Discursive Change in Hong Kong Sociopolitical Dynamics, Metaphor, and One Country, Two Systems

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Discursive Change
in Hong Kong
All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.
Discursive Change
in Hong Kong
Sociopolitical Dynamics,
Metaphor, and One Country,
Two Systems
Jennifer Eagleton
LEXINGTON BOOKS
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Names: Eagleton, Jennifer, author.

Title: Discursive change in Hong Kong : sociopolitical dynamics, metaphor, and one
country, two systems / Jennifer Eagleton.
Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references
and index. | Summary: “Discursive Change in Hong Kong is a comprehensive
interdisciplinary study of socio-political and discursive change in Hong Kong
since 1997. It provides a stimulating, politically well informed, and comprehensive
“insider” account of media and official discourse on democracy and political change
as part of “One Country, Two Systems.””—Provided by publisher.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021059708 (print) | LCCN 2021059709 (ebook) | ISBN
9781793630841 (cloth) | ISBN 9781793630858 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Political culture—China—Hong Kong. | Social change—China—
Hong Kong. | Protest movements—China—Hong Kong. | Politics and government—
China—Hong Kong.
Classification: LCC JQ1539.5.A91 E24 2022 (print) | LCC JQ1539.5.A91 (ebook) |
DDC 306.2095125—dc23/eng/20220105
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021059708
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021059709
∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Contents
A Word on Primary and Secondary Sources Used in This Book vii
1 A Transition: Impact of the Past on the Discourse of

Hong Kong’s Political Future 1
2 Hong Kong’s “Guiding Light”: The Basic Law as
Discursive Frame 25
3 Participants in the Discourse: The Political Divide 59
4 Metaphor as Narrative: Mapping the First Decade of
Political Change 91
5 Hijacking an Ideology: The Cultural Revolution, Metaphor,
and Hong Kong’s Democratization 155
6 Contested Concepts: Civil Disobedience and the Rule of
Law before, during, and after the Umbrella Movement 179
7 The Mainlandization of Hong Kong Political Discourse 207
8 “Being Water”: A Holistic Study of the 2019 Protests 233
9 Looking toward a Contested Future 263
10 Discursive Change in Hong Kong: Sociopolitical Dynamics
and the One Country, Two Systems 291
Appendix: A Timeline of Hong Kong 301

References309
Index355
About the Author 359
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A Word on Primary and Secondary
Sources Used in This Book
BASIC LAW AND RELATED TEXTS
The Basic Law can be found on https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclaw-

text/index.html. Other related research materials were obtained from the
Basic Law Drafting History Online (BLDHO), an online resource provided
by the Centre for Comparative and Public Law, the University of Hong Kong.
This resource has articles, legislative discussions, and textual history of the
drafting of the Basic Law (http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/bldho/home.action). Hong
Kong and British Hansards were also consulted.
OFFICIAL HONG KONG GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Official government documents are the “framers” of the discourse and are
mentioned from time to time throughout this book. The first of these dis-
cussed is the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the agreement that fixed Hong
Kong’s return to China followed by the Basic Law which arose out of it and
which set Hong Kong’s governance system in place. More about how to
access these texts are detailed in the various chapters.
POLITICAL PARTY TEXTS
Political party texts are drawn from the websites of the political parties under
study and will be discussed in chapter 3 and elsewhere.
vii
viii A Word on Primary and Secondary Sources Used in This Book
NEWS TEXTS
News texts used in chapters 2–5 come from the Apple Daily, the Ming Pao
Daily, Ta Kung Pao, and the South China Morning Post. In Hong Kong, as
elsewhere, newspapers are well-known for holding certain “ideologies.” And
since this book relates to political discourse it is necessary to be upfront about
their political stance.
1. The Apple Daily (蘋果日報) is a pro-democracy, tabloid-like broadsheet.

The Apple Daily was founded by Jimmy Lai in 1995 and published by his
company Next Media; his extreme pro-democracy stance had seen Apple
Daily’s reporters banned from working on the Mainland and certain
large commercial entities have boycotted putting advertisements in the
newspaper after it published reports that they considered unfavorable. Lai
was arrested on August 10, 2020, by the Hong Kong police on charges
of violating the territory’s new National Security Law, an action which
prompted widespread criticism (Ramzy and May 2020). Jimmy Lai was
sentenced to 14 months in prison in April 2021 after being found guilty of
unauthorized assembly. In June 2022, Hong Kong authorities said reports
by the paper had breached the National Security Law. They froze its bank
accounts, and arrested key staff members. The Apple Daily is no longer
available online but can still be accessed through certain databases.
2. The Ta Kung Pao (大公報) is a pro-Beijing/Hong Kong government-
aligned newspaper. The Ta Kung Pao (www.takungpao.com.hk) was
first established in China in 1902 and subsequently set up a Hong Kong
edition. It often publishes in full the speeches of major mainland Chinese
leaders and Hong Kong government officials. It also had a leading role
espousing leftist views during the 1967 Hong Kong riots (Cheung 2009;
Loh 2010).
3. The Ming Pao Daily (明報) is an elite broadsheet with democratic lean-
ings that attempts to provide a balanced coverage of views. The Ming
Pao Daily (www.mingpao.com) was first published on May 20, 1959; it
once had a publisher, the novelist Louis Cha, who was Hong Kong co-
convenor of the Hong Kong side of the Basic Law Committee during the
drafting of the Basic Law.
4. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) (www.scmp.com) is an Eng-
lish-language newspaper and was founded in 1903. In selecting this
newspaper, which is read by educated Chinese, overseas Chinese, and
the English-speaking population, we obtain a “mediated” view of hap-
penings that occur more fully in the Chinese press. Wiebrecht (2018)
has shown this newspaper has undergone an “editorial shift” that moves
it closer to the position of the Chinese government. Lee and Lin (2006)
A Word on Primary and Secondary Sources Used in This Book ix
in their work on Hong Kong media discourse illustrate how a newspa-

per can claim neutrality by giving “both sides” space on their opinion
articles, and this is the case of the SCMP. The Alibaba Group, China’s
e-commerce giant, acquired the SCMP in April 2006. Alibaba said that
the acquisition was made out of the desire to “improve China’s image in
light of its Western bias” (Barboza 2015).
Most news media texts used in chapters 2–5 were downloaded through the
Chinese media database WiseNews for the period January 1, 1998–December
31, 2007, according to year using the keyword “universal suffrage” (普選 in
the Chinese texts). The SCMP is no longer obtainable from the WiseNews
database. Later access was through Factiva or ProQuest Newspapers
databases.
For chapters 6–9, various other sources were used and these will be
detailed in the relevant chapters. Articles were also drawn from the Hong
Kong Free Press (HKFP), an online newspaper founded in 2015. It states on
its website that it is an “an impartial, non-profit, English-language newspaper.
Run by journalists, backed by readers and completely independent, HKFP is
governed by a public code of ethics” (see https://hongkongfp.com/hkfp-code
-ethics/). For a significant period, reporters of HKFP, like other online media,
were denied entry to government press conferences on the grounds that it did
not have a print edition (HKFP 2015). This ban was lifted in 2017.
A NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATION AND

ROMANIZATION OF NAMES
Unless otherwise stated, the author translated all excerpts from the Chinese
newspapers, while English versions were used when discussing Hong Kong
government documents. There is no one method of writing Cantonese names
in English. For well-known people, the preferred versions of their names are
used. The Cantonese version of reporters’ names in the Chinese news texts
could not always be found, so they were rendered in Pinyin. The Chinese fol-
lows this Romanization.
Chapter 1
A Transition
Impact of the Past on the Discourse
of Hong Kong’s Political Future
INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong’s geographic coordinates of 22 15 N, 114 10 E and its position in

Asia, “along the southeast coast of mainland China, bordered by Deep Bay,
Mirs Bay, the South China Sea, and the country of China,” occupying a total
land area of 1,092 sq. km,1 have determined not only its political fate but also
how it discursively constructs its changing fate, as this book will show. When
its fate meant that it would ultimately become part of China in 1984 with the
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, there was a great deal of “con-
cern about this ‘one country, two systems’ experiment.” Michael DeGolyer,
the director of the Hong Kong Transition Project, summed up Hong Kong’s
attitude as “wary hope,” that promises made would be promises kept. “There
is a lot of anxiety about how this is actually going to work out,” he said.
“I think people are going to measure it in very practical terms. Hong Kong
people are like that” (CNN 1996).
Hong Kong’s gradual advance toward 1997 and decolonialization had
seen it become a “global media spectacle” (Lee et al. 2002; Knight and
Nakano 1999) and the subject of many academic and popular studies on its
political and social transition, usually couched in negative terms, talking of
the “fall of Hong Kong” and the city being a “borrowed place, borrowed
time” (Roberti 1996; Hughes 1976). Linguistically, studies focused on the
“discourse of colonial withdrawal” (Flowerdew 1997a, 1998). Initially,
post-1997, the new political arrangement drew discussion on such topics as
outside perceptions of Hong Kong’s postcolonial development (Pan 2002)
and other aspects of Hong Kong and its identity (Flowerdew 1997b, 1997c,
1998, 2004, 2007; Eagleton 2004). There have also been isolated studies
on various aspects such as stance in chief executive election manifestos
2 Chapter 1
(Ho and Crosthwaite 2018) and evasive replies in Hong Kong’s political
discourse (Wai and Yap 2018), just to name a few. In recent years, there
have been many general (nonlinguistic) books about Hong Kong relating to
politics, for example, the Umbrella Movement of 2014, such as Jason Ng’s
Umbrellas in Bloom (2016) and Joshua Wong’s Unfree Speech (2020).
Linguistically, Flowerdew gives a critical discourse-historiographical
approach to the Umbrella Movement (2017), while Bhatia discusses the
discursive illusions of that Movement (2017). Recent publications City on
Fire: The Fight for Hong Kong by writer/lawyer Antony Dapiran (2020),
Vigil: Hong Kong on the Brink by historian Jeffrey Wasserstrom (2020),
and Making Hong Kong China—The Rollback of Human Rights and the
Rule of Law by legal scholar Michael Davis (2021) deal with the events
and some aspects of the language used in the 2019 protests, but not in any
systematic way. They both provide excellent background reading to the
cause and course of the protests.
THE MAJOR APPROACH OF THIS BOOK
However, there has not been any dedicated and holistic study of the major
political discourses of Hong Kong from before its transition to 2021, the
entire lifespan of Hong Kong as Special Administrative Region (SAR) so far.
Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of China, at the
start of its existence was considered an executive-led partial democracy
with a constitution that promised universal suffrage at an unspecified time
in the future. This book largely focuses on how this future democratiza-
tion and other political reform were talked about and how the discourse
changed over time; its principal, but not exclusive, orientation is an
exploration of the use of metaphor as a major mechanism for ideology
and meaning-making. To this end, this book will exemplify the utility
of particular discursive linguistic tools such as the discourse-historical
method of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Wodak 2001; Reisigl and
Wodak 2009).
While certain discourse theories from time to time will be mentioned, this
book is not intended to be heavily theoretical; it aims to unfold the changing
discourses of Hong Kong’s political development and tell it in a narrative
form that is accessible to both the academic and general reader, all the while
providing a reference for possible ways of studying other ongoing political
movements and their discourses. A brief discussion about the major linguistic
approaches of the book now follows.
A Transition 3
Critical Discourse Analysis

According to van Dijk (1988), CDA is a methodology that is concerned with
studying and analyzing texts of all kinds to reveal the discursive sources of
power, dominance, inequality, and bias. It examines how these discursive
sources are maintained and reproduced within specific social, political,
and historical contexts (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In a similar vein,
Fairclough (1995) defines CDA as
discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relation-

ships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events
and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes;
to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologi-
cally shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how
the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor
securing power and hegemony. (132–133)
The discourse-historical approach (D-HA) to CDA (Reisigl and Wodak

2009; Wodak 2001, 2011) considers that “discourse is always historical, that
is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communica-
tive events which are happening at the same time or which have happened
before” (Wodak and Ludwig 1995, 12). D-HA focuses on entire texts, not in
terms of decontextualized words or phrases but in terms of their situatedness
within the text-internal context, intertextual and inter-discursive relations,
the situational context, and the sociopolitical/historical context (Reisigl and
Wodak 2009). In Hong Kong’s political discourse, “historical legacies” rela-
tive to the current situation are frequently discussed, and so studying such
discourse without insertion of the historical antecedents to texts limits the
reliability of any study (Eagleton 2012).
The Use of Metaphor

Metaphor has a prominent place in this book for three reasons. First, metaphor
is intrinsic to language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980); second, because the purpose
of metaphor is to describe something more comprehensively, economically, and
more forcefully than is possible in literal language (Newmark 1998, 111); and
third, because metaphors are extremely effective linguistic tools in that they work
to integrate pragmatic, cognitive, and linguistic knowledge as well as incorporate
ideology, culture, and history.
Metaphor sends out ideological messages covertly, for, as Goatly (1997)
argues, it helps structure our thinking, “hiding some phenomena and applying
them to and highlighting others,” with linguistic associations serving to argue
4 Chapter 1
for cause and effect. Effective use of metaphor in politics is not only linked
to certain cognitive “mappings” on the reader/listener where the topic is con-
nected to a semantic domain that has certain metaphysical resonance but also
to certain cultural and historical contexts (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Steen
2002). Metaphors are pervasive in political discourse and are integrated with
other rhetorical strategies as Charteris-Black notes in his work (2005, 197).
Defining metaphor can be a tricky business as numerous studies have
shown (Goatly 1997, 12; 2007; Ortony 1979). The Oxford English Dictionary
defines metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word
or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous
to, that to which it is literally applicable; an instance of this, a metaphorical
expression.”2
But this definition is limiting. Deignan (2005, 8) mentions that differ-
ent researchers use the term “metaphor” as a kind of “catch-all” term for
different kinds of linguistic, mainly figurative expressions. In Chinese,
the word for metaphor “比喻” can mean either a “metaphor, analogy, or
figure of speech” making figurative language in Chinese a seemingly fluid
category.
Cameron (2003, 9) states that the “linguistic presence of metaphor is sig-
naled by a lexical item that can have an interpretation which is incongruous
with the discourse context or with the meaning created by the co-text,” which
is somewhat wider than the OED definition.
The metaphorical focus Cameron refers to as the vehicle of the metaphor
is in contrast to the topic which is the content of the ongoing discourse, and
which may or may not be actually present as a lexical item. The immediate
linguistic frame of the vehicle will usually contain items that help identify
the topic of the metaphor. Alternative names for these terms, if focusing on
cognitive metaphor, are target and source domain. Some of the debates in
metaphor theory arise from differences in opinions as to the nature of the
domains involved (Cameron and Low 1999, 3–28) and from the analyst’s
process of inferring from the surface of the discourse how to describe the
underlying conceptual domains.
Cameron sees the need to remove speaker intention and hearer inter-
pretation from the criteria for metaphoricity (2003, 12) saying that it is an
“intractable problem” in identifying ambiguities that “offer the possibility of
metaphorical (mis)interpretation and so can be labelled as linguistic meta-
phors” (Ibid). The analyst has to use his or her own judgment as to which
ambiguities or instances of polysemy have a reasonable probability of being
interpreted as a metaphor. Therefore, the identification of metaphor has to be
tailored not only to the type of texts to be analyzed but also to the particular
study’s aims. The analyst has to constantly justify his or her selection of
A Transition 5
metaphor, and knowledge of the cultural and political context is crucial to

this justification.
The Process of Metaphor Identification

Metaphor can be identified in various ways, for example, through the iden-
tification of words or phrases as metaphor vehicle terms. The Pragglejaz
Group’s (2007) method has been adapted for this book:
1. Familiarization with the discourse data

2. Working through the data looking for potential metaphors
3. Possible metaphors were checked for:
(a) Its meaning in the discourse context
(b) The existence of another, more basic meaning
(c) An incongruity or contrast between these meanings, and a transfer
from the basic to the contextual meaning.
A later chapter will deal with how metaphor is repeated, altered, and elabo-
rated in a more contextualized and socially situated stretch of discourse. This
“discourse approach” to metaphor developed by such scholars as Cameron
and her colleagues (Cameron 2007; Cameron and Maslen 2010; Zanotto et.
al. 2008) shows how patterns of metaphors flow, adapt, and are modified
throughout a discourse event and the contributions it makes to the under-
standing of the cultural and social aspects of a community as well as the
cognitive and emotional processes involved.
The Author as Participant-Observer

The discussion about Hong Kong’s further political reform, limits on free-
dom, and encroaching “mainlandization” has escalated over the years, first
in 2003 and the Article 23 controversy and exponentially since 2018, due to
various political crises and especially appeals to Beijing’s intervention over
the Basic Law. Having lived in “transitional” Hong Kong from just after the
return to Chinese sovereignty in October 1997 to the present day and with
knowledge of Chinese, the author is ideally placed to carry out a holistic
analysis of the 23 years so far of Hong Kong’s development as an SAR of
China. Through my involvement in various organizations in Hong Kong,
my previous writings, and access to people involved in think tanks, politi-
cal parties, tertiary institutions, and the mass media have naturally given me
a more thorough look at the developing situation and also an ethnographic
perspective which helps to contextualize the development of the discourse.
You could call the author a “participant-observer” of Hong Kong politics.3
6 Chapter 1
LAYOUT OF THE BOOK
The number and differing nature of political events since July 1, 1997, mean
that quite a diverse range of topics need to be highlighted in order to give a
full picture of the major discursive changes over the last two decades in Hong
Kong as an SAR of China. Chapters 2–5 focus on the first ten years of the
SAR, while the second half deals with specific incidents in the subsequent
ten years till 2021.
Chapter 2 is a detailed look at the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic
Law as framers and central texts in this discourse. It seeks to display how
events involved in these documents’ drafting led to a politically motivated
ambiguity concerning the progress of Hong Kong’s future democratization.
How this progress was reflected in texts from the print media (both in English
and in Chinese) evidences how such a progress was contested linguistically.
Central to understanding the arguments concerning Hong Kong’s con-
stitutional reform in the light of how it is framed in the Basic Law is an
appreciation of the ideological stance taken by its framers and its interpret-
ers. Therefore, chapter 3 focuses on the stance of two early established Hong
Kong political parties over the first ten years till 2007, through an analysis
of the factors shaping their habitus (Bourdieu 1991). Membership categori-
zation analysis (Sacks 1972) is then used to show how these parties catego-
rize themselves (through party logos and manifestos) and their opponents
(through newspaper texts) metaphorically. Party development will also be
touched upon briefly for the period after 2007, which helps better understand
the political events after 2007.
The print media, as well as other official texts, play a central role in medi-
ating the discourse about Hong Kong’s democratization. To understand this
mediation, and given that its discourses represent an ongoing dialogue ref-
erencing past events, chapter 4 is a study of how discourse metaphor forms
a thematic narrative over the first ten years of Hong Kong as an SAR. A
parallel interlinking of events and metaphors indicates how metaphors are
carried forward in the discourse through repetition, relexicalization, or expli-
cation, allowing certain themes to emerge. This gives us the “big picture” of
the whole of the first ten years of Hong Kong’s political transition, and this
can be later contrasted with how the discourse has changed over time in the
second half of the book.
Chapter 5 focuses on one metaphoric thread from the narrative seen in
chapter 4. This is to show more thoroughly how a specific historical event
relates to the overall discourse. The different “camps” in the discourse
“hijacked an ideology”—that of the Cultural Revolution, using metaphors
related to that “ten years of chaos” to point out the dangerous aspect of one
group’s so-called democratic extremism or the other’s so-called extreme
A Transition 7
democratic deficit. This shows how an understanding of history is key to

understanding discursive strategies by actors.
Chapter 6 details how the “Umbrella Movement” (alternately known as
“Occupy Central with Love and Peace”) of 2014 was linked with discussions
about the movement’s possible effects on the “rule of law,” seen as the “basic
foundation” of Hong Kong’s identity, and how this related to the merits or
otherwise of “civil disobedience” and Hong Kong’s evolving sociopolitical
identity. This event had subsequent impacts on Hong Kong’s political dis-
course, especially the Hong Kong protests of 2019 and beyond.
Chapter 7 details how Hong Kong’s officials increasingly struggle to trans-
pose and adapt the language of an authoritarian governing system for use in
Hong Kong where the rights and freedoms of it as an SAR with a high degree
of autonomy are supposed to remain undisturbed. Discourse analysis of Hong
Kong government press releases and other texts will show the problematic
and contested nature of Hong Kong’s political discourse under its “One
Country, Two Systems” governance framework where an authoritarian sys-
tem meets a semi-democratic liberal society. This will be done in three ways.
First, through an analysis of a change in wording and emphasis in the Basic
Law Fact Sheet in 2015; second, through a case of historical revisionism on
the Hong Kong Police’s official website; and third, through analysis of how
the Hong Kong government reacted to questions of Hong Kong “indepen-
dence” or “self-determination” in Hong Kong government press releases in
2017 and 2018 that arose out of a series of connected incidents.
Chapter 8 aims to demonstrate how CDA and multimodal analysis can be
used as a conceptual framework to holistically investigate a multipronged
protest. A vast and diverse range of sources such as social media posts, post-
ers, memes, and protest signs from the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB protests
show how Hong Kong’s history as a British colony and a Chinese society is
reflected in protest-related discourse. I will show how the discourse of these
protests both use and contest Chinese rhetorical topoi (Rapp 2010; Powers
and Kluver 1999) and how the discursive practices (Foucault 1972) of these
protests reflect the conflicting ideologies of Hong Kong’s post-1997 political
system vis-à-vis mainland China (Eagleton 2012). This will also show how
the protest discourse has been both reflective and reactive to events as they
unfolded.
The first half of chapter 9 is an essay on “looking toward a contested
future” that will show how discussion of Hong Kong’s future had been a
decades-long pursuit that was largely based on its sense of uniqueness. The
post-1997 future is discussed through the Basic Law phrase “50 years no
change” (i.e., no change till 2047). This was a contested future that became
more contested with the sudden introduction of the National Security Law
(NSL) in June 2020 and then the electoral changes in May 2021. A textual
8 Chapter 1
analysis of certain aspects of the NSL and the electoral will then be given as
well as how the Hong Kong government attempted to “sell” these to the Hong
Kong people. This forms the second part of the chapter.
Chapter 10 serves as an epilogue, summing up discursive change in Hong
Kong in its first two decades, and the sociopolitical dynamics underlining this
change as it adapts to being a second system of a large powerful country. The
author concludes the chapter by taking the liberty of coining her own “meta-
metaphor” of Hong Kong’s political development to date.
It is important to note certain historical and cultural aspects of Hong
Kong’s history and its transition to China as well as its identity (i.e., how it
sees itself, especially metaphorically) before launching into specific studies
of its political discourse—this aids in understanding the how and why the
discourse takes the shape it has. The following sections in this chapter are
some considerations of these aspects that will help the reader more fully
understand the linguistic reactions and possible discursive strategies to future
political events.
A POLITICAL TRANSITION
On the night of the reversion to sovereignty, just after midnight on July

1, 1997, President Jiang Zemin and Prince Charles of Great Britain each
gave a speech to mark the occasion. You could say each gave their “Hong
Kong story” to the world. Whereas Prince Charles used the overarching
metaphor of a “story of success,” the Chinese leader used the metaphor
of “return to the motherland” which made the event, to Jiang, “both a
festival for the Chinese nation and a victory for the universal cause of
peace and justice” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997). In his speech,
Jiang Zemin also emphasized the important phrase “One Country, Two
Systems” (一國兩制). This phrase (usually described as a “principle”)
was rhetorically adroit because it allowed Britain and China to negotiate
an agreement over Hong Kong’s future (when it was obvious that it had
to be given back to China) that could be interpreted by both sides in ways
that met their needs. For Britain, it was an honorable exit leaving behind
a flourishing economic city with “British values”—the rule of law, “clean
and light-handed government,” as well as the “values of a free society”
(Gargan 2012). Hong Kong’s return to China has been described as a
“reversion to sovereignty,” “the handover,” or the “great Chinese take-
away.” The latter is what Prince Charles of Great Britain called the event
in his diary (Milmo and Judd 2006). These designations of course reflect
different ideological positions and give the impression that Hong Kong
was a passive actor in this process. For China, it heralded the end of over
A Transition 9
a century of humiliation and a confirmation of its rise after the “decade of

chaos” known as the Cultural Revolution.
The “One Country, Two Systems” principle can be said to be “strategically
ambiguous.” Strategic ambiguity being a discourse strategy employed “when
the goal is not clear” (Eisenberg 1984, 230) or as in this case, when the actors
each wanted different goals to be achieved within the discourse event (van
Dijk 1987, 1988), achieving a “unified diversity” (Eisenberg and Goodall
1997) of perspectives.
The strategic ambiguity inherent in views of “One Country, Two Systems”
is carried over into its legal embodiment in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s
“mini-constitution” allowing for divergent interpretations or “deniabil-
ity” (Paul and Strbiak 1997, 149–159) to exist in its various articles, par-
ticularly the more contentious ones relating to Hong Kong’s constitutional
development.
The “One Country, Two Systems” principle under which Hong Kong is
governed arose out of an idea originally proposed by Deng Xiaoping, then
paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for the reunifica-
tion of China during the 1970s, primarily with Taiwan in mind (to take into
account “historical realities” of vastly different political and social systems).
Later he extended the concept to Hong Kong when it was likely to be given
back to China. He suggested that there would be only one China, but areas
such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan could have their own capitalist eco-
nomic and political systems, while the rest of China would use the “social-
ist” system. Under this idea, these places could continue to have their own
political system; legal, military, economic, and financial affairs, including
commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries; and “enjoy”
“certain rights” in foreign affairs as well as enjoy “executive, legislative, and
judicial power,” continuing to take pleasure in “horseracing and dancing” all
the while being an “inalienable part of China.”
Jiang’s speech on July 1 also reiterated the importance of stability and
prosperity: “the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and Hong Kong compatriots will be able to manage Hong Kong well,
build it up and maintain its long-term prosperity and stability” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 1997). The phrase “stability and prosperity” has loomed large
in discussions of Hong Kong’s political development long before discussions
about its future began. Prince Charles was somewhat different in his message
and emphasis—“This important and special ceremony marks a moment of
both change and continuity in Hong Kong’s history”—a somewhat contradic-
tory statement and one that surfaces constantly in Hong Kong’s discourse on
political change.
The “One Country, Two Systems” principle saw Hong Kong being an
“anachronistic case of decolonisation without independence” (Lau 1990);
10 Chapter 1
“anachronistic” since rather than allowing British colonies to become self-

ruled states on their departure as was the usual case, it became a special
region of the PRC, but with a promise of more democracy than it had had
under British rule. Furthermore, it could also be considered a total departure
from the traditional Western model of democratization or sudden democrati-
zation like that of eastern Europe in the late 1980s as it concerned a large span
of time—a 12-year transitional period from the signing of the Sino-British
Declaration in 1984, the agreement that Hong Kong would be “handed back”
to China to a transitional period till Chinese sovereignty was resumed on
July 1, 1997; and then, according to the Basic Law, after it became an SAR
it had another ten years (“subsequent till the year 2007”—in Annex II) when
the political system could be changed. Furthermore, it was stated (Article 5)
that there were to be “no changes in the capitalist system and lifestyle for
50 years,” adding an interesting temporal dimension to the political process.
And with the “ultimate aim” of universal suffrage written into its constitution
without a firm date, this democratization process became an “open-ended”
speculative future event (Neiger 2007, 309–321).
The successful implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” was also
held up at ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the reversion to
Chinese sovereignty in July 2007. Hu Jintao, the current Chinese president,
hailed Hong Kong as a “window and bridge,” emphasizing the role that
Hong Kong has always played in Chinese history (China Daily 2007a). The
Chinese leader repeated the “century-old wish of the Chinese people” that
Hong Kong had returned to the motherland and that Hong Kong had become
an even “more prosperous city.” He also thanked Chinese and foreign friends
for its “continued prosperity and stability.” Many times during this speech,
he stressed that the central government had striven to “ensure prosperity and
stability” and that the two chief executives had upheld the “overall stability of
Hong Kong” (Ibid). Note the preponderance of metaphor in describing Hong
Kong’s role in Chinese history.
The year 2017 saw the twentieth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to
China, and the emphasis was somewhat different:
“‘Together • Progress • Opportunity’ is the theme of our 20th anniversary
celebration which also speaks the vision of Hong Kong to join hands with
the Mainland in building an even brighter future” (Beijing Office 2017). This
theme emphasized Mainland-Hong Kong linkages and was in line with what
some saw as increasing “mainlandization” since 2015. Like decades before,
“Hong Kong has always been a bridgehead where East meets West” (Ibid).
Occupy Central, also known as the Umbrella Movement, in 2014 failed to
secure any changes or promises from the government, and problems such as
skyrocketing real estate prices, deteriorating education standards, and stag-
nant wages were common topics in the media. Since 2015, a small but highly
A Transition 11
vocal group of mostly young people, disappointed with the pace of political
change, started calling for Hong Kong to have more autonomy or even inde-
pendence, a call that was practically nonexistent for the previous 15 years.
In 1997, Hong Kong had moved from being a colonial dependency of
democratic Great Britain to being a region belonging to authoritarian,
socialist (albeit an increasingly market-oriented), PRC. Its distinctive devel-
opment has thrown up interesting challenges to the description, interpreta-
tion, and explanation of the so-called traditional discourses of politics and
democratization.
THINGS TO CONSIDER IN ANALYZING

HONG KONG’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE
In describing and interpreting the discourses of political change in Hong

Kong, certain aspects need to be considered. First is its political hybridity; the
second is how the promise of the ultimate aim of universal suffrage is stated
in the Basic Law (the major “framing” document for this discourse), Hong
Kong’s constitutional document; and third is its history as a British colony
but a Chinese society.
First aspect to be considered is Hong Kong as a political hybrid. At the
beginning of this chapter, I stated that Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, became
an “executive-led partial democracy,” one that said to straddle “the liberal
autocracy of the past and the ideal of a fuller democracy in the future” (Lau
and Kuan 2000; Kuan and Lau 2002, 60). However, its political structure
could also be said to amount to a liberal form of authoritarian rule, in which
there are civil liberties, but not competitive elections (Case 2009). The “One
Country, Two Systems” as a governance style is, by its nature, a “hybrid” as it
combines two quite different political (capitalist, liberal, authoritarian, social-
ist) and social systems with quite different discursive styles. The following
quotation reflects this hybridity.
The SAR has today become a state of anarchy, something that is neither one
thing or another, neither Chinese nor Western, neither a chicken nor a duck, nei-
ther democratic and also neither authoritarian. When Deng Xiaoping invented
the “One Country, Two Systems” and “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”
concept, he employed too much wishful thinking; setting parts of Hong Kong’s
organizational structure too simply and setting the art of British administration
too low; he also set the intelligence estimate too high for the “governance sys-
tem” of those “who love China and love Hong Kong.” (Apple Daily, December
24, 2004)
12 Chapter 1
Furthermore, Hong Kong’s post-1997 political structure, much like its

pre-1997 colonial system, reflects this hybridity in that the chief executive
(elected by an electoral committee and with powers similar to British gov-
ernors of the past) and executive authorities (usually appointed rather than
elected) could be said to represent its “authoritarian” nature, while the legis-
lature is its “democratic” nature in that its currently elected members (either
directly by the general public or professional categories) have limited powers
to initiate change. How is this hybrid political nature reflected in the ideologi-
cally bound language of political change?
Another aspect to be considered is how the promise of the ultimate aim of
universal suffrage is stated in the Basic Law. Hong Kong as a “presidential
limited democracy” (CIA Factbook, updated September 23, 2021) is therefore
hoping to attain “fuller” democracy, that is, universal suffrage, in the future.
Universal suffrage, like democracy, is an “essentially contested concept”
(Gallie 1956) since it is a term that exhibits polysemy, a state which “char-
acterizes the language of ideology”; essentially contested concepts involve
widespread agreement on a concept (e.g., “fairness”) but not the best realiza-
tion thereof this concept. Essentially contested concepts are “concepts the
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper
uses on the part of their users,” and these disputes “cannot be settled by
appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone”
(Gray 1977, 344).4
According to the OED, universal suffrage consists of the extension of the
right to vote to all adults:
Universal suffrage, a suffrage extending to the whole of a community, esp. one

in virtue of which all persons (formerly all-male persons) over a certain age,
except lunatics, aliens, and criminals, have the right to vote for representatives
to a legislative (usually parliamentary) assembly.5
The concept of democracy as set out in the “One Country” (China) and the
“Second System” (Hong Kong) is quite different. China practices “social-
ist democracy” or “democratic centralism” under one-party rule. Many in
Hong Kong, like the West generally, consider a “democratic system” as one
possessing the rule of law, equal and fair elections, pluralism of political
parties, and freedom of speech, among other enshrined principles. However,
the concept of democracy can be “conceptually stretched” and can come
“with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1996) and the minimal criteria for
a regime to be denoted as “democratic” can be contested (Ibid). Robert A.
Dahl, a noted political scientist, states: “yet a term that means anything means
nothing. And so it has become with ‘democracy’ which is not so much a
term of restricted meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular idea” (Dahl
A Transition 13
1989, 2). Accordingly, how does the wording in the Basic Law deal with this
“contested concept” and how do different actors in the discourse conceive
universal suffrage?
Hong Kong’s history as a British colony and a Chinese society also has
an impact on the discourse. As a predominately Chinese population whose
familial origins lay in China but governed under so-called benign liberal
authoritarianism, this intersecting of Chinese cultural thinking and Western
influence must have an effect on discourse vis-à-vis political change between
it and the PRC, particularly regarding topics said to be common to the
Chinese cultural mind-set.
These topics, also known as rhetorical topoi (Rapp 2010) “are generated
by believers held in common by the group or culture.” These topics are basic
categories of relationships among ideas, each of which can serve as a tem-
plate or heuristic for discovering things to say about a subject. Foucault’s
“discursive practices” (Foucault 1972) could almost be equated with the con-
cept of topoi in that he sees them as “a body of anonymous, historical rules,
always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period and
for a given social economic, geographic, or linguistic area, the conditions
of operation of the enunciative function” (117) and that they underpin other
varied discourses of that group, either implicitly or explicitly.
Typical rhetorical topoi (topics) in Chinese discourse throughout the centu-
ries have involved harmony (e.g., a harmonious society, illustrating continu-
ity with the past; the need for consensus), loyalty (individual subordination
to the collective), Chinese versus foreign (outside forces threatening Chinese
territory/sovereignty and the fostering of togetherness), and stability (which
is connected to harmony and consensus) (Powers and Kluver 1999).
Of these, “stability” could almost be said to be the major topos in mainland
China since the “open door” policy was instituted in 1978 with the phrase
“stability overrides everything” (穩定壓倒一切) most prominent.6 Whenever
there have been political crises, the “discourse of stability” crops up.
In the past, the Confucian concept of Zhengming (正名) or “rectification
of names” was often used as the basis for generating arguments about a
subject or a concept: “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance
with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of
things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.”7 Chu and Chin (1978, 238)
found that there has been a long, largely unbroken continuance with the past
involving these traditional Chinese rhetorical topoi, even during the Cultural
Revolution, despite the radical social and political upheavals of that decade.
During this time, there was a “redefinition of names” serving to accommo-
date changes in ideology without compromising the basic social structure.
For example, the term people would exclude “capitalist roaders,” “rightists,”
and “landlords” during various political movements in China (Xu 1999, 46).
14 Chapter 1
Even as recently as 2011, at a conference on language, law, and discourse, a

Mainland scholar dealing with legal texts mentioned that in China “the peo-
ple” is a political term and that in Chinese legal writing “the people” (人民)
should be changed to “citizen” (公民) instead.8 Redefinition can also be seen
in how the Mainland justifies “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” to
include developing as a market economy.9
The “rectification of names” relates to the Confucian concepts noted
above, constructs such as harmony, stability, loyalty, and so on, being further
defined/redefined or emphasized by those in authority according to the spe-
cific demands of society at a particular time. Although Hong Kong consid-
ers itself an ultramodern metropolis and re-branded itself as “Asia’s World
City”10 post 1997, these “traditional” rhetorical topoi affect or are affected by
discourses related to its democratization.
Hong Kong, being a political entity undergoing unique political change,
would have its own unique political discourse, characterized by hybridity
and perhaps a unique set of metaphors, unique patterns of argumentation, and
unique discourse strategies. Hong Kong’s partially democratic and authori-
tarian nature while promising universal suffrage at some unspecified time
in the future suggests that there may be a confluence of liberal and illiberal
discourses that contest this future promise. This has proven to be the case.
HONG KONG, ITSELF A METAPHOR
Hong Kong’s journey from a colony to decolonization but not independence

hinges on questions of identity vis-à-vis its geographical and historical con-
text. How Hong Kong has seen itself through these lenses has a large bearing
on how it has seen its future political course and how it is expressed rhetori-
cally and lexico-grammatically. In this section, the metaphors of Hong Kong
as symbol and token will be discussed in order to contextualize the political
discourse of Hong Kong’s political democratization and connected events
that follow in later chapters.
Cities and nation-states are “conceptual” entities that can also be meta-
phorical, since they are frequently “imagined” (e.g., see the websites of
any nation’s tourism authority). Benedict Anderson defined a nation as “an
imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited
and sovereign” (Anderson 1991). An imagined community is different from
an actual community because it is not (and cannot be) based on face-to-face
interaction between its members. Instead, members hold in their minds a
mental image of their affinity. As Anderson puts it, a nation “is imagined
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of
A Transition 15
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of
each live the image of their communion” (Ibid).
In Italo Calvino’s fictional work, Imaginary Cities (1974), the reader is
given a series of vignettes describing cities of all kinds. We eventually dis-
cover that these fragmentary images are in fact one specific city: The Venice
of Marco Polo as told to Kublai Khan. These fragments could perhaps be seen
as either the multifaceted aspects of a single city or the imaginary conception
of that city’s citizens. The following excerpt from this work is pertinent in the
context of Hong Kong’s image construction:
CITIES AND THE SKY 3
Those who arrive at Thekla can see little of the city, beyond the plank fences,
the sackcloth screens, the scaffoldings, the metal armatures, the wooden cat-
walks hanging from ropes or supported by sawhorses, the ladders, the trestles.
If you ask “Why is Thekla’s construction taking such a long time?” the inhabit-
ants continue hoisting sacks, lowering leaded strings, moving long brushes up
and down, as they answer “So that its destruction cannot begin.” And if asked
whether they fear that, once the scaffoldings are removed, the city may begin to
crumble and fall to pieces, they add hastily, in a whisper, “Not only the city.”
If, dissatisfied with the answers, someone puts his eye to a crack in a fence,
he sees cranes pulling up other cranes, scaffoldings that embrace other scaffold-
ings, beams that prop up other beams. “What meaning does your construction
have?” he asks. “What is the aim of a city under construction unless it is a city?
Where is the plan you are following, the blueprint?”
“We will show it to you as soon as the working day is over; we cannot inter-
rupt our work now,” they answer.
Work stops at sunset. Darkness falls over the building site. The sky is filled
with stars. “There is the blueprint,” they say. (Calvino 1974, 101)
Dung Kai-chung’s The Atlas: Archaeology of an Imaginary City (2011)

echoes Calvino, but with wry sarcasm, in a collection of 51 short vignettes
in 4 sections. The temporal setting for two of these sections, “City” and
“Streets,” is the twenty-first century when the “City of Victoria” (another
name for Hong Kong) no longer exists and narrators can only divine from
old maps and atlases what it was like and how it changed during 156 years
as a British colony. This is because of the rapid erection and demolition of
the physical structures of the place as echoed in Calvino above shows. Chen
(2006, 90) says that the author of The Atlas “claims that the Hong Kong that
is known to its people in fact cannot be pinpointed on a map because a map
is only an ‘epistemological translation’ of the world.”
16 Chapter 1
The Sun Yat-sen Historical Trail (https://hk.drsunyatsen.museum) pro-

vides an example of what Akbar Abbas calls the “disappearance” of history
or, better still, the “dis-appearance” of history (Abbas 1997). The Trail,
launched in 1996, links up historical sites related to Sun Yat-sen’s activities
in Hong Kong as a revolutionary. The government put up plates imparting
relevant historical facts on selected sites and later erected signposts on these
spots. The Sun Yat-sen Historical Trail concerns the “emptiness” of signs,
for the actual buildings with any historical significance to Sun Yat-sen have
been demolished. Each of the plates on the Trail presents “the old site of” a
historical building. The buildings and their historical reality are gone, leaving
behind only the plates or signposts. Barthes describes this phenomenon as
“the signified pass, the signifier remains” (1993, 416).
Abbas suggests that one form of the disappearance of history is this kind
of turning history into decoration: “This patina of history is no more than
decorative, an image of history meant for visual consumption” (Ibid, 66). The
Trail also demonstrates another form of historical disappearance in Abbas’
sense, that is, the substitution of one history with another, a displacement of
attention from the sometimes conflictual colonial history of Hong Kong, to
the harmonious accommodation of Chinese culture in colonial architecture
(Ibid, 68) as well as the opening of many new museums after 1997, to this
end to show the intricate links of Hong Kong and the Mainland.11 On the
other hand, some fear the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong into “just another
Chinese city.” One can already see the contradictions between the desire for
“closeness/identity with China,” especially economically, and Hong Kong’s
desire to be unique and apart. The Sun Yat-sen Trail and many other aspects
of heritage preservation are thus presented as a “simulacrum” of the past that
is no longer physically present.12 A simulacrum “is a material image, made
as a representation of some deity, person, or thing” and is also “something
having merely the form or appearance of a certain thing, without possess-
ing its substance or proper qualities.”13 The French theorist Jean Baudrillard
describes how simulacra and the “real” have been substituted so frequently
that they have become indistinguishable; in his essay “The Precession of
the Simulacra,” Baudrillard (2010) discusses a story by Jorge Luis Borges
(1998), “On Exactitude in Science” in which a map so extremely large and
detailed is made that it covers the whole empire. After a while the map begins
to become tattered with use, and the citizens of the empire mourn its loss.
Under the map the real territory has turned into a desert, a “desert of the real.”
In its place, a simulacrum of reality—the threadbare mega-map—is all that’s
left. This “exactitude” of mapping is about the “ideal of representation” in
which the “gaps are filled in,” in order to leave no room for uncertainty and
therefore fear.
A Transition 17
In addition to reconstructing (and refiguring) the past, it is constantly con-

structing the present. Hong Kong is often described as “one big construction
site,” with buildings going up and down with extreme alacrity—a five-star
hotel, the Ritz-Carlton, was pulled down in 2008, only 15 years after being
built, to build an office tower (Eng 2008). Development, almost exclusively
related to infrastructure and the economy, is almost a hallowed term to the
business community and government of Hong Kong. For example, the Chief
Executive’s Policy Address of 2007 “A New Direction for Hong Kong”
had “Undertaking 10 Major Infrastructure Projects for Economic Growth”
as the first major section of the address after the introduction (Hong Kong
Gov. 2007). The word development was mentioned 122 times in the text.14 In
November 2020, the Chief Executive’s Policy Address, “Striving Ahead with
Renewed Perseverance” (after the table of contents), mentioned the word
development 194 times (Hong Kong Gov. 2020). This time, however, the
focus of Hong Kong’s development was more on the Mainland.
Hong Kong’s economic growth and development as an international finan-
cial “hub” permeates all discourses in Hong Kong at some level, heritage
issues included.15 In recent times the discussion of Hong Kong’s “collective
memory” in relation to heritage and conservation issues has escalated as
various historical sites make way for “urban renewal” or “redevelopment.”16
The following text comes from the website “heritage.gov.hk” (italics added):
To protect, conserve and revitalise as appropriate historical and heritage sites

and buildings through relevant and sustainable approaches for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations. In implementing this policy, due
regard should be given to development needs in the public interest, respect for
private property rights, budgetary considerations, cross-sector collaboration and
active engagement of stakeholders and the general public. (www.heritage.gov
.hk/en/heritage/statement.htm)
“Development needs,” however, also seem to take priority whenever histori-

cal preservation issues arise, since real estate developers hold great sway in
the SAR and land premiums are high.
The discussion about how Hong Kong sees “development,” in particular,
economic development, is crucial to this study, as quickness of action seems
to characterize Hong Kong while political reform seems to be related to
caution, deliberation, and pragmatism lest it affect “stability and prosper-
ity”—these could be called “Hong Kong collocates.” One establishment
figure said that if the city was not careful, Hong Kong would “go backwards”
(Tien 2006). The process of development and therefore change seems to take
precedence over the nature of that change. Bernard Chan of the Hong Kong
government’s Executive Council said that “Most of our debate about political
18 Chapter 1
reform focuses on structure, such as the numbers of seats, methods of election

and, of course, timetables. We don’t hear much about political process, such
as policy formation” (Chan 2007).
The key to the “imagined community” that is Hong Kong, as all the above
implies, is based on development and “infrastructure,” since Hong Kong’s
story of how “a small collection of fishing villages” rises, through copious
sweat and toil, to become an “international metropolis” is taken as a cause
of pride by Hong Kong residents. This “Hong Kong spirit” as it is called
is also known as the “Lion Rock spirit,” that is of prospering in the face of
bitter adversity, entered the collective imagination with a 1970s television
series about the lives of working-class residents living below the city’s iconic
Lion Rock mountain. Many of them had sought refuge in the then British
colony from China’s political strife, and together they strove to improve their
lot. This was seen as the “spirit” of resilience. This construct is especially
invoked when economic downturns or other crises trouble Hong Kong’s
society. Adversity always seems to be on the horizon, despite Hong Kong’s
extensive fiscal reserves, and it is this continual “battle against the odds”
that is implied in paragraph 102 of the Chief Executive’s Policy Address for
2005–2006:
During almost 40 years of public service, I have, together with the people of
Hong Kong, experienced many ups and downs. We have grown up with Hong
Kong and, collectively with our “Hong Kong spirit,” endured many trials. With
their bare hands, Hong Kong people have built a vibrant world city that is caring
and just, without compromising its efficiency. Over the past eight years, these
same people have, through their perseverance and wisdom, overcome the most
serious economic difficulties in half a century. We have finally emerged from
rainy weather to embrace sunny days. (www.policyaddress.gov.hk/05-06/eng/
index.htm)
This is also related to the “discourse of fear” of failing in its economic reason
d’être that is linked up to the sojourner mentality of the older generation in
Hong Kong, who saw the place as a temporary location from the Mainland
where one must accumulate enough security in case of future trouble or
political strife. This is connected to the “need for continuous development”
and a fear of falling behind other regional cities like Singapore and Shanghai.
This belief was exacerbated in late 1997 when Asia was at “the centre of an
economic quake” (Hughes 1997).
How Hong Kong has seen itself impacts crucially on the past and cur-
rent discourses of its future democratization, because in “transition” a state
questions its previous identities and tries to fashion new ones to suit shifting
circumstances. In Hong Kong’s case, its closeness to China, but not being “of
A Transition 19
it,” meant that its citizens had always been keenly aware of the differences
that exist between the two places.
What is it that enables this floating city to stay so readily in the air? Could it be
the gravitational pull between earth and sky? Or could it be the marionette per-
formance staged by the god of destiny holding numerous strings in his hands?
(Xi 1997, 11)
Hong Kong may have been a “floating city,” but talking about “mainland
China” as being separate from Hong Kong is rather an odd usage as large parts
of the territory of Hong Kong are “geographically part of the Mainland, and
that Hong Kong island is itself separated from ‘the mainland’ by only a few
hundred metres of sea” (Benson 1994, 74). The two terms for “Mainland” in
Chinese, dalu (大陸) “mainland” literally or “big continent” and “內地” liter-
ally “inner place,” reflect this. The latter term implies that Hong Kong is on the
“outer edge” of the nation, a peripheral entity. These designations are thus more
metaphorical and ideological than geographical. Although the term “nonlocal”
seems obvious, in Hong Kong this means “from the Mainland” to distinguish
mainland Chinese from “foreigners” as in the expression “nonlocal university
students” (as opposed to “international university students”) since Hong Kong
is part of China. They are not of Hong Kong, but they are still Chinese.
Now, being “of it,” in a (special) sense as an SAR of China, has meant that
its position, both geographically and metaphorically, is questioned. As the
quotation above and subsequent metaphors relating to Hong Kong’s location
will show, this situatedness between China and Britain, as one local novel-
ist puts it, being “a tiny speck, smaller than a sesame seed” (Xi 2002, xvii),
is something moveable and “powerless.” The main characters of this novel
Marvels of a Floating City (Ibid) live in a lush green land called Fertillia and
panic as an earthquake approaches from Dragonland, their ancestral home,
“a once-sleeping behemoth who has been given too many clocks by foreign
countries” (Ibid). This powerlessness, either perceived or real, might also
arise in its role as a portal of trade between places. This could be considered
almost ironic since Hong Kong seems to be integrating more closely with the
Mainland’s economy.
This powerlessness stems also from Hong Kong still being seen as a pas-
sageway, a “gateway” (門), or a “bridge” (橋) to China and the rest of Asia.
A Google search of Hong Kong as a “gateway to China” comes up with is
many millions of hits. In other words, Hong Kong is a conduit, not a place to
dwell for any length of time. A conduit, by definition, cannot be a mediator;
a conduit facilitates the passage of goods, people, or information to another
location.
20 Chapter 1
Hong Kong, despite now being part of China, is still a conduit, particularly
an economic one. The Hong Kong government had considered that a new
high-speed rail would reinforce Hong Kong’s position as an effective gate-
way to China (ROLCS 2019)—this high-speed network is now in place as
well as the mega Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge, all built to speed trans-
portation and trade between the three major cities in the Pearl River Delta
region (both opened in 2018); and former Chief Executive Donald Tsang,
who had said years earlier that even though the “big door” to facilitate trade
between Hong Kong and the Mainland had been opened by CEPA,17 some
“‘smaller doors’ had not yet been opened up for the two sides to operate”
(Cheung 2010). There is now the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which is
a global development strategy in 2013 involving infrastructure development
and investments in 152 countries and international organizations in Asia,
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas.18
The talk of bridges, gateways, and other links to the Mainland again relates
to how one academic Abbas sees the politics that Hong Kong practices as one
of “disappearance” (Abbas 1997) as discussed earlier. This is due to the pres-
ence of so many “binary opposites” that “dispel memory, history and pres-
ence” (Ibid, 4). The most prominent binary opposites are “East and West” as
in “a distinctive blend of East and West” and “modern and traditional.” It is,
[A]lmost like a living, breathing oxymoron. A city where the East truly meets
the West, where insane levels of activity mesh seamlessly with hushed peace
and the modern stands side-by-side with the traditional. Hong Kong can boast
many seemingly contradictory titles. (Ibid, 4)
These opposites are metaphors that cancel each other out, for Abbas says
that Hong Kong disappears through these particular dualities. Even disgraced
politicians and revolutionaries could hide in the city and “disappear” (Torode
2008). Various controversial political figures have spent time in Hong
Kong with often little publicity either hiding out or passing through on the
way to other locations political activities such as Anwar Ibrahim, Thaksin
Shinawatra, Ho Chi Minh, and of course Sun Yat-sen. “You might say that
Hong Kong is of the region but, politically and diplomatically at least, it is not
really part of the region . . . Hong Kong may be a part of China, but it is still
basically at arm’s length . . .” and “I always thought Hong Kong is a place
where you can come to ‘disappear’ for a while,” as one envoy said (Ibid).
However, some considered that Hong Kong’s “dual characteristics” give
it its “competitive edge” and are complementary to each other. For example,
an article titled “A unique fusion of Confucius and Aristotle” (Po 2010) dis-
cusses whether the Mainland’s system of values has impacted Hong Kong’s
“core values” and notes that the Mainland is becoming more capitalistic. “It
A Transition 21
is imperative that Hong Kong is thoughtful in taking the values the mainland
is discarding and in letting go of the values it is picking up” (Ibid). A letter
to the editor commenting on this article sees it as having “one of the best
descriptions of Hong Kong’s uniqueness” and “a heart-felt and cogent rep-
resentation of the coexistence of Western and Eastern values” (Engel 2010).
The discourses of future political change in post-handover Hong Kong
seem “to have been built on contingency, on geographical and historical
accidents, shaped by times and circumstances beyond its control and by
pragmatic accommodation to events” (Abbas 1997, 73). Such “shapings”
and “accommodations” inform Hong Kong’s previous overall metaphorical
positioning as a place and an “idea,” which its new political self as a part of
the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, takes up as the basis for “con-
structing” discourses about its ultimate destination.
NOTES
1. Based on the Gazetteer of Conventional Names, third edition, August 1988, US

Board on Geographic Names and on other sources. www.worldatlas.com/webimage/
countrys/asia/hk.htm.
2. “Metaphor, n.” OED Online, June 2011. Oxford University Press, August 29,
2011. www.oed.com/view/Entry/117328?redirectedFrom=metaphor.
3. The author was once a committee member of the Hong Kong Democratic
Foundation (hkdf.org), and the Civic Party of Hong Kong (https://www.civicparty
.hk/en/) till early 2021 when she resigned from both groups. With an MA and a PhD
in applied linguistics (discourse analysis) from Macquarie University in Sydney, she
has closely followed and participated in protests since 2004 and has written various
articles and commentaries on Hong Kong political discourse.
4. Various websites that discuss and promote democracy or better governance
focus on explaining what they see as the principles of democracy, the elements and
exercise of democratic government, and the international scope of democracy—like
the National Democratic Institute (www.ndi.org) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(www.ipu.org/dem-e/overview.htm).
5. “Universal Suffrage.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/universal%20suffrage.
6. See https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/trouble-on-chinas-periphery-the-stability
-instability-paradox/ Trouble on China’s Periphery: The Stability-Instability Paradox
/ David Skidmore August 18, 2020.
7. The Confucian Analects—The Chinese Text Project. https://ctext.org/analects
?searchu=%E6%AD%A3%E5%90%8D.
8. This was said by a mainland Chinese legal expert at the First International
Conference on Law, Language and Discourse: Multiculturalism, Diversity and
Dynamicity. This conference was jointly run by the City University of Hong Kong
with the Polytechnic University, August 20–21, 2011, and attended by the author.
22 Chapter 1
9. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics is something that combines the basic

principles of scientific socialism with the facts of building socialism unique to China.
Socialism is the common rule and essential feature of the practice.” http://cpcchina
.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-09/16/content_13918113.htm. Despite saying this, the web-
site does not elaborate on what these characteristics are. See also http://www.xinhua-
net.com/english/2017-10/08/c_136665156.htm.
10. This is the theme of “Brand Hong Kong” (www.brandhk.gov.hk): “The idea
of ‘branding’ Hong Kong first emerged in 1997. At that time, much attention was
focused on the return of Hong Kong to China, and there was concern in some quarters
that Hong Kong might vanish from the international stage after reunification. Various
strategies were considered, and the decision to develop Brand Hong Kong (BrandHK)
was finally taken in 2000.” One core value was that Hong Kong people were
“Enterprising: Efficient, industrious and resilient, Hong Kong people are renowned
for their can-do spirit, entrepreneurial skills and an ability to create opportunities.”
(https://www.brandhk.gov.hk/html/en/BrandHongKong/WhatIsBrandHongKong
.html).
11. The “Hong Kong Story,” a permanent exhibition at the Hong Kong Museum
of History, emphasized the links with the Mainland and folk culture (Eagleton 2004).
In 2020, people lined up to see “The Hong Kong Story” one last time before the
Museum of History gave it an “extensive revamp.” They came to photograph the
colonial-era displays, on the assumption that items like governors’ portraits would
be scrapped due to the recent political climate. The existing exhibition that—when
opened in 2002—struck many as downplaying the colonial period and Hong Kong’s
older claims to a distinct regional culture. The exhibition’s timeline ended in 1997
with the Hong Kong handover. The word is that the new-look exhibition will have a
bigger focus on the post-1997 period.
12. There are many other examples of this rebuilt, moved location (brick by brick)
torn down and “rebuilt in the likeness of” or “redeveloped.” For example, in 1982,
the Murray Building was dismantled to make way for the new Bank of China tower.
Over 3,000 building blocks were cataloged and stored away for future restoration. It
was later rebuilt in Stanley.
There is also the “core elements preservation” approach, meaning facades, or
an “element” of a structure was left behind such as for the Wan Chai Market facade;
Lee Tung Street that was near the market was once known as “Wedding Card Street”
and featured local artisans making “wedding cards.” The new development was to
feature a “cultural gallery” that would “provide about 30,000 square feet retail net
floor space which is more than twice as big as the area of all the former wedding
card shops combined,” this is kind of “better than the original mindset” (URA 2007).
13. “Simulacrum, n.” OED Online, Oxford University Press. www.oed.com/view
/Entry/180000?redirectedFrom=simulacrum.
14. See full text of the Policy Address at www.policyaddress.gov.hk/07-08/eng/
policy.html. “Development” always seems to be the focus of these policy addresses.
15. Hong Kong has been touted, not only as an international financial hub, but
a tourism hub, a Chinese medicine hub, and education hub; these are conduit-like
metaphors. See the 2020 Hong Kong annual Policy Address “Striving Ahead with
A Transition 23
Renewed Perseverance” (https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2020/eng/pdf/PA2020

.pdf) and earlier addresses.
16. There were 159 articles dealing with this topic in 2007, a time when a few
Hong Kong architectural “icons”—Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier—were about to be
demolished and/or moved elsewhere. The government often planned to “rebuild”
them at another location.
17. CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement) is the first free trade agree-
ment that Hong Kong signed with mainland China; see www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/
cepa_overview.html.
18. “The Belt and Road Initiative—A Road Map to THE FUTURE.” https://belt-
androad.hktdc.com/en/belt-and-road-basics.
Chapter 2
Hong Kong’s “Guiding Light”

The Basic Law as Discursive Frame
This chapter will look at the primary framers of the discourse, the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. The former is the document set-
ting Hong Kong’s future as an SAR of China, and the latter, which arose out
of it, is the physical realization of “One Country, Two Systems.” First, I will
discuss the contextual, social, and political atmosphere behind the drafting
as well as a textual analysis of each of these two documents, particularly the
Basic Law as a legal genre and source of contestation regarding Hong Kong’s
constitutional development. The chapter will conclude with how the Basic
Law is seen as the embodiment of the “One Country, Two Systems” both
metalingually and metaphorically. Seeing the Basic Law as a metaphor by
certain “gatekeepers” will indicate how discourse actors may assign meaning
to the term “universal suffrage” and future political development.
The Basic Law has a tripartite identity: international, domestic, and con-
stitutional. It is the “brainchild” of an international treaty, the Sino-British
Joint Declaration (hereafter the JD);1 a domestic law of the PRC; and the
constitutional document of the Hong Kong SAR, its “parent legislation,” the
constitution of the PRC.
Furthermore, as the offspring of vastly different legal and political sys-
tems with fundamentally different notions of authority and governance, the
Basic Law poses interesting questions due to the inherent intertextuality and
interdiscursivity of legal writing, which requires interpretation to take into
account the “sociopolitical objects” that the document is written to achieve
(Bhatia 1993). In this case, the object was to inculcate a new ideology and
identity for Hong Kong as a part of China (Loh 2010, 234).
In the next section, I will show how negotiations over Hong Kong’s future
influenced the drafting and emergent text of the JD.
25
26 Chapter 2
THE HANDOVER PRELIMINARIES
Hong Kong could be considered a “long-term lease” taken out by the British
(Ma 2007) and its “handing back” the expiration of that lease in 1997. The
Chinese government had always taken the position that the whole of Hong
Kong was a Chinese territory. After China took Taiwan’s seat at the United
Nations in 1971, it requested the United Nations General Assembly to
remove Hong Kong from its decolonization agenda as “Its position for many
years was that the question of Hong Kong came into the category of unequal
treaties left over from history; that it should be settled peacefully through
negotiations when conditions were ripe.” So, from this time onward, the
“question” of Hong Kong began to take purchase in people’s minds, particu-
larly in the late 1970s as the lease’s expiration came nearer.
When the need to “remove the uncertainty” about the 1997 deadline arose,
discussions on Hong Kong’s future began. Hong Kong then became “the only
human habitation in the world that knows when it will die—1997” (Hughes
1976, 13–14).
Both Britain and China had “the common aim of maintaining the stabil-
ity and prosperity of Hong Kong” (see Endnote 1), according to British
prime minister Margaret Thatcher when she met Chairman Deng Xiaoping
in Beijing on September 24, 1982, to open discussions. Communist China
had benefited economically from free, capitalist, and prosperous Hong Kong
as means for contact with the outside world, and as a source of finance and
trade. For Britain’s part, it wanted to maintain good trading links with China
and leave on good terms with the Hong Kong public. Like its establishment,
Hong Kong’s relinquishment was largely about economics (Ghai 1997, 36).
At the start of formal negotiations, Britain had “explained in detail the
systems prevailing in Hong Kong and the importance for these systems of the
British administrative role and link” (White Paper, see Endnote 1). It tried to
make the case that Hong Kong was successful and prosperous because of its
difference from China, the respective (and incompatible) systems coexisting
because of its colonial status, and the presence of the British in running these
systems.
Following extensive discussion, however, it became clear that the continu-
ation of the British administration after 1997 was unacceptable to China. To
the Chinese, this would be colonialism by another name and imply that China
was unable to administer Hong Kong successfully by itself.2
However, if other “arrangements acceptable to the Hong Kong people”
were found, Britain would acquiesce to China’s demands for “full sover-
eignty.” In other words, the colonial “buffer” (Wesley-Smith 1996, 106)
would be removed. In its place Britain desired to replace this “buffer” with a
legally binding promise that would largely keep in place its existing systems:
Hong Kong’s “Guiding Light” 27
Examining with the Chinese how it might be possible to arrive at arrangements

that would secure for Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy under Chinese
sovereignty, and that would preserve the way of life in Hong Kong, together
with the essentials of the present systems. White Paper (Paragraph 11)
Such a metaphorical buffer (i.e., “a high degree of autonomy”) would also

suit the Chinese authorities. Talks then centered on Deng Xiaoping’s prin-
ciple of “One Country, Two Systems.” Deng saw this principle as resolving
the contradictions inherent in uniting such different places. The application
of this principle would allow the capitalist system to operate in Hong Kong
but not “contaminate” the Mainland’s socialist system, provide an exemplar
for reunification with Taiwan, and grant an economic “catch-up” period for
China as it pursued marketization under “socialism with Chinese character-
istics” (Ibid). Economics was thus “one of the main pillars” of this system
(Xiao 2001, 391) and the basis for further negotiations.
When the JD was formally signed in December 1984, Deng Xiaoping
called it “a product of dialectic Marxism and historical materialism”;
Margaret Thatcher described it as an “ingenious idea” (Carroll 2007, 181)
while Percy Cradock, British Ambassador to China, cautiously saw it “as
comprehensive protection as could be devised and agreed” (Cradock 1994,
209). In other words, the best that could be attained under the circumstances,
and it was presented to the public as a “take-it-or-leave-it” agreement, which
greatly influenced how Hong Kong people regarded it. They had no choice
but to “take it.” In other words, the JD was seen as an expedient way of
achieving a strategic objective.3
THE NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AND

ITS LINGUISTIC REALIZATION
Despite Britain’s feeling that it had largely achieved its objective (protection
and maintenance of Hong Kong’s systems), China’s negotiation strategy was
largely instrumental in shaping the document’s final text (Cotterill 1993;
Tsang 2004; Bonavia 1985).
The main principle that China insisted on before negotiations started
was that Britain had to admit that Hong Kong belonged to China; Britain
could not then logically argue that sovereignty and administration could be
separated. Accepting this “principle, the Chinese could deduce other details
by their own logic, putting the other side on the defensive” (Ibid, 40–43).
Concessions could then be extracted easily if the other side wanted the agree-
ment badly enough (Pye 1985). This caused the British to believe that China
was determined to take back Hong Kong at any cost, even as a “wasteland”
28 Chapter 2
(Cottrell 1993, 128). By instituting a firm deadline (September 1984), and

saying that if this was not kept, China would announce the terms of Hong
Kong’s constitution itself.
The following briefly sums up China’s negotiation strategy and the objec-
tive for using this style:
1. Emphasize general principles; sovereignty without administration was

not possible.
This was to be a basis of discussions and nothing else till this was
confirmed: this meant that China could control the course of negotiations.
2. Exclude fine details from the agreement. To be confirmed later when put
into the Basic Law that China is in control of.
3. Put a time constraint on negotiations. Made the other side flexible if they
wanted the agreement badly enough.
4. Hold negotiations in Beijing. Negotiations would be on Chinese “home
turf,” the British would be the “petitioner”; this emphasized that Hong
Kong was a China issue, not a British one.
5. Hold “megaphone” diplomacy. Announce items in the press before for-
mal discussions take place had the effect of putting certain matters on the
agenda.
The actual JD is 1,166 words long and had three annexes, a total of 6,000-
odd words. The former (and shorter) document was what the Chinese wanted
and the latter was what the British “needed” (Loh 2010, 142). British diplo-
mat and sinologist David Wilson said that “We learnt to rechristen our details
as principles and found everyone got along much better” (cited in Blyth and
Wotherspoon 1996, 79) and “We [the British] wanted to write a book—which
would have looked like the Encyclopedia Britannica—while the Chinese
wanted around 2–3 sides of A4 paper” (David Wilson cited in Blyth and
Wotherspoon 1996, 79).
These comments by Wilson mirror the typical differences in legislation
between the two systems; the British following the common law system
while the Chinese, the civil code. Under a civil code system, laws are “under-
specified and written in the form of general principles” (Bhatia, Candlin, and
Allori 2008, 136; Cao 2004) leaving the interpretation to other bodies.
The Name of the Document

China first resisted the idea of a treaty, wanting to record the understanding of
the different sides as “parallel statements” (Ghai 1999, 53). Given the differ-
ences of views on the historical question of sovereignty, both sides wanted to
state their own position, but that when the parties agreed, this would be stated
in a common declaration (Ibid). The term “joint declaration” (聯合聲明)

created uncertainty about the document’s status as it had no set definition in
Chinese or English law or language. Although the Chinese and English both
agreed to use this term, their understandings of it diverged widely. The British
regarded this as a binding international treaty and stated so in the White Paper
that accompanied it: “[A]n international agreement of this kind is the high-
est form of commitment between two sovereign states.” The Chinese side in
contrast consciously avoided the use of words like “treaty,” “convention,” or
“international agreement,” which the British used that might suggest that they
approved of the British position. Others thought it did not matter what the
document was called as it was “equally binding.”4 Since China had seen the
treaties ceding Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories as “unequal”
and therefore “invalid,” there was no need for the Chinese to reach an agree-
ment with Britain on the return of sovereignty in the first place.
The Chinese could view the JD as a domestic agreement that [the PRC]
could unilaterally override if need be. Moreover, once China exercised its
sovereignty, it did not need the British to agree with its policies. The Chinese
could then regard the JD as a “transitional” document that would end on July
1, 1997, when the Basic Law, a domestic law, would come into force. In a JD,
both parties only declared what had to be done, without necessarily setting
out clearly their rights and obligations. In 2017 this issue again arose when
China’s foreign minister said that the JD was a “historical document that
no longer had any practical significance” (Reuters 2017). The Hong Kong’s
legal fraternity largely disagreed with this view and said that Basic Law does
not supersede the JD as the latter was a treaty. The JD “is also used as an
interpretative tool when construing the Basic Law in the courts so in no way
is it a ‘spent’ document” (Ibid).5
A High Degree of Autonomy

Article 3 of the JD sets out, in 12 general principles, China’s basic policies
for Hong Kong. These were to be enacted by China in the future Basic Law,
which would be supervised by the National People’s Congress (NPC) of
China and not by Britain.
The second basic policy, perhaps the most important regarding Hong Kong
as a “second system” of China, is as follows (Article 2):
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the
authority of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of
China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree
of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities
of the Central People’s Government.
30 Chapter 2
This “high degree of autonomy” is not defined, apart from what it does
not contain: “foreign and defence affairs” which was within the purview of
China. And as some commentators in the post-1997 discourse would claim,
a “high degree” does not mean that “Hong Kong is autonomous,” since that
“high degree” has to be further defined.
The “buffer” of achieving a quasi “status quo” post-1997, which is what
Britain wanted to instill confidence in Hong Kong and which the Mainland
also wanted to maintain stability and prosperity but without the humiliating
colonial content (Xiao 2001, 237), resulted in the declaration having four
provisos on “no changes” (such as no changes to the existing social and eco-
nomic systems); four on “maintenance” (such as the maintenance of its status
as a free port and as a separate customs territory); and two on “continuity”
(for foreign exchange, gold, securities, and futures and the Hong Kong dol-
lar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible), in the JD itself,
while in Annex I there are ten provisos on “maintenance,” nine on “preser-
vation,” and seven that Hong Kong could make decisions on its own on a
series of issues. Furthermore, “The HKSAR will be vested with executive,
legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudica-
tion. However, the laws currently in force in Hong Kong would remain basi-
cally unchanged” (emphasis added). “Basically unchanged” obviously can be
taken to mean some change.
Signaling the Democratic Road Ahead

One significant aspect of the negotiations on Hong Kong’s future was the
last-minute insertion of the word “elections” into the JD, five days before the
draft agreement was initialed (Cottrell 1993, 17).
The British usually made steps to institute democracy on exiting its colo-
nies. Some saw this as a means to raise a class of political leaders who spoke
the same “language” (i.e., ideology) as themselves; the old colonial power
would still have some influence, albeit indirectly. However, in Hong Kong’s
case, its “special circumstances” affected the usual decolonization experience
and fear of economic downturn, instability under an “ideological” China, con-
flicted with what some saw as their “moral obligation” of introducing some
form of self-government. This ambivalence can be illustrated in the various
documents relating to Hong Kong’s political development during the 1980s.6
Unpacking “Elections” as a Key Term: What Did It Mean?

