Assessing the Risk of

Technological Disaster
in Indonesian Armed Forces
CURIE MAHARANI, WENDY A. PRAJULI,
& REINE PRIHANDOKO

Introduction

The issue of technological disaster in Indonesia’s military came

to the fore following the tragedy of submarine KRI Nanggala 402 in
April 2021. The submarine sunk amid military exercise, taking 53
Indonesian best sailors to eternal patrol. It required approximately 14 days
and the support of three nations to conclude search and rescue mission,1
and another two weeks to salvage parts of the submarine for an investigation
into the causal factors. While the general public’s response was mourning,
they also demanded explanations for the cause of the accidents. Age of
the submarine, 42 years old, became the first suspect.2 Whereas other reports
mentioned lack of maintenance3 and the possibility of undersea waves.4
To date, the investigation team assigned has not concluded the
final findings.
Among the most pressing homework awaiting the leadership of TNI
is the modernization of the weapons system5. Current research by think-
tank Lab45 revealed that Indonesia is stuck in the arms maintenance

Curie Maharani is a faculty member at Binus University

and a non-resident research fellow at Disaster Management Research Unit,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS-DMRU) since 2020.
Wendy A. Prajuli is a PhD student at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies,
Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany.
Reine Prihandoko graduated from Department of International Relations,
University of Indonesia, and currently works as a researcher at Lab45.

6 Indonesian Quarterly
position in the arms dynamics spectrum, which indicates the lack of
ability to modernize its weapons systems6. Regardless of more than a
decade of defense modernization efforts through Minimum Essential
Forces (MEF) 2010-2024, most Indonesian weapon systems are not only
behind the latest technology7 but also ageing8 and under maintenance.9
This has increased the disaster risk associated with the utilization of
weapon systems, particularly in training and operations.
This paper aims to assess the risk of technological disaster within
TNI. In this context, technological disaster is defined as a great loss of
life or other vital aspects, either to military or civilian, resulting from a
number of possible causes (i.e., the malfunction of technology and/
or human error) in the application of military equipment or weapons.
Aircraft crashes, ammunition explosions, and submarine accidents are
some of the examples. The issue is highly relevant because technology-
related accidents happen quite frequently in the Indonesian military,
as many as 18 times throughout 2015-2021,10 or according to our data, they
occurred at least 34 times from 2010 to 2021. While the loss from such
disasters—both in terms of the value of weapon systems and personnel—
is huge, its investigation report is not made open to the public.11 We hope
that this paper could shed light on the risks of technological disaster in
TNI by identifying the main variables behind them. By doing so, we aim
to support the policy-making process on the proper allocation of budget
and priority programs in the defense sector.

Technological Disaster and Its Causal Factors

Technological disaster refers to a great loss of life or other vital aspects

that are caused by the malfunction of technology and/or human error in
the application of technology. It covers, for example, nuclear, chemical,
and biological accidents, dam failure, and fire and mining accidents.12
In general, there are three causal factors responsible for the technological
disaster, namely human, technological, and organizational.13 Human factors
include lack of effectiveness, safety, and performance that are caused
by human error in decisions or behaviors. Furthermore, technological
factors are faulty technological development that causes design errors
and equipment failures. Lastly, organizational factors include safety issues,
communication failures, miscalculation of the level and nature of dangers,
lack of contingency plans, and cost pressures leading to safety problems

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 7

 that are caused by organizational weaknesses.
The previous causal factors can be broken down into 5+1M categories,
namely man, machine, medium, management, mission, and finally a
mix of more than one cause. Man refers to all human elements, such
as physiological and psychological factors, proficiency, and performance.
It does not only focus on “the pilot or driver aspect” but all people
involved in the system.14 Machine refers to the technology used by vehicles.
It includes the design, manufacture, and maintenance of the vehicles.
Historically, the development of technology in design and manufacture
has minimized the risk of failure of vehicles. However, sometimes,
failures still happen. Several accidents show that failures can still be traced
to the problems of design and production. Hence, maintenance and
constantly repairing errors are needed to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is achieved throughout the life of the vehicles as well as to detect
hazards that potentially occur in the future.15
Medium is linked to the environment where the vehicles or equipment
are operated. It consists of natural phenomena, such as weather
and topography, and non-natural features, such as airport or seaport
conditions, regulations, standard operating procedures, training curricula,
and so forth.16 It must be noted that natural phenomena cannot be
eliminated, consequently, they must be avoided, or anticipation must be
made for them. The natural phenomenon cannot be used as an excuse to
escape from responsibility when an accident happens.
Meanwhile, Welss17 in his book writes “[t]he responsibility for safety
and, thus, accident prevention in any organization ultimately rests with
management, because only management controls the allocation of
resources.” Hence, management refers to the monitoring aspects of the
development and operation of technology or vehicles. In other words, it is
about the capacity to monitor the formulation and implementation of good
regulations and policies as well as attitudes towards safety. The mission is
about the purpose of the operation. Different types of operations have
different types of risks. Each type of operation has its intrinsic hazards.
Risks or hazards in military war operations differ from military operations
in humanitarian aid.18 Finally, mixed factors refer to the combination of
causal factors explained above.
Defense is among the sectors that are exposed to the risk of technological
disaster, most importantly because of contemporary trends in arms
acquisition. First, the military is increasingly dependent on technology and
therefore there is a need to be at the forefront of technological progress.

