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Opposition Relations Between Prophecies (Preprint)

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DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32584.14081

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 Opposition Relations Between Prophecies
(Preprint)?

José David Garcı́a Cruz1[0000−0001−8331−0589] and Yessica Espinoza Ramos2

1
Institute of Philosophy, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Santiago de Chile,
Chile
jdgarcia2@uc.cl
2
Faculty of Philosophy, Meritorious Autonomous University of Puebla, Puebla,
México
yle.morph@gmail.com

Abstract. This paper presents two versions of opposition relations for

prophetical statements, the first one is an application of “Ockham’s the-
sis” in Classical propositional Logic. The second one is a reinterpretation
of that thesis in the logic M RS P .

Keywords: Ockham’s Thesis · Conditional · Connexive Logics · Oppo-

sition Theory.

1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to compare two ways of representing oppositions of
prophetical statements. We will begin presenting what we have called “Ock-
ham’s thesis”. According to Ockham3 , prophecies about future contingents are
conditional expressions. That means that a prophetic sentence such as “before
the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice”4 , is, from a logical point of
view, a conditional (say “A ⊃ B”). The novelty of Ockham’s interpretation lies
in assuming that expressions like this contain an implicit antecedent (say “A”)
that in making it manifest, and in conjunction with the consequent shows the
meaning of the prophecy5 . Ockham is analyzing a problem connected with op-
position theory, the problem of future contingents6 , due to this fact we propose
?
Supported by Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and ANID (Agencia Nacional
de Investigación y Desarrollo). This work is part of the project: The logic of prophet-
ical conditionals: Prophetical language, divine communication, and human freedom
61559-3, supported by John Templeton Foundation. We are grateful to Manuel Cor-
reia and to anonymous referees for their valuable corrections, comments and sugges-
tions to an earlier version of this paper. To appear in A.-V. Pietarinen et al. (Eds.):
Diagrams 2020, LNAI 12169.
3
[11, 44]
4
(Mark, 14:72)
5
In this example, the antecedent may be “Peter is pressured by the people”. (Matthew,
26: 69).
6
See [1, IX, 18a 28 ss.]
2 J. D. Garcı́a and Y. Ramos

two alternatives for representing the opposition of prophecies. On the one hand,
it is explored what it means to be an opposite of prophecies in Classical propo-
sitional Logic (CL), where several interesting consequences and some intuitive
ideas about conditionals are considered.
Consequently, a problem is outlined concerning what we have called auto-
conditional prophecy. This problem throws us to the study of the oppositions in
the logic M RS P 7 , in which we propose a solution to the mentioned problem.
In addition, from this analysis, two consequences are analyzed in detail: a) the
inversion of oppositions in M RS P , and b) a generalized definition of oppositions,
which can be applied to multi-valued paracomplete logics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section two we present an outline of
Ockham’s analysis of prophetical discourse. Section three is devoted to analyze
Ockham’s thesis in CL with some results and an outline of the problem of auto-
conditional prophecies. Section four present a solution to the mentioned problem
and a reinterpretation of the oposition relations in M RS P and more interest-
ing consequences. Finally we outline a generalization of opposition relations in
multiple valued logics.

2 A brief presentation of Ockham’s thesis

Ockham holds that “all prophecies regarding any future contingents [are] condi-
tionals”[11, p. 44]; we have called this idea “Ockham’s thesis”. This philosopher
proposed the thesis to eliminate the tension between logical omniscience and
free will, this tension is eliminated maintaining that prophecies are means by
which God communicates future knowledge, and this information when being in
conditional form does not conflict with human freedom.
According to Ockham’s thesis, the expression “before the cock crow twice,
thou shalt deny me thrice” is a conditional whose antecedent is implicit, either
in the scriptures or in the formulation itself. It is the task of the exegete to find
this information to give coherence to the prophecy within the communicative
system between God and the human being8 .
Despite being an original proposal, it has not been explored logically at
present, although there are works that try to question it. In this regard, A.
Edidin’s work is the most notable [4]. In summary, he maintains that Ockham’s
example is designed to work like this, and that in other examples it is not possi-
ble to make the antecedent explicit, and therefore, a) the conditional is trivial,
or b) the antecedent is very strong and therefore it is not possible to unfold it,
or finally, c) that the conditional is false [4, p. 184]9 .

