Identities and Inequalities Exploring the

Intersections of Race Class Gender and

Sexuality 3rd Edition Newman
Solutions Manual
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Identities and Inequalities Exploring the Intersections of Race Class Gender and Sexuality 3

Chapter 2: Manufacturing Identities: The Social Construction of Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality

Chapter 2
Manufacturing Identities: The Social
Construction of Race, Class, Gender, and
Sexuality

Brief Chapter Overview

 Perspectives On Identity
o Essentialism
o Constructionism
 Definitions of Differences and Identities
o Racial/Ethnic Identities
 The Social Construction of Race and Ethnicity
 Multiracial Identities
o Class Identities
 How do Americans Determine Class Standing?
 Who is Poor?
o Gender Identities
 Doing Gender
 The Sexual Dichotomy
 Intersexuality and Anatomical Ambiguity
o Sexual Orientations
 The Complexities of Sexual Identity
 Heteronormativity
 “The Closet”
o Identities on the Borderlands
 Conclusion
Investigating Identities and Inequalities—A sociological treasure hunt: The artifacts of
identity

Chapter Summary

Chapter 2 begins with a discussion on the active processes of making identities through
two narratives. The first example is about the transgendering process from man to woman

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 Chapter 2: Manufacturing Identities: The Social Construction of Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality

(so far as that was possible through internal and external medical treatments). The second
example is about the process of going from black to white to black again. The chapter
addresses the shifting boundaries between identity categories as well as their
intersections. The chapter defines identity and discusses where or in what criteria is
identity located. The chapter defines essentialism and constructionism, and raises the
question of which, if any, social identifiers exist as natural objective entities, and which
emerge from particular cultural and historical contexts and active human processes. Race,
ethnicity, class, sex, gender, and sexuality are all defined and reflected upon regarding
the poles of essentialism versus constructionism. The chapter concludes with an
examination of gay black men on the down low and the consequences they face.

Key Terms

Note: consists of both terms highlighted/defined by the author, and terms suggested for
instructor emphasis.

Identities: These are definitional categories used to specify to oneself and to others who
one is; social locations that determine one’s position in the world relative to other people.

Multiple identities: We all possess many identities be they based on race, ethnicity,
religion, gender, class, sexuality, oc-cupation, education, family, age, geography, or some
other aspect of our background. At any given moment, some of these identities can
overshadow the others.

Essentialism: This focuses on what are believed to be universal, inherent, and

unambiguous “essences” that clearly distinguish one group from another.

Constructionism: An alternative to essentialism is constructionism (also known as the

social construction of reality perspective), which argues that what we know to be real and
essential is always a product of the culture and historical period in which we live.

Race: To most people, race is a category of individuals who share common inborn
biological traits, such as skin color; color and texture of hair; and shape of eyes, nose, or
head. It is widely assumed that people who are placed in the same racial category share
behavioral, psychological, and personality traits that are linked to their physical
similarities.

Ethnicity: Sociologists typically use the term ethnicity to refers to the nonbiological
traits—such as shared ancestry, culture, history, language, patterns of behavior, and

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 Chapter 2: Manufacturing Identities: The Social Construction of Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality

beliefs—that provide members of a group with a sense of common identity.

Honorary white: The government created a category of “honorary white” for rich,
powerful Asians (Hu-DeHart, 1996). Less affluent Asians—such as immigrant laborers
from China—weren’t afforded this privilege and remained “colored.”.

Social class: It is a group of people who share a similar economic position in society
based on their wealth and income.

Caste system: It is a stratification system in which one’s socioeconomic status is

determined at birth and considered unchangeable. Ancient Hindu scriptures identified a
strict hierarchy consisting of elite priests, warriors, merchants, artisans, and untouchables
who were so lowly they were actually considered to be outside the caste system.

Social mobility: It is the movement of people or groups from one class level or another.

Upper class: This group is the highest-earning 5% of the U.S. population. It is usually
thought to include owners of vast amounts of property and other forms of wealth, major
shareholders and owners of large corporations, top financiers, rich celebrities and
politicians, and members of prestigious families.

Middle class: This group roughly comprises of 45% of the population. This group is
likely to include college-educated managers, supervisors, executives, small-business
owners, and professionals (for example, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and engineers).

Working class: This group comprises of about 35% of the population. They typically
includes industrial and factory workers, office workers, clerks, and farm and manual
laborers. Most working-class people don’t own their own homes and don’t attend college.