The insertion of the word “elections” in the JD signaled a possible future
“democratic road” for Hong Kong by providing that the head of government,
the chief executive, would be selected “on the basis of the results of elections
or consultations held locally” (in the JD and Annex I) and that the “legislature
. . . shall be constituted by elections” (in Annex I only). No timetable was
included for these elections nor was the term “elections” defined.
Despite accuracy and precision being a perceived characteristic of
legal language, in international relations, linguistic ambiguity or vague-
ness may be consciously used in certain negotiating situations (Mattila
2006, 65) as shown in Hong Kong’s case. Leaving the word “elections”
undefined and unexplained means that this leaves room for compromise
without endangering the treaty’s introduction. Since the two sides reached
a consensus over economics, negotiators allowed the insertion of ambigu-
ous terms in the treaty so that this ambiguity could be solved later, in this
case in the drafting of the Basic Law, which would be handled by China.
“Elections” can mean quite different things. The British obviously consid-
ered that “elections” need not mean multiparty universal suffrage and that
it could include either direct or indirect elections. While to ordinary people,
familiar with Western systems, they were likely to mean one person, one
vote.
To the Chinese, the word “election” (選舉—選 = choose/vote/select; 舉 =
raise/mobilize/elect) did not mean universal suffrage. Elections in China are
more like “consultations.” In some respects, this is like how the British ruled,
co-opting elites onto various committees with the governor having the ultimate
say (Goodstadt 2005). Elections for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bodies
are “selections” where the candidates are preselected or approved by the party
hierarchy in numbers equal or almost equal to the posts available. Since all the
candidates are acceptable to the party an election can then take place (Loh 2010,
160–162).
It is also interesting to note that the chief executive “will be appointed
. . . on the basis of the results of elections or consultations held locally”
(Article 3, Item 4), giving the option of either an election or a consultation.
Furthermore, the JD states that, in addition to being elected or selected, he or
she would be “appointed by the Central People’s Government.” If someone
could be so “appointed,” it follows that they can then be “un-appointed.” This
is another key example of linguistic differentiation.
It could be that the purpose was to insulate Hong Kong from China
through a representative government. Roberti (1996) suggested that the
British wanted to maximize Hong Kong’s chance of surviving the transfer
of power, while Cottrell (1993) suggests that reform toward the representa-
tive government was to obtain the British Parliament’s support for passing
the JD.
32 Chapter 2
SUMMARY
The JD was an expedient way to achieve a strategic objective of giving Hong

Kong people confidence in the future, what was thought a graceful retreat
for the British and flexibility for Hong Kong. It reiterated China’s views on
sovereignty and past unequal treaties as well as demonstrating China’s new
power (Ghai 1999, 54). However, the primary purpose of the JD was keep-
ing the status quo going rather than promoting further institutional autonomy
which might threaten that status quo (Ibid, 55). This meant that the JD was
basically a “snapshot” of 1984 (Hoo 2008) when the JD was finalized.7
The ambiguity existing in specific provisions of the JD left “creative room”
(Davis 1990) for the Basic Law drafters while still allowing them to stay
within its “broad contours,” with which the new document had to “converge.”
In sum,
The draft agreement is like site formation work, has prepared the way for a
well-constructed future. But it is only when work commences on the infrastruc-
ture of the Basic Law, that we shall begin to see the shape of what is to come,
and when the superstructure of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
is established, that we can judge if there are any structural faults. (Report of
the Independent Monitoring Team, Hong Kong Assessment Office, Hong Kong
Government, Printer, 1984)
Other metaphors about the draft, which was considered a “partial agreement,”
was that it was an “ill-fitting shoe” and the yet-to-be-drafted Basic Law was
likely to be a “blank cheque” and a “shotgun marriage,” which emphasized
its compromising nature. The JD was passed and later ratified without any
changes to the draft text.
Complicating matters, the period between the ratification of the JD and
the “handover” on June 30, 1997, was considered a “transitional” period; the
British had to administer Hong Kong “with the object of maintaining and pre-
serving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government
of the People’s Republic of China will give its cooperation in this connec-
tion” (Article 4) it had also to “ensure a smooth transition.”
THE LEGALIZATION STAGE OF THE ONE

COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS: THE BASIC LAW
The fundamental laws of states are usually “modelled” (Elkins, Ginsburg,

and Melton 2005), after countries that are similar to theirs, reasoning that
what is good for a similar state would also be good for them (Tushnet 1999).
However, Hong Kong “in terms of its form, the political system is not entirely
occidental nor is it completely oriental” (Rao 2006), so its drafting could not
mimic either of those systems. According to Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping,
it had to delineate the boundaries between national sovereignty and local
autonomy; comply with the JD; preserve and improve the existing system
while removing the hated colonial elements; it also had to be in compliance
with the principles of democracy and take consideration of different sectors
of society (Xiao 2001).
The drafting took place alongside developments in representative govern-
ment that would ultimately affect its final text and have repercussions through
the years. These developments were Britain’s responsibility while the Basic
Law drafting was China’s responsibility. However, it can be seen that these
two processes intersected and affected each other. The drafting of the Basic
Law needs to be seen in the context of these concurrent developments.
Concurrent Developments in Representative Government

Despite minimal political changes suggested in government Green and White
Papers in 1984, the Chinese considered them a bid to return the administra-
tion to the people of Hong Kong instead of China by shifting policy-making
control to the legislative council.
China described the British action as extremely clever because it had the
effect of deepening “division and turmoil” in society and diluting Chinese
sovereignty by giving Hong Kong more autonomy (playing the so-called
“democracy card”). In October 1985, Ji Pingfei (head of the Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office) called upon the British to only alter the Hong Kong’s
political system prior to 1997 in ways that “converged” with the Basic Law,
which was just beginning to be drafted. If nothing was done, the British
would have pushed ahead with the plan and Hong Kong “would be in chaos”
(Loh 2010, 163). The British agreed, so there would be little political reform
before 1997. In return, Beijing would allow the legislature elected in 1995
to straddle the transition till 1999 if it conformed to the Basic Law. This
arrangement was referred to as the “through train” (直通車) and could be
described as “a useful cover for China’s instinctive hostility towards demo-
cratic reform” (Ibid) as it kept the form of the pre-1997 governance frame-
work but without British administration.
The conservative camp’s view was that convergence of the political sys-
tem before and after 1997 was essential for a seamless transition and thus
prosperity, while the more liberal camp thought faster democratization would
provide safeguards for Hong Kong and thus stability.
The Hong Kong government published another Green Paper in May 1987,
Review of Developments in Representative Government was released. This
34 Chapter 2
was to assess whether an element of direct elections could be introduced into

the Legislative Council in 1988.
Questions, options, and sub-options put to Hong Kong people in this paper
were considered extremely confusing, leading to allegations that they were
framed to confuse. The questions were constructed in such a way that it
was possible to say you were against direct elections, but not possible to say
unequivocally that you were in favor of them. For example, one option was
“that direct elections are . . . not desirable”; the other options were “that in
principle some element of direct elections is desirable but that it should not
be introduced in 1988,” and “that a directly elected element be introduced in
1988.” The public were thus not given a clear-cut choice for direct elections.
Again, this could be seen as a mechanism of delay. Furthermore, the issue of
“timing” again was important, saying that changes have not really “settled” into
the system so further change would likely affect stability. The specter of politi-
cal parties “manipulating” direct elections and “confrontational” politics aris-
ing (as well as political party formation) was mentioned in the Green Paper.
The Evolution of the Basic Law

Proposed models of post-1997 political system were given during the discus-
sions for the second draft of the Basic Law which was released in February
1989 for public consultation. A few months later, the Tiananmen crackdown on
June 4, 1989, shook Hong Kong and altered how Beijing considered the city;
it also transformed Britain’s attitude and marked a turning point in Hong Kong
people’s views on representative government; there were calls for faster democ-
ratization, some seeing the incident as highlighting the “importance of One
Country, Two Systems” and the need to firm up Hong Kong’s “high degree of
autonomy,” otherwise it could be “Today’s Beijing, Tomorrow’s Hong Kong”
(Loh 2010, 168). Faster democratization was necessary to retain confidence in
Hong Kong many said, and it was thought a specific timetable was necessary.
In the British Parliament, there was a tone of “sympathy” for Hong Kong’s
plight, being a captive of “. . . its history and geography.”8 On the one hand,
while some urged faster democratization for Hong Kong, they were also
concerned that the people of Hong Kong had to “secure the least possible
damage to their economic vitality as a result of what has happened in China,
because China is their largest trading partner”; others thought it ironic that
Britain was pushing for democracy in places where they had no responsibility
and not pushing for it where they had responsibility: “If we are in favour of
democracy in Eastern Europe and crave it for South Africa, why is it not also
appropriate for Hong Kong?”9
The Basic Law was formally promulgated on April 4, 1990, by the NPC.
The Basic Law as Text

The Basic Law has been called a “mini-constitution” as well as other names
such as “political document,” “constitutional edict,” and a “quasi-constitu-
tion.” Its status as a “constitution” could be disputed as Hong Kong is part of
“one country” and should go under that constitution. However, one Chinese
scholar remarked that (emphasis added):
It should be pointed out that although the Basic Law is not a constitution
according to Chinese legal concepts, it is a fundamental law with the effect of
prescribing guiding principles, being the supreme law of the territory. Thus, the
Basic Law is, according to the common law jurisprudence, a constitutional law.
(Chen 1993, 479)
And as Swales (1990, 54) writes, “A discourse community’s nomenclature

for a genre is an important source of insight” since it determines how we
“read” the document in question. Many thus “read” the Basic Law as a
constitution, so this is how the Basic Law has been framed. Constitutions
“don’t merely describe the national spirit community but bring it into being
as a legal and political entity,” they “perform” the state and define a nation
and its goals (Pryor 2008, 9). Because constitutions “perform the state,” and
are regarded as a framework for that state, they are often treated as “sacred”
documents (Ibid).10
The following principles are considered by Mainland Basic Law drafter
Xiao Weiyun as embodying the “second system” (Xiao 2001, 88–131) of
Hong Kong and its “high degree of autonomy” and they largely follow the
JD (the following are paraphrases):
• The Hong Kong SAR is an inalienable part of the PRC (Article 1).
• The NPC authorizes the Hong Kong SAR to exercise a high degree of
autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative, and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of
this law (Article 2).
• The executive authorities and legislature of the Hong Kong SAR shall be
composed of permanent residents of Hong Kong in accordance with the
relevant provisions of this law (Article 3).
• The Hong Kong SAR shall safeguard the rights and freedoms of the resi-
dents of the Hong Kong SAR and of other persons in the region in accor-
dance with law (Article 4).
• The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong
SAR, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain
unchanged for 50 years (Article 5).
36 Chapter 2
• The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules
of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be
maintained, except for any that contravene this law and subject to any
amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR (Article 8).
A few of these principles impact the future discourse of Hong Kong’s

democratization. They are “high degree of autonomy” (Article 2); “50 years
no change,” “executive authorities and legislature . . . shall be composed of
local residents” (Article 3), and the “maintenance of the previous capitalist
system” (Article 5), and the “laws previously in force” (Article 8).
Article 2, the “high degree of autonomy,” is similar to that mentioned in
the JD. This article has implications for constitutional development as further
democratization implies increasing autonomy from the center.
Article 3 relates to the executive authorities and legislature being made up
of local residents. The word “elections” is not mentioned at all. Although this
is dealt with later in the section under political structure, there is still scope
for further definition of the term.
Article 5 refers to the maintenance of the capitalist system and Hong
Kong’s “way of life” would remain unchanged for 50 years. The “50 years
no change” of this article is the period considered by Deng Xiaoping to be the
time that China would “catch up” to the West. Furthermore, “capitalism” has
not been fully defined in this principle or in later principles.
However, the Basic Law includes many details of the capitalist system that
it must preserve (see Chapter V of the Basic Law) thus constraining Hong
Kong’s autonomy within these specific parameters. Economic aspects are
more textually detailed than the future political structure in the Basic Law as
they were more numerous (Rao 2006). Economic matters figure large in the
post-1997 discourse of Hong Kong’s future democratization and the possible
effect of democracy on its financial systems and relationship to capitalism.
The following section discusses the Basic Law articles that deal with Hong
Kong’s democratic promise and analyses and implications of the language
used.
HONG KONG’S DEMOCRATIC PROMISE CONTINUED
As stipulated in the JD, the Basic Law takes up Hong Kong’s democratic
promise and expands it (italics added):
The Chief Executive shall be selected by election or through consultations held

locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government” and that “the
method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the
actual situation. . . . in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly
progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal
suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in
accordance with democratic procedures. (Article 45)11
The italicized phrases, which are either ambiguous or vague, have been
heatedly contested and have framed how Hong Kong talks about its political
development. The first two, the principles of “actual situation” (實際情況)
and “gradual and orderly progress” (循序漸進), can be said to exhibit meta-
phor-like characteristics being “empty vehicles” upon which any number of
meanings (i.e., domains) could be inserted.
Elaborating this article, Basic Law Annex I, specifies election of the chief
executive by a “broadly representative” Election Committee in the first two
terms but provides in Annex I, Article 7 for changing the method of election,
as follows:
If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executives for
the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments must be made with
the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative
Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval (emphasis
added).
Taking such action would move the system toward the specified “ultimate
aim” of choosing the chief executive “by universal suffrage on nomination
by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with demo-
cratic procedures.”
Article 68 provides essentially the same process in relation to forming the
Legislative Council, except there was no need for a nominating committee
and the provision on changing the method in Annex II; Article III specifies
that the change need only be reported to the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (SCNPC) “for the record.”
Parallel Principles
“Actual Situation” and “Gradual and Orderly Progress”
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “actual” as in “actual situation”
(實際情況) as “existing in fact, real; carried out, acted in reality. Opposed
to potential, possible, ideal, and so on”; the phrase “actual situation” has to
be further interpreted in order for it to have meaning. An “actual situation”
changes over time. The “ideal” situation is not defined specifically in the
38 Chapter 2
Basic Law. However, other provisions in the Basic Law (particularly the eco-
nomic provisions) will be used to “define” what is appropriate to the “actual
situation.”
“Gradual and orderly progress” (循序漸進), as per the dictionary defini-
tion for “gradual”; “taking place, changing, moving, and so on by small
degrees or little by little” suggest a predefined speed and plan. “Progress”
(進) means moving forward, while “order” (序) is for one thing to follow
another in succession, “follow” (循) could be open to interpretation, but as
it relates to “order,” although the “order” would have to be decided by some
authority. The only word that needs interpretation is the word “gradual”
(漸). The “subsequent to the year 2007” could be seen as a ten-year delay
mechanism.
“Actual situation” and “gradual and orderly progress” could be seen as
having the same level of importance. However, since the “actual situation”
principle precedes the “gradual and orderly progress” principle in the text,
therefore the speed of constitutional developments depends upon the “actual
situation,” which of course can change.
The “Ultimate Aim”

The term “ultimate aim” in Article 45 (最終達至 [ultimate] . . . 的目標
[aim]) means that at the endpoint of Hong Kong’s political development, the
chief executive (and also for the Legislative Council in Article 68) would be
elected by universal suffrage. “Ultimate” (最終達至, literally “finally reach”)
as in the “ultimate aim” is an adjective meaning “final, ultimate, and even-
tual” and implies that it is at the terminal or “pinnacle” of a cline of progress.
“Finally” (最終) and “up to” (達至) in the phrase above implies a process.
Thus “ultimately” semantically implies a relatively long progression.
“Universal Suffrage” and “Democratic Procedures”

“Universal suffrage” (普選) and “democratic procedures” (民主程序) are
defined nowhere in the Basic Law. As mentioned in chapter 1, democracy
and universal suffrage are considered “contested concepts” (Gallie 1964;
Gray 1977, 344). Perhaps part of the problem here is that when democracy is
discussed, people are thinking of different things, for as Dahl (1998) says “the
simple fact that ‘democracy’ refers both to an ideal and an actuality.” As the
Ta Kung Pao, a pro-establishment/pro-Beijing newspaper says: “Taking the
false as real, taking black as white, for a hundred years we have been shout-
ing about democracy, our concept of democracy is still a blank” (Yip 2004).
Therefore, what designates “democratic procedures” could be considered
very broad.
“Broadly Representative”
“Broadly representative” (廣泛代表性) relates to the makeup of the future
Chief Executive Nomination Committee who will nominate candidates to
run for the post. After nomination, the candidate will then be elected by the
people of Hong Kong by universal suffrage.
“Broadly representative” was not specifically defined for this future com-
mittee. However, this “broadness” could be inferred as the chief executive
was elected by a “broadly representative” Election Committee made up
of four sectors (functional constituencies), each with the same number of
seats. How these sectors were delimited and was not transparent although
they “shall be prescribed by an electoral law” and “in accordance with the
principles of democracy and openness” that was nowhere defined (Loh
2006).12
The inference gleaned from previous government Green and White Papers
(1984) showed a reluctance to implement “direct elections” (via geographi-
cal constituencies) and saw the need for indirect elections (via the functional
constituencies) to provide professional expertise as it was considered that
universal suffrage (where all citizens’ votes equally count) could not guar-
antee this professional expertise. As such, universal suffrage by itself could
not provide this “broad representation.” Whether universal suffrage could be
considered “broadly representative” and whether other systems of election
could or could not be equivalent to being “universal and equal” forms a large
part of the initial post-1997 political discourse.
“If There Is a Need” and “Subsequent to the Year 2007”

“If there is a need” (如需修改) is a contested phrase used for both the elec-
tion of the chief executive and the Legislative Council which is contained
in Annex I of the Basic Law. There is no indication in the Basic Law about
who decides “if there is a need.” “Subsequent to the year 2007” is in Annex I
relating to the election of the chief executive (二○○七年以後). This phase
is also contested as some say that it could include 2007 while others meant
after 2007.
Any such amendments for changing the electoral system for the chief
executive and the Legislative Council must be made with the endorsement of
a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the
consent of the chief executive and Beijing. This tripartite agreement neces-
sary for political change would make it difficult to come to an agreement over
any democratic changes: “They shall be reported to the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress for approval” (Item 7 of Annex I) and
“they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s
40 Chapter 2
Congress for the record” (Item III of Annex II); the phrase “for approval”
might indicate that Beijing might not approve it, while “for the record” could
be taken to indicate that Beijing might automatically approve it.
Hong Kong’s Democratic Promise Compromised

As has been shown above, the specific promise of universal suffrage is
ambiguous; however, other articles within the Basic Law could also be con-
sidered to be “compromising” democratic development due to the competing
authoritarian and liberal ideals contained within them. First, the split-voting
mechanism for the Legislative Council (Article 74) inhibits directly elected
members being able to pass members bills since one half of the legislative
comes from largely conservative functional constituencies who mostly vote
the government’s way as well as other “executive” powers held by the chief
executive (Young and Cullen 2010).
Second, there are issues related to human rights, since they are frequently
linked with democracy. This especially relates to freedom of speech and
protest; for example, in Article 18, if Beijing “decides to declare a state of
war or, by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong SAR which endangers
national unity or security”; the word “turmoil” (動亂) was added to this
article as the result of the Tiananmen crackdown. An early version of Article
23, dated April 1988, said only that Hong Kong must prohibit by law any
act intended to undermine national unity or subvert the Central People’s
Government. After June 4, 1989, however, a later version stated that Hong
Kong must prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, and theft of state
secrets.13
This was the result of many prominent Hong Kong people helping pro-
testing students to flee China. These prominent identities were also at the
vanguard of the democracy movement in Hong Kong. The attempt to enact
this law in 2003 saw a massive protest march, the aftermath of which was
to fundamentally change the nature of how Beijing saw Hong Kong and its
rhetoric toward its democratization.
INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S

DEMOCRATIC PROMISE
Despite Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” as an SAR of China and the
continuance of its common law legal system, there was scope for Mainland
encroachment despite the maintenance of “laws previously in force” (Article
8) with the proviso that “except for any [law] that contravene this law” opens
the possibility of interpretation about what actually “contravenes” the Basic

Law had been previously mentioned.
This raises another aspect of the ambiguity inherent in the “One Country,
Two Systems” principle, the matter of interpretation and amendment of the
Basic Law, that is, the interpreting of one set of laws (the Common Law) in
the context of another (the Civil Law) (Bhatia, Candlin, and Allori 2008).
Article 158 of the Basic Law is a controversial link between the two legal
systems as it places the power to interpret the law with the SCNPC while
Article 159 states that the power to amend the Basic Law lies with the NPC;
Hong Kong courts are authorized to interpret provisions of the Basic Law that
“are within the limits of the autonomy of the region” which could be open to
debate and although Hong Kong can propose amendments the ultimate say
lies with Beijing (see Article 158).
Bhatia (1993, 359–371) argues that “writing legislative discourse in terms
of simple principles without adequate specification of the required scope,
on the other hand, means giving wider powers to the judges and the courts
to interpret the intentions of the legislature.” In a “fundamental way” Ghai
(1999, 191) says, “Interpretation is necessary to ‘complete’ the Basic Law, to
explicate its reach and parameters.”
Although the “gate” (the Basic Law) itself has inbuilt contradictions to
hamper political reform, the “gatekeepers” are also important because of
the vagueness and ambiguity of the language used. NPCSC Chairman Wu
Bangguo at a seminar held in Beijing to mark the tenth anniversary of the
Basic Law’s implementation “stressed the need for an accurate understand-
ing of the essence of the Basic Law.” Wu listed three principles as being
important in the Basic Law’s interpretation: “safeguarding the country’s sov-
ereignty, maintaining a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong, and secur-
ing the SAR’s prosperity and stability” (China Daily 2007b). As far back as
1994, one Mainland legal expert, Wang Zhenmin, said he had “no trust in
regional institutions to observe the mini-constitution when operating in Hong
Kong. We need a guardian. Only the Central Government can guarantee the
full implementation of the Basic Law” (Yeung 2006).
Constitutional scholar Yash Ghai (2007) argues that despite the explana-
tion of conflict over the interpretation of the Basic Law in terms of the com-
mon law and civil law, Article 158 is more realistically analyzed in terms of
strategies of control, that is, questions of power and ideology. And since “the
ideological settings” of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) and the
Court of Final Appeal (Hong Kong’s highest court) are quite different, this
means that they will inevitably disagree over the interpretation of the Basic
Law; the former, having the ultimate say in interpretation, will most likely
win any debates about what the Basic Law means.
42 Chapter 2
The interpreter is a one-party Marxist state with a fledgling legal system

and limited historical experience with the rule of law; a state with a notion
of sovereignty means that it dislikes outside criticism and constraints on
state power. It is also a state that since June 1989 has focused on internal
stability and the supremacy of the Communist Party. Taking these factors
into consideration, the inherent “adversarial thrust” behind Western ideas
of democracy, that is, the distrust of rules, desire to block tyranny, efforts
to restrict the power of the state (Randle, Henkin, and Nathan 1986), it is
perhaps inevitable that various articles of the Basic Law provide linguistic
“checks and balances” that make it difficult for further political reform to
proceed.
PRO-BEIJING/PRO-ESTABLISHMENTS’
VIEW OF THE BASIC LAW
While many considered the Basic Law problematic in light of the ambigui-
ties in the articles previously discussed, how the Basic Law was regarded by
Beijing as the sovereign power provides a solid indication about how con-
troversial issues involving it might be discursively handled in the future.
The following sums up the Mainland’s view of Hong Kong’s Basic Law
(emphasis added):
It erased historical shame and the end of governance by the British in Hong
Kong, as highlighted in the Preamble. It will be inscribed with glory in the
pages of our country’s history. As a creative law without precedent it achieves
national unity solving the problems of Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan, prob-
lems which have been left over from history. It elaborates on the one country
two systems and embodies them in concrete form. The practical significance
of the Basic Law is that it fulfills national unity and territorial integrity and
maintains the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. The international sig-
nificance of the Basic Law is that it has important international meaning;
for Sino-British relations . . . for convergence during the transition. It will
help economics and trading and help as an exemplar for problems left over
from history and conflicts in other countries as a way to resolve issues. (Xiao
2001, 14)
Since it “erased historical shame” by ending governance by the British in

Hong Kong and would be “inscribed with glory in the pages of our country’s
history” as well as being a “creative law without precedent” (Ibid), it could
be seen that criticism of the Basic Law could be seen as being tantamount to
a repudiation of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework.
The next section will look at how the Basic Law was generally described
metalingually and metaphorically because this “sets the scene” or “frames”
the future discussions of political reform in Hong Kong.
THE BASIC LAW AS SEEN METALINGUISTICALLY

AND METAPHORICALLY
Metalingual Talk about the Basic Law

Legal cases often revolve around arguments about what the wording of an
actual law means. The following “metalingual” discussion of the Basic Law
are related to interpretations of the Basic Law by the SCNPC—2004 deals
with who decides when Hong Kong can have universal suffrage, 2005 deals
with the term limits of the chief executive.
These metalingual references could be seen to act “space holders” for later
metaphoric vehicles. These “space holders” include: “written in black and
white,” “grey areas,” “vague/ambiguous,” and “loopholes/drilled holes.”
First, the following from an editorial in the pro-democracy Chinese news-
paper, the Apple Daily, sums up the debate about the lack of clarity in the
wording of the democratic promise (emphasis added):
The worst shortcoming of the Basic Law is deadly as it is full of rule of man lan-
guage. For example, it is difficult to understand the wording, like “subsequent
to the year 2007,” but also with other abstract nouns, such as “the principle of
gradual and orderly progress”; in the legal language of Western civilization,
“the year 2007” is clearly a year period and “gradual and orderly progress” is
an ambiguous concept. If you want to change the rule of law, it must be based
on the clear definition of words.
(Apple Daily, February 1, 2004)
Written in Black and White (白紙黑字)

The pro-Beijing Chinese press frequently discussed that the attainment of
universal suffrage would happen since the Basic Law said this “in black and
white”; this was not explained further, just that it would eventually happen
(emphasis added):
The Central Government has never anything against universal suffrage, the
Basic Law guarantees Hong Kong people universal suffrage in black and white,
but when it is to be achieved, depends on the people themselves to create the
conditions. (Kwan Chiu, Ta Kung Pao, November 11, 2005)
44 Chapter 2
However, the time of universal suffrage left it to “the people themselves” to

ensure the promise is delivered, by achieving “conditions” not yet specified.
Further (emphasis added):
It states in black and white in the Basic Law: Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive
and the Legislative Council will ultimately be elected by universal suffrage.
Democratic objectives and the direction are clear, but must be combined with
reality. . . . and there will be no guarantee of prosperity and stability. (Kwan
Chiu, Ta Kung Pao, March 4, 2004)
As we can see here, these statements are based on the wrong assumption
that when and how democratization would take place has been substantially
defined. People had to “trust” that universal suffrage would ultimately hap-
pen. However, the pro-democracy Apple Daily saw this differently since how
the system would be constructed was largely out of Hong Kong residents’
hands (emphasis added):
Beijing’s handling of Hong Kong’s democratic aspirations is clearly a great

fraud. Everything is said to be in black and white and well-established, if there
are differences of opinion in the status of the Basic Law’s words, paragraphs,
intent or spirit, and in the Zhongnanhai fashion, its political will prevail.
(Claudia Mo, Apple Daily, April 23, 2004)
Grey Areas (灰色地帶)

“Grey areas” in a text are areas where the concepts or topics are unclear and
this expression and these “areas” are said to exist in the Basic Law (emphasis
added):
Although the past few years there have been many arguments concerning the
Basic Law, these relate to grey areas within the provisions. The community
generally supports the Basic Law . . . ; challenging the provisions in the Basic
Law and respecting the Basic Law are two different things. (Apple Daily, May
18, 2004)
Here, the pro-democracy Apple Daily makes the point that querying some
of the provisions of the Basic Law is not the same as disrespecting it. A
Beijing authority stated that during the drafting of the Basic Law, “its
provisions, the contents of every word and every sentence after legal
experts deliberated, were ‘carefully worded’” (Ta Kung Pao, March 27,
2004).
However, “grey areas” still remained, perhaps as the “One Country, Two
Systems” was still a “work in progress” and “unique in the world” and there-
fore the concepts of its text had not yet been properly defined despite prom-
ises being made in “black and white” (emphasis added):
NPC Deputy Yuan Wu said: “The Basic Law is Hong Kong’s ‘great law’ on
one hand at the same time as being implemented it is also being perfected and
improved. The grey areas in it need to be explained clearly.” The grey areas he
referred to was whether there could be universal suffrage after 2007 or whether
it can include 2007; and who have the right to amend the electoral methods. (Ta
Kung Pao, March 29, 2004)
As mentioned earlier, the Basic Law is a “product of another world” and this
relates to its intersection of legal systems:
Undeniably, some “grey areas” have been found in the Basic Law since its
implementation; these are “small imperfections” due to the application of our
common law tradition which makes it difficult for the Basic Law to be compat-
ible with. So it is not surprising if in the medium-to-long-term future, and at
the appropriate time, the Basic Law is revised. (Qing Pu, Ta Kung Pao, March
30, 2005)
However, the following example contradicts what has been said above that
there were “grey areas” in the Basic Law as “the so-called ‘grey areas’ or
disputes no longer exist” (emphasis added):
On the contrary, Hong Kong has become an integral part of the People’s
Republic of China, implemented “One Country, Two Systems,” “Hong Kong
people ruling Hong Kong,” a high degree of autonomy has been set under the
Basic Law as the legal basis for all the SAR’s systems, framework and the rights
and obligations in the Basic Law have been clearly defined, there are no blank
or “grey areas.” (Ta Kung Pao, October 21, 2004)
This section on “grey areas” emphasizes what has been said before about
the Basic Law being written in general principles and with Beijing, which
practices quite a different political and legal system to Hong Kong having
the right of interpretation. When a document contains “grey areas” and is
not “universally foolproof” (Wong 2005), clarifications can be made by the
designated gatekeepers.
46 Chapter 2
Vague and Ambiguous (模糊)

Highlighting the ambiguity of the Basic Law as a “topic” of metaphor accord-
ing to the “actual situation” means that the scope for metaphor vehicles
related to it could be vast. Various articles in the Basic Law “are vague or
ambiguous,” meaning that you could insert your own meaning according to
your particular ideology.
The pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao does not say that the Basic Law is ambigu-
ous or vague but that other people’s views of it are “vague.” Political “vague-
ness” is often a strategy like the “corridor compromises” made in order for
treaties to be confirmed and also in election campaigns to have later “deni-
ability.” “Vagueness” is useful for those in authority as they can come out and
clarify the confusion about these issues later. The following is an example of
this vagueness or ambiguity in the Basic Law (emphasis added):
However, the Basic Law’s reference to how the Legislative Council would run
by universal suffrage after it was introduced is fairly vague. (Ming Pao Daily,
November 26, 2005)
The next example highlights that the Hong Kong government is supposed
to be “executive-led,” but the actual term is not used in the Basic Law ifself
(emphasis added):
First, executive-led government is actually a very vague concept; the whole

Basic Law did not mention anything about being executive-led; it is difficult
to be convinced that design of the provisions of the SAR’s political system as
being executive-led. (Johannes Chan, Apple Daily, May 7, 2004)
Loopholes and “Drilling Holes”

“Loopholes” (漏洞) are a “means of escape” and refer to ambiguity or omis-
sion in the text through which the intent of a text can be evaded. Again this
can be found in documents written in principles. Drilling Holes is another
term for “loopholes.” The ambiguity of principles in the Basic Law allows
“holes to be drilled” as “to drill a hole” (鑽空子) in Chinese means “to exploit
an advantage.” The following are some examples in the pro-democracy Apple
Daily (emphasis added):
Now see the loopholes in the Basic Law come out by the hundreds and be arbi-
trarily distorted; if these are not overcome, I’m afraid there will only be trouble,
and in addition to rubbishing the law, the central government has also lost cred-
ibility. (Ling Fen, Apple Daily, March 23, 2005)
The excerpt below mentions the “spirit of the Basic Law” (基本法的精神)
rather than the actual words contained in it as being important, and this
“spirit” will be invoked at regular intervals throughout the future discourse,
and of course is open to interpretation (emphasis added):
Liu Dazheng said, concerning the provisions of the Basic Law Annexes, some
Hong Kong people only interpret the words and simply disregard the legislative
principle. This act is like drilling loopholes in the law, explaining that they did
not act in accordance with the law, because to rely on the law you first have to
respect the basic spirit of the law. (Ta Kung Pao, March 30, 2004)
Metaphors of the Basic Law and Its Interpreters

The following selection of metaphors in this section mostly relates to the
Interpretation and Decision by the SCNPC. Briefly, the Basic Law is a gift,
a protector, a guide, a building, a source of containment, and a thing abnor-
mally born. Before discussing these, we will look at two metaphors, both
from the pro-democracy Chinese newspaper, the Apple Daily, about how
many saw Beijing’s authorities’ role in interpreting the Basic Law. These
legal authorities were known as “guardians of the Basic Law.” These guard-
ians were portrayed as almanacs, books that help one prepare for the future
(emphases added):
Considering if we can rely on the Basic Law for 50 years, has not proved to be
a marriage certificate, not a revised textbook, but rather a book of laughter and
forgetting! The power to interpret and initiate lies with the Central Government,
with gray areas giving the Central Government the final word. Central to this
system of Hong Kong’s commitment to seven years in bankruptcy, the Basic
Law in the four guardians of the Basic Law drama, functions almost like an
almanac. You look in the almanac to select an auspicious wedding day; the
Hong Kong people want universal suffrage? The law guardians fired off: do not
select 2007 for big occasions! 2047 then, when the time times take a closer look
at the Central Government’s mood. (Chen Ye, Apple Daily, January 25, 2004)
Coupled with the “decree”-like pronouncements often made by these “guard-

ians,” the Apple Daily said the following:
Deng said at one time that patriots should be the main body in Hong Kong . . .
Old Deng is Allah, and the Basic Law has turned into the Koran. In the desert
with thousands of kneeling followers, the Shias have the Shiite way of speak-
ing, the Sunnis have a Sunni interpretation, the Taliban have the Taliban way of
48 Chapter 2
understanding . . . Present-day Hong Kong is becoming more and more like the
Arab world of the Middle East. (Lee Bat Fong, Apple Daily, February 16, 2004)
Outside Hong Kong, the ever-present Middle East conflict was also used by
those wary of quick universal suffrage to discuss how “imposed” democracy
was doomed to failure, so it is not surprising that a metaphor like this was
coined.
A Gift
Hong Kong has been lucky to experience the realization of the “One Country,
Two Systems” concept (the Basic Law), so it could be considered a “gift
bestowed.” By far the most common expression was “bestow or confer”
(賦予).
Similar statements were made in the South China Morning Post either by
commentators on various sides of the political fence. The Ming Pao Daily,
more so than the Apple Daily, talks about how “Democracy is not bestowed,
it has to be strived for” (民主從來不是賜予的，民主從來是要努力爭取的)
(Lo Fung Apple Daily December 3, 2005), it is something arising from
its citizens, as in “democracy is not bestowed from the ‘top down’”
(民主從來不是「從上而下」的賜予) (Lee C-Y., Ming Pao Daily,
December 12, 2005).
As a Guarantor and Protector

The gift of the Basic Law (and the “One Country, Two Systems”) guarantees
a number of benefits key to the successful functioning of Hong Kong:
Yes, the Basic Law and Hong Kong’s fate are closely linked together, flesh and
blood, indivisible, as fish live in water. The Basic Law has brought good fortune
to Hong Kong and its people, a 50-year symbol of long-term good fortune. As
Prof. Wang said, “the Basic Law already provides the best policies and institu-
tions that the Chinese Government can give.” (Xie Weiwu (謝緯武), Ta Kung
Pao, March 19, 2004)
And because the Basic Law has the best policies for Hong Kong, it provides
a guarantee to the system as the following example shows:
The Basic Law is a constitutional law that delivers Hong Kong political, eco-
nomic and social relations; no person shall violate it and no one would say that
these relations do not rely on legal norms, mutual trust and self-restraint. (C.Y.
Leung, Ming Pao Daily, April 20, 2004)
Hong Kong’s fate is inseparable from the Basic Law as the “One Country,
Two Systems” is suitable for its current situation as it is now part of China.
The excerpt below again refers to this connection, but with the metaphor
vehicle of a “moat” (天塹):
One of the essences of “One Country, Two Systems” is “river water not inter-
fering with well water,” which means mainland China not intervening affairs
within the scope of Hong Kong’s self-autonomy. Similarly, HKSAR should
not intervene in China’s affairs. “One Country, Two Systems” mainly and pre-
cisely refers to the social and political systems. In the economic, cultural, and
livelihood perspectives, “two systems” is not some insurmountable “moat,” but
ensures mutual contact, complement in advantages and common development.
All these years since the handover have already proven this point. (Kwan Chiu,
Ta Kung Pao, July 15, 2006)
The close connection to the first metaphor (fish living in water) and “moat”
(天塹), an encirclement of water around a castle or fortress, implies mixing of
the One Country and Two Systems but without “interference” in each other’s
systems gives rise to a potential contradiction about who controls those who
can across this moat.
The Apple Daily sees the Basic Law as being antithetical to Hong Kong’s
systems and guarantees are difficult because of “birth defects” (先天缺陷)
involved in weaving the two legal and governance systems together (empha-
sis added):
The suspicious part of the Basic Law is its leading character which is taking
“control” as the theme, and by the will of the subjective mood, Deng Xiaoping’s
era of old politics, taking a “small-scale world regime” as the weft of the third-
rate “legal” provisions (if you can call them “legal” that is), because of major
birth defects. (Apple Daily, February 1, 2004)
Xiao Weiyun [a mainland Basic Law drafter] and Hong Kong people belong
to two different worlds. The Basic Law is the product of another world outside
Hong Kong, so its provisions only need another world’s paternalistic authority
to interpret it. Therefore, China’s “legal experts” struggle with what the rule of
law means. (Chip Tsao, Apple Daily, January 18, 2004)
50 Chapter 2
Beacon/Guiding Light
The metaphor of the Basic Law as “beacon” (明燈) or “guiding light” is
useful as it brings up attributes of that object, that of the projection of light
(emphasis added):
Hong Kong’s only beacon is the Basic Law. To destroy this beacon, Hong Kong
will be pitched into darkness, into never-ending darkness. (Xie Weiwu, Ta
Kung Pao, January 15, 2004)
Hong Kong’s Basic Law is its guidance beacon after its return to China, and
ensures its stability and prosperity. Who will hold the beacon high so that Hong
Kong will be bathed in light otherwise it will become dizzy. (Lin Fenyi, Ta
Kung Pao, April 13, 2007)
The translated word “dizzy” (昏亂) above can also mean “confused or cha-
otic,” but since “beacon” is used, it is appropriate to give it the attribute of
“light,” the implication being that the Basic Law has to be used properly and
not “narrowly.” The Ta Kung Pao uses “beacon” three times to describe the
action of the Basic Law, while the Ming Pao Daily just mentions it as some-
thing said by Deng Xiaoping about the Basic Law. The South China Morning
Post has only one instance of this metaphor but talks about it being a “guiding
light” (emphasis added):
“If that’s the case, what does our guiding light—the Basic Law—have to say?”
“Making the Leap to Universal Suffrage.” (David Ackers-Jones, South China
Morning Post, August 9, 2006)
The Basic Law as Building Works: Framework,

Blueprint, Foundation/Foundation Stone
Framework could be said to be rather a generic building metaphor. “Under
the Basic Law framework of” (在《基本法》的框架下) was a frequently
used structure in the newspapers, especially in pro-Beijing/establishment
circles, to discuss what could be done, or was allowable within its scope. A
“framework” (框架) is “a skeletal structure designed to support or enclose
something” and acts as kind of “container” for Hong Kong’s development as
posed by the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao (emphasis added):
Legislation can be amended based on social development, but it cannot

depart from the framework of the Basic Law. (Ta Kung Pao, January 6
2006)
The Apple Daily sees that power has the risk of going beyond what the Basic
Law actually says (emphasis added):
“However, the power of the central government must be exercised within the
framework of the Basic Law, rather than being arbitrarily extended beyond the
Basic Law.” (Lee Yee, June 12, 2007)
“Under the framework, we will gradually develop a democratic system that

suits our own circumstances.” [Said by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National
People’s Congress] (Ming Pao Daily, April 27, 2004)
“Blueprint” (藍圖) was also quite a common metaphor for the Basic Law
and was used in all newspapers, again usually in a generic way. A blueprint is
a “detailed plan of action” and it is usually synonymous with “plan” in most
discourse contexts (emphasis added):
“Have to rely on the Basic Law’s 10 years’ blueprint of gradual and orderly
progress. Blueprint.” (Ta Kung Pao, April 12, 2004)
“Jiang Enzhu said that the Basic Law is the grand blueprint for the implementa-
tion of ‘one country, two systems,’ the cornerstone of the SAR’s political and
legal system, and the legal guarantee for the prosperity and stability of Hong
Kong.” (Ta Kung Pao, April 4, 2000)
“In Hong Kong’s constitutional development debate, the constitutional design

should be reasonable and based on merit, and the Basic Law has provided a
clear blueprint.” (Apple Daily, May 6, 2004)
“The Basic Law is the 10-year blueprint for the constitutional development of
the SAR” (Human Rights Watch, Apple Daily, September 9, 2004)
The South China Morning Post did not use “blueprint” to describe the Basic
Law. Basic Law provisions as regards Hong Kong’s political development were
not specific, making this “blueprint” rather lacking in substance. More detailed
“plans” had to be worked out during the initial ten-year time frame given in the
Basic Law. One commentator in the South China Morning Post said that with
this “blueprint,” movement had to occur “within whose tram lines [where] we
have to map out the future” (Akers-Jones 2007), seemingly indicating that a
direct way to universal suffrage lay ahead. The Basic Law had other more solid
building metaphors however, like foundation stone.
“Foundation” or “foundation stone” (基石) metaphor was also important
since the characters “基本” of the Basic Law (基本法) means “essential,”
52 Chapter 2
“basis,” or “foundation,” and it was mainly used in the pro-Beijing Ta Kung

Pao (emphasis added):
“The Basic Law is the foundation stone of prosperity and stability.” (Ta Kung
Pao, November 7, 2002)
“The Basic Law is the foundation stone of Hong Kong’s life and the corner-
stone of the system of ‘one country, two systems’.” (Ta Kung Pao, November
12, 2002)
“The political system of the Basic Law’s regulations is to maintain a long-term stable
political foundation for Hong Kong.” (Xie Weiwu, Ta Kung Pao, April 26, 2007)
The Apple Daily, as does the Ming Pao Daily, tended to use the “foundation
stone” metaphor to stand in for aspects of good governance like the rule of
law and freedom of the press that Hong Kong had before 1997; they also use
this metaphor for democracy and universal suffrage as the foundation stone
for Hong Kong’s constitutional development. The South China Morning Post
quotes government figures who see the Basic Law’s “10-year programme of
elections” as “a solid foundation for the young democracy to reach its adult-
hood step by step” (At Large, February 27, 2005).
We will return to this building metaphor in chapter 6 and the discussion of
the rule of law.
All the newspapers in this study with the exception of the Ta Kung Pao
saw the Basic Law as a “method of restriction or containment,” as regards
constitutional development.
As a Method of Restriction or Containment

This designation will to be category of metaphor when discussing the Basic
Law and events that impact it; most of the following appeared in the Apple
Daily, Ming Pao Daily, and the South China Morning Post; the Ta Kung Pao
did mention some of these, and when it did, it was usually to refute them.
The metaphor of “birdcage” (鳥籠) will become prominent and discussed
in much more detail in chapter 4 as a discourse-length metaphor. The fol-
lowing is the first instance of it in the data. Although it refers to the “One
Country, Two Systems” in the example below, the Basic Law is its embodi-
ment, so the Basic Law is a birdcage (emphasis added).
I have had Taiwanese say to me “One Country, Two Systems” is a large bird-
cage controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, and who would be willing to
live in a bird cage. (Ming Pao Daily, August 22, 2003)
The example below contains a “metalingual” metaphor (“white spaces”) with a

clustering of other “containment” metaphors (“shackles,” “feudal slaves”). The
following editorial is from the pro-democracy Apple Daily (emphasis added):
The so-called “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong and with a high degree
of autonomy,” actually belie the Basic Law provisions, which at great length,
is heavy with shackles and every word a trap. And though the sentences are
written in ink, there are white spaces everywhere all full of “suspect” words
from the Chinese Emperor to his feudal slaves. (Apple Daily, February 1,
2004)
Despite the Basic Law being seen as a method of restriction or containment

by some, constitutions are supposed to be definitive while existing for con-
siderable periods of time in which social and political attitudes can undergo
tremendous change. Therefore, they need to exhibit “flexibility” in line with
these changing conditions.
As a Flexible Object
There is much legal literature on finding metaphors that best describe consti-
tutions (Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden 1995, 2). Metaphors are needed as they
determine how the judiciary will interpret the “intent” of the law, whether to
allow for what the original drafters meant or extend it to circumstances that
the original drafters could not have envisioned. Often constitutional meta-
phors are “living beings” because of this flexibility. For example, Australia
uses the metaphor of a “living force” (Lee and Winterton 2003, 405) which
brings up possibilities that its constitution would be pulled in various ways
by sitting judges, while Canada sees its constitution as a “living tree,” a
metaphor that in some ways captures the idea that even a “living” document
is constrained by its origins.
The flexibility of “not being too tight or too loose” (宜粗不宜細—which
can also be translated as “crude not fine,” “broad not detailed,” or “thick
not thin”) was used to describe the way of drafting the Basic Law, but it
still needs a “backbone” (骨幹) as an anchor for this flexibility (emphasis
added):
Elsie Leung explained, the Basic Law, “must be stable and predictable in order
to take care of the needs of rapid social development, therefore the Basic Law
cannot be written in a very detailed manner. Specific provisions will be by gen-
eral legislation.” She used this metaphor: “The Basic Law is the backbone while
legislation is the flesh and blood.” (Ming Pao Daily, January 6, 2006)
54 Chapter 2
With the Basic Law, two very different legal systems are in operation, with
the potential for arguments about interpretation about what the text means.
But as has been noted in chapter 1, because of the “One Country, Two
Systems,” “people will now have to think not only from one angle, but from
the angle of the other perspective” (Wong 2008). The following is from the
South China Morning Post sees constitutions as “alive” and therefore chang-
ing (italics added):14
As long as the Basic Law is treated as a “living constitution,” there is ample

room within the existing framework for constitutional development. (South
China Morning Post, July 9, 2007)
Constitutions are fertile ground for interpretation and argument over mean-
ing. In constitutional law, these arguments and their outcome are usually
shaped and decided by the exigencies of politics, in tandem with the language
of the constitution. This fact invites scholars when speaking of constitutional
interpretation, often invoking the notion of a living constitution and the idea
that the document be responsive to the needs of the time (Davis 2003).
CONCLUSION
The “One Country” in the “One Country, Two Systems” emphasizes national
unity, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while the “Two Systems”
part indicates a “high degree of autonomy” and “Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong,” a seeming semantic and ideological contradiction. The “divi-
sion of labor” theoretically embodied in the “One Country, Two Systems”
principle seemed to fulfill Britain’s goal of maintaining Hong Kong’s pre-
1997 lifestyle and economic system with minimal modifications; however,
the Basic Law “wedge” separating the two systems was also a “bridge” con-
necting the two places and despite the objective to “maintain the metaphorical
and constitutional distance” between China and Hong Kong, the desire of
the former to “assert sovereignty and achieve unity” (Wesley-Smith 1996,
106) comes into potential conflict, particularly with the wording dealing
with Hong Kong’s further democratization, which implicitly infers further
autonomy of the “Two Systems.”
However, the Basic Law appears to be considered as “both sacred and
profane” and as history now shows, it could be “fluid when you want it to
be and rigid when you want it to be,” made so by its apparent ambiguity and
vagueness (Ghai 2009). Like any constitution for a former colonial territory,
the Basic Law inevitably bears the imprint of contention among major politi-
cal forces and thus carries with it ambiguities that were helpful in achieving a
compromise at the time it was formulated. However, it left behind a “penum-

bra” of uncertainty (Finer, Bogdanor, and Rudden 1995, 2). This uncertainty
would be a tool used by various mediators of the discourse as will be shown
in the next chapter.
NOTES
1. The full name of this document is “Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong.” The draft text of this
document and its accompanying White Paper can be accessed at C:/Users/English/
Downloads/23ILM.pdf.
2. The following fact is not widely known. History (and Hong Kong’s politi-
cal development) might have been different if the British had accepted the Chinese
Nationalist government’s offer in the 1930s to sell the New Territories for ￡20 mil-
lion. This offer came about as the Nationalists wanted to strengthen Britain’s com-
mitment to the Chinese war effort against the Japanese. The money would be used
to purchase more war materiel on the international market. The negotiations in this
matter all came from the Chinese side. The British officials were receptive to the idea
but eventually declined the offer as they wanted to conserve resources for the likely
war with Germany and a desire not to provoke the anger of the Japanese (Wordie
2012).
3. The following is quoted from the document put out by the Assessment Office
on the Draft JD of people’s views, “It is difficult to foresee the future. The draft
agreement is a post-dated cheque. The result can only be known when it is proved—
an individual”; also, “The worry about Hong Kong being governed by people from
Beijing or from the left-wing cannot be removed simply by initialing the draft
agreement.—A minority of individuals” (Hong Kong Assessment Office 1984, 20).
4. This was also noted in the press at the time; Sir Geoffrey Howe called it “the
agreement” throughout a press conference and later on the same day the Xinhua News
Agency called it a “Joint Declaration” in a dispatch from Beijing. “No matter what it
is called, it will have equal binding effects on both sides,” said one official and that
“it doesn’t matter if it is called a treaty, an agreement or convention,” said one leading
academic, see Norman Miners (2000). Both English and Chinese texts of the JD were
“equally binding.”
5. “The Basic Law does not supersede the Joint Declaration which is a treaty.
Unfortunately, the enforcement of it is not in the hands of the Hong Kong people
but in the hands of the UK and they have been pretty supine until recently. The Joint
Declaration is also used as an interpretative tool when construing the Basic Law in
the courts so in no way is it a ‘spent’ document,” barrister Gladys Li, personal com-
munication, January 17, 2020. This announcement, coming from the Chinese Foreign
Ministry, raised questions over Beijing’s commitment to Hong Kong’s core freedoms
(Reuters 2017).
56 Chapter 2
6. A government White Paper in 1981 would allow District Councils to be

formed through elections. There was a Green Paper in 1984 “to develop progres-
sively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong,
which is able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong”
(Hong Kong Gov. 1984, 4). Local politician and barrister Margaret Ng said, during
a seminar attended by the author, that the introduction of elections were potential
“sweeteners” preempting reaction to later change—“Hong Kong Political Reform
Series: The 2009 Consultation Document—Will it Break the Deadlock?” held on
January 9, 2010, organized by the Centre for Comparative and Public Law and Centre
for Civil Society and Governance, The University of Hong Kong and the National
Democratic Institute, Hong Kong.
7. The “Transport system, legal system, financial system, taxation system. There
were 12 large areas—basic policies—which will never change. And the whole idea
was what we call a snapshot, a 1984 snapshot. Take out your Kodak camera; take
a picture of Hong Kong in 1984 and you can say that is what will not change for at
least 50 years. That was the bargain struck.” Alan Hoo, Chairman of the Basic Law
Institute and Member of the CPPCC National Committee, “The Roadmap towards
Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong,” speech given at the Hong Kong Democratic
Foundation launched on April 10, 2008, in which the author attended. The full speech
can be accessed at www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&newsar-
ticle=213.
8. House of Lords: July 5, 1989, HL Deb 05 July 1989 vol. 509 cc1189-99 1189,
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1989/jul/05/hong-kong#S5LV0509P0
_19890705 _HOL _166. Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe recorded in British
Parliamentary Hansard, HC Deb 05 July 1989 vol., 156, cc309-22.
9. British Parliamentary Hansard, February 16, 1990. https://hansard .parlia-
ment.uk/Commons/1990-02-16/debates/d386f2bb-8bdf-4fba-89a3-2c724f79283b/
HongKong:
Is not the best guarantee for Hong Kong people not to clamour to get out of Hong Kong,
but rather to stay in Hong Kong, to develop and entrench their democracy, and to make
Hong Kong the success that it undoubtedly can be? That success is the best guarantee, and
the only long-term guarantee, of Hong Kong’s future.
I think that my right hon. Friend is right. The events of last June have both increased the
appetite and feeling in Hong Kong in favour of democracy and made the Chinese Govern-
ment defensive, and, to use my right hon. Friend’s word, “difficult.” Our job is to continue
to try to persuade the Chinese Government that Hong Kong’s future in China—two sys-
tems, one country—depends, if it is to be successful, on keeping alive the spirit of enter-
prise and freedom in the territory. This measure is part of that. It is a start to democracy,
not, as some headlines in today’s press suggest, an end to it. It is a more substantial start
than was envisaged previously.
10. Exhibitions and websites about constitutions such as “Charters of Freedom”

detailing the Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/ and the design of the “Magna Carta,
Treasures in Full” website, www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/index.html have a simi-

lar “iconic” atmosphere of reverence.
11. The fact that the JD is mentioned in post-1997 discourse highlights the inter-
textual and interdiscursive aspect of political discourse in Hong Kong and the impor-
tance of what Bourdieu called the “archaeology” of a text (1991). Often these two
framing documents are mentioned together and compared. For example, those advo-
cating slower democratization would say things like “there’s nothing about universal
suffrage in 1984’s Joint Declaration” or it had “no concept of universal suffrage.”
12. It is difficult to find out who is eligible to join these functional constituencies.
See Loh (2006). Up-to-date information about these can be found at the Registration
and Electoral Office of HKSAR, https://www.reo.gov.hk/en/voter/FC.htm.
13. Information about how China defines “state secrets” can be found at
the following website: www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=8039&lib=law
&SearchKeyword=State secrets&SearchCKeyword=;
14. A possible metaphor that suggests difficulties for interpreting laws between
Beijing and Hong Kong. This is Hong Kong’s regional emblem, the Bauhinia
(Bauhinia “Blakeana”—洋紫荊). However, subsequent research has shown that it is
“completely sterile” and “the result of hybridization between the largely sympatric
species, B. purpurea and B. variegata” (Lau, Ramsden and Saunders 2005). This
further emphasizes the “hybridity” of the Hong Kong system and also illustrates the
contradictions (a tree that produces seeds yet is sterile) of the system.
Chapter 3
Participants in the Discourse

The Political Divide
Central to understanding the arguments concerning Hong Kong’s constitu-

tional reform in the light of how it is framed in the Basic Law is an apprecia-
tion of the ideological stance taken by its framers and its interpreters. This
chapter focuses on the stance of Hong Kong’s two major political parties
from before the handover on July 1, 1997, to December 2007, and to a much
lesser extent from 2008 to the present. This will be done through an analysis
of the factors shaping their habitus (Bourdieu 1991). Membership categoriza-
tion analysis (MCA) (Sacks 1972; Schegloff 2007) is then used to show how
these parties categorize themselves (through party logos and manifestos) and
their opponents metaphorically (through the newspaper texts mentioned at
the start of this book). While there were other political parties apart from the
two major parties dealt with in this chapter, these two parties could have been
said to be the ones that set the “frame” on how politics were seen initially in
Hong Kong.
The political divide has been analyzed in this way for two reasons. First,
our perception of the world stems from our “habitus,” that is, our history,
which is influenced by our social and cultural environment as well as our
historical context. It is a set of acquired patterns of thought and behavior
that determines actions. These patterns (or “dispositions”) are carried over
through social change and of course are realized in discourse. Given the
reflexive reaction holding between social change and discourse change
(Fairclough 1992, 96), the actors of that discourse (Goffman 1973) may be
regarded in some sense as spokespersons of this social change as they “battle
for public opinion.” Second, MCA can serve to show us how these spokesper-
sons position themselves or are positioned by others during processes of dis-
cursive shift and, as in this case, may offer evidence for the various ideologies
of political groups vis-à-vis themselves and others. Since the discourse(s)
59
60 Chapter 3
of Hong Kong’s future democratization involve bargaining among multiple

actors (the China and Hong Kong governments, political parties, business
entities, and, to a lesser extent, the people), categorization, which could be
considered a metaphoric act, can be, and is, used to bond group members
together in order to build up their own arguments as well as demolish or
invalidate the arguments of others.
The first part of the chapter is an overview of the forging of the habitus
of Hong Kong’s two major political parties up till 2007, and this is fol-
lowed by an analysis of the political symbols of these two political parties:
their names, logos, and political manifestos. The major categories that the
political actors are called by their ideological opponents will be listed dis-
course—their “Other” categorization—and how these actors responded to
this categorization. Because these two parties’ foundation moments largely
set the tone for the discourse over time, it is worth studying these aspects in
depth.
HONG KONG’S POLITICAL HABITUS

AND THE POLITICAL FIELD
A field, according to Bourdieu (1991), is a setting in which agents and their

social positions are located. The position of each particular agent in the field
is a result of interaction between the specific rules of the field, the agent’s
habitus, and the agent’s capital (social, economic, cultural) in that particular
“marketplace.” Participants use this “symbolic capital” in the “linguistic
marketplace” to negotiate a specific gain. On the other hand, “a speaker’s
linguistic and cultural capital can equally become obsolete and lose in
value . . . with regards to acting structures” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 43ff). This
capital has a certain value in this “marketplace of values” (Calhoun et al.
1993). Fields interact with each other and are hierarchical (with subordina-
tion to the larger field of power). Like Wodak’s (2001) “fields of action,”
the field also includes textual and discursive elements that interact with the
wider sociopolitical marketplace (of symbolic capital) and of intersecting
discourses.
The “foundation moments” of Hong Kong’s political parties gave rise
to unique political cleavages (Lau and Kuan 2000; Kuan and Lau 2002).
Traditional political cleavages involve geographical (urban-rural), owner-
worker (socioeconomic), cultural/ethnic (center-periphery), or religious
(church-state) categories. However, prior to 1997, Hong Kong’s politi-
cal cleavages were largely based on the pace of democratization and trust
in the Beijing or Hong Kong governments (Lau and Kuan 2000; Ma
2007, 140).
Participants in the Discourse 61
Habitus and the Political Field Prior to 1997

Most Hong Kong people had little political say under British administration,
so their dispositions as outsiders to the elite-based “orders of discourse”
(Bourdieu 1991) meant that they concentrated on aspects outside the political
arena (Tsang 2004; Wacks 1999), on achieving stability and prosperity in the
commercial arena and in fields of cultural production. While social activist
groups existed, political groups only began to form in the early 1980s as a
response to the knowledge that Hong Kong was to be “handed back” to China
in 1997. Other events increasing political party activity were the Tiananmen
Square crackdown in 1989 and Governor Chris Patten’s reforms of 1992, and
the emphasis on stability, not politics.
The first Hong Kong’s political party, in the formal sense, was founded
in 1990 as the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK). The UDHK
developed as a result of growing opposition within civil society against
authoritarian rule during the 1980s and the ongoing Sino-British negotiations
culminating in party formation less than a year after the events in Tiananmen
Square in 1989, an event with a huge impact on the public support for democ-
racy in Hong Kong.
The United Democrats gained popularity during the Tiananmen Square
protests of 1989, as it had roundly condemned the Chinese government who
had deemed the protests “turmoil” rather than a patriotic “democracy move-
ment,”1 helping student dissidents to escape via “Operation Yellow Bird,” an
“underground railway” out of China for student dissidents that existed almost
up to the time of the handover. The name “Yellow Bird” came from a Chinese
proverb: “as the locust catches the cicada, the yellow bird is behind it wait-
ing” (O’Neill 2009); Democrats, having lost trust with Beijing, now urged
a faster pace of democratization; for their actions in 1989, democrats were
barred, and remained barred from visiting the Mainland.
The landslide victory of the Democratic Party in the 1991 Legislative
Council elections was the impetus for conservatives to form political par-
ties. They were already represented in the Legislative Council through the
appointment and the functional constituency systems (Loh 2010) but electoral
success spurred them to action, with Beijing now seeing political parties as
useful political tools (Grundström 2006). A pro-establishment party, the
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), was set up in
1992 as a check on the pro-democracy parties in elections prior to 1997 and
to provide support to the Hong Kong government post-1997 (Loh 2010, 185).
The DAB was reputed to be formed with the assistance of the Xinhua News
Agency, at the time the public face of the CCP in Hong Kong. This party
reportedly received financial support from leftist trade unions and support
from other mainland Chinese sources (Brinkley 2011). These conservative
62 Chapter 3
and business parties were inclined to favor the existing status quo and slower
political change.
With widespread uncertainty about Hong Kong’s future under Chinese
rule, the Democratic Party supported the controversial package of political
reforms brought about by the last British governor, Chris Patten, which was
also popular with the people. Beijing feared that Patten’s changes favored
the democrats in order to leave British “proxies” in place (Ma 2007, 139).
This led to the formation of the Provisional Legislative Council in December
1996 in which the Democratic Party refused to join. As the body became the
official legislature of Hong Kong SAR after reunification, the party lost all its
seats in the legislature. July 1 meant that political parties in Hong Kong were
given “new rules of the game” to follow. Whether the new rules under which
they operated were congruent and compatible to easily achieving universal
suffrage will be the focus of the next section.
Habitus Political Field Post-1997–2007

In most democratic states, political parties serve the electorate as organiza-
tions and as a means of forming governments. For the electorate (the demos),
parties simplify choices, provide education and socialization to citizens, gen-
erate symbols of identification and loyalty, and mobilize people to participate
in politics (Dahl, Shapiro, and Cheibub 2003). As organizations, they are sup-
posed to help recruit political leaders, train new political talent, and combine
political interests (Ma 2007, 135). Political parties form governments when
they achieve legislative majorities, and they provide personnel to implement
policies (Ibid). When out of power, parties help organize dissent and opposi-
tion, posing an important mechanism for providing checks and balances to
those in power (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 5–10).
However, in Hong Kong, political parties are constrained by the spe-
cific rules of the field (mostly built into the Basic Law) that inhibit them
from performing all these usual roles effectively.2 With such infrastructural
deficiencies, it is not surprising that Hong Kong’s political parties were
underdeveloped (Ma 2007; Sing 2003, 2004, 2009). The exception was the
pro-establishment parties who were heavily financed by business and those
connected to Beijing. The lack of political “talent” in political parties as a
result of these infrastructural deficiencies gave rise to circular arguments
which said that when there was enough political talent, Hong Kong would
then be “ready” for universal suffrage.
The following quotation from the pro-democracy Chinese-language Apple
Daily satirizes the limitations and attitudes to parties by the establishment/
Beijing in Hong Kong’s political system:
The Chinese character for “party” (黨) [as in political party], if you break up the
character, reads “still (尚) black (黑)” words that advocate violence, fraud, and
conspiracy in order that the government achieves legitimacy.
Ultimately, not only does the Legislative Council have no “through train,”
moreover, Hong Kong people’s “party” train, whether linked to the Liberal
Party, the Democratic Party, the DAB and the like are different colourful com-
partments towards a destination, not a stop at the Kingdom of Heaven stop of
Western parliamentary politics but the “still black” black hole singularity of the
Chinese Palace stop. (Tsao 2006a)3
One can see from the above that Hong Kong’s political parties are con-
strained in acting as politicians in the (“usual”) democratic political field, so
Hong Kong’s politics was not “politics as usual” (Wodak 2009). This disso-
nance between both habitus and field is also reflected in the “self” and “other”
classification of Hong Kong’s political parties. In the following, we can see
how these classifications could possibly shape the tenor of the discourse of
Hong Kong’s future democratization.
THE TWO “CAMPS” AND THEIR CATEGORIZATION
The idea of categories is central to our cognitive understanding of the world

as most symbols (i.e., words and their representations) do not designate par-
ticular things or people, but categories: “every time we see something as a
kind of thing, for example, a tree, we are categorizing” (Lakoff 1987, 5–6).
Metaphors, like categories, can act as powerful schemata in long-term
memory by which people make sense of their experiences and posit the
future. In fact, Thomas and Mareschal (2001, 5) state “metaphor is categori-
zation” or comparison as some attributes of “B” but not others are used in an
“A is B” configuration. For example, what the characteristics are of “instant
noodles” is carried over into the metaphor “instant noodle-style democracy”
(即食麪式民主) (Apple Daily, October 29, 2005). Although Hong Kong
people do like their instant noodles, they are still not as tasty as the freshly
made ones. And as this example shows, the way that a cultural system (in this
case the “eating culture”) influences how and what attributes of a category/
metaphor will be selected would be likely to lay with the category system
already existing in that culture, with that culture having their own particular
prototypes, the “most representative” of a type (Rosch and Lloyd 1987, 29).
New categories are invented for new situations or old categories can be entex-
tualized and then recontextualized (like Daoist terms being used to describe
Buddhist concepts when the latter entered China from India) (Zurcher 1972).
64 Chapter 3
Categories are also “moral in character” (Jayyusi 1984) since they are used
to describe and are used to do various tasks, for example, “deliver judge-
ments, warrant further inferences, assign actions, project possible events,
explain prior events and account for behaviour etc.” (Ibid, 2). Political cat-
egories are connected to a particular ideology (to use the cliché, one person’s
terrorist is another’s freedom fighter) and used alongside the moral standards
of a culture in which they are situated (e.g., the Chinese rhetorical topoi
mentioned in chapter 1). Since new categories are invented and incorporated
into a culture it stands to reason that old categories can be recontextualized as
situations change or when they no longer suit the usual requirements.
According to MCA, “membership categories” are constituted by “cate-
gory-bound predicates,” which may include activities, dispositions (the habi-
tus) to act, aims, beliefs, and values (Watson 1978). Categories are organized
by members in collections and together with the rules of application they
become “membership category devices” (Sacks 1992).
This organization is a result of how we relate ourselves to others as there
is “a necessary multiplicity in human perception” (Holquist 2002, 22), so
“the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness” (Ibid, 8),
since meaning is dialogic and therefore relational. Therefore, it is impos-
sible to consider the “Self” as “Self” if one does not reveal one’s self to the
“Other,” through the Other, and with the help of the Other (Bakhtin 1981,
287). Without the Other’s presence, the self does not exist and cannot have
any meaning since it cannot be defined (Holquist 2002, 36).
Thus “Us” and “Them” are perhaps the most basic “standardized relational
pair” in MCA; the use of one half of the pair invokes the other half of the
pair—like a word and its antonym (Cruse 1986, 197). Such pairs are defined
not simply in terms of typical expectations (of actions) that are considered
representative of the other but also in moral terms (as ideology) as suggested
above by Rosch and Lloyd, as “it constitutes a locality for a set of rights and
obligations” (Sacks 1992, 73) that are contextually situated.
Linguistically, positive self-representation and negative “Othering” (i.e.,
“Us” and “Them”) can be done in systematic ways so that the group describes
themselves in a way that negates the other (Wodak 2001, 46), usually by a
variety of rhetorical strategies used in conjunction with each other such as
referencing using MCA and metaphor as well as prediction (giving evalua-
tive attributes to the Other and the Self) and perspectivation, argumentation,
topoi, and collectivization in general categories (Ibid, 48). In politics, “Us”
and “Them” are arguably the most common “relational pair” in this field of
action. Hong Kong’s two political “camps” could thus be said to be a rela-
tional pair themselves.
The definition of the “pro-establishment camp” is that it adopted a more

conservative approach toward constitutional reform, ensured a friendlier
relationship with the Chinese and Hong Kong governments, and stressed the
values of stability and prosperity. It emphasized the “one country.” For this
category, the DAB alone will represent the pro-establishment camp as it was
the largest and most influential group in that “camp.”
The definition of the “pro-democracy camp” is that it emphasizes the
early implementation of double universal suffrage, adopts a more critical
attitude toward the Central and the HKSAR governments, puts greater
emphasis on human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. It empha-
sizes the “two systems.”4 The Democratic Party of Hong Kong will repre-
sent this “camp.”
Often each “camp” saw the other as a general group, meaning that mem-
bers of that camp are most frequently called by a collective name such as
the “establishment camp” (建制派) or “pro-China faction” (親中派) and as
“democrats” (民主派) or “pan-democrats” (泛民主派 or 泛民). But finding
out how some political parties refer to themselves and their ideologies, in
large part, also determines how they categorize the “Other” and the “Other”
side’s discourse as well as their own.
Categorizing the Hong Kong’s Political Self:

Signs and Symbols
In the field of action encompassing party-internal formation of attitudes,
opinions, and will, the name of a party (the “party identity”) is the most
important category label; it is their “ideological shorthand” semiotically.
It could be assumed that political parties are in a category consisting of a
single member—being contextualized or “situated collectivities” (Leudar,
Marsland, and Nekvapil 2004).
Further, names of political parties are “collocated” with a logo. This signi-
fier (the logo) is connected to a signified (political ideology), together consti-
tuting the linguistic sign. All signs (no matter what their nature) are “indexes”
(Scollon and Scollon 2003, vii) and are a visual “grammar” of the entity that
they represent.
Political Party Logos

Some of the following texts were valid at the time of the initial research
(2007–2012), and some of the information now cannot be accessed. However,
the logos have not changed as these are essential components of a party’s
66 Chapter 3
ideology. For example, the DAB’s logo (see www.dab.org.hk) semiotically

emphasizes Hong Kong’s relationship with China:
The logo is made up of the letters “D” and “B.” “D” stands for “democracy” and
the “B” inside stands for “betterment of our society.” The logo gives expres-
sion to our determination to contribute to the democratic development of Hong
Kong, and to build a better place for everybody to live in. The two loops sym-
bolize the interactive and interdependent relationship between Hong Kong and
China. The logo looks like the Chinese character “回” (meaning “return”), sym-
bolizing our readiness to embrace the return of Hong Kong to our motherland.
The DAB also had a slogan “Faithful to Hong Kong” (真誠為香港) which is
also the name of its party song, the following of which is an excerpt:
We work hand in hand to build a better Hong Kong; Our goal’s democracy
in this striving place where we belong; Firmly march we along, proudly sing-
ing our song. And ice melts into torrents flowing strong, as more will join our
throng. The Party with a Future, we are growing strong.
The Democratic Party’s logo, a green “wing-clapping” pigeon, is a recog-

nized symbol of peace (see http://dphk.org):
The Democratic Party adopts a wing-clapping pigeon, against a green back-

ground, as the constituent part of its Emblem. This symbolizes the prevalence
and spread of the Democratic Party’s convictions—Democracy, Liberty and
Justice—throughout society.
Since the “white dove” is emblematic of “peace” and “justice,” the

Democratic Party also became known as the “white dove party” (白鴿黨).
Categorizing the Self: Political Party Manifestos

Manifestos are public declarations of intentions, opinions, objectives, or
motives of an individual or organization such as political parties, and they are
also the party-internal formation of attitudes, opinions, and will. Alongside
their names and logos, a party’s manifesto is meant to elaborate on the sym-
bolism contained in the name or logo in a more extended (discursive) form,
stating their fundamental beliefs about how a society should be run and the
basis on which their policies are set.
A political manifesto is a text that “contextualizes” a political party; the
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are the “political context”
of Hong Kong’s political parties and these parties’ manifestos interact both
intertextually and interdiscursively with these other documents. Manifestos

present complex political ideas in a broad and simplified manner (Fernandez-
Vazquez 2010) that hopefully resonates (and persuade) an audience (Downs
1957, 98) while they interpret that party’s particular political “truth”
(Bourdieu 1991, 190) and with which they can then connect with specific
policies made by that party. What is ideologically significant about texts is
that words and phrases “are willfully chosen” as are the other words they col-
locate with (Fairclough 1989, 113). Since the political cleavages based on the
foundation moments of Hong Kong’s parties are relevant to political stance,
the following three aspects are considered in analyzing these manifestos:
• Relationship with China—as it relates to “One Country, Two Systems” and

the boundaries of autonomy.
• Stability and prosperity—as “Hong Kong collocates” these have resonated
throughout Hong Kong since before negotiations for the Sino-British Dec-
laration began.
• Attitudes to governance and future democratization—since attitudes deter-
mine a preferred system of government and the speed with which it is
implemented.
Relationship to China
DAB
• Hong Kong is “a part of China”;

• “China is our motherland and Hong Kong is our home”; relationship “one
of cooperation and communication”;
• Do “our utmost to expedite any activities conducive to the realisation of
‘one country, two systems’ and China as a whole.”
Democratic Party
• “Hong Kong is an indivisible part of China”;
• “Cares for China” and has the “right and obligation” to participate and
comment on the affairs of China;
• Calls for amendment of the Basic Law to “achieve democracy as a safe-
guard to liberty during the transitional period”;
• Says Beijing “crushed” the student movement in Tiananmen Square and
“assaulted” the “will of the people”;
• Urges the central government to “overrule” its position on Tiananmen and
considers the student’s actions a “patriotic movement”; it would fight for
amendment of Basic Law after 1997.
68 Chapter 3
From the above we can infer that the DAB focuses on “Chineseness” and as
a part of the “One Country, Two Systems.” The Democratic Party despite
saying it is a “part of China” emphasizes its right to comment on Mainland
affairs. The Democratic Party called for the overturning of Beijing’s line
about the events in Tiananmen in 1989.
Stability and Prosperity

DAB
• Stability and prosperity will ensure smooth political transition and the party
will work toward this;
• It is the “foundation on which Hong Kong develops”;
• “Democratic development has to keep this in mind.”
Democratic Party
• Democracy, freedom, human rights, and rule of law are the foundation of
stability and prosperity;
• A high degree of autonomy is allowed in the one country, two systems and
establishing democratic government will contribute to this.
The DAB implies that maintenance of the status quo will ensure the smooth-
ness of the transition and stability and prosperity, while the Democratic
Party sees human rights-related themes as bringing true stability and
prosperity.
Attitudes to Governance and Future Democratization

DAB
• Supports “participatory democracy”; there was “no genuine democracy
under colonial rule”; it was the JD and Basic Law has made participa-
tory democracy possible and these two documents need to converge for a
smooth transition;
• There should be no interference with foreign forces;
• Democratic developments need to be in line with the “actual needs of the
circumstances” and is “advantageous to maintaining social stability and
economic prosperity.”
Democratic Party
• “The major aim of the Democratic Party is to further unite the democratic
forces in Hong Kong to shoulder the responsibility for the future of Hong
Kong. At this crucial moment, we sincerely appeal to the citizens of Hong

Kong to unite together and support the Democratic Party in its pursuit of a
high degree of autonomy and an open and democratic government of Hong
Kong”;
• Democracy “provides safeguards,” “institutionalize protection,” and
“strengthen human rights.”
The DAB states that democracy now exists and it had not existed under
the British. It paraphrases the Basic Law in describing how constitutional
development should proceed. Democratic development to some seems to be
antithetical to stability and prosperity, and the actual paraphrases of the Basic
Law by the two establishment parties may indicate that they will adhere to
that document more closely in the future. The Democratic Party sees it as
its “mission” to help bring about democratic development. It is a party of its
time and context.
The name (textual), logo (metaphoric), and manifesto/platform (discur-
sive) of a political party thus form a three-way conceptual, ideological, and
metaphorical “grid” about how that party perceives and categorizes itself.
These grids frame how the audience interprets a party’s later discourse and
also how the media reacts to it.
Categorizing the Hong Kong’s Political “Other”

The pioneer of MCA, Harvey Sacks (1992), was particularly interested in
who “administered the application of that new category rather than how
that new category was identified” (i.e., the “gatekeepers” of a particular dis-
course). Category manipulation is done by changing the predicates (charac-
teristics, actions) attributed to a given category, re-specifying the criteria for
membership in a given category, or by altering, at an overarching level, the
super-category into which the category is subsumed. In Hong Kong’s politi-
cal discourse, it is the elites, the Hong Kong and the Central Governments
(e.g., Mainland Basic Law officials), who were the primary definers of the
discourse and they largely controlled these categories and therefore the scope
of the discourse.
By carefully examining articles from the newspapers we have been using
in the previous chapters (containing the key word “universal suffrage” 普選),
the most general designations of the parties and individuals within those
parties were noted. Some of these were set phrases that occurred repeatedly.
These formed the superordinate categories under which other subcategories
are placed. In this chapter, most of these expressions were in the Chinese
newspapers.
70 Chapter 3
OVERALL CATEGORY PAIRS OF HONG

KONG’S POLITICAL PARTIES
The overall category pairs were “loyalists” and “the opposition”:
Loyalists (保皇派):
Loved China, Loved Hong Kong (愛國愛港)
Sought Consensus (尋求共識)
Espoused True Democracy (真民主)
Opposition (反對派):
• Anti-China, Destabilizing Hong Kong (反中亂港)

• Sought Confrontation (搞對抗)
• Espoused False Democracy (假民主)
The words “loyalist” and “opposition” highlight the polarization of the two
major political camps. The expressions “love China, love Hong Kong” and
“anti-China, destabilizing Hong Kong” (反中亂港)5 are set terms that high-
light this polarization. “Seeking consensus” and “seeking confrontation” is
a category pair because the former represents an ideal of traditional Chinese
society of “harmony in the family,” while the other does not and invokes the
“adversarial” (and “Western”) nature of democratic politics. “Espousing real
democracy” or “espousing false democracy” is a category because ultimately
this is the main topic of democratization/political change, and participants in
the discourse have to convince others what is “real” democracy and why this
democracy is suitable for Hong Kong.
These all are contextualized “standard relational pairs,” since as stated
earlier, you cannot consider the “Self” without considering the “Other.”
“Opposition” and “loyalist” can be taken as the most superordinate category/
metaphor under which all the other pairs are subsumed and because of this
superordinate nature, the other categories are often invoked at the same time
as these (Ji, Kuiper, and Shaogu 1990); Wray (2002, 2008).
Loyalists and Opposition

Opposition
Democrats were largely categorized as the “opposition” from 2003 onward.
This label was most frequently used in the pro-Beijing/pro-establishment Ta
Kung Pao as a general category often without further elaboration. However,
both pro-government and pro-democracy parties are effectively playing an
opposition role as no one party could win power and head the government.
However, the pro-establishment camp was often seen as a quasi “ruling coali-
tion” with the chief executive on most policies.
Democrats (of various persuasions) mostly did not agree on many govern-
ment policies and were thus accused of “always opposing for the sake of
opposing” and labeled the general term of “opposition.” Thus the democrats
fell into the “default” position being of a quasi-opposition, making the other
party appear more conciliatory, as the following example suggests:
Tsang Yok-sing [DAB leader] also said that acting as an opposition is not an
option for the DAB. “The opposition continued to attack the government’s
policy mistakes and failures . . . and deliberately belittle the government. . . .
We will not do such a thing, because we love Hong Kong, we would like to see
the government succeed.” (Ta Kung Pao, December 8, 2002)
Furthermore, by categorizing democrats as the “opposition” and “always

opposing” the other side is attempting to place them as antithetical to the
Chinese concept/topoi of “harmony in the family” (and therefore stability).
Loyalists
The label “loyalist” literally means “protect the emperor group” and forms
the major category for the pro-establishment/pro-Beijing camp. “Loyalist”
was used without explanation in newspapers apart from the Ta Kung Pao
which was a Beijing-aligned newspaper as was the DAB.
The pro-democracy Apple Daily used this category the most in a sarcastic
manner. This label was used for what some perceived as this groups’ “loy-
alty” to the Hong Kong and Central Chinese governments’ basic line, the
implicature being that this group only channeled Beijing’s views before mak-
ing any comment. The pro-Beijing/pro-establishment Ta Kung Pao used this
least since it was not how it categorized itself.
Similarly, the “loyalists” or pro-establishment camps were seen by pan-
democrats as opportunists attuned to where the political wind was blowing.
The following two metaphors from the Apple Daily highlight what the demo-
crats saw as the changeability of beliefs of the pro-establishment/pro-Beijing
camp (emphases added):
What are really surprising are those loyalist chameleons. The latest polls show
that Mr Jasper Tsang’s popularity [Tsang was a DAB member] is low among
senior officials and the Executive Council. This shows that the public remember
the loyalist party’s stance on the Article 23 legislation. But people are forgetful.
As chameleons in next year’s Legislative Council elections, will put forward
72 Chapter 3
political views in support of universal suffrage in order to gain votes by cheat-

ing. After being elected, they will again change “colour.” (Lee Yee, Apple
Daily, August 22, 2003)
Tung Chee-hwa and the DAB are conjoined twins sharing a heart and blood,
but today suffering a shock in common, and to avoid becoming “one corpse for
two lives,” need to undergo a separation operation. (Apple Daily, November
30, 2003)
By implication, the democrats were not so changeable about their core beliefs
(e.g., that they wanted universal suffrage as soon as possible). However,
resisting this category label, the pro-establishment camp commented that
they were not always government “yes-men,” and they would say “yes when
it needed to be yes and no when it needed to be no” (是其是、非其非) and
not “blindly support” the government (Li 2003).
“Love China, Love Hong Kong” and “Anti-China,

Destabilizing Hong Kong”
The term “Love China, Love Hong Kong” spiked in 2004 at the height of
a debate about “patriotism” and who could be deemed “patriotic” (Human
Rights Watch 2004). This category occurred mostly in the pro-Beijing
newspaper, the Ta Kung Pao. When it is mentioned in other newspapers, it
is usually either refuting this category or discussing what this phrase means.
Simply being a democrat seemed to mean that they did not love China
(emphases added):
Xu Chongde said that the Central Government needs to communicate with the
people of Hong Kong, especially those who love China and Hong Kong, and
it also has to communicate with the “democrats” better. However, for there to
be an atmosphere of communication, certain conditions have to be met; and but
how to communicate if the “democrats” are inciting the people of Hong Kong to
make trouble, frequently engage in large-scale demonstrations, and also invite
foreign interference? (Ta Kung Pao, April 5, 2004)
Here, it is automatically assumed that democrats are not people who love both
China and Hong Kong, so an antithetical relationship is established, especially
so as the speaker referred to is a “guardian of the Basic Law.” Not loving China
relates to disagreeing with its decisions, going on demonstrations, and inviting
foreign influence (in Hong Kong affairs) as will be explained later.
The mainland Chinese authorities’ emphasis on stability and prosperity in
the post-Tiananmen crackdown period and the recurring topoi of harmony,
loyalty, and Chinese versus foreign has already been mentioned in chapter
1. The elders of the Democratic Party were active in helping students exit
China with foreign help which led Beijing’s leaders to lack trust in Hong
Kong’s democrats. Furthermore, saying that the “source of the [universal
suffrage protest] July 1 marches was June 4” (七一遊行源自六四) (Lo 2004)
and that “reversing the verdict on June 4 is patriotic” (平反六四才是愛國)
(Lam 2004) rhetorically linked these two events as the Tiananmen protest-
ers in 1989 who also had called their movement “patriotic.” Democrats also
saw themselves as the necessary “democratic vanguard for China,” and this
was reflected in the Democratic Party’s political manifesto discussed earlier.
Therefore, democrat’s definition of “patriotism” was to advance such con-
cepts as democracy, free speech, and the rule of law. This was mocked in the
following editorial regarding the possible introduction of Article 23 in 2003:
However, in this is a debate, “democrat” legislators are suddenly playing the

“patriotic” role with an onslaught on Article 23 of the Basic Law saying it
“undermines the rule of law,” “ruins the ‘One Country, Two Systems’,” and
“turns the public into enemies.” (Ta Kung Pao, July 5, 2003)
From the above, the democrats’ categorization of “patriot” was contested as

the criteria for such a category was set by those in authority (who authored
Article 23 of the Basic Law).
People and groups who “loved China, loved Hong Kong” had the attributes
of not engaging in “empty talk,” enthusiastically implementing the “One
Country, Two Systems,” did not “bad mouth” Hong Kong by discussing its
affairs with foreign countries, and also “did not oppose the Communist Party
or confront China.”6 The DAB was thus the party that “loves China, loves
Hong Kong”:
DAB clearly holds up the banner of patriotism. DAB is in line with Deng
Xiaoping’s political party patriot standard, DAB is the patriotic faction. (Lin
Shuming, Ta Kung Pao, August 17, 2004)
The “battle” metaphor, which is ubiquitous in political discourse (Burns

1978, 38), is positioned now according to the relational pair of “patriots” and
“opposition.”
Ma Lik [chairman of the DAB] while attending a forum for Guangdong

Community Organizations, said the Legislative Council elections in September
is not a confrontation between “pro-democracy” and “loyalists” but a decisive
battle between “the opposition” and “patriotic” camps. (Ming Pao Daily, July
22, 2004)
74 Chapter 3
And it is only patriotic groups who can provide the right method of demo-
cratic attainment (emphasis added):
The SAR government, DAB and other patriotic political groups, have never
objected to the development of democracy, but stressed that it has to proceed
step by step according to the Basic Law; the “democrats” only engage in dem-
onstrations, shout slogans, and mislead the masses. (Hai Yun, Ta Kung Pao,
November 14, 2003)
“Anti-China and Destabilizing Hong Kong” (or slight modifications of

this phrase) was the other half of the “Love China, Love Hong Kong”
relational pair. This occurred mainly in the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao,
particularly during 2004 as part of a debate about patriotism and during
other controversial events like the interpretation of the Basic Law. This
was also closely linked with the concept of stability that has and will
be a recurring theme in this book (being “anti-China” implied being a
traitor).
The following quotation illustrates how political activism and “opposing”
could be seen as undermining prosperity and stability (emphasis added):
All in all, in the six years after the reunification of Hong Kong, the “democrats”
was hit by several unexpected crisis and lack of experience [showing that they
were] anti-China and caused disorder in Hong Kong; they have ulterior motives
but in the long run, people will certainly be more aware that these activities
undermine prosperity and stability and also harm Hong Kong’s interests. (Lu
Shi (魯士), Ta Kung Pao, June 9, 2003)
“Disturbance” or “disorder” (亂), as mentioned in this and earlier chapters,

is a state feared by past Chinese leaders of all persuasions and to be avoided
at all costs. Disorder affects the stability and prosperity of a place and without
the latter the kind of political system one possesses is immaterial. The follow-
ing “letter to the editor” sees the use of the phrase, “anti-China and destabiliz-
ing Hong Kong” for people so characterized as a means of pressurizing the
requirements on achieving universal suffrage (which perhaps mean putting
higher requirements on its attainment):
Beijing, regardless of the content of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the
provisions in the Basic Law for the ultimate aim of universal suffrage have
launched irrational abuse concerning people in Hong Kong’s democratic move-
ment as being “anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong . . . in order to put
pressure on the requirements for universal suffrage in Hong Kong. (An Ping,
Apple Daily, June 12, 2004)
Designating democrats as “anti-China” and therefore “destabilizing Hong

Kong” diverts the attacker from having to address the opponent’s argument;
furthermore, this label meant that democrats failed on the most important
criteria for becoming chief executives of Hong Kong: trust and belief in the
central government in Beijing. By saying that certain democrats were unac-
ceptable to Beijing, nothing needs more to be said; therefore, they would or
should never get far in Hong Kong’s political life. The next major relational
pair relates to those who are not “anti-China” but who seek consensus on
political problems while others just “confront” the Central and Hong Kong
Governments.
Seeking Consensus (尋求共識) and Seeking

Confrontation (搞對抗)
Since the Ta Kung Pao was a pro-establishment/Beijing supporter, “seek-
ing consensus” was most prominent in that newspaper. This relational pair
could almost be seen as a relationship between the East (harmony of the col-
lectivity, consensus) and the West (the view of the individual, adversarial).
“Consensus” was seen by Beijing, the Hong Kong government, business-
people, and other conservative sectors as necessary for Hong Kong’s politi-
cal development, and by giving themselves the label of “consensus-builders”
they obtained the attributes of being “rational,” which meant that their oppo-
nents were not (emphases added):
Hong Kong’s democratic development process is a rugged road, and the DAB
will continue its efforts to seek social consensus, and actively create condi-
tions to allow Hong Kong’s democratic political system to pragmatically head
towards the goal of universal suffrage. (Ta Kung Pao, February 13, 2006)
The democrats were accused of being poor leaders by “misguiding the public”
by provoking confrontation. “Confrontational” meant street marches, slogan-
shouting, and querying the Basic Law. Making noise and shouting slogans
was “the only thing that the Democratic Party knows” (直斥民主黨只懂喊
口號) according to the pro-Beijing/pro-establishment camp. One such slogan,
“Return power to the people” (還政於民),7 was used by pan-democrats on
democracy marches. Such a slogan was seen by the pro-establishment and
Beijing as advocating “independence for Hong Kong” (港獨). To them, with
the “One Country, Two Systems,” the departure of Great Britain power had
truly returned to the people. This went on to become a crucial phrase in the
discourse.
The following could be said to be sub-relational pairs related to consensus
and being able to compromise.
76 Chapter 3
Pragmatic and Rational versus Irrational or Unrealistic