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 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

Research and development of leading-edge technology entail risks,

which is why more states are looking to co-develop weapon systems
to learn from senior partners that are technologically ahead.19
Second, as the result of the technological race, and despite the effort to
seek a more economical supply chain including using commercial off-the-
shelf components, the production costs of weapon systems had escalated
since the 1980s. While further research is still called for, in the UK it is
suggested that the new technology inflates combat equipment real cost
growth by 7.5% per annum.20 As a result, the life cycle of a weapon system
is further extended.
The risk of technological disasters will increase after weapon systems
pass a certain age, and this will be multiplied if the government fails to
plan for through-life maintenance and modernization. Furthermore, there
is an irony: the more the military maintains outdated systems, the greater
the economic burden on maintaining them, and, eventually, the tighter the
fiscal room for modernization.21 The situation where the military is forced
to maintain obsolete weapon systems in their inventory, despite suffering
from corrosion, fatigue cracking, material degradation, and wear-and-tear
effects because the government is unable to provide replacement systems
is dubbed as “death spiral”.22 India was one example, its ageing MiG-21 has
been labelled “the flying coffin” due to the high rate of airplane crashes.23
Some military technology inherently more prone to disaster risk
than others. In addition to aircraft mentioned above, submarine
perhaps is the most challenging technology for the military to operate
and maintain. First, submarines share more similar operational character
with airplane than a ship, in a space-like environment and undersea blindness.
The crews—highly selected and trained—are cramped together up to
a month, with minimum contact with home base. Second, not only its
procurement cost is rocket high, but its life cycle cost and rescue platforms
are also super expensive. Third, the whole doctrine of submarine activity
is based on total secrecy.24 Hence submarine operations precondition
a complete package of supports, covering infrastructure, equipment,
organization, personnel, training, information systems, and logistics.
Economic and technological risks associated with the high cost of
procuring and maintaining defense equipment have confronted states, big
and small. Still, it is difficult to get the right formula to plan for an armed
force that is both sustainable and affordable. The US led the effort with the
implementation of “life cycle costing” (LCC) in defense programs since
the 1960s.25 The LCC, which provides insight into the total cost spanning

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 9

 all phases of the program’s life: development, procurement, operation,
sustainability, and disposal before procuring a military technology,26
was carried out as part of the decision-making process in arms
procurement. A rule of thumb of the approach is that the ratio of
costs incurred after technology procurement is much higher than the
procurement cost. One estimation mentioned a 70:30 cost ratio between
operating and maintenance costs and procurement costs, but this is not
necessarily applicable across different weapon systems.27 LCC remains one
of the best practices in defense planning, offering benefits such as more
transparency and predictability to stakeholders. However, implementation
of the concept requires the development of organizational capabilities
and values, such as data integration and professional finance personnel,
which are often lacking in a less modern military.28
This research employs two basic hypotheses. First, the risk of
technological disaster in the military is higher when it comes to ageing
weapon systems. Second, the risk is even higher if the maintenance is
not planned and financed thoroughly for the life cycle of the technology.
The report is structured as shown in Figure 1. We begin with reviewing the
basic profile of the Indonesian armed forces weapon systems inventory to
identify risks commonly associated with a technological disaster, namely
the age of technology. Then we create a profile of technological disaster
(accident) involving military’s inventory throughout 2010-2021 and
derive the pattern of causes in general and in each service (Army, Navy,
Air Force). Finally, we compare the operation and maintenance (O&M)
budget as part of the Indonesian wider defense budget and against other
countries in Asia.
Figure 1. Profile of Indonesian Weapon Systems

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 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

The study limits the data of military inventory by covering only nine
types of major conventional arms created by UNROCA,29 which then
applied to data from the Military Balance as per the year 2020. The age
of weapons is calculated by using the delivery year from SIPRI Arms
Transfer Database 2020. In the case of second-hand weapons, there is no
choice but to search for the production year from alternative sources.
Profile of technological disaster in the Indonesian military is
constructed using a combination of primary and secondary sources.
We relied on media reports of military accidents. From the dataset of each
service’s accidents (see Appendix 1), we obtain a number of information:
(1) time and whereabouts of the accident as well as the type of weapons
system involved; (2) the possible causes based on five plus one category:
men, machine, medium, management, mission, as well as mixed factor
in the case of more than one cause; (3) the country of origin and age
of weapons; and, (4) result of the accident and response from authority.
We crosschecked the causes of accidents reported by the media with
interviewees who wish to remain anonymous.30 We left out one accident
that our sources were unable to confirm, namely the sinking of the Army’s
fast motorboat in 2018 in Kepulauan Seribu.
Identifying risk associated with the O&M budget is tricky, since
there is no rule-of-thumb as to the ideal ratio of maintenance and
operation budget against the aggregated military expenditure (MILEX).
As an alternative, we created a benchmark by comparing the number
of naval weapons inventory and maintenance budget of five maritime
countries in Asia of different sizes (China, Taiwan, Vietnam,
The Philippines, and Malaysia), to get a sense of how ‘normal’ Indonesian
maintenance and operation budget is in the spectrum of those countries.
For this purpose, we used data from Jane’s ship’s inventory in 2020 and
Jane’s defense budget in the period of 2005-2020.

Current Conditions of Indonesian Weapon Systems

How Obsolete Is the Indonesian Weapons Inventory?

Reports on the obsoleteness of Indonesian weaponry are varied,
even among government bodies depending on the choice of periods
and weapon categories. BAPPENAS’ RPJMN 2020-2024 stated that
the average age of defense equipment for the Army is 18.22 years,
the navy is 22 years, and the air force is 15.35 years.31 Senior journalist

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 11

 Edna C. Pattisina, citing data from the Navy Information Desk
(Dinas Penerangan Angkatan Laut/Dispenal), said that currently the
Indonesian Navy has 160 KRIs, and 60% of them are 30 years old.32
She believed that the figure was moderate; yet, the reality was worse.33
See Figure 2.
It is not like Indonesia has not tried to modernize military weapons.
As previously mentioned, the modernization plan dubbed MEF (Minimum
Essential Forces)—a part of TNI’s ideal posture which outlines the
minimum requirement of main components needed to respond to
actual threats to national defense—was stipulated in the Regulation of
the Minister of Defense Number 2 of 2010 or more than a decade ago.34
According to Indonesia’s Defense White Paper, MEF is “not intended
to enlarge defense power, but to “develop and modernize” defense
power to be more effective in military duties and peace missions”.35 The
main priority of MEF is to increase the mobility capabilities and the
combat units, both for the striking forces and standby forces for military
operations other than war.36 MEF is divided into three five-year stages
from 2009 to 2024. It is currently in the last stage, yet only meet around
62.31% of the target in 2020 and most probably will not be able to reach
100% in 2024 with the current budgeting model.37 Furthermore, the
Pandemic that hit in 2020 forced the ministry of defense to refocus its
budget to support government activities in managing COVID-19.
Figure 2. Composition of Weapons Inventory
Based on Age and Procurement Status

Source: IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies Washington,
London, 2019, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, United States, 2001, Web Archive,
https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0011225/.