Lower class or underclass: This group is also referred to as the “poor,” (about 15% of
the population) and consist of people who work for minimum wages or are chronically
unemployed. These are the people who do society’s dirty work, often for very low wages.

Moral boundaries: In terms of social class, this consist of assessments of such qualities
as honesty, integrity, work ethic, and consideration for others.

Cultural boundaries: These are identified on the basis of education, taste, and manners.
Class distinctions often go beyond upper-class snobbery and distaste for the lifestyles of
“lower” classes.

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peasantry were all dependent on them, and were always ready to make
war for their liege lords. Four families were pre-eminent for their power
and wealth—the Doria and the Spinola, Ghibellines; the Grimaldi and
the Fieschi, Guelfs. These nobles, incensed against each other by
hereditary enmity, had disturbed the state by so many outrages that the
people adopted, with respect to them, the same policy as that of the
Tuscan republics, and had entirely excluded them from the magistracy.
On the other hand, they had rendered such eminent and frequent services
to the republic; above all, they had produced such great naval
commanders, that the people, whenever the state was in danger, had
always recourse to them for the choice of an admiral.
Seduced by the glory of these chiefs, the people often afterwards shed
their blood in their private quarrels; but often, also, wearied by the
continual disturbances which the nobles excited, they had recourse to
foreigners to subdue them to the common law. The people were in a state
of irritation against the Ligurian nobles, when Henry VII arrived at
Genoa, in 1311; and to oblige them to maintain a peace which they were
continually breaking, the Genoese conferred on that monarch absolute
authority over the republic for twenty years. But when the emperor
suppressed the podesta, and then the abbate or defender of the people,
and afterwards demanded of the city a gift of sixty thousand florins, the
Genoese perceived that they needed a government, not only to suppress
civil discord, but also to protect rights not less precious than peace; an
internal fermentation of increasing danger manifested itself; and Henry
was happy to quit Genoa in safety, on the 16th of February, 1312, on
board a Pisan fleet, which transported him with about fifteen hundred
cavalry to Tuscany.[12]
 C S .T ,G

HENRY’S CORONATION AND SUDDEN DEATH

Henry VII when he entered Italy, was impartial

[1312-1313 . .] between the Guelfs and Ghibellines. He owed his
election to the influence of the popes, and he was
accompanied by cardinal legates, who were to crown him at Rome. He
had no distrust either of Robert, then king of Naples, the son of Charles
II, or of the Guelf cities. He had no hereditary affection for the
Ghibellines, the zealous partisans of a family long extinct. He
endeavoured, accordingly, to hold the balance fairly between the two
parties, and to reconcile them wherever he was allowed; but experience
had already taught him that the very name of elected emperor had a
magic influence on the Italians, either to excite the devoted affection of
the Ghibellines, or the terror and hatred of the Guelfs. It was with the
latter that resistance to him had begun in the preceding year in
Lombardy; and that revolt had burst forth on all sides since his departure.
Robert, king of Naples, who assumed the part of champion of the Guelf
party, already testified an open distrust of him; and Florence, which by
its prudence, ability, wealth, and courage was the real director of that
party, took arms to resist him, refused audience to his ambassadors,
raised all the Guelfs of Italy against him, and finally constrained him to
place that city under the ban of the empire. The republic of Pisa, on the
other hand, whose affection for the Ghibelline party was connected with
its hopes as well as its recollections, served him with a devotion, zeal,
and prodigality which he had not met elsewhere. The Pisans had sent
him, when at Lausanne, a present of sixty thousand florins, to aid him on
his passage to Italy. They paid his debts at Genoa, and they gave him
another present when he entered their city; finally, they placed at his
disposal thirty galleys and six hundred crossbowmen, who accompanied
him to Rome, where he received the golden crown of the empire from
the hands of the pope’s legate, in the church of St. John Lateran, on the
29th of June, 1312. The Romans, who had taken arms against him, and
had received within their walls a Neapolitan garrison, kept their gates
shut during the ceremony, and would not suffer one of his soldiers to
enter the city.
The coronation of the emperor at Rome was the term of service of the
Germans; they took no interest afterwards in what was passing, or might
be done in that country. They were anxious to depart; and Henry found
himself at Tivoli, where he passed the summer, almost entirely
abandoned by his transalpine soldiers. Had the Neapolitan king Robert
been bolder, Henry would have been in great danger. In the autumn,
however, the Ghibellines and Bianchi of central Italy rallied round him,
and formed a formidable army, with which he marched to attack
Florence, on the 19th of September, 1312. The Florentines, accustomed
to leave their defence to mercenaries, whose valour was always ready for
pay, made small account of a military courage which they saw so
common among men whom they despised; but no people carried civil
courage and firmness in misfortune further. Their army was soon
infinitely superior in numbers to that of Henry; they carried on with
perfect calmness their commerce and negotiations, as if their enemies
had already departed for Germany, but they would not drive them out of
their territory by giving battle; they preferred bearing patiently their
depredations, and waiting till they had worn out their enthusiasm,
exhausted their finances, and should depart of themselves, which they
did on the 6th of January, 1313, finding they could obtain no advantage.
Henry, after giving some months of repose to his army, took the
command of the militia of Pisa, and made war at their head against
Lucca; at the same time, he solicited from his brother, the archbishop of
Trèves, a German reinforcement, which he obtained in the following
month of July. On the 5th of August, 1313, Henry VII departed from
Pisa, commanding twenty-five hundred ultramontane and fifteen hundred
Italian cavalry, with a proportionate number of infantry. He began his
march towards Rome, having been informed that Robert, called by the
Florentines to their aid, advanced with all the forces of the Guelf party to
oppose him. The declining military reputation of the Neapolitans
inspired the Germans with little fear, and Robert had but a small number
of French cavalry to give courage to his army; but the priests and monks,
animated with zeal in defence of the ancient Guelf party and the
independence of the church, seconded him with their prayers, and the
report soon spread that they had seconded him in another manner and in
their own way. The emperor took the road of San Miniato to Castel
Fiorentino, arrived at Buon Convento, twelve miles beyond Siena, and
stopped there to celebrate the festival of St. Bartholomew. On the 24th of
August, 1313, he received the communion from the hands of a
Dominican monk, and expired a few hours afterwards. It was said the
monk had mixed the juice of Napel in the consecrated cup. It was said,
also, that Henry was already attacked by a malady which he concealed.
A carbuncle had manifested itself below the knee; and a cold bath, which
he took to calm the burning irritation, perhaps occasioned his sudden and
unexpected death.

