to ensure that reputation is matched by performance, as Lu
emphasizes in response to an edict by Emperor Ming (Sanguo zhi, ibid.). If Lu is saying that
performance, be it political or moral, requires effort and training, he may have influenced
Li Feng in developing the view that nature and capacity are different.
of capacity and nature. The four views engage one another in coming to
terms with the basis of goodness and other forms of excellence. Once we
realize that the identity and difference of mixing represent two competing
but equally coherent philosophical positions, the other two views readily
fall into place. The debate on human nature forms a part of the received
tradition in third-century China, and certainly traces of Mencius, Gaozi
cf-p, Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu Ml^fF, and Wang Chong can be detected
in the discourse on caixing, but it needs to be reinterpreted in the light
of the higher truth of the mysterious Dao. Wang Bi, for example, insists
that nature as what is genuine cannot be said to be either good or bad,
which are distinctions that do not apply to the transcendental oneness
of Dao.123 Zhong Hui's view on caixing is consistent with his interpreta-
tion of the Laozi, which should be recognized as a major contribution to
xuanxue philosophy. Had he not attempted to topple the Sima regime, or
more precisely had he not failed in that attempt, given the importance
of the Siben lun, no doubt it would have been preserved and given the
attention that it justly deserves.
Facing the same uncertainties in a deeply unsettling post-Han world,
Wei intellectuals cannot but be preoccupied with similar concerns.
Standing under the same tradition and within a relatively small and
homogeneous social network, they naturally share a similar vocabulary.
However, this does not mean that they all adopt the same view. Equally
motivated by the need to reassert the unified teachings of the classics and
the recognition that the Laozi harbors profound insight into the mystery
of the Dao, Zhong Hui, Wang Bi, and their contemporaries display con-
siderable philosophical dexterity and critical independence in arriving
at different interpretations of wu and the order of ziran. Though equally
eager to prescribe a cure for the rampant disorder that threatened to
tear their world asunder, under different assumptions and exercising
different hermeneutical prerogatives, they found reason to disagree on
the relationship between capacity and nature and to support contrasting
positions in other key debates.124 The paucity of records and the fact that
123. Wang Bi makes this point in his commentary to the Lun yu (17.2); see Lou Yulie,
Wang Bijijiaoshi, 631-32. Xing as such cannot be said to be "rectified" or "correct" (zheng IE),
according to Wang Bi, but it is that which makes possible moral rectitude and correctness.
Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 375, argues that Zhong Hui also shares this view, citing
Zheng's commentary to Laozi ch. 16 as evidence; but it appears that he did not have access
to all the surviving quotations from Zheng's work which as a whole testify to a view of
human nature in the sense of dispositions as being determined by one's qi-endowment.
Again, although one may be born with fine qualities, whether they develop into anything
of worth depends on effort. The centrality of fa reflects the concern that except for sages,
nature requires judicious management to reach its proper end.
124. Another influential debate that marks the development of xuanxue is that on the
ALAN K.L. CHAN 159
different arguments often employ the same terminology render a study

of xuanxue frustratingly difficult. Although some conjecture cannot be
avoided, especially in arguing from historical sources and the possible
influence of "family learning," it is important to try to reconstruct the
reasoning and assumptions that underlie the various points of view. In
this regard, although this essay is limited to Zhong Hui, the issues iden-
tified and analyzed here may be of use to a larger study of xuanxue and
the world of thought in Wei-Jin China.
relationship between words (yan U) and meaning (yi Jf). According to the early Jin
scholar Ouyang Jian g£ $% gt, both Zhong Hui and Fu Jia made use of the view that "words
do not exhaust meaning" (yan bujin yi Wi^WiM) to support their arguments on caixing.
As quoted in Yiwen leiju,19, and collected in Yan Kejun, Quan Jin wen 109.2084; see Tang
Yongtong, "Yanyi zhi bian" If M £- 8¥, in his Wei Jin xuanxue lungao, 215. As far as Zhong
Hui is concerned, it is possible that, like his approach to caixing, he also considered words
to be necessary but not sufficient for full disclosure of meaning. However, recall that one
of Zhong Hui's treatises on the Yijing is entitled the Zhou Yijinshen lun, which seems to
suggest that the Yijing can bring out fully the meaning of spirituality and the Dao. This
would be closer to the idea that in principle the inner flows directly into the outer. Per-
haps a distinction could be made between "words" and the linear symbols of the Yijing.
Whereas the former are not only cognitive but alsotiedto emotions, which would render
them imperfect instruments for the expression of the highest truth, the latter are free from
affective distortions. Wang Baoxuan, Zhengshi xuanxue, 349, makes the novel point that
Zhong Hui followed his father's view in regarding calligraphy as the ideal vehicle that
alone could "exhaust" meaning. There is no further record of Zheng's involvement in
the yanyi debate. Wang Bi's position, as is well known, is that "words" must be "forgot-
ten" before "meaning" can be understood. See A. Chan, Two Visions of the Way, 32-34;
and Wagner, Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy in China, ch. 1. On the idea that
the classics embody a unified truth, see also Michael Nylan, "A Problematic Model: The
Han 'Orthodox Synthesis', Then and Now," in Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian
Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics, ed. Kai-Wing Chow, On-Cho Ng, and John B. Hender-
son (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 20. Referring to Han shu 88.3598,
Nylan brings out that "the business of Ju [Ru] is to lun t'ungyi [lun tongyi !§ |n] f|] ('discuss
similarities and differences'), so that all lines of thought may be traced to their common
source" (39nl9). Wei-Jin philosophical debates seem to have been motivated by a similar
concern, which, given the evident political interest, perhaps should be distinguished from
the kind of logical inquiry into the semantics of "identity and difference" characteristic of
the "School of Names" (mingjia &M)'m early Chinese philosophy.