As described in chapter 1 of this book, the first two characteristics of this
relational pair are qualities prized as “Hong Kong values” that led them (to
work together) to succeed over adversity. Being confrontational in the ways
mentioned earlier meant that the pan-democratic camp was neither “prag-
matic” (務實) nor “rational” (理性) unlike the “seekers of consensus” above.
These qualities are needed to think of a practical solution to difficult issues
like implementing universal suffrage in Hong Kong.
Being “irrational,” the “democrats” spoke “gibberish” (胡言亂語),
“lacked sincerity” (缺乏聆), and were full of “empty talk” (空談). The
following is a selection of metaphors arising from this category. The meta-
phor below vividly implies that what the democrats say have no substance
(emphasis added):
She [Jiang Liyun] criticized the pan—“democrat” legislators who shouldn’t be

going to Europe “to speak nonsense”8 [to overseas officials]. She said of the
“democrats”: “It’s like eating sugar; makes you want more after you’ve fin-
ished.” (Ta Kung Pao, November 27, 2005)
Also highlighting their unrealistic nature, where accusations that the pan-
democrats were dreamers by grasping at the “moon in the water” (水中撈月),
an idiom meaning that they were impractical.
This category perhaps had some validity as the democrats kept talking of
the “democratic dream” (民主夢) being constantly broken and dashed, liken-
ing their struggle to Martin Luther King’s famous “I have a dream” speech at
various points in the discourse, implying their dream was still far-off:
Concerning Gao Siren’s [a Beijing official] blunt’s criticism that he [Democrat

Martin Lee] would like to visit China is “dreaming,” Lee says with a laugh:
“America’s black leader Martin Luther King gave a speech in which the first
sentence is: ‘I have a dream!’ I am called Martin [Lee’s English name], and I
have two dreams, one dream is of democracy and a one dream is to return to my
home village.” (Liang Mei Yee, Ming Pao Daily, March 4, 2004)
Democrats saw themselves as “heroes” (英雄) and using Martin Luther

King’s iconic phrase “I have a dream” (我有一個夢) like that of the
instance above draws on the “messianic nature” of Martin Luther King’s
rhetoric (Charteris-Black 2005, 58–85). These attributes will be used to
imply that the lack of a fixed date for universal suffrage is the democrats’
responsibility (Wen 2004) because they had unrealistic expectations about
universal suffrage (普選並不能解決一切), primarily because they advocate
democratization without due respect due to the “actual situation” and with
“gradual and orderly progress” as deemed in the Basic Law. A major category
pair was thus concerned with who possessed the “true” concept of democracy.
Opposite to this, the DAB was described as “a forward-looking party”
(民建聯是一個很有前景的政黨) (Ta Kung Pao 2006), “a respon-
sible party” (民建聯是負責任的政黨) and a “fairly rational party”
(民建聯是一個較理性的政黨) by those who agreed with their ideologies
(Ming Pao Daily 2006).
Espousing True Democracy or Espousing False Democracy

What is and what is not “real democracy” as opposed to “false democracy” is an
unsolvable dichotomy as it has no firm definition as mentioned earlier; therefore,
no one has a “patent” on it, a recurring metaphor in the discourse. Therefore,
ascribing certain characteristics to a group will set up a frame with which the
“truth condition” of their particular view of democracy would be judged.
According to some in the pro-establishment, “proper” democracy was
not equivalent of going onto the streets (民主不等於上街) nor is it shout-
ing slogans. Because of the poor character of the democrats as is implied by
previous labels, the democrats’ definition and meaning of democracy is also
called into question. The DAB (and their allies) say that “their” democracy is
the one that comes with stability:
The DAB was set up to see that One Country, Two Systems and Hong Kong
people ruling Hong Kong are successful. More than that, we hold democracy
close to our hearts. We always have—it is in our name. The party is a proponent
for democracy as much as the opposition. The difference is that we believe the
democracy that comes with stability is absolutely necessary in Hong Kong. The
DAB wants universal suffrage. We want it as quickly as possible, and we are
determined to get it properly. (Ma Lik, South China Morning Post, July 7, 2004)
If there was a democracy that comes with stability, by implication, there is

one that comes with instability, by which is meant the democracy espoused
by the democrats (fast democracy, one person, one vote, etc.). We can see
how this relates back to the DAB’s manifesto and logo. The democracy that
comes with stability is true democracy:
The Pseudo-Democratic Democratic Party has for many years carried a confused
banner of democracy, caused chaos, incited the public with the goal of gaining
votes in an attempt to win the right to rule the SAR to exclude the Central
Government’s position of dominance. In the Central Government’s eyes, for
the sake of economic prosperity and stability of the community certainly they
78 Chapter 3
will not let the Democratic Party’s conspiracy succeed. (Lin Gongbi, Ta Kung
Pao, May 6, 2004)
Furthermore, not only are the democrats undemocratic in nature (a category

error), they are actively hindering democratic development. Wearing a “dem-
ocratic cloak” (民主外衣) occurred 25 instances in the discourse between
1998 and 2007. Out of 25 instances, 16 belong to the Ta Kung Pao alone and
although a couple of these instances refer to universal suffrage as practiced in
the United States, most refer to Hong Kong (emphasis added).
They [democracy camp members] are only a handful of despicable hateful polit-
ical demagogues; “democracy” is just a beautiful coat that at crucial moments
is torn away. (Ta Kung Pao, January 5, 2006)
In the following, the writer implies that the democrats think that “their kind
of democracy” was the only way to democracy, while others’ versions are
invalid. The following is a selection of representative metaphors that aim to
show that democrats hinder rather than advance democratization. The inter-
nal administration of the Democratic Party and other parties was attacked by
saying that there was “no universal suffrage” within the Democratic Party.
However, as a political party or political group, it seems that the handful of

key decision makers [in the democratic camp] still believe universal suffrage
is democracy, and those who negotiate, compromise, show tolerance and bal-
ance, do things gradually and orderly are wearing an anti-democratic cloak of
democracy under the pretext of being “democratic politicians.” (Li Yufu, Ta
Kung Pao, July 20, 2004)
Speedy democracy was considered bad. This is a good point at which to

discuss what could be called “metaphors of personification,” as key figures
in the democratic camp were also often given the attributes of world-famous
democratic or independence “icons”:
To demonstrate against the reform package and to show their determination

to fight for universal suffrage, 17 democrats gathered at the Cultural Centre in
Tsim Sha Tsui waterfront yesterday to hold a “democratic relay race.” There was
the “father of democracy” Martin Lee (right) and the “Goddess of Democracy”
Audrey Eu (third from right) holding high the banner of democracy. [Article
refers to a photograph] (Ming Pao Daily, November 7, 2011)
In the next example, even those sympathetic to the democratic cause thought
that these icon metaphors did not completely fit the attributes and achieve-
ments of those given these titles:
In other words, we can find in the pan-democratic camp several “Hong

Kong’s Aung San Suu Kyis,” “Hong Kong Mandelas” or “Hong Kong’s
Jaime Cardinal Sins,” but cannot find the actual leadership in opera-
tion in the political arena. She [Anson Chan] now is just more than
a symbol of spiritual support and movement, but she is still not the
“common leader” everyone is waiting for. (Ming Pao Daily, June 28,
2006)
Given the DAB’s connections to Beijing, perhaps it was inevitable that demo-
crats would play on the English initials of the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong—DAB—to mock their definition of
democracy:
After the DAB was established, I sometimes attended forums with him he
[Martin Lee] would always to bring up the party’s English initials, DAB and
ridicule it as Democracy According to Beijing. (Ma Lik, Ming Pao Daily,
December 20, 2003)
This ridiculing of the DAB’s name was seen as “negative” and “hostile” to
Beijing by those affiliated to it and that this “would not help” the Democratic
Party, making them unacceptable to it. On the other hand, the democrats have
the responsibility of explaining to the central government that democracy is
not “anti-China”:
It is also understood that the democrats have the responsibility to explain

democratization to the Central Government of the SAR . . . In this process of
dialogue and communication, democracy must be deconstructed as in the past
some hegemonic language was used: democracy = anti-Communists, democrats
≠ patriotic people and so on. (Chan Kin-man, Apple Daily, September 25,
2003)
The above quotation also illustrates the “equations” that are made through
categorization that one has to be the complete opposite of the other. The fol-
lowing section relates to what democratic groups were most often accused of
being: “single-issue politicians,” the single issue being universal suffrage and
Hong Kong’s democratization.
Single-Issue Politicians (一議題政客) versus Multiple-Issue

Politicians (綜合政客)
The pan-democrats were often perceived as just focusing on the achievement
of universal suffrage to the exclusion of everything else. Democratization
forms the key aspect of their “foundation moments.”
80 Chapter 3
The following metaphors used by the opponents to the democrats reflect

how the democrats’ focus on the issue of universal suffrage was represented
in metaphor.
These imply persistence, repetition, and immediate attainment of their goal
without regard to other equally important matters and the wiliness to adopt
radical means and perhaps violence to obtain this goal. They also imply own-
ership of the “rights” of defining democracy. The metaphor of “vultures” and
“holy crusade” vividly describes this view. The first “vultures” particularly
illustrates this “tenacity,” since “regarding a universal suffrage timetable the
democrats will bite and not let go” (對普選時間表緊咬不放):
The “democrats” are single-issue politicians and they have only one issue,
“democracy” and nothing else. Their tenacity has the quality of vultures.
Vultures don’t eat living food, they scrounge off dead bodies, one carcass and
they all descend on it and pick the bones clean till there is no meat left. (Ta Kung
Pao, October 29, 2005)
This “vulture quality” (禿鷹本能) of focusing on one theme was seen as

a kind of “extreme ideology” like that of a “holy crusade” (十字軍聖戰), a
continuing theme throughout the discourse:
After 1997, the sky did not fall down. China is seen as a good sovereign nation.
We haven’t been deprived of our past freedom, nor live in fear or coercion, and
the rule of law is still our way of life, we enjoy great freedom of the press, and
we still have the democratic rights of the past.
But on the other hand, there are still some people in Hong Kong still choose
to use “universal suffrage” to carry out a “crusade for universal suffrage”
against Beijing and the Mainland. (Peter Woo, Ta Kung Pao, March 18, 2004)
Earlier in the chapter it was mentioned that since reunification with China
in 1997, Hong Kong’s increasing economic integration with it had provided
many lucrative opportunities for local businesspeople to prosper. This caused
the “democratic symbolic capital” to go down and, in some quarters, shift
the focus off universal suffrage, since the “democratic rights of the past”
remained in place. The metaphor-coiner in this instance was Peter Woo, a
Hong Kong tycoon and a losing candidate for the post of first chief executive
in 1996. Furthermore inferring from the headline of the article from which
the metaphor was drawn, “stability and prosperity” would result from this
focus.
However, in reply, the Apple Daily refutes this accusation of carrying out
a “crusade” to say that the common aim of both Hong Kong and Beijing was
the implementation of universal suffrage as it is contained in the Basic Law:
What Mr. Wu said of the so-called “holy crusade” is way too serious. Just look
at the provisions in the Basic Law relating to constitutional development and
you will know that to develop democracy and promote universal suffrage is in
fact not any party’s patent, nor is it a fabricated claim, but clearly the goal of
constitutional development. When the National People’s Congress (NPC) issued
the Basic Law in 1990, one has that the central government, has indicated that
the NPC to accept such a goal. In other words, the development of universal
suffrage in Hong Kong is the common goal of the Central Government and the
Hong Kong people and there is no fundamental contradiction between them.
In such circumstances, how can implementing universal suffrage as soon as
possible be seen as a “holy crusade”? (Lo Fung, Apple Daily, March 19, 2004)
Elsewhere, democrats and certain commentators stressed that democracy

was a “world-wide trend” (普選是普世價值) and a “basic human right”
(普選是基本人權) and that it would ultimately make society more stable
and prosperous.
Saying that the pan-democrats focused on attaining universal suffrage to
the exclusion of everything else implies that they considered other aspects
(such as people’s livelihoods) relatively unimportant.
The writer above, who occupies positions on important Mainland bodies
and is closely aligned to Beijing (and who wrote in both the Chinese and
English-language press), always used “dissidents” instead of “democrats” or
“pan-democrats” to give the semantic prosody of people who are against the
state. Other commentators however saw both “camps” as being inherently
“fundamentalist” (基本教義派), since fundamentalists exhibit certain charac-
teristics such as “sticking to certain core beliefs,” maintaining the “integrity”
of their sacred text, and so on to the exclusion of all others (Appleby and
Marty 1994). Hong Kong had its own “version” of fundamentalists: “democ-
racy fundamentalists” (民主基本教義派) and “patriotic fundamentalists”
(愛國基本教義派). They both shared the same “fundamentalist holy book”
(基本聖經).
In Hong Kong, the two fundamentalist factions believe in the same fundamen-
talist Holy Book [the Basic Law], but no metaphysical ideology lies behind
this belief, it is used as a totem, a purely technical procedure for inspiring faith,
and with exclusive dedication. Patriotism and democracy are only a means not
an end, but in the eyes of fundamentalists its purpose is to achieve a “break-
through.” (Simon Shen, Ming Pao Daily, June 27, 2004)
Metaphors related to “fundamentalism” obviously take “ownership” of the

non-metaphorical meaning of the words and the problem of “defining” the
Basic Law as mentioned earlier. Remembering the connection between
82 Chapter 3
outside events and the coining of metaphor, around the time of the excerpts
quoted above, the Iraq war and the verbal “war on terror” between George W.
Bush and Osama Bin Laden were well underway. Furthermore, the characters
“聖戰” in “holy crusade” (十字軍聖戰—literally “cross army holy war”) can
also be translated as “jihad.”
Habitus and the Political Field after 2007

Earlier, we saw how a couple of major political parties were categorized and
labeled, partially realized through their foundation movements. After 2007,
the Hong Kong Democratic Party and other democratically leaning groups
were still seen as the “opposition” while the DAB and other pro-Beijing/pro-
establishment parties and groups were still deemed “loyalists.” The former
was still “irrational,” “non-pragmatic,” and hindering the legislative process
(by “opposing” all the time), while the latter were rational lawmakers help-
ing the government pass important pieces of legislation. Beijing still accused
the pan-democrats of “destabilizing” Hong Kong, while the pan-democrats
accused the DAB and the pro-establishment as being government mouth-
pieces. However, the arrival of new political players on the scene after 2007
saw the rise of a rift between the so-called traditional democratic parties and
those of a more “localist” or Hong Kong-focused nature.
The Legislative Council election in 2008 was marked by some democrats
becoming angry with the lack of real political reform who wanted a more
robust approach to pressure the authorities to make political reforms (Kwong
2016). The League of Social Democrats (LSD), a moderately radical party,9
proposed a “de facto referendum.” Their idea was for 5 out of 23 pan-dem-
ocratic legislators, one from each of the five Legislative Council districts, to
resign at the same time, and called for the result of by-elections to be viewed
as a “popular referendum” on democracy. The Civic Party (CP),10 which
was led by professionals and the middle class, agreed to this action, but the
Democratic Party, the leading opposition party, refused. The party feared
that these resignations would irritate moderate voters and anger the Chinese
government. Although the group won their seats back, many democrats criti-
cized the rejection by the Democratic Party, and so the political rift within the
democracy camp deepened (Kan 2013).
The divide among Hong Kong’s democrats increased exponentially when
the Democratic Party decided to consult (some called it “bargaining”) with
Chinese leaders over a political reform package. The LSD adamantly accused
the Democratic Party of reaching “secret deals” with Beijing and of “betray-
ing” the democracy movement. Following passage of the political reform
package, the rift between moderate and radical democrats grew wider. In
2005 the Democratic Party (once known as the “white dove party” due to
its party logo) had been called “hawks” (鷹派) in their “war on public opin-
ion” over a constitutional reform proposal which they had vetoed. In 2010,
they became the “black crow party” (烏鴉黨) or the “democratic liar party”
(民主騙子黨) when they negotiated with Beijing (Mok K-Y and Ho M-M
2010; Pomfret 2010). The party was accused of selling out the Hong Kong
people and failing to uphold its principles by negotiating interim measures
instead of a firm promise of when universal suffrage would take place as pre-
viously, it had stressed that it would settle for nothing less than a clear road
map to universal suffrage. Therefore, the Democratic Party lost a significant
amount of political capital, particularly among younger democratically lean-
ing people.
The Rise of Localism/Localist Parties

This loss of capital saw the rise in capital of groups who were for more “radi-
cal resistance” and who believed that older pan-democrat groups were too
conservative to elicit political change and that a “radical strategy” was needed
to advance the cause of universal suffrage.
This was one of the key factors that nurtured the rise of the localist move-
ment (Kwong 2016; Kaeding 2017). Localism first emerged in 2005 when
activists set up groups to campaign to save the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s
Pier from demolition. In 2011, People Power (logo: a clenched fist, see
peoplepower.hk), a radical group led by Wong Yuk-man, former LSD chair-
man, advocated a “Vote-them Out Campaign” to “punish” the Democratic
Party in the District Council elections. They also urged resistance strategies
such as filibustering and “occupying” events to put pressure on the govern-
ment. A “localist” camp (本土派) was then added to the political landscape
in Hong Kong.
Localism is, as its name implies, focused on Hong Kong rather than what
happened in the Mainland. By maintaining Hong Kong history, these move-
ments led to a reflection on Hong Kong’s political identity as separate from
mainland China and a growing tendency of Hong Kong people to set them-
selves apart from Mainlanders as having their own unique cultural identity
(Ma 2015).
A 2015 book Hong Kong as a City State advocated that Hong Kong should
“forget China and put Hong Kong first” (Mok and Cheung 2015). Then there
were campaigns against Mainlanders and their seemingly preferential treat-
ment over Hong Kong people (Ip 2014). But it was the failure of the OCLP/
Umbrella Movement of 2014 that gave more momentum to the develop-
ment of localism. This convinced many that Beijing was not likely to offer
real democracy to Hong Kong, so Hong Kong should put itself first (Ibid).
By the end of 2015, less than half of the people (40%) did not trust Beijing
84 Chapter 3
(POPHKU no date). More people were worried that further mainland Hong
Kong (economic) integration gave more opportunity for Beijing to exercise
political control over Hong Kong, thus resulting in the loss of local identity.
Localist groups, or how you defined the category of “localist,” were not
always obvious. However, they seemed to be in the 18- to 30-year-old range
(Ming Pao Daily, April 9, 2016). Whether localism equals advocating Hong
Kong independence remains blurry.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADITIONAL PAN-

DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND LOCALIST GROUPS
Although both traditional pan-democratic parties and localist groups

demanded democratic reform and opposed political control by China, they
naturally had quite different aims and tactics. To recap, before 2007, party
manifestos were analyzed according to three categories, relationship with
China—as it relates to “One Country, Two Systems” and the boundaries of
autonomy; stability and prosperity—since this is a major desire in Hong
Kong; and attitudes to governance and future democratization—since
attitudes determine a preferred system of government and the speed with
which it is implemented. The same categories cannot still be held for local-
ist groups.
Relationship with China

Conflicting Identities: Chinese versus Hongkongers
To begin with, most traditional pan-democratic parties, especially older mem-
bers, have a strong Chinese identity while the localists do not. Based on their
historical connection, the position of the traditional pan-democratic parties
is perhaps representative of political sentiments toward China. In terms of
democrats being called “anti-China,” traditional democrats claimed that they
are “patriotic” as they supported the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty
from Britain to China and have a strong commitment to China’s political,
social, and economic development. As seen in their manifestos, many of the
elder democrats identify with “cultural, ethnic, and historic” China rather
than “political China” (Lam, J. 2015).
But localists tend not to identify with the Mainland but rather with Hong
Kong (Veg 2017). Many take a more critical attitude toward what they see
as “mainlandization” and emphasize that Hong Kong people themselves are
responsible only for protecting Hong Kong’s core values. They are skeptical
of the “One Country, Two Systems” principle because it cannot eliminate con-
trol by Beijing (the “one country”). From the localist perspective, the Chinese
government is attempting to “invade” Hong Kong and weaken Hong Kong’s

identity through stealth by increasing integration (The Economist 2016).
Traditional pan-democrats have long advocated the belief that Hong Kong
and China are closely related and that people in Hong Kong have a respon-
sibility to assist in building a “democratic China” and to see the “end of
one-party rule.” Localists have a strong objection to this argument. Some of
these groups claimed that as Hong Kong is a separate political entity, people
should focus on local problems and Hong Kong’s future rather than concern
themselves with the democracy movement in China. Civic Passion member
Cheng Chung-tai, for instance, stresses that “the assumption that Hong Kong
would have no democracy unless China is democratized is fundamentally
flawed and such logic has been poisoning for long” (Kwong 2016, 66). Hong
Kong people therefore did not need to concern themselves with democratic
development in China. Traditional democrats identified relatively strongly
with China and opposed the one-party dictatorship while expressing strong
sympathy for Chinese people (this still exists on the Democratic Party’s web-
site as of November 2020).
This is shown in how June 4, 1989, was commemorated in Hong Kong.
The University of Hong Kong Student Union and other university student
unions held forums discussing Hong Kong’s future while localist group Civic
Passion organized its own rallies in five locations on the night of June 4,
2016, becoming alternative events (Tsang, Siu, and Zhao 2016).
For many, the meaning of June 4 was a reminder of what an authoritar-
ian regime could do. Localists regarded the Chinese Communist Party and
Mainlanders as the major cause of Hong Kong’s problems, in particular the
slow pace of development of universal suffrage. Anthony Yiu, who organized
a June 4 event in 2014 opposite the PLA barracks, said:
I also used to believe we needed democracy in China [to have democracy in

Hong Kong]. Around four years ago, I began to see it as a kind of fraud. We
don’t have the ability to make it happen, it is a waste of our time to fight for
Chinese democracy (Y. Chan 2014).
Attitudes to Democratization/Political Reform

Traditional democrats faced what they saw as creeping “mainlandiza-
tion” (Ma 2015). Due to their concerns over their public image, traditional
democratic parties were accustomed to taking a “peaceful, rational, and non-
violent” (和平，理性，非暴力) strategy to protest (Yuen and Chung 2018).
This phrase would also be used in the 2019 protests. These included things
such as organizing assemblies, sign-ins, and low-key demonstrations to
express their political sentiment. The annual peaceful July 1 protests are one
such example, and they emphasized that this milder approach was the best
86 Chapter 3
way to gain society’s support and apply pressure on the government while
invoking the traditional Chinese value of harmony.
Although some so-called soft localists agreed with pursuing a non-violent
strategy similar to that of traditional pan-democrats, other radical groups
accepted that “the use of force to prevent violence with the authorities” was
legitimate in order to protect the interests of Hong Kong. For them, “managed
and predictable” protests had no power for change (Scotford 2016).
Edward Leung and Ray Wong, the founders of Hong Kong Indigenous, a
localist group, no website now along with 20 members arrested in a protest in
Mongkok,11 claimed that the Umbrella Movement of 2014 was a failure, so it
was necessary to walk a more radical stance (Kwong 2016). The further rise of
localism would have further repercussions in 2018, 2019, and 2020–2021, which
saw many democratic lawmakers either resign, be disqualified, or arrested.
Categorization of Localist Groups by Authorities

In the face of rising localism, both the Chinese and HKSAR governments
took various ways of dealing with it. On the one hand, both adopted a hard
line by condemning the pursuits of radical localism and “separatism.” Beijing
leaders emphasized that a “minority of radicals” has been advocating local-
ism and making use of some incidents to provoke conflict in the relationship
between Hong Kong and the Mainland. They believed that radicals’ efforts
had “seriously hind their social stability,” the Mongkok riot being a prime
example (Wong 2016). Some pro-Beijing figures organized a series of peti-
tions and protests to support the police, and some even urged speeding up
the passage of the national security legislation (Article 23) against “radical
localism” and “separatism.” Furthermore, a group of pro-Beijing lawyers was
calling on Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen to formally prosecute groups
advocating independence for Hong Kong, as they have allegedly contravened
criminal laws prohibiting seditious activities (Fung 2016). This started a gen-
eral debate over whether simply discussing independence was legal or not
(this is discussed further in chapter 7).
Overall, the position of the Beijing government had tolerated localism if
used in terms of identity, tradition, and culture, but localist demands became
more radical in terms of anti-China sentiment, independence, and confronta-
tion, they were then harshly condemned.
CONCLUSION
For the first ten years of the HKSAR, we can deduce that according to the
pro-Beijing/pro-establishment camp, implementation of universal suffrage
should be slow, gradual, with the one country paramount, be consensual, and
non-confrontational. On the other hand, to the democratic camp, democracy
was a human rights issue that should be implemented as soon as possible. For
the latter group, democracy was the basis of the success of the “One Country,
Two Systems.”
In the first ten years of Hong Kong as a part of China, the political establish-
ment in Hong Kong opposed rapid democratization on the grounds that it would
hurt stability by bringing about political confrontation, and would hurt prosper-
ity by encouraging popularism and the development of a welfare state. Those
seeking quicker universal suffrage were thus categorized as “traitors” and “anti-
democratic” as well as “anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong.” Democrats
claimed that democracy was the best way of reflecting public opinion, which
would actually bring stability as it would mean that Hong Kong people would
be truly running Hong Kong. Those wanting a more “steady” pace to democ-
racy had China’s best interests at heart and would thus be seen as “pro-China
patriots” who practice “true democracy,” a democracy that came with “stabil-
ity and prosperity.” After 2007, and even more so after 2014, there were more
political groupings and even a greater Hong Kong rather than Chinese identity.
So the combination of the “foundation moments” of Hong Kong’s politi-
cal parties and the infrastructure of Hong Kong’s political system has forged
these groups’ habitus and their Self/Other categorization. The superordinate
categories that these groups occupy could be categorized as having largely
Utilitarian (Western) and largely Confucian (Eastern) discursive tropes;
Utilitarian (individuality, freedom, human rights, etc.), while the pro-estab-
lishment/pro-Beijing group reputedly follow Confucian precepts (harmony,
stability, the family).
Hong Kong’s Political Groupings as a Problematic Category

Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations (2001) argued that prob-
lems with categorization only arose if one was concerned with boundaries.
Knowing where the point of demarcation lay means that “boundary-crossing”
does not become an issue. But where this point of demarcation is unclear or
ambiguous, problems would likely arise. The authoritarian aspect of being
“executive-led” as the Hong Kong system is deemed to be and the democratic
elements represented by the Legislative Council makes Hong Kong’s politi-
cal “field of action” (Wodak 2001) problematic. The “One Country, Two
Systems” category remained contested, unfixed, and therefore metaphorical,
so those with power both symbolic and real can “linguistically fix” the attri-
butes of this category.
The habitus and field “struggle” together in Hong Kong’s case due to
this “boundary-crossing” problem which at the base is one of sovereignty
88 Chapter 3
and autonomy. Using the usual fields available to political life to fit in with
Hong Kong’s unique political situation elsewhere was “naming by anal-
ogy”—inferring characteristics possessed by that category in other places
(i.e., elections, electoral campaigns)—leading to the possible impression that
Hong Kong perhaps is like these other places (Benson 1994). Hong Kong’s
political groups’ “linguistic habitus,” forged by their foundation moments,
thus produced products relative to their particular linguistic field (Bourdieu
1991, 21)—they had to learn to speak in different political contexts (to the
general public, Hong Kong government, Beijing, party members) that what
they espoused would not affect but enhance Hong Kong’s stability and pros-
perity; and the “truth-value” of what is said, for example, the “truth” about
whether a pro-democratic party could ever become a “governing party” or a
democrat could win a chief executive election (that they could not).
Hong Kong, the sole example of “One Country, Two Systems,” and is
thus the only member of its category. Although all political parties are the
only member of their own unique category, Hong Kong, as a location gov-
erned under the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, is suffering perhaps
from a “category error” as all the “attributes” of this category have yet to be
finalized.
NOTES
1. “Li Peng Delivers Important Speech on Behalf of Party Central Committee and
State Council,” Source: Beijing Television Service, May 19–20,1989, 15:27 GMT,
FBIS, May 22, pp. 9–13, in which he declares martial law. See www.tsquare.tv/chro-
nology/MartialLaw.html; and “The Truth about the Turmoil” (Editorial Board 1990).
2. First, to a large extent, the colonial system of governance was still largely in
place in Hong Kong (i.e., an “executive-led” system). The Legislative Council is
the only elected body with political power. However, half its seats (30) were filled
by functional constituency representatives (FCs) up to 2007 making the chamber
only half directly elected. These FCs were mostly pro-establishment conservatives
who tended to vote for the government. The enormous disparity in size and makeup
of the FCs in comparison with the geographical constituency electorate meant that
some sectors had enormous power—furthermore, FC voters could also vote in the
geographical constituencies.
Second, it is difficult for members of the Council to introduce private mem-
bers’ bills (Article 74) and the split-voting system also restricts its power as a law-
making body and government watchdog (Item II of Basic Law, Annex II). It also
means that no party can effectively be “in government” even if they won a major-
ity of seats, indicating that discussion of issues is the legislature’s main function.
Furthermore, the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (2002) stipulates that the win-
ner of the Chief Executive election must sever ties to a political party if they belonged
to one. However, there is an informal “ruling coalition” of pro-establishment parties

who have close ties to the chief executive. The actual running of the government is
done by unelected civil servants.
3. Interestingly, the word for “smear” (抹黑) literally means “apply black.” Note
the ironic reference to “through train”—the idea of “convergence” that the pre-July
first legislature would “straddle” the changeover and become the first post-July first
legislature, but here the “through train” probably means that the democrats would
never become the “ruling party.”
4. The DAB had 42,608 as of July, 2021. It also has 16/124 members of the Hong
Kong members of the CPPCC and 5/36 deputies to the NPC. See the Party’s website:
https://www.eng.dab.org.hk/about-us. Other parties do not put up membership figures
or they were out of date, but from my own knowledge of Hong Kong’s politics, total
membership of the major democratic groups would not come to more than three or
four thousand individuals total.
5. A similar phrase is “confronting China and destabilizing Hong Kong”
(抗中亂港); “destabilizing” (亂) can also mean chaos, disorderly, and confused. See
online Chinese dictionary, www.nciku.com.
6. Some of these needed attributes can be found in “We Cannot Let the
‘Democrats’ Enter the Cabinet—Interview with Tsang Hin-chi of the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee (不能讓「民主派」入閣—專訪全國人大
常委曾憲梓),” Ta Kung Pao, July 16, 2003.
7. In the Ta Kung Pao there were 118 articles in 2004 and the Apple Daily had
180 articles in the same period discussing the meaning and use of this phrase as a
slogan for a big protest march on Hong Kong SAR Establishment Day, July 1, 2004.
8. “胡言亂語” is a fixed expression in Chinese meaning “to talk nonsense; rave;
to speak wildly, irrationally, or incoherently,” and in the data, the Ta Kung Pao had
15 articles containing this keyword, the Apple Daily had four articles and the Ming
Pao Daily had three articles.
9. The League of Social Democrats (LSD—社會民主連線, www.lsd.org.hk),
who formed in 2006, saw themselves as the workers’ representatives, “No groups
really represent grass-roots interests at present. We want to provide another choice
for the public. We are unequivocally the opposition camp” (Yeung 2006) and “we
are firmly opposed to small-circle elections” (Ibid). The LSD also urged a reversal
of the verdict on the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, and peaceful reunification
with Taiwan. Although the new group would contest district and Legislative Council
elections, members attached more importance to “mobilizing people through street
politics,” what one founder called “happy politics” (Ibid).
10. The Civic Party (公民黨, www.civicparty.hk) formed in 2006 and arose out
of groups opposing Article 23 of the Basic Law (the security ordinance). The party’s
colors of green, white, and violet were based on the colors used by the suffragette
movement.
11. During which police officers were pelted with bricks and glass bottles and
120 people were injured at the start of the Lunar New Year holiday in 2016 was an
example of such violent clashes (Wong, H. 2016).
Chapter 4
Metaphor as Narrative
Mapping the First Decade
of Political Change
The months leading up to July 1, 1997, were full of speculation about how
Hong Kong would change under Chinese sovereignty: socially, politically,
and economically. The Basic Law, designed to maintain Hong Kong’s previ-
ous “way of life,” gave at least a full decade (till 2007) to discuss possible
constitutional changes before it could decide that “there was a need” (Basic
Law Annex I & II) for universal suffrage, the “ultimate aim” of its political
development.
As outlined in the Basic Law, the two major principles guiding this ulti-
mate aim were “actual situation” and “gradual and orderly progress.” In this
chapter we will see how metaphors in discourse depicted these “actual situa-
tions” (i.e., events, discussions) as they unfolded in a diachronic (chronologi-
cal) fashion over the ten-year period. This is also in line with the conceptual
metaphor of journey as well (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). This chapter will
attempt to answer the following questions:
1. How do people use metaphor in discussions about Hong Kong’s

democratization?
2. What do these metaphors say about their ideas, attitudes, and values
about democracy?
3. How is the relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland depicted
in metaphor?
Because of the ten-year time span, we are likely to see certain themes emerge
and make some tentative observations of Hong Kong’s first ten years as an
SAR of China. Before doing this, here are some thoughts on metaphor vis-à-
vis the cultural context.
91
92 Chapter 4
METAPHOR, IDEOLOGY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
Speakers use metaphors to create new understanding and “challenge previ-

ously established ways of understanding” (Billig and Macmillan 2005, 459).
Thus, a meaning carried by a metaphor or idiom can serve diverse purposes
at different times as Billig and Macmillan have shown with their analysis of
the idiom “smoking gun.” By “contrasting its seemingly incontestable criteria
of application by suggesting a diversity of legitimate interpretations” and “by
metaphorizing the idiom in a different way” (Ibid), the idiom (or metaphor)
changes meaning.
Zinken’s (2003) exploration of the role that metaphors play in ideological
interpretation shows that the role of the “cultural net” (509) in which the indi-
vidual is embedded has mostly been neglected. In his study of Polish political
discourse, he differentiates two “ideal” types of motivation for metaphor:
correlation with historical experience and intertextuality. Zinken highlights
the contextual nature of metaphor placement with news headlines, leads,
first, and last paragraphs, and text underneath photographs as being rich in
metaphorical placement. For example, in the following editorial in the Apple
Daily, the metaphor was contained in the headline only:
Democracy is the Panacea to Solve Current Difficulties. (民主是解決當前困局

靈丹) (Lo Fung, Apple Daily, September 13, 2003—opinion)
Since this is the only place in the article where this metaphor occurs so, this
metaphor-as-headline “frames” the text that we read.
This “cultural net” must take into consideration social change which
both determines how the discourse changes and adapts to the new situation
(Fairclough 1992). The language changes that result could be called what
Jacob Mey deemed a “pragmatics of transition” (Mey 1998, 25), meaning
that there is perhaps an “intersection point” between the “old discourse” and
the “new discourse.” Political scientist Richard D. Anderson researched this
convergence of old and new discourses in his studies of how political lan-
guage changed in Soviet Russia as it headed toward its post-1989 breakup.
Much of his work more or less implies that language itself can change or alter
a political system.
Anderson quotes Harold Lasswell that “non-democratic elites . . . impose
barriers of ‘distance’ and ‘height’ between themselves and the rank and file . . .
the terms of self-reference on formal public occasions are impersonal, lengthy
and stereotype” (2001a, 312). In Anderson’s “Metaphors of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Change in the Russian Political Lexicon” (2001b), he states that
nondemocratic elites demand superiority and interpose barriers of distance and
Metaphor as Narrative 93
height between themselves and ordinary people—and as regimes more toward

the democratic end of the scale, leaders attempt to adopt the “common” speech
and adopt simple “man of the people” actions. For example, politicians, many
of whom are members of elites, visit working-class families at election times
to show that they are in touch with ordinary people. This was briefly touched
in chapter 1 in the period between the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law when Hong Kong’s last British Governor began to “rhetorically”
withdraw from Hong Kong (Flowerdew, 1997a, 1998).
The above study and others by Anderson (2004, 2005) and Anderson
and Chervyakov (1995) imply that metaphors function as ideological tools,
dependent on intertextual knowledge, the culture in which they are used, and
the particular context of situation.
In this context, as Cameron and Low (1999, 4) and Cameron and Maslen
(2010) have mentioned, taking a purely cognitive or a purely sociocultural
approach to language use only obtains a partial and thus inaccurate picture
since it is the interaction between the social and cognitive in language use that
produces the language and behavior that we can observe. Speech community
norms and individual background knowledge relative to what is activated
by an individual or a particular occasion should also be taken into account
(Cameron and Low 1999, 114). The combination of the social and cognitive
is what Cameron (2003, 1) calls an “applied linguistic” approach to metaphor
analysis. Taking this combination of the social and cognitive, Cameron and
Maslen (2010) developed a discourse-based approach to metaphor analysis
that takes into consideration metaphor’s holistic nature and places metaphors
across time and context and classifies them systematically in clusters. The
following offers an account of Cameron’s discourse-based theoretical frame-
work (2010, 80) followed by the author’s elaborative comments in italics:
• Connections are across and between the linguistic, embodied, cognitive,

affective, and sociocultural dimensions of metaphor; this takes into consid-
eration culture, historical contexts.
• Connections are shown between metaphor and their discourse contexts
where they are used (situation/field, text type/genre); this is why different
genres should be included and the interdiscursive aspects integrated.
• Connections are across metaphors in a particular discourse event; this is
to show how people take up metaphor used by others, and repeat or alter
them.
• Connections shown between metaphors are used in a particular discourse
event and metaphors more broadly in society over time; this shows how
they change and are recontextualized; this shows how the discourse moves
over time.
94 Chapter 4
Cameron draws on complexity theory and dynamic systems theory (Larsen-

Freeman and Cameron, 2008) in her work on discourse metaphor and
its relations to the text as a whole. According to Larsen-Freeman and
Cameron, complexity and chaos are perspectives on a world where meta-
phor is an initial bridge into an additional way of framing research and
practice. And in developing her framework, Cameron sees discourse as a
dynamic system that is constantly changing over time, both spatially and
temporally:
Complex dynamic systems theory offers explanatory mechanisms of “self-

organization” and “emergence” to theorise the relation between what happens
in the moment of a discourse event, linguistic metaphors shift as people negoti-
ate meanings, extend their ideas, or enjoy exploiting an unexpected possibility
opened up by metaphor. (Cameron 2010, 87)
Cameron sees metaphor shifting therefore as crucial in the “dynamics” of

metaphor in discourse as a connection between the site-specific use of the
metaphor and its recontextualization in a new situation which necessarily also
declares a relationship with the past.
Types of metaphor shifting according to Cameron (2010, 90) are discussed
in table 4.1.
In vehicle development, there is continuity in both the vehicle and
topic of the metaphor. Metaphor shifting may also occur when continuity
is maintained in only one of the vehicles or topics. Vehicle “re-deploy-
ment” means that the vehicle is used again but with a changed topic; the
vehicle shifts over an entire discourse, situations give rise to instances of
vehicle development around closely connected topics to produce “system-
atic” metaphor (Cameron 2003, 2007, 2010). These could also be called
“metaphor clusters” (Koller 2003; Cameron, 2010). These are significant
patterns of metaphor not evenly distributed in text, but produced more
frequently if the speaker has strong feeling about something in a stretch of
transcript.
This systematicity may be found by reading through the identified
metaphor vehicles to build larger groupings of related vehicles. Conceptual
metaphor theory assumes that particular conceptual metaphors are acti-
vated with a particular linguistic metaphor. Discourse metaphor com-
bined with grounded theory (Charmaz 2000) is useful as a research
methodology when grouping metaphors, since this theory emphasizes
working inductively from the data, rather than preconceived ideas about
why a metaphor is used. The specific method of doing using the discourse
metaphor framework used in this chapter will be detailed in the next
section.
Table 4.1 Types of Metaphor Shifting
Discourse
Metaphor Shifting Vehicle Topic Outcomes
Vehicle The same or changes Include: metaphor
re-deployment semantically appropriation;
connected lexical puns; text
item is reused with a cohesion
different topic
Vehicle Vehicle term is remains the Extended metaphors
development • repeated same
• relexicalized moves to Systematic
• explicated connected metaphor
• contrasted topics
Vehicle Vehicle term is used merges with Symbolization of
literalization non-metaphorically vehicle; topic
in reference to topic can become
metonymic
Source: Cameron (2010, 90).
METHODOLOGY
The Pragglejaz Group’s (2007) method of metaphor identification as men-

tioned in chapter 1 is used here as well as the same ten years of Chinese and
English newspaper texts used in the previous chapters. All genres have the
keyword “universal suffrage” (普選). Other government documents were
used and are quoted where appropriate.
The benefit of personally living through and closely observing and docu-
menting the ten-year discourse period meant that repetition and relexicaliza-
tion of metaphors and certain themes become apparent. Certain metaphors
were often coined during a certain political or social event, picked up, and
carried forward in the discourse by different discourse participants. There was
a number of what could be called “event-metaphor chains.” There was also a
“cross-event-metaphor chain” initiated by a Beijing official. There were also
three “discourse-length” metaphor chains almost spanning the ten years of
data. Analyzing the event-metaphor chains and discourse-length metaphor
chains over the course of the ten years meant that certain “meta-metaphors”
and “meta-themes” could be gleaned (these will be written in small caps).
Ideally, Hong Kong’s ten-year transition should be shown chronologically
by describing important events impacting the discourse on democratization
year-by-year, with selected individual metaphors (shown in tables) inter-
spersed with event-metaphor chains and discourse-length metaphor chains
with an extensive amount of co-text in which the metaphor is embedded, as
this would enable a fuller understanding of the narrative flow and context of
96 Chapter 4
the discourse. Cameron, Maslen, and Low (2010, 118–126) discuss at length
the issue of finding as many metaphors as possible in the data and admit that
there is a “trade off” between amount of data and the level of analysis (these
researchers dealt with oral discourse only). Being a single chapter of a book,
a detailed chronological rendering is not possible.
Therefore, the focus will be on discussion of metaphor shifting of the
three discourse-length metaphor chains, a discussion of the cross-event-
metaphor chain, an example of how one metaphor (“sweat”) became “lit-
eralized” or “realized” as well as a selected number of event-metaphor
chains. Other metaphors clustered near these chains may be mentioned in
passing. Finally, in the second part of the chapter, we will look at meta-
metaphors and meta-themes which result from these chains and other
metaphors found in the ten years of data (not necessarily discussed ear-
lier). Important Hong Kong’s dates in the discourse period are given in the
appendix.
DISCOURSE-LENGTH METAPHOR CHAINS
There were three discourse-length chains gleaned from the data, that of
“birdcage,” “small circle,” and “river water does not mix with well water.”
These appear in most years in the discourse period (especially after 2003)
and carry the semantic prosody of “containment” or “restriction.” These
three chains were mentioned by many different individuals and are linked
to certain emblematic events. The discourse-length metaphor chains provide
an across-genre-across-year metaphoric dialogue and serve as “anchors” to
situation-specific metaphor chains when they occur.
In a sense, “sweat” could almost be considered a discourse-length meta-
phor and a physical realization of the metaphor with the regular summer (July
1) protest marches, and this will also be discussed in this section.
Small Circle (小圈)

The nature of the Election Committee for selecting the chief executive (an
800-member group consisting of different commercial and professional sec-
tors) led to the metaphor of the “small circle.” “Small circle” appears from
1998 onward in all newspapers: 1998 (8), 1999 (6), 2000 (27), 2001 (31),
2002 (20), 2003 (36), 2004 (83), 2005 (142), 2006 (124), and 2007 (167)—
number of mentions. Note that except for 2002 and 2006 use of this metaphor
kept increasing. The first instance in the data was in a general news article.
It is worth giving a significant amount of co-text in this example in order to
understand the “nature” of the “small circle” (emphasis added):
He reiterated his opposition to “small-circle elections,” but said he [Cheng]

would add to the liberal forces if he became a member.
“Some may say the geographical polls can represent the entire population. I
do not think so. They only return legislators who are representative of a certain
area,” Mr. Ng [a former provisional legislator] said. “Without belittling the
geographical election, I would say the Election Committee is an alternative
type of universal suffrage.” (Linda Choi, South China Morning Post March 24,
1998—general news)
This “small circle” is still universal suffrage, but of an “alternative type,”

and perhaps suitable for the unique Hong Kong case. The “small circle”
metaphor was generally used as an adjective as in “small circle game” and
“small circle election” and appeared whenever there was an election for
the Legislative Council or Electoral Committee. The latter type of election,
due to the restricted nature of its voting body, was often considered an even
smaller circle. Therefore, the instances of “small circle” in the discourse are
largely vehicle development, the vehicle remaining the same but referring to
connected topics. That said, since the discourse democratization was an argu-
ment carried out by two sides, this metaphor was also explicated, revolving
around the characteristics or nature of this circle, and that perhaps, despite its
“smallness,” it may be representative (or not) as the case may be (emphases
added):
In the past, the Chinese government painstaking designed a small circle of 800
to ensure that the Chief Executive election is fool proof. However, the Chinese
government overlooked that outside the small circle of 800 there is still a big
circle of six million. (Ming Pao Daily, July 14, 2000—opinion)
Discussion of “balanced participation” (refer back to Article 45 of the Basic

Law in Chapter 2) is connected to the use of the “small circle” metaphor. The
refutation involves that it is not the physical size of the circle but the qual-
ity and “representativeness” of those residing in the circle, the presence of
Commission members who, it implies, represent a diverse group (emphases
added):
Some “democrats” claim the Election Committee is selected via a small circle
election, but in fact it is carried out with the full weight of more than 700
members of the Commission; its representation cannot be questioned. On the
contrary, the EC voters than the other functional constituencies have a broader
coverage than outside. Some people use “small circle” as an excuse to attack
the electoral system; a “small circle” or a “big circle” is not just on the amount
of voters. (Ta Kung Pao, September 19, 2000—general news)
98 Chapter 4
Some saw that there was disconnect between true accountability and elec-
tion via this “small circle.” True accountability was said by many to be only
achieved through universal suffrage and one person, one vote. Appointees in
a suggested “ministerial system” would be “political products” (政治產品)
with the likelihood of “political inbreeding” (近親繁殖) and “small circle-
ization” (小圈子化) (emphasis added):
Those closely aligned with the Chief Executive speak with one voice on issues
so that the principal officials must be a political product . . . this has led to the
emergence of the Chief Executive’s employ small circle-isation and political
“inbreeding.” (Anthony Cheung, Ming Pao Daily, October 18, 2000—opinion)
In the above, the nature of the circle would involve other “circles” that
were supposed to improve upon the limitations of the “One Country, Two
Systems” framework. Note the cluster of metaphors which infer that the
circle will not get larger, but smaller.
In the following, a common refrain that there was no real democracy under
British colonialism was again raised, implying that even a small circle was
better than no circle and that circles cannot be enlarged quickly (emphases
added):
You say the 800-member Election Committee is “small circle,” do not forget
the “small circle” evolved from “no circle” and there had never had elections
before; with political leaders of an immature society, [we] can only adopt a
gradual transition approach. . . . did the Governor arise out of an election? At
that time, did he even have a “small circle” room for selection? (Yi Shan, Ta
Kung Pao, November 10, 2001—opinion)
There was no cause for criticism of the system since it was still “evolving”;
the circle has to gradually enlarge according to the “gradual and orderly prog-
ress” principle in the Basic Law. The democrats were often accused of being
“anti-democratic” themselves (see chapter 3), and the “anti-Tung coalition”
of democrats (referring to Tung Chee-wa, Hong Kong’s first chief executive)
was also accused of being a part of a “small circle,” forgetting the different
nature of an electoral body and a civil society group (emphases added):
CPPCC Standing Committee member Xu Simin said that if 800 people respon-
sible for electing the Chief Executive Election Committee is a small circle, then
what is known as the “anti-Tung Coalition’s” 31 organizations, is even more of
a small circle. “Their organizations are not organized; they are simply a motley
bunch; there is no representativeness.” (Mu Feng, Ta Kung Pao, November 17,
2001—opinion)
Democrats were seen as having no chance at standing for, let alone winning,
an election for chief executive, as being able to even stand for election, the
individual had to gain enough nominations from the Election Committee to
do so. In 2007, Alan Leong of the pan-democratic Civic Party managed to
get nominated, but it was seen, not as a case of a possible win, but as hav-
ing a demonstrative effect of making the likely winner to detail his political
platform (emphases added):
Takes part in the small circle game. The Democratic Party and Civic Party do
not agree with the small circle elections, Alan is running in the election to force
Bow Tie [Donald Tsang] to mention his political platform and be more account-
able, not to win. (Apple Daily, January 3, 2007—general news)
In sum, the “small circle” metaphor was fairly static either as a noun (solo
item) or as an adjective (plus game, plus elections). The main explication of
the metaphor related to the size and appropriateness of the circle.
Birdcage (鳥籠)
The discourse-length metaphor of “birdcage” first appeared in 2003, occur-
ring a total of four times, and then in 2004 (56), 2005 (102), 2006 (34), and
2007 (28). Because it has such a large set of examples, its main effect is text
cohesion and systemicity. The following is the first instance of “birdcage” in
the data as a solo item (i.e., as a noun), said by democratic legislator Emily
Lau who was quoted in a general news article (emphasis added):
I have had Taiwanese say to me “One Country, Two Systems” is a large bird-
cage controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, and who would be willing to
live in a birdcage. (Ming Pao Daily, August 22, 2003—general news)
However, “birdcage” was mainly used as an adjective with various related

topics (topic re-deployment) such as the following:
Birdcage consultation (鳥籠諮詢), birdcage politics (鳥籠政治), birdcage

regime (鳥籠政權), birdcage election (鳥籠選舉), birdcage democracy (鳥籠
民主), birdcage reform, birdcage-like frame (鳥籠式框架), (鳥籠政改), bird-
cage proposal (鳥籠方案).
The topics of “consultation,” “election,” “proposal,” and “reform” related

to specific consultations, elections, and proposals. “Regime,” “democracy,”
“reform,” and “politics” were generally discussed relative to the general
nature of the Hong Kong’s political system.
100 Chapter 4
Perhaps the idea of vehicle development can best be shown in the follow-
ing manner for 2004, which is perhaps the most contentious year of Hong
Kong since the end of British rule.
Birdcage Metaphor Chain 2004

In April, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
handed down a Decision that Hong Kong would not obtain universal suf-
frage in 2007. The Hong Kong government also handed down two task
force reports on constitutional development at this time that many saw
as narrowing the scope for democratization and its discourse (emphases
added).
We now have only two routes, one is talk in the birdcage and help decorate it;
strive within their framework and walk a road with no democracy or one where
the moderates and centrists walk a radical road. (Ming Pao Daily, April 27,
The “bird cage” is the vehicle for the topic of democratic development. This
indicates constraint in the discussion of political development. This metaphor
was used by the Rev. Chu Yiu-ming, a noted activist for democracy.
Naturally some can bite the bullet and fight for the greatest democracy within
the bird cage, naturally have a lot of possibilities, for example, increase the
number of functional constituencies and broaden their electorate base so that
they will become more democratic, but looking ahead at the political reality, of
“us being our own masters,” then we are not too optimistic. (Ivan Choy, Ming
Pao Daily, April 28, 2004—opinion)
The vehicle “birdcage” is used the same way and again raises about what can
be within it. Ivan Choy, a political scientist, was the person quoted above.
Within a short month, the SCNPC . . . has created three reports and set politi-
cal reform within a birdcage; self-guided, self-played off political reform
has been completed, and while Hong Kong’ future performance remains in
a bird cage within the main drama, it will probably only play a small sup-
porting role, this is Hong Kong’s sorrow! (Albert Ho, Apple Daily, April 28,
2004—opinion)
Albert Ho, member of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong, used the “bird-
cage” metaphor in conjunction with another metaphor vehicle for constitu-
tional development: that of a “drama.” Discussion about the events of April
continued and another Constitutional Task Force Report was released in

mid-May (emphases added).
The Central Government denying universal suffrage for 07/08 is slowing down
democratic development, causing Hong Kong’s democratic pace to enter a cof-
fin. Previously I used birdcage (an analogy), because within the birdcage you
can fly and can breathe, coffin politics seals the lid, only has a corpse inside,
and the corpse will decay. (Apple Daily, May 2, 2004—general news)
The vehicle of “bird cage” has now been transformed into a “coffin” and was
also said by the Rev. Chu Yiu-ming (emphases added):
The Democrats’ Yeung Sum immediately challenged that the NPCSC’s

Decision would undermine the “One Country two systems.” Margaret Ng of the
legal sector said that Donald Tsang’s reputation has “completely disappeared.”
Lee Cheuk-yan of the Confederation of Trade Unions had even more harsh
words, saying: “Chief Secretary Tsang told us not to grieve but to look ahead;
do we have to organize the family funeral? . . . now the political reform space
is not just a bird cage but a coffin, we have to wail out loud even louder now.”
(Ta Kung Pao, May 5, 2004—general news)
“Wail out loud” (哭喪), according to ancient Chinese custom, meant people
who would be hired to come and cry in front of the coffin.
Concerning what the democrats call a “birdcage-style consultation,” he pointed

out that Hong Kong’s political trends were complicated, and you do not want
foreign influences coming in, otherwise American forces would come in like
they did in Iraq. (Ta Kung Pao, December 5, 2004—general news)
The topic changes to refer to a consultation, with the vehicle of “birdcage”;

the scare quotes indicate that the speaker—Raymond Wu, a Hong Kong
tycoon and Deputy to the National People’s Congress—did not believe
that the consultation was a “birdcage,” but something like a protective
mechanism.
Preparations in June 2004 were being made for a protest march on July
1 advocating faster implementation of universal suffrage. The following
metaphor was by Jacky Hung, convenor of the Civil Human Rights Front, the
organizer of the July 1 marches (emphases added):
People need to jump out of the Central Government-designed birdcage and

grasp their own destiny. (Apple Daily, June 9, 2004—general news)
102 Chapter 4
Public opinion in Hong Kong is being trampled on and the development of

democracy in Hong Kong is closely tied up in the birdcage set up by the Central
Government. The Hong Kong people in this situation should make every effort
to emerge from these restrictions. (Lee Cheuk-yan, Apple Daily, October 29,
2004—opinion)
Confederation of Trade Unions’ Lee Cheuk-yan refutes: We are stuck with the
National People’s Congress Decision (rejecting popular elections in 2007 and
2008) and we are forced to play with fire to burn open the cage. Who told you
to create a birdcage? Dr Fernando Cheung, social sector legislator proposed a
referendum to move say there is no intention to “condemn” anyone, so he does
not understand why officials are so nervous, stressing that the referendum is
just letting people express their wishes through the ballot box—it is not legally
binding. (Ming Pao Daily, November 9, 2004—general news)
The excerpts above refer to the referendum suggested by Fernando Cheung

in October 2004 for the people to decide on the course of constitutional
development (this referendum will be discussed further in chapter 5). They
all imply that the people need to be proactive to break out of the “bird-
cage.” A Fourth Report on Constitutional Development was released mid-
December 2004. In the following, the topic for the vehicle “birdcage” is now
democracy.
Although modifications to the existing electoral methods such as increas-

ing the number of LegCo [the Legislative Council] seats are allowed, critics
slammed the decision as birdcage democracy and not in line with the promise
of gradual and orderly progress towards full universal suffrage as enshrined
in the Basic Law. (Chris Yeung, South China Morning Post, December 29,
2004—opinion).
This metaphor trajectory shows the many uses to which one vehicle can be
put and also how it can be used with other metaphors of containment. As
mentioned earlier in the chapter, the birdcage was explicated in that its size
changed, it was decorated, whitewashed, and otherwise manipulated. The dis-
course-length metaphor of “birdcage” (鳥籠) was also redeployed throughout
the research period.
There were other extended metaphors like the article titled “birdcage sym-
bol” which the concept of the “birdcage” was considered an intrinsic Chinese
aesthetic object, a means of “control,” and perhaps for protection. An article
from November 10, 2005, titled “the symbol of the birdcage” (鳥籠的象徵)
discusses the “beauty of incompleteness” (broken bridges, crescent moons,
eroded rocks) and the “beauty of morbidity” (withered vines, old trees, and
crows at dusk) that is favored by Chinese art (Kong 2005). This “aesthetic of
the birdcage” obviously resonates since it is used to describe the constraints
under which universal suffrage needs to develop in Hong Kong. Chen Yun,
a Chinese Communist Party elder, proposed the “birdcage” theory of the
economy in the early 1980s (鳥籠經濟理論):
The bird [market adjustment] must not be held tightly in the hand or it will die. It
should fly but only within its cage [central planning]; without a cage it will just
fly away. The best way is to keep it in a birdcage. (Li and Lok 1994, 289–290)
The “birdcage” metaphor could be said to be the major metaphor to “symbol-

ize” Hong Kong’s democratization, at least by the democratic camp.
In another example, in which an entire article was a metaphor, Hong Kong
was a “tiger in a cage” (Tai 2004). The cage was the “One Country, Two
Systems” framework. The tiger did not have the dignity befitting that regal
animal because it was in such a small cage. Interestingly, universal suffrage
would bring it dignity, but the cage (the restrictions under the “One Country,
Two Systems” framework) although would still remain.
“Bird,” rather than “birdcage,” was also the vehicle for the topic of “uni-
versal suffrage” itself, and this “bird” was as frightening as avian flu since
various preconditions and principles were set to prevent the “bird” coming
near Hong Kong any time soon (emphasis added):
You could say that democracy is like avian flu, and you need to do a comprehen-
sive culling within a five km radius and disinfect that large area by sprinkling
medicated powder to prevent democracy spreading like H5N1. (Ng Chi-sam,
Apple Daily, November 30, 2005—opinion)
The “birdcage” metaphor continued into 2006 and referred back to 2005’s
“birdcage proposal” (鳥籠政策), “birdcage political reform” (鳥籠政改),
and “birdcage politics” (鳥籠政治), all metaphoric descriptions of the
Fifth Task Force Report of the Constitutional Task Force: Package of
Proposals for the Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and the
Legislative Council in 2008. The following, taken from a satirical article,
talks more about the bird that becomes the metaphoric vehicle rather than
the cage itself. What can be inferred in the first example is that compro-
mise might be necessary in order to advance democracy, but in the second,
the bird (the topic: democracy, universal suffrage) itself is the problem
and should not be allowed to fly free. The following is in a similar vein
(emphasis added):
104 Chapter 4
Bird within a cage (籠中鳥)
Report No. 5 was rejected, and Hong Kong’s democracy is marking time, now
the bird in that cage cannot grow up and fly away—stupid bird.
Universal Suffrage Firebird (普選的火鳥).
Although the flying bird with the word “universal suffrage” written on it does
not have H5N1, but the big people from the North are still scared to death of it.
(Ming Pao Daily, January 22, 2006—humor)
River Water (河水)/Well Water (井水)

In 1989, Jiang Zemin famously quoted a literary saying, “The well water
[Hong Kong] does not interfere with the river water [China]” (井水不犯河
水) to indicate that Hong Kong should not interfere in Mainland matters.
Later it meant that China would also not interfere in Hong Kong. This was
to be a tenet of the “One Country, Two Systems.” Variations on the “well
water” and “river water” theme have been used a total of 56 times in the
newspapers over the ten-year research period.
There were five instances of the “well water/river water” expression in
May 2004 since this period was considered a time where the contradictions
between “One Country” and the “Second System” became more obvious after
the Interpretation and Decision of Basic Law by the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress. Generally speaking, there were only slight
variations on the “well water not interfering with river water” or “river water
not interfering with well water” metaphor. What is interesting to note is the
few occasions that the vehicle, in particular the “well” part of the metaphor
(i.e., Hong Kong), was explicated (emphasis added):
In regards to the current relationship between China and Hong Kong, “well
water not interfering river water” has indeed been achieved. But river water is
often interfering with well water and it sometimes even overflows the embank-
ment and floods the tiny well of Hong Kong. (Zhang Wei-guo, Apple Daily,
September 21, 2004—opinion)
“Embankment” means the metaphorical division between Hong Kong and the
Mainland, and it often felt “breached.” In chapter 2, the “One Country, Two
Systems” was metaphorically described by a legal scholar as acting as both a
“wedge” and a “bridge,” between the two places, so this “embankment” (the
“One Country, Two Systems” relationship) does not always allow the wedge to
remain, rather it was one-way traffic (controlled by Beijing).
Unlike pro-Beijing commentators, the following use of “embankment” is

the advocating of mixing the different waters. Instead of the “well” waiting to
be flooded (with more influence by Beijing), the following example states that
the “well” should go to the river’s source and influence it (emphases added):
Since river water is interfering with well water, instead of wishfully thinking of
increasing the height of embankment to protect the well water, why not sneak
into the rear area alone and plant a tree in the source of river water? (Leung
Kai-chi, Ming Pao Daily, November 13, 2005—opinion)
This refers to Hong Kong being a kind of “democratic exemplar” for the
Mainland. Another interesting explication example is the “moat” connecting
the “One Country” and “Two Systems.” This metaphor was also listed in full
in chapter 2, but it is worthwhile seeing it in the context of well and river
water mixing (emphasis added):
One of the essences of “One Country, Two Systems” is “river water not inter-
fering with well water,” which means mainland China not intervening affairs
within the scope of Hong Kong’s self-autonomy. Similarly, HKSAR should
not intervene in China’s affairs. “One country, two systems” mainly and pre-
cisely refers to the social and political systems. In the economic, cultural and
livelihood perspectives, “two systems” is not some insurmountable “moat,” but
ensures mutual contact, complement in advantages and common development.
(Kwan Chiu, Ta Kung Pao, July 15, 2006—opinion)
The tenth anniversary of the SAR on July 1, 2007, was marked by many
events as well as a reflection on how Hong Kong had faired under “One
Country, Two Systems” so far. The following portion of the “well water” and
“river water” metaphor chain sums up the previous several years as well and
shows metaphor clustering.
Before the Handover their dire predictions of the “death” of Hong Kong
under Chinese rule. The following are some thoughts of Singapore’s Lee
Kuan Yew (emphasis added):
On the eve of the Handover, former State President Jiang Zemin said, “I practice
my socialism while you practice your capitalism, thus well water not interfer-
ing with river water.” Was this an assurance given by the Central Government
to Hong Kong people? Or was this an “instruction” given by the Central
Government as it did not want Hong Kong people to intervene in China’s
affairs? “There is severe interference of well water by river water.”
Lee said, “Like the confrontation between David and Goliath, although his power
might be limited, as long as he found the right stone and his opponent’s weakness,
David would defeat Goliath.” The Bible stated that David killed Goliath with the
106 Chapter 4
help of God, defeating the Philistines who invaded Israel, but Lee also added, “We
do not wish for his (the Central Government’s) fall, but its rise as a democratic
political system again.” (Ho Yu-hang, Ming Pao Daily, June 4, 2007—opinion)
As “well water” and “river water” could be said to a dual metaphor of com-
parison, “David and Goliath” acts in similar way. Hong Kong, like David,
can find a way (the metaphorical slingshot) to achieve universal suffrage, but
without killing Goliath (the Mainland).
Judging from the present situation, Lee Kuan Yew admitted that “river
water (the Central Government) has interfered with well water (Hong Kong)
severely.” What makes him most concerned is that with the increasingly close
economic relationship between China and Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s high
degree of autonomy is being threatened. (Ibid)
Hong Kong is increasingly economically integrated and some fear that this
mean that democracy and perhaps Hong Kong’s freedoms will be compro-
mised in the name of business success.
Then what is the meaning of “well water not interfering with river water”?
“The saying of ‘well water not interfering with river water’ is unclear. We
are supposed to be a family after the handover; it is “one country” instead of
two. “Two systems” does not refer to two cousins who never keep in touch;
even distant cousins can keep in touch with each other!” The key factor of
describing the political relationship between China and Hong Kong is “what
can be done and what cannot be done.” “What can be done? What cannot be
done? (The Central Government) will never intervene in affairs related to
autonomy, as it does not care about how badly you people involved in a fight,
except for questions that involve the constitution and power of the Central
Government.”
A family shares the same table for meals but minds their own business.
Cheng admitted that there are inherent contradictions in the Chinese and
Hong Kong’s ways of thinking. “The colonial rule that lasted for more than a
hundred years has an impact that is impossible to be eliminated within eight
or ten years.”
Zhu Yu-cheng, Chairman of the Development Research Centre of the State

Council, mentioned yesterday that what Hong Kong is implementing is a “lim-
ited high degree of autonomy.” Without authority of the Central Government,
Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy is like “a river without a source, a tree
without roots.” He added that “any attempt to weaken or exclude the power of
the Central Government harms the overall interests of Hong Kong people.” (Ho
Yu-hang, Ming Pao Daily, June 4, 2007—opinion)
Here, the writer notes the lack of clarity in the definition of “One Country,
Two Systems” and who has the authority to define it (i.e., the Central
Government). The relationship between the two places is likened to a family
relationship—having things in common but also having separate identities.
“A river without a source, a tree without roots” (無源之水無本之木) is an
idiom meaning that something is without a proper foundation or not prop-
erly planned. Here it means that ultimately all power lies with the Central
Government and that Hong Kong’s autonomy has limits.
In the past ten years, we all knew whether the pace for democratic progres-
sion was too fast or too slow. It now appears that some places not only did not
have a “gradual and orderly progress,” but a “gradual and orderly retreat”
instead.
Although the Chinese Communist officials have said something like “well
water not interfering with river water,” well water has been interfering river
water within the past ten years.
Hong Kong is different from Taiwan because Hong Kong’s political reality is
being forced “into an urn” and being forced to return its sovereignty to China.
Therefore, under the master-servant relationship, democratic progression relies
on the gracious approval and grant of the Central Government. Not to mention
anything vague and general like “gradual and orderly progress.” (Yan Huimin,
Apple Daily, 26 June 2007—opinion)
The parallel structure of the opposites of “progress” and “retreat” illustrates

the advance and retreat of democratization and the “mixing” of waters, while
“forced into an urn” is the metaphor vehicle for being a “second system” of
China. Earlier, in 2004 an article titled “Cultivating Hong Kong” emphasized
that its roots (emphasis added):
Holly seeds grow up to become holly and entwine about fences. The seeds of the
banyan tree grow to be banyan trees, but it depends [on circumstances] whether
it will be a banyan tree or a bonsai. Hong Kong is not a holly seed because of its
special historical conditions and key location; it is clearly the seed of a banyan
tree. But the seeds have been put into an earthen bowl and cultivated in a pot.
(Lung Ying-Tai, Apple Daily, September 24, 2004—opinion)
Ultimately, Hong Kong is just a plant in a pot (盆栽), another metaphor

vehicle of containment. From here it can be seen that the metaphors relate
to the smallness of Hong Kong vis-à-vis the largeness of the “One Country,”
108 Chapter 4
as well has the limitations of growth within its governance framework as a

“Second System.”
Sweat as Both Metaphor and Physical

Embodiment of Metaphor
“Sweat” (汗) is an interesting word found in this discourse, one that is contin-
ually employed as a metaphor of the “struggle for democracy” in relation to
protests, particularly the July 1 protest marches held in the subtropical sum-
mer (2003–2007). Sweat was used both in the physical sense of that bodily
fluid and also metaphorically as a mechanism for the ongoing struggle. It is
an illustration of what could be called “dynamic metaphor” as it coincided
with the actual physical “stepping out” (for democracy). Despite the seeming
lack of progress on political reform, the people’s “sweat has not been shed in
vain” (汗水的確沒有白流) (Apple Daily, July 8, 2003—general news), since
physical sweating in 2003 led to the repeal of Article 23 security legislation.
Sweat thus having both a physical and metaphorical effect. It “bleached away
the ‘Blue Paper’” (汗水漂白了「藍紙草案」) of what was considered a
“draconian law” (emphasis added):
Who would have thought that “sweat” would have had a “bleaching” effect!
Earlier Hong Kong united together used bleach to defeat the SARS, and return
on sweat, had played an unexpected role in bleaching: to make a “blue”—
printed “National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill,” has in fact been be
“bleached” into a specific provision for consultation with the “White Bill.” This
is a milestone in the development of our democracy: In my memory, this is the
first time in Hong Kong’s history that its majority of voice on a controversial
issue came out . . . a big step in the history of democratic development in Hong
Kong, and half a million people come out with a big step. (Ho Wing Hon, Apple
Daily, July 12, 2003—opinion)
A “blue paper” is a government bill tabled directly to the legislature, which

means it was up for voting and possible passing of the bill. Note also the
cluster of metaphors that relate to the journey metaphor “stepping” and “mile-
stone.” In 2004, sweat also “changed to glue”:
On July 1, there was a fire in each person’s hearts, and their sweat turned into
sticky all-purpose glue, connecting each other. (Chan Kai Yin, Ming Pao Daily,
July 4, 2004—opinion)
In other words, sweat served as a common bonding fluid of the large crowd
during the hours-long march. “The temperature might be hot but the will of
the people was even hotter” (天氣熱民心更熱) for democracy (Apple Daily,
editorial, July 1, 2004). Furthermore, sweat “helped advance the democratic
footprint” and assisted in “breaking new ground for Hong Kong democracy”
each time that people went out on the streets. Sweat was thus an integral part
of the physical and metaphorical journey toward political change. Sweat was
also a “thermometer on government policy,” that is, how people saw govern-
ment policy and actions; also in 2004, “volcanic magma” was the vehicle for
the crowd in July’s protest march: “The crowds are like a big river, like a
bay of deep volcanic magma, flowing slowly” (Lung 2004). The people were
also “a big steamer” with the annual July marches being its “vent.” These
“volcanic” examples indicate, like volcanic activity in the geological realm,
that there would be periods of quiet followed by possible activity that would
change, in Hong Kong’s case, the political landscape.
In 2005 Hong Kong’s history was again “written in sweat” on the July
march. For if it was not “paid in tears and sweat, birdcage democracy would
always remain.” Similar metaphors were used in 2006, the march being seen
as a “parent and child dehydration-weight-loss exercise,” to show the diversity
of the march’s participants. While in 2007, “our sweat still falls, but our spirits
do not; by now, our sweat has been shed in buckets along the 4-km democracy
avenue.” All these examples come from the pro-democracy Apple Daily.
Cross-Event-Metaphor Chain: Building a Bridge to

Cross the River (2004–2007)
A primary “metaphor-maker” or “gatekeeper” in the discourse was the
Beijing official, Qiao Xiaoyang, deputy secretary-general of the SCNPC.
His “crossing the bridge to go across the river” metaphor chain spanned
three years, from 2004 with the Interpretation of the Basic Law to a SCNPC
Decision about universal suffrage in late 2007.
Firstly, Qiao stated the Interpretation of the Basic Law was not an
amendment to the Basic Law, not a de facto amendment which the demo-
crats accused it of being. However, Qiao said this is not the case as “The
Interpretation is 1+1 = 1, while an amendment was 1+1 = 2” (釋法不等於
修改, 釋法是1+1=1, 修改是1+1=2) and that the Interpretation followed the
“legislative intent” of the Basic Law (Luo, Mo, and He 2004). The mathemat-
ical metaphor could be said to be carried over by Qiao into the architectural
field with the following metaphor chain of “constructing a bridge.”
His explanation for the Interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004 not only
saw the Interpretation as a “new beginning” in Hong Kong’s constitutional
development but also as constructing a bridge across the river (universal suf-
frage). Qiao’s explication of the metaphor has been given below:
110 Chapter 4
1. The Interpretation (Beijing to decide when Hong Kong was to get universal
suffrage) = “Building a bridge to cross the river” (架橋過河)
Predictably, Qiao’s initial remarks drew further metaphorical response in the

media (emphases added):
“Now, perhaps, we can start constructing that bridge.” (South China Morning
Post, April 4, 2004—editorial)
“While sceptics will dismiss Beijing’s move as being a bridge to nowhere,

optimists can cling to a degree of hope.” (Chris Yeung, South China Morning
Post, April 7, 2004—opinion)
The “path” or journey metaphor is highlighted here. This is also carried over
in the bridge metaphor being a “bridge to nowhere” (stagnation of political
reform) as how to proceed were still unclear—there was still no date for uni-
versal suffrage (emphases added).
“Checkpoints are layered upon layers on the road to democratic general elec-
tions . . . however Deputy Qiao can’t clearly see the plans to the bridge across
the river, the identity of the designer . . . We cannot see any more details, all is
uncertain.” (Apple Daily, April 7, 2004—editorial)
However, other details of the bridge’s construction are unclear as are the
“constructor’s” intentions, although blockages could be seen as things need-
ing to be done first before further political reform could take place (emphasis
added):
Unfortunately, the bridge’s plans are blurry, and constructing the bridge we still
don’t know whether it will be flat or bumpy as the explanation has not told us
about how the interpretation of universal suffrage bill will be in the end. (Wang
Youjin, Apple Daily, April 8, 2004—opinion)
This also emphasizes the lack of definite details about Hong Kong’s future
democratization, which could be either “flat or bumpy.” The uncertainty lay
originally in the vagueness and ambiguity of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
and Basic Law regarding constitutional development. The Interpretation was
supposed to solve problems, as it is a “blueprint” (emphases added):
. . . likened the Interpretation to clarifying the blueprint of a bridge across a

river. This is necessary to eventually achieve a quick crossing. (South China
Morning Post, April 9, 2004—editorial)
However, a “blueprint” is usually detailed about the building plans, but

there is no elaboration of a universal suffrage system for Hong Kong, just
about when it cannot be achieved. Therefore, this metaphor is not reflect-
ing reality.
2. Decision (that universal suffrage would not occur in 2007) = “A guidepost”

(立牌指路)
3. Third Report of the Constitutional Task Force (May 2004)—Areas which

may be considered for amendment in respect of the methods for selecting the
chief executive in 2007 and forming the Legislative Council in 2008 = “starting
the car” (駕車上路)
The following extension of the “building the bridge” metaphor in the Ta

Kung Pao takes up Qiao Xiaoyang’s bridge metaphor and considers that the
first three reports of the Constitutional Task Force on Development are the
bridge’s framework (骨架). The next step is the construction of the “platform
deck” (「橋面」平台) to that bridge. This will be up to the “democratic wis-
dom” (民主智慧) of the Hong Kong people (i.e., when they reach consensus)
(emphases added):
Between the First and Third Task Force Reports there have been a number
of large and small storms, some Hong Kong people have been puzzled and
worried, but a more positive meaning of this is to show that there is a gradual
development of democracy, a step-by-step reform of political system has for
the majority of Hong Kong people and the community sets the direction and
route, and puts up a bridge can that can be “open to traffic and pedestrians.”
The Third Report’s “may consider amendments” to be the framework of the
bridge; how to lay the platform to reach the other side, we must look at the
democratic wisdom of the people of Hong Kong. (Ta Kung Pao, May 12,
2004—editorial)
However, there is no mention how the Hong Kong people would reach this
consensus by themselves.
4. Passage of Fifth Report of the Constitutional Task Force (October 2005)—

Proposals for electing the chief executive and the legislative council = “the car
could start to drive across the bridge”
5. A veto of the Fifth Report of the Constitutional Task Force = the vehicle
would “suddenly grind to a halt” (突然停在原地不走了)
112 Chapter 4
6. SCNPC Decision in 2007—that changes can be made in 2012, universal suf-

frage could be achieved in 2017 = “serve as a midway (or transit) station (中途
站) en route to universal suffrage, which would be conducive to a stable transi-
tion to universal suffrage.”
This “midway station” would enable Hong Kong to “concentrate its efforts on
developing the economy and improving livelihood” and having a timetable
will “reduce contentions.” Thus universal suffrage is portrayed as intrinsi-
cally divisive. Qiao Xiaoyang warned that this interim step is a necessary
stage of the political transition and that democratic forces need to abandon
trying to obtain universal suffrage sooner than 2017: “If their demands are
way over the top, people will only question what they really want” (Wong,
Ng., and Wu 2007). By making progress in 2012, “Take one step forward,
progress to 2017 stably and there is the transition. The timetable given by
the NPC will be honored” and universal suffrage was “entirely possible” if
the “complete” process of gradual and orderly development of the political
system was accomplished (Leung and Cheung 2007).
We can see by these discourse-length metaphor chains how they “anchor”
the discourse textually and how the combination of metaphors has a syncretic
effect by their explication and development: being of containment, and pos-
sible expansion if the circumstances are right. As a journey full of surprises,
without full knowledge of the characteristics of the destination (universal
suffrage), it was, to use Deng Xiaoping’s coinage, like a river being crossed
by feeling the stones.
EVENT-METAPHOR CHAINS
Event-metaphor chains resonated when there were significant events like the
release of major documents like Constitutional Task Force Reports. Most of
these chains were from the years 2005 onward, apart from one in 2001. The
discourse-length metaphors discussed earlier were prominent both before
and after 2005. Clusters of metaphors in these event chains will also be dis-
cussed when they appear. A reasonable amount of co-text needs to be given
to see the reasoning behind the use of metaphor and provides a “narrative” of
change as they are repeated or developed.
Selecting a Chief Executive Is Like Selecting a Durian

Metaphor Chain (2001)
This example, from 2001, is unique as it makes the case that it is easier for
others to select a leader easier than doing it for oneself (emphases added):
Electing the chief executive is like choosing a durian, a community group leader
said yesterday, meaning it is a task most people are happy to leave to someone
else.
The secretary-general of the Hong Kong Island Federation, Chung Yam-
cheung, told legislators: “Just like buying a durian, we hope someone will
choose one for us as we don’t know how to select one.”
Emily Lau Wai-hing of The Frontier asked Mr Chung: “Do you mean Hong
Kong people don’t know which durian to buy and need to rely on others? Do
they lack the ability to choose or are they stripped of the right to choose by
the Basic Law?” (May Sin-mi Hong, South China Morning Post, September 5,
Note that the metaphor has to be explained initially by the journalist followed
by the actual statement by the coiner. The response by the democrat Emily
Lau refutes this assertion with a rhetorical question. The metaphor of “select-
ing a durian” deals with the skills and maturity of the electorate to select a
chief executive of “good quality.” Durians are a malodorous tropical fruit
with a hard spiky skin. It is important to know how to choose a mature one.
If it is too ripe, it may be overly bitter and pungent. If it is not ripe enough,
the flesh will be hard and probably tasteless.
This also plays into the discourse that Hong Kong people lacked maturity
for democracy and they needed a group of elites to do that for them (the
“someone”—i.e., the “small circle”). The Basic Law says that in a uni-
versal suffrage system, the Election Committee becomes the Nomination
Committee to select candidates to run for election for chief executive. The
suggestion above is that the system will always be faulty. As a follow-up
use of the metaphor, the metaphor was realized materially with actual fruit
(emphases added):
They hung eight banners outside the Legislative Council and attached eight
durians, to satirize the pro-Beijing group who had earlier used the metaphor of
picking a durian for picking the Chief Election.
The protesters put the names of several candidates for first Chief Executive
including “Tung 董× China,” “Woo 吳× Firm,” “Yang 楊× beam,” and “Li李
× good” and written on paper and pasted on the durians. The “Tung × China”
durian was the largest among them to show that Tung Chee-hwa was hand-
picked by the Central Government.
Gary Fan of the Social Democratic Forum frankly said the meaning of the
durians is that people have the ability to choose a suitable candidate for Chief
Executive, there is no need to use the prosthetic hand of the 800-member
Election Committee. (Apple Daily, July 12, 2001—general news)
114 Chapter 4
The “prosthetic hand” (假手) in the last paragraph above means the arti-
ficial (unreal) nature of the voting process (the “selector” of the durian).
Alternatively, it could almost relate to the pro-Beijing nature of most on the
Election Committee.
Hong Kong’s “I Have a Dream” (我有一