RIVAL EMPERORS; ECCLESIASTICAL DISSENSIONS

The electors of the empire were not convoked

[1313-1322 . .] at Frankfort to name a successor to Henry VII till
ten months after his death. Ten, instead of seven
princes presented themselves; two pretenders disputed the electoral
rights in each of the houses of Saxony, Bohemia, and Brandenburg. The
electors, divided into two colleges, named simultaneously, on the 19th of
October, 1314, two emperors; the one, Ludwig IV of Bavaria; the other,
Frederick III of Austria. Their rights appeared equal; their adherents in
Germany were also of nearly equal strength; the sword only could
decide; and war was accordingly declared and carried on till the 28th of
September, 1322, when Frederick was vanquished and made prisoner at
Mühldorf.
The church abstained, while the civil war lasted, from pronouncing
between the two pretenders to the empire. Clement V did not witness
their double election; he died on the 20th of April, 1314. It was
necessary, two years afterwards, to use fraud and violence, to confine the
cardinals in conclave at Lyons, for the purpose of naming his successor.
They at last elected the bishop of Avignon. He was a native of Cahors,
the devoted creature of King Robert of Naples, and took the name of
John XXII. He was the first who made Avignon, which was his episcopal
town, the residence of the Roman court, exiled from Italy. He was an
intriguer, notoriously profligate, scandalously avaricious; he fancied
himself, however, a philosopher, and took a part in the quarrel between
the realists and nominalists; he made himself violent enemies in the
schools, on the members of which he sometimes inflicted the punishment
of death. While he used such violence towards his adversaries as
heretics, he shook the credit of the court of Rome, by being himself
accused of heresy. His great object was to raise to high temporal power
the cardinal Bertrand de Poiet, whom he called his nephew, and who was
believed to be his son. For that purpose he availed himself of the war
between the two pretenders to the empire, regarded by him as a
prolongation of the interregnum, during which he asserted all the rights
of the emperors devolved on the holy see. He charged Cardinal Bertrand
to exercise those rights as legate in Lombardy, crush the Ghibellines,
support the Guelfs, but above all, subdue both to the authority of the
church and its legate.
The cardinal Bertrand de Poiet launched his excommunications and
employed the soldiers whom his father had raised for him in Provence,
particularly against Matteo Visconti, lord of Milan, one of the most able
and powerful of the Ghibelline chiefs. Visconti made himself beloved by
the Milanese, whom he had always treated with consideration. Without
being virtuous, he had preserved his reputation unstained by crime. His
mind was enlightened. To a perfect knowledge of mankind, he added
quick-sightedness, prompt decision, and a certain military glory,
heightened by that of four sons, his faithful lieutenants, who were all
distinguished among the brave. The Italians gave him the surname of
Great, at a period when, it is true, they were prodigal of that epithet.
Matteo Visconti, in his war with the Lombard Guelfs, took possession of
Pavia, Tortona, and Alessandria. He besieged, in concert with the
Genoese Ghibellines, Robert king of Naples, who had shut himself up in
Genoa, desirous of making that city the fortress of the Guelfs of
Lombardy. Visconti compelled the retreat of Philip of Valois, who,
before he was king, had entered Italy at the solicitation of the pope, in
1320.
 The following year he vanquished Raymond de Cardona, a
Catalonian, and one of the pope’s generals; he persuaded Frederick of
Austria, who had sent his brother to aid the pope, to recall his Germans,
making him sensible it could suit neither of the pretenders to the empire
to weaken the Ghibellines, who defended in Italy the interests of
whoever of the two remained conqueror. But, after having made war