Zhong Huis Laozi Commentary and The Debate On Capacity and Nature in Thirdcentury China

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ZHONG HUTS LAOZI COMMENTARY AND

THE DEBATE ON CAPACITY AND NATURE IN

Alan K.L. Chan

Early China 28, 2003

In discussions of Wei-Jin thought, Zhong Hui often appears as a mar-

develop his father's (Chen Ji Pj||2) view on criminal punishment. At

which did much to bring the numerological and divinatory interpretation

Zhong Hui's Laozi zhu

noting that whereas Han commentaries in general often provide help

which dates to around 200, presents a religious Daoist interpretation of

Zai is an exclamation particle. To manage and protect is what is

According to Zhong Hui, the Laozi speaks of carriages, vessels, and

st. <!*ijffi*if§, J t ^ t n u . mmm&m, mmrn^m, -mm.

use internally, it is on account of the benefit that objects bring that it

On the word yi Jl| in chapter 14, Zhong Hui, according to Lu Deming,

Chapter 16 of the Laozi begins, "Attain utmost emptiness; maintain com-

Chapter 18 of the Laozi challenges the Confucian conception of filial piety

The critique of Confucianism is carried further in chapter 19, where

10) Laozi, ch. 21 (Lu Deming, Laozi yinyi)

11) Laozi, ch. 22

In chapter 22, the Laozi makes use of an ancient expression—"bent, then

12) Laozi, ch. 23

13) Laozi, ch. 25

14) Laozi, ch. 25

nothing") or being alone (Lau translates: "stands alone"). Zhong Hui's

15) Laozi, ch. 25

16) Laozi, ch. 25

63. ]iaoHong,Laoziyi^:IfM,Congshujichengchubian^i,^^fiS.yjS edition (Shang-

17) Laozi, cb. 27

18) Laozi, ch. 28

19) Laozi, ch. 36

20) Laozi, ch. 38

21) Laozi, ch. 39

22) Laozi, ch. 41

23) Laozi, ch. 42

24) Laozi, ch. 65

Zhong Hui's Approach to the Laozi

cording to Zhong Hui, as if it were something "extinguished" or "leveled,"

a "cosmological" interpretation of the Laozi that is more characteristic of

The Structure of the Daoist World:

77. Heshanggong shares this basic interpretation, although he provides specific

What we do find points instead to a basic assumption that there is an

You (Something) and Wu (Nothing)

debates and encompasses a range of philosophical positions. Changes

In Zhong Hui's commentary, however, you-ivu is subsumed under

dependence of you and wu represents an intrinsic "law" or principle in

Restoring Order: Qi and Self-Cultivation

The compound yingpo is explained as "the dwelling place where man

be discounted completely, Wang Bi's interpretation is consistent with his

Ethical and Political Implications

Bi repeatedly emphasizes, is that the Legalist insistence on punishment

89. In Heshanggongfs interpretation, shangde should be rendered the "highest virtue,"

Sages and Laws

"armory"—"one only sees spears and lances."98 This kind of assessment

he believes in the existence of "immortals" (xianftlj)and that it is possible

100. Yan Kejun, Quan Sanguo wen, 25.1188.

necessary (ji-constitunon to develop into a sage or immortal. An ordinary

concluded that Zhong Hui also regarded taiping to be an ideal realizable

105. Sanguo zhi 15.467.

The Debate on Capacity and Nature

In this context, the debate on capacity and nature maybe understood.

In an influential study, Chen Yinque Pit JS t§ argues that politics draws

In Fu Jia's account, then, both capacity and nature are determined by

st. <!ijffiif§, J t ^ t n u . mmm&m, mmrn^m, -mm.