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This aspect of Islamic history is dealt with briefly in the Qur’ān; it is recorded in great detail
in the sīrah literature, (biography of the Prophet, early Islamic history) which gives the
numbers of the dead and those taken prisoner, and sometimes their full names as well. The
hadith literature (sayings, deeds, and tacit approvals of the Prophet) also contains
thousands of reports on this subject. In order to fully understand these bodies of literature
and to derive laws from them, even experts have also to study and examine other bodies of
literatures, including tafsīr (exegeses of the Qur’ān), and hadith methodology; they have to
do this in order to determine the reliability of the various narrators and the authenticity of
the various reports from this period.
Studying the points of correspondence between Islamic law and modern IHL is not a matter
of intellectual luxury: it is of strategic importance in ensuring that IHL principles are
observed in armed conflict.
All these bodies of literature constituted the material, or the texts, from which the fuqahā’,
or jurists, developed the Islamic law of war in the literature of fiqh, or Islamic law, under
such headings as al-jihād, al-siyar, al-maghāzī; to these headings, contemporary Muslim
scholars add those of akhlāq al-ḥ arb (the ethics of war) and al-qanūn al-dawlī al-insānī fī al-
Islām (international humanitarian law, or IHL, in Islam).
This brief introduction shows where, in what sources, the Islamic law of war can be studied.
It also explains how differences in interpretation of these sources are among the reasons
why there are contradictory regulations, and major violations, in connection with the use of
force by Muslims.
with extensive commentary by Al-Sarakhsī (d. 1090) on Islamic international law and Islamic law of armed
It is worth adding here that in Islam, a treaty is binding unless it blatantly violates the
dictates of the religion in some way. It is a matter of some significance that since the seventh
century, Islamic law has been developed by individual, and independent, Muslim legal
scholars who belonged to either the Sunni or the Shiʻite sect. In addition, each of these
scholars was an adherent of one of numerous schools of law: of these schools, four are now
most prominent in the Sunni world (the Ḥ anafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʻī, and Ḥ anbalī) and three
among Shiʻītes (the Twelvers, Zaydis, and Ismāʻilīs).
Because the development of the Islamic law of war rested on specific texts dealing with
seventh-century contexts of war, and because of the nature of the tools involved in the law-
making process, Islamic regulations on the use of force frequently contradict each other.
These contradictions are also partly owing to the fact that Islamic law remained uncodified
throughout Islamic history, apart from twentieth-century codifications of what was mainly
family law. Moreover, as a consequence of European colonialism, Islamic law was replaced,
in all but a handful of Muslim countries, by the French or the English legal systems; because
of this, Islamic law in most areas, including the law of armed conflict, has remained a purely
academic matter.
With regard to international law, including IHL, a consensus has existed since the founding
of the United Nations, among scholars and States in the Muslim world, that these bodies of
law are in consonance with the true spirit and ultimate objectives of Islam, but not
necessarily with all the rules developed in the past by classical Muslim jurists operating in a
very different political context. This is why all Muslim countries have signed the Geneva
Conventions and other relevant international treaties.
However, in recent times, serious violations of IHL have been justified by selectively
invoking certain classical juristic opinions or interpretations of the scriptures, or simply
through analogy to certain classical situations of war — in order, for instance, to justify the
killing of civilians. It should also be noted, however, that some other non-State Muslim
armed groups have drawn up codes of conduct that are based on Islamic law and that are
also in harmony with modern IHL principles. This shows that Islamic law is being both used
and abused in contemporary armed conflict in the Muslim world.
Studying the points of correspondence between Islamic law and modern IHL is therefore no
longer just a matter of intellectual luxury; it is a subject of strategic importance and of great
value in ensuring that IHL principles are observed, to the greatest extent possible, in this
specific context of armed conflict.
(1) religious basis: because Islamic regulations on the conduct of hostilities are derived from
the Islamic scriptures;
(4) contextually and textually based: obviously, throughout Islamic history, jurists differed
on the interpretation of texts and contexts in connection with the Islamic law of war, which
led to
(5) regulations on the use of force that contradicted each other. These contradictory rulings
were also a result of the jurists having to balance Islamic restrictions on the use of certain
indiscriminate weapons and methods of warfare — to humanize armed conflict, so to speak
— with the military necessity of winning a war. This explains
(6) the wide gap between theory and practice: while Islamic law includes detailed
regulations that are, remarkably, largely in agreement with modern IHL principles, serious
violations of IHL are now being committed by some Muslims.
Because of these characteristics, the Islamic law of armed conflict will continue to be used,
or at least referred to, by Muslims who use Islam as their source of reference. Moreover,
because of its contextual and sometimes contradictory rulings, the Islamic law of war is
sometimes erroneously used to justify harming protected persons and objects.