個夢) Metaphor Chain (2005)
A 78-year-old man placed a single-page advertisement in the Chinese
press on October 28. This advertisement consisted of an hourglass with a
single question below it: “Tell me, will I be able to see universal suffrage
one day?” (告訴我，我會看見普選的一天嗎？). Around this time, Rosa
Parks, the black woman forced off a segregated bus in the American South
for sitting in a seat reserved for whites, died. The anonymous 78-year-old’s
wish and, by implication, Hong Kong’s, were likened to Rosa’s—that it
was time to “sit down” (be persistent) in order to “stand up” (for universal
suffrage). The elderly man’s wish was likened to Park’s action (emphases
added):
His [Martin Luther King’s] famous phrase “I have a dream . . .” has not yet
been realized; but the cause that Park’s set of has not been entirely in vain!
But thousands of miles away living in Hong Kong, we have to live with “bal-
anced participation and gradual and orderly progress” under the guise of a
small circle election system! (Leung Kwok Hung—Apple Daily, October 29,
2005—opinion)
Martin Luther King had always been invoked to Hong Kong’s struggle for
universal suffrage, and “Hong Kong people” is the topic of the metaphor
vehicle. “Rosa Parks” was a person fighting for their [democratic] rights. The
reference to “balanced participation,” in the authorities’ eyes, was more equi-
table than equality of voting. Just accepting the status quo would not bring
about change, one must “stand up” (emphasis added):
Tomorrow at 4 pm, the “Civil Human Rights Front” will be meeting in the
Central Government Offices, in the struggle for universal suffrage, will you
continue to sit down or will you stand up? (Ibid)
Hong Kong people also have to do a historically significant act—the July

1 marches have also been described in these terms—this is when they were
to “stand up.” This could also be a reminder of the effect of “standing up” in
2003, when Article 23 Bill was withdrawn.
Fifty years ago, a famous phrased from the U.S. civil rights movement was
Martin Luther King “I have a dream.” An old man has to spend money advertis-
ing to remind the people of Hong Kong that he has waited twenty years for his
democratic dream. Fifty years later, do people still have a dream or not? Don’t
we understand about rights, are they not necessary? (Ada Wong, Ming Pao,
November 2, 2005—opinion)
Stand firm for their rights, which shares the sense of democracy will be turned
into a breath of fresh air to drive away the dictatorship of China for thousands
of years the shadow of dictatorship, the Chinese people in a democratic light of
freedom to stand up. So we pay and would it not be worth it?
One day, when our children bathed in the sunshine of democracy and free-
dom, joy, said excitedly: “You know what? Key to democracy in Hong Kong
time, our parents, elderly people the courage to stand firm.”
Let us come up with the freedom of conscience, sowing the seeds for the
next generation, let us take to the streets in peace so that future generations of
Chinese people to be in the sun to stand up for democracy. December 4, let us
together go hand in hand in the parade and begin to be Chinese democracy’s
Rosa Parks. (Cai Zhiying Apple Daily, November 16—opinion)
These excerpts mirror Martin Luther King’s metaphors in his “I have a

dream” speech, as in the “dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit
path of racial justice,” as a call to take part in a march (King 1963). Martin
Luther King has always been linked to Hong Kong’s struggle for universal
suffrage. The Hong Kong people is the topic of the metaphor vehicle “Rosa
Parks.” “Sowing democratic seeds” (民主的種子) has also been used in the
past to describe earlier Hong Kong democracy marches.
There were 34 articles mentioning the elderly Hong Kong man’s question
in 2005, 4 in 2006, and 4 in 2007, mostly in the Chinese press, to illustrate
the lack of movement in the democratic struggle.
Metaphor Theory Chains of Constitutional Development

The year 2005 saw Fifth Report of Constitutional Development Task Force,
released on October 19. It contained proposals for methods of selecting the
chief executive in 2007 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2008.1
These proposals aimed to “move substantively towards the ultimate aim of
universal suffrage” (5.04—(IV)) and to “broaden the electorate base and
strengthen the democratic element in a pragmatic manner” (5.19). Since
the same relative proportions in the Legislative Council are unchanged, the
political status quo would effectively remain (as set by the Interpretation and
Decision of 2004). The main issue of the discourse surrounding the Fifth
116 Chapter 4
Report was why or why not a timetable and roadmap for universal suffrage
could be formulated.
Raphael Hui, chief secretary for administration, said that under the Basic
Law, Hong Kong will eventually achieve universal suffrage, and the HKSAR
government had no intention of delaying the process. But “universal suffrage
is a process, not a purpose/destination” (普選是一個過程，而非一個目的)
(Ming Pao Daily, November 5, 2005), what was important is the composition
of the legislature. The following from the China Daily explains this further:
Another reason for the impossibility of setting this timetable in the Fifth Report
is that such a demand is removed from reality. The Basic Law requires the
SAR’s political development to tally with the actual situation in the territory. By
“actual situation,” it should mean either the current state of political and social
development or that of recent years. It could not possibly refer to the conditions
10 or more years in the future. If we now fix the timetable through legislation,
it may not suit the future situation. No matter whether this schedule is ahead or
behind future realities, it would still not conform to the Basic Law’s require-
ment that constitutional development must tally with the actual situation. (Chen
Hanwen, China Daily, November 7, 2005—opinion)
With this reasoning, a timetable could only be set immediately prior to the
implementation of universal suffrage as the “actual situation” obviously
changes rapidly. This led to many “process” or “journey” metaphors occur-
ring from this time onward, since the discourse revolved around “roadmaps”
and here, particularly, “timetables.” A selection of these “process” metaphors
included: getting on the wrong bus, climbing a mountain, going up garden
paths, and teaching a child to swim on land, to indicate either what you had
to do or not to do to get to a particular destination. There were also “metaphor
theories” of constitutional development that generally involved “gathering
of the necessary materials” before this development could take place. One
of the first of these “theories” likened preparations for universal suffrage as
preparations necessary for launching a spacecraft, the Shenzhou 6 (神舟6
號)—the Shenzhou 5 mission had just been successfully launched (China’s
first manned spaceflight):
Chief Secretary for Administration Rafael Hui yesterday used the metaphor
“Shenzhou 6” space project preparation to describe the preparation needed
before there can be a universal suffrage timetable: “going into space has the
same goal; you do the ground work now, and then the next step is to plan for
lift off, when there will certainly be a roadmap and time.” (Ming Pao Daily,
October 23, 2005—general news)
Another “theory” was the “Clone Theory” (複製論); this relates to Chief
Executive Donald Tsang saying that Hong Kong could not adopt wholesale
a system of democracy from another jurisdiction, especially the West, due
to Hong Kong’s specific “historical realities.” This was a common refrain
throughout 1997–2007. The “100 Years for Democracy Theory” (百年民
主論) likened the suffragettes’ campaign for votes for women which took at
least a century—universal suffrage would not happen overnight (as in a “big
bang”) (Apple Daily, October 31, 2005—opinion).
Yet another “theory” was the “Assembling Building Blocks Theory” (砌
積木論); this illustrated the argument that not all the right things were in
place for a universal system to be introduced into Hong Kong. Four “building
blocks” were necessary. The first two building blocks were the Fifth Report
of the Constitutional Task Force and the setting up of a political sub-group
under the high-level Commission on Strategic Development. The third and
fourth “blocks” is the creation of a “multilevel chain for the grooming of
political talent, and the strengthening of the role and functions of the District
Councils” (Cheung, South China Morning Post, October 20, 2005—general
news).
The first Hong Kong District Council Election was in 1982. Twenty-three years,
the timetable for universal suffrage is still at the “assembling building blocks”
stage. It seems that the endless accumulation of wood is a puzzle. (Apple Daily,
October 22, 2005—general article)
From the above, there always seems to be something else that needs to be in
place before political reform could take place.
From even a basic understanding of these three “theories” of constitutional
development, it is clear that the Hong Kong’s administration sees the attain-
ment of universal suffrage as being a long-term process despite statements
that they wanted to see it as early as possible. These did form metaphor
chains, but for space reasons, only the one below is used.
Baking Bread Metaphor Chain (烤麵包) (2005)

On November 15, 2005, the Committee on Strategic Development (CSD 策
發會) was expanded to 153 members, the government considering this was
an important advisory body for “pooling the insight and wisdom of the com-
munity for the betterment of Hong Kong.” The metaphor chain that follows,
the longest in the data, was initiated from following statement of the chief
executive taken from a press release (emphases added):
118 Chapter 4
The function of the Commission on Strategic Development may be like fermenta-

tion in the bread making process. If a baker wants to make a soft, fluffy loaf, he
has to use good quality ingredients and all his skills and experience to bake the
bread. But this is not enough. He should attach importance to the fermentation
process—the chemical process that allows all ingredients to yield the best results.
The Commission’s work is similar to the fermentation process—it listens to what
the community says and ensures the public’s views are taken into consideration at
an early stage of policy formulation. This process ensures our policies reflect what
Hong Kong people want. (Hong Kong Gov., November 15, 2005)
The “baking bread theory” (烤麵包論) of constitutional development as it

was known in the media moved beyond simply describing the CSD to relating
the act of baking bread to the constitutional development process as a whole.
All newspapers had a response to this metaphor, splitting up the bread-mak-
ing process into its constitutive elements:
The Cooks/Too Many or a Lack:

“Too many cooks risk spoiling the bread” (headline) . . . “Let us hope that
members will not spoil the dough by insisting on their own recipes. Instead, they
should focus on the goal of baking the best bread for the community.” (South
China Morning Post, November 16, 2005—editorial)
“Recruited 153 cooks—that is too many, and it is well known that too many
cooks spoil the broth, in this case the bread.” (L. Nik, South China Morning
Post, November 25, 2005—letter to the editor)
“Democrats are scarce in Tsang’s bakery” (Ambrose Leung, South China

Morning Post, November 16, 2005—headline)
The above includes an elaboration on the above idiom “too many cooks.”
The large number of people in the CSD means that each have their own
agenda rather than considering the agenda for the community, the result being
“snail-paced democracy.” In Hong Kong, people selected for advisory bodies
usually come from the elite, the elites’ children, businesspeople, and so on.
Furthermore, there were few democrats in the Commission.
“Donald Tsang’s baker’s skill is under par” (Cheung Man-kwong, Ming Pao
Daily, November 18, 2005—opinion)
“The Keung Kee Bread Company” (a play on Tsang’s full Chinese name)
(Margaret Ng, Apple Daily, November 18, 2005—opinion)
“Tsang does not want to meet public demands, but does not want to let go and
tries to delay: ‘We are like bakers baking bread together; we need to let the
policy brew and “ferment,”’ to produce bread of an excellent color, flavor, and
taste, okay?” (Ming Pao Daily, December 4, 2005—editorial)
Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s ability (as “baker”) to come up with

demands (not giving a set time for the “fermentation” (consensus)) that the
community would accept is questioned,
The Dough/Fermentation Process

“But when challenged on how long the dough of a plan for full democracy
would take to rise before it could go into the oven, Mr. Tsang only said he hoped
it would be soon.” (Ambrose Leung South China Morning Post, November 16
“Demand universal suffrage is already ‘moldy’; it has been baked for so long
so it is already ‘moldy’ so how can we ferment it again?” (Ming Pao Daily,
November 17, 2005—general news)
In the first excerpt, Tsang gives an equivocal answer here about the time of the
“fermentation process,” which involves the careful gathering and collating of the
views of the public. In the second, in which Democratic Party elder Martin Lee is
quoted, he says that the fermentation process, the time for democracy to be intro-
duced, is already too long (since the 1980s)—that at this point, you cannot “re-
ferment” the democracy “bread,” thus, the democratic “bread” has all gone bad.
The Ingredients
“The ingredients are unbalanced, the yeast has too much weight, and the loaf has
unlimited expansion beyond the limits that the oven can accommodate. After it
emerges, the bread is strangely shaped, just looking at it one feels full, so you cannot
eat it.” (Cheung Man-kwong, Ming Pao Daily November 18, 2005—opinion)
“To make bread you certainly need good flour” (Tan Wentian, Ta Kung Pao,
November 28, 2005—headline/opinion)
“It will take years to ferment the bread dough in Chief Executive Donald Tsang
Yam-kuen’s CSD—which he calls a ‘bakery’ for a timetable for universal suf-
frage—because the main ingredients of flour and yeast are imported from the
mainland. His customers may starve, or at least become hungry, because Mr
Tsang distributes slices of bread instead of the whole loaf.” (L. Nik South China
Morning Post, November 25, 2005—letter to the editor)
120 Chapter 4
The metaphor “ingredients” represent elements of the reform proposal, which

are here depicted as not “balanced” which is needed in order to produce a
good loaf (although the government’s ideas that it is balanced as in “balanced
participation.)”
The “imported ingredients” refer to the concepts and ideology related to
the Mainland’s attitude to democracy, which would lead to a democracy
not aligned to what people wanted. The “slices of bread” in last excerpt
indicates that democracy will come little by little. If the ingredients of a
universal suffrage system are suboptimal, then the end result is limited or
fake democracy.
The Type of Bread Produced

[said by Audrey Eu, a democratic legislator] “You say that you are baking bread,
but do not know what kind of bread will come out, so does the Government
think that it could reach any conclusion?” (Ming Pao Daily, November 29,
“If you put old flour into the oven and then bake it, everybody knows baking
needs a certain time before it can be backed into bread. To do anything you have
to occasionally wait.” (Apple Daily, December 4, 2005—editorial)
The first excerpt is taken from a long article of which this is only a paragraph.
The entire article is an extended metaphor about the need for good flour, the
properties of bad flour, and how even a small amount of “vermin” in flour can
spoil the whole bag of flour. In this case, the topic of the vehicle is “demo-
crats,” who are generally the “bad flour” in the constitutional development
process according to the pro-Beijing press.
Marrying off a Daughter (談婚論嫁) Metaphor Chain

(November 2005)
Another interesting metaphor chain in late 2005 that was also connected to
the Fifth Report of the Constitutional Task Force was “marrying off a daugh-
ter” coined by Martin Lee of the Democratic Party, who used to the need to
“set a date” (timetable) for universal suffrage (emphasis added):
Legislator Fernando Cheung lamented that people have had 20 years of unre-
quited love for “universal suffrage,” yet the “wedding date” has still to be set.
Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam said, talking of marriage,
society has to have the consensus and the Central Government has to agree to
it, you cannot say that what time that they can be “married off.”
But Stephen Lam in reply said that “marrying off your daughter” a Mr. Right
has to be found first. Fernando Cheung argued that Hong Kong people have an
arranged marriage “before we were forced to marry Tung Chee-hwa, now it is
Donald Tsang, Hong Kong’s Mr. Right is in fact universal suffrage,” referring
to people’s 20-year long “unrequited love” for universal suffrage, but so far
there is no wedding date. (Ming Pao Daily, November 5, 2005—general news)
Setting a date for universal suffrage is given the vehicle: “setting a date for
a daughter’s wedding.” Stephen Lam comments that different parties have
to agree with the time of the “marriage”—the attainment of universal suf-
frage (about forging of consensus which seems difficult to do). Lam replies
to Lee’s metaphor (first referring to it metalingually) by adding “Mr Right,”
the vehicle for “universal suffrage system suitable for Hong Kong.” Cheung,
in reply, said that Hong Kong was already in an “arranged marriage” (with
the chief executive being selected by others), that of the One Country, Two
Systems which was not designed by the Hong Kong people, but says that “Mr
Right” is universal suffrage (one person, one vote) (emphasis added).
Former Democratic Party chairman Martin Lee insisted on a timetable first,

before voting on the reform package. He said: “In marrying off your daughter
you first have to book a suitable date; why would you talk about contents of the
menu [the wedding banquet] first?” (Ta Kung Pao, November 5, 2005—general
news)
In the last excerpt above, Lee points out the incongruity of looking at the
“menu” (various aspects related to constitutional development) while a date
has still not been set, implying if a date has been set, the menu can be easily
ordered.
The above exchange could almost be a “chicken and egg” argument since
you need a date to attain a goal, and you do have to know what you want.
For the democrats this was “one person, one vote” while the government and
Beijing wanted a combination of geographical and functional constituencies
in order to obtain “balanced participation.”
Parable of the Talents Metaphor Chain (November 2005)

Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam speaking at
a Christian forum used the “Parable of the Talents” from the Bible (Matthew
25:14–30; Luke 19:12–28) to imply that even though the reform proposal
was not perfect, Hong Kong people should try to make the best of it. Lam
had also said that he would listen carefully to those who support and oppose
122 Chapter 4
the reform proposals, but how to decide the issue would be “God’s decision”
(italics added) (emphasis added):
He also used the story of the “three servants” in the Bible as a metaphor for the
current reform package metaphor. The story tells of the master who gives 5,000,
2,000, and 1,000 talents respectively to the three servants to manage. . . . Lam
said: “The current proposals are not perfect, we do not have 5,000 talents, but
we have increased the democratic space, so we have 2,000 talents, if the pro-
posals are not eventually adopted, it will be equivalent to the servant with 1,000
talents, only stagnation.” (Ming Pao Daily, November 28, 2005—general news)
Further on in the article quoted above, universal suffrage will likely occur
when God wills it (emphasis added):
Democratic Party Legislative Councilor Andrew Cheng criticized Lam as using his
identity as a Christian to put the responsibility on God for political reform, a move
contrary to Christian principles. Jackie Hung, Director-general of the Catholic Justice
and Peace Commission said that Lam should have the courage to reflect Hong
Kong’s demand for universal suffrage to the Central Authorities rather than passing
the buck to God. (Ming Pao Daily, November 28, 2005—general news)
Cheung Man-kwong criticized this as comparing the relationship between Hong

Kong the Central Authorities as that of one between master and servant. (Ming
Pao Daily, November 29, 2005—general news)
Although “putting the responsibility on God” is not necessarily a metaphor,

it does give the impression that democratic development is out of the govern-
ment’s hands. Similarly, “passing the buck to God” also implies that when
the “time is ripe” constitutional development will happen. The use of “demo-
cratic space” at the start of this section is interesting as it combines with the
“birdcage” metaphor.
This kind of reasoning for urging acceptance of the proposal is similar to
the reasoning behind acceptance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and
Basic Law that this was the best that could be done under the circumstances.
The subtext is that these circumstances lay beyond Hong Kong’s control.
Crossroads Metaphor Chain (十字路口) (November 2005)

On November 30, Chief Executive Donald Tsang addressed the public on
television and urged the proposals from the Fifth Constitutional Task Force
Report to be passed in the Legislative Council (emphases added):
Fellow citizens, we are at a crossroads in our democratic development. If

LegCo passes our reform package, we will take a big step towards our goal of
universal suffrage. With the success gained, there is a greater chance of reach-
ing a consensus on how to achieve universal suffrage. If the package were to
be voted down by LegCo, then constitutional development for 2007 and 2008
would come to a halt. This would make it difficult to reach consensus for uni-
versal suffrage in 2012. (CMAB 2015)
This address implies that the suggested proposals would make the Hong
Kong political system much more democratic than it was previously. Tsang
criticized the pan-democrats for not supporting the reform package because
there was no timetable for universal suffrage (this was known as “bundling”
the two together and playing “bundling politics”).
The three “treasures” [One Country, Two Systems, Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong, high degree of autonomy], should be at the forefront on the occa-
sion of the “crossroads” of Hong Kong’s constitutional development and they
are more than necessary. (Ta Kung Pao, December 2, 2005—editorial)
By referring to the three things as “treasures” it reiterates what has been men-
tioned before that these things are valuable and should therefore be treated
with care in constitutional development. As from previous and future discus-
sions in this book, these “treasures” can be ambiguous, vague, and somewhat
contradictory.
Of course, Mr Tsang did not use casually use the metaphor of “crossroads.” Mr
Tsang used this metaphor is to let the public know that the government’s reform
package, once rejected, the development of democracy in Hong Kong will go
astray, they will embark on a fork in the road, will go to the crossroads rather
than continue to move forward. In other words, the meaning of Tsang’s cross-
roads is “reject political reform and universal suffrage would be more distant.”
(Lo Fu, Apple Daily, December 2, 2005—opinion)
There is a metalingual reference to the use of “metaphor,” but then the

vehicle is developed here into another road aspect, “fork in the road” or
“crossroads” is explained that it would be further off if rejected. The vehicle
of “crossroads” is a democratic progress. The discourse at this time was an
“either/or” scenario—the pro-government camp saw the reform proposals
as an advance on the status quo. The same opinion writer continues below
(emphases added):
124 Chapter 4
In fact, the government’s reform package will enable Hong Kong’s democratic
development go astray, into the side streets alleys, into the confusion of the
crossroads.
It will not change the nature of the small-circle election, there is no direction,
but there is no timetable for the further development of the route to democracy
either. Such a program is not moving in the direction of universal suffrage, there
is a deliberately open up a number of forks in the road, some of the side streets so
the people going around in circles, or even difficult to distinguish the public into
the direction of the crossroads. Out of the democratic road like this how can we
not oppose the political reform package? (Lo Fu, Apple Daily, December 2, 2005
—opinion)
Here, there is only confusion as the “road” (the route in other words) is
unclear, but the one clear thing is that the reform proposals will not change
the characteristics of the “small circle election.”
Sellers of oranges praise them to the skies as being unparalleled in taste. You
say we are at the crossroads, but Chief Executive, how to get customer satisfac-
tion by selling dried or rotten oranges to them; please replace them with a num-
ber of really sweet and juicy oranges! (Ng Chi-sum, Ming Pao Daily, December
2, 2005—opinion)
The metaphor vehicle of “sellers of oranges” is connected to the topic of “the

government” who would naturally want to “sell” the reform package con-
tained in the Fifth Task Force Report. However, the “customer” (the Hong
Kong public) are unlikely to get behind a flawed proposal. They are only
likely to accept something more equitable.
The 25-member opposition is now faced with a political decision, this decision
is about the way to go, the so-called crossroads of wandering. (Zhang Zhigang,
Ta Kung Pao, December 16, 2005—opinion)
In this last example, the topic of the vehicle “crossroads” now becomes
the “opposition” (the democrats). This implies that the democrats may
become irrelevant if they reject some movements toward political reform,
it is they who will be in the political wilderness. A related “journey”
metaphor “being taken up the garden path” (遊花園), in other words not
shown a direct route to universal suffrage. This metaphor occurred in 18
articles in December 2005 (out of 34 for all of 2005), largely in the Apple
Daily.
Be Heroes (英雄) Metaphor Chain (November 2005)

Chief Executive Donald Tsang warned that if the reform package was
defeated it would “damage the growing trust between pro-democracy politi-
cians and Beijing.” He said that “I think that the prime prerequisite for uni-
versal suffrage is winning Beijing’s trust” (Chan and Yan 2005). Democrats
said the way Tsang presented the concessions was just another way of say-
ing “take it or leave it” and that they had no choice but to vote against the
package. If pan-democrats would pass the proposals according to Donald
Tsang, they would be known as “democracy’s heroes” (民主英雄) by doing
a “U-Turn” on current their stance.
Members should not worry about supporting the proposal being labelled as
“doing a U-turn” “because this will be a victory for democracy, they can
bravely stand up to be democratic heroes! This will be . . . a rational victory! If
the program is not passed, the opposition members owe the public a fair, owes
the public an explanation, they must explain to the public what is a better way
to fight for universal suffrage.” (Ta Kung Pao, December 20, 2005—general
news)
The “hero” metaphor for those who would pass the reform is a part of the
underlying “battle” metaphor (or the “politics of persuasion”) that permeates
the discourse of Hong Kong’s further democratization as a whole. Tsang’s
assumption is that democracy was moving forward with the proposals.
Those who decide to vote for the package now would be heroes of democracy.
They should have the courage to shrug off such suicidal bundling tactics, he
said, referring to linking support for the package with the demand for a time-
table. (Cheung et al., South China Morning Post, December 20 2005—general
news)
This “reform carrot” (Leung, Cheung, and Cheung, 2005) failed to sway the
democrats. In the following, the metaphor vehicle of “hero” is changed to
mean Donald Tsang if he pushed for true universal suffrage instead of the
current proposal. He would be the true hero (emphasis added).
“Donald Tsang Yam-kuen could become a hero if he lobbied Beijing for univer-
sal suffrage but would be a coward if he continued to ignore public demand and
kept pushing the reform package, pro-democracy lawmakers said yesterday . . .
The legislator for the medical sector, Kwok Ka-ki, retorted: We don’t want
to become heroes. We will leave that to Mr Tsang. Legislator Leung Kwok
126 Chapter 4
Hung condemned Mr Tsang for trying to mislead the public. How can you call
someone a hero for selling out the people and betraying his own principles?”
(Ambrose Leung, South China Morning Post, December 21, 2005—general
news)
“Albert Cheng pointed out that . . . if democrats support the proposals they
would be ‘democratic cowards’.” (“Focal Person,” Ming Pao Daily, December
21, 2005—general news)
Here, the vehicle becomes “cowards” to indicate those supporting the

proposals.
Although Chief Executive Donald Tsang on the eve of the vote wanted sup-
porters for the political reform members to persuade them so that they could
be “democratic heroes, but yesterday’s poll results reflect that no one is willing
to do “an about face”; no one is willing to . . . suddenly become “democratic
heroes,” the result will be political reform efforts in the pro-democracy opposi-
tion was rejected. In fact, rejecting the Government’s reform package is simply
a matter of course, it is a natural thing. . . . it is a waste of time studying [the
reforms]; how can decorating the birdcage of “birdcage reform” be much bet-
ter? (Lo Fung, Apple Daily, December 22, 2005—opinion)
Note the “hero” metaphor chain intersects with the “birdcage” chain.
Legislators who vote against the proposals are not “democratic heroes,” they are
just maintaining the people’s basic political rights; legislators voting for the pro-
posals are supporting democratic fraud and are certainly democratic cowards.
(Lee Yee, Apple Daily, December 22, 2005—opinion)
It is interesting that the metaphor vehicle has been reversed and becomes
semantically connected to earlier discourse showing the polarization of the
discourse. It is the government who are democratic cowards, not democrats
who want real change.
Earlier, one commentator noted that Hong Kong people did not have lead-
ers like Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson Mandela but could spontaneously take to
the streets to fight for democracy. Because of this excellent quality, “We do
not need a hero, because each of us are heroes” (我們不需要英雄，因為我
們每個人都是英雄) (Choi 2005). The Hong Kong government accused the
democrats as “hindering democracy” and causing democratization to “mark
time” (原地踏步).
Hong Kong Is a Small Brokeback Mountain Metaphor

Chain (2006)
Although the South China Morning Post predicated that “If 2005 was a
thriller year for Hong Kong politics, pundits have forecast a year of slow
motion, if not boredom in politics for 2006, in the aftermath of the bitter
row over constitutional reform” (Yeung 2006). However, the debate over
the vetoing of the reform proposals continued into 2006. Although the fol-
lowing metaphor was just carried over in two articles, it again illustrates
the “unrequitedness” of achieving universal suffrage. In March 2006, Ang
Lee’s adaptation of E. Annie Proulx’s story Brokeback Mountain (the
“gay cowboy” movie) was up for a number of Academy Awards. The
Apple Daily had two articles inspired by the film, with one titled “The
SAR is a Small Brokeback Mountain” (特區少了座斷背山) (emphases
added):
In addition to enemies and friends in this world, that is, apart from homosexual-
ity and heterosexuality, the US-Taiwanese director Ang Lee has announced to
the world that there is a third way, called bisexual Brokeback Mountain.
“Pan democrats” stubbornly cling to the moral high ground, in ignorance
and rigid, black and white, non-rape that is loyalty, “Pan democrats” is stupid,
do not understand is the between “democracy” and “totalitarianism,” there
are a Brokeback Mountain, Hui’s Fifth Reform proposal, although cynical, in
fact, is a “Brokeback Mountain” program. (Chip Tsao, Apple Daily, March 8,
2006—opinion)
I see this metaphor as meaning that compromise should be carried out by

both sides. The democrats should not be so fixated on a timetable and the
government should give also concessions to their proposals and listen to the
democrats.
Everyone has a Brokeback Mountain; it takes courage on behalf of a desire

to break through. In the current political situation, fight for universal suffrage
should be everyone’s desire, don’t we have the courage to take a step forward?
Or just quietly endure the status quo?
To change all this is not easy, but whether it “cannot change the status quo,
they can only suffer in silence”? I believe in the minds of most people, the
answer is no. The road to universal suffrage and human rights is a long road,
but as long as come up with the courage to step by step, one day there will be a
happy ending.2 (Emily Lau, Apple Daily, March 19—2006)
128 Chapter 4
The meaning of the entire metaphor chain was that we should break out of
the political stalemate and stand up for one’s rights, despite the emotional
cost (the “big step” of the headline). The road to acceptance of controversial
matters is long (like racial segregation, gay marriage) and so it is for democ-
ratization. But also taking any step could achieve something by shaking up
the “status quo.”
Buffet Meal Metaphor Chain (自助餐) (2007)

The July 2007 Green Paper on Constitutional Development, had the aim “to
identify for the community a set of solutions” and to “forge a broad consen-
sus” on the models, roadmap, and timetable for the election of Hong Kong’s
chief executive and its Legislative Council by universal suffrage (Hong Kong
Gov., July 11, 2007).
This Green Paper was seen as being full of traps (陷阱),3 peddling a false
universal suffrage/democracy hidden in its profusion of numbers and dates
with the “devil being in the details.” The democrats proposed a series of
“model answers” (標準答案) to the questions posed in the Green Paper to
help people steer clear of these traps. In this latter example, the democrats
were likened to “tutorial kings,” private tutoring centers being a key educa-
tion business in Hong Kong. This particular metaphor chain was used by
the non-democratic camp to indicate that people “did not need help to know
about democracy.” The democrats countered that there were “bad teachers”
in the government.
However, for those in the pan-democratic camp, the Green Paper on
Constitutional Development was a fake consultation, a complex, confus-
ing “buffet” of options instead of the promised “set menu” (套餐)—a fully
developed set of plans for universal suffrage. For reasons of space only
the “buffet meal” metaphor chain is detailed below. This metaphor chain
links onto Hong Kong people’s enjoyment of buffet/combo meals. The
vehicle, like previous metaphor chains, has been developed, explicated, or
contrasted. Emphases are added for all the examples in the metaphor chain
below.
Buffet/Meal Combos
The so-called “breaking up the whole in parts” is what the Government will do
next week with the launch the Green Paper on Constitutional Development. The
proposals will not throw out one, two, or three sets of complete programs and let
people choose one. In other words, we cannot expect it to be like walking into
a restaurant and choosing one meal from A, B or C. (Lee, S., Ming Pao Daily,
July 6, 2007—opinion)
The vehicle of “buffet” has been explicated into a special kind of “self-
service” where you pick and choose according to your preference. This infers
that people have many options that they could choose from to make up a
universal suffrage system. The vehicle “meal” (universal suffrage propos-
als) refers to a combination or set meals, popular in Hong Kong’s cafes and
restaurants. The various options in the Green Paper were broken down into
“courses” (the topic of the metaphor vehicle) corresponding to items that
could contribute to a scheme for universal suffrage.
The Green Paper, will select a “soup,” a “main course,” and “dessert” then and
then bring them together into a “universal suffrage set meal.” (Lee, S., Ming Pao
It provides a “buffet” array of multiple choices, but fortunately it did not rule out the
“dish” of universal suffrage in 2012. (Ming Pao Daily, July 12, 2007—general news)
Liberal Party Legislative Council Member Howard Young thought that the gov-
ernment’s “buffet” approach is not inappropriate means as it is most important is
to give people the right to choose. (Apple Daily, July 15, 2007—general news)
The Green Paper on Constitutional Development is a dazzling menu, because

the government has almost included every possibility in the world (except for
the reform of the election methods for the 2008 Legislative Council). (Wong K.,
Apple Daily, July 24, 2007—opinion)
The appearance of many options in the Green Paper was publicized by the
government of giving people choice as to the universal suffrage system they
wanted.
Set meals—Set A meal, Set B meal, Set C meal—you have a restricted choice
but it wins in being quick and easy; many in Hong Kong love it. Another style
of meal is a la carte, you have 10 kinds of soup, a dozen dishes, and then the
main course, dessert . . . you choose one of each kind, and it’s confusing. (Ivan
Choy, Ming Pao Daily, July 12, 2007—opinion)
Political development is not like a buffet. Preference for, say, option A in one ele-
ment of a new political system may be predicated on preference for option B in
another part of the system. (South China Morning Post, July 12, 2007—editorial)
130 Chapter 4
The last excerpt says that this approach to discuss political development is
faulty as in political systems certain things have to go together; you cannot
employ such a “mix or match” approach.
“Exhaustive menu gives sceptics plenty to feed on” (headline). “On the surface,
the option of universal suffrage in 2012 is still on the menu. But realistically, it
is not a dish the government can deliver at the end of the consultation exercise.”
(Chris Yeung, South China Morning Post, July 12, 2007—opinion)
(said by Civic Party member Alan Leong) in this Green Paper only produces
some “mutilated” proposals. With a smile, he said that originally it was going
to be “Shanghai cuisine” or “Beijing cuisine,” but now a “buffet” has been
provided for the public. (Ta Kung Pao, July 12, 2007—general news)
Tang’s electoral buffet has sour taste for democrats. (Klaudia Lee, July 12,
2007, South China Morning Post—general news)
In the first excerpt above, a pun is used to describe the reaction to the Green
Paper by those who had doubts about what the Hong Kong government
could deliver; the second, the choice of meal was changed from what was
promised; and the third excerpt implies that the document was unacceptable
to democrats.
Options Available
On the surface, the option of universal suffrage in 2012 is still on the menu.
But realistically, it is not a dish the government can deliver at the end of the
consultation exercise. (Chris Yeung, South China Morning Post, July 12,
2007—opinion)
The proposals instead of being a “buffet” were supposed to be a par-

ticular type of cuisine. “Informed choice” is compromised by the “buffet”
method of consultation since people will not know how the “dishes” could
match up.
Lacking a Main Course

Being like a buffet, indicating that there are a number of different options avail-
able to the public, “but this buffet lacks a main course such as that the election
threshold for candidates (for chief executive) is a bit ambiguous.” (Ming Pao
“Lacking a main course” means the reform proposals lack content. At buffets
in Hong Kong, often you have various options to choose from, but you can
also get a choice for an a la carte dish. The “election threshold” refers to the
number of nominations to be able to stand in the chief executive election.
Note that the article below elaborates on what the specific metaphor means.
Civic Party Legislator Tong very much hoped that there would be a main
course in the Green Paper, the main course being the method of formation and
the composition of the Nomination Committee for the election of the Chief
Executive. The content of this main course naturally needs the opposition’s
flavoring. The opposition’s flavoring has yet to be made plain. (Qiao Xiaoqiao,
Ta Kung Pao, July 25, 2007—opinion)
In the second part of this excerpt, the writer takes issues with the “opposition”
(the democrats) who want their “flavoring” but are unable to say what this
“flavoring” was.
A Clearing Tonic or a Taste Test

Mr. Wong: People go to a high class restaurant to eat, the chief has good skills
but the diners have to rely on themselves about whether [the dish] needs to be
spicy, sweet or sour; in that case, the chef’s artistry is then wasted! Miss Chang:
The central authorities have given us a soup which is a clearing tonic, to first
make Hong Kong healthy before universal suffrage. (Ming Pao Daily, July 13,
The “dish” of universal suffrage is something the diners (the Hong Kong
people) need to decide about (the type of universal suffrage), according to
Mr Wong (the “seasoning”). Miss Chang has seen the topic of the reform
proposals as a “clearing tonic” (traditional Chinese medicine), a single item,
and “soup” before the rest of the banquet.
A few months after the Green Paper consultation on 12 December, there
was a report on this consultation process. In concluding this report, Chief
Executive Donald Tsang recommends that “there is a need” (需修改) to
amend the electoral methods in 2012. On the same day, a report was given to
the NPCSC. Two weeks later on December 29, 2007, after the chief execu-
tive’s report to that body, the SCNPC ruled out universal suffrage for Hong
Kong in 2012.
However, it did decide that in 2017 Hong Kong “may” (可以) select its
chief executive by universal suffrage followed by the Legislative Council. In
the interim (the “transit stop”), Hong Kong could make “appropriate amend-
ments” for polls in 2012, but the 50:50 ratio of directly elected and functional
132 Chapter 4
constituency seats in the Legislative Council must continue. If no changes

were agreed upon, the status quo would remain. This was seen as a kind of
“promissory note” (期票) again harking back to Martin Luther King’s “I have
a dream” speech.
In the next two sections, we will look at first the meta-metaphors of uni-
versal suffrage and second the meta-themes of the discourse overall to show
the synergistic effect of metaphor over time. Small capitals will be used for
these meta-metaphors. Some of the aspects mentioned in these sections might
have already been raised in chapters 2, 3, and 4, but they do form a part of
the ten years of discourse overall. Please also refer to the appendix where
all the important events related to this study are listed. Other metaphors not
mentioned previously will also appear in the following section.
META-METAPHORS OF UNIVERSAL
SUFFRAGE AND ITS ATTAINMENT
Meta-metaphors of universal suffrage arose out of either specific metaphors

or from the “tenor” of the discourse(s) as it unfolded as evidenced in the
event, cross-event, and discourse-length metaphor chains and metaphors
clustering around certain key events.
Meta-Metaphors of the Pro-Beijing/Pro-establishment Camp

The following are meta-metaphors of universal suffrage from Beijing, the
Hong Kong government, and the pro-establishment camp.
1. universal suffrage is a process not a destination

2. universal suffrage is a not a solution to everything
3. rushed universal suffrage causes instability
4. democracy does not necessarily mean universal suffrage
1. UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IS A PROCESS

NOT A DESTINATION
This meta-metaphor is interesting as the attainment of something is a goal,
an endpoint, which is in effect, a destination. Such a meta-metaphor implies
that the journey is more important than the goal. In October 2005, Raphael
Hui, Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, said that “universal
suffrage was a process and not a purpose/destination” (普選是一個過程，
而非一個目的) (Ming Pao Daily, November 5, 2005) “since a purpose had
to be set out first because you have to know where you are going” (香港社會
必須先認清目的). The use of the formulaic phrase “first the roadmap, then
the timetable” (先圖後表) also emphasized this point. Other, similar phrases
were also used to imply that the destination was almost irrelevant. How the
gatekeepers of the discourse had earlier defined the words “ultimate” and
“gradual and orderly progress” as defined by a Basic Law “guardian” in 2004
(see chapter 2) implies a long, not a short, process.
And since universal suffrage is a long-term process, all the matters and
structures making up the process need to be carefully thought out and then
carefully implemented; it is a major “project” and care is needed for its
completion (emphases added):
Universal suffrage is “social systems engineering,” the improvement of this

project, needs a series of a series of project timing and project quality standards.
To ensure that the project is perfect, you need a series of project timing and proj-
ect quality standards. The SAR Government does not mention a specific time-
table, but it has at least the principle indicator of “gradual and orderly progress.”
For example, implementation of universal suffrage, expand the tax liability of
the voters, it is necessary to widen the tax net; in order to balance the results
of universal suffrage, to strengthen the executive-led, it is necessary to improve
the party politics. In the following, I will provide some points for consideration,
concerning some milestones to ensure the quality and quantity of universal suf-
frage systems engineering. (Ye Guohua, Ta Kung Pao, June 7, 2004—opinion)
As mentioned in chapter 1, Hong Kong is often considered one big “construc-

tion site” and buildings there can be erected in very short periods of time.
However, universal suffrage was not a construction project that could be
completed in such a fashion.
2. UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IS NOT A

SOLUTION TO EVERYTHING
This meta-metaphor could also be called democracy is not a panacea. In the
discourse period, there were 49 articles in the Chinese press (out of which
the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao had 20 such articles) and 30 in the South China
Morning Post containing the word “panacea” (written as 靈丹妙藥 , 萬靈丹,
or 萬靈藥 in Chinese) and the keyword “universal suffrage.”
Firstly, these metaphors saw universal suffrage as not a panacea and there
is no “one size fits all” type of democracy. Unique situations and historical
constraints necessitate a unique democracy such as in the special Hong Kong
case (emphases added):
134 Chapter 4
The successful experience of the development of democracy around the world

shows that universal suffrage is not a panacea; democracy should be achieved
by the actual situation [in that place] in accordance with their different societies
and histories, formulated through a step-by-step development process. (Lung
Shui Hing, Ta Kung Pao, 21 April 2004—opinion)
Usually opinion articles such as the one above move on to discuss the “disas-
ters” of the democracy Britain left behind after departing from its colonies
(certain African nations) or from countries having it arbitrarily “imposed”
after conflict (like the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan) (emphases
added):
The third is the illusion of “American-style democracy” as the “global stan-

dard.” The US, which prides itself as a “democratic savior”; the international
spirit of democracy was brutally trampled on. (Lam Ling, Ta Kung Pao, May
13, 2004—opinion)
Since Iraq and Afghanistan were often in the news during crucial times in
Hong Kong’s democratization process (2003, 2004), there were some natural
metaphor linkages with it. The following are examples of why universal suf-
frage is not a “panacea”:
(1) 普選不是萬靈藥，不應倉卒施行，而對於全體市民而言，比普選

更重要的是一種能保證社會穩定 Universal suffrage is not a pana-
cea and should not be hastily implemented, and for the community
as a whole, what is more important than universal suffrage is a guar-
antee of social stability. (Ta Kung Pao, August 16, 2006—general
news)
(2) 普選不是萬靈丹，除了普選，還必須有一個能幹的政府，而不是一
個把空想變成願景的政府. Universal suffrage is not a panacea since
you must also have a competent government, rather than an empty vision
of government. (Chan, Y., Ta Kung Pao, March 19, 2007—opinion)
There seemed to be an endless list of why it was not a “panacea” and

discussion that Hong Kong had been prosperous without much democracy
in the past. This is why the democratic camp was mocked for elevating uni-
versal suffrage as a kind of supreme “cure-all”; that it was even better than
the traditional Hong Kong “cure-all” of Po Chai Pills (保濟丸) (emphases
added):4
Dual universal suffrage is a panacea for the pan-democratic camp…with

universal suffrage, anything can be resolved. Universal suffrage can even put
an end to “collusion” and poor governance. In short, universal suffrage is bet-

ter than even Po Chai Pills. (Shiu S-P., Ming Pao Daily News, February 22,
2005—opinion)
This meta-metaphor, used by the head of a pro-China think tank, also seems
to imply ambivalence to universal suffrage. Democracy and universal suf-
frage for Hong Kong were also looked on with suspicion because its lim-
ited introduction under the British was seen as a “parting gift” (離別禮物)
(emphasis added):
In that era, the public rarely heard the terms democracy and universal suffrage
had neither the interest nor did they required it, and we were quite satisfied with
the status quo. England’s fight for democracy in Hong Kong was its parting gift.
(Cheng Kar-shun, Ta Kung Pao, August 16, 2006—opinion)
This “parting gift” was dangerous: being a “time bomb” (定時炸彈) laid
down to disturb and divide society (emphases added):
Prior to the end of colonial rule [Britain] gave local people “more democracy”
to create division, British colonial rule has always been champions at this; how
could the British do not want to lay this “time bomb” in Hong Kong? What
makes Patten “regretful” at present is because Hong Kong is not independent
and has returned to the Motherland. (Kwan Chiu, Ta Kung Pao, July 25,
2006—opinion)
3. RUSHED UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

CAUSES INSTABILITY
This meta-metaphor permeated the discourse from its earliest stages per-
haps inevitably given the Basic Law’s principle of “gradually and orderly
progress.” Since fast change brings along instability it was alleged that a
“rush to democracy” (急於普選)5 means inherently that is not “true democ-
racy” (真民主) since there are insufficient structures in place for it to ensure
stability. A typical article was along the lines of “not afraid of universal
suffrage, only afraid of a rush to universal suffrage” (不怕普選，只怕急
於普選) (Wen 2007) summarizes this mindset of phrases such as “I want
universal suffrage, but” as mentioned earlier in the chapter. The following
article advises against unseemly haste in implementing the “ultimate aim”
(emphasis added).
Universal suffrage is not a bad thing, but its time still has to come, that is, the
conditions are not yet ripe. Universal suffrage is not picking bananas while
136 Chapter 4
green, transporting them to the destination and then subjected to chemical

ripening after which the bananas’ skin becomes golden brown. Universal suf-
frage cannot be this way. The Analects of Confucius say: “Haste makes waste
to see a small profit.” Universal suffrage is certainly a major event for Hong
Kong; one can be too hasty as the saying goes. (Lin S., Ta Kung Pao, May 25,
2007—opinion)
Universal suffrage was fine if gradually implemented, otherwise it could be a

“scourge” (洪水猛獸), an idiom meaning “fierce floods and savage beasts,”
or something extremely dangerous. Rushing into universal suffrage in “such a
cosmopolitan city like Hong Kong and making even the slightest mistake will
cause social unrest and foreign capital to flee”; “rushing to universal suffrage
would also likely lead to welfarism” (急於普選可能導致福利主義), accord-
ing to one editorial, since politicians would take advantage of a politically
naïve public (Ta Kung Pao, March 23, 2006).
There were other reasons why universal suffrage could not be rushed. In
2004, it was because people lacked knowledge of the “One Country, Two
Systems” and the Basic Law, and “since changes to the electoral system will
make radical changes to national sovereignty, care must be taken not to have
an adverse effect” (said by Qiao Xiaoyang of the National People’s Congress,
of the “crossing the bridge” discourse chain, Ta Kung Pao, April 28, 2004).
Furthermore, the business sector had to be assured that capitalism would be
maintained; and finally, there were great differences in the community over
universal suffrage and these differences would “intensify social contradic-
tions”; the consequences of “radical change must be a fierce confrontation,
and [Hong Kong] cannot afford the political cost” (Ibid). Because of these
issues, “There is no urgent need to rush to universal suffrage, it is not too late
to discuss the issue again after eight to ten years” (因此不用急於普選，再過
多十年八年才討論也未遲) (Apple Daily, February 4, 2004). This was said
by the President of the Hong Kong Real Estate Construction Chamber, Ho
Hung-kwan, who also said the Hong Kong people “dream too early” (Ibid).
Because universal suffrage was a “sacred undertaking” (Leung 2004), it
has to be a gradual process, with various people noting that it took women
in the United States many years to attain it. Neither could it be a “big bang”
(大爆炸), a metaphor coined by Chief Executive Donald Tsang in 2005
(Ming Pao Daily, October 26, 2005). This was a denial that the emphasis
on “gradual and orderly progress” was a delaying mechanism for universal
suffrage that “it was an illusion that ‘gradual progress’ should be taken as
‘suppression’” (一是錯視「漸進」為「壓制」) (Ibid):
Including foreign and nearly seven million people of Hong Kong’s long-term
fundamental interests, it is necessary to ensure the long-term stability and pros-
perity in Hong Kong. Constitutional development decision-making must be the
premise cannot be the slightest hesitation. (Lam, L., Ta Kung Pao, May 13,
2004—opinion)
4. DEMOCRACY DOES NOT NECESSARILY

MEAN UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
This meta-metaphor could be said to be the most important in the discourse
period since it opens the scope of what the ultimate aim was. Such phrases
as “universal suffrage is only one style of democracy but it is not all of
democracy” (普選是民主形式之一，但普選不是民主的全部) (Lin 2007)
or variations on it were used by various Beijing, Hong Kong government, and
aligned figures during the discourse period.
From the data, many did not perceive universal suffrage as a preexisting
concept (from the West) that could merely be implemented in Hong Kong,
but as a concept yet to be determined. Since democratization was consid-
ered a process (rather than a purpose/destination) the concept of universal
suffrage easily becomes subject to semantic redefinition. Note the follow-
ing: “in addition to universal suffrage, direct election, indirect election, and
functional constituency elections are also forms of democracy” (除普選、
直選之外，間接選舉，功能組別選舉等，同樣也是民主的形式) (Ibid)
and that “universal suffrage is only a part of constitutional development” (
普選只是政制發展一部分) (Ta Kung Pao, April 18, 2004). Although it is
true that democracy is more than universal suffrage alone, such as freedom
of the press, freedom of assembly, and an independent judiciary, this view
implies that universal suffrage is just another factor rather than an essential
one.
The form of democracy/universal suffrage favored by the view above was
not “one person, one vote” (一人一票) and denied that this was necessarily
“true democracy”: “How can comprehensive universal suffrage be achieved?
Is ‘one person, one vote’ a true democracy or not? All of this, the answer is
clearly no” (「全面普選」才能實現？「一人一票」是否就是真正的民
主？這一切，答案顯然都是否定的) (Kwan 2005a). The discussion of “one
person, one vote” confuses universal suffrage with different methods of vot-
ing. Direct elections were just seen as one possible, but not the only option
available. Arguments along these lines often cited other places which they
considered to have “small circle” elections such as the Electoral College in
the US presidential elections.
“Balanced participation” (均衡參與) rather than “equal and universal suf-
frage” (普及而平等) was another major point raised by the pro-Beijing and
the establishment camp. Professional groups were seen to have aided Hong
Kong’s prosperity in the past and this contribution should be acknowledged
by allowing them to aid the government by being elected by these groups
into functional constituencies. This implies that they would be unable to be
138 Chapter 4
elected via one person, one vote—universal suffrage being seen as inherently
“unbalanced” since surety of being elected could not be guaranteed. And
since no mode of universal suffrage was the “absolute standard,” universal
suffrage and direct geographical elections could not be fully equated. In any
case, “Hong Kong people enjoyed unprecedented democratic rights” (港人享
前所未有民主權利) (Ta Kung Pao, December 30, 2007).
To sum up, the meta-metaphors of the pro-Beijing/pro-establishment
camp imply that universal suffrage and the capitalist economy do not seem
to go together; that universal suffrage does not necessarily equate with one
person one vote; and that universal suffrage would not enable society to be
equitably represented in the legislature (i.e., have “balanced participation”).6
Furthermore, faster democratization is likely to affect the stability and pros-
perity of Hong Kong:
Universal suffrage is the complex political issue related to Hong Kong’s future
and destiny. If not handled properly or if it goes astray, Hong Kong’s prosper-
ity and stability may be destroyed. (Lung Chee-ming, Ta Kung Pao, July 19,
2007—opinion)
Meta-Metaphors of the Democracy Camp

The following are the meta-metaphors of the democratic camp. The first three
could fit into the Western paradigm of universal suffrage and civil rights/
human rights discourse more generally.
1. democracy is a basic human right

2. democracy is not a solution for all problems but it helps
3. universal suffrage is equality and fairness
4. attaining democracy is a struggle
1. DEMOCRACY IS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT

Variations of “universal suffrage is a basic human right” (普選是基本人權)
and “universal suffrage is a universal human value” (普選是一項普遍價值)
permeate the democratic discourse in Hong Kong. Since it is universal to all
places (and a world trend), according to democrats it cannot be stopped. In
fact, the word “democracy” and “human rights” often collocate together in
any simple internet search.
In reply to the general establishment/pro-Beijing discourse that cast
democracy in a negative light, legislator Ronny Tong said that in fact democ-
racy was not “terrible” or “terrifying” (可怕的民主) as some would make it.
He posited the rhetorical question “can’t [we] have democracy because of
the fear that it would turn into welfarism?” (不能有民主因恐變社會主義?)

He saw it as the “biggest insult of all independent-minded people in Hong
Kong.”7
Democracy is to create an equal and the basic elements of social justice. . . .

maintaining a small group of vested interests, the government will undermine
the healthy development of various areas of society.
Yes, any power of a tyrannical government, democracy is terrible. Because
democracy means that the power down, imperious must also be humble. Some
reliance on the power of vested interests, democracy is terrible. Because democ-
racy means that they will not enjoy privileges, must be fair competition with
others and to submit to under the righteous. (Ronny Tong, Ming Pao Daily,
December 2, 2005—opinion)
Hong Kong spends much time discursively constructing itself as a “world

city” and with the best of both “East and West” (Flowerdew, 2004b); this
means that it considers it has systems and structures like other world cit-
ies (such as New York or London). However, democrats saw Hong Kong
as falling down in this regard as “world cities all have ‘democratic general
elections’” (國際都會皆有民主普選); it was a “world city with a democracy
deficit” (民主殘缺的世界之都) (emphasis added):
Hong Kong’s democratic politics is deficient. On the eve of the twenty-first

century, all civilized places have their own elected government institutional
development strategies and the steps to achieve them. This decision [to be
given by the SCNPC in a few days] totally ignores the fact that Hong Kong is
a cosmopolitan city. . . . society must respect human rights and let the people
choose their own government through universal suffrage and not for any reason,
including the Basic Law, subject it to delay, otherwise, Hong Kong’s worthi-
ness as a cosmopolitan city is called into question. I would like to ask Mr. Tung
Chee-hwa, which cosmopolitan city does not have its government elected by
the people through universal suffrage? (Cheung Man-Kwong, Ming Pao Daily,
October 8, 1999—opinion)
2. DEMOCRACY IS NOT A SOLUTION

FOR ALL PROBLEMS BUT IT HELPS
The democratic camp was often portrayed by their detractors as “single-
issue” politicians, neglecting other important social issues in their quest for
faster democratization (shown in chapter 3). They countered with statements
reflecting that without the mantle of universal suffrage, governance prob-
lems, communication problems in society, and the rich-poor gap would not
140 Chapter 4
disappear. They acknowledged that democracy was no “panacea,” but para-

phrasing Winston Churchill saying, “Indeed it has been said that democracy
is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time” (emphases added):
Is democracy a panacea? Democracy is not a panacea; it never has been.

Churchill had said that democracy is a bad system, but that all other systems are
worse than democracy. A democratic system, may slow down efficiency but it
does not necessarily drive down economic growth or cause massive unemploy-
ment. A democratic system is the rock that can guarantee freedom of speech, a
free and unregulated press and freedom from oppression. (Zuo Dinshan, Apple
Daily, September 11, 2004—opinion)
Despite acknowledging that democracy was not a cure-all, it could be a

“panacea to solve a current predicament” (民主是解決當前困局靈丹) (Lu
2003) referring to governance problems and proposed Article 23 legislation
brought people out to the streets. Democracy, despite its faults, would at least
be a way to legitimize the government and “ease public discontent” (普選
是民怨的出路) (Apple Daily, January 1, 2004) because at least their voices
would be heard, not just the small circle of the favored elite (i.e., the func-
tional constituencies). Although democracy would not solve all problems, it
would, in keeping with the medical treatment metaphor, act as a “stimulant”
for society (emphasis added):
Beijing said that democracy has to be done step by step, to ensure that elected
leaders are patriotic and that the business environment is maintained. However,
Hong Kong has pseudo-democratic competition in a “small circle election.”
It has not solved Hong Kong’s problems. Democracy is not a panacea, but at
least it is a stimulant. (Qin Muchu, Ming Pao Daily, March, 25 2007—opinion)
3. UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IS EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS

Elections being “universal and equal” (普及而平等) – equality in participat-
ing in them and equality in voting – were the major campaigning points of
the democratic camp since the election of the chief executive is held within
a “small circle” of (the figure changed from 800 to 1,2000 over the ten years
till the end of 2007) people, and only half of the Legislative Council’s 60
seats were voted in by the general public. The latter situation meant that Hong
Kong’s political system suffered from a “stroke-like” condition with half of
its “body politic” (政治體) being “hemiplegic” (半身不遂) as stated in this
Apple Daily editorial (emphases added):
Since only half of the seats of the Legislative Council are elected universal suf-
frage, representation of public opinion suffers from a veritable “hemiplegia”
syndrome, since only half functions democratically. (Apple Daily, August 5,
2004—opinion)
Hong Kong’s “deformed political system” (畸形政治制度) indicated a prob-

lematic relationship between a democratic legislature and the unelected exec-
utive. Elections being “equal and universal,” that is “fair” was an important
phrase to the more democratically leaning press (Apple Daily (50), Ming Pao
(35), and the South China Morning Post (42)) rather than the Beijing-aligned
Ta Kung Pao which had only seven articles dealing with this phrase. The
concept of “universal and equal” was continually being redefined in various
official documents and discussion papers since 1997.
For democrats, “Universal suffrage elections was a ‘necessary’ not an
‘additional’ condition of democracy; if there was no universal suffrage, then
there was no democracy” (普及而平等的選舉是民主的「必要」而非「充
分」條件，沒有普選便沒有民主) (Chan, February 11, 2004) in countering
their opponents’ claim that direct elections were just one way to democracy.
They acknowledged that other than universal suffrage, certain conditions had
to be met for a place to be “a democracy” but that Hong Kong had already
fulfilled these conditions. Democrats say that “balanced participation” (均衡
參與) in the Hong Kong context meant favoring certain vested interests over
the public at large, that is the functional constituencies (功能界別), which
needed to be “excised” like “tumors” (腫瘤), all in one go. How can a univer-
sal suffrage system exist when “non-humans” (非人)—corporations—could
vote in the functional constituencies went the argument.
Functional constituencies were seen as one of a number of “screening”
mechanisms that seemed to be designed to remove the possibility of a demo-
cratic candidate becoming chief executive (such candidates were always con-
sidered underdogs).8 If all these structural deficiencies remained on achieving
the “ultimate aim” of universal suffrage, Hong Kong would just have “sham
universal suffrage” (假普選).
4. ATTAINING DEMOCRACY IS A STRUGGLE

Since the conceptual metaphor of “battle” or “struggle” is ubiquitous in
political discourse and discourse more generally, attaining democracy has
never been depicted as being smooth.
Articles looking back at the previous “over 20 years of struggle” were
common in articles by proponents of faster democratization, particularly dur-
ing anniversaries celebrating Hong Kong’s reunification with China. These
“reflections on the journey so far” took the form of lists and chronologies.
142 Chapter 4
The following opinion article was a representative example and includes the
metaphor of “battle” (emphases added):
The pursuit of democracy and universal suffrage has been a long battle in Hong
Kong and dates back to the 1980s, over 20 years, and we still have not seen a
timetable and roadmap. In this war is more necessary to carry out a full range of
battles each of which are important, because every battle is a good opportunity
to throw political bombs, throw them again and again, throw many and ease
the grip of the political monopoly. (Ma K-F., Ming Pao Daily, December 12,
2006—opinion)
Although the struggle for democracy was frequently depicted as a war with
campaign strategies and battles, it had also been a time of endless waiting.
The following are two examples from a famous Samuel Beckett play to
describe the fruitless nature of this waiting (emphases added):
Hong Kong people want double universal suffrage and Ronny Tong remembers
the movie Oliver Twist, and like the central character in that move, Hong Kong
people want more. It is said that Hong Kong people have to wait until “balanced
participation,” and will have a dual universal suffrage when they are sensible
and mature, but there is no timetable, so we can only “wait for Godot.” (Qiao
J., Ming Pao Daily, 13 November 2005—opinion)
This metaphor was also used in 2007 as well in an opinion article titled
“Waiting for Godot”:
On Wednesday, Mr. Tsang will deliver his Green Paper on Constitutional

Development; the story will be played out on the stage. Will it be a new scene?
Or will it be a repetition of the same old scene? We can only wait and see. (Ivan
Choy, Ming Pao Daily, July 5, 2007—opinion)
At the end of ten years of the SAR, there was still waiting for further demo-
cratic development. The following metaphors and situations are linked to
form discourse “meta-themes.”
LINKING METAPHOR AND SITUATION:

DISCOURSE META-THEMES
The discussion of Hong Kong’s future democratization through the use of

metaphor and its connections across diverse discourse contexts both synchron-
ically and diachronically has led to certain discourse “themes” emerging.
Figure 4.1 Meta-Metaphors and Meta-Themes of the Discourse. Source: Author created.
The systematicity of metaphor allows the researcher to discern such themes.

Linkages and similarities in metaphor vehicles and their elaboration have
a synergistic effect on each other, making them more than the sum of their
parts. This synergy of event metaphors embedded in relevant co-text that
contain other rhetorical strategies (such as repetition and rhetorical ques-
tions) sees metaphors act as cohesive devices providing a “texture” and
“tenor” to the discourse overall. This effect could be called “metaphor
cohesion.” These themes also take into consideration the event length, cross-
event length, and discourse-length metaphor. Figure 4.1 above shows what
could be considered to be the major themes of the democratization process
of the SAR’s first decade. As you can observe, these meta-themes are oppo-
sitional in nature.
1. GROWING UP NATURALLY OR
ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT
Metaphors of containment, growth, and maturity have been used throughout
the discourse concerning what is allowable for universal suffrage under the
Basic Law and when it could be attained. This meta-metaphor relates to the
principle of “gradual and orderly progress” in the Basic Law and relates to
the “process” of constitutional change and development. Getting married,
going to school, taking a trip to Disneyland, and other life “milestones” or
activities that were given in the discourse as necessary to chart Hong Kong’s
democratic course are reflected in his meta-theme. This then links into the
144 Chapter 4
need for, or the inability to construct, a “timetable” for universal suffrage.

This meta-metaphor was used by the central and Hong Kong governments
and others in the pro-establishment camp.
Earlier it was said that universal suffrage is a “process not a purpose
or destination” so that a timetable would “naturally emerge” when all the
“life stages” and “scheduling” were completed in their allotted order (and
be healthy). This could be described as “growing up naturally” and by
“walking and not running.” When—here the Chinese idioms “a melon falls
when it is ripe” (瓜熟蒂落) and “pulling up shoots to make them grow” (
拉苗助長)9 come to mind. Even earlier, “growing up naturally” was a kind
of meta-metaphor used by the British during the Sino-British negotiations
with their emphasis that the introduction of democracy “should continue
to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary”; and “each step should be
carefully considered” otherwise the stability of society would be affected.10
According to this line of thinking, you could say that Hong Kong’s democ-
ratization was undergoing a process of “natural selection” or “natural
evolution.”
On the other hand, the democratic camp implied that this “growth process”
was actually “arrested development,” since, like riding a bicycle you need to
actually ride the bike before becoming proficient at it. Furthermore, this pro-
cess of maturation, which began with the introduction of some “democratic
elements” into Hong Kong’s colonial system, had been happening since the
1980s setting a date for something that is important for attaining a goal (like
getting married, planning a trip to Disneyland, being elevated to a higher
grade at school, etc.). Even in natural growth, there is usually an estimated
time when something happens (a child talking, walking, and attaining matu-
rity). When this estimated time is not reached by the “child,” remedial action
can then be taken—advice by learning from the experience of others (from
experts like political scientists and other democracies practicing universal
suffrage).
2. DRIVE CAREFULLY, AVOID OBSTACLES,

AND ARRIVE SAFELY
This was used by the central and Hong Kong governments and others in the
pro-establishment camp and it also relates to the principle of gradual and
orderly progress. This discursive meta-theme was present in one article in the
Ta Kung Pao titled “not afraid of universal suffrage but rushed universal suf-
frage” (不怕普選，只怕急於普選) (Wen 2007) that was mentioned earlier.
Earlier in the chapter, we discussed “quick” universal suffrage (introduced
before conditions were deemed suitable) was seen as not only “real univer-
sal suffrage” but universal suffrage that would greatly impact stability and
prosperity and affect Hong Kong’s status as an international financial and

trading hub.
The “driving carefully” part of this meta-metaphor indicates the care
that has to be taken on the journey. This involves going at a “speed” that is
“gradual and orderly” as befits a journey without fully knowing the destina-
tion. This “speed” was seen as being a responsible route to universal suffrage
and in the best interests of Hong Kong. Driving to the universal suffrage
destination has to be particularly careful as “road works” (like designing and
constructing a bridge, the metaphor coined by Qiao Xiaoyang of the National
People’s Congress). However, at other times, it was advised to “cross the
river by feeling the stones” (摸着石頭過河), the pragmatic introduction of
the “One Country, Two Systems.” “Avoiding obstacles” (which you can do
when going slowly) is making sure that all the right structures, that is, “the
universal suffrage building blocks” (普選積木) were in place. Fast universal
suffrage would mean obstacles would come in the way: social instability
and turmoil rather than the necessary “consensus” between the “journeyers.”
Lastly, “arriving safely” means the final destination of universal suffrage. To
date, although a tentative “arrival date” (2017) was given, how to “arrive”
at this destination had not been set (i.e., the roadmap) despite the rhetoric
of “first the roadmap, then the timetable” (先圖後表), a recurring formulaic
phrase that occurred in 25 articles from 2005 to 2007.
In reply, the democratic camp saw the journey becoming needlessly com-
plicated—not only Hong Kong had at least twenty years’ preparation for
democracy, but it had also “matured” sufficiently for it to be immediately
introduced (i.e., “quick” universal suffrage). Furthermore, they considered
that the central and Hong Kong governments constructed barriers/hurdles (障
碍) and checkpoints (關卡) on the journey that was unnecessary and arbitrary
(the two principles of constitutional development in the Basic Law become
three then nine after various constitutional reform studies). This not only
narrowed the discursive “road” to universal suffrage, it seemed to place the
final destination even further away as the instructions about how to overcome
these barriers and checkpoints were unclear.
A “bright road” (光明大道) (Ta Kung Pao, November 19, 2005) lay
ahead for the development of universal suffrage if consensus between par-
ties over a universal suffrage plan was achieved and if it was done gradu-
ally and orderly (Apple Daily, November 11, 2005). Certain conditions
however “sealed the universal suffrage way ahead” (封死普選前路) that
made consensus difficult (too many to detail here). When a decision over
the 2005 reform package needed to be made, the democrats were threatened
with leaving Hong Kong at the democratic “crossroads” (十字路口) if they
did not pass the reforms. When they did not, Hong Kong’s democratization
began to “mark time” or “march on the spot” (原地踏步). The democrats
146 Chapter 4
complained that “since there were no branch roads (支路) or side streets (
橫街) [other plans for a universal suffrage system], how could it be called
crossroads?” (Lo 2005a). In 2007, there had been some movement toward
the end of the journey—a tentative “maybe” (可以) for 2017. Changes to
the electoral system in 2012 would be the “transit stop” (中途站) before the
final (probable) destination.
3. A BATTLE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIONS

This theme relates to the “fervor” that both sides exhibited in the discourse
about Hong Kong’s democratization and the polarization of views that it
engendered. This could be seen as a “textual” battle of lexis and phraseology
related to the promise of universal suffrage contained in the Basic Law rather
than the two main principles of “actual situation” and “gradual and orderly
progress.” All participants in this discourse utilized this meta-metaphor.
The Basic Law was often depicted as a “sacred text” (a heavenly book hav-
ing secret codes within it like the Dead Sea Scrolls, and a text that could be
changed into the Koran). This sacred text needed certain individuals (Basic
Law “guardians”) to act as “almanacs” (interpreters, framers) of its contents.
Being a sacred text (a “creative masterpiece” according to late Chinese
helmsman Deng Xiaoping and thus unique in the entire world), querying its
contents could be seen as “blasphemous” (or perhaps unfilially). Disputing
the contents of this document was discussed in terms of “violation” and
“destruction”; being considered “scientific” by its makers, the Basic Law
could not be bettered (see chapter 3). And perhaps the discourse did at times
fit a “serviceable” definition of fundamentalism:
A serviceable definition is a religious ideology that claims a divinely revealed

inerrant scripture as its ultimate authority, is mainly literalist in its handling
of scripture, radical in the application of scripture to contemporary contexts,
extremist in its methods, and exclusivist towards competing ideologies. (Zeidan,
2003, 51)
A satirical article in the Ming Pao titled “Fundamentalism—Hong Kong

Version” (香港版基本教義派) (Shen 2004) discussed Hong Kong’s “fun-
damentalists”: “pan-democratic fundamentalists” (泛民基本教義派) and
“patriotic fundamentalists” (愛國基本教義派)—and noted each group used
the same “fundamentalist” text (香港兩大基本教義派信奉同一本基本聖
經) but had quite different interpretations of it (Shen 2004). This is also a
play on words as the “basic” (基本) in “Basic Law” (基本法) also means
“fundamental.”
The pan-democrats were described as carrying out a “universal suffrage

crusade” in their single-mindedness to achieve democracy with the Ta Kung
Pao accusing them of treating the words “democracy” as being equivalent to
the Bible (Leung, O. 2004).
During 2004, a pivotal year in Hong Kong’s democratization, the discus-
sion about patriotism and the Interpretation of the Basic Law, the conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan were in full swing, and there were references to the
Hong Kong government as a “Taliban regime” (塔利班政權) (Mu 2001) in
its capacity of shaping a particular brand of democracy as being suitable for
Hong Kong.
4. EXTREME DEMOCRACY IS A CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The “fundamentalism” theme discussed above also links on to the Cultural
Revolution meta-metaphor discursive theme which was used by both demo-
cratic and pro-Beijing/establishment sides, either covertly or literally to the
extreme “fervor,” mass mobilizations, and the potential for extremism and
violence of that period. Individuals fighting this battle for universal suffrage
were also categorized this way. This meta-theme will be discussed in chapter
5 to show one discursive thread more fully.
5. DEMOCRATIC DREAMS ARE A

FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
This meta-metaphor was used by those in the democratic camp to express
the long “incubation” period of Hong Kong democracy and the uncertainty
of ever reaching the endpoint of the democratization process. It relates to the
principle of “gradual and orderly process.” That this was a “fight for civil
rights” was initially apparent from the meta-metaphors of the democratic
camp related to universal suffrage mentioned earlier. Three other aspects
also make this theme pertinent. First, the use of certain rhetorical forms and
phrases that reverberate with the American civil rights movement; second,
the metaphor “mapping” of iconic figures from that movement onto the entity
of Hong Kong as a whole (see chapter 3); and third, the metaphor of the long
and difficult journey as evidenced by the metaphors invoked by the numerous
protest marches during the period.
First, there were articles in the press frequently suggesting “tenacity” (韌
性) (Lee, Y., December 6, 2005) and that “democracy was not a gift” but
something to be grasped for oneself in the “struggle for universal suffrage”
(爭取普選) and by “not retreating and not being content to stand still” (我
們不退卻，也不安於現狀) (Cheung, M-K. 2005). The press engaged in
148 Chapter 4
vox populi or the “voice of the people” (人民呼聲) in using slogans “return
power to the people” (還政於民—this slogan will be discussed in the next
chapter) and in articles where the “ordinary” citizen’s views were articulated
in reaction to certain events. Around the time of planned protests, articles
asking “are you marching?” posed rhetorical questions of the newspaper
reader often engaging in what could be called the rhetoric of the “sacred and
the street” (Remnick 2010, 1; see also Charteris-Black 2005). The fact that
many of the democratic leaders in Hong Kong were Christians also led to
various religious and Biblical metaphors like “running the good race” and
being prepared to roam “40 years in the desert” before eventually reaching
their ultimate aim as in Martin Lee’s opinion article titled “The Narrow Gate
to Democracy” (2007), in which he uses the Bible’s warning of how difficult
it is to reach heaven.
The most iconic figures of the 1960s American civil rights movement were
often invoked by the democratic camp: Martin Luther King’s famous line “I
have a dream” (我有一個夢) was used around a dozen times in the discourse
period in the context of the seeming unattainability of a similar dream (seen
as a fundamental human right), for example, phrases like “Let our dreams
become real” (讓我們的夢想成真) and “Hong Kong people also have a
dream” (讓我們的夢想成真). Chief Executive Candidate Alan Leong used
the rhetorical style of Luther King in a campaign speech when running for
the post of chief executive in 2007 (“If I have a vote . . .”). Prominent figures
in the civil rights movement like Rosa Parks were also used as a metaphor
vehicle for Hong Kong (urging it to finally make a stand for universal suf-
frage), that it was time to “sit down, rather than stand up” (你到時會坐下
去，站起來嗎?). Park’s death was linked to the elderly man’s newspaper
advertisement in late October 2005 which posed the question, “tell me, will
I see universal suffrage one day?” (告訴我，我會看見普選的一天嗎?).
Subsequently, the tandem pairing of getting older but no nearer to the “demo-
cratic dream” was a common theme from 2005 to 2007.
Another constant “civil rights” theme was the “road to democracy” (民
主之路) metaphor.11 The journey metaphor is particularly applicable to the
Basic Law principle of “gradual and orderly progress,” a purposeful (prom-
ised) activity. “Roads to democracy” are never smooth, and as a cursory
Google search of this expression attests, they have never been smooth.12 In
Hong Kong’s case, it also has been a “long road to universal suffrage” (漫長
之路普選) and “the fight for democracy is bitter and long” (爭取民主之路
艱苦而漫長) (Wong, R. 2016).
Charteris-Black (2005, 67) argues that a positive action means forward
movement while a negative one implies going backward, with metaphors to
match—and this is the case in Hong Kong. For example, the expression “roll-
ing back of democracy” (民主倒退) was commonly used by democrats for
actions of the Beijing and Hong Kong governments. In Hong Kong’s case,
movements of the democratization process could be categorized as “marching
on the spot” (原地踏步): “The road to democracy, or forward or back, despite
the twists and turns, there is still no universal suffrage in any direction” (民
主之路或進或退，儘管曲曲折折，但不外是有還是沒有普選這兩個方
向而已) (Lee 2005).
While the purposeful activity of democratization is described as a path,
way, or road, “stepping out on the universal suffrage road” (踏出普選路)
actually meant a physical road (from Victoria Park, Causeway Bay to Central
on Hong Kong Island) on protest marches that would hopefully help bring
“real democracy” (真正帶領香港踏上民主之路)—universal and equal suf-
frage with one person, one vote. This was said by Fernando Cheung, a legis-
lator in the democratic camp, and quoted in a general news article in the Ta
Kong Pao (January 9, 2006).
The road itself was often described in metaphoric terms. For example, in
“Four Km Along Democracy Avenue” (民主大道四公里), the short four-
kilometer stretch to the center of Hong Kong’s business district was con-
trasted with the decades-long challenge of achieving more democracy.
Many marches were held on July 1, Hong Kong SAR Establishment Day
(the public holiday’s official title). The most significant ones were 2003 and
2004; the former had around half a million participants. Because the 2003
march on 1 July successfully repealed Article 23 legislation, this action
became known as “7.1 effect” (七一效應) meaning that “power had returned
to the people” (this will be discussed again in the next chapter). The marches
then became “ritualized” (and seen as a totem—圖騰) and held annually.
These summer marches enabled “sweat” to “bleach away the ‘Blue Paper’” (
汗水漂白了「藍紙草案」) in 2003 and it was also an “adhesive that bound
us [the marchers] together” (化出來的汗水，變成黏黏的萬能膠，把彼此
連繫) after Beijing’s Interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004.
Charteris-Black (2005, 60) notes that Martin Luther King used the “char-
ismatic language of a messianic prophet.” There were no true “prophets” in
Hong Kong democratic discourse (although there were “fathers” and “moth-
ers” of democracy as noted earlier); commentators in the democratic camp
generally used “messianic language” to highlight that “We are all heroes” (
我們都是英雄) in the struggle for universal suffrage rather than one iconic
leader being in charge of the movement.13
Many reasons along the way were given why the promise of universal suf-
frage was not able to be delivered as mentioned earlier. While Martin Luther
King’s phrase “the tranquilizing drug of gradualism” used in his famous “I
have a dream” speech was not found in the data, it fits the context as a warn-
ing against the complaint that the “time would never be right” for universal
suffrage. King also used the metaphor of “promissory note” in this speech
150 Chapter 4
and just such a metaphor was used in the discourse of Hong Kong’s future
democratization in these ten years (emphases added):14
The Hong Kong Basic Law claimed that Kong people would be ruling Hong
Kong and that it would have democratic elections and the right to elect Chief
Executive and all Legislative Council members. But in the past ten years, we
have to deal with this sad fact: we are still not getting this kind of political right.
The time of assembly and procession, to cash a check, which is a promissory
note written in the Basic Law which promised to ensure that all Hong Kong
people can have their own fate of political rights, such political rights to ensure
our freedom, the rule of law and the independent pursuit of happiness. (Lee Y.,
Apple Daily, January 16, 2006)
In many respects, the metaphors in this meta-metaphor theme resemble

that of other “political struggles” (Charteris-Black, 2005) being “historic”
as the 2003 march was described by some; it was also a kind of “spiritual
quest,” and you could almost say that the “promised land” was universal
suffrage.
INTERACTION OF THE META-METAPHORS AND