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 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

Our dataset calculated the average age of each weapon from eight
categories. Figure 2 shows that the oldest weapons categories are
battle tank, armored vehicle, and warship at an average age of 52-, 40-,
and 38-years-old. On the opposite, the newest weapons categories are
attack helicopters, fighter jets, and submarines at an average age of 11-,
18-, and 19-years-old. When broken down to the age of every category,
only six categories (armored vehicles, artillery systems, fighter jets,
attack helicopters, warships, and submarines) have inventories aged less
than 10 years old. This suggests that, first, modernization until 2020 has
not touched upon two weapons categories which are battle tank and
missile & launcher.38 Second, arms procurement has not just brought in
new weapons but also a significant number of second-hand as shown
in Figure 3. Warships have the highest percentage of second-hand
weapons, at around 60%, followed by fighter jets and attack helicopters at
around 50%. Submarine and missile & launchers are the only categories
without second-hand weapons.
Figure 3. Composition of Weapons Inventory Based on Procurement Status

Source: IISS Military Balance, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Washington, 2019.

The procurement of used weapons is quite common in Indonesia,

mainly due to underbudgeting. In some cases, they were conducted
on a massive scale. For example, Indonesia’s first military inventory in
post-independence was second-hand bought from Dutch inventory in
the Pacific and in 1997 the navy procured one-third of East Germany’s

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 13

 navy armada. In the last two decades, Indonesia had obtained 28 types
of used weapons from 12 countries.39 Since MEF kickstarted, most of
the second-hand arms procurement occurred in the 2010-2014 period,
namely 11 types, possibly related to the acceleration of the first phase
of the MEF (2010-2014).40 Indonesia also received five types of second-
hand weapons through grants from South Korea, the United States,
Australia, and Brunei. In the second stage of the MEF (2015-2019),
the procurement of used weapons was minimized.41 SIPRI Arms Transfer
Database recorded procurement of four types of second-hand but
modernized-before-delivery since 2016, namely C-130H from Australia,
M-108 VBCL APC and M-109A1 self-propelled gun from Belgium, and
M-113 Arisgator APC from Italy.
The discourse of procuring used weapons briefly surfaced in
the third stage of the MEF (2020-2024), through the concept of
“interim readiness” introduced by the Minister of Defense (MoD).42
But the idea was immediately criticized and rejected, citing the
argument that ageing weapon systems will incur more expensive post
procurement budget.43 While the public sentiment towards procuring
a second-hand weapon system or receiving it through grants remains
negative, a remaining significant bulk of second-hand military inventory
means Indonesia will continue to deal with the challenges of operating
ageing weapons. Weapons disposal had been listed under MEF, but slow
procurement for replacement means some ageing weapons might have to
extend their service.44 When this paper is written, unlike in commercial
sector, there is no regulations on the maximum age of weapons within the
MoD and TNI.45

Profile of Technological Disaster-Related to Weapon

Systems, 2010-2021

As indicated in Figure 4, out of the total 34 disaster cases related to

military weapons systems throughout 2010-2021, 9 cases (27%) were
experienced by the Navy, 12 cases (35%) by the Air Force, and 13 cases
(38%) by the Army. Aircraft dominated the accidents with 22 cases or
62,8% of the total accidents, followed by ships with 9 cases or 28%.
Cannon and armored vehicles each have one case. This data shows
that aircraft, both fixed and rotary wings, are the most susceptible
technology to experience disaster whereas land systems and ammunitions
are the least risky.

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Figure 4. Total Number of Accidents, 2010-2021

Our dataset shows that the medium factor exists more often than
others in military-related accidents (Figure 5). It is followed by machine
and human factors at the second and the third positions, respectively.
Finally, management and mission are the least factors of the accidents.
All factors appear either as a single or conjoint cause.
Figure 5. Profile of Accident related to Weapon Systems

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 15

 Figure 6. The Pattern in Mixed-causal Factors of Technology Disaster

The general assumption held is that a major share of accidents is related

to ageing weapons. We found this hard to verify when information from
the authority is lacking. First, it is not easy to determine the age of weapons
involved in accidents due to repeated procurements, meaning the same
type of weapons can be procured through different contracts occurring in
different years. For example, there are accidents involving KT-1 Wong Bee
trainer aircraft in 2010, 2015, and 2020, of which age of weapon involved
are hard to determine as their procurement had been conducted in three
different batches across 2001-2018.46 Second, a few accidents occurred
to relatively new weapons, for example, the KT-1 Wong Bee trainer that
crashed in 2010 was less than 10 years old47 and the Mi-7 helicopter that
crashed in 2013 was only three years old.48 Fast Motor Boat AD-16-05 was
operated by the Army sink in 2018 when it was only four years old.49
Our data shows while the old age of weapons is quite prominent
in characterizing military-related accidents in the Navy and the
Air Force, it is not so much in the Army. In fact, the causal factors
related to the condition of the weapon system (machines) are different
in each service. In the Army, mixed factor dominates with seven events.
The most prevalent with four cases are caused by the combination of
man and medium, followed by machine and management with two cases.
The combination of machine and medium, machine and management,
as well as man-medium-machine-management each occurred once,
respectively (see Figure 6). Seven of the 10 helicopters (63%) that crashed
were Bell-412 and Mi-17, which are specifically assigned for logistics,