On the other hand, and as shown below, the similarities between IHL principles and the
Islamic law of war suggest that these two legal traditions have the same objectives and that
modern IHL principles are of great practical help in directing conduct of hostilities during
contemporary situations of conflict. Emphasizing the universality of IHL principles, which
transcend legal traditions, civilizations and cultures, is absolutely essential for ensuring
compliance with IHL.
The Islamic law of war sought to humanize armed conflict by protecting the lives of non-
combatants, respecting the dignity of enemy combatants, and forbidding damage to an
adversary’s property except when absolutely required by military necessity or when it
happens unintentionally, as collateral damage.
The following are the core principles of Islamic international humanitarian law.
Extract from the Qu’ān, Sura 2 “Al-Baqara”, Verse 190. (Source: KSU Electronic Moshaf project)
The ʻusafā’’s various duties on the battlefield at the time included such things as taking
caring of the animals and the personal belongings of the combatants. Their equivalent in the
context of modern warfare would be medical personnel — military and civilian — military
reporters and all other categories of people in the army of the adversary party that do not
take part in actual hostilities; these people, too, cannot be targeted. The companions of the
Prophet and succeeding generations of jurists grasped the logic guiding the prohibition
against targeting these five categories of people, and provided non-combatant immunity for
other categories of people as well, such as the sick, the blind, the incapacitated, the insane,
farmers, traders, and craftsmen.
Sirte, Lybia, August 2016. In a makeshift field hospital, a wounded man awaits the arrival of an ambulance, which
However, members of these categories of protected people will lose their non-combatant
immunity if they take part in hostilities. Classical Muslim jurists investigated various
interesting cases involving participation by such protected people in hostilities and
deliberated on the permissibility of targeting these people.
These cases included the following: a woman who actually fights on the battlefield or throws
stones at Muslim army soldiers or patrols the enemy’s forces or uses her own money to
finance the enemy’s army; and a hermaphrodite (whose appearance gives no conclusive
proof of gender) encountered during combat. Other cases involved a child or an elderly
person taking part in direct hostilities, and an elderly person brought to the battlefield to
plan the enemy’s operations. Regardless of the nuances of their deliberations and their
different rulings on the permissibility of targeting these protected people, the mere fact that
they investigated these cases and reflected on them proves beyond doubt that the principle
of distinction and the doctrine of non-combatant immunity were major concerns for the
majority of classical Muslim jurists.
It should be added here that the permissibility of using such indiscriminate weapons was
investigated in connection with situations other than those involving combat between
individuals. For instance, jurists considered whether such weapons may be used against an
enemy fighting from fortified positions. In situations like these, it would obviously be
extremely difficult to avoid causing incidental harm to protected people and objects. All this
again goes to show that the principle of distinction was the rationale for discussing the
permissibility of using these indiscriminate weapons.
Balancing this humanitarian principle with that of military necessity, most of the jurists
permitted shooting at the enemy fortifications with mangonels, but they disagreed sharply
on the permissibility of shooting fire-tipped arrows at enemy fortifications: one group
prohibited it, another expressed its dislike for this method of warfare, and a third permitted
it in those instances when military necessity called for it or when it was retaliation in kind.
Conflicting rulings of this kind create major difficulties when the Islamic law of war is used
as the source of reference in contemporary armed conflicts, because they can be used
selectively to justify attacks against protected civilians and objects.
The rationale for studying the lawfulness of night fighting — an issue that first arose during a
discussion between the Prophet and his companions — was that it did not involve fighting
between individuals because they cannot see each other at night. Mangonels and similar
weapons were mainly used against an enemy at night, which increased the risk of protected
persons and objects being harmed. Similarly, they found that attacking human shields
might also cause incidental harm in two instances they studied: to persons protected from
the enemy or to Muslim prisoners of war.
Time and again, the need to balance the humanitarian principles of distinction,
proportionality and precaution with the principle of military necessity, led the jurists to
make contradictory rulings: some of them prohibited attacks made at night or against
human shields, others disliked these methods, and still others were willing to permit them,
but only when absolutely required by military necessity. They also disagreed about what
constituted military necessity. There was, however, no difference of opinion among them on
the fundamental point: that protected persons and objects were not to be deliberately
harmed.
4. Protection of property
In the Islamic worldview, everything in this world belongs to God, and human beings — as
His vicegerents on earth — are entrusted with the responsibility of protecting His property
and contributing to human civilization. Hence, even during the course of hostilities, wanton
destruction of enemy property is strictly prohibited.