DISCOURSE META-THEMES: A CONCLUSION
As previously noted discourses and discourse themes have “fuzzy” boundar-

ies and interact with each other which make chronologic and “cartographic”
depiction a complex task. The discourse metaphor themes as detailed above
could be likened to the journeyers arguing about the route of the trip, how
long it would take, and the veracity of the journey’s outline (as given in the
Basic Law). These themes (some perhaps might call them kinds of “cogni-
tive metaphors”) make the discourse metaphorically cohesive. They could be
likened to the overall “sentiment” of the journey and the assessment of it (or
the memories left behind, which act as “snapshots”).
Finally, what we can say more specifically about the metaphors of Hong
Kong’s democratic promise? That it was a gift from Beijing.
Metaphors of the pro-Beijing and establishment camp’s ideas, attitudes,
and values about democracy were that it was dangerous if implemented too
quickly and without any safeguards in place, nor that could it solve all prob-
lems, while in the democratic camp universal suffrage was a civil right and
a world trend long denied a sophisticated city like Hong Kong. Democracy
would not solve all problems they posited, but it would make Hong Kong a
more equitable and balanced place. However, the “Second System” had to
take into account the “One Country,” so the relationship was not an equal one
and thus had only certain room for the “high degree of autonomy” that was
accorded it by Beijing.
NOTES
1. The Fifth Report of the Task Force on Constitutional Development can be

accessed on https://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/eng/report5/pdf/5th_Report_English.pdf.
2. The writer wishes she’d “never written the story” because fans keep trying
to change the story and give the characters a happy ending. Many readers rewrite
the ending to include “all kinds of boyfriends and new lovers and so forth after Jack
is killed.” She states that the story was not about Jack and Ennis, but about “. . .
homophobia; it’s about a social situation; it’s about a place and a particular mindset
and morality,” Proulx said. “And that particular mindset doesn’t allow for happy gay
people.” Perhaps one can see parallels with the author’s thinking and democratization
in Hong Kong. See “‘Brokeback Mountain’ Author: ‘I Wish I’d Never Written the
Story.” https://www.out.com/film/2021/1/04/brokeback-mountain-author-i-wish-id
-never-written-story.
3. The democrats saw the following five traps: (1) choosing the number of
CE candidates—the public is not asked about nomination process, but only on
the appropriate number of candidates; (2) size of nomination committee for chief
executive—nothing said about composition, only size. A larger committee is not
necessarily a more democratic one; (3) nomination by “democratic procedures”—the
public does not have any option on the nomination procedure; (4) raining Functional
Constituency (FC) seats in the Legislative Council—one of the options in the
Green Paper is to retain the FC seats but change the election method; and (5) uni-
versal suffrage for the chief executive first, then the Legislative Council later—the
government says this is “easier” because it is harder to abolish the FC seats in the
Legislative Council. This may sound reasonable, but the effect is to lower expecta-
tions, and induce the public to give up on earlier universal suffrage for the Legislative
Council.
4. These pills can be used for acute symptoms of food stagnation, including
epigastric or abdominal bloating, abdominal cramps, frontal headache, belching,
hiccoughs, and nausea. Symptoms include poor digestion or appetite, diarrhea,
abdominal pain, abdominal upset, dysphasia, and acid regurgitation; distension, pain
or hyperacidity in the epigastrium, nausea, and poorly formed stools. It is useful in
morning sickness, motion sickness, hyperacidity, overeating, or to alleviate hangover;
helpful in stomach flu and food poisoning. See “Made in Hong Kong: The Story of Po
Chai Pills, ‘Cure All’ Medicine Chinese Families Have Relied on for Over 60 years”
(DeWolf 2017).
5. “Rush to universal suffrage” (急於普選)—a phrase which appear in 13 articles
in the discourse alongside the keyword “universal suffrage,” largely in the pro-Bei-
jing Ta Kung Pao; there are also 21 instances of “quick democracy” (快民主) in the
texts.
152 Chapter 4
6. It was mentioned in chapter 1 that the Chinese mainland has its own concept
of “democracy” while many in Hong Kong have more of the Western kind in mind.
In the Chinese constitution, the word “democracy” is mentioned 11 times, mainly in
the context of “socialist democracy.” China says it practices “democratic centralism.”
It also has a “multi-party system” in the PRC with a number of “democratic parties”
under the main party, the Chinese Communist Party. See the Chinese Constitution at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
7. Two opinion articles with the same name, “Terrifying Democracy” (可怕的
民主), Ronny Tong (湯家驊) were published in the Ming Pao Daily, April 22, 2004
and December 2, 2005, respectively. Interestingly, Ronny Tong today is considered
a democratic “turncoat” and in the government, pro-Beijing camp: “Today’s most
prominent ‘reformed’ democrat is Ronnie Tong who not only sits in Carrie Lam’s
Executive Council but is also increasingly wheeled out to be the voice of the govern-
ment while most other members of the council lurk in the shadows.” See https://www
.ejinsight.com/eji/article/id/1725079/20171215-Quit-the-democrats-land-a-job.
8. This is also the case in February 2012 with the chief executive election. On
Monday February 5, the South China Morning Post interviewed three Election
Committee members about why they nominated one out of three possible candidates
to stand for the election. One said of Albert Ho Chairman of the Democratic Party
(emphasis added):
I know him very well and he’s a very capable individual. Unfortunately for Albert Ho, he
comes from the Democratic Party, which in Beijing’s eyes is not a party they want to lead
Hong Kong. We know—whether we like it or not—we are part of China. And there’s no
kidding ourselves that Beijing also has a say in the election. My worry is that if Albert
Ho was to get in, Beijing would really feel very uneasy about Hong Kong. And it would
hurt Hong Kong a lot. And so I am happy that he is running because it makes this a real
election and a better election—a better fight. But, unfortunately, he’s not with the right
party at the moment. See South China Morning Post “Debate,” February 6, 2012, opinion.
9. The story goes: A man from Song was concerned by his sprouts’ lack of
growth and, hoping to encourage them, began pulling them up one by one. When he
finished, he returned to his family looking weary and said, “Today has been exhaust-
ing! I have been helping the sprouts grow!” His family hastened to go and see it, but
the small sprouts had withered.
10. The White Paper, The Development of Representative Government: The Way
Forward was also released in February 1988, before the first draft of the Basic Law
was delivered.
11. Number of articles (in all newspapers) with keyword “universal suffrage” (普
選) related to “Road to Democracy”: “Road of democracy” 民主之路 (53); “democ-
racy road” 民主路 (214); and “universal suffrage road” (普選路) (39).
12. Some examples found in the past: “Egypt’s Bumpy Road to Democracy”;
“Hope on Egypt’s hair-raising road toward democracy”; “Burma’s long Road to
Democracy”; “Egypt’s journey to democracy is again proving anything but smooth.”
13. For example, in the following opinion article, “Hong Kong people’s sense of
democracy is in fact, already quite mature. In the previous peaceful demonstrations,
it was quite remarkable how calm and rational the people were. Hong Kong people
should be proud. We do not have the leadership of India’s Mahatma Gandhi or the
South African spiritual leader Nelson Mandela and can spontaneously take to the
streets and fight for democracy. It’s a most valuable quality.” See “Let Hong Kong
Again be the Envy of the World” (讓香港再傲視全球), Choi S. M. (蔡淑梅), Apple
Daily, December 1, 2005.
14. “Promissory note” (期票) occurred in 23 articles alongside the keyword “uni-
versal suffrage” during the discourse period (2) 2003, 4 (2004), 1 (2005), 3 (2006),
and 13 (2007).
Chapter 5
Hijacking an Ideology
The Cultural Revolution, Metaphor,
and Hong Kong’s Democratization
The rhetoric of “stability and prosperity” in relation to Hong Kong’s future

democratization was firmly in place long before Hong Kong’s possible return
to China was first discussed. After July 1, 1997, the pro-Beijing and pro-
establishment camp stated that “democracy is a reflection of social stability”
(民主，是社會穩定的反映) (Lin, August 8, 2003) and if this stability was
not “treasured,” turmoil would result. This chapter focuses on one meta-
metaphor discourse theme from the previous chapter: extreme democracy
is a cultural revolution. Meaning of the “utmost or exceedingly great in
degree,” “extreme” here has the semantic prosody of “excess” and “irra-
tionality.” In the case of Hong Kong, this meta-metaphor discourse theme
was also an argument about pace of change, with fast, major change seen by
some as going against the principle of “gradual and orderly progress” in the
Basic Law, being “revolutionary” rather than “evolutionary” change, remind-
ing some of the issues that arise with “radical” change, as per the Cultural
Revolution.
The two main political camps (pro-Beijing/establishment and democrats)
in the discourse from 1997 to 2007 both “hijacked an ideology”—that of the
Cultural Revolution, using metaphors and “ways of talking” of the Cultural
Revolution to point out the danger of one group’s so-called democratic
extremism or the other’s so-called extreme democratic deficit.
The pro-Beijing/establishment side harked back to the Cultural Revolution
by denouncing democrats’ “confrontational” tactics, mass mobilizations (i.e.,
political marches) and the disarray that fast democratization would cause
Hong Kong, while democrats’ accused Beijing of using “Cultural Revolution
rhetoric” (e.g., the names given to Democratic Party founder Martin Lee, such
as running dog, traitor, collaborator, worshiper of foreign Buddhas, etc.).1
155
156 Chapter 5
Democracy itself was also often seen as a potential “tool for harm”
throughout the discourse by the pro-Beijing/establishment side. For exam-
ple, Secretary for Security Regina Ip’s comment about Hitler being elected
by universal suffrage2 and by the use of “robust” words like “turmoil,”
“chaos,” “upheaval,” “division,” and “instability.” Instead of causing
social upheaval through rapid change, the focus should be on economics
rather than politics, since Hong Kong was an “economic city.” On the
democrat side, universal suffrage was necessary for the smooth function-
ing of society, and thus worth fighting for its quick adoption, being seen
as a civil right. Democrats saw no contradiction between having a good
economy and increased democracy.
After discussing the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Hong Kong3
and the Mainland, a brief look at the nature of Cultural Revolution rhetoric
will be given, followed by examples from the discourse that seem Cultural
Revolution-like—labeling mass mobilizations and talk of “extreme democ-
racy.” Conclusions will then be drawn about this meta-metaphoric discourse
thread. The chapter is laid out mostly in a chronological fashion using the
data from the previous chapters.
IMPORTANCE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

TO CHINA AND HONG KONG, SAR
The so-called Proletarian Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 following Mao’s

death on September 9 of that year. The “ten years of chaos” had brought eco-
nomic devastation and cultural destruction to China. In fact, the Sixth Plenum
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a
resolution on June 27, 1981, stating:
The “cultural revolution,” which lasted from May, 1966 to October, 1976 was
responsible for the most severe setbacks and the heaviest losses suffered by the
Party, the state, and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic.
(CCPCC 1981)
It conceded that Mao was responsible for “the grave left error” as “he con-
fused right with wrong and the people with the enemy” (Ibid).
The Chinese people were keen to examine the Cultural Revolution
after Mao’s death in 1976. Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, allowed
writers and intellectuals to explore at least part of the truth about what
had happened during the 1966–1976 decade, which Deng called “ten
years of catastrophe.” Writing known as “Scar literature” was popular
till 1980 when Deng decreed that there should be no more discussion of
Hijacking an Ideology 157
the Cultural Revolution as it might lead to the ultimate rejection of the

Communist Party. “He ordered an end to scar literature and instructed
the Chinese people to ‘set aside residual fear’ and ‘look forward’.” (Link
2016).
In 2016, on the anniversary of the movement’s start, an editorial in the
Communist Party’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily, said China must
learn from the tumultuous, decade-long Cultural Revolution and never allow
such an event to happen again: “We must never forget to draw lessons from
the ‘Cultural Revolution’ on the anniversary of its start” (Reuters 2016).
Hong Kong, considered a haven from the excessive political movements
of the Mainland, began to use “the rhetoric of ‘citizenship’ of ‘community’
and ‘belonging’” on a large scale as “anti-communist propaganda” (Cheung
2009, 5), especially from the 1960s onward. Exploiting the local phobia about
social upheavals, the colonial administration emphasized the importance of
maintaining economic “prosperity and stability” rather than the “extreme”
politics as practiced across the border which was seen as antithetical to stabil-
ity and prosperity:
In Hong Kong, we do not want politics of any kind, neither of the left nor the
right. What we need is to continue to build up our economy . . . we are an
industrial and trading community and economic activities should command our
whole interest and attention. I want to appeal to all workers to remember that
our future well-being depends, not on playing politics, but on our work, our skill
and our industry.
Official Report of Proceedings, Legislative Council, June 28, 1967, 3544
The colonial policy of maintaining stability with economic incentives contin-

ued after 1997 and instilling confidence in the Hong Kong populace through
the Sino-British Declaration’s promise of “elections.” Therefore, slow
change or maintenance of the status quo suited the authorities in Hong Kong.
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS A
RHETORICAL PHENOMENON
The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 soon after Mao’s death and the arrest
of the “Gang of Four.” However, the shock waves of the ten-years of chaos
continue to have a devastating effect on Chinese thought, culture, and com-
munication behaviors (Lu 2020, 3). Language influences thought, culture, and
human action. Rhetorical features such as “formalized language, numerical
associations, deductive reasoning, and the use of emotional appeals resonated
158 Chapter 5
throughout the Cultural Revolution period in order to promote revolutionary

zeal and dehumanize class enemies” (Ibid).
THE RHETORICAL THEMES AND FEATURES

OF THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSE OF THE
POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Mainland discourse of the post-Cultural Revolution period is fundamentally

the same as that during the Cultural Revolution itself: Lu (2020: 184) sees
five dominating themes: (1) moral appeals; (2) mythmaking; (3) conspiracy
theory; (4) dehumanization; and (5) radicalization. Linguistic means to real-
ize these themes were syllogism, repetition, anecdotes, value statements,
catchphrases, metaphors, and slogans, as well as formalized language. Post-
Cultural Revolution, similar rhetoric can be seen despite China’s more out-
ward and Westernized outlook since the “Open Door” policy of 1978:
Denouncements of Falun Gong, and the anti-America rhetoric. Ritualistic prac-

tices such as confession, criticism and self-criticism, and group studies have
been performed to convert or alienate individuals and have been employed in
the “reeducation” of Falun Gong practitioners. Moreover, although China’s
leaders are no longer deified, as was the case with Mao Zedong, adulation of
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin is still in evidence to a different degree. Deng
has been praised as the architect of China’s economic reform. (Lu 2020, 179)
CASTING HATS
The rhetoric of radicalization, in the Cultural Revolution, promoted hatred,

incited fanaticism, and polarized thinking. As such rhetoric escalated during
the period, the hatred of class enemies intensified, and, if you were designated
ideologically unsound or negatively labeled as such, persecution would result.
Negatively categorizing or labeling another, literally “casting hats”
(扣帽子) in Chinese, is a large part of any political field of action. Political
name-calling is colorful, often ad hominem metaphoric attacks serving to
distort and oversimplify on another’s beliefs; accusing one of “casting a hat”
is taken as a sign of political immaturity and unfitness for political office.5
During the Cultural Revolution, “struggle sessions” were held and certain
“bad elements” were endlessly ridiculed by Red Guards for their perceived
ideological errors and “wrong thinking.” Often they were given dunce caps
to wear in line with their bad political status.
Mao Zedong singled out nine categories for ridicule during the Cultural
Revolution: landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements,
rightists, traitors, foreign agents, capitalist roaders, and “the Stinking Ninth”
(intellectuals) (Esherick et al. 2006; Schoenhals 1996).
Therefore “casting hats” has an ominous connotation and semantic link-
age to Chinese political discourse as this example from 2004, a particularly
contentious year in Hong Kong’s politics, shows: “Arbitrarily casting hats
[labeling] on someone in the legislature, makes things unreasonable, and
it’s just like going back to ‘Cultural Revolution’ times” (指有人在議會亂
扣帽子，有理無理先鬧個痛快，仿如回到「文革」時期) (Ta Kung Pao,
October 14, 2004).
The Elite Faction

In the first ten years of the Hong Kong SAR, the pro-establishment/pro-
Beijing side attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the pan-democrats to
speak on what was “true” democracy/universal suffrage (this was discussed
in chapter 3). The democratic camp was labeled as being full of “profession-
als” or “elites” who could not speak for the “people” (the demos) who were
the grassroots of society.
Democracy is supposed to represent all sectors of the community (“bal-
anced participation” as discussed in chapter 2 implied that these sectors
had to be regulated in order to be “balanced”). In line with the above, being
labeled an “elitist” could be considered not in line with democracy, or as
part of the masses. By accusing some in the pan-democratic camp of being
“elitists,” the pro-establishment/pro-Beijing DAB, who saw themselves as
a “grassroots party” (Lau and Kuan 2000), were trying to undermine the
ideology of the pan-democratic group, implying that the democrats were far
removed from the concerns of the ordinary citizen:
Remember the grass roots? A decade ago the democrats were virtually digging
up lawns trying to get close to any stray grass root they could find. Now they
ignore them. The democratic leadership is packed with elitists; there’s hardly
a humble worker in sight, although there are sufficient lawyers in the pan-
democratic movement to provide a legal service and a high court for Somalia.
(Sinclair 2005)
Furthermore, elites are supposed to exhibit “proper” behavior when act-

ing in society, and not “take to the streets.” However, in the Hong Kong
case, democratic were also “anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong” as
160 Chapter 5
mentioned previously. They acted like street fighters (街頭鬥士) but they
were a “little more elegant.”6
In many respects, many pan-democratic leaders were “elites” being
barristers or lawyers (Martin Lee, original chairman of the Hong Kong
Democratic Party was a notable example). Although being called a pro-
fessional title before one’s family name is a sign of respect, the fact that
some of these leaders practiced law meant that this honoic was often used
disrespectfully, especially when the pro-Beijing press was criticizing these
groups for “going against the Basic Law,” the implication being that they
“did not know the law” (Ming Pao Daily, April 17, 2004). The Civic Party
(see Endnote 12) was known as the “barrister party” (大狀黨) because it
was founded by several barristers. Although “barrister party” was also
used by commentators in the pro-democracy press in a neutral or “self-
mocking” way, the Ta Kung Pao used it to highlight that they should know
better what the law truly means as the following example attests: “The
Civic Party, known as the ‘barrister party,’ is it due to their ignorance of
constitutional law or knowingly using it for a specific political purpose?”
(Ming 2006).
The Radical Faction

In 2004, perhaps the most “contentious” year regarding Hong Kong’s
democratization due to the Interpretation of the Basic Law, saw an increase
in name-calling in politics: “Arbitrarily casting hats [labeling] someone in
the Legislature whether reasonable or not, and making a fuss is just like a
return to the ‘Cultural Revolution’ period” ( 指有人在議會亂扣帽子，有
理無理先鬧個痛快，仿如回到「文革」時期) (Ta Kung Pao, October 14,
2004).
The Ta Kung Pao described democrats as being of “Three factions”
(三「派」), seeing certain “truths” evident about them. There was a “dis-
ruptive faction” (搗亂派) because of shouting in the Legislative Council
chamber; the “act wild faction” (撒野派) because they were at the forefront
of regular protests; and the “devious faction” (歪纏派) because they tried
to twist the meaning of the law and query Beijing’s decisions—this faction
consisted of the “barrister party,” other legal practitioners, as well as various
professionals (emphasis added):
Primarily an attempt to lure more people like the male Long Hair and the female
Long Hair . . . are like the “Gang of Four” during “Cultural Revolution”; the
“Gang of Four” wishful thinking that “to cause turmoil in China is to win vic-
tory.” Actually, a past master of this is the regime of Chen Shui-bian [the presi-
dent of Taiwan] . . . Similar tricks may make the “democrats” succeed in Hong
Kong, but Hong Kong people must “put in 100 percent of their energy” so they
don’t stagger along the road like a drugged child. (Lian 2004)
“Being a little more elegant” than street fighters, the barristers could
“lure” or encourage the more radical members to do their dirty work.
The kind of language contained above served to categorize demo-
crats as “radical” (激進), with “radical being their default mainstream”
(但在反對派政治裡，激進通常是主流) (Cui 2007). The “Gang of Four”
were four prominent barristers of the Civic Party, being ironically compared
to the four radicals of the Cultural Revolution (四人帮) who orchestrated
propaganda campaigns and unfavorable press coverage or commentary about
Mao’s political rivals.
The “male long hair” referred to above was Leung Kwok Hung of the
League of Social Democrats, who was considered Hong Kong’s “chief
radical” by Beijing/pro-establishment groups, being called a “street fighter”
(街頭鬥士) or a “democracy fighter” (民主鬥士), and swearing the oath
in “red-guard ‘militant-style’” when elected to the Legislative Council in
2004 (「長毛」梁國雄紅衛兵「武鬥」式的宣誓就任)—this appeared in
an editorial in the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao on October 12, 2004.7 Leung’s
electoral victory was seen as evidence of the immaturity of the Hong Kong
public for democracy, likening it to birth abnormalities occurring if a woman
gives birth too young (“direct elections give birth to an abnormal foetus”—
直選生出了怪胎) (Dan 2007). The following also uses this fear of instability
by “radical elements”:
Mainland officials have told the business community that who can guarantee
that after universal suffrage that the public will not elect someone like Long
Hair or other radical democrats? The Central Government has to be on their
very strict guard. I consider that the Central Government underestimates the
practicality of the Hong Kong people. (Ibid)
“Long Hair” Leung Kwok Hung discussed above had made a vow that he
would not cut his hair until China apologized for the Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre.8 In many respects, he could be seen to fit the “prototypical” category
of “activist” since he was been at the forefront of labor and political issues
for over two decades.9
According to prototype theory (Rosch and Lloyd 1978), prototypes are
“clearest cases of category membership defined operationally by people’s
judgments of goodness of membership in that category”; this theory moves
away from an either/or categorization, takes the view of how members in a
given category do not always share similar properties to the same degree;
it “can accommodate uncertainty and ambiguity” (Ibid 1978, 118) and that
162 Chapter 5
there is “different categorization of the same event/experience is more a norm

rather than an exception” (Ibid). The highest level on that cline is the member
of the category, who holds most, if not all of the attributes that could be held
under that category; it is the “original model on which something is based”
and someone or something that serves to illustrate the typical qualities of a
class as model or exemplar.
Because of prototype theory’s accommodation of uncertainty and since a
category under this theory can be seen as placed on a cline, Long Hair could
be considered at the “extreme” end of that cline—one that other democrats
may become in time even with the many barristers making up the movement;
in other words, they may experience radicalization, that is, “longhairization”
(長毛化).10 One commentator in the Ming Pao Daily said that if this were so,
it was the central government’s fault (泛民長毛化責在中央) because they
could see “no way out” for Hong Kong’s democratization, that is, no change
would occur, so stronger action was needed.11
The “fundamentalism” mentioned in chapter 3 and chapter 4, although
referring to both sides, the democrats, in particular, were deemed “one issue
politicians” (“vultures”) also fits into the “Cultural Revolution” discourse
framework of extreme “devotion” to a cause. Saying that the pan-democrats
focused on attaining universal suffrage to the exclusion of everything else
implies that they consider other aspects (such as people’s livelihoods)
relatively unimportant. Radicals are fixated on a single idea or issue, as in
Cultural Revolution times.
MASS MOBILIZATIONS
Mass rallies were frequently held during the Cultural Revolution and, in
the discourse of democratization in Hong Kong, protest marches were
seen as destabilizing and irrational by both the Hong Kong government
and Beijing. Beijing’s attempts to draw Hong Kong closer to itself since
reunification have been met with panic and protest, often led by students.
Although protests were frequent, the most “ritualized” of them were the
annual July 1 protests. In this section, the focus is on the 2003 and 2004
protest actions.
The 2003 July 1 Protest

The July 1 protests were annual rallies organized by the Civil Human Rights
Front from the day of the Handover in 1997. However, it was not until 2003
that the march drew large public attention by opposing the introduction of
Basic Law Article 23. Although the actual words “Cultural Revolution” were
not always mentioned in connection to these protests, the language used by

the pro-Beijing and establishment camp invoked it by using the kind of lan-
guage that was used at that time.
A 500,000-strong public demonstration protest against the proposed “anti-
subversion” law (Article 23) and other issues took place on July 1, 2003.
Most marchers saw the proposed law as threatening civil liberties, while oth-
ers saw economic issues and governance problems as reasons for the protest
march rather than universal suffrage.
The 2003 protest march shocked Beijing as a government-run think tank
had predicted a vastly smaller turnout on the day.12 Within days of the march,
Beijing, obviously aware that its usual sources of information in Hong Kong
had failed, dispatched envoys to Hong Kong to assess the political situation.
This was the point that Beijing decided to have a more “hands-on” approach
to Hong Kong affairs.
The head of one political group (the Liberal Party), withdrew support for
Article 23 Bill which meant that the government did not have enough num-
bers for it to pass. Rather than face certain defeat, Tung Chee-hwa announced
on July 6 that the bill would be deferred. Soon after, the “people power” of
taking Article 23 legislation off the government’s agenda became known as
the “July 1 effect” (七一效應), since sweat had “bleached” away a blue paper
(see chapter 4). This “7.1 spirit” later served as encouragement for mobilizing
protest marches over various issues since 2003.13
The pro-Beijing/establishment camp saw democracy “as a reflection of
social stability” (民主，是社會穩定的反映), and permutations of this
phrase were often repeated by the pro-Beijing/establishment camp around
this time (Lin 2003). To them, the July 1 marches broke this stability. And,
if Hong Kong was unstable, the “gradual” of “gradual and orderly progress”
would be prolonged rather than shortened.
Soon after the July 1, 2003, protest, Beijing came to the conclusion that Hong
Kong’s problems stemmed from the sluggish economy. Fix the economy, the
argument went, and political passions would cool, and support for Tung Chee-
hwa’s government and the pro-Beijing political parties would revive. “Unrest
in society, not only ensnares it [society] in extreme democracy, it even becomes
totalitarian” (動亂的社會，不是陷於極端民主中，便是處於極權下) and
that “‘one person, one vote’ would not benefit Hong Kong’s economic recov-
ery and development” (「一人一票」不利香港經濟復甦發展) (Ta Kung
Pao, August 9, 2003).
A City of Turmoil (動亂之都)

In August 2003, just after the protest march of the previous month, Zou
Zhekai, deputy director of the Liaison Office of the Central Committee of
164 Chapter 5
the Communist Party of China, delivered a speech at a preparatory meet-

ing for the anniversary of the 54th anniversary of the founding of the PRC
stating that Hong Kong would change from being a “dynamic city” to a
“turbulent city” if its people took to the streets all day long to engage in
criticism, the economy would be soon the verge of collapse, and people’s
life would be miserable, just like in the Cultural Revolution period (Ba
2003).
The pro-democracy Apple Daily, in an opinion article, criticized Zou’s
remarks saying Zou was not comparing like with like. The Cultural
Revolution was a mass movement initiated by Chairman Mao, Jiang Qing
(of the Gang of Four), and others against the bourgeoisie; the Hong Kong
protest was a mass movement launched “indirectly” by the leaders of the
chief executive, who denied them what was promised in the Basic Law (Lin,
August 17, 2004).
Furthermore, after the Cultural Revolution, China’s national power
declined for at least ten years, the Apple Daily article went on, while in
Hong Kong the decline in the economy occurred at least ten years before.
The Cultural Revolution made foreigners criticize China, while Hong Kong
protests drew praise from them; the Cultural Revolution shed a lot of blood
and killed many people, while in Hong Kong, all that was spilled was sweat;
the Cultural Revolution had destruction but no construction, while Hong
Kong had both construction (promoting the benefits of universal suffrage)
and destruction (undermining the dictatorship of Chief Executive Tung Chee-
hwa’s administration) (Ibid).
Similarly, the following quotation from the Ta Kong Pao is perhaps the
most direct reference to the democratic camp always “opposing for the sake
of opposing” and the mass protests as leading onto a Cultural Revolution
scenario (emphases added):
The mainland’s Cultural Revolution—how did it start? It started from the “Red
Guards” and the “Four Olds,” followed by the “rebels” use of great democ-
racy, mass mobilizations, being engaged in doubt and down with everything,
so the organization of the rebel headquarters began to protest, wanting to seize
power. . . . This is “great democracy” and led to ten years of turmoil. (Chan
M. 2003)
Here “great democracy” seems to imply “too much democracy” without

proper guidance from responsible authorities. This term, which was used dur-
ing Maoist times, will be discussed later in the chapter.
The Patriotism Debate

In an article titled “Trust Us,” by former Chief Secretary for Administration
Anson Chan in Time magazine in June 2004, she referred to a debate around
certain statements made by the “guardians of the Basic Law” (see chapter 2)
concerning patriotism early in 2004 and the Interpretation of the Basic Law,
which made her think of the Cultural Revolution (emphasis added):
The central government has moved swiftly to lay down the law as far as the
elections of the territory’s Chief Executive and members of the Legislative
Council are concerned. While Beijing has a constitutional right to do so, the
manner in which the central government has handled this whole issue, coupled
with its public rhetoric and posturing reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution,
have left most Hong Kong people puzzled, hurt and frustrated. (Chan
2004, 47)14
Chan’s accusations of Beijing’s so-called Cultural Revolution methods

(文革式手法) drew flak from the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao which accused
Anson Chan of “provoking social conflicts” and denigrating Hong Kong.
Turning the debate back to the democrats, the article then accuses the
democrats of creating political disputes and advocating “taking to the
streets” and causing “white terror” (白色恐怖), which is just like the
Cultural Revolution—a “Hong Kong-style Cultural Revolution.”15 At
this time there were a number of comments again on the relationship
between “well water” (Hong Kong) and “river water” (the Mainland) and
the separation that was supposed to be between the “One Country” and
the “Two Systems.”
The younger generation, who originally had no baggage on the Communist

Party, now had a resentment and resistance towards the Party, which was
equivalent to how their fathers and grandfathers felt as a result of the civil war,
the anti-Rightists stance of the Communist Party and the impact of the Cultural
Revolution. (Cheung, A. Ming Pao Daily, June 5, 2004)
A Contested Slogan: “Power to the People” (還政於民)

Political slogans were ubiquitous during the Cultural Revolution: “They were
the primary rhetorical symbols used to justify violent behavior, dehumanize
class enemies, encourage anti-traditional acts, and elevate the cult of Mao”
(Lu 2020, 53).
166 Chapter 5
The theme for the July 1 protest in 2004 was “Striving for Universal
Suffrage in 2007 and 2008.” This slogan “Return Power to the People” was
first used a year earlier on the July 1 protest march. There was much criti-
cism of the protest slogan “return power to the people” as being particularly
inflammatory and confrontational to Beijing; it was more or less a call for
“independence for Hong Kong.” To these groups, with the introduction of
the “One Country, Two Systems” and the departure of Great Britain, power
had truly returned to the people. This went on to become a crucial phrase in
the discourse overall.
Before the British withdrawal from Hong Kong, under the banner of
“returning power to the people” and with the help of support agents, “it had
attempted to justify its continuing right to rule and turn Hong Kong into
an independent political entity,” claimed an editorial in the Ta Kung Pao,
January 10, 2004. However, the Apple Daily saw political power not return-
ing to the Hong Kong people, who would become their own masters (“Hong
Kong people ruling Hong Kong”) but to Beijing: “Pro-China Tung said that
this [return power to the people] was an idea raised in British Hong Kong,
then its rulers first returned political power to the people, and then returned
an elected regime to Beijing, but the Chinese insisted on ‘returning political
power to China,’ that is not the way to develop democracy in Hong Kong.”
(Lee, Apple Daily, January 12, 2004).
“Power to the People” was a slogan not invented by Hong Kong protest-
ers; it had long been used by civil rights movements all over the world. Five
major such movements of the twentieth century had chosen this slogan as
their motto: The American Civil Rights Movement, the Black Panthers, The
Philippines, South Africa during Apartheid, and the German Democratic
Republic before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Lisson 2018).
The slogan “power to the people” could also be seen by some as encour-
aging a “mob” mentality. Property tycoon Gordon Wu commented that
those who went on street marches to fight for democracy engaged in “mob
rule” (胡應湘指「上街爭民主」是「暴民政治」) and denounced plans by
democrats to stage a mass rally against the government’s reform proposals in
2005 (Qing 2005). however others thought that “Labeling all protesters as a
‘mob’ (暴民), would cause people to come to the rally” (Ibid). Wu was also
ironically called the “march convenor” (遊行召集人) much like Secretary
for Security Regina Ip, who had said in 2003 that people did not have any-
thing better to do than protest on July 1 as it was a public holiday. As one
commentator put it, “Wu is, in a way, denouncing the 500,000 people who
marched on July 1, 2003, as a ‘mob.’ In fact, it is the privileged class [i.e.,
the establishment] who benefit from the undemocratic system that is a mob”
(Ming Pao Daily, November 23, 2005).
LET THE MASSES DECIDE: SUGGESTIONS

FOR A REFERENDUM IN 2004
The Chinese idiom “a melon falls when it is ripe” (瓜熟蒂落), meaning when
the time is right, a certain result will naturally occur, was used on occasion in
the discourse to imply that when conditions were suitable, universal suffrage
would come to Hong Kong.16 The following implies that “rushed” or “urgent”
democracy would be catastrophic:
Democratic elections are the trend of today’s world. Even if we don’t fight for
it, democracy will come naturally with China’s strength and progress. Rushed
democracy for Hong Kong is like chemotherapy, in that it will have great side
effects. It could kill and the death will be very painful. (Leung 2004a)
In late October 2004, Fernando Cheung, a newly elected pro-democratic

member of the Legislative Council, proposed that the method of electing the
chief executive and Legislative Council should be decided by a referendum
(i.e., voting en masse) by the people of Hong Kong. He had criticized the
lack of wide public consultation leading up to the Third Task Force Report.
However, the chief executive held that calling for a referendum was inap-
propriate, is “inconsistent with the established legal procedures is impractical
and misleading to the public” and that it “will seriously undermine the pre-
vailing harmony in the community” (Hong Kong Gov., November 15, 2004).
Much discussion revolved around the definition of “referendum” and its
role as a reflection of public opinion. The pro-establishment/pro-Beijing
camp and the Hong Kong government said that referendums “violate” the
Basic Law. The Basic Law, however, says nothing about referendums—
although a draft version did have a mechanism involving deciding if the
chief executive should be elected by universal suffrage. The democrats said
that it would merely be an “advisory referendum” and not binding on the
government. Beijing saw this as “supporting Hong Kong independence.” This
should be seen in the light of President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan who earlier
that year attempted to hold a referendum that was vigorously condemned by
Beijing (emphasis added):
The “national referendum” that Fernando Cheung proposed for electing the
Hong Kong Chief Executive and forming the Legislative Council in 07/08, is in
fact basically the same as the “national referendum” put forward by Chen Shui-
bian about the future of Taiwan. They have stolen the name of the entire popula-
tion, a deliberate challenge to 1.3 billion people, it is not only “knowing that it is
impossible,” moreover is an attempt to use citizens as suicide bombers to blow
up the walls of the Basic Law, to compel the central government to accept their
168 Chapter 5
radical political reform, this is clearly a blatant unconstitutional act and clearly
the dangerous game of pulling chestnuts out of the fire. (Leung 2004b)
Referendums, that is, direct votes by a group on a particular proposal,

were obviously being seen as a kind of “pure” universal suffrage or “total
autonomy” or “direct democracy” (Leduc 2003, 13–18) by Beijing. Fernando
Cheung was suggesting that the Hong Kong people could have their (unhin-
dered and unmediated) say about the direction of political reform, rather
than through representatives, either directly elected in the geographical con-
stituencies of the “balanced participation” or through the profession-based
functional constituencies.
The “democracy speculators,” referred to above, were the four barristers of
Article 45 Concern Group (deemed the democratic camp’s “Gang of Four”):
Obviously, Margaret Ng using her lawyer’s sophistry to play politics is irre-

sponsible in the extreme, and her “Gang of Four” has such problems. If this
“Gang of Four” thinks it is popular to Beijing and Hong Kong, they are wrong!
(Qiao, 2004)
Reference was also made to Adolf Hitler in the discourse around this pro-
posed referendum. Hitler, it was alleged, did not believe in elections but
relied on carefully calculated referendums or plebiscites (Zurcher 1935). This
was also mentioned in the article “Suggesting a Referendum is Like Waving a
Colonial Mourning Stick” (提公投如揮殖民哭喪棒) (Ke 2004), the article’s
title reflecting the idea that these “radicals” wanted Hong Kong to return to
being a colony of Great Britain.
The strong tone of Beijing’s reaction to the suggestion of having a referen-
dum on universal suffrage led to another strong metaphor (emphases added):
Fernando Cheung, Legislative Councilor of the social welfare sector, moved a

motion for a “referendum” in the Constitutional Affairs Committee. Although
it was not formally discussed, it but caused the sticks to fly . . . the wording of
articles [relating to the referendum motion] is building up momentum and has
brought back us back in time to the Cultural Revolution. No wonder people
say, the virus of the Chinese Cultural Revolution has long been hidden in the
depths of the body’s blood and bone marrow, and when there is an opportunity,
this virus will multiply and attack and its destructive power will be unmatched.
(Ng 2004)
The above example highlights the continuity of metaphors relating to extreme

“ideological” periods in China’s history. The metaphor implies that such
ideologies are so ingrained that they remain and lie dormant being ready to
emerge when events that resonate with them occur (emphasis added):
The Legislative Council has formed into two sharply divided factions and you
can see the war of words between Members in the Hall of Procedure, then you
can feel the political ecology of “two factions.”
The lessons of the Cultural Revolution are still fresh, the opposition’s “gen-
eral line” of being “anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong” hasn’t changed,
the government and the general public needs to prevent the opposition using the
name “universal suffrage” to carry out a “great universal suffrage revolution”
in Hong Kong. When the destruction signs of the Cultural Revolution appear in
Hong Kong, the government authorities concerned must deal with them like the
violent WTO demonstrations without hesitation . . . arrest the perpetrators and
invoke the Public Order Act to prosecute them. (Guo 2005)
This is a parallel metaphor to “universal suffrage crusade” (普選聖戰)

(Leung 2004). “聖戰” could also be translated as “jihad” or “holy war.” The
pan-democrats were described as carrying out a “universal suffrage crusade”
in their single-mindedness to achieve democracy with the Ta Kung Pao
accusing them of treating the words “democracy” as being equivalent to the
Bible.17
Futhermore, it was inferred that asking for a referendum was “extreme
democracy.” The link was not directly stated as being a “Cultural
Revolution” but statements like “extreme democracy divides society”
(極端民主分化社會) and “extreme democracy only leads to social chaos”
(極端民主非民主極端民主非民主) (Yu 2004) in the context of a discussion
about referendums would naturally lead to this thought.
Some considered since democracy would lead people to extremes, this
could be considered one of the “three great diseases” (三大頑症) affecting
Hong Kong, the first one of which was “great democracy disease” (大民主病)
which was seen as destroying the “business environment” (「大民主」破壞
營商環境) (italics added):
The first is great democracy disease. This is obvious to all. Great democracy, in
fact too much democracy is contrary to the rule of law, democracy and under-
mines democracy in the normal social order, affecting the economic develop-
ment of democracy. Democracy is good? Well and good. But too far is too bad,
this is called when extremes meet. The Mainland has lessons in this regard. The
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s of last century had as its scourge
great democracy.
170 Chapter 5
Hong Kong in recent years has had this great democracy disease. For
example, universal suffrage is everything, it denies gradual and orderly progress
and balanced participation regardless of the interests of the community and its
acceptance, wants to go to universal suffrage in a single step, and continues to
cause social strife. (Pi 2006)
Apart from “great democracy” (大民主病), there was also “great prosperity
disease” (大富貴病) that undermines the entrepreneurial spirit and the “great
Hong Kong disease” (大香港病) meaning an insular mentality (against out-
siders, including people from the Mainland).
Compared to the Chinese press, the South China Morning Post did
not actually have extended metaphor chains across the expanse of the
discourse (due to its limited coverage of issues compared to the more
competitive Chinese newspapers). An opinion article titled “the Demon
of Democracy” written a few weeks after the July 1, 2006, protest
march takes up the theme of the dangers of instability and social unrest
that may result due to the quick implementation of universal suffrage.
A letter-to-the-editor in reply also illustrates the general fear of mass
mobilizations without an actual plan for universal suffrage in place
(emphases added):
But it is clear that the marchers on July 1, leaving aside those who had their
own personal agenda, had no idea of what they were doing. They were burning
incense at the shrine of what Rudyard Kipling fittingly called: Demah Kerazi,
a demon inhabiting crowds and popular assemblies. They and their supporters
would have spent their time more profitably reading and thinking about the kind
of society they advocate—and what might befall future generations if they get
their wish; Perhaps next year. (Wells 2006)
Wells’ article “The democracy demon” should be translated into Chinese and
read by every aspiring politician. . . . Hong Kong’s politicians are naive if they
believe that universal suffrage means real democracy, which in Greek means
“people’s power,” as it also does in the Chinese characters. To introduce democ-
racy without knowing where we are going could, in fact, result in politicians
setting aside the issues that really matter to the community to pursue power.
Unless they do so [read newspapers], how can they know where they
have been, where they are now, or where they are going? Mr Wells is right.
Unplanned democracy can be a “demon inhabiting crowds and popular assem-
blies.” (Tu 2006)
The reply to Wells was written by a long-time activist during British colonial
days, who saw the return to China of the colony as righting some colonial
wrongs. It also shows that “people power” without guidance by some author-
ity or leadership would deviate to an unhelpful direction.
THE GREAT DEMOCRACY OF CHAIRMAN MAO
On several occasions earlier, the expression “great democracy” was men-

tioned as occurring in the Cultural Revolution. A general reader may think
this expression means “too much democracy,” but it actually refers to a con-
cept espoused by paramount leader Mao Zedong at the start of the Cultural
Revolution.
The Cultural Revolution began in mid-May 1966 when party chiefs in
Beijing issued a document known as the “May 16 Notification” Central
Committee 1966. The text of the notification warned that enemies of the
communist cause had infiltrated the party, intending to restore capitalism.
The document also summarized Mao’s ideological justification for the
Cultural Revolution, warning that the party had been infiltrated by counter-
revolutionary “revisionists” who were plotting to create a “dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie.”
To counteract a possible “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,” the chair-
man had put forward the concept of “great democracy” (大民主), which
were contained in the “Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution” (also known as “the 16 Points” August 8, 1966) (Central
Committee 1966). The freedoms granted in the 16 Points were later written
into the PRC constitution as “the four great rights” (四大自由) of “great
democracy”: the right to speak out freely, to air one’s views fully, to write
big-character posters, and to hold great debates (大鸣、大放、大字报、
大辩论).
In 1980, the National People’s Congress adopted a special resolution to
delete from Article 45 of the Constitution these “four great rights”:
People who worship Western “democracy” are always insisting on those rights.
But having gone through the ordeals of the ten-year “cultural revolution,”
China cannot restore them. Without ideals and a strong sense of discipline
it would be impossible for China to adhere to the socialist system.” (Deng
1985)
It is easy to see here the connection that too many “rights” (or freedoms) to
do as one wishes means that stability or control to achieve a stated aim would
be difficult. “Western democracy” is thus seen as relatively lawless. In the
following, this idea is taken up again with democratic change being seen as
inherently destabilizing.
172 Chapter 5
EXTREME DEMOCRACY = THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
In July 2007, the Hong Kong government released the Green Paper on
Constitutional Development (CMAB 2007). It represented a summary of the
decade-long discourse of Hong Kong’s democratization and incorporates and
draws selectively on, both intertextually and interdiscursively, many texts.
Hong Kong citizens had until October to post their thoughts on its contents.
The Green Paper implied that universal suffrage and the development
of a capitalist economy were antithetical to one another; that there was a
trade-off between democracy and economic growth; that universal suffrage
did not necessarily equate with one-person-one-vote; and that universal suf-
frage would not enable society to be equitably represented in the legislature
(i.e., have “balanced participation”). Another important inference was that
the pace of democratization would also affect the stability and prosperity of
Hong Kong.
Also in October, the annual Policy Address titled A New Direction for
Hong Kong (HKSAR 2007) was delivered by Hong Kong’s leader. In the
Address, there were a number of examples that set up antithetical relation-
ships between universal suffrage and constitutional development as being
inherently destabilizing as the following examples show: “When and how to
implement universal suffrage will have far reaching implications on Hong
Kong’s long-term stability and prosperity.” (paragraph 101); “As the qual-
ity of governance has a direct bearing on people’s daily lives, the efficiency
and effectiveness of our governance must not be compromised by constitu-
tional development” (paragraph 102); and “We promote democratic devel-
opment without compromising social stability or government efficiency”
(paragraph 126).
In a radio interview not long after the delivery of the Policy Address, the
host of the program picked up on this antithetical relationship (emphasis
added):
Host: I was struck by one phrase at the end of the Policy Address, towards the
end of the conclusion, you say, we promote democratic development without
compromising social stability or government efficiency, that kind of implies
that democratic development does compromise social stability or government
efficiency? (Mo and Lin 2007)
Chief Executive Tsang seemed to sum up the establishment and pro-Beijing

view of universal suffrage as “extreme democracy” in his reply (emphases
added):
Donald Tsang: It can, it can, if we go to the extreme, people go to the extreme,

and you have a Cultural Revolution, for instance, in China. When people take
everything into their hands, then you cannot govern the place.
Host: But the Cultural Revolution wasn’t really an extreme example of democracy.
Donald Tsang: What is it? People taking power into their own hands! Now, this is
what it means by democracy, if you take it to the full swing. In other democra-
cies, even if you have an elected person, then you overturn the policy in Califor-
nia, for instance. . . . then you overturn policy taken by the government, that’s
not necessarily conducive to efficient government. (Ibid)
“When people go to the extreme,” “People taking power into their own
hands,” and “If you take it to the full swing” indicate that “full” democracy
(e.g., one person, one vote) was something to be avoided, thus the emphasis
on the “gradual” in the “gradual and orderly progress” principle of consti-
tutional development and “balanced participation” through special electoral
groups. The large protests and the reaction to the suggested referendum of
2004 could be seen as indicators of the potential for “extreme action” down
the line, if unchecked. The slogan “power to the people” used in protests
would also have suggested to some that perhaps the people would rise up in
the future.
“Democracy taken to the extreme is equivalent to the Cultural Revolution,”
which was written as an equation in Chinese: “極端民主=文革” naturally
drew a lot of comment. What is particularly significant about Tsang’s words
was that they were also given just after the conclusion of the consultation
period for the Green Paper on Constitutional Development and before
responses to the document were analyzed.
In other words, “too much democracy” was rather like “having too much
of a good thing” is no good at all. Likening democracy to the Cultural
Revolution misunderstands the nature of democracy and likens it to an ideo-
logical campaign run by authoritarian regime.
The Chief Executive “Cultural Revolution Tsang” (文革曾), as he
was called after his gaffe, with the subsequent discussion of it focusing
on how little Tsang knew of history and the “real” meaning of democ-
racy with the Apple Daily saying that the “Cultural Revolution occurred,
not because of extreme democracy, but because of extreme dictatorship”
(文革的發生，不是因為極端民主，而是因為極端獨裁) (Ng 2007; Chu
2007). This metaphor of Tsang’s was seen as “a pot of ‘extreme democracy’
cold water” (潑上一盆「極端民主」的凉水) being “poured” on the still-
to-be analyzed submissions to the Green Paper and showed Tsang’s lack
of understanding of commitment to democratization (Chu 2007) and that
174 Chapter 5
“The aim of democratic development was to avoid something like Cultural

Revolution” (Sinn 2007).
Tsang later retracted his comments: “I am very sorry that I made an inap-
propriate remark concerning the Cultural Revolution during a radio interview
yesterday, and I wish to retract that remark” (Hong Kong Gov., October
13, 2007). Apologies usually have a brief addressing of the offense and an
expression of remorse (Eisinger 2011, 137). Tsang, by saying his remarks
were “inappropriate,” was admitting that they were “not suitable or proper in
the circumstances,” but this could hardly be considered a true note of regret.
Tsang’s office had tried to tone down the leader’s comments: “What the chief
executive means is that we must have a democratic system that best suits
the situation in Hong Kong, a system that will further improve the quality
of government” (Sinn 2007), which still seems to emphasize the antithetical
relationship between universal suffrage and stability and prosperity contained
in both the Green Paper and the Policy Address.
The pro-Beijing Chinese press only briefly mentioned Tsang’s gaffe,
mainly noting that had withdrawn his remarks saying it was a mistake and
that people needed to “move on” from it. Apologies also should elicit either
an offer of reparations or an assurance that the offense will not be commit-
ted again (Eisinger 2011, 137). Tsang further goes on with an “assurance” of
sorts:
Hong Kong people treasure democracy and hope to implement universal suf-
frage as soon as possible. I share the same aspirations. I reiterate that I will
honour my pledge in the Policy Address to do my utmost in resolving the ques-
tion of universal suffrage in Hong Kong during my current term. (Hong Kong
Gov., October 13, 2007)
There was a report after the Green Paper Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress that a time be set for universal suffrage, with the SCNPC
saying this “may” be achieved in 2017 if certain interim political conditions
were met. Unfortunately, these were not met.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the Beijing authorities and the pro-Beijing camp believed that
the Cultural Revolution was an “all out execution of democracy” (democracy
taken to the extreme) because, at that time, ordinary people were given the
right to create wall posters, openly debate their views, freely rally and pro-
test, and challenge the status quo. The democracy that the democrats wanted
(universal suffrage, with one person, one vote being their preferred method)
and that they were prepared to go out on the streets to fight for it were seen
as being extreme and confrontational.
The issue is about the “essentially contested concept” of democracy (Gallie
1956). As Richard McGregor stated, “China claims it is democratic for his-
torical reasons, because Mao’s rhetoric, and that of the party, always referred
to their rule as democratic”; however, “you need a different dictionary if
you are looking for a definition of Chinese and western-style democracies”
(Wong, A. 2018), “Western-style democracy” was often seen as something
not appropriate or applicable to the special Hong Kong context.
Rather than being an exercise in democracy, or as a means of preventing
China from becoming a capitalist society as Mao said it would, the Cultural
Revolution is now widely seen as an attempt to destroy his enemies by
unleashing the people on the party and urging them to cleanse its ranks of
the ideologically unsound. The democratic camp believed that “democracy
involves the participation of the majority of the people in politics, but its
operation has to be based on law and order; it has to honor the worth of
individuals’ dignity and freedom of thought and expression” (Lu 2020, xiv),
and it did not involve wholesale destruction like that which occurred in the
Cultural Revolution. That was why the democrats accused their opponents
of misunderstanding what “real” democracy entailed in the latter’s use of
Cultural Revolution rhetoric.
The nearness of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a
period of widespread social and political upheaval to Hong Kong’s return to
China, suggests that perhaps it is not surprising that language of the Cultural
Revolution would have been taken up by both sides to further their own
political agendas and play on not-too-distant historical fears (Cheung 2009)
and perhaps fear of the future. This “hijacking an ideology” shows how both
sides in a discourse can recontextualize concepts and rhetoric of a certain
time to serve their own ends.
NOTES
1. The following that mentions all these terms together in an Apple Daily editorial
on October 1, 2004—China’s National Day: “Sincere Respect for Dissent Can Only
Untie Knot” (真心尊重異見方能解開心結).
2. Secretary of Security Regina Ip at a forum for Article 23 on October 28.
Dismissing claims that Hong Kong was not ready for Article 23 legislation because
it lacked democracy, she said: “Don’t believe that democracy will be a panacea and
that ‘Adolf Hitler was returned by universal suffrage and he killed seven million
Jews’” (「希特勒就是一人一票選出來，他殺了700 萬猶太人。」). She then
defended the way the Communist Party came to power: “The Chinese Communist
176 Chapter 5
Party became the ruling party with people’s support.” “At Forum City University
Students Oppose Legislation” (論壇上即場表態城大學生反立法), no author, Ming
Pao Daily, October 29, 2002.
3. Using the terms “Great Cultural Revolution” (文化大命) or “Cultural
Revolution” (文革) there were 430 articles containing one of these terms and “uni-
versal suffrage” (普選) in the Chinese newspapers for the discourse period, out of
which 152 were for 2007 alone, mostly due to chief executive’s “Democracy taken
to the extreme is equivalent to the Cultural Revolution” (極端民主=文革) comment.
There are 20 instances of (極端民主) in 2007 related to discussion about what was
“extreme democracy.” Not all of the earlier articles related to the Hong Kong situa-
tion per se, but since these articles also discussed democracy and universal suffrage,
it would impart a “comparison” effect on the discourse.
4. Records of Legislative Council sittings for 1967 can be found at: www.legco
.gov.hk/1967/yr1967.htm.
5. The term “casting hats” occurred 12 times in the Ta Kung Pao, 25 in the Ming
Pao Daily, and 19 in the Apple Daily. The South China Morning Post also uses the
term “labeling” but has only a few instances.
6. “In fact, the people who use such tactics also makes them Long Hairs are
also some of the ‘academic elite’ only their form of expression just a little bit more
elegant (其實，使用這種手法的人不僅僅是「長毛」們，還有某些「精英學
者」，只是他們的表現形式稍微文雅一點而已)” (Qiao 2005).
7. For the swearing-in ceremony of the Hong Kong Legislative Council on
October 6, 2004, Leung’s fellow legislators arrived in business attire. Leung, in
contrast, wore a T-shirt with Tiananmen Square on the front and Che Guevara on the
back. When he was called to come forward and take the oath, he raised his left fist,
encircled with a black wristband, a memorial to those who died in the 1989 protests.
He had planned to alter his oath of office, but a Hong Kong judge said such a step
would make it impossible for him to serve. Instead, Leung added his own messages
to the standard oath, demanding vindication for those killed in the 1989 Tiananmen
Square crackdown, calling for the release of political prisoners and an end to one-
party rule on the Mainland. He shouted at the ceremony: “Long live democracy! Long
live the people!” He was then sworn in as a council member.
8. He was also known as “Hong Kong’s Che Guevara” as he always wore T-shirts
with the latter’s image on it. Leung’s long hair has only been cut once against his will
when he was briefly imprisoned following a political protest. On a historical note, in
the early 1850s, the God-worshiping society cut of their queues, a sign of subjuga-
tion to the Manchus, and they then rebelled. They refused to shave their foreheads as
well and were referred to as Long Hairs (zhang mao 長毛) by Qing dynasty officials
(Heath and Perry 2010).
9. This consistency led some commentators to remark that Mr Leung was a
“professional protester,” as he seemed to appear at “almost every protest and demon-
stration worth its salt” in “Dissident Making a Mark without Money” Clara Li, South
China Morning Post, May 25, 2000.
10. However, the term “Long Hair” was also used by democrats and people gener-
ally in Hong Kong. This became a Hong Kong neologism, being the local noun or
adjective for “activist.” The following are other “Long Hair” categories: social sector
(社福界長毛), a female (女長毛), a shareholder (股東長毛), and an elite “Long hair”

(精英長毛).
11. See “Chan Kin Man: ‘The Longhairization of the Pan-democrats is the
Responsibility of the Central Government’ (陳健民泛民長毛化責在中央),” Ming
Pao Daily, November 27, 2004. Chan Kin-man was one of the “Umbrella Nine” who
was charged and imprisoned over the 2014 Occupy Central (OCLP) Movement.
12. One political analyst told Human Rights Watch, “No one expected that there
would be more than 500,000 people on the streets. Many people told China that (the
turnout) would be less than 50,000. They were surprised and they thought that Hong
Kong was out of control” (Human Rights Watch 2004).
13. “The July 1 Effect” (七一效應), which was usually used with quotation marks
by all Chinese newspapers, was used 25 times in 2003, 12 times in 2004, not used in
2005, 1 in 2006, and 25 in 2007. Other phrases like “7.1 spirit” (7.1精神) had a simi-
lar role in the discourse which also relates to “people power” and mass mobilization,
usually in protest marches.
14. Anson Chan also said the following in this article:
I do not doubt that Beijing wants what is best for Hong Kong. In its eyes, stability is key.
But the tactics being employed are likely to have the opposite effect. Hong Kong society
is now polarized to an extent not seen in recent history. There is growing intolerance of
different viewpoints . . . has raised fears about freedom of expression. In this game of
shadow boxing, it is increasingly difficult to pinpoint who are the instigators and who are
the innocent bystanders or victims. There’s a wide gap in mind-set and values, which only
genuine communication and trust can bridge. And bridge it we must if we are to secure
our future, with our rights and freedoms intact. (see Chan 2004, 74)
15. White Terror is the violence carried out by reactionary (usually monarchist
or conservative) groups as part of a counter-revolution. In Taiwan, the White Terror
describes the suppression of political dissidents, as well as public discussion of the
228 Incident in Taiwan under the martial law period from May 19, 1949, to July 15,
1987 (Kwok, C. 2004).
16. “Only if the conditions of ‘actual situation’ and ‘gradual and orderly
progress’ are met and perfected will the ‘fruit’ of the ‘ultimate [aim]’ ripen
and fall (只有「實際情況」和「循序漸進」的條件都具備了、完善了，「最
終達至」的「果」才會瓜熟蒂落、水到渠成)” (Ta Kung Pao, September 12,
2005).
17. “Use your eyes to clearly see what politicians are doing, Affairs, others, and
use the sharp eyes to look at the actions of the politicians, do not be gullible into
believing that the word ‘democracy’ is equivalent to the Bible!” (要用雪亮的眼睛看
清楚政客的所作所為，更不可輕信「民主」二字等同於《聖經》!) (Leung, O.
2004).
Chapter 6
Contested Concepts
Civil Disobedience and the Rule
of Law before, during, and after
the Umbrella Movement
Previous chapters dealt with the first decade of the political discourse of
the HKSAR, and now we move on to its second decade.1 The “Umbrella
Movement” (also known as “Occupy Central with Love and Peace”—OCLP)
of 2014 was linked with discussions about the Movement’s possible effects
on the “rule of law,” seen as the core of Hong Kong’s identity, and how this
related to the merits or otherwise of “civil disobedience” vis-à-vis Hong
Kong’s “rule of law” and Hong Kong’s evolving sociopolitical identity.
Although this event only lasted just over two months and was considered a
“failure,” it had a subsequent impact on Hong Kong’s political development
and was directly linked to the Hong Kong protests of 2019 and ultimately the
National Security Law of 2020. The phrase “rule of law” is regularly invoked
in Hong Kong’s political discourse, as in the following sentence: “Hong
Kong’s success is because everything is institutionalized and based on the
rule of law, rather than relying on the rule of man” (Eu 2005).2
This chapter will first discuss what “rule of law” actually means and the
historical development of the “rule of law” in Hong Kong to show how it
“took root” in Hong Kong and its importance as a “core value” and “identity
marker” of the city. “Civil disobedience” will also be defined. The back-
ground to the OCLP will then be given before an investigation of how the
“rule of law” was seen as a conceptual metaphor both during the “threat” of
OCLP from January 16, 2013, and till December 31, just after its realiza-
tion. Articles drawn from English newspapers the South China Morning Post
and The Standard in Hong Kong and the China Daily (Hong Kong edition)
were analyzed to discover and compare metaphors regarding the rule of law
for both these periods. Found metaphors were identified and explained with
179
180 Chapter 6
reference to the historical legacies of the rule of law in Hong Kong and the
principle of “One Country, Two Systems.”
Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth in Why Resistance Works (2008,
7–8) showed that in the twentieth century, nonviolent campaigns were
twice as likely to succeed outright as violent insurgencies, adding that
“civil resistance” has been growing in frequency and with success over
time. Hong Kong’s case, however, presents an intriguing challenge to
acts of civil disobedience in semi-liberal polities despite these statistics.
Though the OLCP could be considered an ideal disobedience scenario, a
movement which had widespread, and was led by three prominent civil
society figures, law professor Benny Tai, Baptist minister Chiu Yiu-ming,
and sociology professor Chan Kin-man, it ultimately failed. It did not lead
to any significant democratic advances and effectively halted any further
democratic progress. A discussion of why OLCP failed is given at the end
of the chapter.
THE RULE OF LAW
Discussion about the meanings of “rule of law” has focused on thin and thick
definitions of the term. Thin definitions emphasize the procedures through
which rules are formulated and applied; “Thinness: amounts to a largely
procedural understanding of the notion in which the process of obtaining a
‘just outcome’ has to meet certain criteria in order to be considered ‘just’”
(and hence, in accordance with the rule of law). For example, it should be
public, impartial, and accessible (Van Veen 2017). Thick definitions aim to
protect human rights and frame them within broader human development
discourse (Peerenboom 2002). This is concerned about what the rule of law
should contain, its aim in society, and what defines an effective or ineffective
form of the rule of law (Belton 2005). For example, the last Hong Kong gov-
ernor, Christopher Patten, writes in a review of Tom Bingham’s The Rule of
Law:
The rule of law is a phrase often used but seldom defined. It can easily become
a portmanteau expression of political virtue. Yet protected and practised, it is a
fundamental part of both the software and hardware of a free, pluralist society.
(Patten 2010)
According to the World Justice Project (2017), the rule of law comprises four
universal principles: accountability, just laws, open government, accessible
and impartial dispute resolution. In Hong Kong’s legal system, the rule of
law, warranted by the Basic Law, is defined by the principles of legality and
Contested Concepts 181
independence of the courts of the executive (Community Legal Information

Centre n.d.).
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE “RULE

OF LAW” AS HONG KONG’S “CORE VALUE”
Hong Kong’s emphasis on the “rule of law” could be said to be one of its
“social imaginaries” or an “identity marker”:
By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intel-
lectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a
disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and
their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative
notions and images that underlie these expectations. (Taylor 2004, 23–30)
The following shows the development of the emphasis on the rule of law as
one of Hong Kong’s “social imaginaries.”
In the 1950s, Hong Kong was a place of refuge for a massive stream of
migrants from the Chinese mainland; it was a place of sojourners, and it
was not until the 1970s when a local identity started to take shape with a
sense of “othering” by the colonial government of mainland China, as “Law
played a fundamental role in the creation of a ‘Self’ and an ‘Other’” (Monroe
2018). Then there was a “lack of social cohesion for Hong Kong’s temporary
residents.” The 1970’s colonial government “deconstructed their dispersed
cultural identities, splitting them between an identification with a backward
Mainland China and a modern Westernised Hong Kong identity” (Jones
1999, 54).
In 1971, local immigration law added the category of the “Hong Kong
belonger,” a new category thus shifting a negative definition of refugee
or sojourner toward a positive concept of having a local identity in law.
Becoming a collective community via a legal term “empowered the imagi-
nary of difference between Hong Kong and the Mainland” (Monroe 2018).
The identity category of “Hong Kong belonger” became “a means of break-
ing up the remnants of older social ties, of dissolving the identity of the
Chinese” (Jones 1999, 54). Belonger status was later renamed “permanent
resident” status in 1987.
As Hong Kong waited years for the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, fear
of “lawlessness” arose due to the June 4 crackdown on the Mainland (Hong
Kong: Government Printer 1989/90, 15). Concern over Hong Kong’s legal
future stemmed from the fear that “China-style disorder and corruption”
182 Chapter 6
would transfer with China’s sovereignty and would “rip the rule of law into
shreds” (Lee, M. June 14, 1995). Thus came further emphasis on order and
robustness of their common law legal system. The Hong Kong’s identity
became intimately interwoven with the rule of law, and it was this “which
was in this moment offered to Hongkongers as their salvation in the face of
oppression” (Jones 1999, 55).
The emergence of a discourse of rights (the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance was developed in 1990, passed by the Legislative Council in
June 1991, and enacted on June 8, 1991), the rule of law narrative became
intertwined with a discourse of prosperity and progress, which had emerged
in the 1970s, as Hong Kong was being recognized as one of the Four Little
Dragons of the “East Asian Miracle.” The perception was the Hong Kong’s
rule of law was one of the key to the success of the “barren-rock-turned-
capitalist paradise” (Ngo 1999, 120) and a reason for doing business there.
The following remains (as of August 2021) on the Hong Kong government’s
information page:
The rule of law is one of Hong Kong’s greatest strengths. It is the cornerstone
of Hong Kong’s success as a leading international commercial and financial
centre, providing a secure environment for individuals and organisations and a
level playing field for business. (https://www.info.gov.hk/info/sar5/elaw_1.htm)
The rule of law, considered as essential to the preservation of rights and

the maintenance of the territory’s liberal capitalist-led economic prosper-
ity, had been discursively “over-lexicalized” by the last governor of Hong
Kong, Chris Patten (Flowerdew 2012, 57). Characterizing the rule of law
as “the guardian angel of Hong Kong’s decency and the engine of Hong
Kong’s success,” he portrayed it to Hongkongers as “the bedrock of your
way of life” and calling it “this community’s most prized possession,” as it
provided “a sense of individual and communal identity” (Ibid, 43). Many
worried about the preservation of the rule of law under the “one country,
two systems” principle, as established in the Handover agreements, and
whether the promise that the current social and economic system would be
fulfilled.
While portraying the post-1997 period as being increasingly authoritarian,
Western media and others tended to depict the rule of law as British colonial
legacy pre-1997 as being totally positive: “a much celebrated British ‘gift’ to
Hong Kong has been the rule of law, which with an independent and impartial
judiciary, supposedly delivers fair and equal justice to all” (Chan 1997, 567).
Hong Kong was also “gifted” with the “One Country, Two Systems” frame-
work by the Mainland (see chapter 2). The framing of this British “legacy”
of rights and freedom vis-à-vis the Mainland’s autocratic handling of the law
neglects how the use of law (as a means of “keeping order”) was used during
British colonial rule.
The Colonial Coercive Use of Law

In the context of the 1997 handover, the last colonial government developed
a discourse emphasizing democracy, rights, and the rule of law (Ku 2004)
which led many to forget that the “law and order” and “rule by law” dis-
courses used by the post-1997 Hong Kong administration, had also been used
by the British colonial government.
The historian Richard Klein documented British colonial rule over Hong
Kong and demonstrated how “the British have utilised the legal and legisla-
tive systems to stifle and oppress those who opposed or desired to reform the
governance of the Colony” (Klein 1997, 2). An example in the early twentieth
century was a law prohibiting “any Chinese public meeting,” as the associa-
tion of people was judged “incompatible with the peace and good order of the
Colony” (Ordinance No. 8 of 1920, Paragraph 3(c), cited in Klein 1997, 3).
This 1888 Ordinance “Regulation of Chinese” was extensively used by the
colonial government, when its authority was challenged, as in the 1966 riot
against the increase in the Star Ferry fare.
In a similar way to the colonial government, the post-1997 Hong Kong
government used the law as a coercive political instrument. The Basic Law
was “about control, not autonomy” (Ghai 2007, 128) since it contained
“many mechanisms through which the SCNPC and the central government
can ‘interfere’ with the affairs of the HKSAR” (Lo 2015, 75). Article 158
of the Basic Law gives the power of interpretation in the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC). Just before the handover, in
February 1997, the Chinese authorities decided to repeal laws that they con-
sidered inconsistent with the Basic Law, some of which were instituted by
Governor Chris Patten. The NPCSC “removed several recent laws that were
more consistent with the Basic Law than the older colonial laws [. . .], show-
ing its preference for restrictive colonial laws over the reforms that carried
forward the Basic Law provisions” (Ghai 2007, 132).
Marrying the Discourse of “Law and Order” with

the “Rule of Law”
The discourse of “law and order” was also used alongside the “rule of law”
narrative, post-1997. At the ceremony celebrating the establishment of the
SAR on July 1, 1997, Tung Chee-Hwa, the first chief executive, built on
Patten’s discourse about the importance of “equality before the law” and
the independence of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the
184 Chapter 6
government, but added an aspect of “law and order”: “we strive for liberty,
but not at the expense of the rule of law” (Tung Chee-hwa cited Flowerdew
2004a, 1570). By linguistically placing “liberty” and “rule of law” in opposi-
tion to each other, Tung altered the meaning of the rule of law, giving the
concept of the rule of law that had an emphasis on rights and democracy
with a euphemism for “order.” The current chief executive, Carrie Lam, uses
much the same rhetoric in regard to the juxtaposition of the rule of law with
law-breaking, as well as freedom of expression but no unlimited freedom of
expression (see later chapters). It could be said that by discussing the “rule
of law” right alongside “law and order” was a way to reconcile two radically
different legal systems as a “way of satisfying both Beijing and the Hong
Kong people” (Monroe 2018).
The opposition between a “rule of law” rights-inspired narrative and the
“law and order” discourse has often been played out in the context of social
protests in Hong Kong, none more so in the case of Occupy Central as will
be shown.
THE MEANING OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
“Acts of civil disobedience,” an encyclopedia definition states that they are

illegal, nonviolent, public, and done to protest a governmental law or policy
(Gale 2006). Rawls (1999) sees civil disobedience as “a public, non-violent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” in order to
address “the sense of justice of the majority of the community” (p. 320). Talk
about civil disobedience has generally focused on what it is and whether acts
of civil disobedience can be morally justified.
Any law-breaking, according to Rawls, had to be undertaken “within the
limits of fidelity to the law” (Rawls cited in Mueller, January 15, 2019). This
was like Martin Luther King Jr, who argued that one who breaks the law
in the name of civil disobedience “is in reality expressing the very highest
respect for the law” (King Jr, 1963) by highlighting its fundamental injustice
in such a way as not alienate one’s fellow citizens. Thus, King believed that
“one who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, [. . .] and with a
willingness to accept the penalty” (Ibid, italics added).
Note that Tai had modified his “occupy” with “love and peace,” harking
back to Martin Luther King Jr’s rhetoric. The mention of “lovingly” should
not be taken to mean that civil disobedience had to be non-confrontational.
The civil rights movement in 1960s America did not just espouse the prin-
ciples of freedom and equality, but sought out confrontations with police,
for example, in the march in Selma. At Selma, it was the television coverage
of policemen savagely beating unarmed protesters that made some white

Americans reconsider their unconditional defense of “law and order” under
Jim Crow (Klein 2020 [2015]).
OCCUPY CENTRAL WITH LOVE AND PEACE
In March 2013, Benny Tai, a law professor at the University of Hong Kong,
with others, released a manifesto about the OCLP campaign. Advocating
the values of democracy, civic participation, and nonviolence, the campaign
aimed to generate pressure on the Beijing and HKSAR governments to intro-
duce a fair and open chief executive election in 2017 through universal suf-
frage as promised Hong Kong’s post-1997 constitutional document, the Basic
Law, and had yet to be delivered. The beginning of the OCLP manifesto is
as follows:
This campaign originates from our love and concern for Hong Kong. We
believe that a truly harmonious society can only be built upon a just political
system. The campaign aims to strive for the election of the Chief Executive by
universal and equal suffrage in 2017. Civic awakening determines the success
of the movement. Therefore, dialogue, deliberation, authorization by citizens
and civil disobedience are all conducive to the reflection and participation of the
whole society. We shall be like preachers communicating enthusiastically with
different communities to convey the universal values such as democracy, uni-
versal and equal suffrage, justice and righteousness. We hope that in realizing
these values in the system and society of Hong Kong they are willing to pay a
price. (https://oclphkenglish.wordpress.com/about-2/manifesto/)
This kind of language fits in with the “civil rights” and “struggle” language
of democratic groups in chapter 3. Benny Tai was a practicing Christian and
his rhetoric fits in with the meta-theme of universal suffrage as a civil right
and something that must be fought for.
The OCLP campaign would be carried out if the Hong Kong government’s
proposed universal suffrage plan did not fall in line with what they consid-
ered international standards. Occupying Central, the main financial district in
Hong Kong, would be the last civil disobedience act in the campaign, with
the first three being public deliberation, public authorization, and negotia-
tion. The “occupy action” could be carried out by citizens in the following
ways:
(1) To provide support to those who carry out the acts of civil disobedience
without breaking any law themselves.
186 Chapter 6
(2) To carry out the acts of civil disobedience without giving themselves up
to the authorities.
(3) To carry out the acts of civil disobedience, give themselves up to the
authorities and file no defense in the trial. (Ibid)
The OCLP and the Discourse of Threat

Since OLCP was first announced in March 2013, its supporters saw this
possible action as a last-ditch effort to have genuine, rather than symbolic,
universal suffrage. As there was no actual date for its launch as certain things
had to happen or not happen, opponents of OLCP could focus on the “fear”
that often lay at the heart of the Hong Kong psyche, that is, uncertainty and
the potential of instability and economic backwardness that comes with a
possible political upheaval.
Proximization theory, a cognitive-pragmatic model of crisis and threat
construction, could be applied as regards how the OCLP was perceived as a
threat. The term “proximization” was first proposed by Piotr Cap to analyze
coercion patterns in US antiterrorist rhetoric following 9/11 (Cap 2017). The
essential point of proximization is the delegitimization of the “Other” (i.e.,
foreigners, political opposition, etc.), who are presented negatively. This
includes acts of negative other-presentation, acts of blaming, scapegoating,
marginalizing, excluding, attacking the moral character, rationality, or sanity
of the other (Ibid). As a discursive strategy, proximization involves present-
ing remote events and ideologies as increasingly significant to a group or
individual (Kowalski 2018).
The threat of future civil disobedience had been seen in almost apocalyp-
tic terms by those opposing it; for instance, as in “the opposition camp no
doubt intends to take Hong Kong residents hostage . . . Tai’s rhetoric pres-
ents a direct challenge to the rule of law and is a bomb aimed at destroying
Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability” (Pressreader 2013). This would be
a “knife in the heart” of Hong Kong, according to a video “They Can Kill
This City” produced by the pro-Beijing group “Silent Majority for Hong
Kong” (https://silentmajority.hk/) in June 2014, which called pro-democracy
groups “agitators.” Their predicted outcome “was apocalypse-level grid-
lock, cops and ambulances stuck in traffic, and Hong Kong plunged into
anarchy” (Winn 2014) as well as blood in the streets.3 This could be seen
as an extension of how democratic legislators and others were categorized
in chapter 3 as lacking in rationality and pragmatism, by focusing on uni-
versal suffrage with “Cultural Revolution-like” fervor to the exclusion of
everything else. While democrats may not have gone so far in the past,
they could very well do so now (the “worst-case scenario” according to the
video).
THE STUDY
Since protests and lack of consensus have often been deemed to affect the
prosperity, stability, and rule of law in Hong Kong, it is worthwhile examin-
ing how the rule of law was depicted in the press vis-à-vis the threat of civil
disobedience and the threat’s later realization, an act which involves the
breaking of laws.
The OCLP campaign brought to the fore issues about Hong Kong’s gov-
ernmental system. Under the constitutional principle of “One Country, Two
Systems” as previously mentioned, Hong Kong, being a distinct Chinese
region, could retain its legal, administrative, and economic systems while the
rest of China uses the Chinese socialist model, with the inherent ambiguity
between two radically different legal systems.
This corpus-based discourse-analytical part of the chapter compares
English newspapers published in Hong Kong in two periods: January 16,
2013, to September 28, 2014, when OCLP collaborators threatened civil
disobedience and September 29, 2014, to December 31, 2014, from the time
the threat was carried out until two weeks after the occupation. It examines
how the press presented the rule of law over these two periods, and why,
and whether there was any change in how the concept of the “rule of law”
was described. Specifically, the study compares metaphors used to depict the
abstract concept of the “rule of law”’ in the newspaper corpora to ascertain
the ways in which rule of law metaphors in the corpora reveal linguistic, cog-
nitive, and political contexts (Charteris-Black 2005; Goatly 2007; Cheng and
Ho 2014; Cheng and Lam 2013). This chapter aims to address two research
questions:
(1) How did reports on OCLP by Hong Kong and Chinese newspapers
compare in their metaphorical description of the rule of law in the period
of threat of civil disobedience and the period of realizations of civil
disobedience?
(2) What might have accounted for the findings?
Previous Research on OCLP

The following studies on language and the OCLP seem to emphasize the
confrontational, “Othering,” and evasive techniques employed by political
actors in discourse. Hallberg (2014) analyzed reports on the pro-democratic
OCLP published in the South China Morning Post. The study concluded that
the newspaper had been misrepresenting both Hong Kong’s pro-democratic
opposition in favor of more moderate status quo political ideologies and the
challenges of the dominant pro-establishment hegemony in Hong Kong.
188 Chapter 6
In another study, Mey and Ladegaard (2015) analyzed the pragmatic

meaning of a contentious word, “democracy,” as reported in the news dur-
ing OCLP. The word was quoted to mean “We practice Chinese democracy,
not western-style democracy” by the mainland Chinese government and
Hong Kong’s pro-government spokespersons, and “There is no such thing
as Western or other democracy, there is just big D Democracy” by “an
anonymous Occupy retort” (324). The researchers suggested that only when
the “ideological and socio-cultural differences from the above, the research-
ers suggested that only when the “ideological and socio-cultural differences
between Hong Kong and Mainland China” (319) are discussed, a meaningful
debate about “democracy” between the opposing sides will be possible.
Lan and Ye (2016) compared news reports and articles published in
China Daily, The Washington Post, and The New York Times from April
to December 2014 in terms of representation of social actors (van Leeuwen
2008) and transitivity (Halliday 1994). They found that China Daily labeled
the protesters as an “organized antigovernment minority” and student pro-
testers as “ignorant campaigners,” whereas the two American newspapers
represented all protesters as “the majority of Hong Kong people fighting for
the deserved political power” (Lan and Ye 2016, 82). The researchers attrib-
uted these polarized views of Occupy Central protesters to the news outlets’
different political backgrounds and hence their views about governance,
power control, civil rights, and civil disobedience. In a corpus-based study of
the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement circa 2014, Ho (2019) compared word
co-occurrences in the South China Morning Post and China Daily and found
opposing voices. Ho also found the use of discursive strategies of prediction,
nomination, and perspectivization to construct the social actors.
METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, conceptual metaphors rather than discourse metaphors are

used, since conceptual metaphors are drawn from a collective cultural under-
standing, they eventually become linguistic conventions within a particular
culture. This explains why the definitions for so many words and idiomatic
expressions are dependent on understanding the underlying accepted con-
ceptual metaphors was so important for the discourse overall and repeated
constantly in regard to the talk of the threat of OCLP and during the realiza-
tion of OCLP. This study built six corpora of newspaper articles split into
two time periods. Data were collected from two periods: January 16, 2013, to
September 28, 2014, the period when Occupy Central was first mentioned to
the time it was announced, and September 29, 2014, to December 31, 2014,
from the declaration of Occupy Central to two weeks after the clearance
of those occupying various parts of Hong Kong. The search item “Occupy
Central” was used to retrieve relevant articles from three English language
newspapers, South China Morning Post (SCMP), The Standard, and China
Daily (Hong Kong edition) for both of the time periods (table 6.1). SCMP
was downloaded via Factiva; The Standard and China Daily were down-
loaded from Wise News. SCMP and The Standard corpora were combined for
both periods as they are both Hong Kong-based publications, while the China
Daily is a Beijing-affiliated publication but in a Hong Kong edition, and thus
will likely espouse the official Chinese Communist Party ideological line.
Hard news articles and opinion articles were examined together.
To examine how the words “rule” and “law” were depicted metaphori-
cally in the corpora, ConcGram 1.0 (Greaves 2008), a phraseological search
engine, was used to generate the concordance lines of the two-word conc-
gram rule/law, with 20 words before and after rule/law in order to have suf-
ficient co-text to identify their metaphorical meanings. Concordance analysis
identified metaphor words in the concordance lines to decipher meanings
according to the co-text, following the Metaphorical Identification Procedure
(MIP) developed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007). These potential metaphori-
cal words were then cross-checked against the METALUDE database as a
source of reference. The metaphors in this database were sorted by Goatly
et al. (2002) according to different source domains. In particular, metaphors
following MIP were checked on METALUDE for information about source
domains and metaphorical meanings; those identified were grouped accord-
ing to conceptual metaphors or root analogies. Root analogies are given in
small caps. For example, the lexical word “treasure” as in “my cleaning
Table 6.1 Facts about the News Articles
Opinion Hard news Total No. of Total No. of