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ranging from three to 18 years old. Our source pointed out that age is not
the decisive factor behind the accident, but rather the number of sorties.
He was concerned that “machine fatigue” might have befallen specific
types of aircraft, due to being overworked.50 The two helicopter types
are known to be the backbone of army operations, thus enduring the
most flying hours and challenging missions such as on mountainous and
border areas. Medium factor combined with management error—such as
assigning inexperienced pilots to missions in areas with extreme geography
and weather as in the case of the Bell-412EP crash in Malinau51 and Mi-17
in the Bintang Mountains,52 and pilot fatigue, as in the Bell-412EP crash
in Poso53—had resulted in deadly accidents.
As shown in Appendix 2, in the navy, the most frequent causal factor
of accidents is the medium, such as crashing into shipwreck as in the
case of KRI Pati Unus in 201454 and patrol boat KRI Matacora 2016,55
and extreme weather which usually affect smaller boats as in the case
of Sea Rider that sunk near Rote.56 Our source highlighted the issue of
force majeure57 about the condition of Indonesian waters as a special
risk. Indonesian waters are home to numerous hazards to the safety of
navigation, from war leftover mines to shipwrecks. The latest example
is a sea mine from World War II that was found in Makassar waters in
March 2021 and had to be neutralized by the navy.58 Parts of Indonesian
waters became the location of naval battles in which mines were laid in
strategic places.59 Despite efforts to clear mines, some may have been
washed away from their initial location undetected. Another hazard at sea
is a shipwreck. Indonesian waters serve as busy international passages,
thus vulnerable to ship accidents. Law Number 17 of 2008 concerning
Shipping has mandated ship owners to get rid of the ship’s hull and/or
cargo a maximum of 180 days after the ship sank.60 In reality, there are still
many shipwrecks left unreported to regulators. Their presence, unmarked
and hardly seen at night, poses a high risk to the safety and security of not
just commercial shipping but also to military ships.
Machines are the second largest cause of accidents after medium,
but the root causes also vary. Four ships involved in accidents are
more than 40 years old and another two are older than 30 years old.
Ageing weapon systems remain risky despite maintenance because they
are more susceptible to extreme weather and fire.61 Particular materials
also increased risk for an accident, for example in the case of KRI
Rencong 622 that was burned and abandoned in Sorong waters Papua62
and newly minted Catamaran in Banyuwangi dockyard.63 The use of

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 17

 aluminium as ship hull materials in KRI Rencong came with both benefits
and disadvantages. While the benefit is the lightness of the material
enhances the ship’s speed and manoeuvrability, it also renders the ship
more prone to fire. Similar risk also increases when the ship is made with
carbon materials, as in the case of the Catamaran that was burned while
still in the shipbuilding dock before the navy took the delivery.
In the Air Force, seven of the 12 planes that crashed were trainers with
an age range of 10-30 years, followed by transport and combat aircraft
in three and two cases respectively. In terms of age, only four of the
12 planes or 33% that crashed were over the age of 30 namely Hawk
Mk-209, F-16, and Fokker F-27. The Air Force employed four variants
of trainers for fighter pilots: British Hawk Mk-209, South Korean KT-1B
Wong Bee and T-50 Golden Eagle, and Brazilian EMB-314 Super Tucano.
Among all jet trainers, the Hawk squadron is the oldest, having been in
service a decade earlier than the others. However, Hawk’s rate of accident
is similar to T-50 with two cases, which is lower than KT-1B crashed three
times. EMB-314 Super Tucano holds the lowest rate of accidents with
one crash. The South Korean and Brazilian trainers entered service in
the 2000s, hence can be considered equal in age. This shows that age may
not be the only risk, but also the type of operation performed in which
training seems to entail a higher risk than other types of operation.
Our database shows that training with a certain type of new aircraft
is more susceptible to accidents. While further research is necessary
to figure out exactly why the Korean trainers crashed more than other
types of trainers of equal age, our source pointed out that the higher
accident rate might be due to the undertraining of pilots. The Air Force
does not own a training simulator for KT-1B; hence they must send their
pilots to South Korea once a year to be trained for emergency scenarios.64
While trainee pilots are mandated to bag in 140-150 flying hours before
flying real fighters,65 there is a possibility that the flying hour’s threshold is
not met on schedule for some pilot trainees.66

Is Budgeting the Real Issue?

Defense planning and budgeting amid rising weapons costs is practically
a challenge for every country, regardless of the size of the defense
economy, but this trend hurts especially small countries. While Indonesia
as a member of the G20 is hardly a small economy and its MILEX might

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be one of the biggest in ASEAN, but it has one of the lowest MILEX
ratios to GDP. When the Yudhoyono administration kick-started MEF,
they also pledged to raise MILEX to 1.5% GDP, but this comes with
a precondition of economic growth at 7%. Widodo administration
continued the modernization, yet the promise made by the previous
administration could hardly materialize due to a stagnant if not declining
economy especially after the pandemic. Because underbudgeting has
become a persistent feature that defines Indonesia’s defense sector, there
is an urgency to implement LCC in defense planning. President Widodo
has spoken about the need to adopt LCC and our source confirmed that
the navy has utilized the approach since 2017,67 but no further information
on its implementation.
To make matters more difficult, there is hardly any flexibility in the
MILEX due to the domination of personnel spending as shown in Figure 7.
This also means the Army, with the largest number of personnel,
has been getting the bulk of the MILEX. Operational and maintenance
(O&M) budget comes far second, counting as almost half of the
personnel spending, followed by procurement budget. The O&M and
procurement budgets show a trend of widening divergence in 2016,
indicating prioritization of O&M over procurement, then it got stagnant
until 2020. When the pandemic hit, refocusing on budget forced reschedule
of procurement might have affected O&M as well.68
Figure 7. Distribution of Defense Budget, 2015-2020

Source: Jane’s Defense Budget, IHS Global Ltd, Surrey, 2020.