7
See [5] and [6].
8
For a more detailed analysis you can consult [8].
9
For more details see [8].
 Opposition Relations Between Prophecies (Preprint) 3

In our view, Edidin’s argument fails because he does not realize that the
scriptures themselves offer evidence to extract the antecedent for more complex
prophecies that are not so easily explainable in terms of conditionals10 .
What interests us is Ockham’s formulation of the problem, since it estab-
lishes a direct connection with opposition theory. The problem is to question
whether what is revealed by the prophets is necessary or contingent [11, p. 44].
If necessary, since what is revealed is about the future, the opposite will not be
true and the prophecy is true from now on.
The problem arises when faced with the idea that revealed truths force facts
to happen in such a way, and since they are revealed truths they are necessary.
Ockham will argue a few lines below that these truths are not necessary but
contingent, and also, conditional.
This allows him to continue affirming that the prophet state a contingent
proposition, because what he says is true under a certain condition, that ex-
pressed by the antecedent, which is sometimes explicit and sometimes not [11,
p. 44]. The fact that they are contingent makes interesting the question about
how they oppose11 , we present in our next section our analysis of the oppositions
of prophecies in terms of conditional opposition.

3 Classical Opposition of Prophecies

3.1 Classical Logic and M RS P
By means of L we will identify the propositional language that we will use,
formed as usual from a non-empty collection of variables V ar = {A, B, C, ...}
and a collection of logical connectives C = {⊃, ¬}. For Classical propositional
Logic (CL) the semantics is composed of models of the form M = hL, V, D+ , vi,
whith V = {⊥, >}, D+ = {>}, and v : V ar −→ V . The definitions of logical
consequence and logical truth are the definitions are those that are already known
in a standard way. Let M be a collection of models, we say that a formula ϕ is a
logical truth (and we will write ϕ) if v(ϕ) ∈ D+ , ∀v ∈ M. Given a collection
Σ of formulas, we say that a formula ϕ is a logical consequence of Σ, and we
write Σ ϕ, if v(β) ∈ D+ (∀β ∈ Σ), then v(ϕ) ∈ D+ , ∀v ∈ M. On the other
hand, the logic M RS P differs from CL because its collection of truth values is
V = {⊥, ∗, >}, while the collection of designated values is D+ = {>}, ordered
as: ⊥ < ∗ < >. Truth tables for conditional and negation are given in Table 1.

3.2 Prophecies in CL
To begin with the analysis of the oppositions between prophetical expressions
consider the following oppositions of conditional formulas susceptible to be the
opposite of (A ⊃ B) displayed in the Table 2. This list of formulas can be divided
10
This theme is left for a future paper dedicated exclusively to analyzing Edidin’s
argument and Ockham’s thesis.
11
Because if they were necessary, they would simply be contradictory.
4 J. D. Garcı́a and Y. Ramos

¬A ⊃>∗⊥
⊥> >>∗⊥
>∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
>⊥ ⊥∗ ∗∗
Table 1. M RS P tables for conditional and negation

into two groups: negative and positive prophecies. To elaborate our analysis we
will begin with some definitions for the opposition relations12 .

Definition 1. Contradiction: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L we say that ϕ and

ψ are contradictory, iff ∀v ∈ M, v(ϕ) = > ⇐⇒ v(ψ) = ⊥.

Definition 2. Contrariety: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L we say that ϕ and

ψ are contraries, iff ∀v ∈ M, v(ϕ) = > =⇒ v(ψ) = ⊥.

Definition 3. Subcontrariety: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L we say that ϕ

and ψ are subcontraries, iff ∀v ∈ M, v(ϕ) = ⊥ =⇒ v(ψ) = >.

Definition 4. Subalternation: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L we say that ψ is

subaltern of ϕ, iff ∀v ∈ M, v(ϕ) = > =⇒ v(ψ) = >.

Now, consider our example “If you are pressured by people, before the cock
crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice” as a natural language correlate of A ⊃ B.
In Fig. 1 are displayed the possible opposition relations between the formulas of
Table 2. The main candidate to be an opposite of A ⊃ B is ¬(A ⊃ B) because
external negation forms a contradictory formula.

A ⊃ B ¬(A ⊃ B) ¬(A ⊃ ¬B) (A ⊃ ¬B) ¬(¬A ⊃ B) (¬A ⊃ B) (¬A ⊃ ¬B) ¬(¬A ⊃ ¬B)
> ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > > ⊥
⊥ > ⊥ > ⊥ > > ⊥
> ⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ > ⊥ >
> ⊥ ⊥ > > ⊥ > ⊥
Table 2. Classical tables for square of prophecies

According to the truth conditions shown in the tables we can see that there
are three more alternatives to be opposite of A ⊃ B, which are composed of com-
binations of internal negations that affect A, B, or both. This is interesting if
we consider that the formulation of the prophecy corresponds to the consequent
one, that is to say, the main part of the prophecy is in a sense the consequent
one, because in the consequent is formulated the revealed truth. On the other
hand, the antecedent have the function of providing relevant information for
12
Where ⇐⇒ and =⇒ are biconditional and conditional in metalanguage.
 Opposition Relations Between Prophecies (Preprint) 5