Homs, March 2016. The city bears the scars of the conflict. (Pawel Krzysiek/ICRC)
The first caliph Abu Bakr (d. 634) instructed his army commander thus: “do not cut down
fruit-bearing trees; do not destroy buildings; do not slaughter a sheep or a camel except for
food; do not burn or drown palm trees.” The eighth-century jurist Al-Awzāʻī (d. 774)
declared: “it is prohibited for Muslims to commit any sort of takhrīb, wanton destruction,
[during the course of hostilities] in enemy territories”. Such destruction was forbidden
because it constituted — as the crime of terrorism does under Islamic law — the criminal act
described metaphorically in the Qur’ān as fasād fī al-arḍ (literally, destruction in the land).
It is interesting to note that few jurists distinguished between inanimate and animate
property owned by the enemy: Al-Shāfiʻī (d. 820), the eponymous founder of the Shāfiʻī
school of law, said that all living creatures were capable of feeling pain and therefore any
harm to them amounted to unjustifiable torture; while for Ibn Qudāmah (d. 1223) harming
living creatures fell within the bounds of fasād fī al-arḍ . Targeting horses and similar
animals during the course of hostilities was permitted, but only if enemy soldiers were
mounted on them while fighting.
There are numerous examples in classical Islamic legal literature of regard for the sanctity
of an adversary’s private and public property. It may be enough to mention one example
here. Classical Muslim jurists considered the lawfulness of consuming an enemy’s food
supplies or using his fodder to feed one’s own animals; they concluded that this was
permissible, but only in the quantities absolutely required by military necessity, thereby
confirming the inviolability of enemy property. Therefore, as a rule (except when required
by military necessity) attacks against enemy property must be carried out with two aims in
mind: to force the enemy to surrender or to put an end to the fighting; to avoid deliberately
seeking to cause the destruction of property.
In the matter of what should be done with POWs, classical Muslim jurists fell into three
groups. The first, basing their position on the Qur’ān 47:4, maintained that POWs must be
released unilaterally or in exchange for captured Muslim soldiers. The second group, made
up of some Ḥ anafī jurists, argued that the State should decide, based on its best interests,
whether to execute or enslave POWs; but a few others from the same school said that the
POWs may be freed, but must remain in the Muslim State because permitting them to
return to their country will strengthen the enemy’s forces. The third group, the majority of
the jurists, also argued that the State should decide, based on its best interests; however,
they also said that POWs may be executed, enslaved, set free unilaterally or in exchange for
captured Muslim soldiers, or be freed but forced to remain in the Muslim State. It should be
noted here that the jurists who permitted the execution of POWs based their conclusion on
reports that three POWs had been executed in the wars between the Muslims and their
enemies during the Prophet’s lifetime. Examination of the historical record, however, shows
that if all or some of these reports were true, these three POWs were singled out because of
crimes they had committed before joining the war.
As for the treatment of POWs, Islamic law requires that they be respected and treated
humanely. They must be fed and given water to drink, clothed if necessary, and protected
from the heat and the cold and from cruel treatment. Torturing POWs to obtain military
information is prohibited, as indicated by Mālik (d. 795), the eponymous founder of the
Mālikī school of law.
Because of the nature of their profession, diplomats have enjoyed the privileges of amān
since the pre-Islamic era. Classical Islamic legal literature may be said to define amān, in
the sense of quarter, as “a contract of protection, granted during the actual acts of war, to
cover the person and property of an enemy belligerent, all of a regiment, everyone inside a
fortification, the entire enemy army or city”. Amān has the same objective, in some respects,
as the hors de combat status: in the words of the classical jurists, this is ḥ aqn al-damm
(prevention of the shedding of blood, protection of life). Therefore, if enemy combatants
request amān on the battlefield during the course of hostilities — whether verbally or in
writing, or through a gesture or by some other indication they are laying down their arms —
they must be granted it. Afterwards, they must be protected and granted the same rights as
civilian temporary residents of the Muslim State in question. They must not be treated as
POWs; nor must their lives be restricted in any other way during their stay in the Muslim
State. This protection remains in effect until their safe return to their home country.
In brief, the amān system makes it unambiguously clear that enemy combatants must not be
targeted if they are not actually fighting. It goes without saying that perfidy is strictly
prohibited under the Islamic law of war; however, ruses are permitted, as the Prophet held
that “war is ruse.”
The uniqueness of Islamic law — its origins and sources, and its methods of creating and
applying laws — should be clear from the foregoing description.
Indeed classical Muslim jurists have succeeded in providing an impressive legal literature
that humanizes armed conflicts. They also showed a great deal of concern for non-
combatants and civilians, as well as for specific civilian objects: they argued that all of these
must be protected, and that no incidental harm to any of them was justified except in cases
of absolute military necessity.
Nonetheless, some Islamic rules on the use of force pose challenges to humanizing armed
conflicts. That is because the Islamic law of armed conflicts was not codified at any point in
Islamic history, and also because no punishments for violating it were formulated. However,
because treaties are binding in Islamic law, and because modern IHL principles are in
agreement with the Islamic law of war, IHL fills this gap — the repression of violations —
particularly well.