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 19

 As the second-largest expenditure, O&M tends to increase but not
significantly from 24% (2015) to 26% MILEX (2020). When broken
down to each service, the Army’s domination prevails still. It is the navy
that received the least O&M budget throughout 2015-2020, with the
only exception in 2016 (see Figure 8). This is surprising considering that,
unlike the Army, the navy is laden with technology that necessitates
round-the-clock support and scheduled maintenance. When considering
the navy’s ageing inventory, one can deduce that the amount of its
maintenance budget must be significant.
Figure 8. Distribution of Operational and Maintenance Budget, 2015-2020

Source: Jane’s Defense Budget, IHS Global Ltd, Surrey, 2020.

How Does Indonesia Fare against Other Asian Countries?

Jane’s data show that compared to five other countries in the

Asia Pacific, the Indonesian navy ranked third in the number of inventories
that consist of submarines, destroyers, frigates, corvette, attack patrol
craft, and amphibious ships. Indonesian navy also ranked third in terms
of O&M budget (Figure 9). When compared to China and Taiwan,
whose naval inventories are almost six times and twice bigger, Indonesian
O&M looks underfunded. However, the Indonesian navy’s O&M seems
normal when compared to that of smaller navies like Malaysia, Vietnam,

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and the Philippines.69 It must be noted that if the size of the operation
area were thrown into the equation, the benchmark could change.
But we cannot access data on the operation area of each of the navy.
Furthermore, such benchmarking might not work since the navy is not
the only actor to safeguard a country’s territorial waters and Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). As an example, Indonesia has a total of seven
institutions that are mandated and equipped with fleets to conduct
maritime security operations.70
Figure 9. Comparison of Naval Inventories and O&M Budget
of Selected Asian Countries

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ship and Jane’s Defense Budget, IHS Global Ltd, Surrey, 2020.

It is worth noting that budget is not the only structural issue that
hampers arms maintenance. In 2021, MoD listed at least ten more issues
encompassing personnel, knowledge, hardware, lack of standardization,
and institutional arrangements.71 In terms of personnel, the problems
lie in the lack of the number of safety inspectors and knowledge gap.
Another issue is hardware and testing tools that are not fully provided by
the state. For example, the navy and Army have not possessed precision
measuring instrument calibration for the maintenance unit. If remains
unaddressed, these structural issues would raise doubt on the true capacity

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 21

 of maintenance planning and execution in both MoD and TNI and
harm the institution’s reputation in issuing certificate of worthiness as
precondition to operate weapon systems.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This research confirmed that age is not necessarily the dominant

factor that led to weapon systems-related accidents in the TNI. In fact,
each service experiences a different pattern of accidents. The old age of
weapons is more dominant as the causal factor of accidents in the Navy
and Air Force. Also, we cannot simply put the blame on the budgetary
issue considering that the O&M budget of the Indonesian military is still
comparable with that of Southeast Asian neighbors, although it is dwarfed
by East Asian countries. Therefore, further research needs to take into
consideration other factors related to the maintenance and operation
within TNI.
We noted that several actions have been taken to ensure the achievement
of zero accidents within TNI and Minister of Defense (MoD).
First, the provision of maintenance funding is no longer borne only
by services that own the weapon systems but can also be supported by
the MoD. In 2021, for the first time, the MoD provides a maintenance
budget for the Army to “expedite the operational readiness and achieve
zero accident”, through maintenance of Bell 412 helicopter operated by
the Army’s Aviation (Penerbad).72 While such action is commendable,
one must not forget that it requires a more structural approach to ensure
that all TNI’s weapons systems are well-maintained.
Second, each service has issued a zero-accident target and taken steps
to reduce the risk that befalls certain types of weapons systems. But this
is still too little, and sometimes also too slow. For example, the Air Force
has incorporated a trainer simulator for KT-1B Wong Bee made by a
local company. As mentioned before, a trainer simulator is vital to
increase the chance of trainee pilots to accumulate enough experience
before flying the real trainer jet, hence reducing the chance of an accident.
Unfortunately, the simulator for Air Force is not yet a full flight simulator
therefore has limited use for pilots - only to familiarize the instrument
in the cockpit. Another notable example is the submarine rescue vessel.
Its procurement plan finally appeared in Bappenas’s mid-term development
plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/RPJMN) 2019,

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 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

but until 2021 is yet to be executed until the Nanggala tragedy attested the
limitation of depending on other countries for submarine rescue.73
There is another lesson learned here: the risk of technological disaster
can be traced back to the procurement plan and execution. Some types of
weapons technology, such as submarines and aircraft, are inherently more
prone to disaster. Hence, their procurement should have encompassed
not only the technology, but the supporting systems to ensure they enter
service in top safety conditions. The procurement of simulators should
have been done much earlier, even planned before the Air Force procured
the trainer jet. The same logic also applies to submarine rescue vessels.
Irrespective of the research findings that weapon’s old age is not always
the causal factor of a military accident, the ageing weapons in MoD and
TNI’s inventory carry a growing budgetary burden as well as the risk
of disaster and thus call for better management of their life-through
readiness. This research recommends that, first, MoD and TNI incorporate
LCC in defense planning and budgeting, both at the service level and
integrated level, and use LCC as important consideration upon
procurement of new weapons. While LCC in defense planning helps
in achieving more balanced budgeting, its application in procurement
will also help the decision-makers, not to be deceived by procurement
price only but to grasp the true lifetime cost. This should spare TNI
the repercussion of adopting a “white elephant”. Second, based on the
data from LCC, MoD and TNI should be able to draw the maximum
age of weapons systems and activate their disposal. Third, MoD and
TNI should prioritize maintenance and replacement of ‘workhorse’
weapon systems, for example aircrafts with high number of flying hours,
and those inherently carry high risk of disaster, such as submarine.