Fig. 1. Classical Octagon of Prophecies

the interpretation of the truth revealed in the communicative context between

God and human beings. In that sense, it is consistent to think that the remain-
ing opposition alternatives of a prophecy are those that justly deny either the
formulation of the prophecy (B) or the antecedent, or both.
The three opposites are subcontraries, that means they can be true simulta-
neously, but not simultaneously false; they oppose in the sense that if the first is
false, the second must be true. The cases in which they maintain different value
are the least interesting since they only present opposite truth conditions, the
interesting cases in our view, are in which both are true, therefore, we will briefly
analyze these cases. The first case is (A ⊃ ¬B). This formula can be taken as a
negation of A ⊃ B, just in the sense that it denies the main part of the prophecy,
the consequent. That is to say a candidate for denial of “Peter is coerced, then
Peter denies Christ” is “Peter is coerced, then Peter does not deny Christ”. In
natural language this formulation seems to be very coherent, even if we deny
everything we know of classical logic, there would be doubt between considering
this or external negation as the most opposite one.
Interestingly, the cases in which they are true simultaneously are the follow-
ing. Both are true in cases where v(A) = ⊥, this implies that if “Peter is coerced”
is false, both consequents are true. In other words, if the world conditions are
such that Peter is not coerced by anyone, he will be able to deny or do not deny
Christ. That is the most interesting case of the three opposites, the remaining
two are connected to this but more non-logical analysis is required, that is be-
yond our capabilities but our opinion is as follows. We believe that this may be a
negation in the sense that it denies the link between “Peter is coerced” and the
consequent, anything else is the cause of Peter denying Christ, and the coercion
of the people is not what explains why Peter denies Christ. It is possible that
both formulas could be true when the consequent is true, because the relevant
thing to consider its truth is only the true of B.
On the other hand, in what sense (¬A ⊃ ¬B) is a negation of B? The
only thing we can answer in this regard is that if we assume contraposition,
negation can mean reversing the antecedent and consequent order, since these
6 J. D. Garcı́a and Y. Ramos

two formulas are compatible with respect to the truth in cases where v(A) =
v(B).
These oppositions depend largely on the definitions of conditional and the
classical logical laws, in this respect we will consider an interesting case. What
would happen if the antecedent of the prophecy of our example is the same as the
consequent one? A prophecy, from a logical point of view, becomes a necessary
expression13 and some other negations become contingent, as shown in Figure 2
and in Table 3.

A ⊃ A ¬(A ⊃ A) ¬(A ⊃ ¬A) (A ⊃ ¬A) ¬(¬A ⊃ A) (¬A ⊃ A) (¬A ⊃ ¬A) ¬(¬A ⊃ ¬A)
> ⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ > > ⊥
> ⊥ ⊥ > > ⊥ > ⊥
Table 3. Classical tables for auto-conditional prophecies

Despite forming these interesting oppositions, is it coherent to accept these

types of autoconditional prophecy as genuine formulations? In this regard, we
consider that there are two possible alternatives: a) restrict the use of A ⊃
A as an impossible representation of pophecies, and b) consider another logic
where formulas such as the previous one are logical contingencies, preserving the
contingent nature of the prophecies. We opt for the second option to be more
interesting, and therefore, using M RS P in the next section we explore some
consequences of this analysis.

Fig. 2. Classical Octagon of auto-conditional Prophecies

13
And therefore, the problems reported by Ockham arise, if we consider prophecies as
necessary sentences.
 Opposition Relations Between Prophecies (Preprint) 7

4 Connexive Opposition of Prophecies

As we saw in the previous section, if we accept that the prophecies can be
formed with the A ⊃ A formula the prophecies become logical truths. We opted
for taking as logic of the prophecies a logic that does not validate this scheme
as a necessary truth, the logic M RS P , which we have also characterized in the
previous section. In this logic, other interesting formulas are also validated, two
of them are in the octagon presented above, we refer to the Aristotle’s thesis in
its two versions: ¬(A ⊃ ¬A) and ¬(¬A ⊃ A)14 .
In CL both are logical contingencies, while in this logic they are tautologies.
This is mainly because in CL, v(A) = v(¬(A ⊃ ¬A)) = v(¬A ⊃ A) and v(¬A) =
v(¬(¬A ⊃ A)) = v(A ⊃ ¬A). In Table 4 it can be seen that these equalities are
not satisfied, and therefore the octagon undergoes modifications and results in
the diagram of Figure 3. Obviously the above definitions of opposition relations
are useless in this logic, therefore, we present below a generalized version of
them.

Definition 5. MV-Contradiction: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L, we say that

ϕ and ψ are contradictory, whenever ∀v ∈ M, v(ϕ) ∈ D+ if and only if v(ψ) ∈
/
D+ .