against the church party twenty years, without ever suspecting that he
betrayed his faith, for he was religious without bigotry, age awakened in
him the terrors of superstition; he began to fear that the
excommunications of the legate would deprive him of salvation; he
abdicated in favour of his eldest son Galeazzo, and died a few weeks
afterwards, on the 22nd of June, 1322. The remorse and scruples of
Matteo Visconti had carried trouble and disorder into his own party, and
gave boldness to that of his adversaries. A violent fermentation at Milan
at length burst forth; Galeazzo was obliged to fly, and the republic was
proclaimed anew; but virtue and patriotism, without which it could not
subsist, were extinguished; and after a few weeks Galeazzo was recalled,
and reinvested with the lordship of Milan.
The two parties of the Guelfs and Ghibellines, since the death of
Henry VII, no longer nearly balanced each other in virtue, talents, and
patriotism. In the beginning of their struggle, there were almost as many
republics on one side as the other; and sentiments as pure and a devotion
as generous equally animated the partisans of the empire and of the
church. But, in the fourteenth century, the faction of the Ghibellines had
become that of tyranny—of the Guelfs that of liberty. The former
displayed those great military and political talents which personal
ambition usually develops. In the second were to be found, almost
exclusively, patriotism, and the heroism which sacrifices to it every
personal interest. The republic of Pisa alone, in Italy, united the love of
liberty with the sentiments of the Ghibelline party. This republic had
been thunderstruck by the death of Henry VII at a moment when a career
of glory and prosperity seemed to open on him. Pisa, exhausted by the
prodigious efforts which she had made to serve him, was true to herself,
when all the Guelfs of Tuscany rose at once, on the death of Henry, to
avenge on her the terror which that monarch had inspired. She gave the
command of her militia to Uguccione dà Faggiuola, a noble of the
mountainous part of Romagna, which, with the March, produced the best
soldiers in Italy. The Pisans, under the command of Faggiuola, obtained
two signal advantages over the Guelfs. They took Lucca, on the 14th of
June, 1314, while the Lucchese Guelfs and Ghibellines were engaged in
battle in the streets of that city; and, on the 29th of August of the same
year, they defeated, at Montecatini, the Florentines, commanded by two
princes of the house of Naples, and seconded by all the Guelfs of
Tuscany and Romagna. But the Pisans soon perceived that they were
fighting, not for themselves, but for the captain whom they had chosen.
Almost immediately after his victory, he began to exercise an
insupportable tyranny over Pisa and Lucca. Fearing much more the
citizens of these republics than the enemies of the states, he, on the
slightest suspicion, employed the utmost severity against all the most
illustrious families. At Lucca, he threw into a dungeon Castruccio
Castracani, the most distinguished of the Ghibelline nobles, who had
recently returned to that city with a brilliant reputation, acquired in the
wars of France and Lombardy. A simultaneous insurrection at Lucca and
Pisa, on the 10th of April, 1316, delivered these cities from Uguccione
dà Faggiuola and his son.d
The Pisans put Uguccione’s partisans to death, and gave the
government to Count Gaddo della Gherardesca. This news arrived at
Lucca when the Lucchese were tumultuously demanding the liberty of
Castruccio. Uguccione not daring to oppose the general wish, Castruccio
was taken from prison and presented to the public loaded with chains. At
this spectacle the people grew still more furious; Uguccione was obliged
to fly; and the chains being taken off Castruccio, the latter, by a rare
good fortune, was declared lord of Lucca on the very day which had
been destined for his death.e

CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI

Castruccio was the scion of a Ghibelline stock, and was devoted to the
Ghibelline cause; for four years successively he was freely elected to
command the Lucchese with almost sovereign power. He knew men and
how to govern them; knew what enmities to despise or punish, and what
friendships to win and retain. As a daring soldier and skilful general he
was beloved by the troops, for he was not blind to merit and knew how
to reward it, but cared little about the morality of his followers if they
only did their duty and quietly submitted to the rigid discipline that he
established and enforced. No man was more beloved by the people or
more generally popular with every class of citizen; they admired his
talents and were proud of his fame. In 1320 he felt so confident of his
position in the public mind that he ventured to expel the Avocati, who
with about 180 great Guelfic families now bid adieu to their country, and
then boldly demanded the supreme authority; out of 210 senators there
was but one voice against him, and the people unanimously confirmed
this election. He was therefore a legitimate ruler. His economical
management of the public revenue was exemplary and productive; he
had amassed great treasure, and his system of military honours and
rewards heightened and improved the warlike spirit of the people until it
had acquired a more professional character. All the neighbouring
predaceous chiefs were allured to his standard by the hope of future
conquests, and rough and unscrupulous as they were he made them all
bend to his discipline.
Thus prepared on every hand to begin that career of ambition to which
he felt himself more than equal, Matteo Visconti’s proposal was warmly
received, and Philip of Valois’ expedition with the ready assistance of the
Guelfic league were together considered an infringement of the general
peace, or at least a sufficient excuse for retaliation on the part of the
Ghibellines. Uguccione Faggiuola was dead, a circumstance that
heightened the anxiety of both Castruccio and the Florentines,
particularly the latter, whose dread of this veteran chief, blinding them as
it did to the dangerous ambition of his successor, had never ceased since
the disaster of Montecatini.
Such was the state of affairs in April, 1320,
[1320-1321 . .] when Castruccio Castracani with some Pisan
auxiliaries suddenly occupying Cappiano,
Montefalcone, and the bridges of the Gusciano, broke into the Florentine
territory carrying death and devastation as far as Cerreto Guidi, Vinci,
and Empoli; then, getting possession of Santa Maria a Monte by
treachery, returned in triumph to Lucca. Afterwards, invading Lunigiana
and Garfagnana, he dispossessed Spinetto Malespina of several places
necessary for his own military operations and then marched with all his
force to aid the siege of Genoa. This city still maintained a fierce and
bloody struggle with its own exiles and the Lombard Ghibellines; war
raged not only round the walls but throughout the whole Riviera, or coast
district; it extended to Sicily and Naples and involved even more distant
countries in its action, so that the siege of Troy itself, as Villanid asserts,
was hardly equal to it for heroic deeds, marvellous exploits, and hard-
fought battles by land and water, without any cessation either in summer
or winter.
 The Florentines determined to prevent a junction that would probably
have settled the fate of Genoa, therefore made a powerful diversion in
the Lucchese states which compelled Castruccio to return ere he had
joined the besiegers; avoiding an action they retreated to the frontier at
Fucecchio while the enemy halted in front of Cappiano, both armies
remaining nearly inactive until the advancing season drove them into
winter quarters. To make amends for this inglorious campaign, more
vigorous measures were pursued and an alliance was concluded with the
marquis Spinetto Malespina, who, although a Ghibelline, had been too
much injured by Castruccio on account of his friendship for Uguccione
not to seize the first opportunity of revenge. Florentine troops were
despatched to his aid, yet Castruccio was not apprehensive of anything in
that quarter, but prepared with the help of a powerful body of Lombard
Ghibellines for a more serious struggle on the side of Florence and soon
marched to raise the siege of Monte Vettolini at the head of sixteen
hundred men-at-arms. The Florentines, having only half that number,
immediately retired and allowed him to devastate their territory with
impunity for the last twenty days of June, after which he retired to
chastise the Malespini in Lunigiana.
Discontent ran high in Florence and the retiring seigniory were much
censured for their feeble conduct; the Agubbio faction was still powerful,
and probably the inconvenience of a fluctuating administration was
beginning to be felt, as the foreign affairs with a more complex character
embraced a wider circle; to remedy this, twelve counsellors, two for each
sesto under the denomination of “Buonuomini” were added to the new
seigniory, but to continue six months in office instead of two, and
without whose sanction nothing important could be undertaken. To check
also the increasing intimacy, and consequent favouritism between
citizens and foreign officers of state, which led to great abuse, it was
decreed that no stranger who brought a kinsman in his suite could have a
place in the commonwealth, and that until ten years from his resignation
of office he could not be re-elected. Some taxes were then reduced, the
gold and silver currency reformed, and preparations made for a fresh
campaign. Azzo of Brescia was appointed captain-general; one hundred
and sixteen knights and one hundred and sixty mounted crossbowmen
were enlisted and under the command of Jacopo da Fontana soon
checked Castruccio’s incursions so as to protect the line of the Gusciana.
But Philip of Valois’ expedition had in the meanwhile failed, and in
Lombardy the Tuscans were defeated at Bardo in the Val-di-Taro, their
captain the marquis of Cavalcabò was killed, Cremona recaptured, and
Visconti everywhere victorious.
In Florence one of the first public measures in
[1321-1323 . .] 1321 was to complete the whole circuit of public
walls and strengthen it by flanking towers fifty-
five feet high at regular intervals of more than one hundred and eighty
feet apart; a work that was doubtless accelerated by their apprehension of
Castruccio, which had now taken a more alarming character from some
recent proceedings at Pistoia.
This ever-vexed city, harassed by external war and inward troubles,
finally elected the abbate da Pacciana de’ Tedici, a tool of Castruccio, as
their ruler; he was a weak intriguing man who, catching at a popular
opinion, was suddenly floated into power by the stormy multitude
without ballast enough to steady him. Castruccio made good use of him,
and a truce was suddenly concluded with that leader against all the
influence of Florence, by which, according to Villanid (though unnoticed
by the anonymous author of the Istorie Pistolese),f an annual tribute of
three thousand florins was to be paid by Pistoia. The dread of Castruccio
was rapidly and generally spreading.