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 23

 Appendices

Appendix 1. List of TNI Related Accidents, 2010-2021

24 Indonesian Quarterly
 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

Appendix 2. List of TNI Related Accidents and Respective Causal Factors,

2010-2021

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 25

 Endnotes
1. Those who lent help in SAR were Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia, whereas China helped in salvaging
efforts afterwards. India initially planned to send DSRV via C-17 but cancelled it following news that
the submarine wreckage had been found thus leaving no possibility of survival. See “India recalls
second rescue vessel as Indonesia says missing submarine sank,” The Hindu, last modified April 24, 2021,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/missing-indonesian-submarine-iaf-despatches-second-
naval-dsrv/article34399626.ece. Indonesian military requested help through activating 2012 agreement
with Singapore and international submarine escape and rescue liaison office (ISMERLO), which was
responded by Australia, India, Malaysia, US, Germany, France, Russia, and Turkey. See “Commentary:
Indonesia submarine tragedy exposes painful realities of international rescue operations,” CNA, last
modified April 27, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-submarine-
tragedy-missing-kri-nanggala-14697638.
2. ”KRI Nanggala-402 Berusia 42 Tahun, Pengamat: Normalnya Digunakan 30 Tahun,” VOI, April 25,
2021, https://voi.id/berita/46815/kri-nanggala-402-berusia-42-tahun-pengamat-normalnya-digunakan-
30-tahun.
3. Edna C. Pattisina, “Pesan dari Komandan KRI Nanggala-402,” Kompas, last modified April 25, 2021,
https://www.kompas.id/baca/di-balik-berita/2021/04/25/pesan-dari-komandan-kri-nanggala-402.
4. “What Is An ‘Internal Wave’? It Might Explain The Loss of An Indonesian Submarine,” NPR, last
modified April 30, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/04/30/992496772/what-is-an-internal-wave-it-
might-explain-the-loss-of-an-indonesian-submarine.
5. “Pengamat soal Bakal PR Andika: Alutsista, China, dan Tumpukan Perwira,” CNN Indonesia, last
modified November 03, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20211103135250-12-716064/
pengamat-soal-bakal-pr-andika-alutsista-china-dan-tumpukan-perwira; “Jadi calon Panglima TNI, ini PR
yang menanti Andika Perkasa,” Kontan, last modified November 07, 2021, https://nasional.kontan.co.id/
news/jadi-calon-panglima-tni-ini-pr-yang-menanti-andika-perkasa.
6. See Iis Gindarsah, et.al., “Dinamika Persenjataan Global dan Pembangunan Kekuatan Pertahanan
Indonesia 2045,” LAB 45 Research Report, (Jakarta: Laboratorium Indonesia 2045, 2021).
7. See Gindarsah, et. al. (2021).
8. “TB Hasanuddin: 70 Persen Alutsista TNI Sudah Tua, Perlu Modernisasi,” Merdeka, last modified
May 29, 2021, https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/tb-hasanuddin-70-persen-alutsista-tni-sudah-tua-
perlu-modernisasi.html.
9. “Special Content: Masalah Alutsista Bertumpuk, Sudah Cukup Prajurit Jadi Korban,” Liputan6, last
modified April 30, 2021, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4545959/special-content-masalah-
alutsista-bertumpuk-sudah-cukup-prajurit-jadi-korban.
10. “LSM: Indonesia Alami 18 Kecelakaan Alutsista Sejak 2015,” Anadolu Agency, last modified October 5, 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/id/nasional/lsm-indonesia-alami-18-kecelakaan-alutsista-sejak-2015/2229164.
A different calculation is offered by the following source: “16 Kecelakaan Alutsista Terjadi di Era Jokowi,
Ini Daftarnya,” April 26, 2021, https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20210426/15/1386455/16-kecelakaan-
alutsista-terjadi-di-era-jokowi-ini-daftarnya.
11. See “Menhan: Investigasi Pesawat Celaka TNI Rahasia Negara,” last modified February 12, 2016, https://
www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160212132453-20-110557/menhan-investigasi-pesawat-celaka-tni-
rahasia-negara
12. See George D. Haddow, et.al, Introduction to Emergency Management, 7th ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2021);
Z. Kundzewicz, “Hazards, Technological”. In Kirch W. (eds) Encyclopedia of Public Health. (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5614-7_1348.
13. Ibrahim M. Shaluf and Aini Mat Said, “A review of disaster and crisis,” Disaster Prevention and Management,
Vol. 12 No. 1 (2003), pp. 24-32, https://doi.org/10.1108/.
14. Alexander T. Wells, Commercial Aviation Safety, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001); Stephen K.
Cusick, et,al, Commercial Aviation Safety, 6th ed, (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2017) https://www.
accessengineeringlibrary.com/content/book/9781259641824 . Cusick, Stephen K., Antonio I. Cortés,
and Clarence C. Rodrigues, Commercial Aviation Safety, 6th ed, (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2017)
https://www.accessengineeringlibrary.com/content/book/9781259641824
15. Ibid.