Definition 6. MV-Contrariety: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L, we say that ϕ

and ψ are contraries, whenever ∀v ∈ M, if v(ϕ) ∈ D+ then v(ψ) ∈
/ D+ , and if
+ + −
v(ϕ) ∈
/ D then v(ψ) could be in D and could be in D .

Definition 7. MV-Subcontrariety: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L, we say that

/ D+ then v(ψ) ∈ D+ ,
ϕ and ψ are subcontraries, whenever ∀v ∈ M, if v(ϕ) ∈
and if v(ϕ) ∈ D then v(ψ) could be in D and could be in D− .
+ +

Definition 8. MV-Subalternation: Given two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L, we say that

ψ is subaltern of ϕ, whenever ∀v ∈ M, if v(ϕ) ∈ D+ then v(ψ) ∈ D+ , and if
v(ψ) ∈ D+ then v(ϕ) could be in D+ and could be in D−

These definitions allow us to construct the octagon of Figure 3 that satisfies

the following properties. First, if we divide the formulas into >-predominant
(particular) and ⊥-predominant (universal) proposed by C. Williamson (see [12,
p. 499] and [7, p. 256]), these definitions allows us to propose a generalization
on this division, dividing the formulas in which predominant values are in D+
and formulas in which predominate values in D− .
In that sense we will have universal and particular formulas, which, as in
the octagon of CL, form a square of contraries and subcontraries, respectively.
The interesting thing about this is that the contrary formulas of CL are the
subcontrary of M RS P , and the contrary ones of M RS P are the subcontrary of
14
This logic is part of the family of logics known as connexive logics, logics that are
neither subsystems nor extensions of CL and that are characterized by validating
principles that, like those mentioned, are not classical theorems. For more details
see: [2], [3], [6], [9], [10], [13].
8 J. D. Garcı́a and Y. Ramos

A ⊃ B ¬(A ⊃ B) ¬(A ⊃ ¬B) (A ⊃ ¬B) ¬(¬A ⊃ B) (¬A ⊃ B) (¬A ⊃ ¬B) ¬(¬A ⊃ ¬B)
> ⊥ > ⊥ > ∗ ∗ >
∗ > ⊥ > > ∗ ∗ >
⊥ > ⊥ > > ∗ ∗ >
∗ > > ∗ ⊥ > ⊥ >
∗ > > ∗ > ∗ > ⊥
∗ > > ∗ > ⊥ > ⊥
∗ > > ∗ ⊥ > ⊥ >
∗ > > ∗ > ∗ > ⊥
∗ > > ∗ > ⊥ > ⊥
Table 4. M RS P tables for square of prophecies

CL. For the same reason, subalterns are reversed and the only ones that remain
are contradictory formulas. That is due to the fact that universal formulas of CL
are the particular ones of M RS P and vice versa, since the negation of M RS P
does reverse the value ∗ towards the value >15 .

Fig. 3. Octagon of Prophecies in M RS P

Finally, taking up the problem of auto-conditional prophecies, consider the

following truth tables of Table 5. In this case, the octagon formed in Figure
4 satisfies more opposition operations than that of Figure 3, there is only an
equivalence relation between the two versions of Aristotle’s thesis, and the rela-
tions of contrariety and subcontrariety are distributed proportionally. All these
relations are satisfied due to the generalized version of the oppositions we gave
in this section, and interestingly, these definitions are not sensitive to systems
in question, that is, they are fulfilled in both regardless of whether they main-
tain different characteristics and produce different octagons. In that sense this

15
To analyze this feature is interesting but it comes out of our goals.
 Opposition Relations Between Prophecies (Preprint) 9

generalized version, is better than the first version of the oppositions outlined in
section 3.2.

A ⊃ A ¬(A ⊃ A) ¬(A ⊃ ¬A) (A ⊃ ¬A) ¬(¬A ⊃ A) (¬A ⊃ A) (¬A ⊃ ¬A) ¬(¬A ⊃ ¬A)
> ⊥ > ⊥ > ∗ ∗ >
∗ > > ∗ > ∗ > ⊥
∗ > > ∗ > ⊥ > ⊥
Table 5. M RS P tables for self prophecies

Fig. 4. M RS P Octagon of Self Prophecies

5 Conclusions

We have presented a brief synthesis of what we call Ockham’s thesis. From this
thesis we outline two ways of opposition of prophetic expressions, one based
on CL and the other on M RS P . As a main result, an octagon of oppositions
can be constructed in CL with the relations that material conditional and clas-
sical semantics allow. We have considered the option that the prophecies can
be represented by formulas such as “A ⊃ A”, and this led us to the construc-
tion of a second octagon. Consequently, these two octagons have been replicated
in M RS P , where some interesting results have been found and a new way of
opposition of prophetic expressions have been analyzed (Figure 4). Finally, a
generalized definition of opposition relations was presented to unify these two
alternatives of representation.
 10 J. D. Garcı́a and Y. Ramos

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