Jan 16, 2013–Sept. 28, 2014 Articles Articles Articles Words
SCMP 406 1,115 1,570 801,273
The Standard 66 400 466 206,500
SCM & The Standard 472 1,515 2,063 1,007,773
China Daily 324 180 504 354,879
(Hong Kong edition)
Opinion Hard News Total No. of Total No. of
Sept 29 2014–Dec 31 2014 Articles Articles Articles Words
SCMP 197 654 851 491,980
The Standard 15 304 319 135,846
SCM & The Standard 212 958 1,170 627,826
China Daily 180 170 350 182,464
(Hong Kong edition)
Source: Author created.
190 Chapter 6
lady is a real treasure—she’ll do anything I need” is under the root analogy

human is valuable object/commodity; “treasure,” in this case, means literally
“wealth in the form of jewelry or money” and metaphorically a “likeable,
helpful person” (METALUDE entry for the lexical word “treasure”). After
ascertaining the top root analogies, the study will present examples and dis-
cuss why these particular metaphorical structures are used.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The present study aims to find out in what ways news articles on OCLP by
Hong Kong and Chinese newspapers compare in their metaphorical descrip-
tion of the rule of law in the period of threat of civil disobedience and the
period of realizations of civil disobedience, and possible reasons for the
findings. To address these aims, the study first compared the frequencies and
normalized percentages of the two-word concgram rule/law in the corpora of
newspaper articles. As shown in table 6.2, the normalized percentages of rule/
law in the China Daily in both periods are much higher than those in the cor-
pus of SCMP and The Standard, showing the Beijing-affiliated newspaper’s
emphasis on the rule of law.
As noted by Li and Ye (2016), the ideological slant of the newspaper led
not unexpectedly to polarized views about action. Concordance analysis of
rule/law in the first period of threat of civil disobedience shows that the rule
of law is usually discussed in the context of protecting or following or keep-
ing the rule of law, or what OCLP would do to the rule of law in Hong Kong
if it went ahead, or if the movement continued for a longer period. In the
second period after the threat had been realized, concordance analysis of rule/
law shows an even greater threat.
As in Eagleton (2012), the present study finds repetition, relexicalization,
and explication of metaphors. There is regular repetition of similar meta-
phors across the different corpora in both the threat and realization of threat
periods, reflecting the possibility that the same opinion-makers, who were
by and large the “gatekeepers” of the discussion about political reform, had
written articles across the two periods, and in both newspapers, regardless
of ideological slant. Writers connected to the OCLP often tried to represent
themselves in a less confrontational manner in line with traditional Chinese
cultural thinking. The reasoning of the OCLP supporters was that what they
were doing would ultimately benefit society.
Concordance analysis also shows that the abstract phrase “rule of law”
seems to take on a physical shape as something that could be “attacked,”
“violated,” “damaged,” “eroded,” or “undermined,” while it should be
“respected,” “cherished,” “upheld,” “valued,” and “treasured” as something
Table 6.2 Frequencies and Normalized Percentages of Rule/Law in the Corpora
Normalized Percentages
Jan 16, 2013–Sep 28, 2014 Frequencies of Rule/Law of Rule/Law
SCMP and The Standard 242 0.024%
China Daily (Hong Kong Edition) 351 0.099%
Normalized percentages
Sep 29, 2014—Dec 31, 2014 Frequencies of rule/law of rule/law
SCMP and The Standard 280 0.045%
China Daily (Hong Kong Edition) 209 0.115%
that had made Hong Kong successful, prosperous, and stable. The metaphors
are chiefly verbs and are used to describe something that might change the
status quo or long-held beliefs. This is similar to the “discourse of threat,”
which was discussed earlier and which involves emphasis on a potential
effect when discussing possible scenarios resulting from a threat and its
aftermath (Cap 2017). Since verbs need doers of the action, the nouns and
noun phrases (in italics) identified were: “those who ignore the court’s warn-
ings who undermine the rule of law,” “Benny Tai’s rhetoric presents a chal-
lenge to the rule of law,” and “Occupy Central constitutes a challenge to the
rule of law.” This relates to Ho’s (2019) study in that discursive strategies
of prediction, nomination, and perspectivization were used to construct the
actors involved in this potential action. Compared to verbal metaphors, noun
metaphors that refer to the rule of law are far fewer, realized in “foundation,”
“cornerstone,” “treasure,” “bomb,” and “core values” of Hong Kong (see also
chapter 1 of this book). Verbal and noun metaphors are also combined, such
as “It will erode the foundation of the rule of law and ruin Hong Kong” and
“Challenging the spirit of the rule of law,” where the OCLP campaign would
harm some aspects of the rule of law. Double metaphors were also found; for
example, “As the spirit of the rule of law is fading, while the boundary of the
rule of law is in danger of being breached” describes an aspect of the rule of
law being affected by the OCLP. The term “rule of law,” like “democracy”
as studied by Mey and Ladegaard (2015), can also be pragmatically used
and taken as “law” as being equal to “rule.” This construal casts OCLP as a
law-breaking action. The rule of law is depicted as both a feeling entity and
a structure (a building), with OCLP being an action likely to damage the
structure and render it uninhabitable. This can also be shown by the orienta-
tional nature of some of the metaphors, such as “undermine,” “understand,”
“underlie,” “uphold,” “core,” “centerpiece,” and “under.” Therefore, as “rule
of law” is considered metaphorically a building, one’s position vis-à-vis the
“building” might determine how firm the foundation of this structure would
192 Chapter 6
be, according to the “architects” or “managers” of the building. The follow-

ing sections discuss the major root analogies found and the implications of
these analogies. Many diverse root analogies were identified, but the two
newspaper article corpora in both the threat and the realization periods share
the following:
1. social organization is building

2. importance is centrality
3. good quality/morality is high
4. effect is impact
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IS BUILDING

The most common metaphor between the corpora and in both periods is vari-
ations on “undermine,” especially in the threat period. The literal meaning of
“undermine” is “dig underneath” with the metaphorical meaning of “cause
to fail.” To “undermine” requires a structure to exist, such as a foundation.
These are the most basic structures of either a building or a concept, in this
case, the rule of law (see extracts in table 6.3). The extracts show how this
multi-metaphorization builds up the basic ideological stance that the OCLP
campaign will threaten the basic structures of Hong Kong as an entity.
In the realization period of OCLP (table 6.4), different forms of “under-
mine” are still the most prominent metaphor; however, other verbal meta-
phors make their appearance, such as “collapse,” metaphorically meaning
Table 6.3 Social Organization Is Building (Jan 16, 2013–Sep 28, 2014)
SCMP and The Standard China Daily (Hong Kong Edition)

Undermine/undermining Undermine/undermining
“He says it is an important “Tai’s ‘Occupy Central’ movement will cause huge
counter to what he sees as damage to the local economy as estimated by
increasing ‘mainlandisation’ many experts, and undermine the city’s much
in Hong Kong and the treasured rule of law.”
undermining of the rule of “SMHK holds that Tai and the entire ‘Occupy
law.” Central’ movement are putting Hong Kong’s
“Unlawful activities that future on the line, undermining the rule of law
undermine the rule of law in and creating a threat to the livelihood of the
Hong Kong.” people.”
Foundation stones “One of foundation, cornerstone “The rule of law is
the foundation stones of our the cornerstone of democracy. Without it,
society is the rule of law and democracy cannot work effectively or last
we should respect this and long. Some people demand an ideal form of
not undermine it.” democracy but do not respect the rule of law.”
Table 6.4 Social Organization Is Building (Sep 29, 2014–Dec 31, 2014)
SCMP and The Standard China Daily (Hong Kong Edition)

Undermine/undermining/undermined Undermine/undermining/undermined
“Huang and Chen say the protests have “With the rule of law—one of the key
upset social order and undermined the cornerstones of the city’s economic
foundation of the rule of law.” prosperity and social stability—
“‘We are resolutely opposed to all kinds being relentlessly challenged and
of illegal activities that undermine Hong undermined by ‘Occupy’ protesters,
Kong’s rule of law and social order and concerns are rising that the city’s
firmly support the SAR government in status as an international financial
handling these in accordance with the center and its role as a conduit
law so as to safeguard Hong Kong’s between the mainland and foreign
social stability,’ Yang was quoted as countries could be weakened.”
saying.” Foundation
Cornerstone “‘I think it is time for them to leave the
“The rule of law is the cornerstone streets,’ Tsang wrote, worried that a
of Hong Kong’s success. We can’t prolonged protest will lead to more
violate the rule of law while pursuing conflict that might shake the city’s
democracy.” foundations—including the stability
Collapse of its financial markets and the rule
“Students cry out against the collapse of law.”
of rule of law while standing in an “President Xi Jinping in Beijing on
occupied street, entirely unaware of the Sunday . . . ‘fully affirms and supports’
hypocrisy inherent in that statement.” the Hong Kong SAR Government’s
Built current efforts to maintain social order
“It has been suggested that the rule of and safeguard the rule of law as a
law has been left intact in that those foundation of stability in Hong Kong.”
who have broken the law have come Cornerstone/cornerstones/key
forward to face the legal consequences. cornerstone
Hong Kong is built on rule of law. “The events unfolding on the streets of
Such an argument is tantamount to Hong Kong . . . . are undermining
legitimizing law-breaking activities and rule of law—a key cornerstone for
will not be accepted in our society.” democratic development, as well as
social stability—the foundation of the
city’s economic prosperity.”
“fall down suddenly” or “fail or cease to exist,” and “built” since the threat
had materialized. The metaphor of “undermining” is combined with another
root analogy Effect is Impact (e.g., “safeguard”), since action has to take
place for something to be “undermined.”
IMPORTANCE IS CENTRALITY
The root analogy of importance is centrality is expressed by such words as
“core value,” “core interests,” and “pivotal” (table 6.5). Fewer examples of “core
194 Chapter 6
Table 6.5 Importance Is Centrality (Jan 16, 2013–Sep. 28, 2014)
SCMP & The Standard China Daily (Hong Kong Edition)

Core value/values Core values/core interests
“Democracy and rule of “Hong Kong is a mature citizen society where the core
law are Hong Kong values include the rule of law, fair competition and the
people’s core values” pursuit of freedom, equality and reason.”
“Look, rule of law is “ . . . have not only reaffirmed one of Hong Kong’s core
one of Hong Kong’s values—rule of law- but also flagged a timely warning
core values” to advocates of the ‘Occupy Central’ campaign: Political
appeals are no excuse for illegal activity.”
Pivotal
“History shows convincingly that the rule of law has
played a pivotal role in facilitating the boosting of Hong
Kong’s economy . . . ”
value” were found in the SCMP and The Standard than in the China Daily. This
was to be expected as the China Daily had more opinion articles than the former
and is likely to express the official Beijing line. The “core” is the central and most
crucial part of something, without which something major would happen.
In the realization stage of OCLP, the phrase “core values” is used more fre-
quently in more or less the same way (table 6.6). In many respects, “core values”
are likely to accompany the root analogy of social organization is building
since the latter analogy refers to the most crucial part of a physical structure.
GOOD QUALITY/MORALITY IS HIGH

This refers to the “upholding” of “core values,” such as the “rule of law”
(table 6.7). The adjective “good” in this metaphor reflects the orientational
Table 6.6 Importance Is Centrality (Sep. 28, 2014–Dec. 31, 2014)

Core value/values Core value/values
“Society’s most important core value “In an effort to educate the public on the rule
is the rule of law not democracy.” of law—one of Hong Kong’s core values—
“ . . . seriously affect the rule of the government may distribute copies of
law which is a core value for the the Basic Law at protest sites.”
city’s role as a financial centre.” “Hong Kong is a capitalist society which
Centerpiece regards the rule of law as a core value.
“Importance of the rule of law, In theory ‘Occupy’ is a bona fide radical
the centerpiece of the latest movement. It is designed to weaken the
Communist blueprint.” rule of law, which is the foundation of a
society’s democracy and freedom.”
Table 6.7 Good Quality/Morality Is High (Jan. 16, 2013–Sep. 28, 2014)

Uphold/upheld/maintain Uphold/upholding
“In June, Security Secretary Lai Tung-kwok “A country that does not hold
promised ‘robust action to uphold the rule uphold the rule of law cannot be
of law and maintain public safety and public democratic.”
order.” “I care less who is elected chief
“Hong Kong’s stability and thriving economy executive . . . than I do about
can only be maintained if its rule of law and upholding the rule of law.”
global governance standards are upheld in
the long run.”
nature of most conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). The literal
meaning of “uphold” is “support and grip in a high position”; the metaphori-
cal meaning is “defend or maintain (a law or principle),” according to the
METALUDE online database.
In the realization period when the actual OCLP got underway, the “rule of
law” is used in much the same way (table 6.8).
EFFECT IS IMPACT
An activity must have an effect, as in “cause and effect,” and hence the prom-
inence of effect is impact. The “effect” of OCLP would be “impacted,” that
is, it would be a violent change. This root analogy bifurcates into the actual
Table 6.8 Good Quality/Morality Is High (Sep. 29, 2014—Dec. 31, 2014)
SCMP & The

Standard China Daily (Hong Kong Edition)
Upheld/uphold/ Uphold/upholding
upholding “The temporary injunctions show Hong Kong’s judiciary will not
“While I bow to illegal political pressure and is capable of upholding the
appreciate law as well as dispensing justice.”
the courage “What Hong Kong needs now is a quick return to normality.
shown by the It needs to uphold the rule of law and enter the next stage
protesters, it is of consultation for constitutional change to deliver universal
more important suffrage in 2017.”
to maintain Above
social order “ . . . the current administration must uphold the rule of law as
and uphold the should everyone in Hong Kong including the ‘Occupy’ protesters,
rule of law.” some of whom are legal practitioners. They are not above the rule
of law.”
196 Chapter 6
Table 6.9 Effect Is Impact (Jan. 16, 2013–Sep. 28, 2014

Safeguard Guard
“In the statement, dated July 5, “He felt obligated to speak out to guard the
the association accused ‘an rule-of-law tradition in a society that is
extremely small number of widely admired for its civil freedom.”
radical elements’ of staging the Protect
Occupy Central movement, “His promise is a much-needed assurance
and praised the police for to shore up the confidence of Hong Kong
safeguarding Hong Kong’s rule residents and international investors in the
of law.” SAR government’s and judiciary’s resolve to
protect Hong Kong’s rule of law.”
“effect” (“hit,” “damage,” “destroy,” and “impact”) and how to minimize

or prevent this “effect” if this activity did occur (“guard,” “safeguard,” and
“protect”). See table 6.9 below.
Table 6.10 (below) shows that compared to the threat period, a greater
variety of metaphors under effect is impact, also negative metaphors (“hit,”
Table 6.10 Effect Is Impact (Sep. 29, 2014—Dec. 31, 2014)
China Daily (Hong Kong

SCMP & The Standard Edition)
Impact Safeguard
“There has been much discussion, over the nine “President Xi Jinping on
weeks of protest, about the impact of the Occupy Sunday reaffirmed the central
movement on Hong Kong’s rule of law.” government support . . . .
Protect the SAR government’s efforts
“There is no certain formula that can ensure our to safeguard the rule of law
future, so it is time to end the civil disobedience and maintain social order in
and mend the divide, protect our rule of law . . . ” Hong Kong.”
safeguard “Dealing with illegal activities through Damage
legal means is the best safeguard for the rule of “The unlawful protests will do
law.” more long-term damage to
Hit governance and the rule of
“The occupy movement has already hit Hong Kong’s law.”
rule of law and disrupted social order.” Destroy
Damage “Movement know the best way
“Movement has already done harm . . . and the ‘rule to paralyze . . . but all of
of law’ has been seriously damaged.” Hong Kong is to destroy its
Destroy rule of law.”
“In no circumstances should anyone destroy the rule
of law.”
“damage,” and “destroy”), were used to express similar metaphorical

meanings.
From these four root analogies, one could surmise that the rule of law,
something integral to Hong Kong, would be impacted greatly, if not
destroyed, by OCLP. This appears in both the threat and realization phases.
Since metaphors resonate over a period of time and since all communica-
tion is dialogic (Bakhtin 1981), a metaphor forms a dialogue with other
metaphors and rhetorical structures to have a “synergistic” effect, creating
certain themes (Cameron 2010, 80). Three common themes are in evidence:
(1) the relationship between the rule of law and Hong Kong, (2) the effect of
OCLP on the rule of law, and (3) the relationship between the rule of law and
democracy. Each of the themes is discussed in the following.
The Relationship between the Rule of Law and Hong Kong

The root analogies social organization is building and importance is cen-
trality both point to Hong Kong’s close identification with the rule of law.
The former root analogy uses such metaphors as “foundation” and “corner-
stone,” being crucial elements of a structure, while the latter stresses the qual-
ity and worth of the rule of law as integral to the essence of Hong Kong. The
following excerpt, which contains several metaphors (in italics), highlights
this:
Rule of law is one of Hong Kong’s greatest strengths, an integral part of the core
values ingrained in Hong Kong people’s psyche. It is the cornerstone for Hong
Kong’s many successes. History shows convincingly that the rule of law has
played a pivotal role in facilitating the boosting of Hong Kong’s economy, its
entrance into the world market and transformation into a vibrant cosmopolitan
city. (China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, during the threat period)
All sides in the debate would state that the rule of law is one aspect of what
has made Hong Kong as it is today, as illustrated by the following excerpt from
a government website (https://www.info.gov.hk/info/sar5/elaw_1.htm, no date):
It has often been said that if Hong Kong people have a defining ideology, it is
the rule of law. That is why, since 1997, the rule of law has been the focus of
considerable attention in Hong Kong and for the international community.
It later goes on to add:
The rule of law is one of Hong Kong’s greatest strengths. It is the cornerstone
of Hong Kong’s success as a leading international commercial and financial
198 Chapter 6
centre, providing a secure environment for individuals and organisations and a

level playing field for business.
This kind of sentiment was echoed in similar metaphors throughout the

four corpora studied. The importance of the rule of law above other val-
ues, such as human rights, clean government, freedom, and democracy, as
described in the 2013 Policy Address by the Hong Kong government, will be
discussed in the following section on the relationship between democracy and
rule of law in Hong Kong.
The Effect of OCLP on the Rule of Law

Examining headlines of news reports about future events, Neiger (2007)
found that the “conjectured future” type of discourse had “the highest level of
speculation,” bearing “political import because it provides fertile ground for
releasing trial balloons, magnifying threats, creating solidarity, and justifying
acts of government” (309). This was the focus of many in the anti-Occupy
Central camp in the threat phase. The following extract from China Daily
(Hong Kong Edition) (August 3, 2017) is an example:
“Occupy Central” remains theoretical at this stage, and we might not over-
state its feasibility though. But, the ill-conceived plan has gathered substantial
momentum in the last two months, due to its masterminds’ relentless inflam-
mations. We should come to grasp the reality that “Occupy Central” is merely
a prelude for struggle over the Hong Kong SAR’s political power. We should
instead gain an insight into the matter, and must not treat it lightly. Any neglect
could prove fatal to our city’s sustainable and steady development.
The “conjected future” in this case, at least by one side, is a potentially

dark one. “Occupy Central” is represented as threatening the stability of the
city of Hong Kong. Both social organization is building and importance is
centrality indicate existing and future adverse effects of the OCLP on the
rule of law of Hong Kong. During the “realization” phase, the threat remained
of further deterioration. In social organization is building, sentences using
“undermine” or “undermining” expressed confusion about the differences
between “breaking the law” and “breaking the rule of law.” One legal expert
said that while the protests were breaking the law, they were not “undermin-
ing it, rather it is purposeful law-breaking with a ‘higher ideal’” (Davis 2014).
According to the China Daily (Hong Kong Edition), OCLP convener Benny
Tai “has tried to add a pinch of sacredness to his campaign by calling it ‘civil
disobedience’,” but it is “an abuse of civil disobedience” which “undermine(s)
the city’s much treasured rule of law” (Li 2013). Li’s view was that civil
disobedience is justified only when people “rebel against great injustice in

a highly oppressive society” like the actions of Martin Luther King Jr. and
Nelson Mandela. However, Hong Kong enjoys “a high level of freedom and
civil rights” with readily available “channels for discussions, negotiations and
making compromises on issues, including constitutional reform and election
formats,” thus rendering “civil disobedience unwarranted” (Ibid). Therefore,
since the movement does not fit the criteria for civil disobedience, it breaks
the law. Nevertheless, the occupiers saw it in a completely different light;
in contrast, a basic tenet of the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong was that
“one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws,” as argued by Martin
Luther King Jr when justifying the civil disobedience movement in the 1960s.
Although “traditional” Chinese (i.e., “Confucian”) values still to a certain
extent remain, such as obedience to authority, and social harmony, meaning
that some citizens may not support the disruptive nature of the movement and
may see it as “law-breaking” if they follow the official government narra-
tive, this does not mean that traditional or Confucian values does not support
action against unjust rule. There has been admiration for qing guan (清官),
“upright officials” who have, regardless of the personal sacrifice, dared to
stand up to unjust authority.
The different perspectives of the Chinese Mainland and the West on civil
disobedience can also be seen in the context of Chinese rhetorical topoi.
Typical rhetorical topoi in Chinese discourse throughout the centuries have
involved harmony, loyalty, and Chinese versus foreign and stability (which
is connected to harmony and consensus) (Powers and Kluver 1999). The
discourse of threat and change is important here as the focus of the JD and
the Basic Law was keeping Hong Kong’s systems basically the same after
the reversion of sovereignty, albeit without certain colonial elements. This
folds into the “discourse of threat” and also the “discourse of stability,” with
mainland China focusing on the slogan “stability overrides everything,” after
the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, in Hong Kong after 1967 riots, and in
the lead-up to July 1, 1997.
The Relationship between the Rule of Law and Democracy

According to the Declaration adopted on September 24, 2012, by the United
Nations General Assembly at the High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law at
the National and International Levels, it was reaffirmed that “human rights,
the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.” This
can be seen in the concordance lines when “democracy” was co-selected with
“rule of law” (tables 6.11 and 6.12).
Interestingly, the corpus of SCMP and The Standard newspapers in both
periods had approximately half of the close mentions of the “rule of law” and
200 Chapter 6
Table 6.11 The Relationship between the Rule of Law and Democracy (Jan. 16, 2013–
Sep. 28, 2014)

“Rule of Law and “A democratic culture is consisting of least of the following
Democracy are six: due respect for the rule of law”
core values” “Rule of law is more essential to freedom than democracy”
“Rule of law “Rule of law is the cornerstone for democracy”
underlines “Hong Kong people treasure rule of law more than
successful democracy”
democracy” “Country that cannot uphold the rule of law cannot be
“Rule of law is key democratic” (3 instances)
. . . to carrying out “Democracy without rule of law plunge society into chaos”
democratic reform” (2 instances)
(3 instances) “Without the rule of law—the name of democracy will be
“Rule of law underlies tarnished”
every successful “Rule of law is an integral part of democracy”
democracy” (3 “Demand ideal form of democracy but do not respect the
instances) rule of law”
“Rule of law is “Democracy is a precondition to the rule of law”
the bedrock of “Democracy is the foundation of the rule of law” (2
democracy” instances)
“democracy” than did China Daily in both periods. Again, this is probably
due to the larger amount of opinion articles in the China Daily (Hong Kong
Edition) and its agenda of promoting the Beijing government’s line. China
Daily emphasizes that the rule of law is what should come first and what
democracy’s attitude to the rule of law should be, as in “it has to respect the
rule of law” and “the rule of law is the cornerstone of democracy” (social
organization is building). A society that cannot uphold the law cannot have
democracy (Good Quality/Morality is High), and the rule of law is more
important than democracy (Importance is Centrality).
The following stances were observed to occur in most of the Hong Kong-
based and China-based newspaper article corpora:
1. Other people’s views are being ignored by the protesters.

2. Their idea of universal suffrage is not necessarily the only right one.
3. The protesters’ basis for protesting about democracy is wrong.
4. Democracy is a dangerous topic.
5. The rule of law is quite fragile.
This finding is also related to “democracy,” and in this case to universal

suffrage. Like the “rule of law,” “democracy” is also an “essentially contested
concept” (Gallie 1956) as has been shown throughout this book so far. To
Table 6.12 Relationship between the Rule of Law and Democracy (Sep 29–Dec 31,
2014)

“A senior mainland official “Rule of law is the true basis of democracy” (2
has asked Hongkongers to instances)
contemplate the relationship “Amounts to saying that democracy is not a
between democracy and the rule necessary condition for the rule of law”
of law” “Carrie Lam emphasized that the rule of law is
“Wants us to contemplate the vital for democracy” (2 instances)
relationships between the ‘one “Essentially the opposition camp is fighting for
country’ and the ‘two systems,’ so-called genuine democracy at the expense
between democracy and the rule of the rule of law”
of law.” “The rule of law is fundamental to democracy”
“If you want peace and social order “It [the protests] shows their lack of respect for
you should treasure the rule of the spirit of democracy and the rule of law”
law more than democracy” “This would allow them to pursue democracy
“Society’s most important core while respecting the rule of law”
value is the rule of law, not “Democracy and the rule of law are the two
democracy” pillars that ensure Hong Kong is a rule-based
“Seeking democracy at the society”
expense of the rule of law is not “Democracy is not a necessary condition for
democracy” the rule of law”/“We can’t violate the rule of
“When people discover that that law while pursuing democracy”
‘true democracy’ is false or “Protesters understand that in the West rule of
pushed so far as to undermine law is the cornerstone of democracy”
the rule of law”
“Real democracy strengthens the
rule of law”
recap, this is because it is a term that has multiple meanings, a state which
characterizes the language of ideology that is “pervaded with political and
moral interests” and “shaped in a cultural setting” (Irving 2012, 1). Again,
essentially contested concepts are “concepts the proper use of which inevi-
tably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their
users,” and these disputes “cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence,
linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone” (Gray 1977, 344). Essentially
contested concepts involve widespread agreement on a concept; for example,
fairness and democracy, but not the best realization of this concept, that is,
democracy in action as a governance system or the rule of law as a judicial
system (this has implications when political regime change occurs).
The common themes listed above can be explained by both historical
legacies of the rule of law in Hong Kong as mentioned earlier in the chapter
and the constitutional principle of the “One Country, Two Systems,” which
was for the reunification of China during the early 1980s. The last Governor
202 Chapter 6
of Hong Kong Chris Patten’s Handover speech of June 30, 1997, wanted to
leave a legacy that since became mythologized: “as British administration
ends, we are, I believe, entitled to say that our own nation’s contribution
here was to provide the scaffolding that enabled the people of Hong Kong
to ascend.” These things were, according to Chris Patten, “The rule of law.
Clean and light-handed government. The values of a free society. The begin-
nings of representative government and democratic accountability.” The
rule of law had assumed political and ideological importance in Hong Kong
because it was seen as the most crucial factor differentiating Hong Kong
from mainland China (Cullen 2005). Hong Kong, as a part of China, meant
that various stakeholders attempted to reconcile the concept to “fit” into quite
different political systems, such as juxtaposing the rule of law discourse with
the discourse of law and order as mentioned earlier.
Regarding “One Country, Two Systems,” the discussion in Hong Kong
about the rule of law during the OCLP seems to display confusion over
“breaking the law” and “breaking the rule of law.” This could relate to inter-
preting the meaning of the expression in one system (Hong Kong) in the
context of another system (Beijing). Those who push the “two systems” in the
“One Country, Two Systems” framework tended to be of the pan-democratic
camp and follow Western tradition; those who follow the establishment or
Beijing line in Hong Kong or mainland China’s focus on the “one country”
part of the equation (Eagleton 2012).
In 1997, the Chinese Communist Party decided to make the rule of law
a basic strategy and “building a socialist country under the rule of law” an
important goal for socialist modernization (State Council 2011). However,
the definition of “rule of law” is different from what it is in the West. The
phrase in Chinese is fazhi (法治), composed of fa (法) meaning “law” and zhi
(治) meaning “to govern.” In the case of fazhi that phenomenon has led to two
similar but distinct translations in Chinese-English dictionaries: “rule of law”
and “rule by law.” While the two phrases may seem similar, they actually
have very different connotations. The Chinese language lacks prepositions;
the preposition “of” and “by” can make a large difference to meaning and
give rise to alternative interpretations, particularly when used by gatekeepers
of a discourse.
In contrast to “rule of law,” the concept of “rule by law” sees the govern-
ing authority as somehow being above the law and has the power to create
and implement law if they feel that it is necessary, despite its effect on other
rights or freedoms that the public may enjoy. Rule by law is used by people
in power to shape public behavior, and maybe in terms of governing the
country. People have no choice but to obey or risk the chance to be thrown in
prison (Van Norman Law, no date).
In the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party in 2014, the party leadership wrote in a communique that only if the
“rule of law is vigorously enforced under party leadership can people be the
masters of their own affair” (Liao 2014). In other words, the state is a reflec-
tion of the will of the people, and the law will better serve citizens when it
is seen as an instrument of the state. In addition, the official media used a
longer phrase, “ruling the country according to law,” to describe the agenda.
“Ruling according to law” (依法治国) could be taken as being somewhat
semantically different from the rule of law (法治). In Jiang Zemin’s report
delivered to the 15th Party Congress in 1997 (“ruling according to law”) was
officially defined as:
Under the leadership of the Party, the general public participate in governance
. . . according to the Constitution and state laws . . . and gradually institutional-
ize and legalize socialist democracy, so that such institutions, legislations, and
legal decisions will not be susceptible to changes when the occupants of the
leaders’ offices change or the leaders” opinions or focuses of attention change.
Therefore, to rule according to law is to have the rule of law. (Jiang 1997)
Thus acts that were “against the law” (i.e., illegal acts) could be seen as
threatening the whole legal system which makes the legal system seem rather
fragile. The Chinese Communist Party pledges to operate under the primacy
of the law, yet it insists on Party supremacy in all matters, including the law.
Anything seen as threatening the socialist system could be deemed as being
against the law. Thus there is a contradiction between legal rule and party rule;
the Socialist rule of law could be seen as “political oxymoron” (Liao 2014)
since the Chinese Communist Party takes precedence over everything. It is
immediately apparent that OLCP’s actions could be come to be seen by the
Chinese Communist Party as a threat to its own definition of the rule of law.
THE FAILURE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN OCLP
Civil disobedience is a recognized legal principle in the Hong Kong courts,

as it is a common law system, and many agreed with the protesters concerns,
political environment being, at least, partially liberal. To explain why this is
a failure, three factors need to be taken into consideration.
First, Hong Kong is a postcolonial society that remains still quite conserva-
tive; second, there is disconnect in political accountability in Hong Kong’s
system (being decolonized but without being given independence); and third,
the judiciary has become increasingly politicized.
204 Chapter 6
First, as a postcolonial society, Hong Kong remains quite conservative.

While Hong Kong could be considered more liberal than other territories in
the region, colonial (not to mention Confucian) values of order and authority
were still important values. As mentioned earlier, some colonial laws (like the
Public Order Ordinance),4 were opposed by anticolonial activists and finally
amended by Chris Patten, the last governor. However, these were reinstated
after the handover in 1997.
Second, there is a lack of political accountability to the public in Hong
Kong’s system. The decision on universal suffrage on August 31, 2014, was
made by Beijing officials who were not concerned with public opinion in
Hong Kong and who considered too much freedom in elections to be danger-
ous (remember earlier reaction, see chapter 2). The potential to create politi-
cal pressure through civil disobedience was limited.
Lastly, the Beijing authorities had put forward the new concept of China’s
“comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong in June 2014,5 and repeatedly
emphasized that the judiciary is part of Hong Kong’s governing team and
should actively enforce Beijing’s jurisdiction. It has furthermore cultivated
a public environment in which civil disobedience is seen as an eccentric and
ultimately selfish challenge to public order (through the pro-Beijing Chinese
press and the establishment). This limited the appeal of civil disobedience, to
a certain extent, and was risky in view of Beijing’s willingness to use retali-
ation when its authority is challenged (Veg 2019).
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

OF THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG
In 2015, 2017, and 2018, a number of “occupiers” had been prosecuted by

the Department of Justice of the HKSAR, being charged with inciting others
or conspiring to commit public nuisance, and with taking part in an unlawful
assembly. Benny Tai had expressed that he would be willing to plead guilty as
“a guilty plea aligns with the spirit of civil disobedience—the central theme
of the 79-day Occupy demonstrations” (Ng 2017). Tai was found guilty in
a trial that only commenced in late 2018, jailed for 16 months in April 2019
alongside some of his colleagues, the “Umbrella Nine” as they were known
(Lau and Sum 2019); and he was dismissed from his job at Hong Kong
University in July 2020 (BBC 2020a; Lau and Sum 2019). Despite the end
of OCLP, the discourse of threat continued in 2019 when a sustained series
of protests broke out utilizing the opposite strategy of “occupying”; that is,
by “being water” (i.e., being flexible). Further, in 2020, the introduction of
the National Security Law, a direct consequence of the 2019 protests, whose
origins lay in the abortive OCLP/Umbrella Movement would again bring
further discussion of the rule of law in Hong Kong. But before these events,
the discourse took a “Mainland” linguistic and discursive turn, in conjunction
with certain government acts and measures that saw greater economic and
geographical connections with the Mainland.
NOTES
1. The part of this chapter that analyzes metaphors of the rule of law has been
adapted from W. Cheng and J. Eagleton “The rule of law and the Threat of Civil
Disobedience in Hong Kong: Metaphorical Structures in Local Media Coverage.”
The Linguistics Journal 13, no. 1, 173–196. https://www.elejournals.com/linguistics
-journal/linguistics-journal-volume-13-issue-1-2019/.
2. Articles containing the phrases “rule of law” and “universal suffrage” in the first
ten years of Hong Kong as an SAR (1997–2007) are almost in similar proportions in
all the newspapers used in the earlier chapters: Apple Daily (446), Ming Pao Daily
(367), Ta Kung Pao (311), and South China Morning Post (331).
3. The “They Can Kill This City” video can be viewed at https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=QEH_TdDwXjo.
4. The Public Order Ordinance can be found at Historical Laws of Hong Kong
Online, see https://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/items/show/2969.
5. “The Practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region” (「一國兩制」在香港特別行政區的實踐) was a
White Paper issued by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China on June 10, 2014. “Comprehensive jurisdiction” over the territory
meant that “The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a
decentralized power,” it said. “It is the power to run local affairs as authorised by the
central leadership.” The White Paper can be found at: http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/
eng/Topics/pth/t1164061.htm.
Chapter 7
The Mainlandization of Hong

Kong Political Discourse
The previous chapter discussed how a concept, the “rule of law,” became a
“core value” of Hong Kong, how it was seen as a metaphor before and after
the Occupy Central/Umbrella Movement, why that movement failed, and
future implications for the rule of law in Hong Kong. This chapter moves
away from metaphor to detail how Hong Kong officials had to transpose
and adapt the language of an authoritarian governing system for use in Hong
Kong where the rights and freedoms of it as an SAR of China with a high
degree of autonomy were supposed to remain undisturbed. It will show
the problematic and contested nature of Hong Kong’s political discourse
under its “One Country, Two Systems” governance framework where an
authoritarian system meets a semi-democratic liberal society, in a number of
discourse-analytical ways. First, through an analysis of the change in wording
and emphasis in the Basic Law Fact Sheet in 2015 as a response to changes
in the political situation. Second, thought an analysis of the revision of the
account of the 1967 riots on the Hong Kong Police website as well as some
changes in how Chinese sovereignty was to be handled in proposed school
textbooks. Third, the rise of “independence talk” on university campuses and
a controversy over a talk given by a political party advocating independence
will be discussed in the light of the status of Hong Kong’s freedoms and
“high degree of autonomy.” Finally, reaction to overseas criticism of changes
occurring in Hong Kong shows how the intermixing of Mainland and Hong
Kong discourses is taking place. The next section begins with a brief defini-
tion of “mainlandization.”
207
208 Chapter 7
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY “MAINLANDIZATION”?
“Mainlandization” in the Hong Kong context means integration of Hong

Kong politically, economically, socially, and culturally into the Mainland,
the “One Country” (Lo 2008; Kong 2017). These aspects of mainlandization
will be discussed in more detail in the first half of chapter 9. Mainlandization
also extends to language. Hong Kong’s political self as a part of the “One
Country, Two Systems” framework means that two “discourses” come into
contact with each other and possibly intermix. Because Hong Kong is part of
this framework, people have to think from two different radically different
perspectives. As more integration with the Mainland takes place, it could be
assumed that it would be more likely that the discourse of the “One Country”
would be adopted.
Hong Kong government press releases and statements have increasingly
used the vocabulary and phrasing of the Central People’s Government, giv-
ing the impression that they are aligned with decisions made in Beijing and
act with the latter’s blessing (Hui and Kopf 2020). The aim seems to be to
reinforce China’s national sovereignty; refute criticism and justify the Hong
Kong government’s own actions; and redefine previously held concepts to
better align them with the Communist Party’s ideology. Mainlandization of
discourse also means revising the historical narrative. This change in official
Hong Kong discourse began in 2014 at the end of Occupy Central/Umbrella
Movement. An easily missed example was changing a key concept of the
“One Country, Two Systems”; this was the “stealth” revision of the Basic
Law Fact Sheet.1
REVISION OF THE BASIC LAW FACT SHEET
The Hong Kong government’s Fact Sheets provide “useful information about
Hong Kong on a comprehensive range of topics,”2 according to the official
ideology on that topic. The following is how the Basic Law Fact Sheet
appeared on the Hong Kong government website on August 2013:
The Basic Law is a constitutional document for the HKSAR. It enshrines within
a legal document the important concepts of “one country, two systems,” “a high
degree of autonomy” and “Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong.”
The following version of the Fact Sheet appeared on December 16, 2014:3
The Basic Law is a constitutional document for the HKSAR. It enshrines within
a legal document the important concepts of “one country, two systems,” “Hong
The Mainlandization of Hong Kong Political Discourse 209
Kong People administering Hong Kong” and a high degree of autonomy. It also
prescribes the various systems to be practised in the HKSAR.
There are two major differences between the two versions. First, “Hong
Kong people ruling Hong Kong” becomes “Hong Kong people administrat-
ing Hong Kong” and second, “high degree of autonomy” now comes after
“administering” and without question marks, rather than quotation from a
document. Thus the emphases of these three “important concepts” which are
“enshrined within a legal document” have been changed.
In the Chinese version of the Fact Sheet, the phrase for “Hong Kong people
administering Hong Kong” remains the same at “港人治港,” but the order
has been changed to place the high degree of autonomy last and the quoted
voice removed, so it changes from “「一國兩制」, 「高度自治」和「港
人治港」” in the previous Fact Sheet to “「一國兩制」, 「港人治港」,
高度自治等” in the current Fact Sheet. The Chinese character zhi (治) can mean
either “to govern” or “to rule.” Arguably, this could also be translated as “admin-
ister,” although other Chinese words for “administer” are “管” or “管理”).
Ruling, or Administering with a “High Degree of Autonomy”

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “ruling” as a transitive verb
means to “direct, guide, manage (a thing); to have under one’s control,”
while “administer” in the same dictionary is “to carry out or oversee the
tasks necessary for the running of (an organization) . . . to manage the affairs
of (an institution, community, etc.).”4 Arguably, “administering” could be
taken as being less than “ruling.” The timing of this change is significant as
the last occupied site of the Occupy Central movement (in Causeway Bay)
was cleared by police on December 15, 2014. Perhaps occupying various
key spaces in Hong Kong and disrupting transport was too much “to have
under one’s control,” and this perhaps reverberates with Donald Tsang’s
idea that “democracy taken to its fullest swing” would result in a “Cultural
Revolution” that was mentioned in chapter 5. For as Regina Ip, current leg-
islative/executive counselor and former secretary for security in 2003 during
Article 23 controversy had said:
Occupy is an attempt to redefine “one country, two systems” and, by implica-

tion, Hong Kong’s relationship with China. By rejecting the decision of the
National People’s Congress Standing Committee of August 31, which ensures
Beijing’s say on the outcome of the chief executive election in 2017 via the
nominating committee, the Occupy demonstrators are effectively saying no to
China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. (Ip 2014)
210 Chapter 7
By “effectively saying no to China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong,” they

could be said to be attempting to “truly rule” themselves.
The Hong Kong government argued that there was no change in meaning,
and that this was merely a correction or a repetition of an English interpre-
tation and that it was “purely based on editorial refinement considerations”
(Hong Kong Gov. January 7, 2015):
The recent update of the topical “Hong Kong Fact Sheets—The Basic Law”
made some editorial refinements and did not involve revisions of any content
and information. In fact, public documents about the policy initiatives of the
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB) submitted to the Panel
on Constitutional Affairs of the Legislative Council by the Bureau have also
adopted the order of “one country, two systems,” “Hong Kong people adminis-
tering Hong Kong” and a high degree of autonomy. As such, the order used in
the “Hong Kong Fact Sheets” is not exceptional.
The justification for the change in the English version was “consistency
of word choice” because it seems that “administer” appeared elsewhere.
“Administer was first used in the Hong Kong Yearbook 2007” and
because Clause 1 of Article 22 of the Basic Law reads “the affairs which
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in
accordance with this Law (Ibid.)” The government also stated that as the
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau had also adopted the transla-
tion of “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” in its replies to
the questions on the estimates of expenditure in the Legislative Council
(Ibid).
The government also stated that “any update of background information
or editorial refinements will not affect the legal effect of the provisions or
the underlying principles of the Basic Law” (Ibid). However, Hong Kong
people at this sensitive time, just after the end of the OCLP/Umbrella
Movement, would naturally see this as “exceptional” and in response to
recent events.
Interestingly, the month before the change in the Fact Sheet, the
Legislative Council was to debate the motion “Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong” on November 12 (at the height of OCLP/Umbrella Movement).
The motion on “devising the constitution by all people, making a new cov-
enant, and realizing genuine ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ (Hong
Kong Gov., November 10, 2014); the motion was proposed by democrat
legislator and radio host Wong Yuk-man. Among other things, the motion
wanted,
after the passage of a new constitution by referendum of Hong Kong people,

dual universal suffrage for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council elec-
tions should be conducted with nominations jointly endorsed by citizens, so as
to manifest “direct democracy” and realize genuine “Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong.” (Ibid)
This motion was later defeated.

However, in August 2021 the old wording of “Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong” could still be found on the main website of the Constitutional
and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB), despite using it for submission to the
Legislative Council earlier.5 Whether this was just an oversight on the part of
the official webmaster is unclear.
However, looking through Hong Kong government press releases in the
first ten years of Hong Kong SAR, “administering” is rarely to be found.
“Administering Hong Kong” appears to be used almost exclusively since late
2014.
Ever since the transition on July 1, 1997, there has also been extensive
discussion that a “high degree of autonomy” was not the same as “total auton-
omy.” Only foreign affairs and military were under the remit of the Central
People’s Government. And reiterations that “without the one country, there
would not be a second system” and thus the “one country” should take prior-
ity. Therefore, it could be seen that “people taking to the streets” in protests
and “suggesting referendums” (see chapters 3 and 4) are too similar to “full
autonomy” (i.e., “independence”) for Beijing’s liking.
A White Paper, The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was issued by the Information
Office of the State Council of China on June 10, 2014, and stated that “The high
degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes
solely from the authorization by the central leadership” (State Council 2014).
This high degree of autonomy, it went, was “not full autonomy, nor a decentral-
ized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central lead-
ership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the
central leaderships’ authorization” (Ibid). This means the autonomy that Hong
Kong receives was what the central leadership saw fit to give it. Before we take
up the matter of autonomy and independence in several controversial incidents,
we will look at how the historical narrative is undergoing some changes.
However, the word “ruling” was never taken by Hong Kongers to mean
sovereign independence (at least not before 2014), but gave Hong Kong
people the confidence, except in the areas of foreign affairs and defense, that
the Hong Kong government would be responsible for formulating all other
policy areas, not just “administering” policies given to it by Beijing. Perhaps
212 Chapter 7
this was a reminder of the time when the British had asked China that in
exchange for its sovereignty, Britain could maintain its position as adminis-
trator of the city.6
THE NEAR-PAST AS DISCURSIVE BATTLEGROUND
Historical Revisionism on the Hong Kong Police Website

We often learn just as much about history from the way history is told as from
the events themselves. History is often revised (Riley 2020).7 It gets rewritten
for the purpose of the historical account, the availability of new evidence, and
the level of objectiveness of the writer in selecting evidence for the account.
Then there are the social, political, and psychological paradigms of the time.
In that sense, all historians who conduct research are “revisionists.” In Hong
Kong’s case, there are clashing ideologies that need to be reconciled. In
September 2015, changes were made to the Hong Kong Police website about
the 1967 riots that took place in Hong Kong.
The police response to accusations of “rewriting history” when these omis-
sions and changes were discovered was that the changes were to “simplify
the contents” and there was no question of “political or other purposes.” The
Commissioner of Police wanted to make it more “accessible to today’s read-
ers” as they “want to get information quickly.”
The 1967 riots were large-scale clashes between pro-Communists and their
sympathizers and the Hong Kong government. While originating as a minor
labor dispute, tensions later grew into large-scale demonstrations against
British colonial rule. Demonstrators clashed violently with the Hong Kong
Police Force. Leftists called for massive strikes and organized demonstra-
tions, while the police stormed many of the leftists’ strongholds and placed
their leaders under arrest.
The missing details would later be reinstated on its archived website, but
more historical details would be added a little later to make the account
“fuller,” but still making it different from what was originally on the web-
site. Instead of posting the latest amended version on its website, the Police
inserted a hyperlink to a ten-page PDF file under the section “Modern Era
1945-1967.”8
In the following, the original version is shown before the revised version.
If there is a “reinstated” version, that is also included.
Original Version
This brief flurry was but a rehearsal for the following spring in 1967. In China,
the political turmoil spread and eventually lashed Hong Kong. The 1967
disturbances were preceded with a series of labour disputes between mid-April

and late-May, which escalated into violent conflict between workers and the
police and finally resulted in massive protests and demonstrations against
the government. Besides, inflamed by rhetoric, fuelled by misplaced ideas of
nationalism, huge mobs waving Mao’s quotations and chanting slogans rallied
at Government House for several times from mid-May onwards.
“Huge mobs waving Mao’s quotations and chanting slogans rallied at

Government House” was changed to “Huge mobs finally rallied at Government
House” in the update (emphasis added):
Revised Version
This brief flurry was but a rehearsal for the following spring in 1967. In China,
the political turmoil spread and eventually lashed Hong Kong. The 1967 distur-
bances were preceded with a series of labour disputes between mid-April and
late-May, which escalated into violent conflict between workers and the police
and finally resulted in massive protests and demonstrations against the govern-
ment. Besides, inflamed by rhetoric, fuelled by misplaced ideas of nationalism,
huge mobs marched on Government House for several times from mid-May
onwards.
Although removing “marched on Government House” may be “simplifying”

the information and “making it more accessible” to readers, you could say
that the “ideological” part of the phrase was removed to fit in with Hong
Kong’s post-colonial rulers’ emphasis on stability.
A passage removed from the original account which read “demonstrators
. . . waving aloft the Little Red Book and shouting slogans” was later rein-
stated but is presented alongside a description depicting the overall mood as
“not chaotic in the first few days” and of “reasonably good order” (emphases
added):
Starting from May 19, demonstrators launched large scale protest activities
outside the Government House. They dressed in white shirts and dark trousers,
waving aloft the Little Red Book and shouting slogans.8 Generally speaking, the
situation was not chaotic in the first few days and “the demonstrators managed
to maintain reasonably good order”; while “the government exercised restraint
in the first few days of the protests.”9 [Footnotes were added, indicated here by
the superscript numbers.]
In a passage describing gunfire from the Chinese side of the border at Shau
Tau Kok:
214 Chapter 7
Original Version
In the most serious single incident of that year of violence, communist militia
opened fire from the Chinese side of the border in Sha Tau Kok. Five policemen
were shot dead in a hail of bullets with eleven others injured.
The revised account uses the word “gunmen” instead of the deleted “commu-
nist militia” and leaves the identity of those involved open to interpretation
(emphasis added):
Revised Version
In the most serious single incident of that year of violence, gunmen opened fire
from the Chinese side of the border in Sha Tau Kok. Five policemen were shot
dead in a hail of bullets with eleven others injured.
There was a reinstated version in which extra information was added with
footnotes listing other sources about who the gunmen could possibly be:
Reinstated Version
In the most serious single incident of that year of violence, gunmen opened fire
from the Chinese side of the border in Sha Tau Kok. Five policemen were shot
dead in a hail of bullets with eleven others injured.12 The true identity of the
gunmen could not established and there were different versions of them ranging
from (1) “communist militia”; 13 (2) “Chinese militia”; 14 (3) “villagers in the
border area”; 15 (4) “villagers in the immediate vicinity”; 16 to (5) “unknown
gun-men in the Mainland.”17 [Footnotes were added, indicated here by the
superscript numbers.]
Lawrence Ho Ka-Ki from the Education University’s Department of Social

Science, whose bibliographies were cited in the revised website, said that
“Listing all academic arguments made the account more objective” as “schol-
ars have different views on the riots” (Leung 2015). This, although true, gives
the impression of uncertainty concerning the usual account of events, possi-
bly written before 1997 and the departure of Great Britain.
Regarding where bombs were made during the 1967 riots was also con-
sidered a sensitive subject, since where they were made were elided in the
revised version:
Original Version
Those early days in May 1967 were the start of a torrid, worrying summer. From
mid-July, the mass protests tapered off, to be replaced by a campaign of terror
and bombing. Bombs were made in classrooms of left-wing schools and planted
indiscriminately on the streets.
A general reference to what was carried out with these bombs in the revised
version (emphasis added):
Revised Version
Those early days in May 1967 were the start of a torrid, worrying summer. From
mid-July, the mass protests tapered off, to be replaced by a campaign of terror
and bombing.
The police then reinstated the original account’s assertion that bombs were
made in “classrooms of left-wing schools and bombs were planted indis-
criminately on the streets,” inserting doubt by quoting a source: “There were
reports that bombs were made in classrooms of left-wing schools and planted
indiscriminately on the streets” (emphasis added):
Reinstated Version
Those early days in May 1967 were the start of a torrid, worrying summer.
From mid-July, the mass protests tapered off, to be replaced by a campaign of
terror and bombing. There were reports that “bombs were made in classrooms
of left-wing schools and planted indiscriminately on the streets.”19 [A footnote
was added, indicated here by the superscript numbers.]
These changes to the Hong Kong Police’s website can easily be linked to
“identity” issues and the increasing emphasis on the “one country” by the Beijing
and the Hong Kong governments, and to see the former in a better light, and be
less embarrassing in light of how the Cultural Revolution was depicted since.
Since the early 1990s, Communist Party supporters, including some who
participated in the riots, joined the pro-Beijing party Democratic Alliance
for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong party (the DAB) since the
reversion of sovereignty would entail new respectability (Hong Wrong 2016).
In 2001, Yeung Kwong, a pro-Communist Party activist of the 1960s, was
awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal by then Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa.
The event was a symbolic gesture that raised controversy as to whether the
post-1997 government of the time approved the riot.
Textbooks Are Also a Historical Battleground

In 2018, Hong Kong and Beijing officials emphasized the need for students
in the city to learn more about Mainland history and to understand Hong
216 Chapter 7
Kong in a national context. A review panel reporting to the Education

Bureau rejected as “inappropriate wording” phrases referring to Hong
Kong’s colonial past in a history textbook that had been submitted to them
for publication approval. Concerns about Beijing’s influence on Hong
Kong’s book industry arose after it was found that China’s Liaison Office in
Hong Kong indirectly owned over half of the SAR’s bookshops (Mannering,
Yu, and Zhao 2018). Attempts to introduce patriotic “national education”
curriculum into Hong Kong schools in 2012 led to huge protests that year,
forcing it to be put on hold. However, the push to instill a sense of Chinese
national identity is frequently repeated in Hong Kong government rhetoric
as in Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s first Policy Address in 2018, where she
announced that Chinese history would be taught as a compulsory subject at
the junior secondary level from the end of that year. The thinking was that
this would help students become knowledgeable and responsible citizens
“with a sense of our national identity, and contribute to our country and our
society” (Ibid).
Proposed changes to the Chinese history curriculum in 2018 put Hong
Kong’s past within a national context, an approach the Education Bureau
said was “natural, reasonable, and logical” and supported by teachers (Ibid).
Previously, pro-establishment politicians had accused liberal studies, a man-
datory subject that promoted critical thinking, as promoting anti-government
sentiment since it had a wide-ranging remit in topics that could be covered—
which included politics.
Textbook review panels for the Chinese history subject in 2018 made nega-
tive comments on the contents of certain textbooks submitted for review (that
the Education Bureau had to pass later). There were several offending terms
and expressions listed, but the ones concerning sovereignty will only be dealt
with here: The following were deemed to have “inappropriate wording”:
“China recovered Hong Kong”

“The transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to Mainland China”
“China insisted on recovering Hong Kong’s sovereignty”
(Hong Kong Gov., May 2, 2018)
Questioned about these phrases in reviewed textbooks, Education Secretary

Kevin Yeung stated that China had never given up sovereignty of Hong
Kong. Earlier, how Hong Kong’s history was depicted on internet websites
was generally along the lines of something like the following: China ceded
Hong Kong Island to the British when the First Opium War ended in 1842.
The lease to the New Territories was signed in 1898, and after more than
100 years of colonial rule, Britain returned the territory to China in 1997.
However, this could be seen as “over-simplification” as implied by Secretary

for Education Kevin Yeung:
If unsupported viewpoints and stances, over-simplification of the cause-and-

effect relationship of historical events, and inconsistency in presentation of
viewpoints between textbooks and primary source materials, which may mis-
lead students about the sources of the viewpoints concerned, are spotted in
textbooks, textbook review panels will comment on them. (Hong Kong Gov.
May 2, 2018).
Yeung also said that the standard acceptable wording in textbooks had
to be reviewed within the “context.” “I am only saying that if we just
look at this sentence [on sovereignty], I personally think it is problem-
atic,” he said. Yeung is saying that the sentence is problematic without
context.
Since Yeung stated that China has always had sovereignty over Hong
Kong, thus school textbooks should not describe the 1997 Handover as a
transfer of, or taking back of, sovereignty (Cheng, K. 2018a). For China had
resumed exercising sovereignty as “It has never given up the sovereignty,”
because:
The United Nations also accepted that Hong Kong and Macau were not colo-
nies. Factually and historically, Hong Kong’s sovereignty was in the country’s
hands. There was no such issue of transfers of sovereignty, or taking back of
sovereignty. (Ibid)
Yeung is referring to the United Nations General Assembly adoption of

Resolution 2908 nearly 50 years ago. One of the Resolution’s effects was the
removal of Hong Kong and Macau from the UN’s list of non-self-governing
territories. Consequently, Hong Kong and Macau, once considered colonized
peoples, lost their right to self-determination in the 1960’s UN “Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (United
Nations 1960). This is also the Mainland’s view although the point was more
forcefully made in 2020:
Before 1997, Britain regarded Hong Kong as its “overseas territory,” an alias
for colony. However, Hong Kong was in fact not a colony; it was merely under
the colonial rule of the British. It is very important to note the difference, which
will help us understand the significance of Hong Kong’s return to the mother-
land and see the ulterior motives of Britain’s “glorious retreat” as well as the
absurdity of Hong Kong independence. (Xiao 2020)
218 Chapter 7
Continual lack of identification with the Mainland (and downplaying its

sovereignty) as well as an increased sense of local “Hong Kong-ness,” despite
government attempts at increasing emotional links with the Mainland, meant
continual discussions and controversies on what “high degree autonomy”
meant. “Autonomy” (and “independence”) were contested terms as will be
noted in the following section.
FULL AUTONOMY = INDEPENDENCE

= SELF-DETERMINATION
To Beijing, full autonomy seemed to be equivalent to “independence” and

“self-determination”: “self-determination was merely a different expression
of independence: It’s the same, no matter what they say—it’s just a different
choice of words, but the nature is the same” (Cheung, K. 2018). These terms
need to be defined as were contested by various groups. Since “independence”
and to a lesser extent “self-determination” are the focus on this next section,
clarification of terminology is necessary. Self-determination according to the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization means (emphasis added):
Essentially, the right to self-determination is the right of a people to determine

its own destiny. In particular, the principle allows a people to choose its own
political status and to determine its own form of economic, cultural and social
development. Exercise of this right can result in a variety of different out-
comes ranging from political independence through to full integration within
a state. The importance lies in the right of choice, so that the outcome of a
people’s choice should not affect the existence of the right to make a choice.
(https://unpo.org/article/4957)
As per the quotation above, “self-determination” could be linked to the idea of

independence, the condition of a person, nation, country, or state in which its
residents and population, or some portion thereof, exercise self-government,
and usually sovereignty, over its territory. The opposite of independence is
the status of a dependent territory (Ibid). For Hong Kong people, who have
not had much opportunity to chart their own political development, despite
being told previously that Hong Kong people now ruled Hong Kong after the
1997 Handover (before the change to “administer”), self-determination is a
problematic concept. It is problematic within the context of a high degree of
(but not total) autonomy.
The key article in the Basic Law that is relevant to this discussion of indepen-
dence/self-determination is Article 1: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.” According

to the OED it means “Not alienable; that cannot be alienated or transferred
from its present ownership or relation”.9 In the next section, we will look at
some controversial incidents where the topics (and meaning) of Hong Kong’s
independence and self-termination became prominent.
THE RISE OF “INDEPENDENCE TALK” AND THE

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT’S REACTION
Talk of “Hong Kong’s independence” was rare in Hong Kong politics prior
to 2014 (Kwong 2016). The failure of political reform for the last decade and
the Umbrella Movement meant a drop in trust toward the Beijing government
over the years (HKUPOP, no date). The failure of traditional democratic par-
ties in recent years saw a shift to the discourse of the “local” rather than the
“national” as mentioned in chapter 3. This was because “localists” (as they
were called) had their focus on Hong Kong and called for either less inter-
vention in the city by Beijing or even independence for Hong Kong (Kwong
2016).
On January 16, 2015, Chief Executive Leung Chung-ying accused
Undergrad, the official magazine of the University of Hong Kong Student
Union, of “advocating independence” and “putting forward fallacies” in a
book it published in September 2014 titled Hong Kong Nationalism. In reply
to Leung’s criticism, a student involved in the publication stated:
“We were thinking about the issue, and defending our right to express a politi-
cal view . . . I don’t think we are promoting it, because the topic about [inde-
pendence] existed, and all we did was discuss its possibility,” he said, adding
that he had no plan to start any independence movement. (Cheung, Lau, and
So 2015)
Leung said he only made the criticism because the magazine’s editors
“persistently” thought about independence. “It shows the young generation’s
growing distrust about the principle ‘one country, two systems’ (Ibid). Leung
said that the cause of recent political controversies such as the Occupy/
Umbrella Movement was a misconception of the Basic Law by “some
people,” who Leung did not name. This is interesting as in chapter 6, we
were shown that the two sides of the discourse both considered the rule of
law (which the Basic Law is supposed to uphold) as an important core value
of Hong Kong but had differing views on what the Occupy Central/Umbrella
Movement meant to the rule of law.
220 Chapter 7
Leung believed that his words were a reminder about the nature of “One
Country, Two Systems” for the younger generation who were not aware of
the drafting constraints of Hong Kong’s governance framework in the late
1980s when the Basic Law was being drafted (Leung was then a member
of the Basic Law Drafting Committee). Leung was mocked and called the
“Father of Independence” by some who pointed out that he was the one who
brought the topic into prominence, where previously it was rarely mentioned.
The next two sections will deal with two incidents involving “indepen-
dence talk.” The first incident involved the emergence of banners advocating
Hong Kong’s independence on university campuses in 2017 and the visa
controversy after the Andy Chan lunch talk at the Foreign Correspondents
Club in August 2018.
Independence Talk on University Campuses

Slogans and talk advocating “Hong Kong’s independence” began appearing
on university campuses in September 2017. To look at the government’s
official response to these banners, Hong Kong government press releases (the
English versions) from September to December 2017 were found using the
keyword “independence” and downloaded from the Hong Kong government
website. Fifteen press releases contained the keywords and eight were found
that referred directly to Hong Kong students. Most of these press releases
consisted of reporters’ questions and answers by officials to these questions.
There were four main topics that can be gleaned from in these press
releases: (1) that freedom of speech is not absolute; (2) talk of independence
is illegal; (3) education is necessary to educate students about the Basic Law
and the “One country, Two Systems”; and (4) projection of state power.
These topics further escalated in 2019 and 2020 (Hui and Kopf 2020) and will
be mentioned again in chapter 9.
Freedom of Speech Is Not Absolute

Commenting on the independence banners seen on Hong Kong university
campuses, Chief Executive Carrie Lam “emphasized that freedom of speech
is not without limits, and that academic freedom and autonomy of tertiary
institutions are not excuses for the advocacy of fallacies.” Further, students
advocating such had “overstepped the bottom line of society” and people
need to “join forces to rectify such abuse of the freedom of speech” (Hong
Kong Gov., September 8, 2017).
However, the phrase “freedom of speech is not without limits” was not
followed by any criteria for this limitation. The “advocacy of fallacies” that
she mentions is obviously the holding of the concept of “independence” for
Hong Kong. This view implies that because it is a wrong concept to have, it
should not be voiced in public. Lam provides no evidence of how “people
should join forces” to “rectify such abuse.”
Freedom of Speech is enshrined in Article 27 of the Basic Law:
Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publica-
tion; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration;
and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.
However, freedom of expression is not an absolute human right (according

to the United Nations and other international bodies) is not a problematic
statement, but it needs further elaboration. This will be reiterated time and
time again by Hong Kong government officials without explanation in 2020
(Hui and Kopf, 2020) and 2021. Article 39 of the Basic Law states that
“The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[ICCPR] . . . as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be
implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not
be restricted unless as prescribed by law” (emphases added). Therefore,
we need to see if there is a “restriction prescribed by law” and this gives us
two tests to employ: is a restriction prescribed by law, and does it meet the
requirements of the ICCPR, which is incorporated in the laws of Hong Kong
as the Bill of Rights Ordinance.10 Article 16 concerns “freedom of opin-
ion and expression.” The Article sets out the right followed by exceptions
to it.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference, and
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The third item in the Article states that there may be “certain restrictions”
and then states them. They must be “provided by law” again and “necessary”
for one of four purposes: respect of the rights or reputations of others; or for
the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or
morals.
Whether it is justified to have a particular restriction on freedom of expres-
sion must be shown. For example, take the talk of independence in 2017,
would banning it be “provided by law”? The permitted exceptions are on the
condition that they are specified by law. A speech that is not against the law is
not unlawful if it goes against official thinking or is seen as a threat to national
222 Chapter 7
sovereignty. The “sedition” section of the Hong Kong Crimes Ordinance

preserves the right to:
(b) point out errors or defects in the government or constitution of Hong

Kong as by law established or in legislation or in the administration of
justice with a view to the remedying of such errors or defects; or
(c) to persuade Her Majesty’s subjects or inhabitants of Hong Kong to
attempt to procure by lawful means the alteration of any matter in Hong
Kong as by law established; or
(d) to point out, with a view to their removal, any matters which are produc-
ing or have a tendency to produce feelings of ill-will and enmity between
different classes of the population of Hong Kong. (“Crimes Ordinance”
at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap200)
The heads of ten universities in Hong Kong on September 16, 2017, pub-
lished a joint statement condemning “recent abuses” of free expression on
campus and calling Hong Kong independence “unconstitutional,” which
could be considered “unlawful” in the above context. The following is the
statement in total (emphasis added):
We treasure freedom of expression, but we condemn its recent abuses. Freedom

of expression is not absolute, and like all freedoms it comes with responsibili-
ties. All universities undersigned agree that we do not support Hong Kong inde-
pendence, which contravenes the Basic Law (HKUST 2017).
Timothy O’Leary, head of the University of Hong Kong’s School of

Humanities questioned the statement: “It would have been nice to know what
argument they have for the banners being an ‘abuse’ of freedom of expres-
sion” (Sang 2017).
Chief Executive Carrie Lam supported “the issue of that statement”
because it “simply states that, yes we have freedom of expression and should
safeguard freedom of expression, but that doesn’t mean that you could
breach the Basic Law or do things that society finds totally unacceptable”
(emphasis added). In this case “do things” is obviously to advocate inde-
pendence, but could have a wider application to anything that the Central
People’s Government does not desire. Further, to criticism that she is exert-
ing pressure on university heads she states: “I think you have underestimated
the independent thinking of our university heads. I don’t think that they
could be easily influenced by a Chief Executive” (September 19, emphasis
added).
Apart from the slight irony of stressing “independent” thinking of
Hong Kong university heads, Lam’s latter statement could be disputed as
public-funded universities, of which there were eight in Hong Kong at the

time, almost 60 percent of the recurrent income of their universities are
borne by the Hong Kong government, while the balance is either covered by
tuition fees, various grants, or interest and investment income. Then there is
the University Grants Committee (UGC), a non-statutory advisory commit-
tee responsible for advising the Hong Kong government on the financing and
expansion needs of its subsidized higher education institutions. Appointed by
the chief executive of Hong Kong, its members consist of local and overseas
academics, university administrators, and community leaders (UGC no date).
In 2018, a number of universities would see their top leadership change and
they were being “closely monitored” to see if policies related to academic
freedom would change (Sharma 2018).
“Freedom of speech” would again become a controversial topic with the
introduction of the National Security Law in mid-2020.
The Talk of Independence Is Illegal

The press releases also commented on the “legality” of mentioning or advo-
cating independence either on a banner or shouted as a slogan (emphasis
added):
We are against the independence issue, as it is against the Basic Law, and it is
not legal. So how the universities handle this issue, I will leave to the manage-
ment of the universities. (September 8, 2017)
I am telling the people of Hong Kong that there is no room for any discussion
on the independence of Hong Kong because that breaches the “one country, two
systems,” which underlines the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. That vio-
lates the Basic Law, and is absolutely not in the overall interest of Hong Kong.
So that position is very clear. (September 19, 2017)
Hong Kong independence contradicts the HKSARS constitutional and legal

status under the Basic Law. (November 14, 2017)
Similarly, to the discussion of “freedom of expression” above, despite

what Article 1 of the Basic Law says that Hong Kong was an “inalienable
part of China,” there was no “law” or legal statute in 2017 in which you
could be prosecuted for raising the issue of Hong Kong independence.
Despite labeling discussion of Hong Kong independence “illegal,” none of
the statements from state media, the city’s leader, or universities’ vice-chan-
cellors logically articulated the legal basis for such an assertion (Carrico
2018). The most often-cited basis is that Article 1 of the Basic Law declares
224 Chapter 7
that Hong Kong is an “inalienable part of China,” meaning that even dis-
cussion of independence thereby breaks the law. Unless one can ask what
exactly he meant and where it was in written law or the Basic Law, it would
be hard to expect educational institutions to advise students on this matter
if he is not specific. The essence of all of this, according to one prominent
barrister, is “you either go by rule by law in which case anything can be
made criminal by law or you believe in certain values which do not lead to
an expression of difference of opinion inevitably to prison or arrest.”11
Furthermore, talk of “violating” the Basic Law in September 7 press release
brings to mind how the Basic Law was seen as a metaphor by Mainland offi-
cials (chapter 1) as something that should not be “outside its framework,”
and that even suggestion of holding a referendum (see chapter 5) would have
catastrophic consequences for the Basic Law.
Education Is Necessary
Students have to be made aware of the illegality of the idea of independence
through education (emphasis added):
And for this particular Hong Kong independence issue, I think that the school
should left the students know that it is illegal and it is not possible in Hong
Kong. Therefore, students must be educated in the correct manner. (Hong Kong
Gov., November 18, 2017)
There have been numerous calls for improved Basic Law education over the
years, and the abortive introduction of “national education” in 2012 both
sought to inculcate young people, who may have had a “rosy-colored” view
of the previous British administration despite not experiencing colonial times
themselves (Morris and Vickers 2015). Schools were also “urged to make the
best endeavours to implement the Basic Law education effectively” (Ibid).
Basic Law education has been undertaken regularly since 1997 (Hong Kong
Gov. 2017; see also “Constitution and the Basic Law Education”—EDB
2020).
Earlier, in 2017, the Under Secretary for Education, Mr. Kevin Yeung
stated before the Legislative Council that “With the close link between
the Basic Law and the daily lives of Hong Kong citizens, it is only natu-
ral for students to learn about the Basic Law” (Hong Kong Gov. June
21, 2017).
Interestingly in this press release, students “through Basic Law educa-
tion and the study of relevant subjects, students can learn, from historical,
moral and legal perspectives, such important concepts as ‘one country, two
systems,’ ‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong’ and a ‘high degree
of autonomy.’” Once students learn these perspectives, it is implied that they

will no longer query the Basic Law and agree to the local/Beijing govern-
ment’s governance direction. Note that “administering” rather than “ruling”
is also used here.
Projection of State Power

The focus on Hong Kong as “an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of
China” is reiterated in most of these articles. Since the “One Country, Two
Systems” is considered “the best institutional arrangement to ensure Hong
Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability after our return to the Motherland”
(Hong Kong Gov. May 16, 2018) Citizens questioning separateness is thus
questioning the “motherland.” A metaphor related to this way of thinking
is that “mother knows best.” That education about the Basic Law and the
Constitution of the PRC is necessary also follows on from this premise.
THE FCC ANDY CHAN TALK AND THE

VICTOR MALLET VISA CONTROVERSY
This controversy was considered to have a major impact on freedom of

expression in Hong Kong. The Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC) sched-
uled a lunchtime talk on August 14, 2018, in which Andy Chan, convenor
of the Hong Kong National Party (HKNP), a political party that advocated
independence for Hong Kong. China called for the cancellation of the talk,
and Hong Kong government expressed its “regret” because the issue of inde-
pendence was said to “cross the red lines” on national sovereignty (Chung
2018). Victor Mallet, chairperson of the club welcomed different political
views and opinions as a tenet of the club:
Sometimes the views of our speakers are abhorrent to the Chinese government,
sometimes they are abhorrent to the opponents of the Chinese government . . .
Our views are not represented by our speakers. We do want to hear from speak-
ers of all kinds, whether they are right wing or left wing, or extremist or not. We
will continue to do that. (Cheng, K. 2018b)
The talk was entitled: “Hong Kong Nationalism: A Politically Incorrect

Guide to Hong Kong under Chinese Rule,” and was publicized as “The talk
will cover a brief history of the Party, and touch on what Mr. Chan feels
it means to be at the helm of a movement trying to construct a national
identity for Hong Kong, and his reaction to the strong pushback from the
government faced by his party” (Quackenbush 2018). The talk went ahead
226 Chapter 7
despite the Hong Kong government saying that “it is also totally inappro-
priate and unacceptable for any organisation to provide a public platform
to espouse such views [of independence]” (Hong Kong Gov., August 14,
2018).
A short time later, Victor Mallet, who was also a Financial Times journal-
ist and co-host of the Andy Chan talk, failed to get his work visa renewed.
Later he was denied entry to Hong Kong even as tourist which he attempted
to do to finalize his plans for leaving the city (Lum, Su, Sum, and Ng 2008).
In the absence of an official explanation, Mallet’s visa rejection was widely
seen as being due to his role in chairing the Andy Chan talk. The following
section will show how the Hong Kong government denied responsibility for
Mallet’s visa denial. This will then be followed by how the Hong Kong gov-
ernment responds to overseas condemnations of Mallet’s visa denial.
The Hong Kong Government’s Response to the Visa

Denial Controversy
The keyword “visa” was searched on the government’s press release website
(the same site mentioned earlier) for the entire month of August 2018. Of 39
releases found, 8 dealt with the visa denial issue. This visa denial resulted in
two major responses by the Hong Kong government: (1) visa matters are the
concern of the Immigration Department; and (2) there is no press censorship
due to the sheer number of press organizations operating in the SAR. Both
of these responses reflect the Hong Kong government’s attempt to repeat that
Hong Kong had not changed in form or nature despite these developments.
Visa Matters Are the Concern of the Immigration Department

The following are the standard responses to reporters’ queries on the Victor
Mallet visa issue (emphases added):
Let me say that visa matters are considered in the context of every place’s immi-
gration policy. Every country, every place, has their own immigration policy,
and visa applications are concerning individuals, which will be processed by
the pertinent authority, in our case the Director of Immigration in accordance
with the law, the policy and the circumstances of that particular case, and it is
always not appropriate to talk about individual cases in public, especially in this
particular case that you have referred to. (Hong Kong Gov. November 1, 2008)
We are firmly committed to protecting press freedom. We do not exercise any

censorship. On a recent work visa extension case, we will not comment on any
specific decision on our immigration control. All such decisions are made by
our immigration authorities under the laws and prevailing policies, having
regard to individual circumstances of each case. (Hong Kong Gov. November
7, 2018)
The Immigration Department never provides explanations for visa denials.