26 Indonesian Quarterly
 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

16. Wells, 2001

17. Wells, 2001
18. Cusick, et.al, 2017
19. Eurofighter Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter are two examples of joint development of leading-edge
technologies that involve the participation of unequal partners.
20. This figure was later revised to 11.5% per annum. See Davies, Neil, A. Eager, M. Maier, and L. Penfold,
“Intergenerational Equipment Cost Escalation,” In DASA-DESA, Economic Working Paper Series,
(London: Ministry of Defense, 2011).
21. Jean Rene Gebman, Challenges and Issues with the Further Aging of US Air Force Aircraft: Policy Options for
Effective Life-Cycle Management of Resources, Vol. 560, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009), https://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR560.pdf
22. Ibid.
23. India’s MiG-21 accident record is 482 instances which lead to the death of 171 pilots, 39 civilians, and eight
personnel from other services. The fighter jet entered service as early as 1963. In 2021 alone, there have
been three incidents involving the fighters. See “11 down in 5 yrs, 3 in 2021, but many in IAF still swear by
MiG-21s despite its ‘safety record’,” last modified May 24, 2021, https://theprint.in/defense/11-down-
in-5-yrs-3-in-2021-but-many-in-iaf-still-swear-by-mig-21s-despite-its-safety-record/663813/
24. “The Beast: On Board IDF’s Most Advanced and Expensive War Machine”, Haaretz, last modified
April 10 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/MAGAZINE-the-beast-on-board-idf-s-most-
advanced-and-expensive-war-machine-1.5439440
25. The approach is also adopted by western European countries such as the UK in the 1990s and the
Netherlands in the 2010s.
26. Ryan, E., Jacques, D., Colombi, J. and Schubert, C., “A proposed methodology to characterize the
accuracy of life cycle cost estimates for DOD Programs,” Procedia Computer Science 8, 361-369 (2012)
27. See Robert Beeres, et.al, “The Strategic Value of Life Cycle Costing,” In Optimal deployment of military
systems: technologies for military missions in the next decade, (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2014), https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/344236490_The_strategic_value_of_life_cycle_costing/figures?lo=1.
28. Ibid.
29. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) categorizes conventional large arms
into seven categories: battle tanks, combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft and
unmanned combat vehicles, assault helicopters, warships, missiles, and launch systems. See “Categories,”
UNROCA, https://www.unroca.org/categories. Furthermore, we separated unmanned combat vehicles
and submarines from the previous categories to get a total of nine categories.
30. All interviewees are members of military institutions whose job authorizes them to access adequate
information on accidents. We managed to get interviewees that represent all services, namely Air Force,
Navy, and Army.
31. Ministry of National Development Planning Republic of Indonesia (Kementerian PPN/Bappenas),
The Medium-Term National Development Plan (RPJMN) 2020-2024, (Jakarta: Kementerian PPN/Bappenas,
2021), https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/rpjmn/Narasi%20RPJMN%20IV%202020-2024_Revisi%20
14%20Agustus%202019.pdf.
32. “LSM: Indonesia Alami 18 Kecelakaan Alutsista Sejak 2015,” Anadolu Agency, last modified
October 5, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/id/nasional/lsm-indonesia-alami-18-kecelakaan-alutsista-
sejak-2015/2229164.
33. Edna Patissina, journalist, interview by phone, Jakarta, October 7, 2021.
34. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia (Kementerian Pertahanan), Regulation of the Minister of Defense
of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19 of 2012 concerning the Minimum Essential Force Alignment Policy for
the Main Components, (Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan, 2012), https://www.kemhan.go.id/ppid/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/Permenhan-Nomor-19-Tahun-2012-Lampiran-1.pdf.
35. Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia (Kementerian Pertahanan), Indonesia Defense White Paper,
(Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015), https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENSE-WHITE-PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf.
36. Tri Suryono, Optimalisasi Pemberdayaan Industri Strategis Nasional Guna Mendukung Kesiapan Alutsista TNI
Dalam Rangka Menjaga Keutuhan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta: Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional
RI, 2014)

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 27

 37. Defense Minister plan to propose a new model had been shot down prematurely in 2021, despite a
promise of new approach to expedite MEF fulfillment. See “Rencana Menteri Pertahanan Adalah
Terobosan Penting Untuk Memodernisasi Alpalhankam,” Indonesia Defense, last modified June 7,
2021, https://indonesiadefense.com/rencana-menteri-pertahanan-adalah-terobosan-penting-untuk-
memodernisasi-alpalhankam/.
38. Indonesia “modernize” the Army with second hand main battle tank from Rheinmetall in 2007. As for
modernization of missile & launcher, in 2017 Indonesia signed contract to procure Norwegian Advance
Surface-to-air Missile System (NASAMS) from Norway and the US with expected delivery before 2020.
However, the system is yet to be recorded in IISS Military Balance 2020.
39. Evan A. Laksmana, Iis Gindarsah and Curie Maharani, 75 Tahun TNI: Evolusi Ekonomi Pertahanan, Operasi,
dan Organisasi Militer Indonesia, 1945-2020 (Jakarta: CSIS Indonesia, 2020), 144.
40. Ibid.
41. Both military and MoD are aware with the condition following procurement of second-hand and aid.
While the procurement cost is less or even free in the case of grants, there are significant cost to be
borne for modernization. Also, modernization of grant weapons can be a window of opportunity for
brokerage and corruption as in the case of F-16 grant from the US in 2011. See Xiaodon Liang and sam
Perlo-Freeman, “Corruption in the Indonesian arms business: tentative steps towards an end to impunity”,
World Peace Foundation, December 2017 https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/12/Corruption-in-
the-Indonesian-arms-business-20171211-2.pdf.
42. “Diam-Diam RI Dikabarkan Mau Borong Kapal Selam Bekas, Serius?” CNBC Indonesia, last modified
July 28, 2021, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20210728180501-4-264388/diam-diam-ri-
dikabarkan-mau-borong-kapal-selam-bekas-serius.
43. Ibid.
44. Interview with a military officer from the Indonesian Army, Jakarta, September 24, 2021.
45. Interview with a military officer from the Indonesian Army, Jakarta, September 24, 2021.
46. Procurement data is taken from SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1950-2020. Although each aircraft has a
registration number, the information is not always disclosed.
47. “Bangkai Pesawat KT-1 Wong Bee Dievakuasi Tim Investigasi,” Tempo, last modified June 25, 2010,
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/258452/bangkai-pesawat-kt-1-wong-bee-dievakuasi-tim-investigasi.
48. “Ini Kronologi Jatuhnya Helikopter MI-17 di Malinau,” Kompas, last modified November 09, 2013,
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/11/09/2335461/Ini.Kronologi.Jatuhnya.Helikopter.MI-17.
di.Malinau?page=all.
49. The fast motor boat entered service in 2014. See “Kapal TNI yang Tenggelam di Pulau Seribu Seharga
Rp 12 Miliar”, Detiknews, last modified March 12, 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3912303/
kapal-tni-yang-tenggelam-di-pulau-seribu-seharga-rp-12-miliar
50. Interview with a military officer from the Indonesian Army, Jakarta, September 24, 2021. This statement
is ought to be crosschecked with number of flying hours that these aircrafts have endured annually vis-à-
vis other type of transport aircraft in army’s inventory.
51. “Rententan Insiden Kecelakaan Helikopter TNI,” CNN Indonesia, last modified October 5, 2021, https://
www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200607135219-20-510711/rentetan-insiden-kecelakaan-helikopter-
tni.
52. “6 Fakta Helikopter MI-17 yang Baru Ditemukan Sejak Hilang Kontak Juni 2019,” Liputan6, last modified
October 5, 2021, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4181005/6-fakta-helikopter-mi-17-yang-baru-
ditemukan-sejak-hilang-kontak-juni-2019.
53. “Rententan Insiden Kecelakaan Helikopter TNI,” CNN Indonesia, last modified October 5, 2021, https://
www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200607135219-20-510711/rentetan-insiden-kecelakaan-helikopter-
tni.
54. “Kronologi Kecelakaan KRI Pati Unus,” Jakarta Greater, October 5, 2021, https://jakartagreater.com/
kronologi-kecelakaan-kri-pati-unus/.
55. “KRI Matacora (823),” Wikipedia, last modified October 5, 2021, https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/KRI_
Matacora_(823).
56. “Kecelakaan Kapal TNI AL: Lima Meninggal, Enam Selamat, Satu Hilang,” Flatsome, last modified
October 13, 2021, http://v2.rotendaokab.go.id/kecelakaan-kapal-tni-al-lima-meninggal-enam-selamat-
satu-hilang/