FLORENCE MENACED

He fortified Lucca, and prepared to invade Florentine territory. The

Florentines sent a strong detachment of troops into Lombardy on
condition that in the following summer the Genoese and other Guelfic
powers were to attack Lucca on every side and annihilate the rising
power of Castruccio. Scarcely had an army been assembled for this
purpose, when intelligence arrived that their principal condottiere,
Jacopo di Fontanabuona, had passed over with all his following to the
enemy; he had been commissioned to make himself master of Buggiano
and other places by treachery, but failed, and soon after joined
Castruccio with two hundred men-at-arms.
Castruccio with this reinforcement and the possession of his enemy’s
secrets crossed the Gusciano on the 13th of June, 1323, attacked
Fucecchio and other places, ravaged the surrounding country, then
passed the Arno, devastated the territory of San Miniato and
Montepopoli with all the vale of Elsa, and marched quietly back to
Lucca. On July 1st he suddenly reappeared in front of Prato, only ten
miles from the capital, with six hundred men-at-arms and four thousand
infantry; the citizens sent in terror to Florence for help, but paralysed by
Fontanabuona’s treachery she was nearly destitute of regular troops. The
citizens however had not quite forgotten the use of arms, and their spirit
was still high; the shops were immediately closed, a candle was placed at
the Prato gate, and every individual liable to serve summoned to the
ranks ere it burned out, under the penalty of losing a limb; a
proclamation being issued to announce that all exiles who instantly
joined the army would be pardoned and restored to their country. By
these prompt measures, twenty-five hundred men-at-arms and twenty
thousand infantry were in the field round Prato on the 2nd of July, only
one day after Castruccio’s appearance, four thousand of whom were
exiles!
Castruccio’s rash advance with so small a force
[1323-1324 . .] might have ended disastrously if the Florentines
had been well commanded; but he retired in the
night and made an unmolested retreat to Serravalle, the discord in the
Florentine camp, an offset from civil dissension, having saved him. Thus
ended this singular campaign in which the army scarcely saw an enemy,
but which brought back danger and revolution to the state. The
Florentines now added three subalterns (pennoniere) to each urban
company, so that the whole force became infinitely more flexible and
divisible and better adapted to real service.
He soon recommenced his successful incursions, but was generally too
weak to oppose the united strength of Florence; the moral effect of his
character was however very imposing in both states and nothing was too
daring either for his arms or conscience. His Ghibelline allies the Pisans
were deeply engaged in war with the king of Aragon for the defence of
Sardinia, which offered him a favourable occasion as he thought of
becoming their master; the conspiracy was however discovered; the
conspirator Betto or Benedetto Malepra de’ Lanfranchi with many others
lost his head; all friendship or alliance with Lucca was renounced by
Pisa, and 10,000 golden florins were offered for the head of Castruccio.
About two months afterwards he suddenly left his capital at the head of a
small detachment on the 19th of December, and by the treachery of an
inhabitant of Fucecchio was admitted at night into the town during a
deluge of rain, which at first concealed his aggression; the subsequent
struggle was fierce and bloody; a great part of the place was taken, but
alarm fires on the towers brought strong reinforcements from the
neighbouring garrisons; Castruccio held on with desperate resolution
against an overwhelming force of soldiers and citizens until, wounded,
fatigued, and hopeless of success, he sullenly retired with the loss of
banners and horses, but still unmolested; for the glory of repulsing him
was deemed sufficient, and the habitual dread of his prowess left no
appetite for a second encounter.