“Prevailing policies” mentioned above could be seen as the current pushback
against “independence talk.” This kind of answer avoidance, by just stating
“nothing is the case,” is quite common in these press conferences, and in
other jurisdictions as well.
No Media Censorship Due to Number of Media

Organizations in Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Journalists Association warned of the “death knell of free-
dom of speech” because of this visa denial (Guest Contributor 2018). Later,
in response to an overseas report, Secretary for Security John Lee insisted that
the ban on Mallet was unrelated to press freedom, but declined to explain the
decision (emphasis added):
Any concerns that Hong Kong’s freedom of speech and of the press is under
threat are totally groundless. On the contrary, we maintain an environment
conducive to the operation of a free and active press. Some 80 foreign media
organisations operate in Hong Kong and rigorously perform their role as a
watchdog. (Hong Kong Gov. November 7, 2020).
The presence of foreign media organizations is equated with freedom of

speech and of the press; the secretary for security fails to mention disturb-
ing incidents involving journalists in the few years up to 2018 (Hong Kong
Journalists Association 2019).
REACTIONS TO OVERSEAS CRITICISM

OF CHANGES IN HONG KONG
The Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom government issues a

series of reports, published at six-monthly intervals that look at the imple-
mentation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration from 1997.12 These reports
look at governance, human rights issues, and freedom of the press, and how
they have been applied in the SAR. There have been six such reports from
January 2017–March 2019. The Hong Kong government’s response to the
228 Chapter 7
reports used exactly the same text as in the case of the Report of February 24,
2017, and September 14, 2017. On March 15, 2018, the following was said:
Since the return to the Motherland, the HKSAR has been exercising a high
degree of autonomy and “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” in
strict accordance with the Basic Law. This demonstrates the full and successful
implementation of the “one country, two systems” principle, which has been
widely recognised by the international community.
Foreign governments should not interfere in any form in the internal affairs
of the HKSAR.
This is a non-answer, and it does not answer any criticism raised in the
reports. Note the insertion of “interfere in any form in the internal affairs,”
a standard mainland-like phrase. However, the responses to the next two
reports following the March report were rather fuller. The first, on September
7, 2018, was perhaps because the report commented on the sensitive topic of
“freedom of speech” and “independence” in the SAR:
The Basic Law clearly stipulates that the HKSAR is an inalienable part of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). “Hong Kong’s independence” is a blatant
violation of the Basic Law and a direct affront to the national sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity of the PRC. “Hong Kong’s independence” runs
counter to the successful implementation of “one country, two systems” and
undermines the HKSAR’s constitutional and legal foundations as enshrined in
the Basic Law.
The HKSAR Government attaches great importance to freedom of speech,
which is also protected by the Basic Law. However, both the relevant interna-
tional human rights convention and court cases clearly point out that freedom
of speech is not absolute.
The press release does not elaborate further on this point, and this is similar
to what was said about the independence banners on university campuses.
The subsequent response on March 27, 2019, to the July to December 2018
Report, used similar sentiments to the above to make the same point, although
using slightly different wording.
The Hong Kong government has similarly taken to counter any claims that
it dislikes by labeling them as false, with increased use of phrases like “mis-
led” and “distorted” (Hui and Knopf 2020).
Phrases have also entered the Hong Kong government’s responses to the
public which increasingly sound like Beijing. “Misunderstandings,” some-
times used alongside “misconceptions” and “misgivings,” have been used in
response to those who criticize Hong Kong’s human rights environment. This
implies that textual meaning can be only fully interpreted by the government
(or Beijing) “gatekeepers.” For example, any suggestion that protesters had
been targeted for exercising their fundamental rights during public rallies
was, according to Secretary Matthew Cheung in a speech to the United
Nations Human Rights Council in 2018, a “misunderstanding” that needed to
be “clarified.” For example, (emphases added):
Recent concerns over some aspects of Hong Kong’s human rights situation are
unwarranted, unfounded and unsubstantiated. They arise from misconception
and a lack of understanding of our real situation he stressed. (Hong Kong Gov.
November 7, 2018)
The use of “misunderstandings” or “misconceptions” reflects perceptions

by Beijing that Western thinking has somehow misled Hongkongers,
so therefore this misunderstanding needs to be corrected by education.
Beijing has often complained that if only Hongkongers spent more time
on the Mainland which, as some say, “offers a much larger playing field
for young talent” (Tse 2020), and truly understood the Basic Law, the
political situation would stabilize and there would not be mass protests or
social unrest.
CONCLUSION
The change from “ruling” to “administering” in the Basic Law Fact Sheet
can be seen as a reaction by the Hong Kong and Beijing governments to
the recent Occupy Central/Umbrella Movement, which they considered to
be a “mass movement” which showed that the “people” needed oversight in
running their affairs. The Hong Kong government also seems to be taken to
countering any claims that it dislikes by overseas bodies by labeling them
as false or inaccurate. Also implied is that “outsiders” would not be able
to understand the unique situation of Hong Kong as an SAR of China and
its constraints as a polity. One thing to note is the increasing emphasis on
China’s sovereign power (i.e., “national sovereignty”) in the discussion
of “independence,” “self-determination,” and “freedom of expression,”
juxtaposed with statements that Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy”
was not compromised. An action by the Hong Kong government in 2019
led many to see further narrowing of this “high degree of autonomy” and
further integration into the “One Country.” This will be the subject of the
next chapter.
230 Chapter 7
NOTES
1. I call this a “stealth” revision “Government Changes Basic Law Facts” as it

was unannounced officially. The changes were first noticed by Webb-site, an online
platform established in 1998 by David M. Webb, a former investment banker. In
their article of December 7, “Moving on from Occupy to the Central Issue,” they
quoted from the Basic Law fact sheet of August 2013 as it appeared on the Hong
Kong Government web site. On December 16, 2014, it was replaced a new Fact Sheet
(https://webb-site.com/articles/lowerautonomy.asp).
2. The Fact Sheet page can be found on: https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/
factsheets/. Clicking on the Basic Law on the Fact Sheet page link now takes you to
the Basic Law page: https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/index.html with multiple
links. Previously, you would have gotten a pdf one-page sheet.
3. You can access the late 2014 Basic Law Fact Sheet as discussed here using the
following link: https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/basic_law.pdf.
4. “Rule, v.” OED Online. December 2020. Oxford University Press. https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/168718?rskey=SLbi4P&result=1.
5. https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/basic2.htm: The Basic Law is a constitu-
tional document for the HKSAR. It enshrines within a legal document the important
concepts of “One Country, Two Systems,” “a high degree of autonomy” and “Hong
Kong People ruling Hong Kong.” It also prescribes the various systems to be prac-
ticed in the HKSAR.
6. “No progress was made in the ensuing three rounds of talks in July 1983 about
Hong Kong’s future ‘as Britain insisted that it should continue to administer Hong
Kong after 1997.’ In September 1983, Deng Xiaoping told the visiting former British
Prime Minister Heath that Britain’s proposal of exchanging sovereignty for power
of administration was not acceptable.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China (undated).
For Britain to still “administer” Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, would imply
that China was incapable of running it themselves.
7. “Historians are not too worried at the threat posed by ‘rewriting history’...We
are constantly engaged in a process of re-evaluating the past and reinterpreting stories
that we thought we knew” (Riley 2020). This article largely referred to the toppling
of a slave trader’s statue in the UK.
8. The current version can be found at Chapter 2: The Modern Era 1945-1967
–https://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/01_about_us/ph_02.html - click on the link and
there will be another link to the pdf.
9. “Inalienable, adj.” OED Online. September 2020. Oxford University Press.
(https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/93064?redirectedFrom=inalienable)
10. “For example, in terms of freedom of speech, it could be limited by law under
certain situations, for example, in safeguarding national security, ensuring public
order, for public health reasons or to protect the rights and reputation of another per-
son, then there will be laws to limit the expression of such speeches by individuals in
Hong Kong” (news.gov.hk, September 8, 2020).
11. Personal correspondence (via email), November 8, 2020. Gladys Li, a Senior
Counsel at the Hong Kong Bar with a constitutional law and human rights practice,
and a founding member of the Hong Kong Civic Party. She says “all of this is subject
to the big caveat of the National Security Law now in 2020. What has become ille-
gal under the National Security Law (supposedly non-retrospective), we have yet to
find out.”
12. These can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/six
-monthly-reports-on-hong-kong.
Chapter 8
“Being Water”
A Holistic Study of the 2019 Protests
The 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, also known as the Anti-Extradition Law
Amendment Bill1 (Anti-ELAB) Movement, took place from 2019 to 2020 in
response to the introduction by the Hong Kong government of the Fugitive
Offenders Amendment Bill on extradition, which was later withdrawn in
September 2019.
Protesters in 2019 avoided the fixed, immobile occupation strategies of
2014, in favor of something unique: a highly mobile style of protest. A protest
could occur anywhere in the city. A rally could morph into a march; a march
could begin in one direction and abruptly change to the opposite direction;
the focus of a particular protest action could only actually emerge in the
course of the march itself. Subgroups of protesters could carry out targeted
“wildcat” occupations of government buildings, flooding the entrance lob-
bies, escalators, and lifts. When the government declared the building closed
and the staffs were dismissed for the day, the protesters dispersed and moved
on to their next target (Tong 2019; Yu and Zhao 2019). This became known
as “being water” (如水).
“Being water” meant that protesters were like water in all its states: strong
like ice, fluid like water, gathering like dew, and ethereal like mist. As martial
arts icon Bruce Lee once said, “be formless, shapeless. Now if you put water
in a cup it becomes the cup, put it in a teapot, it becomes the teapot” (Zhou
and Wong 2019), in other words, the protest strategy was flexible, adaptable,
and reactive. Lee went on to say “Now water can flow or it can crash,” (Ibid)
and “crash” it did with the university “sieges” of mid-November 2019. Why
did the “be water” protest strategy come into being, and how has this strategy
impacted the discourse and form of this protest movement?2
Notable features of these protests were the diffuse spread of the protest
actions throughout Hong Kong, the participation and solidarity between most
233
234 Chapter 8
sectors of society (although dominated by youth), and the ubiquity of protests

and community activism of various kinds (“everyday politicization”). The
protests showed the continuance of Hong Kong’s past political discourse
themes and were both reflective and reflexive of events as they unfolded.
The author lived in Hong Kong in 2019 and attended a number of protest
activities and actions, as either a participant or observer, wrote copious notes,
and took many photographs as events unfolded. This chapter will analyze the
diffuse and diverse nature of the protests, the solidarity between protesters of
very different types, and the “everyday politicization” of participation. These
categories resonated with the concerns and developments raised in earlier
chapters of this book.
This chapter analyzes the 2019 protests during the “escalation” period
(early June 2019) to the end of the “be water” phase (mid-November 2019).3
The “be water” phase of the protests ended in mid-November with the “uni-
versity sieges,” at the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong and the Chinese
University of Hong Kong in which students barricaded themselves on their
university campuses. The protests more or less ended in January in the early
days of the Covid-19 pandemic.
ANALYZING THE HONG KONG “PROTESTSCAPE”
Pisaltu (2019) used the term “protestscape” as a “language of mobility that

employs rich semiotic resources within the context of protest” in her study
of Romanian protests. She drew on Appadurai’s idea of five dimensions
of global cultural flows called “scapes.” Appadurai (1996) mentions five:
ethnoscapes, ideoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, and financescapes.
Although we are speaking of Hong Kong, and not the global situation per
se, this theory is relevant as the “flow” of this discourse is north “toward”
Beijing and then outward to become part of the global media as a part of a
wider discourse of political and civil rights. Appadurai’s five dimensions also
represent indiscursivity. The Hong Kong protestscape is also naturally inter-
discursive (like all protests) by incorporating issues of identity, economics,
and history. By adding the suffix “-scape” to the word “protest,” the land-
scape (of protest) becomes “fluid” and “irregular” which mimics the unfixed
nature of the protest, as the suffix “-scape” in the OED means the “forming
nouns denoting a view, picture, or (literal or figurative) landscape of a type
specified by the first element, as cityscape n., mindscape n., moonscape n.,
etc.” Appadurai indicates that (emphasis added):
These are not understood in terms of objectively given relations that look the
same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival
“Being Water” 235
constructs inflected by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of dif-

ferent sorts of actors. (Appadurai 1996, 33)
The methodological focus of this book is Ruth Wodak’s discourse-historical

approach to critical discourse analysis where “discourse is always historical,
that is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communi-
cative events which are happening at the same time or which have happened
before” (Wodak and Ludwig 1995, 12; see also Sarangi and Coulthard 2000).
In other words, although the protests might be happening in the here and now,
they are situated in a wider cultural context, and it is not just a reaction to the
Extradition Bill alone. Earlier chapters in this book set the context. Therefore,
you need to approach a discourse event such as a months-long protest both
synchronically and diachronically, showing an “ebb and flow” between the
two. This analytical approach also fits in with the “be water” strategy of these
protests.
In this regard, the “protestscape” could be understood as both a melding
of the semiotic and linguistic landscapes resulting from various interactions
between “objects in motion” in both the online world (digital activism, instant
sharing of updates, using hashtags, creating memes, posting and sharing
pictures from protests, creating online events, etc.) and the offline worlds
(demonstrations, protest placards, posters, banners, people wearing badges or
clothing with messages, etc.)—some of which occurred in both worlds. In the
Hong Kong protests of 2019, what will be described relates to both images
and texts that were distributed in both the online and offline worlds.
To describe “the Hong Kong protestscape,” the visible “bits of written
language” in the public space were analyzed, in what Blommaert and Maly
(2016, 1) call the linguistic landscape as well as “bits of signs and images”
in the semiotic landscape. Both these “landscapes” within the “protestscape”
are largely specific to Hong Kong and highly intertextual to other Hong
Kong events as well as globally. However, there are problems in studying the
discourse of a protest because of the “fluid” and hard to quantifiable nature
of protest materials and texts—they “shift”—and do not always permanently
occupy the same space over the course of a protest action or series of actions;
sometimes they would “disappear” (i.e., pulled down by counter-protesters),
and sometimes they are replaced, forming a textual/multimodal dialogue of
sorts. As the discourse-historical method of critical discourse analysis relies
on triangulation of materials, sufficient analysis of different types of materi-
als gives validity to an analysis such as this. Of course, not everything can be
included and analyzed for reasons of space, for example, protest-related “cul-
tural materials” have been left out.4 Another difficulty was how to arrange
the discourse material so that it forms a coherent whole due to the complex
confluence of materials/words that interact with each other. Looking at the
236 Chapter 8
principles, nature of participation, and types of participation with certain

incidents and actions that drive the ongoing protests seemed to be a logical
arrangement of material. The next few sections deal with the background and
escalation of the protests.
BACKGROUND TO THE PROTESTS
These series of protests began in March 2019 in response to the Hong Kong
government’s attempt to institute criminal extradition to China. It was a mur-
der in 2018 that was more or less a “direct path from that hotel in Taipei to
tear gas and bullets on the streets of Hong Kong” (Dapiran 2020, 14). Chan
Tong-kai had confessed to the murder of his girlfriend Poon Hiu-wing after
returning to Hong Kong. Chan pleaded guilty to money laundering and was
sentenced to 21 months in prison, but he could not be charged with a murder
committed in Taipei, nor could be extradited there was no reciprocal extra-
dition agreements between these two places. The murdered girl’s parents
approached Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam for assistance. We do
not know if Lam wanted to genuinely help the girl’s parents or saw an oppor-
tunity to please Beijing; she devised a plan to settle the issue with the intro-
duction of the Hong Kong’s Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (the “Extradition
Bill”) (Legislative Council 2019).
If it had passed, the proposed bill would have empowered the chief execu-
tive and the local courts to handle extradition requests on a case-by-case
basis from countries/territories with no prior agreements, including Taiwan
and China. Lam and her government blamed growing public opposition to
the proposal on a simple lack of comprehension. People did not properly
understand her proposal or the mainland judicial system. The proposal would
be for a specific number of crimes, requiring it to be (nonpolitical) crimes in
both Hong Kong and the requesting jurisdiction, with the chief executive hav-
ing the final say over any extradition request. However, many felt there were
not enough safeguards in place, despite the Hong Kong government saying
that there was (Hong Kong Gov., June 5, 2019). This proposed Bill played
on Hong Kong people’s fears that Hong Kong would “just become another
Chinese city” (this is discussed further in chapter 9).
Hong Kong had rarely witnessed highly disruptive or even violent social
mobilizations either before or after the transfer of sovereignty because of its
institutional setting and conservative protest culture and nature of Chinese
society (Ku 2020; Fong 2013; Cheng 2016). The protest against Article 23
(national security legislation) on July 1, 2003, although large, subsequent
rallies tended to follow the principle of being “peaceful, rational, and non-
violent” (和平, 理性, 非暴力). These were seeking government concessions
through large turnouts (Cheng 2016) through the “the July 1 effect” that was
mentioned in chapter 7.
Although some protests adopted more direct forms of action, such as
occupation during the pier protection campaigns in 2006 and 2007, most
were nonviolent in order to appeal to broader society (Ibid). Although they
addressed a variety of issues, these peaceful protests all sought to protect
diminishing civic freedom and to liberalize the space contained within the
semi-democratic political system of “One Country, Two Systems” (Ma 2007).
From the early 2010s onward, a new form of activism focused on liveli-
hood issues rooted in the increasing interactions between Hong Kong and
mainland China emerged across residential neighborhoods and adopted more
confrontational actions targeting tourists, new migrants, and parallel traders
from the mainland (Chen and Szeto 2015; Yuen and Chung 2018). However,
it was not until the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP)/Umbrella
Movement and the rise of “localism” that Hong Kong’s protest culture under-
went a significant change in terms of scale and intensity. The lack of any
meaningful developments for the introduction of universal suffrage resulted
in radicalization in the localist sector of society, which had a growing appeal
to young people in Hong Kong.
BUILDING MOMENTUM IN THE

ANTI-ELAB MOVEMENT
The Extradition Bill definitely aroused immense concern from the public
following the release of the amendment proposal in February because of
local citizens’ deep distrust toward the Mainland legal system. However, as
the Hong Kong government failed to lessen people’s worries, the April 28
demonstration initiated by Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) unexpectedly
attracted the largest turnout for a rally since 2014. Inside the Legislative
Council, intense debates took place in May 2019, while more than 270,000
signatures of Hong Kong citizens were collected through various online peti-
tions against the amendment proposal before one million citizens protested in
the streets on June 9. The first use of tear gas by police three days later during
clashes in Admiralty and Central was a critical moment. Protesters arrested
on June 12 were charged with rioting for the first time during the Anti-ELAB
movement; this led to the CHRF calling for another demonstration on June
16 during which “Five Demands” (五大訴求) were officially presented; they
included:
238 Chapter 8
1. Full withdrawal of the Extradition Bill (徹底撤回送中修例)

2. An independent commission of inquiry into alleged police brutality
(成立獨立調查委員會追究警隊濫暴)
3. Retracting the classification of protesters as “rioters” (取消暴動定性)
4. Amnesty for arrested protesters (撤銷對今為所有反送中抗爭者控罪)
5. Dual universal suffrage, meaning for both the Legislative Council and
the chief executive (以行政命令解散立法會立即實行雙真普選)
With the first two demands came alongside two other demands: that Carrie
Lam resign and for the release of the injured student protesters, were first
shown on a placard displayed by Leung Ling-kit before he fell to his death
on June 15 (see the later section on the July 1 protest). The CHRF, the major
organizer of the annual July 1 marches, took on his idea, turning “release all
injured student protesters” to “an amnesty all arrested protesters” and added
a fifth demand, formulating the first version of the “Five Demands.”
On June 21, tens of thousands of demonstrators surrounded the police
headquarters in Wan Chai—unprecedented in Hong Kong’s history—to
express their anger over what they saw as the police’s excessive use of force
against protesters. The phrase “be water,” which had been occasionally men-
tioned online, gained more traction as the protests progressed (Zhang 2019).
On July 1, 2019, a handful of protesters stormed into the Legislative
Council complex and replaced “Carrie Lam steps down” with a call for uni-
versal suffrage in their declaration; this then became widely adopted by other
protesters as another demand.
The fifth demand encapsulated Hong Kong people’s concerns about the
recent extradition proposal, previous political reform (the long-delayed “uni-
versal suffrage”) as detailed in the previous chapters and actions by the Hong
Kong authorities and the police.
Another major slogan after the “Five Demands” was “Liberate Hong
Kong, Revolution of Our Times” (光復香港時代革命). “Liberate” may not
be an accurate translation of “光復,” which literally means “restoring the
light,” “restoring the glorious past,” or just “restore.”
From then on, the “Five Demands” became a collective action frame that
gave legitimacy to various movement activities in the subsequent months
(Benford and Snow 2000). Coined by localist leader Edward Leung in his
election campaign in 2016, the Slogan “liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of
Our Times” began to gain more popularity among movement supporters,
representing people’s “vivid revolutionary imagination unthought of before”
(Ku 2020).5
After protesters adopted this slogan in late July 2019, both the Chinese
government and Chief Executive Carrie Lam cited this slogan as a “call to
revolution” and a “challenge to Chinese sovereignty, unification and territorial

integrity of the People’s Republic of China” (Hong Kong Gov., July 2, 2020).
SOLIDARITY IN DIVERSITY
Within the movement, a high and persistent degree of solidarity within

diversity provided a ground for both “radicalization and innovation of par-
allel repertoires beyond street politics” (Chung, H-F., 2020, 59). This was
codified by certain rules such as “going up and down together” and “not
one protester less,” respectively (齊上齊落 #一個都不能少). Both slogans
reminded protesters that no one should be left behind, especially at protest
sites, and “brothers climbing a mountain together, each one with their own
effort” (兄弟爬山各自努力). This statement means that peaceful and valiant
protesters are like brothers. Although they climb the mountain by their own
efforts and their own ways, they share the same goal. This norm of solidarity
first redressed the cleavage between pacifism and militancy during and after
OCLP/Umbrella Movement. It also united supporters who wanted peace-
ful actions to those who wanted more radical, perhaps violent actions. For
example, “righteous persons” (義士) were also “hands and feet,” but more
specifically, a “righteous person” was one who made a sacrifice for the cause.
For example, Leung Ling-kit, an anti-extradition activist before falling to his
death on June 15, was referred to as “Righteous Leung” (梁義士).
The “Silver-hair Gang” (銀髮族) also known as “parents” formed a pro-
tective unit for “beloved babies” (寶寶), the young protesters who were also
known as their “sons and daughters.” The “gang” were members of a group
called “Protect the Children,” made up of senior citizens and other volunteers.
This group (wearing yellow vests with “Protect the Children” printed on
them) would come out to try to mediate between police and demonstrators,
as well as buy protesters time to escape when the police started to charge (Lin
and Leung 2019). This group reflected the “family” and collectivist nature of
the local Chinese society and also indicated wider community involvement
in what was largely seen as a youth-driven movement. See figure 8.1 below.
“Rational, Pragmatic, and Non-violent” (和理非) was another designa-
tion for those taking part in the 2019 protests. These were people who were
“peaceful, rational, and non-violent” in their protest actions as opposed to
“The Valiant” or “Braves” (勇武) and the “magicians” (魔法師—those who
fought against police in various ways; that is, “fire magicians” were those
who throw petrol bombs at police). Non-protesters (citizens, bystanders) were
“civilians” by more “frontline” protesters (note the military metaphor).6
The consideration that Hong Kong people showed to protesters in the way
of provisions and equipment was duly noted by the press. Money/tickets were
240 Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 A Briefing of the “Protect the Children” Group in the MTR. Source: Photo
by Author.
left on ticket machines in the subway as well as changes of clothing. Executive

Councilor and Hong Kong delegate to the NPC, Ip Kwok-him, stated that “he
did not believe protesters could acquire their equipment, or form their tactics
easily by themselves, insisting that ‘foreign forces’ must be involved, an accu-
sation also raised during the Umbrella Movement” (Cheng 2019b).
DIFFUSION AND CONTENTION
Diffusion, the spreading of something more widely, in the protest sense,

refers to a process of spreading forms of contention, an issue or particular
framing from one site of struggle to another (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 31).
Stepping toward July 2019, street politics went beyond the standard locations
and familiar routes as in previous mass mobilizations (the “democracy road”
of Victoria Park, Causeway Bay to Central Government Headquarters on July
1 and other dates); and the locations of OCLP/Umbrella Movement. In keep-
ing with the “be water” strategy, diversity was the criteria of “actions.” Some
of the major actions are described and analyzed below. There were “one-off”
actions and also “reoccurring” actions. These actions were “networked”
through communication technology.
COMMUNICATION: A NETWORKED PROTEST
Like other networked protests, the rapid diffusion of contention in the

Anti-ELAB movement in 2019 was highly related to the decentralized,
horizontal organization afforded by the extensive use of social media and
mobile technology. In particular, the online forum LIHKG and a number of
Telegram groups functioned together as central communication platforms
for immediate onsite tactics and deliberation over long-term strategies. As
a Reddit-like platform, LIHKG facilitated the crowdsourcing of leadership
connected to robust feedback loops (Ting 2020). Compared to other popular
platforms such as WhatsApp, Telegram was considered by protesters to be
a more reliable encrypted messaging tool that could provide higher secu-
rity and protection. Although called a “leaderless” protest movement and
deemed “open source protests” (Cheng, K. 2019c) that is not to say it was
not entirely undirected, the large marches being organized by the CHRF.
For street confrontation, platformized coordination enacted the motto of
“be water.”
The Scheduling and Creative Naming of Protests

Messages about upcoming protests would also appear on posters on walls and
on various forums online, either focusing on one particular protest (signifi-
cant ones) or as a “schedule.” See figure 8.2 below.
Note the creative naming of protests and the inclusion of the two major
principles of the protests on the posters and whether they have been approved
by the police or not (Letters of No Objection).7 The vast number of protest
actions necessitated this multiple naming and scheduling.
Charting the Course and Controlling the Narrative

As the protests continued, banners and posters appeared summarizing in text
and images what had happened up to that date. These provided a continuous
“narrative,” the story of the protests unfolding rather like an ongoing televi-
sion miniseries. These “updates” served as reminders of official misdeeds,
rekindling anger over official actions, and thus acted as means to keep the
momentum (and anger) going. The following are the kind of “updates” that
were particularly significant, that is, “MTR events” (Mass Transit Railway)
and police “protest-control listings.” For example, events revolving around
the MTR. Figure 8.3 below taken outside University MTR Station by the
author and details events related to police actions in the Mass Transit Rail
system throughout Hong Kong in the months of August and September 2019.
242 Chapter 8
Figure 8.2 The Creative Naming of Actions Were a Feature of the 2019 Protests.
Source: Photo by Author.
In the early days of the protests, the MTR provided extra trains and
extended hours to accommodate protesters’ movements to and from protests.
Then, on August 23, after Chinese state media criticized the transit network
for doing so, the MTR’s management clamped down on protesters’ access
to stations (Chan, H., 2019e). The MTR then became a protest target after
images of riot police using shuttered stations as resting and staging areas
fueled public mistrust (Leung, H. 2019).
There were many “tallies” of incidents, actions, and use of weapons. The
police would also release updated data on their use of/pepper spray in their reg-
ular press briefings. They used nearly 6,000 rounds in total, according to a tally
of figures released in police briefings, in areas home to much as 88 percent of
Hong Kong’s 7.4 million residents (Prasso 2019). Hong Kong people termed
Figure 8.3 Banner Detailing Police Action in the MTR in October 2019. Source: Photo
by Author.
the mass release of “tear gas” by police, particularly if they were nearby the
release and experienced it themselves, leading to the Hong Kong expression:
“getting a tear gas buffet (see figure 8.4 below).” Thus there was a discourse of
“appropriate use of force” or “inappropriate use of force.” Hong Kong police,
who were once called “Asia’s Finest,” were now seen as a source of anger (Ives
2019).
In response to police misconduct and the desire for truth-seeking over
contested events, protesters launched a series of Citizens’ Press Conferences
as platforms for protesters, victims of police abuse, and experts to speak
out to attempt to counteract the government’s narrative. These protesters
stated that they wanted to “broadcast under-represented voices” and reflect
the truth of the movement (Chan H. 2019c). The three spokespeople, who
dressed in “protest black,” also wore yellow construction helmets and face
masks repeated protesters’ five core demands, condemning police violence
against “civilians,” saying that “current government officers should be held
accountable for the public outcry” (Ibid). Organizers were responding to the
government’s new policy of having more frequent press briefings, which the
trio said contained “malicious distortions” and “untruth” that the protesters
were solely out to destroy Hong Kong:
244 Chapter 8
Figure 8.4 This Was a “Tally” of Weapons/Objects Used by Police Until October 17,
2019. Note the QR code in the bottom right-hand corner. Source: Photo by Author.
Some radical elements have changed the nature of the protests: some defaced
the national emblem, and others took down a national flag and threw it into the
sea. They said they want to foment revolution, to “liberate” Hong Kong, Lam
said (Ibid).
Sector Protests
An array of small-scale protests emerged in residential communities (社區)
across Hong Kong in addition to the mass protests of June, July, August, and
October. Different professional groups, such as journalists, lawyers, flight
attendants, creative workers, and civil servants, also organized their own dem-
onstrations and even joined other mass protests as a sectoral group, which were
seldom seen in the past (Shek 2020).
One such sector protest was the “silver-haired protest” of July 17, in
Chater Garden, Central. Younger people spritzed water and bowed to the
white-clad—white being the color of mourning in Chinese culture—elderly
and middle-aged participants. Such was the inclusive nature of the vari-
ous protests that even younger people participated, as they walked by on
the way to the Central Government Complex in Admiralty on Hong Kong
Island.
COMMUNITY ACTION: “EVERYDAY POLITICIZATION”
What was noteworthy was the development of “everyday politicization,”

referring to the process of inventing alternative ways and practices of per-
forming and enacting politics in ordinary and “normal” settings (Roussos
2019). This was a unique feature of the 2019 Anti-ELAB protests. Politics
permeates everyday life in a general sense of course, from the ordinary
interactions we have with others to the sense of belonging and identity
developed within social groups and communities (Howarth and Andreouli
2017). The politicization of everyday life in the Anti-ELAB movement was
characterized by widespread connective actions of the Hong Kong commu-
nity in various ways, apart from more violent frontline action by youthful
protesters.8
Although not everybody “took sides” in the protest movement, those that
did were designated by color. Citizens from the pro-government/pro-China/
pro-police camp and the pro-democracy/pro-movement camp respectively
either “blue ribbon” (藍絲) and “yellow ribbon” (黃絲). This categorization
first appeared in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, when people wore colored
ribbons or used such symbols on social media to show their political views.
There were also “degrees of blueness” depending on the stridency of one’s
views. The author noted the use of a new verb in the 2014 protests, “to go
blue ribbony,” as in “my friend said the group chat [on FB] has gone blue
ribbony, so she left” (Eagleton 2014). This acted as a kind of “shorthand” for
quickly making one’s views known, either textually or visually. Mainland
authorities later deemed the protests as potentially leading to a “color revolu-
tion” seeing links to other world movements that were called by this name.
The “general community” took part largely in “peaceful, rational, and
non-violent” (和理非) actions. Posters listing regular activities such as sin-
galongs, human chains, flash mobs, boycotting “blue” shops, and the “with
you” protests” were regularly posted on the internet and on walls.
Singing “Glory to Hong Kong.”

Early songs sung at the 2019 protests were the Christian hymn “Sing
Hallelujah to the Lord” and “Do you Hear the People Sing?” from the musi-
cal “Les Miserables” (this was also sung in previous years’ protests), among
other tunes. Such songs link the current protest into wider civil rights con-
cerns and the global community.
Protest songs, by their very nature, are highly intertextual; they refer to cur-
rent issues either directly or obliquely through metaphors or other figurative
imagery. In addition, they often refer to other historical movements, thereby
246 Chapter 8
accessing the listener’s feelings about that movement and compounding the
song’s power through “semantic snowballing” (Turino 1999).
“Glory to Hong Kong” was sung in many protest actions, for example, the
“sing with you” actions in shopping malls and so on. It largely became the
movement’s overall “Anthem.” This song could also be called a “principle”
of the protest as it encapsulates the “Hong Kong as metaphor” discussed in
chapter 1 and also how Hong Kong saw itself vis-à-vis mainland China and
its future (see chapter 9). This “anthem” was heavily criticized and banned in
2020 with the introduction of the National Security Law.
The composer of “Glory to Hong Kong,” only known as “Thomas,” stated
that the idea behind the song was to create a piece that could capture and
unite the spirit of the protesters. The lyrics contains a line from the Chinese
National Anthem: “Arise! Ye who will not be slaves again” and also a refer-
ence to Martin Luther King Jr’s “I have a dream speech”: “For Hong Kong,
may freedom reign,” showing consistency of the civil rights themes that have
permeated the discourse over the course of decades. The slogan “Liberate
Hong Kong Revolution of Our Times” was also incorporated into this
song.9
“Fucking Shouts at 10 pm” (十點鳩叫) was another action proposed by
LIHKG forum users in late August 2019. Residents were asked to open their
windows to shout different slogans at 10:00 p.m. every night to show their
support for the movement. These included the two major slogans mentioned
earlier. Since most Hong Kong people live in high-rise apartments, this action
enabled people who for whatever reason could not take part in larger protests,
to participate.
Lunchtime Flash Mobs

There were a number of actions called “with you” (和你) protests held
throughout the period. “With you” was a made-up prefix by protesters
describing campaigns or actions that everybody, as “和” means “with” as
well as “peace or harmony” and “you” (你), which emits a strong sense of
solidarity and inclusiveness. The following are some “with you” actions.
These “with you” actions could occur all over Hong Kong. For example,
“lunch with you” in Central on Hong Kong Island usually entailed office
workers gathering on the street, some waving placards at lunchtime shouting
the usual slogans at riot police on the opposite side of the road.
A more elaborate “with you” action was the “fly with you” (和你飛) action
of July 26 so-named to mimic the Cantonese pronunciation of “和理非”
(peaceful, rational, and nonviolent). As travelers emerged from immigration,
protesters formed a channel on either side of the exits, and held placards,
explaining why the protests were taking place, and apologizing for the incon-
venience caused. There were multiple “apologies” in the course of the 2019
protests—this is related to minimizing loss of face between protesters and the
new arrivals, which was a unique feature of the Hong Kong protests, concern
for the non-protester and “civilian.” There were signs and banners in multiple
languages and information tables with protest literature detailing the political
cause. Human bodies, apart from forming a mass “sit-in” in the middle of
the arrivals hall, also formed mobile “Lennon Walls.” People and travelers
however could still move fairly freely about the airport complex (Choo 2019).
This protest action was also a way to subvert the tourist slogan “Asia’s World
City” and also to counteract the government narrative that all was well and
that it was not “business as usual.”
The “Hong Kong Way”

The “Hong Kong Way” was a 38-mile-long human chain that took place
in August 23. Dubbed The Hong Kong Way, it started as a short post on
the online forum LIHKG suggesting that Hong Kong protesters mark the
30th anniversary of the Baltic Way, a giant human chain formed in protest
of Soviet rule (Umbraško 2019). The Baltic Way was a peaceful politi-
cal demonstration that took place on August 23, 1989, when around two
million people joined hands to form a 600 km-long human chain through
the Baltic countries, thus demonstrating their unity in their efforts toward
freedom. Several days later, the casual online call to action had been real-
ized: Over 210,000 people joined hands across Hong Kong on August 23
(Chan, Grundy, Creery, and Cheng 2019). From the crowded streets of Wan
Chai on Hong Kong Island, to the famous waterfront of Tsim Sha Tsui,
to the suburbs of the New Territories people linked hands in a continuous
human chain representing solidarity that traversed the city. People waved
their mobile phone lights and chanted slogans and people in cars tooted
their horns. Dapiran (2019) called “The Hong Kong Way” an example of
“enchantment” being used as a weapon, “enchantment” being what politi-
cal theorist Jane Bennett says is something “that stops you in your tracks,
leaving you transfixed and spellbound—a suspension of time and move-
ment” (Ibid). Seeing images of lights traversing Hong Kong’s iconic Lion
Rock led to writings such as the following letter-to-the-editor in the South
China Morning Post, given this headline: “The ‘Hong Kong Way’: how
over 200,000 strangers joined hands and became fellow travellers on the
road to freedom” (Li, S.L. 2019). “Minor” human chains involved second-
ary school students who formed them each morning before classes (Lew and
Choi 2019).
248 Chapter 8
Lennon Walls
Physical “place” has often been foregrounded, especially by scholars inspired
by the geosemiotic approach such as the Scollons (2003), because the meaning
of signs has been found to depend upon a consideration of their sociocultural,
geographical–physical context. However, the social meaning of “signs and
discourses” and protesters’ “actions” do not need any fixed “material place-
ment” (Ibid, 2). In Hong Kong, messages and notices were repeated in similar
or different forms on walls, fences, or billboards in addition to online versions.
“Lennon Walls” (連儂牆) filled many urban spaces throughout the city.
Lennon Walls refers to the original Prague Lennon Wall, a monument to
John Lennon’s peace ideals created after his death and representing the pur-
suit of free speech and nonviolent rebellion by young Czech people against
the communist regime during the 1980s.10
Hong Kong pro-democracy supporters first created a Hong Kong Lennon
Wall using Post-it sticky notes outside the headquarters of the HKSAR
government in Admiralty during the Umbrella Movement. As time went on,
Lennon Walls became a spatial practice and expressive channel for citizens
to voice their dissent without any mediation (often government “town halls”
would be with selected representatives who were to represent the “people”).
Lennon Walls also served as community “bulletin boards,” also many of
these messages and notices also appeared in the online form.
Although it was impossible to quantify these notes as there were many
Lennon Walls in the city, there was a consistency of messages. They also
appeared on other sites in Hong Kong. Lennon Walls could also be mobile,
with the human body becoming the “wall” (as in the airport protests). The
most famous was Lennon wall was actually a “tunnel”; the Taipo “Lennon
Tunnel,” a connecting underpass to a bus interchange and Taipo railway sta-
tion and in which the walls, floors, and ceilings were covered with post-it
notes, hand-drawn images, and professionally designed posters. See table 8.1
below for the major categories.
Many of the posters explained that there were valid reasons for the pro-
tests and that protests were something of a last resort; Martin Luther King Jr,
also figured in many posters, again showing the continuance of “civil rights
discourse” with the Hong Kong protests of 2019, as part of a global struggle
for what was seen as a basic right to vote for one’s leader of choice. Posters
that could be called a “plea to the world” also appeared and referenced the
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act that were ultimately to pass
in the US Congress.
This Act is a US federal law that requires the US government to impose
sanctions against mainland China and Hong Kong officials considered
responsible for human rights abuses in Hong Kong, and requires the US
Department of State to conduct an annual review to determine whether
Table 8.1 Categories of Posters
Category of Posters Examples

Protest Principles “Five Demands Not One Less”
“Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times”
Reasons given for the protests
Solidarity Boosters “Add Oil” (加油)
“Stand with Hong Kong”
“Don’t forget your original intention” (毋忘初心) / “Resist” (反抗)
“No retreat, no dismissal” (不撤不散)
“May glory return to Hong Kong”
(願榮光歸香港)
Helpful Protest Hints How to do if tear gassed or pepper sprayed; what do if
attacked
Schedules Upcoming protests/actions
Comments on the “Pursue black cops”; “Death to black cops”
Police
Pleas to the World Pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act
changes in Hong Kong’s political status justify changing the unique, favor-
able trade relations between the US and Hong Kong. The passage of the bill
was supported by pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong (Yaffe-Bellamy and
Rappeport 2019)11 and in 2019 received near-unanimous support in Congress
(Denyer and Liang 2019). This plea to the outside world would have severe
repercussions with the charge of “collusion with foreign forces” crime in the
National Security Law of 2020.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous of posters were the ones firming up solidarity
for the continuing struggle: to “add oil” and to “carry on till your last breath,”
to perhaps feeling that “independence is the only way out,” as well as hop-
ing that the ultimate goal would eventually be achieved: “still searching for
universal suffrage.” The expression “all in all you’re just another brick in the
wall,” a reference to a Pink Floyd song that appeared on at least one poster,
was not highlighting the sameness and lack of distinction of the individual
in Hong Kong, but a “David and Goliath” metaphor of the nature of Hong
Kong’s democratic struggle. What is implied is that it takes numerous small
“bricks” to build up a resistance to the seemingly impenetrable wall of the
Beijing and Hong Kong governments. The significance of human chain
actions and individual actions can be referred back to the “sweating” in the
annual July protests, as mentioned in previous chapters.
What Goes Up Must Come Down (and Up Again?)

Since any protest discourse has two sides, the messages on the Lennon Walls
were naturally contested. For those against the movement who tore down
250 Chapter 8
Figure 8.5 Lennon Tunnel, Taipo, New Territories. Source: Photo by Author.
these, protesters called them “dogs that tear paper” (撕紙狗). However, “If
you tear off one [poster], I will post one hundred more” (撕一貼百).12 This
served as a warning to pro-government citizens not to tear off posters. Late
at night, a group turned up to tear down slogans and images against the
Extradition Bill and put up posters for a pro-government march (Cheung and
Sum 2019) and a government action (Cheng, K. 2019d).
Ordinary Hong Kong residents could learn much about the movement
through these message boards: “I am quite disappointed that they are being
removed. We have lost a place where we can reflect and remember what has
happened in the past [few months]” (Ibid).
Other “Connective” Actions

People would pass on pro-movement messages and information, express pro-
movement opinions online, sign online petitions, and so on, as connective
actions rather than going out on the street. There could be “keyboard war-
riors” (鍵盤戰士), who were protesters who contributed to the cause online
by writing articles or doing translation for the overseas media. This term
first appeared in the early 2010s in the Hong Kong online community as a
negative term to refer to people who criticize from their computer keyboards
without taking any concrete action. This term became more neutral and came
to mean protesters who have contributed to the movement online, like taking
part in promotion campaigns, signing petitions for international sanctions,
making complaints to government departments, or paying taxes dollar by
dollar. This was also a way to make the pro-movement citizens feel more
inclusive no matter their task (just as the terms “hands and feet” put “in-the-
field” protesters on an equal valued basis).
There were also funding campaigns, two of which raised over HK$21
million ($2.7 million) to place adverts in major international newspapers.
“By placing ads internationally, we can break through the filter of the media
and show the world the truth underneath the government propaganda,” one
campaign co-organizer noted (Zhao 2019). Later on, this would give rise
to the call of “foreign collusion” because of outside involvement in the
protests.
Economic Resistance
For the first time in protests, the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement
employed economic means of action to create “alternative political resources
in an acute imbalanced bargaining structure between protesters and the
government” (Chan and Pun 2020). Hong Kong has long been considered
a “shopping” paradise, so this became another target of protesters. There
was a call to Hongkongers to cut their personal spending in a bid to inflict
temporary damage to the economy. Hong Kong as an “economic city” rather
than a “political city” was an often-used excuse to delay any meaning-
ful political change in universal suffrage. There was an online campaign
called “Bye Buy Day HK” (Leung, K. August 18, 2019) that urged people
to spend less on Fridays and Sundays and avoid retailers and other firms
which were “blue,” (pro-Beijing or Beijing-affiliated) and patronize those
that were “yellow” (those who wanted further democracy). By targeting
a major characteristic that Hong Kong was known for, this action tried
to stop the “flow” of consumerism that might bring a response from the
government.
MASS PROTESTS
There were a number of mass protests where the public took part. The July
1 protest was perhaps the most significant one as it was the one where the
storming of the Legislative Council took place and triggered an escalation
of protest actions and increasing use of violence from the police and also
frontline protesters.
252 Chapter 8
The July 1 Protest

The annual Hong Kong Establishment Day ritual of protest took on an added
significance with the presence of the Extradition Bill still on the govern-
ment’s agenda.
This large protest was peaceful for most of its duration. However, in the
evening hundreds of demonstrators stormed the Legislative Council complex.
What was done at this protest encapsulates the discourse of the last few years
and even for at least the past decade. The following subheadings were what
took place while protesters were inside the complex.
Defacing the City’s Floral Emblem

Protesters spray-painted over the white bauhinia flower. The Chinese charac-
ters for “Peoples Republic of China” were blacked out, but those for “Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region” were not. The Chinese Flag was also
damaged. Among the most common slogans spray-painted onto the walls
were the five core demands. Protesters also erected placards that showed the
demands printed onto pictures of the faces of Hong Kong’s top officials. Police
were also targeted, with protesters calling them “black cops” or “police dogs.”
Colonial Flag
One protester draped the flag of colonial-era Hong Kong at the podium of
the legislative chamber. The flag of Hong Kong between 1959 and 1997 was
a blue ensign with the coat of arms of Hong Kong on a white disk. In Hong
Kong, it was called “the Hong Kong flag,” “British Hong Kong flag,” or the
“Dragon and Lion flag.” While the flag lost its official status following the
July 1, 1997, transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong, it resurfaced in the
2010s as a symbol of Hong Kong’s autonomy and protest against Chinese
rule in Hong Kong.
The flag was later removed. There was a debate on the LIHKG forum over
whether displaying the colonial flag would be considered a bad or good thing.
One response was “Britain won’t come and save us, Britain was also respon-
sible for selling out Hong Kong.” (英國真係睬你有味:o):o) :o) 英國都有份
出賣香港人xx( xx( xx). Another wrote: “This will give an excuse for others
to attack us, take it back please” (Chan, H., 2019a). Colonial flags were often
carried on protests (Chan, H. 2019b). Most of the younger protesters would
not have experienced Hong Kong under colonial rule. Perhaps the flag’s use,
especially by those who had not experienced colonialism, expressed “nos-
talgia” for a past just read about, since the flag “represents certain values
embodied by the colonial government: personal freedoms, rule of law, clean
governance” (Ibid), even though the British had not given much democracy
to the Hong Kong people.
Criticism of Hong Kong’s Political System

While the main target of the protesters’ anger was Chief Executive Carrie
Lam and her administration, some also took issue with the Legislative
Council (often seen as a “political vase” or a “rubber stamp”). Photographs
of officials were taken down and defaced. The portraits of pre-1997 legisla-
ture presidents were unmarked (these presidents were chosen by the colonial
administration, not Beijing).
Protesters also spray-painted the slogan “abolish functional constituen-
cies” in multiple locations. Functional constituencies refer to the 30 seats
in the 70-person legislature that were not openly contested but were elected
by members of specific professions or interest groups. In the first ten
years of Hong Kong, metaphors to describe functional constituencies were
“tumors,” “non-human entities,” or “aliens” among other names (Eagleton
2012).
In another related action, a protester ripped up a copy of the Basic Law
while standing on the podium of the legislative chamber. In this action, we
remember the controversies over its Interpretation in 2004 and pronounce-
ments by Beijing’s “Basic Law Guardians.” Some older Hong Kong people
may remember the long-drawn-out drafting period (from 1985 to 1990) and
the fact that they had, on the whole, not much say on its drafting.
References to “Martyrs”
Some protesters told the media that the escalation was necessary because
people had “given their lives for the movement.” This was in reference to the
three people who it was alleged took their own lives in recent incidents. On
the walls of the legislature, there were slogans such as “blood for blood” and
“Have you repaid the debt of blood?”
Later on, some would count around a dozen “unnatural deaths” related to
protests. The majority of the deceased committed suicide—at least six indi-
viduals left suicide notes expressing their support of the protests and frustra-
tion toward the government (Lam, O. 2020). Because of the fear of death
at the hands of the police if taken into custody, protesters started to employ
“non-suicide declarations” either before or during arrest; detainees stated
their names on camera and declared “I will not commit suicide.” Some have
even published statements on their social media profiles or set up automatic
emails for family and friends, assuring everyone that if they ended up dead,
it would not have been their own choice (Anderson 2020).
These “martyrs” had memorials at the site of their deaths or alleged mur-
ders and people celebrated “anniversaries” each month afterward (and into
2020 as well). Protests followed these incidents, where white, as previously
mentioned, was worn, it being the color of mourning in Chinese culture.
254 Chapter 8
Hong Kong Identity

There was a bench that was spray-painted with “Hong Kong is not China,
not yet.” Another wall on the ground floor was densely covered with slogans,
some referring to jailed activist localist Edward Leung and the slogan he used
during his unsuccessful 2016 election bid, “revolution of our time,” would
later become one of the principal slogans of 2019.
Rationale for Escalation

Writing on one column outside the legislative chamber quickly went viral.
It read: “It was you who taught me that peaceful marches are useless”
(是你教我和平示威沒有用的), because after a number of mass protests
Chief Executive Carrie Lam refused to take the Extradition Bill off the leg-
islative table. Another slogan, which later was seen on posters all over Hong
Kong, was both spray-painted onto walls and shown on a banner at the front
of the legislative chamber that read: “There are no rioters, only tyrannical
rule” (沒有暴徒只有暴政). This was seen as the rationale for escalation—
the ignoring of public opinion by the administration.
They Were Protesters, Not Thieves

Inside the cafeteria on the ground floor, protesters left a note on the refrig-
erator saying “We are not thieves, we won’t take things without asking.”
Another widely circulated photograph showed a small tray in a fridge which
was filled with cash, in payment for the drinks taken.
International Solidarity
The vast majority of messages left by protesters referred to local issues, but
one made reference to China’s treatment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
“China will pay for its crimes against Uighur Muslims,” the message read.
The photograph of the graffiti has been shared by Uyghur activists on social
media. This is one instance of linking the local protest with political struggles
elsewhere.
The Black Bauhinia Flag
Outside the legislature, protesters raised the “black bauhinia” flag in the early
hours of July 1. A riff on the official flag of Hong Kong, the design features
a half-wilted bauhinia flower stained with blood, presented on a black back-
ground. The original HKSAR flag hung next to the black bauhinia flag out-
side the legislature, but protesters lowered it to half-mast.
Hong Kong’s regional emblem, the Bauhinia (Bauhinia “Blakeana”
/洋紫荊), as research has shown that it is “is completely sterile” (Lau,
Ramsden, and Saunders 2005). This further backs up the “hybridity” of the
Hong Kong system and also illustrates the contradictions (a tree that produces
seeds yet is sterile) inherent in the “One Country, Two Systems” governance
framework.
References to Pop Culture

Participants of the 2014 pro-democracy Umbrella Movement often sing the
song “Do you hear the people sing?” from the musical Les Misérables. In
2019, however, in addition to this song, many have cited a popular line from
Suzanne Collins’s book Mockingjay, which is part of “The Hunger Games”
series: “If you burn you burn with us,” which the government took as a call
for violent action.
Chief Executive Carrie Lam on July 9 stated that the Extradition Bill was
“dead” and that government work on it had been a “total failure” (BBC 2019).
However, people were not convinced that the Extradition Bill was finished
and that saying it was “dead” was not the same as being “buried.” It was
finally buried in October with the Bill being taken off the legislative table.
Despite the “death” of the Bill many felt that the protests should continue
(Lum, Cheng, and Lam 2019).
INCIDENTS
Dates have always been important to Hong Kong as has been mentioned
earlier (this will also be discussed in the next chapter). Incidents involv-
ing certain dates served to maintain protest momentum. The three hashtags
#721唔見人, #831打死人, and #101 槍殺人, as well as the date alone, would
be spray-painted on many walls in the city and related to incidents involving
violence or deaths involving police and protesters.
Not showing up on July 21, 2019 (#21唔見人): thugs (triads) believed to
be hired by the pro-government camp attacked protesters and other passen-
gers in the Yuen Long train station on that date. Despite thousands of reports
being made to the emergency hotline for more than 30 minutes, police did not
arrive. In 2020, there has also been a further discursive rewriting of history in
how government officials and representatives of the Hong Kong police have
framed the incident over the past year, from being a “violent attack” to being
a “gang fight” (Ho, K. 2020c).
Beating people to death on August 31, 2019 (#831打死人): Police
attacked protesters and other passengers in the Prince Edward metro
station.
256 Chapter 8
Shooting people to death on October 1, 2019 (#101 槍殺人): A police

officer shot an 18-year-old protester at close range. The protester survived
after being hospitalized.
The “Eye Girl Incident”

The “Eye Girl Incident” became an ongoing symbol of 2019 in relation to a
woman (a first-aider during a protest) who injured her eye during a protest
outside the Tsim Sha Tsui police station on August 11, 2019. A projectile,
which appeared to be a bean bag round, was seen lodged inside her safety
goggles, leaving her right eye badly damaged. Her injury became a symbol
of what protesters saw as increasingly excessive force (this incident occurred
where many journalists and first-aid volunteers had gathered), and gave new
impetus to the protest movement (Kilpatrick 2019). It also brought to mind
the idiom “an eye for an eye” and suggests that possible retaliation actions
might occur.
This incident led to the “Eye 4 HK” campaign calling for people to cover
their right eye and post a photograph on social media to support the woman,
the ongoing anti-extradition law protests, and in opposition to what was
considered police brutality. This became a worldwide movement (Cheng,
K. 2019b). One particular poster mimics an eye chart, with the characters
“民心” meaning “popular feelings, popular support, or will of the people,”
being placed at various angles, as in an eye chart. The Chinese characters at
the bottom of the poster read “yellow or blue is a political view, but black
or white is a matter of conscience” (referring to the pro-democracy and pro-
establishment groups, respectively); the poster goes on to say, “if you can’t
see the color clearly, at least you can tell black from white.” The aim of this
poster was to question government supporters who blindly supported the
Hong Kong government despite the facts, which are as “clear as black and
white.” Like other aspects of the 2019 protest, there is a discursive reimagin-
ing of the narrative of the girl with the eye injury.13 The “eye girl” could say
to be a protest “icon” from mid-August onward, but there were a number of
others as well, which will be discussed in the next section.
HONG KONG PROTEST ICONS
Pepe the Frog

Pepe the frog, the internet cartoon meme character, first appeared in the US
online community (Echevarria 2020). Hong Kong protesters appropriated it
for designing stickers and posters. Unlike the United States, this icon does not
carry the idea of racism in Hong Kong. Many Hong Kong people probably
did not realize the frog is actually a symbol of America’s alt-right movement.
“In the United States it’s a hate symbol, but now it is reborn in Hong Kong
as a symbol of love and freedom” said one protester (Burke 2019). This is
why it is dangerous to think that an object that has a certain semantic mean-
ing somewhere would have the same connotation in another location, thus
context is key in disambiguating the symbolic.
“Lady Liberty”—A New Goddess of Democracy

To recap, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests have always resonated with
the Hong Kong people at large. The yearly remembrance rally in Victoria
Park on June 4 had often drawn large crowds, and the Democratic Party’s
“foundation moment” were partly forged in reaction to June 4, 1989, becom-
ing their “political capital.” Since 1997 many universities have had replica
Tiananmen Square “goddesses of democracy” on their campuses.
In August 2019, money was raised to build a four-meter-tall statue called
“Lady Liberty Hong Kong” (9.8 ft.). “Lady Liberty” was fitted with a gas
mask, helmet, a first-aid bag, an umbrella, and a flag that said: “Liberate
Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times” and was modeled after the girl whose
eye was allegedly ruptured by a bean bag round shot by the police. It was
installed on the iconic Lion Rock but was vandalized and removed by an
unknown group the day after its installation (See figure 8.6 on the next page.).
ABANDONING WATER, BECOMING FIRE
“Abandoning water,” that is, becoming “stationary” rather than fluid like
water, involved the “three suspensions” (三罷) slated for November 11,
2019. Three strategies or “suspensions”: to strike (罷工), to class boycott
(罷課), and for shop-owners to stop running their businesses (罷市). This
was an attempt to force the government into responding to protest demands.
This was also called “the day that Hong Kong stood still” (香港停擺日). In
addition to the three suspensions, obstructions through various means, such
as road blockages, obstructing the MTR, and drivers driving slowly to cause
traffic congestion. Five Chinese terms were used: “黎明,” “晨曦,” “破曉,”
“曙光,” and “旭日” to describe the daily protests or operations, all meaning
the word “dawn.” The five terms were used to refer to the operations that
were to run from the early mornings of Monday to Friday, respectively. In
English, they were all named “Operation Dawn,” or accompanied with “1.0”
to “5.0” to denote the weekday in question.
258 Chapter 8
Figure 8.6 Photograph of “Lady Liberty.” Source: Courtesy of Dr. Kacey Wong.
This was the event leading to the so-called university sieges. Protesters
disrupted traffic to facilitate a general strike on November 11, 2019, other
protesters inside the Chinese University of Hong Kong threw objects onto rail-
way tracks near the University station, to which the Hong Kong police force
responded by shooting pepper bullets at students and launching volleys of tear
gas into the campus. The next day saw various clashes between the two sides,
with the police storming into campus to conduct arrests while the protesters, in
response, threw petrol bombs. After nightfall, the university’s vice-chancellor
and president Rocky Tuan arrived to seek mediation with the police, who
refused to negotiate. At least 70 students were injured. Access to the author’s
home in Taipo was blocked with rail and services halted for several days.14
Protesters briefly occupied the Polytechnic University from November 13
to 15, and set up barricades and crafted makeshift weapons inside the uni-
versity campus. Other university students also barricaded the school after the
siege. The majority of the protesters left the campus by November 15, with
some leaving for the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, which was besieged
by the police on November 17. The police received criticism for storming the
university campus, though they defended the act, claiming that the campus
was a “weapon factory” (Channel NewsAsia 2019).
The 12-day siege (November 17–29) ended with more than 1,300 people
arrested and over 300 hospitalized. Violence had reached a new level as
protesters used Molotov cocktails, catapults, and bows and arrows, while
police fired tear gas, water cannon jets, and volleys of crowd-control pro-
jectiles (Chan and Creery 2019). The intensity of the fighting was not the
only reason the Polytechnic University siege was unprecedented. It also
raised fundamental questions over how to maintain unity in a leaderless
movement, exposing tensions over tactics and strategy (Tufekci 2017)—
underscoring the physical and mental challenges faced by protesters as they
grappled with the trauma. Since the beginning of the movement, demon-
strators have stuck to the key tenet of “Leave no-one behind, advance and
retreat together.”
The Polytechnic University and the City University of Hong Kong now
have turnstiles to prevent the public from going in to the complex without
authorization, and the nearby once-open footbridge near the Polytechnic
University is now encased in wire.
THE AFTERMATH: THE TRACES OF PROTEST
At certain times, protest slogans on walls were roughly painted over by the
authorities leaving behind a kind of “artistic smudge,” a reminder of what
once lay beneath. This “smudge” is what the author calls the “discursive
Figure 8.7 This Photograph First Appeared in a Hong Kong Free Press Article by Kelly
Ho on April 12, 2020. Source: Photograph courtesy of Mr. Giraffe Leung.
260 Chapter 8
remains.” In 2020, a local Hong Kong artist framed these discursive remains
with tape (Ho, K. 2020b).
The artist, Giraffe Leung, called these discursive remains “scars” and
labeled the date, size, and medium of the “work,” and most importantly what
he considered the real artist’s name to be—“the Hong Kong government.”
“The repair works are attempts by the government to paper over the cracks,
but it was such a half-hearted effort, just like their governance,” Leung said.
“The things that the government is cleaning up are only on the surface, they
have little intention to solve the underlying issues” (Ibid).
After 2019, Chief Executive Carrie Lam has frequently stated that peace
and “stability had returned” to Hong Kong and “has helped us greatly” (Khan
and Purnell 2019), but this peace and stability was an artificially imposed
stability and peace, as overt protest actions were liable to prosecution under
the National Security Law.
CONCLUSION
One of the key reasons why Hong Kong’s protesters in 2019 had been able
to coordinate at such scale and duration is likely their sense of collective
identity, which keeps getting reinforced through solidarity slogans, songs,
and reminders about what they were fighting for. One can see how some
typical Chinese cultural topoi were followed as well as their ideal of Hong
Kong as not simply just another Chinese city as their freedoms are what sets
them apart. We can also see the reflexive nature of these protests and how
they related to the concerns illustrated in the previous chapters of this book,
either overtly or covertly. This chapter has not been an intricate elaboration
of the verbal arguments between the government and protesters, rather it
shows how the intersection of several themes have given a holistic “tenor” to
the discourse and a “weaving” of multimodal strands make sense of a larger
whole, without detailing every possible aspect that could be said about a sev-
eral months-long protests. This has been possible due to the author acting as a
participant-observer and closely observing and recording as much as possible
while the actual events were taking place.
NOTES
1. Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 can be found at: https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18
-19/english/bills/b201903291.pdf.
2. June 21 was a key date in the movement as protesters surrounded Hong Kong
Police Headquarters. The phrase “be water,” which had been occasionally mentioned
online, was said at the protest site, reminding protesters that their strategy had to be
flexible (Zhang 2019).
3. A sit-in by the pro-democracy group Demosistō held at the Central Government
Complex on March 15, 2019, was the first protest against the extradition bill.
The Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), a platform for 50 pro-democracy groups,
launched a protest march against the bill on March 31 and another on April 28, 2019.
4. These include “protest” mooncakes linked to the mid-autumn festival in
September 2020 and “protest” lai see (利是 or 利事)—traditional “lucky” money
envelopes for 2020 Lunar New Year as well as “protest” tattoos, and even new “pro-
test” Chinese characters.
5. The Guangfu Hui (光復會) that was a revolutionary group opposing Qing
dynasty used the phrase “Restore Han Rule” (光復漢族) as one of its mottoes.
Guangfu Hui was also the name of an organization established by the Republic of
China after the communist revolution on the mainland with the purpose of “restoring
the light on Mainland China” (Lee 1970). The latter organization was dissolved in
June 1990. Therefore, this particular slogan would rankle Beijing as it talked of 1949
as being China’s “Liberation.” It needed no further restoration.
6. Hong Kong Free Press is an excellent reference for slogans and terminology:
https://hongkongfp.com/hong-kong-protest-movement-data-archive-glossary/.
7. Notification of the Intention to hold a Public Meeting / Procession (police.gov
.hk) https://www.police.gov.hk/info/doc/licensing/general/en/gls_ppm-fm_en.pdf.
8. See table 8.2. The figures are the percentage of respondents who have partici-
pated in that kind of protest activity (Chung, H-F 2020).
9. These lyrics can be found at: https://genius.com/Thomas-dgx-yhl-glory-to
-hong-kong-official-lyrics-lyrics. A full orchestra and choir, clad in black, construc-
tion helmets, and gas masks, can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=oUIDL4SB60g.
10. The wall was in a secluded square across from the French Embassy. It was
first decorated following John Lennon’s 1980 assassination, when an unnamed artist
painted an image of the singer-songwriter along with Beatles lyrics. Western images
and symbols were banned in Czechoslovakia at that time, and despite these being
constantly removed, the graffiti kept being applied to the wall. Later, when the Velvet
Revolution signaled the end of Communism, the wall became a site for calls to activ-
ism worldwide.
11. See https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1838, for details
of this bill.
12. I wrote on my FB page on that day: “Again . . . you can’t stop a good Lennon
Tunnel from regenerating”; a friend had replied to my post: “it has been documented
and it can be rebuilt,” “and it has been gutted before.” The author lives in Taipo, New
Territories, where the Lennon Tunnel was located.
13. See “Protest Eye Girl ‘Left HK with No Serious Injury’,” Michael Shum, The
Standard, May 25, 2021: “A woman’s eyeball did not burst when she was hit by a
hard object outside Tsim Sha Tsui police station two years ago, police sources said”;
“Reward Raised to $1m for Info on Eye Girl Who Fled to Taiwan,” staff reporter,
The Standard, May 26, 2021, and “Hong Kong Hospital Chiefs Reject ‘Cover-up’
262 Chapter 8
Allegation over 2019 Protest Eye Injury,” Kelly Ho, Hong Kong Free Press, May
26, 2021.
14. Long Night’s Journey into Day: A Monologue Play” was the author’s story of
how she was trapped on the bus overnight in November 12–13, 2019, and her long
walk home. See https://hkprotesting.com/2020/11/28/monologue/.
Chapter 9
Looking toward a Contested Future

In recent years, “future studies” have become popular. This is an academic

discipline that involves the “systematic study of possible, probable, and pref-
erable futures including the worldviews and myths that underlie each of these
futures” (Inayatullah 2013, 37). The first part of this chapter deals with Hong
Kong’s future—a contested future—and has been slightly adapted from the
essay “Hong Kong’s Unlikely Hope: That Its Future Remains Its Past,” from
the September 2020 special issue of the Journal of Future Studies on the
China-Hong Kong crisis of 2019. Submitted to the Journal in March 2020,
and unaware that a National Security Law (NSL) was to be introduced in late
June, this NSL confirmed that Hong Kong’s future was definitely an unlikely
hope, and that its future will be definitely not like its (colonial) past.1 The
NSL could still be considered a work in progress, and it will be discussed in
the second half of the chapter alongside related electoral changes.
THE FUTURE IS THE SUPREME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY
The thinker Slavoj Zisek (1989, 274–275) tells us that the future is the
“supreme object of ideology” and that it is “without form, shape or color: it
demands yet exceeds all figuration.” Consequently, he sees discourse about
the future as a necessary site for conceptualizing and using this “virtual
space” for “privileging” certain futures, as metaphor has shown in some pre-
vious chapters of this book. Beijing seems to be privileging a future where
Hong Kong is increasingly assimilated into the Mainland despite promising a
high degree of autonomy as part of the “One Country, Two Systems” frame-
work; Hong Kong is privileging a future that maintains this high degree of
autonomy. The Extradition Bill of 2019, which led to massive protests (refer
263
264 Chapter 9
back to chapter 8), was seen by a broad section of the community as a “tip-
ping point” in Hong Kong’s full integration into China. Hong Kong sees the
city as being apart from China, rather than a part of it (Bajpai 2019), a situa-
tion that China felt should no longer be the case.
The conjectured future has a “very high level of speculation” as such
discourse has cultural and political importance because “it provides fertile
ground for releasing trial balloons, magnifying threats, creating solidarity,
and justifying acts of government” (Neiger 2007, 310), involving “worst-case
scenarios” and “what would have happened if . . .” which relate to the cultural
and political norms of the location. The potential for a “worst-case scenario”
is used by various institutional bodies to assess possible risk (Candlin and
Crichton 2011, 4) by the presence of a known “deficit,” which has the pos-
sibility of worsening.
The “worst-case scenario” is often presented to the Hong Kong people
by those in power (be they government figures or business tycoons) if they
do not support official policy. This was the case with the Sino-British Joint
Declaration. The Hong Kong people were told to “take it or leave it” other-
wise the future maintenance of their systems could not be guaranteed (Hong
Kong Assessment Office 1984; Eagleton 2012). This was a joining of a “dis-
course of a (potential) future” and a “discourse of fear”—witness the “death
of Hong Kong” articles prior to the signing of the JD and afterward (Kraar
1995; Richburg 2018; Wu 2018; Ng 2020). This predicted “death” refers to
the loss of what made Hong Kong different from China, such as freedom of
the press, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary.
Hong Kong has always been obsessed with dates, and thus its future.
In the 1970s, with Britain’s 99-year lease over most of Hong Kong due to
expire in 1997, London worried about the colony’s future as investment was
bound to dwindle over time, as would Hong Kong’s legal, economic, and
social systems unless an accord was reached with China. Eventually, Beijing
agreed in the Joint Declaration (1984) and, later, the Basic Law (1990) that
Hong Kong’s systems would remain unchanged for 50 years after its return to
Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, under a policy known as “One Country,
Two Systems.”
The result was a 13-year-long discussion (from 1984 to July 1, 1997) of
what Hong Kong would be like in the future; the desired future was where
the structures and systems of 1984 would be maintained. This desired future
was thus the preservation of the (then) present Hong Kong; in other words,
a Hong Kong that wanted its present to be its future (remember from chap-
ter 1 that one legal expert called it a “snapshot of 1984,” Hoo 2008). This
“maintenance of the present” was the result of the fear of how this “mar-
riage” between two radically different ideologies and legal and social systems
would work, given the relatively recent chaos of the Cultural Revolution and
Looking toward a Contested Future 265
the crackdown in Tiananmen Square. However, even after 1997, despite the
guarantees of a “high degree of autonomy” and the “ultimate aim” of univer-
sal suffrage, Hong Kong still had another date to consider: 2047, when the 50
years of “no change” was up.
So What Does “50 Years No Change” Actually Mean?

Hong Kong is, in 2021, near the mid-point of this 50-year period. This “50
years” is the period considered by Deng Xiaoping to be the time that China
would “catch up” to Western developed countries economically (China Daily
2019). However, on occasion, this 50-year timeframe has been taken meta-
phorically to mean “a long time” or “maybe never.” In a speech at a meeting
with the members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee on April 16, 1987,
Deng Xiaoping said:
If the [opening up] policy is successful, yielding the desired results [increase
in GDP] in the 50-year period after 1997, we shall have little reason to change
it then. That is why I say that after the Motherland is reunified under the “one
country, two systems” formula, our policy toward Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan will not change for 50 years and that it will remain unchanged even
beyond that period. (Deng 1987; China Daily 2019)
The colonial era cliché “borrowed place, borrowed time” (Hughes 1976)
contained an element of truth as Hong Kong was always aware of the clock
ticking. Before 1997, nervous citizens counted down to the end of British
rule. After 1997, citizens started to live their lives, thinking that 2047 was
still far off and optimistically hoped something better might happen in the
interim; for example, China, with its open-door policy, would somehow lead
it to become more democratic (Eagleton 2012).
1997–2018: Hinting toward a Potential Future

The “One Country, Two Systems” system has been described as being
both a “wedge” and a “bridge” between the two radically different systems
(Wesley-Smith 1996). Hong Kong would have a “high degree of autonomy”
and “enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power” (Article
2 of the Basic Law) and that the “socialist system and policies shall not be
practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (Article 5 of
the Basic Law). After 1997, there was a concerted effort to show that Hong
Kong had always been a part of China from the earliest times. For exam-
ple, the permanent exhibition “The Hong Kong Story” in the Hong Kong
Museum of History highlights this connection from only a small amount of
266 Chapter 9
archaeological evidence (Eagleton 2004). This “story” of Hong Kong’s early

days and its present is perhaps being altered.2
While there were early controversies such as the Right of Abode saga and
Interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004 (Huang, Z. and Huang, E. 2016; Key
Points 2000), it was after 2003 and the withdrawal of Article 23 security
legislation—a piece of legislation that many considered “undermines the rule
of law,” “ruins the ‘One Country, Two Systems,’” and “turns the public into
enemies” that the Mainland started to keep closer eyes on Hong Kong.
Certain controversies from 2012 have caused many to think more closely
once again about what Hong Kong’s future would look like, making the
phrase “50 years no change” seem hollow. The major ones have been the
push for “national education” in 2012; the abduction of booksellers critical
of Beijing in 2015 (Chou and Siu 2016); and the snatching of a politically
connected tycoon in 2017 (Haas 2017). Furthermore, the Hong Kong govern-
ment has intensified pressure on the city’s democracy movement, prosecut-
ing activists, blocking opposition politicians from running for election, and
banning an independence-promoting political party in 2018 (Cheng 2018b,
2018c). The refusal to renew the visa of Financial Times Victor Mallet,
president of the Foreign Correspondent’s Club in 2018 after a representative
of a pro-independence party spoke at a club luncheon was seen as a tactic
borrowed directly from the Mainland, which often uses journalists’ visas as
a means of control (Lahiri 2018). All these particular incidents relate to areas
where Hong Kong and the Mainland differ: in ideas of what could or could
not be said, and who had the right to say it. Why did these situations occur at
this time? This could be laid at the door of the growing economic power of
China on the world stage.
Hong Kong, once the “rich cousin” benevolently helping its poor relations
next door, was no longer seen as such. Both fiscally and physically, the “poor
relation” is largely poor no more and thus there is less need for Hong Kong
to be used as its “gateway” (Prasad 2019), although this metaphor was still
used to a certain extent.
Fiscally, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI—the Silk Road Economic Belt
and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road) is a development strategy adopted by
the Chinese government in 2013 involving infrastructural development and
investments in nearly 70 countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa (Lo 2018). In
addition, the Pearl River Delta is now “the Greater Bay Area”—the Chinese
government’s scheme to link the cities of Hong Kong, Macau, and others
within a certain radius into an integrated economic and business hub. This
has been likened to “a political manifesto masquerading as a business plan”
(Heaver 2020).
Also disappearing are physical borders with the placement of a mainland
customs station within the high-speed train terminus at West Kowloon, in
which a portion of Hong Kong land was ceded back to become part of the
Mainland—and where technically a person can now be charged with a crime
from the Mainland’s jurisdiction (Feng 2017; Li, C. 2018). In addition, the
newly constructed Zhuhai-Macau-Hong Kong mega bridge was largely seen
as a “white elephant” integration project since its current and projected use
vis-à-vis the cost of its construction does not match up (Yip 2018).
All these can be seen as erosions of freedoms on one hand and integration
and erasure of the physical border on the other—the width and length of both
the metaphorical/physical bridge has widened, while the metaphorical wedge
continues to be gradually chipped away. Why has there been this speeding up
of integration in the 2010s?
Previously, the distinct political systems, and even their occasional antago-
nisms, could not overcome the complementary economic profiles, com-
parative advantages, and relative access to capital and technology that China
needed from Hong Kong. Hong Kong in the 1970s traded up into the value
chain into financial services that the Mainland still did not have. This meant
that social and political contradictions could be put on hold (Eagleton 2015),
until some Mainland cities could bypass Hong Kong to a certain extent.
However, these inherent social/political contradictions have become more
apparent, and alongside the delayed universal suffrage, and the seeming lack
of warmth for their ancestral land, became increasingly obvious.
The Extradition Bill of 2019 could be seen as a “tipping” point toward
further integration with the ideology of the “one country” and an implied
future as one country rather than one with two systems (please refer back to
chapter 8).
This Bill was seen as an affront to the rule of law, as the latter was desig-
nated the “bedrock” and “foundation” of Hong Kong society (Eagleton 2012;
Cheng and Eagleton 2019, chapters 2 and 6 of this book), because once the
people were on the other side of the border nothing could be guaranteed
(Davis 2019). The government said that protesters were threatening the rule
of law, while the protesters said the opposite, that it was actually the govern-
ment that was threatening the rule of law (Duhalde 2019; Hamlett 2019).
Voicing the Future

With the Extradition Bill came talk of 2047, and the three major “voices” dis-
cussing the future of Hong Kong were the young people of the city, the Chief
Executive Carrie Lam, and Xi Jingping, the president of China. The young
protested because they were the future, but the chief executive and President
Xi Jingping hinted that the future would not be a good one. The “hint” was
contained in Article 18 of the Basic Law and implied in the speeches of the
Chief Executive and President Xi Jingping.
268 Chapter 9
The Young
Many of the young, who were the main drivers of the protests—and who
would be middle-aged in 2047—saw the freedoms they currently enjoy as
being incompatible with China’s political system. “In 2047, our freedom
will become nothing in Hong Kong,” one such youth said, and “That’s why
we need to go out to the street and tell the government what we’re thinking”
(Marlow 2019).
The young people of Hong Kong could be called the “transitional genera-
tion” (Wong and Ng 2020) born on the cusp of 1997 or slightly later. They
were “the first generation to grow up after the end of British rule, but before
Chinese rule had really taken hold” (Ibid). Despite the early transitional years
of the SAR going relatively smoothly, the city was trying to work out its
new identity as part of China, rather than a British colony, and these young
people were caught in between, so they also had no “fixed” identity as either
“British” or as “Chinese.” Over time that identity seems to have solidified
into something more distinctly different from the idea that China would have
wanted. For, as one 20-something Hongkonger stated, “I am from a city
owned by a country that I don’t belong to”; this is despite attempts to foster
more national pride in the young, such as national education. For as that this
20-something noted:
I grew up learning that my city’s core values were rooted in the freedoms
granted by the Basic Law, including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
and freedom of press and publication. Myself and many people from Hong
Kong take pride in being somewhat politically separated from China, which is
governed by the Chinese Communist Party that notoriously censors the internet
and imprisons dissident people in China. Many citizens even call themselves
“Hongkonger,” which the Oxford Dictionary later adopted in 2014. (Hui 2019)
The Hong Kong government and others kept reiterating their adherence
to the rule of law, an independent judiciary and free speech. However, the
young saw that the events mentioned earlier in this essay seemed to favor
Beijing’s point of view and that only lip service was being paid to these
aspects touted as Hong Kong’s “core values” and what they desired for the
future.
One student, who had interned at the Palace Museum in Beijing in 2017,
stated why an individual can love the culture but not its politics:
On the surface, the government might think I’m an easy target to be moulded
into a patriotic youth—that is by their standard—because of my interest in
Chinese culture . . . But I see my interest and my political position as separate.
My love for Chinese culture doesn’t make me trust or like the Chinese legal and
political system more. (Lo, K. 2019)
Since the Umbrella Movement of 2014 when central Hong Kong Island
was partially blocked for 79 days, the local governments have tried to make
the youth optimistic about Hong Kong’s future. But the evidence presented
here suggests that the youth are not convinced that the future is rosy, nor that
they need to love their country unconditionally.
The film 10 Years, a 2015 independent film, garnered attention for its dys-
topian critique of Hong Kong’s future, in particular “mainlandization,” and
perhaps drew on the fears of many of the youth (Fang 2017). The film, which
was a series of vignettes, offered a vision of the semi-autonomous territory
in the year 2025, with human rights and freedoms gradually diminishing.
One vignette illustrated the increasing dominance of Mandarin; in another, a
young hardliner supporter for Hong Kong independence becomes the first to
be convicted under a National Security Law and dies during a hunger strike
in prison. The third vignette has an unknown person self-immolate in front
of the British Consulate-General in Admiralty. In the last vignette, Sam’s
grocery shop is targeted by Youth Guards, a Red Guards-like group, since he
labels his Hong Kong eggs as “local eggs,” while the word “local” is censored
in Hong Kong (Ibid).
A popular slogan during the 2019 protests as mentioned in chapter 8 was
“Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of our Times.” First used in 2016 for a
local land issue, it drew attention to the wishes of many protesters for “Hong
Kong to become a Hong Kong for Hongkongers” (Kwong 2016). In contrast,
former Chief Executive of Hong Kong Tung Chee-hwa, Pro-Beijing camp
political parties, editor of Global Times Hu Xijin, and the Xinhua News
Agency, all considered these slogans to involve Hong Kong independence.
This tested the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” and reminded
China of its humiliating past when it was “carved up” by imperialist powers.
The past could not be their future.
The Chief Executive

Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, like other chief executives
before her, emphasized the importance of “One Country, Two Systems” for
Hong Kong’s prosperity. Like the young, Lam also stressed the maintenance
of this framework in post-2047 Hong Kong, something she thought the young
did not respect (Sum and Lam 2020) as shown in the following:
My view is this: as long as we persist with the “One Country, Two Systems”
principle, push forward the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”
270 Chapter 9
and have a full understanding and implementation of the principle . . . then
we have adequate reason to believe that “One Country, Two Systems” will be
implemented smoothly and in the long term, and it will not change after 2047.
(Cheng, K. 2020)
The trouble is this “understanding” of the “One Country, Two Systems” is

not elaborated. The “maintenance” of the framework is said to be a given goal,
but what does this “smooth implementation” mean? Implied is a future envis-
aged from the central government’s view (i.e., the “correct understanding”).
Despite promises of continuance of the One Country, Two Systems, many
consider there has already been “change” and that more change was likely to
come in the future. The young were blamed for their “lack of understanding”
of the principle and the Basic Law, so they “may cause the situation that they
are worried about” (Cheng 2020). Thus, there have been frequent education
campaigns about the correct meaning of the “rule of law” since 1997 (Marlow
2020). It seems there is a battle over what “rule of law” should mean, and
since many of the city’s lawyers have taken part or have been sympathetic
to the 2019 protests for just the same reason, the implication is that legal
professionals are also “misunderstanding” what the rule of law entails. It is
the Hong Kong and the Beijing governments who define what Hong Kong’s
future should be.
It is hard to find direct commentary on the issue of 2047 and Hong Kong’s
future, but government policy focuses on the “development” of the economy
and thus closer cooperation and integration with the Mainland (see Hong
Kong’s annual policy addresses). Rather than political reform, the Hong
Kong government wants Hong Kong to be an “economic” rather than a
“political” city (Eagleton 2012).
President Xi Jingping
Praise has been constantly heaped on Macau, the other SAR of China, Hong
Kong’s sister, SAR by President Xi Jingping. On the 20th anniversary of the
Macau SAR’s founding in late December 2019, Xi expressed faith in the
“One Country, Two Systems” principle as practiced in Macau in four ways:
(1) Macau has worked to safeguard the sovereignty and security of the
country;
(2) Macau always strives in the right direction; its citizens recognize

that “one country” is the premise and precondition of the “two
systems”;
(3) Macau people had always kept the country’s overall interests in mind;
and
(4) Macau residents had the “tradition of loving the Mainland as well as a
strong sense of national identity, belonging and pride” (adapted from Siu
and Cheung 2019a, 2019b).
While he made no mention of Hong Kong, these words were widely seen
as a rebuke of Hong Kong in the light of previous remarks made during the
protests (Zhou 2019). It seemed clear that Xi was deliberately contrasting
his strong approval of Macau with his “silent disapproval” of Hong Kong’s
relationship with the motherland since its 1997 return to Chinese sovereignty.
The following relates to the points made in Xi’s speech:
(1) The call for “self-determination” and for “independence” by some in

Hong Kong touched a sensitive nerve as this was seen as a threat to “sov-
ereignty,” always a sore point with the Chinese Communist Party (Point
1 above). Protesters seem to focus on the “second system”;
(2) You cannot have a “second system” without the “one country,” and the
latter should take priority (Point 2);
(3) Hong Kong seemed to be more focused on their own affairs rather than
Beijing (Point 3); calling themselves “Hongkongers” rather than “Chi-
nese”; and saying the oath of office wrongly, meant that potential legisla-
tors would not uphold the “One Country, Two Systems”;
(4) Macau did not seem to have this kind of conflict (Point 4); furthermore,
Macau was largely protest-free.
Macau presented to Hong Kong, the future scenario envisaged to it by

Beijing—a model future so to speak.3
President Xi Jinping said that Hong Kong’s chief executive has stood firm
on the principle of “one country, two systems” and has Beijing’s backing, but
warns she must tackle “deep-rooted conflicts and problems” to make the situ-
ation more to Beijing’s liking, and so that the “One Country, Two Systems”
would continue to be followed in Hong Kong in the future (Cheung, Wong,
and Lam 2019). There is an inherent threat that the system may be down-
graded if political chaos continues.
Furthermore, the recent appointment of Xi-friendly hardliners to staff the
Liaison Office is again an indication that Beijing would likely “get tough”
on Hong Kong in the future. This means “reducing of the direct influence of
younger specialized career bureaucrats trained to work in the ‘Two Systems’
bureaucratic environment created by Beijing’s original promises about a
‘high degree’ of post-colonial autonomy” (Pepper 2020).
Xi Jinping said that China “sincerely hopes for the best” for Hong Kong,
urging the city to strive for stability, and in his New Year’s Eve speech on
December 29, 2019, Xi said the city could only thrive if the unrest ended (Hu
272 Chapter 9
2019). The problems, he implied, lie in contradictions with the people rather
than the system itself which was always seen as “Hong Kong’s guiding light”
(Siu and Cheung 2019b; Eagleton 2012). Therefore, Xi argues that the people
need to change to secure a prosperous future.
It seems the future conceptualized for Hong Kong does not lie with the
average person on the street. The “virtual space” for contesting the future
seems to be narrowing down to one dictated to by Beijing (the “one coun-
try”). The future of the “second system” as a real “second system” with a
promised “high degree of autonomy” is seemingly delegitimized. Thus the
discourse of Hong Kong’s future is a clash of diametrically opposite futures.
And to paraphrase Zisek’s concept of the future cited earlier, Hong Kong’s
future seems to have a certain “form, shape, or color.” And that “form, shape,
or color” seems to lie in Beijing’s hands rather than Hong Kong’s. And with
the introduction of the National Security Law on July 1, 2020, Hong Kong’s
fears for its future had been well-founded. This has profoundly affected the
discourse of Hong Kong’s future, and will be detailed in the next section.
A NEW FUTURE FOR HONG KONG:

THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
The “worst-case scenario” seemed to have arrived and a possible future

seems to have materialized with an agenda item discussed at the annual
session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in May 2020. This item
was to deliberate on a resolution put forward to its Standing Committee to
“establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for
the HKSAR to safeguard national security” (Hong Kong Gov., May 28,
2020). When the proposed law was announced, various Hong Kong govern-
ment bodies issued statements saying that they gave “full support” for such
a law (such as the Police, Immigration, and Fire Departments, and others).
There was also a campaign in newspapers and billboards urging the public
to “get behind the law” (Ho, K. 2020a). This is despite the fact that none of
these bodies, nor the public, nor even Carrie Lam herself, knew what was
going to be in the law as it had yet to be drafted. Despite this, the government
responded to the American Chamber of Commerce’s concerns saying, “It is
therefore unhelpful at this stage to speculate on the content of the legislation
or spread rumors and fear about a law to safeguard national security, which
as in any other country, is within the purview of the state” (Hong Kong Gov.
May 27, 2020).
Despite the public misgivings about this proposed law, Mainland authori-
ties stated that the “majority of Hong Kong people supported ‘one country,
two systems’ and supported a prosperous, stable, and peaceful Hong Kong,”
and that “only a small handful of traitors and ‘Hong Kong independence’
extremists” would not (Q&As 2020).
On May 29, Chief Executive Lam published a “Letter to Hong Kong
Residents” in 11 major newspapers in the city. Around the same time, the
PRC released a document, “Q&As on National Security Legislation for
Hong Kong SAR” on its embassies’ websites that was similar in content to
Lam’s letter (Lam, May 26, 2020). In the next section, an analysis of Chief
Executive Lam’s “Letter to Hong Kong Residents” and these “Q&As” will
be juxtaposed into an analysis of aspects of the drafted National Security Law
(NSL 2020) and a brief discussion on whether the NSL would be able to do
or be what they say it does.
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE’S LETTER

TO HONG KONG CITIZENS
In this letter, Lam stated the need for the law, the current situation, its objec-
tives, emphasizing that Hong Kong’s systems would stay the same and that
the new law would bring stability and prosperity and the continuation of the
“One Country, Two Systems” to Hong Kong. She goes on to say: “Hong
Kong, the home we all treasure, is defined by the ‘Lion Rock spirit’ by which
we join hands to pursue our dreams while putting aside our differences”
(Lam, May 26, 2020). She did not mention what these differences were. Lam
invokes the “Lion Rock spirit”, still seeing it as a quintessential Hong Kong
characteristic. Using Mainland-style language of “violence by rioters,” Lam
said that advocating Hong Kong independence and self-determination had
“blatantly challenged the authority of the Central Authorities,” and put the
city’s stability and prosperity “at risk.” This kind of rhetoric as previously
mentioned in chapter 7, was usually found in the Chinese pro-Beijing press.
Nowhere in her letter does Lam acknowledge that Hong Kong people had any
valid concerns over the introduction of the NSL.
An Inadequate Legal System? The NSL’s Antecedents