28 Indonesian Quarterly
 Assessing the Risk of Technological Disaster in Indonesian Armed Forces

57. Interview with a retired admiral from Indonesian Navy via zoom, November 13, 2021.
58. “Ledakan Besar di Laut Kota Makassar, Ternyata Ranjau Temuan Kapal TNI,“ last modified March 29,
2021, https://www.viva.co.id/militer/militer-indonesia/1360032-ledakan-besar-di-laut-kota-makassar-
ternyata-ranjau-temuan-kapal-tni.
59. “Diduga Ada Ranjau Laut di Tuban, Budi Karya: Serahkan ke TNI,“ Tempo, last modified December 1,
2019, https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1278587/diduga-ada-ranjau-laut-di-tuban-budi-karya-serahkan-ke-
tni. Previously in 1997, The Indonesian navy has retrieved 40 sea mines placed in waters off the main
island of Java in World War II. See Associated Press Newswire, “Indonesian navy clears waters of World
War II sea mines”, October 1997.
60. “Kemenhub Wajibkan Pemilik Angkat Kerangka Kapal yang Tenggelam,” Kementerian Perhubungan
RI, last modified August 18, 2020, http://dephub.go.id/post/read/kemenhub-wajibkan-pemilik-angkat-
kerangka-kapal-yang-tenggelam?language=id.
61. Interview with a retired military officer from Indonesian Navy via zoom, November 13, 2021.
62. “KRI Rencong-622 Terbakar dan Tenggelam, Semua Awak Selamat,” Kompas, last modified September
11, 2018, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/09/11/22364991/kri-rencong-622-terbakar-dan-
tenggelam-semua-awak-selamat.
63. Interview with a retired military officer from Indonesian Navy via zoom, November 13, 2021.
64. “Instruktur Penerbang Tingkatkan Kemahiran di Sacheon Korea,” TNI Angkatan Udara, last modified
December 15, 2016, https://tni-au.mil.id/instruktur-penerbang-tingkatkan-kemahiran-di-sacheon-
korea/.
65. Interview with a military officer from Indonesian Air Force via zoom, May 4, 2021.
66. For more elaboration on the condition and effectiveness of Indonesian air force training for pilot, see
Sovian Aritonang, Hendro Yulieanto, and Deni Dadang Ahmad Rajab, “Spatial Disorientation Training
To Support Flying Safety In Indonesian Air Force,” Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 6 No. 2 (2020), pp.269-277,
http://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/DefenseJournal/article/view/794/sovianpdf
67. Interview with a retired military officer from Indonesian Navy via zoom, November 13, 2021. In 2020
the general planning staff of TNI (Srenum TNI) held FGD of research and development entitled
“Sinchronisation of Life Cycle Cost Planning in TNI with the force development and management
program to support TNI’s main duties”. This implies that LCC planning might have been done in service
but not yet integrated on TNI headquarter level. See “FGD Sinkronisasi Perencanaan Life Cycle Cost
Alutsista TNI” last modified December 14, 2020, https://jakartagreater.com/288411/fgd-sinkronisasi-
perencanaan-life-cycle-cost-alutsista-tni/ .
68. There have been statements on how pandemic affect military budget. For example, Member of Parliament
from first commission who is in charge with defense issues, Muhammad Farhan, said that pandemic has
dampened the budgeting plan for minimum essential forces 2020-2024. See “Panja Alutsista Dalami
Kebutuhan Alutsista TNI”, last modified March 26, 2021, https://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/
id/32281/t/Panja+Alutsista+Dalami+Kebutuhan+Alutsista+TNI.
69. By operation area, we believe it should not be limited to the size of territorial waters and EEZ, but also
include operation abroad such as in UN mission and combined task force.
70. Interview with Sayed Fauzan S.Sos, IMAS, faculty member at the Department of International Relations,
Raja Ali Haji Maritime University via zoom, December 14, 2021.
71. “Pemeliharaan Alutsista TNI yang Optimal dalam rangka Meningkatkan Kesiapan Operasional TNI
dan Mewujudkan Zero Accident,” (paper presented at Pemeliharaan Alutsista TNI Tahun Anggaran
2020 Seminar, Jakarta, August 12, 2020), https://www.kemhan.go.id/kuathan/2020/08/12/eminar-
pemeliharaan-alutsista.html.
72. See “Danpuspenerbad puji Kemhan yang Dukung Anggaran Pemeliharaan Alutsista” last modified
October 28, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5786784/danpuspenerbad-puji-kemhan-yang-
dukung-anggaran-pemeliharaan-alutsista
73. Collin Koh, “Indonesia submarine tragedy exposes painful realities of international rescue operations”,
last modified April 27, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-submarine-
tragedy-missing-kri-nanggala-245621

First Quarter 2022 Vol. 50 No. 1 29