S M ,F

Nothing of importance occurred between Castruccio and the

Florentines in the following year, for the former was busy with his
intrigues against Pisa and Pistoia, and the latter employed reducing some
petty chieftains in the Mugello, but still more seriously on the side of
Arezzo where the bishop was rapidly gaining ground against the Guelfs.
Five hundred men-at-arms were engaged in France, and other
preparations making for the day of battle which the Florentines foresaw
must come before Castruccio could be arrested in the rapid course of his
ambition; a new confederacy was therefore formed in March between
Florence, Bologna, Siena, Perugia, Orvieto, and Agubbio; with other
communities and Guelfic lords, for the recovery of Città di Castello,
which was to be effected by a combined army of three thousand men-at-
arms levied for three years, a great part of which was maintained by the
Florentines.
Castruccio meanwhile had moved towards the
[1324-1325 . .] Pistoian Mountains, and repairing the castle of
Brandelli, whence there was a view of both
Pistoia and Florence, called it Bellosguardo and gazed with a longing eye
on either city. One was only his own in perspective, the other was almost
in his grasp; and Filippo Tedici, who had driven his uncle from the
government of Pistoia, and was in treaty with Castruccio and Florence,
pretending the greatest alarm, demanded assistance of the latter, with
whose aid he hoped to better his bargain. A body of troops was directly
sent under command of the podesta, but discovering his object, this
officer returned in disgust; upon which he made his terms with
Castruccio, and Pistoia was suffered for a while to exist as an
independent state. Florence had attempted to gain it by treachery but
failed, and Castruccio, tired of Filippo’s intrigues, offered him 10,000
florins and his daughter Dialta in marriage for immediate possession of
the city. This secured Filippo, who before daylight on the 5th of May,
1325, opened a gate to the Lucchese general; but the latter distrusting his
ally would not enter until he had actually unhinged it, and then took
possession of the place in the manner of the time by scouring the streets
at the head of his cavalry and trampling upon all that came in his way.
The fall of Pistoia was an event of great importance; equally distant
from Florence and Lucca and on the confines of both, it formed a
rallying-point for the armies of either, and its friendship or enmity had
considerable influence on every operation of the war; hence the
eagerness of Florence at all times to preserve her authority there, and
hence the general consternation when intelligence of its capture arrived
at the capital.