In her letter, Lam also stated that “Regrettably, the current legal system and
enforcement mechanisms for Hong Kong to safeguard national security are
inadequate or even ‘defenceless’” (emphases added). Now the talk involved
“improving the legal system.” In chapter 2, you remember the Basic Law was
held to be “scientific” and a “guiding light” for Hong Kong, the implication
being that it is almost a “sacred text.” Interestingly, the Basic Law was seen
as inadequate and defenseless, but not because it had intrinsic problems, but
because “Hong Kong has yet to enact laws to curb acts that threaten national
274 Chapter 9
security in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law,” and that the current
political and social situation made it “difficult for Hong Kong authorities to
complete on its own legislation to safeguard national security in the foresee-
able future” (Ibid, emphases added). Therefore, it was now the task of the
central government.
As the central government’s “Q &A on National Security Legislation” puts
it, Hong Kong “hasn’t fulfilled its constitutional obligation” of doing so, thus
national security is left “full of loopholes.” Democrats had always seen the
Basic Law as being “full of loopholes.” National security was thus in “serious
jeopardy” due to the “escalated violence, terrorist activities, and excessive,
unlawful foreign meddling in Hong Kong.” The central government thus has
the legitimacy in formulating the law as Hong Kong, who had “authorization”
to enact national security legislation had failed to do so. Here we see the nar-
rative of threat is taken up again, as well as attempts to change the “story”
of the 2019 protests as justification for bringing in the National Security
Law. This brings back memories of the controversy over both the drafting of
Article 23 and its abortive introduction in 2002–2003.
Article 23 Controversy
It is worth taking a look back at this to see how the political atmosphere had
changed and its resonances with Hong Kong’s past hopes and its fears for
the future. It is worth recalling that the Basic Law draft was in circulation in
1989 around the time of the Tiananmen protests and subsequently Article 23
was altered as a result.
In 2002, a consultation paper was released which outlined the legislation
and its objectives but not the actual wording of the proposed law (related
documents can be found on this link: https://www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/eng-
lish/). This was in contrast to 2020 where there had been no consultation with
the public, only a publicity campaign for its acceptance before the law had
even been drafted.
The proposals for Article 23 were described as being vague and ambigu-
ous and similar to Mainland laws. The proposed legislation was frequently
described as a “draconian law” (惡法) in the press, but in legal terms this
Chinese expression can be translated as “dysnomy” meaning “bad legislation;
the enactment of bad laws” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004). Many said that
the problem lay with the content and the vagueness of terms such as “trea-
son,” “secession,” “sedition,” and “subversion.” While some saw the law as
protecting national security, others saw it as an attempt to undermine freedom
of speech, the rule of law, and the implementation of universal suffrage as
well as an attempt to introduce Mainland laws into Hong Kong. The implica-
tions for democracy under such a security ordinance were a large part of the
debate about Article 23, since “a democratic system would guarantee a stable
society” (Chan 2004), and such a system should be introduced before Article
23 to ensure the rule of law remains.
This is connected to the fear of the two legal systems “meshing” (Wesley-
Smith 1996) with the sovereign “One Country” overriding the “Second
System” due to the two places’ vastly different approaches to the definition
of legal terms. Chief Executive Tung’s policy address in January 2003 did not
allay those public fears. A 500,000-strong public protest against the proposed
“anti-subversion” law took place on July 1 of that year. One of the slogans
during the protest was “return power to the people” (還政於民). Then came
the withdrawal of the proposal due to lack of numbers in the Legislative
Council (remember the physical sweat and the metaphorical “sweat” of the
July 1 protest which acted as “bleach” in chapter 4). In this case, it could
be said that power did return to the people; this became known as the “July
1 effect” (七一效應), with July 1 protest activity becoming ritualized over
time. One political analyst told Human Rights Watch at the time that “No
one expected that there would be more than 500,000 people on the streets.
Many people told China that (the turnout) would be less than 50,000. They
were surprised and they thought that Hong Kong was out of control” (Human
Rights Watch 2004).
After the withdrawal of Article 23, there were periodic calls to revive its
drafting, but it had such toxicity in the community that these calls were con-
tinually being shelved (Tong 2018). Calls for revisiting Article 23 arose again
with the increased talk of independence and the rise of radical localists after
the OCLP/Umbrella Movement in 2014. After the 2019 protests and what
was called the “wolf warrior” mentality of Xi Jingping, it did seem likely that
sooner rather than later that a National Security Law and/or Article 23 would
be introduced. Before we continue with other aspects of Carrie Lam’s letter,
the key points of the National Security Law should be elaborated.
KEY ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
Since the major focus of the new NSL concerns what would constitute
offenses violating national security and their penalties, it is worth first focus-
ing on these, as they were some of the most controversial aspects of the law.
The key need was to “plug a gaping hole in national security” was chapter
III: Offences and Penalties:
The objective of the legislation is to prevent, curb and sanction secession,

the subversion of state power, the organisation and carrying out of terrorist
276 Chapter 9
activities that seriously endanger national security, and interference by foreign

and external forces in the affairs of the HKSAR. (Lam 2020, May 26)
The NSL (NSL 2020) carried maximum sentences of life imprisonment

for the crimes of the secession (breaking away from the country), subversion
(undermining the power or authority of the central government), terrorism
(using violence or intimidation against people), and collusion (the act of
doing something secret or illegal with a foreign power). The following are the
general definitions of these crimes as stated in the text of the NSL:
Secession, could be interpreted to prohibit non-violent speech or other
advocacy of changing the legal status of Hong Kong or its relation to the
PRC, as in “a person who organises, plans, commits or participates in . . .
acts with a view of committing secession or undermining national unification
shall be guilty of committing an offence” (Article 20). “A person who incites,
assists in, abets, or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance” is also
guilty of an offense (Article 21). “Inciting others to incite others” was one of
the charges against some of the OCLP/Umbrella Movement protest leaders
(Cheng 2018).
Subversion (Article 22) which could be interpreted to permit the criminal
punishment of such democratic expression as peaceful picketing or media
criticism on grounds of “interference” with or “undermining” of the Hong
Kong or Chinese governments as “seriously interfering, disrupting, or under-
mining the performance of duties and functions” of the PRC and HKSAR
(point 3).
Terrorist Activities (Article 24) mentions “serious violence against a per-
son or persons,” as well as such things as explosion, arson, sabotage, “seri-
ous interruption or sabotage of electronic control systems.” Therefore, even
damaging public transport facilities could be considered terrorism under the
law. Vaguely defined conduct as “other dangerous activities which seriously
jeopardise public health, safety or security” (point 5) are also considered
crimes under the NSL as well as merely advocating such activities.
Collusion with a Foreign Country or with External Elements to Endanger
National Security (Article 29), which is so vaguely defined as to permit the
criminal prosecution of Hong Kong and foreign academics, media, and non-
governmental organizations for mere opposition to Hong Kong or Chinese
government policy for “seriously disrupting the formulation and implemen-
tation of laws or policies . . . which is likely to have serious consequences”
(Article 29, Point 3, emphases added), as well as “provoking by unlaw-
ful means hatred among Hong Kong residents towards the Hong Kong or
Chinese governments” (Article 29, Point 5).
Former Chief Executive C.Y. Leung often mentioned the involvement of
unnamed “foreign forces” in both the OCLP/Umbrella Movement and the
2019 protests (Price 2017). He and others thought that young protesters in both
these movements did not have the skill or funding to carry out these major
protests. Since it is a crime under the NSL to impose “sanctions or blockade,
or engaging in other hostile activities” against the Hong Kong or the Mainland
(Article 29 Point 4), we can see that the reason for the disqualification of four
democratic legislators in November 2020 as they called on foreign nations to
impose sanctions on Hong Kong government officials. Extrapolating from this
and the discourse in other chapters, this would be considered as something
akin to treason. Sixteen years earlier, Democrat Martin Lee was called “Wu
Sangui” in an editorial in the pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao (October 1, 2004). This
was an “anti-China” label and implied “traitor” (漢奸).4 Lee had gone to the
United States in 2004 to discuss Hong Kong’s political situation. In addition
to being an “anti-China destabilizing Hong Kong element” (反中亂港分子),
he was also a “Hong Kong independence element” (港獨分子), a “foreign
lackey/running dog” (外國走狗), and so on (these terms are listed in an edito-
rial in the Apple Daily October 1, 2004).
The sentencing provisions for all these crimes in the NSL do not include
clear definitions of what constitutes an offense of “a grave nature” as life
imprisonment could result (this exact phrase is used in all of these four
crimes). The law also has broadly worded extraterritorial application, apply-
ing to actions not committed within Hong Kong by persons who are not
permanent residents of the SAR (Article 38).
Beijing now had the power over how the law should be interpreted
rather than any Hong Kong judicial or policy body. If the law conflicts
with any Hong Kong law, the Beijing law takes priority since the “power
of interpretation” of the NSL is vested in the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (SCNPC), rather than in the courts of Hong
Kong as mentioned in the discussion of the writing of the Basic Law in
chapter 2. Some saw this part of the law as the abortive extradition law
of 2019 introduced in a new form. A special office of a Mainland advi-
sor, the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS) in Hong Kong
which officially opened on July 8, 2020. In addition, Hong Kong also had
to establish its own national security commission to enforce the NSL, with
a Beijing-appointed adviser. Hong Kong’s chief executive would now have
the power to appoint judges to hear national security cases, raising fears
about judicial autonomy.
There are many other aspects of the NSL that raised issues about judicial
independence, another of Hong Kong’s “core values” alongside “rule of law.”
The OSNS, because of its security function, meant that there is no real trans-
parency of its actions, as “transparency” would naturally impinge on national
security. For example, note the following exchange:
278 Chapter 9
All these [i.e., peace, stability and personal safety] had been put at risk by rioters
associated with or incited by external forces to subvert State power, very often
under the guise of promoting democracy.
It will be inappropriate to disclose the details of indications in investigations
and intelligence that foreign intervention was rampant with money, supplies and
other forms of support. However, there were many media reports or statements
made by organisations and individuals outside Hong Kong concerning money,
supplies and equipment they provided to assist the rioters. (Personal email from
the Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau to the author, July 19, 2021)
Again, here they “assume” these details as “facts” but ones that they cannot
reveal because of the danger in doing so.
Hong Kong judges had been criticized by Beijing and others (Lum 2019;
Zhao 2020) for being “too lenient” in sentencing protesters and there was
a recent case where a judge was moved to another judicial position which
was seen as “punishment” for dismissing a case by police against protest-
ers (Wong, R. 2020a). It is interesting to note a two-day meeting held in
November 2020 marked the “establishment of Xi Jinping Thought on the
[socialist] Rule of Law and its Status as the Guiding Thought for law-based
governance in China” (Xinhua 2020). It was difficult to ascertain exactly what
this meant apart from the primacy of the Chinese Communist Party in all mat-
ters. Surely the primacy of the Party would override any other legal statute.
Zhang Xiaoming, deputy director of the central government’s Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office, made a widely publicized speech at the recent legal
summit to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Basic Law. Zhang proclaimed
the need for further “judicial reform” to make certain that “anti-China”
and “unpatriotic judges” who failed to grasp the essence of the Basic Law
are either fired from the judiciary or brought to heel in their work (Wong,
C. 2020). Zhang declared that patriotism was “a legal requirement now”
(Cheung and Cheng 2020).
Again it is worth repeating that the mainland Chinese authorities liked to
draw up laws in broad principles for specific application according to shifting
circumstances, therefore they could then rely on the ambiguity of language to
fit their needs at the time. Such was the case here.
Commitment to One Country, Two Systems

Carrie Lam also said in her letter that the NSL “demonstrates the commitment
of the Central Authorities to fully and accurately implement ‘One Country,
Two Systems’ as well as their care for Hong Kong people.” This has been
a constant refrain from officials from 1997 onwards. However, on June 9,
2020, Zhang Xiaoming said that Hong Kong people needed to provide the
NPC with a report in order to win a new mandate to extend the 2047 promise
of “50 years no change.” Lam was questioned about Zhang’s statement that
it was the people’s responsibility to do this, and she replied:
That is not an issue that we need to address now. The immediate issue is to prove
that “One Country, Two Systems” works well in Hong Kong, and to prove that
Hong Kong people are reasonable and sensible citizens of the People’s Republic
of China that we could be trusted to continue to have our own way of life and
our own way of system within the whole country. (Lam, June 9, 2020)
Here Lam avoids answering the question on how to prove Hong Kong
people are “reasonable and sensible citizens” and how they could be “trusted”
to keep their city as it is. She possibly means agreement with what Beijing
would desire for people in the SAR to act, rather than what Hong Kong
people wanted in the future as discussed earlier in the chapter, that is, the
continuance of decades-long systems alongside the introduction of real uni-
versal suffrage.
With the NSL “stability has been restored,” and as this book has shown,
“stability” has long been the excuse for keeping the status quo or reversing
norms according to the “actual situation.” The economy, as had been reiter-
ated many times before, was seen as the major force for lack of change, for
as Lam says by “restoring stability as soon as possible and resume develop-
ment of the economy and livelihoods,” this “way out of the impasse.” The
fact that Macau introduced its national security on its own in 2009 had proven
a “safeguard for Macao’s prosperity and stability in economic and social
development” (FMCOPRC 2021). Again we see the “demonstration effect”
of Macau as a “model” administrative region, one that Hong Kong had been
compared unfavorably to.
Nowhere in Lam’s letter does she say that the Hong Kong people had any
valid concerns about what they were protesting about in the previous year.
The Same Enjoyment of Freedoms

Toward the end of her letter to Hong Kong citizens, Lam states that:
Citizens will continue to enjoy the freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly,
of demonstration, of procession, and to enter or leave Hong Kong in accordance
with the law. All relevant law enforcement will be conducted strictly in accor-
dance with the law as well as statutory powers and procedures. And that the
“current system in Hong Kong will not change.”
While the “Q & A on National Security Legislation” says:
280 Chapter 9
After the National Security Legislation in Hong Kong, the “one country, two
systems” policy will not change. The current system in Hong Kong will not
change. The high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong will not change. The
SAR’s legal system will not change.
Article 4 of the NSL states this as well and says that “human rights will be
respected, including freedom of speech, of the press, of publication, of assem-
bly, of procession and demonstration for residents of the Region under the
Basic Law” as well as the international covenants currently applied to Hong
Kong as specified in the Basic Law.
Despite the rhetoric that there is the same enjoyment of freedoms, it was
obviously not the same. Many of the press releases of the Hong Kong govern-
ment just prior to, and after the introduction of the Law, also stress that these
“core values” of Hong Kong remain and state this in a similar form to the
above without further explanation. Remember from chapter 7 that officials
frequently stated that “freedom of expression” was not unlimited; however,
post-introduction of the NSL, certain words like “independence” and the
slogans “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time” and “Five Demands
Not One Less” were effectively banned as well as the “anthem” Glory to
Hong Kong and their appearance on banners, posters, or lips could (and does)
mean prosecution.
The justice secretary has said that whether slogan-chanting was illegal
would depend on the circumstances and would be determined by the courts,
which would make many likely to think twice about speaking up, even if
the criticism was constructive. Lam in her letter had said (emphases added):
“The purpose of this piece of legislation is not just to punish, it is also to
deter people from committing such serious offences as secession, subverting
the state power, terrorist activities and so on. So deterrence is very impor-
tant” (News.gov.hk, 2020). With the introduction of so-called snitch hotlines
(BBC, 2020b), it brings to mind one aspect of the Cultural Revolution where
neighbor spied on neighbor.
Twenty-four-year-old Tong Ying-kit is the first person to be charged and
sentenced under the NSL, for displaying a flag with the words “Liberate Hong
Kong, Revolution of Our Times” on his motorbike and driving toward police
officers. He was recently sentenced to nine years in prison.
Legal experts say the court’s decision means that the slogan is capable of
carrying an independence/secessionist meaning—and had incited others to
commit secession and will have a binding effect on future court cases, and
the legal risks are uttering the slogan. Tong was sentenced by three desig-
nated judges who could handle National Security cases, and no jury, so they
alone had the power to determine the definition of the slogan. Thus this case
effectively sets the legal characterization of the slogan for other cases in the
future. This is despite linguistic experts saying that the “liberate Hong Kong”
slogan was open and ambiguous (RTHK, 2021).5
The NSL also tightens control over education, journalists, and social
media. In the name of national security, the law gives the Chinese central
and Hong Kong governments new expansive powers to oversee and manage
schools, social organizations, media, and the internet in Hong Kong (Article
9) to “strengthen public communication on matters concerning national
security” and promote education on the NSL and schools. It already has had
an effect on Liberal Studies seen as “giving students the wrong thinking”
(Chau 2020; The Standard 2020). Liberal studies would be “renamed and
reformed—more China content, less focus on current affairs. dangerous or
unlawful” activities “[s]uch as chanting slogans, forming human chains, and
posting slogans or singing songs which contain political messages at schools

for expressing political stance” (Grundy 2020). The law also gives law
enforcement agencies the power to remove online content or obtain user data
without a judicial warrant.
Many Hongkongers, who were regularly sharing news online about the
protests since June 2019, have shut down their social media accounts for
fear of violating the law. Shops and restaurants that had previously posted
banners and stickers in support of the protest movement removed them even
before the law was in force. Within days, public libraries started to sort out
books on “sensitive” issues and authored by activists critical of the govern-
ment. Activist Joshua Wong withdrew from Demosisto, and later the group
disbanded after another key member, Nathan Law, fled overseas. Within one
week after the enactment of the law, at least seven politically active groups
had disbanded.
THE NSL WAS A “SWORD,” NOW

A “SHIELD” IS NEEDED
In May 2021, Beijing radically overhauled Hong Kong’s electoral system so

that “patriots rule Hong Kong,” it being a “necessary condition” for imple-
menting the governance framework of One Country, Two Systems. Like the
National Security Law before it, there was an expensive campaign to “sell”
the future changes (Chow, March 27, 2021).
Luo Huining, director of the Liaison Office (this is an agency that repre-
sents the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong), stated on “National
Security Education Day” (April 15, 2021) that “The NSL provided authorities
with a ‘sword’ and the election changes a ‘shield’” (McLaughlin 2021).6 The
use of the verb “restore” in expressions used to promote the NSL implied that
order had been reinstated (emphasis added): “Preserve One Country, Two
282 Chapter 9
Systems, restore Stability” (FSO, 2020), and that more systematic changes
were needed to “cement” this restoration: “Improve Electoral System, Ensure
Patriots administering Hong Kong, Preserve One Country, Two Systems,
enhance stability and prosperity” (emphasis added) (CMAB 2021). The main
point about the electoral changes was to make sure “patriots” were elected to
the legislature.
Ensuring the Election of Patriots

The slogan “Improve Electoral System, Ensure Patriots Administering
Hong Kong, Preserve One Country, Two Systems, Enhance Stability and
Prosperity” was used as the title of a booklet (CMAB 2021), the purpose
of which was to explain the need for electoral reform. The contents of the
booklet were as follows:
• Foreword
• Background
• The Recent Situation
• The Event Book of Chaos Involving Non-pro-establishment Members in
the Sixth Term Legislative Council
• The Legal Basis and Process of Improving the Electoral System
• Main Content of Improving the Electoral System
• Timetable for Improving the Electoral System
• Frequently Asked Questions
The way the sections were worded is significant. The word “improving” is
repeated three times to indicate the current system was flawed and that the
changes were to be positive. These changes were presented as a fait accompli,
with this booklet a means of convincing the reader of their merits.
Remembering that discourse analysis is asking why something is said one
way and not the other, the heading “The Event Book of Chaos involving Non-
pro-establishment Members in the Sixth Term Legislative Council” (pp. 8–9)
is a strange way of saying “chronology.” This “Event Book” lists the “sins”
of certain legislators (groups across the democratic spectrum) although they
are not named democrats, but as “non-pro-establishment members,” which
designates them as outsiders, as those who often “oppose,” just for the sake
of opposing (see chapter 3). These democratic “sins” are decontextualized
so we do not know the wider context that led up to these acts that may show
them in a more sympathetic light (such as problems in the system that render
democrats without much power, meaning that they often can only “oppose”).
These individuals are shown as disrupters of order, confrontational, violent,
and also lawbreakers—for example, “legal procedures are still ongoing” is
frequently cited at the end of each “chaotic event.” The implication is that
the “pro-establishment members” do not engage in this kind of behavior. The
first “sin” mentioned at the start of the “Event Book” was not taking the oath
of office “in a sincere or solemn manner”: An act that “hurt the feelings of
the Chinese people” (p. 8), a frequent response to foreign actions that Beijing
did not agree with.
Apart from the heading, the word “chaos” is mentioned six times through-
out the section. As shown in earlier chapters, this relates to the traditional
rhetorical topoi in the Chinese discourse of stability and harmony that has
been mentioned time and time again throughout this book. And “chaos” has
frequently applied to the “anti-China, destabilizing Hong Kong” categoriza-
tion that the democratic “camp” falls into as shown in chapter 3.
What is most interesting about the booklet are the 12 FAQs (Frequently
Asked Questions) given at the end. Quite verbose in nature, these FAQs gen-
erally tried to refute what many saw as the negative aspects of the proposed
changes. It must be noted that a successful ruling ideology “must engage sig-
nificantly with genuine wants, needs and desires; but this is also its Achilles
heel, forcing it to recognize an ‘other’ to itself and inscribing this otherness
as a potentially disruptive force within its own forms” (Eagleton 1991, 45).
Thus, for a governing ideology to be “monological” and “unifying” (the
one given the most prominence) it must also address its opposite and thus
be “dialogical” in order to be “unifying.” There is thus a dialogue between
ideologies that need to be reconciled. Perhaps this is why these FAQs are in
this booklet.
In the following, I have assigned these 12 FAQs into six categories and
reworded them as answers in the positive sense, to show how the government
wanted to convince the public of the validity of the changes:
• The changes are compatible with the current governance OCTS framework.
• The need for patriots and the criteria for their selection are valid.
• It’s not “tailor-made” for the pro-establishment camp; the “opposition
camp” can run for office.
• The Legislative Council will not be a “rubber stamp.”
• The Election Committee changes will improve the current system and be
more balanced and representative.
• The “ultimate aim” of universal suffrage as stated in the Basic Law has not
changed; in fact, the new changes will enhance this aim.
Please refer to the booklet (CMAB 2021) for the actual FAQ wording
(27–38).
Perhaps the most important FAQ was patriotism, as that was the major
reason for the proposed electoral changes:
284 Chapter 9
Patriotism FAQ: “Are there any detailed and objective criteria for patriots?
Does loving our country mean loving the Chinese Communist Party?” The
following formed the first part of the answer (p. 30, emphasis added):
Mr. Deng Xiaoping clearly articulated that the criteria of patriots are to
respect one’s own nation, sincerely support the resumption of the exercise
of sovereignty over Hong Kong by the Motherland, and not to impair Hong
Kong’s prosperity and stability.
This is a selective reading of Deng, the architect of the “one country, two
systems” formula under which Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty
in 1997. “It must be required that patriots form the main body of administra-
tors, that is, of the future government of the Hong Kong special region,” Deng
had said in 1984. He gave his definition of who would qualify: “What is a
patriot? A patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports
the motherland’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not
to impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability” (Brooker 2021).
Also said by Deng, but not mentioned in the FAQ: “Those who meet these
requirements are patriots, whether they believe in capitalism or feudalism or
even slavery”; “We don’t demand that they be in favor of China’s socialist
system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong” (Ibid).
Deng was setting an expansive definition of who could be considered a
patriot. People did not need to support the Communist Party; on the contrary,
they could have political beliefs that were diametrically opposed. All they
had to do was to accept Hong Kong’s return to China, confident by the party’s
assurances that the city’s way of life would remain basically unchanged as
per the JD of 1984.
“Swearing allegiance” now took on increased importance, with civil ser-
vants and legislative councilors requiring to take an oath to uphold the Basic
Law and also swear allegiance to the HKSAR. This was in response to the
“improper behavior during oath taking” (p. 30), one of the events in the
“Event Book of Chaos.” The following is the oath for civil servants (the oath
for legislative councilors is quite similar):
Content of the Oath/Declaration

I declare that, as a civil servant of the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, I will uphold the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, bear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People’s Republic of China, be dedicated to my duties and be
responsible to the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region. (CSB 2021)
This oath is not listed in the answer to the FAQ, but the answer does refer to
“a set of detailed and objective criteria with a positive list and a negative list
as prescribed in the law” that sets out the legal requirements (CMAB 2021,
30). These criteria are listed in a separate Bill by the Legislative Council
(2021). In the Bill, there are five “upholds” (constitutional order as estab-
lished by the PRC constitution and the Basic Law; national sovereignty/ter-
ritorial integrity; implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”; HKSAR
is an inalienable part of the PRC; and maintaining prosperity and stability)
and one “loyalty” (“is loyal to, and safeguards the interests of, the HKSAR”)
(Ibid, 4).
Under the new legislation, however, those hired or elected to the office can
be unseated by the Secretary for Home Affairs if their pledges of allegiance
are deemed invalid. As for “upholding,” “we will further specify that the
meaning of ‘uphold’ should include generally and truthfully observe, sup-
port, maintain and embrace words and deeds as well as the intention to do
so” (Legislative Council 2021, 4). Deciding what a person’s “intention” is
obviously subjective: “The process of taking the oath is not that harsh, as long
as the councilor swears the oath sincerely and solemnly,” according to Eric
Tsang, Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs (Cheng, S. 2021).
The NSL is not supposed to be a retrospective law, but in practice it is not,
since as Tsang also stated, “past behaviour will be considered when determin-
ing if the oath has been breached” (Ibid).
The “we” who specify the meaning of “uphold” is problematic and will
involve the National Security Law Committee and the newly established
Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, who will vet candidates’ suitability
for office by how they carry out the five “upholds” and not carry out any
acts on the negative list. FAQ 10 (p. 36) refutes the claim that the electoral
changes had the “aim to exclude the opposition camp from the LegCo.” If the
opposition could “meet the requirements and criteria of patriots” (p. 36), they
could still be elected. However, being vetted by the bodies mentioned above
would tend to minimize their chances of achieving this.
The negative list is much longer than the positive list (Legislative Council
2021, 4–6), including some of the “upholds” given in negative form as well
as advocating independence for Hong Kong, and insulting or disrespecting
the national anthem and flag. Particularly vague is “commits acts that under-
mine or have a tendency to undermine the overall interests of the HKSAR”
(p. 6). Like many political matters in Hong Kong, an interpreter is needed to
be able to “operationalize” the law or policy. Another negative criterion was
the following:
286 Chapter 9
Makes use of an election held by the Government to organize or implement,

or to incite another person to organize or implement, a “de facto referendum”
in any form to confront the Central People’s Government (“CPG”) and the
Government. (Ibid, 6)
The above obviously refers to the unofficial 2020 Hong Kong pro-democracy
primaries held on July 11–12, 2020, for selecting candidates for the 2020
Legislative Council election. This was in order to maximize their chances to
achieve a majority in the 70-seat Legislative Council. Beijing (through the
Liaison Office in Hong Kong) saw this however as a potential coup (empha-
ses added):
The goal . . . is to seize the power of governance in Hong Kong, and delusionary
state the Hong Kong version of a “colour revolution” . . . Benny Tai and the
opposition have brazenly threatened that the goal of coordinating the opposi-
tion’s election to the Legislative Council to control it, veto the budget, and
paralyze the SAR Government. (my translation, LOCPG July 13, 2020)
Here, Beijing, a one-party system, misses the point that political groups in
democratic places strategize ways of improving their chances at elections,
which sometimes cause a further election according to a particular majority/
minority result. As far as the author knows, this was not illegal, but with the
introduction of the NSL, an act was so judged as illegal if it was seen by the
authorities as a potential threat to national security.
FAQ 1 in the booklet was a justification of why the NSL and the electoral
“improvements” were needed and relates to the primaries of July 2020. The
FAQ states the following (emphasis added):
With the support of external elements, they have gone further in recent years
and blatantly advocated “Hong Kong Independence,” “self-determination,” and
“mutual destruction,”7 and incited violence and seize power through election.
(CMAB 2021, FAQ 1, 27)
“Seize power through election” is rather similar to “seize the power of gov-
ernance” (夺取香港的管治权). Usually one says to be “elected to office”
through the ballot box, not “seizing” office or power as if doing so by force.
The words “de facto referendum” in the negative criteria in the oath-taking
requirement above is also a reminder of the suggested “referendum” in 2004,
where the pro-Beijing Ta King Pao likened its potential “to use citizens as
suicide bombers to blow up the walls of the Basic Law” (Leung 2004b) this
was mentioned in chapter 5.
Other changes to the electoral system included fewer lawmakers being

returned by geographical constituencies (which were all elected by universal
suffrage), and the excluding of District Council members (also all elected by
universal suffrage) from the Election Committee to elect the chief executive
(FAQ 8, CMAB 2021, 34). This was because they had (emphases added):
“become politics-driven platforms and been turned into anti-China and anti-
government bridgeheads hampering the governance of the HKSAR,” the
expression in italics being similar to expressions used to describe anyone
in the democratic camp. Further, “If District Councillors are given certain
seats in the Election Committee and the LegCo, the loopholes in the electoral
system will continue to exist” (Ibid). Perhaps the “loopholes” refer to the
ability for the District Council members to have a say on the Committee. In
late November 2019, democrats took control of 17 out of 18 councils across

Hong Kong in District Council elections held at that time. Democrats would
gain the District Councilors seats in the chief executive Election Committee
because of its winner-takes-all rule. It would have increased the power of
democrats inside the Committee.
Despite the obvious diminishing power differential of the democrats com-
pared to the past, the electoral changes had to be positioned as not being “con-
trary to the aim of selecting the Chief Executive and electing all Members of
the LegCo by universal suffrage in accordance with the principle of gradual
and orderly progress as enshrined in the Basic Law” (CMAB 2021, FAQ 2,
28). FAQ 2 thus deals with what was the primary focus of the first half of
the book. This FAQ talks about the SCNPC approving “further development
of the democratic system on three different occasions” but it was “due to the
opposition camp’s obstruction, democratic development materialised only
once in the past” (Ibid). It goes on to further accuse the democrats of voting
down the constitutional development proposal that arose out of the “8.31
Decision” of the SCNPC (which had led to the Occupy Central Movement).
The FAQ fails to mention that these proposals were not what democrats con-
sidered real democratic developments. The first election under the new rules
is slated for December 19, 2021.
CONCLUSION
After 1984 and the JD and in the 13 years before Hong Kong’s transition,
Hongkongers had been promised they would not be subjected to the same
kinds of disruptive upheavals that had been experienced in the Mainland and
that continuance and maintenance of their cherished systems would continue.

But since June 30, 2020, change rather than maintenance seems to be the
288 Chapter 9
case: in the mainlandized language of official discourse, the demand for per-
formative loyalty from civil servants, the scrutiny of candidates for elective
office based on past or current behavior while in office, and the inability to
voice certain thoughts reflect that this unwanted change had truly arrived.
The metaphors of a “sword” (for the National Security Law) or a “shield”
(for the electoral changes) used by mainland Chinese officials indicate that
Hong Kong had finally undergone a “second return” to the Mainland, as
Zhang Xiaoming, head of the Office of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
of the State Council, described Hong Kong in 2020. From Beijing’s perspec-
tive, the first return following the end of British colonial rule in 1997 did not
go as smoothly as it had wished (Pepper 2020). Nor did two decades result
in a population who felt much closer or who identified with the Mainland.
Therefore, a more “hands on” approach by the “One Country” seemed to be

in order.
In the Polytechnic University siege of November 2019, some students had
decided to stay on the campus and follow what one described as “a Buddhist
approach of living in the moment,” not forgetting that their desired past was
already behind them, but realizing that before them lay an unpredictable
future (Chan and Creery 2019). A few years after, the future is still develop-
ing. Their future and the rest of Hong Kong would not remain its past as it
had hoped and had been promised in the JD and the Basic Law.
NOTES
1. The special issue The China-Hong-Kong Crisis: Problems, Opportunities and

Alternative Futures—Special Symposium for the Journal of Futures Studies can be
found at: https://jfsdigital.org/articles-and-essays/vol-25-no-1-september-2020/hong
-kongs-unlikely-hope-that-its-future-remains-its-past/.
2. This exhibition was closed in October 2020 for a two-year revamp, and much
speculation has arisen over what this might entail, post introduction of the National
Security Law. Although the museum had a consultation exercise from 2015 onward
with various stakeholders, “Some fear that the new version may be tainted by political
propaganda and present a distorted account of history to future museum-goers” (Lai
2020). Just before its closure, massive crowds turned up to see the exhibition. One
visitor held up a mobile phone in his hand displaying the word “liberate” in Chinese
next to a display of former President Jiang Zemin’s calligraphy that said “A Better
Tomorrow for Hong Kong” so the line read “Liberate Hong Kong. Tomorrow is bet-
ter” alongside a hand gesture that signaled “Five demands, not one less,” which refers
to the 2019 protests (Wong, R. 2020b).
3. Macau Special Administrative Region already has a National Security Law

(2009), somewhat less draconian. See (Wong, N. 2020).
4. Wu Sangui (吳三桂) (1612–1678) was a Ming dynasty Chinese general instru-

mental in the succession of rule to the Qing dynasty in 1644. Considered by scholars
as a traitor to both dynasties, Wu declared himself Emperor of China as ruler of the
Zhou dynasty in 1678, but his revolt was quelled by the Qing Kangxi Emperor.
5. Rather than advocating city’s independence from China, the words “Liberate
Hong Kong Revolution of Our Times” represented protesters’ pursuit of freedom and
democracy, according to journalism scholar Francis Lee of the Chinese University
of Hong Kong who was a witness for the defense. He said it was wrong to assume
that it could only have one meaning. While the expression could be understood to be
pro-independence, Lee found it was “very open and ambiguous,” pointing to a 2019
study which found there was a diverse range of opinions among protesters and their
supporters on how the phrase should be interpreted (Wong, B. July 13, 2021).
6. Democracy has also been used as a “shield.” On February 24, 2004, Xinhua
News Agency published an article by Tang Hua, deputy chief editor of the Xinhua
magazine Outlook, which claimed that certain Hong Kong politicians were guilty of
“subversion” (CNN 2004) (emphasis added):
Some people continue to participate in or even lead political organizations aiming at

opposing the leadership of the Communist Party and subverting the central government,
using democracy as a shield.
Although Tang did not identify these alleged subversive elements by name, it
was clear that he was referring to the democratic camp. Calling democrats “subver-
sive” was not a new phenomenon, but by 2020, It could no longer be tolerated.
7. The term laam chau is commonly used by local protesters in 2019’s anti-extra-
dition protests to signify a “mutual destruction” with the government, best expressed
with the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us.” Benny Tai had made a prediction for
2020–2022 that there would be ten steps to Hong Kong’s which include pro-democ-
racy camps winning a majority seats in the Legislative Council, the chief executive
being forced to resign due to the budget being rejected twice (The Standard, January
6, 2021).
Chapter 10
Discursive Change in Hong Kong

Sociopolitical Dynamics and the
One Country, Two Systems
Like most places, but perhaps more so, Hong Kong has been “shaped” and
has made “accommodations” in the light of a series of historical acts giving
it its own unique social and political identity. How it sees itself, how it would
like to see itself, and how it would like others to see it is both a constant
and transforming process, one that is almost like the construction of myth.
These “accommodations” to its history and geography suggest that if one is
to analyze the discourses of political change in post-handover Hong Kong,
historical context has to play a large part. In fact, these historical “problems”
are often cited or indirectly referred to in official documents relating to Hong
Kong and its governance (emphasis added):
Hong Kong has been part of the territory of China since ancient times; it was
occupied by Britain after the Opium War in 1840 . . . Upholding national unity
and territorial integrity, maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong,
and taking account of its history and realities. . . . China’s resumption of the
exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be established. (Preamble to the Basic Law)
At the beginning of Hong Kong as an SAR, Hong Kong people were in a

unique situation being guaranteed a full set of civil liberties that were similar
to those of most Western liberal democracies, but most are denied the abil-
ity of electing their head of government, the chief executive. Pan-democrats,
who had won a majority of popular votes in all the partial elections up until
recently, had been a minority in a Legislative Council that is relatively weak
in terms of constitutional power. While civil society was vibrant and there
was freedom of the press and speech, most political power, at least consti-
tutionally, was and is vested in the hands of a chief executive who was not
291
292 Chapter 10
directly elected by citizens but by a “small circle” of a few hundred individu-

als and corporations. This position was certain to give rise to an interesting
sociopolitical dynamic about how people saw and discursively constructed
the initial and subsequent change over time.
A LONG-TERM PROCESS OF TRANSITION
Anticipating its future withdrawal from Hong Kong, the “little d” discourse of
the British administration began to change (Gee 2005, 7). It started to “dehis-
toricize” its connections with Hong Kong by ideologically shifting (Fowler
1991, 84) how it called its colonial possession, which was now a “territory”
rather than a “colony” (Davies and Roberts 1990, 69). Calling Hong Kong a
“territory” diluted the legitimacy of possible claims to Hong Kong’s future
independence at the level of lexis according to Benson (1994, 74). However,
they did not apply the “Big D” discourse as the colonial administration car-
ried on as much as it did before (Flowerdew 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; 1998).
And while the British attempted to distance themselves from the responsi-
bility of what was to happen to Hong Kong and to secure a legacy, the British
administration also tried to calm the fears of the public who feared repression
under Chinese rule. They did this by maintaining a “discourse of smoothness
and continuity” and the
discourse of convergence by implying that their way of life would remain the
same, and Hong Kong would remain stable and prosperous under the sover-
eignty of China, . . . although there was a discourse of “confrontation” when
Chris Patten, the last governor attempted to introduce some democratic elements
in the interim system. (Flowerdew 1998, xix)
THE ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS:

A NEW IDEOLOGY IN PLACE
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong became an SAR of China and the only realiza-
tion of the One Country, Two Systems principle. This principle was to build
a new political order that embodies a new hegemony of beliefs and ideology
(Loh 2010, 234).
This new ideology required an acceptance that the SAR be subordinate
to the “One Country,” and that a “high degree of autonomy” did not mean
full autonomy, and that those who shared the values of the new political
order were the ones that would best defend its beliefs and ideology. As
ideology also “rationalizes” social interests, “rationalizing” something is to
Discursive Change in Hong Kong 293
imply that there is something not-quite-right about an ideology or potential

course of action (Eagleton 1991, 51). For example, there were constant
arguments that Hong Kong needed an “executive-led system,” functional
constituencies, and so on, in order to remain an effective and efficient inter-
national financial hub (i.e., the status quo prior to 1997) and thus remain
“Asia’s world city.”
This new political order involved a “clash of ideologies”—a “capitalist”
liberal ideology and a “socialist” market one. Such ideologies are part of dis-
courses in the Foucaultian sense. Since the “Open Door” period, China had,
more-or-less, followed Deng Xiaoping’s maxim to “seek truth from facts”
(實事求是), that is, following a pragmatic course in state affairs rather than
carry out political movements like that of the Cultural Revolution, although
some may consider this changing under the leadership of Xi Jingping and
the rise of “wolf warrior” diplomacy (Zhu, 2020). “Seeking truth from facts”
or being “pragmatic” was a way to allow the definition of socialism to be
finessed to mean “with Chinese characteristics” to fit in with the marketiza-
tion of China’s economy. This also formed the governance framework for
Hong Kong. This governance framework could still said to be a “work in
progress” that necessitates “crossing the river by feeling the stones” because
the relevant articles in the Basic Law concerning the attainment of universal
suffrage and other aspects of political change were ambiguous. And because
the actual process of this attainment was still being worked out, this “dis-
course of pragmatism” was an important component of the rhetoric about
democratization and related political reform.
For the above reasons, the word “pragmatic” can be considered a par-
ticularly “ideological” word in Hong Kong political discourse. It appears
quite regularly in articles dealing with universal suffrage and is used more
frequently during particularly politically contentious periods, to show how
“threatening” political change could be. Hong Kong people were frequently
told to be “pragmatic,” in other words be “realistic” about what could be
achieved in its constitutional development (i.e., have low expectations).
“Pragmatic” was often collocated with “rational” and “consensus” in Hong
Kong discourse, as in this representative sentence, “Deal with it in a rational,
pragmatic and inclusive manner, and finally build a consensus, which also
creates conditions for universal suffrage” (按理性、務實及包容的態度去
處理，最終凝聚共識，也是為普選創造條件) (Li 2007). What could really
be called the “ideology of pragmatism” permeates the discussion of political
change in Hong Kong and is important because “sticking to a particular view”
(e.g., sticking to a particular date for universal suffrage) was made to seem
“ideological,” unreasonable, and therefore extreme, for as Seliger has stated
“To criticize a view as ideological is to already to criticize it for ‘ideology’ is
not a neutral term” (1976, 77). It could be said that Hong Kong people are a
294 Chapter 10
pragmatic people who had to “make do” in earlier, poorer days, this was their
famed “Lion Rock Spirit.”
Another common phrase constantly used by people in this book that could
be said to be “ideological” was “stability and prosperity.” This phrase was
regularly used in normal times but even more frequently during contentious
times. In the Hong Kong context, the phrase “stability and prosperity” had
the function of playing into the fears of the Hong Kong people who had seen
the turmoil next door as numerous political movements took hold in mainland
China. Raising a possible threat of instability when change in the political
system was suggested would play on people’s fears and raised desires for the
status quo to remain. In China, stability was key after the end of the Cultural
Revolution but also, as noted by Gessen (2017) and others, “stability” had a
long history of use in totalitarianism. Dictators like Hitler and Stalin held out
a promise of stability under their rule, but they cultivated a state of permanent
instability suited their needs (emphasis added):
The point is that both Hitler and Stalin held out promises of stability in order to
hide their intention of creating a state of permanent instability. . . .For the totali-
tarian ruler is confronted with a dual task which at first appears contradictory to
the point of absurdity: he must establish the fictitious world of the movement
as a tangible working reality of everyday life, and he must, on the other hand,
prevent this new world from developing a new stability; for a stabilization of its
laws and institutions would surely liquidate the movement itself and with it the
hope for eventual world conquest. (Arendt 1958, 391)
SUMMARIZING THE SITUATION SO FAR
Constitutional reform discourse in Hong Kong over the first decade as an

SAR of China has often taken the form of a heated political battle between
pro-democracy groups and those loyal to Beijing or the establishment. It has
largely been portrayed by one side as a fight for a fundamental human right
and by the other as a potentially hazardous development that, if done too
quickly, could undermine Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, and result in
a movement like the Cultural Revolution.
Chapter 3 showed the importance of historical background and how other
sociopolitical factors influenced the ideology of political groups in Hong
Kong. The historical context of political party formation in Hong Kong was
connected to their “foundation moments” (e.g., June 4, 1989, for the Hong
Kong Democratic Party) and showed how their habitus and capital changed
over time. How these parties saw themselves and categorized others ensured
different textual frames according to their alternate readings of the JD and
Basic Law, in the light of their own particular ideologies. The chapter showed
the central role of metaphor and its interpretation in this categorization and
how, later in the book, this categorization remained much the same. Post 2007
saw the development of a stronger Hong Konger identity and a disenchant-
ment with traditional political parties that saw the rise of “localism” and the
occasional call for “independence.”
A constant refrain in this book is that “discourse is always historical, that
is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communica-
tive events which are happening at the same time or which have happened
before” (Wodak and Ludwig 1999, 12), and because two major principles for
Hong Kong’s democratization in the Basic Law involve both speed (when
universal suffrage could be attained) and suitability of the “situation” to that
attainment), the context of situation is important in understanding how the
discourse unfolds, thus the discourse-metaphor approach in chapter 4.
Throughout the SAR’s first ten years as shown in chapter 4, the discourse
has been largely framed as a discourse of “timetables” (when universal suf-
frage should be delivered) and “roadmaps” (what form that this universal
suffrage system should take). “Timetables” and “roadmaps” were particu-
larly prominent since the Basic Law’s two main principles for constitutional
development related to the “actual situation” (i.e., the roadmap) as well as
“gradual and orderly progress” (i.e., the timetable) and an agreement on how
this development should take place. These two principles could be seen as
two “meta-metaphors” for the whole decade’s discourse to the end of 2007.
In the first ten years, metaphors of “containment” (e.g., “birdcage,” “small
circle,” and “river water not mixing with well water”) were prominent and
discourse-length metaphors with discussions on how to work around the
“space” of Hong Kong’s governance framework, or how “space” within “One
Country, Two Systems” framework could be “stretched.”
It was also shown in this chapter how metaphors were repeated, took on
new forms, and clustered together forming a “texture” of coherence, enabling
certain themes to emerge over time. They also played a large role in argu-
mentation (the discursive strategy), metaphors being seen as “warrants” in
arguments (Santibázez, 2007); the warrant being the frame through which
the data of an argument is viewed. As Toulmin (1958, 105) stated, “warrants
are hypothetical bridge-like statements.” Warrants connect (conspicuously
or inconspicuously) the claim and the support; they derive from our cultural
experiences and personal observations.
Metaphors can provide this deniability as actors can say that their words
were misconstrued. Modification of the illocutionary force of an utterance
can also be done through such devices as modal particles, vagueness, ambigu-
ity, and hyperbole, often in conjunction with metaphor (Zhang 1998; Franken
1997, Charteris-Black 2005).
296 Chapter 10
Since it is hard to provide all the context and co-text around the various
metaphor threads in a single chapter, one particular narrative thread, used by
both sides, was drawn out in chapter 5, that of the Cultural Revolution. This
was to show more thoroughly one particular thread to the discourse, showing
the tight link with a historical event that had a direct impact on how many
saw political development. It showed that the understanding of history is
necessary to why certain sensitivities exist over certain actions (e.g., mass
mobilizations and protests).
Chapter 6 showed how the concept of the “rule of law” developed in Hong
Kong and how it was linked with discussions about 2014’s Occupy Central/
Umbrella Movement, and of the Movement’s possible effects on the “rule of
law,” seen as the “basic foundation” of Hong Kong’s identity, and how this
related to the merits or otherwise of “civil disobedience” and Hong Kong’s
evolving sociopolitical identity. It showed that understanding of what the
“rule of law” meant again showing how both sides in the discourse used their
ideas of what the “rule of law” was. This two-month-long event had subse-
quent impacts on Hong Kong’s political discourse, especially the Hong Kong
protests of 2019 and beyond where controversies around the rule of the law
would again arise.
Chapter 7 detailed how Hong Kong officials increasingly changed their
discourse (and discourse forms) to adapt to the increasing integration of the
“Second System” into the “One Country.” The chapter showed how the slight
amendment in wording in the Basic Law Fact Sheet in 2015 when “ruling
Hong Kong” became “administering Hong Kong” was clearly a response to
the previous year’s Occupy Central. Soon after this, there was a narrative
alteration of history to an account of the 1967 riots on the Hong Kong Police’s
website, showing that when a new ruling ideology is more firmly in place,
certain historical embarrassments could be glossed over and replaced with a
more politically correct narrative. School textbooks also reflected this. Lastly,
this chapter discussed the rise of “independence talk” on university campuses
and elsewhere as many Hongkongers became unhappy with the increasing
mainlandization of their city. Finally, reaction to overseas criticism of the
Hong Kong government showed how much the language of the latter had
changed, transforming colonial bureaucratic language into the phraseology
that was once just used in Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing Chinese press.
Chapter 8 largely moved away from metaphor and looked at the hugely
significant 2019 protests multimodally and holistically through its strategy of
“be water,” and how this strategy was reflected in discourse. The author of
this book closely watched, recorded, and occasionally participated in events
as they unfolded. Over time, certain categories were built up and certain
themes were discerned using a diverse range of sources such as posters, ban-
ners, signs, and slogans. These protests highlighted Hong Kong’s history as a
British colony and a Chinese society is reflected in protest-related discourse

and how it was used and contested Chinese rhetorical topoi and showed the
discursive practices of the 2019 protests as again emphasizing the conflicting
ideologies of Hong Kong’s post-1997 political system vis-à-vis mainland
China. The discourse of the protests was shaped over time by being reactive
to events as they occurred over time. The protests were also reflexive in that
the different participants in the protests attempted to control the narrative
through chronologies, timelines, and lists.
The first part of the penultimate chapter looked at how Hong Kong saw its
future long before it became a part of China, and as it became a part of China.
This future, which became increasingly contested, was discussed in connec-
tion to the phrase “50 years no change” (i.e., 2047) in the Basic Law, now that
Hong Kong was half way to that date. Talk about Hong Kong’s future before
2020 was on how it saw itself as a globally unique place, rather outside its
geographic region, and the importance of maintaining this uniqueness. This
highlighted many of the themes that appeared earlier in the book. The sud-
den introduction of the National Security Law (NSL) on June 30, 2020, and
the electoral changes of May 2021 formed the second part of the chapter. A
reading of some key points of the NSL and the electoral changes, and how the
Hong Kong government attempted to “sell” these to the public showed how
once more the narrative of past events was changed to fit the altered political
scene, using established concepts, keeping their names, but changing their
definition (concepts like democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech). The
narrative of the past can then be altered to fit the new political reality. For as
F.A. Hayek in The Road to Serfdom (1944/2006, 161) pointed out:
The most effective way of making people accept the validity of the values they
are to serve is to persuade them that they are really the same as those they have
always held, but which were not properly understood or recognized before. . . .
And the most efficient technique to this end is to use the old words but change
their meaning.
A PERSONAL META-METAPHOR OF HONG

KONG’S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
In chapter 1, three aspects were to be considered in analyzing the discourse

related to Hong Kong’s political reform. The first was that Hong Kong was
a political hybrid. The second was how the promise of the ultimate aim of
universal suffrage was stated in the Basic Law. The third was Hong Kong’s
history as a British colony and a Chinese society. Also, a factor impacting
how democratization was seen was how Hong Kong saw itself (its personal
298 Chapter 10
mythology, its metaphor of itself, as a unique place). As mentioned at the

start of the book, the geographic position that Hong Kong found itself in has
always been bound not only with the discursive but also the political.
Taking into consideration the above as well as the nature of the conceptual
and discourse metaphors discussed in the book as a whole, and the various
meta-metaphors and meta-metaphor discourse themes from chapter 4, the
author has taken the liberty of coining her own overarching metaphor for the
journey of Hong Kong’s political discourse up to now. Coining such a metaphor
is over-simplifying matters to a certain extent due to the complexities of such a
discourse comprising of multiple actors, clashing systems, and the global situa-
tion. Despite this simplification, the metaphor holds to a large degree.
META-METAPHOR OF HONG KONG’S

DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS: A CANAL LOCK
The meta-metaphor of “canal lock” was chosen as a summary of the meta-

phors for a political system in which democratic choice is permitted but is
carefully constrained by structural and other means by certain “gatekeepers.”
This meta-metaphor is explained below.
A lock is a device for raising and lowering boats between stretches of water
of different levels on river and canal waterways. The distinguishing feature of
a lock is a fixed chamber in which the water level can be varied. Since Hong
Kong is the “well” (an artificial construct of “One Country, Two Systems” to
the Mainland’s “river”), a water metaphor seems a suitable choice, since the
“embankment” between the two can be raised or lowered at will.
How a Lock Works

1. A boat comes to the top of the lock and wants to go to the downstream side.
2. The gates on the upstream side of the lock can easily be swung open
because the water inside the lock is the same elevation as the water on the
downstream side. So the lockkeeper turns the cranks that open the gates
to let the boat in.
3. The boat floats into the lock.
4. Now the upper gate is closed.
5. Valves are opened on the downstream side of the lock which lets water
out of the lock.
6. As the water drains, the boat floats down.
7. When the water in the lock matches the water level of the downstream
water, the gates can be opened and the boat can move out.
“How a Lock Works” (www.rideau-info.com/canal/lock.html)
HOW THE HONG KONG (DEMOCRATIZATION/

POLITICAL REFORM) LOCK WORKS
1. The boat (Hong Kong) comes to the lock (the democratization process)
and wants to go downstream (toward universal suffrage).
2. The gates (Basic Law, Task Force Reports, Interpretations, Decisions,
and directives from Beijing) can be swung open or not according to the
lock staff (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). The
locks are opened by appointment only or at set times. But the Hong Kong
Boat is unsure of the lockkeeper’s schedule.
3. The boat (Hong Kong) has often floated into the lock in 2004 but the
lockkeeper decided not to open the lock in 2007. It was stuck in the lock.
There was a possibility that the lock might be raised a little in 2005,
but fighting on board about how long it would take to navigate the river
(having no timetable to reach the ultimate aim); the navigation charts
(roadmaps) also had problems.
4. In 2007, there was some movement by the lockkeeper. While the upper
gate remained closed, valves would be opened slightly on the down-
stream side of the lock (minor changes to the system, but the same
ratio of functional constituencies to geographical constituencies had to
remain) but this would not happen till 2012.
5. If all goes to plan and the boat and the lockkeeper both agree to the rules
and regulations of the 2012 lock opening, the water will drain (but slowly
and gradually), the boat floats down (but remains in the lock).
6. When the water in the lock matches the water level of the downstream
water (to universal suffrage), the gates can be opened and the boat can
move out (the lockkeeper had made a promise to do this in 2017).
7. However, after trouble with the boat in 2014 and disagreements with the
lockkeeper, the boat has been stalled.
8. Due to a major dispute in 2019 over the development of the canal, it
has been decided that the canal will likely be filled in (NSL in 2020 and
electoral changes in 2021).
ENDNOTE
By going beyond consideration of the purely linguistic dimension of selected

texts to encompass the larger historical and sociopolitical context, and by
incorporating textual, discursive, and metaphoric analysis, this thesis has
sought to provide a comprehensive examination of the discourses of Hong
Kong’s political changes and its constitutive themes. The methodology and
the multi-perspective approach used in this book provide a possible means
of a comprehensive study of a particular discourse or discourses over time,
taking into account their many complexities.
Appendix
A Timeline of Hong Kong
Chapters in the book connected with these events are marked in the relevant
places.
CHAPTERS 1, 2, AND 3
1970s—Governor Murray MacLehose visits Beijing to discuss the future of

Hong Kong.
1982—Britain and China begin formal negotiations on Hong Kong’s future.
1984—Britain and China sign the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which
details the conditions under which Hong Kong will become a Special
Administrative Region of China in 1997.
1989—Tiananmen Square crackdown. A huge protest in Hong Kong was
held in response and there were calls for faster introduction of democracy
in Hong Kong. A draft of the Basic Law was in public circulation.
1990—The Basic Law is formally ratified by Beijing.
1992—Chris Patten becomes the last British governor of Hong Kong. Patten
announces proposals to broaden the electoral base, angering China; China
threatens to overturn Patten’s reforms after 1997.
1994—Hong Kong’s legislature introduces a modified democratic reform
package.
1995—Elections held for the new Legislative Council.
301
302 Appendix
CHAPTERS 3 AND 4
1997—Hong Kong is handed back to China after more than 150 years of
British rule. Tung Chee-hwa, a shipping tycoon, is selected by Beijing to
lead Hong Kong.
1998—First post-handover elections held.
2001—Chief Executive Ordinance is introduced mandating that chief execu-
tives cannot be members of any political party.
2002—The government releases proposals for controversial new anti-subver-
sion law, Article 23.
2003
March—China and Hong Kong are hit by pneumonia-like SARS virus.
July—Half a million people march against Article 23. Two Hong Kong
government members resign, and Article 23 is shelved indefinitely.
2004
March—The First Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force
is released.
April—China interprets the Basic Law, saying its approval must be given
before there are any changes to Hong Kong’s electoral laws. The Second
Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force is released. The
Chief Executive’s Report to the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress is also released. The SCNPC announces that it would
not permit universal suffrage for the chief executive in 2007 or for all
the seats in the Legislative Council seats in 2008.
May—The Third Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force is
released.
September—Legislative Council elections are held.
2005
March—Tung Chee-hwa resigns, citing ill health. He is succeeded by Don-
ald Tsang. Pro-democracy legislators block Tsang’s plans for limited
constitutional reforms, saying they do not go far enough.
October—The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force
is released.
2006—Tens of thousands of people rally for universal suffrage on July 1.
Appendix 303
CHAPTERS 4 AND 5
2007
March—Donald Tsang is appointed to a new term as chief executive.
July—Marks the tenth anniversary of Hong Kong SAR. The Green Paper
on Constitutional Development was released.
October—During a radio interview, Tsang states that “extreme democ-
racy” is equivalent to a Cultural Revolution.
December—Beijing says it will allow the people of Hong Kong to
directly elect the chief executive in 2017 and their legislators by 2020.
Tsang hails this as “a timetable for obtaining universal suffrage,” but
pro-democracy campaigners say this timetable is too long.
2008
September—The pro-democracy camp win over a third of seats in the Leg-
islative Council elections, retaining a veto over future bills.
2009
June—Tens of thousands of people attend a vigil on the 20th anniversary
of the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
December—The government unveil proposals for political reform includ-
ing an enlarged Legislative Council, but critics say the moves still do
not go far enough.
2010
May—Five opposition legislators are returned to their seats in by-elections
they triggered by resigning, which they considered a “de facto” referen-
dum on the wish for universal suffrage.
2012
July—C.Y. Leung becomes chief executive in July, succeeding Donald
Tsang.
August—Demonstrations take place against “moral and national educa-
tion,” a new school curriculum proposed by the Hong Kong Education
Bureau.
September—Pro-democracy parties retain their power of veto over new
laws in Legislative Council elections.
304 Appendix
CHAPTER 6
2013
March—Benny Tai, a law professor, proposes the civil disobedience cam-
paign “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (OCLP).
August—A mass group of homeland associations/pro-Beijing groups held
an “anti-Occupy Central” protest in August.
2014
June—Over 90 percent of nearly 800,000 people taking part in an unof-
ficial referendum vote in favor of giving the public a say in short-listing
candidates for future chief executive elections. Beijing condemns the
vote as illegal.
July—Tens of thousands of protesters on Hong Kong SAR Establishment
Day take part in what organizers say could be Hong Kong’s largest
pro-democracy rally in a decade.
August—Beijing rules out universal suffrage for Hong Kong’s leader in
2017, saying that only candidates approved by Beijing will be allowed
to run. The OCLP/Umbrella Movement begins.
December—OCLP lasts till December when the authorities clear the occu-
pation sites.
2015
June—The Legislative Council rejects proposals for electing the territory’s
next leader in 2017. Despite pro-democracy protests and an extensive
consultation process, plans remained the same as those outlined by
China in August 2014.
October—for the next few months, five staff of Causeway Bay Books
go missing and reappear in mainland China charged with various
offenses, not having left Hong Kong through official immigration
channels.
2016—In August, hundreds of protesters rally against the disqualification of
six pro-independence candidates from Legislative Council elections to be
held in September.
November—the high court disqualifies two pro-independence legisla-
tors from taking their seats in the Legislative Council after they
refused to pledge allegiance to China during their swearing-in
ceremony.
Appendix 305
CHAPTER 7
2017
February—Former CE Donald Tsang is sentenced to 20 months in prison
for misconduct in public office.
March—C.Y. Leung’s deputy Carrie Lam wins the CE post with 777 votes
from the Election Committee.
July—Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Hong Kong to swear in Carrie
Lam and warns against attempts to undermine China’s influence over
the SAR.
August—three Hong Kong pro-democracy activists—Alex Chow, Nathan
Law, and Joshua Wong—were given prison sentences by the Court of
Appeal for their roles in a protest in Admiralty in September 2014.
September—Independence banners appear on university campuses in
Hong Kong.
CHAPTER 7
2018
February—The murder of Poon Hiu-wing by her boyfriend Chan Tong-kai
took place in Taiwan. Poon’s mother’s requests Chief Executive Carrie
Lam’s help to bring Chan to justice. Lam proposed an extradition law
extradition law with the Mainland which led to the 2019 protests.
August—Hong Kong National Party leader Andy Chan gives a talk at
the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondence Club (FFC) that was widely
condemned by Beijing and the Hong Kong governments. The National
Party advocates independence for Hong Kong.
September—the Hong Kong government officially declares the National
Party to be an illegal society and bans it on national security grounds.
The Hong Kong section opens of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong
Express Rail Link. Chinese criminal laws can be legally enforced for the
first time on Hong Kong soil as the PRC’s immigration station is located
in the Kowloon rail terminus.
October—Victor Mallet, chairman of the Foreign Correspondents Club,
fails to have his work visa renewed. This was widely seen as retalia-
tion for hosting the talk by Andy Chan, whose political party advocated
Hong Kong’s independence.
306 Appendix
The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, a 34-mile-long bridge-tunnel

system opened.
CHAPTER 8
2019
April—Tens of thousands of people march peacefully against a local gov-
ernment bill that would allow extraditions to mainland China.
June 9—Despite the government modifying the law, protesters come out
again in large numbers. Organizers say more than one million people
join the largely peaceful demonstration, the biggest since the 1997
handover. It descends into violence after midnight when police, using
batons and pepper spray hoses, try to disperse protesters who hurl bottles
and use metal barricades.
June 12—Huge crowds block major roads and attempt to storm the Legis-
lative Council, delaying the bill’s second reading. Police used tear gas,
pepper spray, rubber bullets, and beanbag rounds.
June 15—CE Lam postpones the bill.
June 16—A new demonstration calls for full withdrawal of the extradition
bill and for police accountability to what many saw as excessive vio-
lence on their part. Organizers say two million people took part in the
protest. Police put the figure at 338,000.
June 18—CE Carrie Lam apologizes for her handling of the extradition
bill.
June 21—Protesters surround the Legislative Council after Carrie Lam
fails to withdraw the bill by their 5 p.m. deadline.
June 26—Carrie Lam refuses to completely withdraw the bill.
July 1—Early on this day, young masked protesters take over key roads,
sparking new clashes with police. Hundreds later smash their way into
the Legislative Council and write graffiti on its wall.
July 9—Lam says the extradition bill “is dead” but protesters do not
believe her.
November—Intense clashes between police and student protests occurred
during sieges at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the Chinese
University that shut down transport links and had a profound impact on
events to come.
November 24—District Council elections held attract a record-high voter
turnout. Democrats win the majority of the Councils.
Appendix 307
CHAPTER 9
2020
May—The NPC approved a decision to authorize the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People’s Congress to enact a National Security Law
for Hong Kong. This was adopted by the third session of the thirteenth
National People’s Congress on May 28.
June—Beijing unveils details of the National Security Law on the 30th,
which takes effect just before midnight on July 1.
July—Unofficial “primaries” by pan-democratic groups and individuals
are held to obtain the best candidates to stand for the next Legislative
Council elections slated for 2020 (later postponed).
December—Hong Kong media tycoon and pro-democracy advocate
Jimmy Lai charged with fraud.
2021
January—Participants in the unofficial primaries of July 2020 are arrested
and charged with offenses under the National Security Law.
April—Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 14 months in prison after being found
guilty of unauthorized assembly.
May—Electoral system changes to ensure that “patriots” administer Hong
Kong. District Council members removed from the CE Election Com-
mittee; fewer lawmakers to be returned by geographical constituencies,
with a Candidate Eligibility Review Committee to screen candidates to
see if they are patriots. An oath-taking requirement swearing allegiance
to the SAR and the Basic Law is included in the changes.
June—Pro-democracy newspaper run by Jimmy Lai ceases operations
after funds were frozen by the government.
Index
Abbas, Akbar, 16, 20–21 birdcage, 52, 96, 99–104

actual situation, 37–38, 46, 77, 91, 116, blueprint, 15, 20, 23, 50, 110–11, 195,
134, 146, 177, 279, 295 199
ambiguity, 6, 9, 31–32, 41, 46, 54, 110, bridge, 19, 54, 94, 102, 104, 109–11,
161, 187, 278, 295 136, 145, 265
Anderson, Benedict, 14–15 broadly representative, 37, 39
Article 23, 5, 40, 71, 73, 86, 89, 108, building a bridge metaphor chain,
114, 140, 149, 162–63, 175, 209, 109–12
236, 266, 274–75, 302
Article 45, 37–38, 91, 168, 179 canal lock (as a metaphor of Hong
autonomy, 7, 11, 27, 29–36, 40–41, Kong), 298–99
45–49, 53–54, 67–69, 84, 88, 105–7, capitalism, 36, 105, 136, 171, 284
123, 151, 168, 183, 205, 207–11, categorization, 6, 59–60, 63, 73, 79,
218, 220, 225, 228–30, 252, 263, 86–87, 161–62, 245, 283, 295
265, 271–72, 277, 280, 292 censorship, 226–27
Civic Party, 82, 89, 99, 131, 161–62,
balanced participation, 97, 114, 120–21, 231
137–38, 141–42, 159, 168, 170, civil disobedience, 7, 179, 180, 184–88,
172–73 190, 198, 199, 203–5, 296, 304
barristers, 160–62, 168 Civil Human Rights Front, 101, 114,
Basic Law, 5–7, 9–13; background to, 162, 237, 261
25–29; democratic promise in, 36– collusion, 135, 249, 251, 276
42; drafting of, 33–36; interpretation colonialism, 26, 98, 252
of, 41, 74, 109, 147, 149, 160, 165, common law, 28, 35–36, 40–41, 45,
206, 266; metalingual talk of, 43–47; 182, 203
metaphors of, 47–56, 59, 62; political Communist Party, 31, 42, 52, 73, 85,
parties view of, 66–69 99, 103, 152, 156, 157, 164–65, 175,
Basic Law Fact Sheet, 7, 207–12 189, 202–3, 208, 218, 268
be water, 233–36, 238, 240–41, 260, compromise, 31, 40, 46, 55, 75, 78, 103,
296 106, 127, 132, 172, 199, 229
355
356 Index
conduit, Hong Kong as, 19–20, 22, 193 factions. See fundamentalist/
Confucian concepts, 13–14, 87, 199, fundamentalism
204 fifty years no change, 7, 36, 265–66,
consensus, 13, 31, 70, 75–76, 111, 119– 279, 297
21, 123, 128, 147, 187, 199, 293 five demands, 237–39, 249, 280, 288
constitutions, 35, 53–54, 56 flash mobs, 245–47
critical discourse analysis, 2–3, 235 Foreign Correspondents Club, 225–26,
Cultural Revolution, 6, 9, 11; as extreme 305
democracy, 143, 147, 155–56; Mao’s foundation moment, 60, 67, 87–88, 257,
great democracy, 164, 169–71; as a 294
rhetorical phenomenon, 157–62 freedom of speech, 12, 40, 140, 220–21,
223, 227–88; National Security Law,
DAB, 61, 63, 65–69, 71–75, 77, 79, 82, 230, 268, 274, 279–80
89, 159, 215 fundamentalist/fundamentalism, 81,
death of Hong Kong, 105, 264 143, 146–47, 160–62, 277
decolonialization, 9, 14, 75
democracy, 2, 10–12, 21; in Basic Law, gatekeepers, 25, 41, 45, 69, 133, 190,
37–40; in Joint Declaration, 30, 202, 229, 298
33–34, 36 gateway to China, 19–20, 266
Democratic Party of HK, 61–63, 65–67, Glory to Hong Kong, 245–46, 280
69, 73, 75, 77–79, 82–83, 85, 88, goddess of democracy, 78, 257
99–100, 119–22, 152, 155, 160, 294 gradual and orderly progress, 37–38, 43,
democratization, 2, 6, 10–11, 14, 18, 51, 77, 91, 98, 102, 107, 114, 133,
33–34, 40, 44, 54, 57, 60–63, 67–68, 136, 143–44, 146, 148, 155, 163,
70, 77–79, 84–87, 91, 95, 97, 100, 170, 173, 177, 287, 295
103, 107, 110, 125–28, 134, 137–39, Green Paper, 33–34, 56, 128–32
141–46, 148–51, 155, 160, 162,
172–73, 293, 295, 297–99 habitus, 6, 59–64, 82, 87–88, 294
Deng Xiaoping, 9, 12, 26–27, 33, 36, handover. See sovereignty
49–50, 112, 146, 156, 158, 230, 265, heritage, 16–17
284, 293 Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge, 20,
disappearance, 16, 20. See also Sun 267, 306
Yat-sen Trail Hong Kong police website revision, 7,
discourse of threat, 186, 191, 199, 204 212–15
human rights, 40, 65, 68–69, 87, 127,
education, Basic Law, 224–25, 270, 290 138–39, 180, 198–99, 227–29, 231;
education, national, 216, 224, 266, 268, Human Rights & Democracy Act,
303 248–49, 269, 280
elections, 11–12, 30–31, 36–37, 56, 61, hybridity, 11–12, 14, 57, 254
71, 73, 82–83, 88–89, 97–99, 102,
110, 137–41, 150, 157, 161, 165, icons. See goddess of democracy; Pepe
167–68, 204, 211, 286–87, 291, the frog
301–4, 306–7 identity, 1, 7–8, 14–16, 25, 83–87, 122,
Extradition Bill, 235–39, 250, 252, 179, 181–82, 214–16, 225, 234,
254–55, 261, 263, 267, 306 245, 254, 260, 268, 271, 291,
Eye Girl, 252, 261 295–96
Index 357
ideology, 2–3, 6, 12–13, 25, 30, 41, 46, Mao Zedong, 156–58, 161, 164–65,
64–66, 80–82, 92–93, 120, 146, 159, 171, 175–76
175, 197, 201, 208, 263, 267; one Martin Luther King, Jr., 76, 114–15,
country, two systems, 292–93, 296 132, 148–49, 246, 248
independence, 7, 11, 78, 84–86, Marxism, 27; Marxist, 42, 171
166–67, 181, 183, 203, 207, 211, Mass Transit Railway (MTR), 241–42,
246; discussion of, 217–29; National 257
Security Law, 271–75, 277, 280, metaphor, 2–4, 6, 8, 10, 44; of the Basic
285–86, 289, 292, 295, 304–5 Law, 47–54; in discourse, 91–95;
discourse-length metaphor, 96–108.
Jiang Zemin, 8–9, 104–5, 158, 203, 288 See also sweat/sweating; Hong Kong
Joint Declaration, 1, 6, 25, 29, 55, 57, as, 14–21, 28, 32, 43, 46; Pragglejaz
66, 74, 93, 110, 122, 127, 264, 301 method, 95–96
July 1 protests, 73, 85, 101, 108–9, 114, museum, 265, 268, 288
149, 162–63, 166, 170, 177, 236–38,
240, 251–55, 275, 302–6 nationalism, 213, 219, 225
National Party, Hong Kong, 225
Lai, Jimmy, viii, 307 National People’s Congress (NPC), 29,
Lam, Carrie, 152, 184, 201, 216, 220, 37, 39–41, 51, 81, 89, 100–102, 104,
222, 236, 238, 253–55, 267, 269, 136, 145, 171, 174, 183, 209, 272,
272, 275, 278, 305–6 277, 299, 302, 307
last governor. See Patton, Christopher National Security Law, viii, 7, 179, 204,
League of Social Democrats, 82, 89, 223, 231, 246, 249, 260, 263, 269,
161 272–75, 281, 285, 288, 297, 307
Lee, Martin, 76–79, 119–21, 148, 155, negotiations, 25–28, 30, 55, 61, 67, 144,
160, 277 199
Lennon walls, 247–50
Leung, C. Y., 48–49, 219–20, 276, 303 oath-taking, 161, 176; civil service oath,
Leung Kwok Hung, 114, 125, 161, 176. 271, 283–86, 307
See also Long Hair Occupy Central. See Umbrella
Liberal Party, 63, 129, 163 Movement
Lion Rock spirit, 18, 273, 294 One Country, Two Systems, 1; as a
localists, 82; rise of, 83–87, 219, 237, principle, 7–10. See also Basic Law
254, 275 open door policy, 13, 158, 265
Long Hair, 160–62, 176–77. See also Opium war, 216, 291
Leung Kwok Hung
longhairization, 162, 177 participant-observer, 5, 234, 260
loyalist, 70–71, 73, 82 patriotism, 72–74, 81, 89, 147, 165,
278, 283–84
Macau, 9, 20, 217, 266–67, 270–71, Patton, Christopher, 182, 202, 204, 292
279, 288 Pepe the frog, 256–57
mainlandization, 5, 11, 16, 84–85, 207– Police, viii, 7, 86, 89, 184–85, 196, 207,
8, 218, 269, 296 209; anti-extradition protests 2019,
Mallet, Victor, 225–27, 305 237–39, 241–46, 249, 251–53, 255–
manifesto, 1, 6, 59–60, 66–67, 69, 73, 56, 259–62, 278, 280, 296, 306
77, 84, 185, 266 Police website, revision of, 212–15, 230
358 Index
policy address, 17–18, 23, 172, 174, Taiwan, 19, 26–27, 52, 89, 99, 107, 161,
198, 216, 270, 275 167, 177, 236, 265
political cleavages, 60, 67 terminology, 218, 261
posters, 7, 171, 175, 241, 245, 248–50, textbooks, 207, 215–18, 296
254, 256, 280, 296 Thatcher, Margaret, 26–27
power to the people (slogan), 75, 148, threat, discourse of, 186–88, 190–97
165–66, 173, 275 through train, 33, 63, 89
Pragglejaz Group, 5, 95, 189 Tiananmen, 10, 40, 61, 67–68, 72–73,
pragmatism, 18, 186, 293 89, 161, 176, 199, 257, 265, 274
Prince Charles, 8–9 traitor, 74, 87, 155, 159, 273, 277, 289
promises, 1, 10, 45–46, 199, 270–71, transition, 1–2, 5–6, 8, 10, 19, 29,
294 32–33, 42, 67–68, 92, 95, 98, 268,
287, 292
Qiao Xiaoyang, 109–12, 131, 136, 145, treason, 40, 274, 277
168, 176 treaty, 25, 28, 29, 31, 55
Tsang, Donald, 20, 99, 101, 117–19,
rectification of names, 13–14 121–23, 125–26, 131, 136, 142,
referendum, 85, 102, 167–69, 173, 211, 172–74, 193, 209, 302–3, 305
224, 286, 303
rhetorical topoi, 7, 13–14, 64, 199, 283, ultimate aim, 10–12, 37, 38, 74, 91,
297 115, 135, 137, 141, 265, 283, 297–99
riots of 1967, 199, 207, 212, 214, 296 Umbrella Movement, 7, 11, 83, 86,
rule of law, 2, 7–8, 12, 42–43, 49, 52, 179–80, 205, 207–8, 210, 219–20,
65, 68, 73, 80, 150, 169, 179–205, 229, 237, 239–41, 245, 248, 255,
207, 219, 252, 264; National 269, 275, 296, 304
Security Law, 266–68, 270, 274–75, universal suffrage. See democracy
277–78, 296–97 university sieges, 234, 258
self-determination. See independence visa, 220, 225–27, 266, 305

small circle, 96–99 voting, 40, 88, 97, 108, 114, 121, 126,
socialism, 14, 22, 27, 105, 293 137, 140, 167, 287
sovereignty, 5, 8, 10, 13, 26–29, 32–33,
41–42, 54, 84, 87, 91, 107, 136, welfarism, 136, 139
181–82, 199, 207–10, 212, 215–18, well water idiom, 104–8
222, 225, 228–30, 236, 239, 252, White Paper, 26–27, 29, 33, 39, 55–66,
264, 270–71, 284–85, 291–91 152, 205, 211
stability and prosperity, 9, 17, 26, 30, white terror, 167, 177
42, 50, 61, 65, 67–69, 72, 74, 80, 84, Wu Bangguo, 41, 51
87–88, 136, 138, 155, 157, 172, 174,
273, 282, 294 Xi, Jingping, 267, 270–72, 275, 293
state power, 42, 220, 225, 275, 278, 280 Xiao, Weiyun, 35, 49
state secrets, 40, 57
subversion, 163, 274–76, 289, 302 Zou, Zhekai, 163–64
Sun Yat-sen Trail, 16, 20
sweat/sweating, 18, 96, 108–9, 149,
163–64, 249, 275
About the Author
Jennifer Eagleton, a Hong Kong resident since October 1997, is a close

observer of Hong Kong society and politics. Her doctoral thesis on how Hong
Kong talks about democracy using metaphor arose out of her time in the city
during the first two decades of its transition. She teaches communication-
related subjects at the University of Hong Kong as well as stylistics and
discourse analysis at Hong Kong Metropolitan University. In her spare time,
she collects Hong Kong’s political paraphernalia and political fiction. In addi-
tion to her interest in Hong Kong politics, Jennifer, who was once president
of Hong Kong Women in Publishing Society, has written articles for Hong
Kong Free Press, poetry for Voice & Verse magazine, book reviews for Asian
online literary journal Cha, a poem and essay for Mekong Review, and a les-
son plan on “sent-down” youth for Education about Asia.
359

Discursive Change in Hong Kong Sociopolitical Dynamics, Metaphor, and One Country, Two Systems

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Discursive Change in Hong Kong Sociopolitical Dynamics, Metaphor, and One Country, Two Systems

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Eagleton, Jennifer, author.

A Word on Primary and Secondary Sources Used in This Book vii

1 A Transition: Impact of the Past on the Discourse of

Appendix: A Timeline of Hong Kong 301

BASIC LAW AND RELATED TEXTS

The Basic Law can be found on https://www​.basiclaw​.gov​.hk​/en​/basiclaw-

OFFICIAL HONG KONG GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

POLITICAL PARTY TEXTS

1. The Apple Daily (蘋果日報) is a pro-democracy, tabloid-like broadsheet.

in their work on Hong Kong media discourse illustrate how a newspa-

A NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATION AND

Hong Kong’s geographic coordinates of 22 15 N, 114 10 E and its position in

THE MAJOR APPROACH OF THIS BOOK

Critical Discourse Analysis

discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relation-

The discourse-historical approach (D-HA) to CDA (Reisigl and Wodak

The Use of Metaphor

metaphor, and knowledge of the cultural and political context is crucial to

The Process of Metaphor Identification

1. Familiarization with the discourse data

The Author as Participant-Observer

LAYOUT OF THE BOOK

democratic deficit. This shows how an understanding of history is key to

On the night of the reversion to sovereignty, just after midnight on July

a century of humiliation and a confirmation of its rise after the “decade of

“anachronistic” since rather than allowing British colonies to become self-

THINGS TO CONSIDER IN ANALYZING

In describing and interpreting the discourses of political change in Hong

Furthermore, Hong Kong’s post-1997 political structure, much like its

Universal suffrage, a suffrage extending to the whole of a community, esp. one

Even as recently as 2011, at a conference on language, law, and discourse, a

HONG KONG, ITSELF A METAPHOR

Hong Kong’s journey from a colony to decolonization but not independence

CITIES AND THE SKY 3

Dung Kai-chung’s The Atlas: Archaeology of an Imaginary City (2011)

The Sun Yat-sen Historical Trail (https://hk​.drsunyatsen​.museum) pro-

In addition to reconstructing (and refiguring) the past, it is constantly con-

To protect, conserve and revitalise as appropriate historical and heritage sites

“Development needs,” however, also seem to take priority whenever histori-

reform focuses on structure, such as the numbers of seats, methods of election

1. Based on the Gazetteer of Conventional Names, third edition, August 1988, US

9. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics is something that combines the basic

Renewed Perseverance” (https://www​.policyaddress​.gov​.hk​/2020​/eng​/pdf​/PA2020​

Hong Kong’s “Guiding Light”

influenced the drafting and emergent text of the JD.

THE HANDOVER PRELIMINARIES

Examining with the Chinese how it might be possible to arrive at arrangements

Such a metaphorical buffer (i.e., “a high degree of autonomy”) would also

THE NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AND

(Cottrell 1993, 128). By instituting a firm deadline (September 1984), and

1. Emphasize general principles; sovereignty without administration was

The Name of the Document

in a common declaration (Ibid). The term “joint declaration” (聯合聲明)

A High Degree of Autonomy

Signaling the Democratic Road Ahead

Unpacking “Elections” as a Key Term: What Did It Mean?

The JD was an expedient way to achieve a strategic objective of giving Hong

A Word on Primary and Secondary Sources Used in This Book vii

Appendix: A Timeline of Hong Kong 301

The Basic Law can be found on https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclaw-

The Sun Yat-sen Historical Trail (https://hk.drsunyatsen.museum) pro-

Renewed Perseverance” (https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2020/eng/pdf/PA2020

Treasures in Full” website, www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/index.html have a simi-

ideology. For example, the DAB’s logo (see www.dab.org.hk) semiotically