THE FLORENTINE ARMY UNDER RAYMOND OF

CARDONA

She might have bought it for the same price or even less than
Castruccio, because Filippo felt himself too insecure not to make both
friends and money by the sacrifice of his country; but failing, either from
want of skill or perhaps dishonesty in her agents, she repeated her
attempts to surprise the place, thus forcing him into the arms of
Castruccio, and he poisoned his own wife to complete the union.
Rumours of this event reached Florence while the magistrates were
engaged in public festivities on the occasion of two foreign officers of
state being dubbed knights by the republic, and the banquet was going on
in the church of San Piero Scheraggio when the news was confirmed. In
a moment the whole assembly fell into confusion, the tables were
overturned, and every man was immediately armed and in his saddle;
believing that a part of the town might still hold out, a rapid march was
made as far as Prato, where hearing the whole truth they returned
dejected and mortified to Florence. The following day brought some
consolation in the arrival of Raymond of Cardona, who had been sent in
the preceding November from Milan on a mission to Rome; he had
promised to return, but was absolved by the pope and sent instantly to
Florence as commander-in-chief of the republican forces. His presence
gave new spirit to the people, which was increased by the capture of
Artimino on the 22nd of May.
One of the finest armies ever assembled by the republic soon took the
field at the enormous expense of 3000 florins a day; the city bells tolled
as a declaration of war; the public standard waved over San Piero a
Monticelli; the soldati or mercenary troops first moved to Prato, and the
cavallate with all the mass of civic infantry joined them on the following
morning. One of the city bells which had been captured at Montale broke
while in the act of sounding; three weeks before there had been a violent
earthquake in Florence, and the following evening a broad stream of
fiery vapour flared over the city. All these circumstances were dwelt
upon with anxious and gloomy foreboding by numbers of citizens over
whose mind the talents and success of Castruccio had gained a
superstitious ascendency. The cavalry consisted of 500 gentlemen of the
highest rank in Florence under the name cavallate or men-at-arms on
horseback, all magnificently equipped and a hundred of them mounted
on destrieri, the largest and finest war-horses of the time and which few
could afford to purchase; none cost less than 150 golden florins [nearly
£200 or $1000], yet there were 300 of these, natives and strangers, in the
Florentine army. Besides the cavallate there were 1500 foreign cavalry in
the pay of Florence, of whom 800 were French and German gentlemen
of the highest rank and distinction; the general-in-chief, Raymond of
Cardona, a Spanish condottiere, and his lieutenant, Borneo of Burgundy,
were followed by a troop of 230 Catalan and Burgundian cavalry, and
lastly there were 450 Gascons, French, Flemings, Italians, and men of
Provence picked with great care from the veteran companies of
Masnadieri, and all experienced soldiers. Fifteen thousand well-
appointed infantry, between citizens and rural troops, completed the
personal force of this fine army, and 800 canvas pavilions and other great
tents, with 6000 ronzini and baggage horses attended its movements.
 T P P ,F

With the exception of 200 Sienese cavalry no allies had yet joined, but
hostilities commenced on the 17th of June by devastating the Pistoian
territory up to the gates of the capital, capturing many small places,
insulting Castruccio, who was in that city, by running for the Palio under
its walls, and sending him repeated challenges to battle. Castruccio dryly
answered that it was not the right time, and the Florentines marched
directly to besiege Tizzano, a strong town about seven miles from Pistoia
on the road to Florence; there every preparation was apparently made for
a regular siege, while Cardona on the 9th of July sent his lieutenant
Borneo with 500 picked men towards Fucecchio; and to engage
Castruccio’s attention a strong detachment was at the same time directed
to alarm Pistoia and the surrounding country. Borneo was joined at
Fucecchio by 150 Lucchese exiles and a numerous infantry, besides
some reinforcements from the garrisons in Val d’Arno. Carrying with
him a pontoon bridge, apparently the first noticed by the early historians
of these campaigns, he threw it silently over the Gusciana at Rosaiuolo
during the night, and the whole division crossed that river without being
perceived by the garrisons at the bridge of Cappiano or Montefalcone,
scarcely a mile above and below the point of passage.

RAYMOND TEMPORISES

On hearing this, Raymond suddenly quitted Tizzano, passed the lofty

range of Monte Albano, and by night-fall had joined his detachment and
invested the fortified bridge and fortress of Cappiano. This was an
unexpected stroke for the Lucchese general, who believed himself safe in
that quarter, and would appear to have doubted the possibility of so
sudden a passage of the Gusciana by any soldiers; so that this operation
increased the fame of Cardona, the confidence of the league, and the
spirit of the Florentines. His frontier line being thus broken, Castruccio
immediately quitted Pistoia, and entering the Val di Nievole threw his
army in position amongst the hills above Vivinaia, which he
endeavoured to strengthen while he pressed for the co-operation of all
his friends; Pisa disregarded this summons in consequence of his recent
treachery; but from Lucca, Arezzo, La Marca, Romagna, and the
Maremma he assembled thirteen hundred men-at-arms and a numerous
infantry, with which he reinforced all his positions from Vivinaia to
Porcari, strengthening the latter with additional works and troops to
secure his communications with Lucca; and finally cut a trench from the
hills to the marsh of Bientina which was guarded with the utmost
solicitude.
The bridge of Cappiano was taken by Cardona on the 13th of July; the
town itself next fell; two days after, Montefalcone was summoned and
reduced in eight days, and thus the whole line of the Gusciana was
cleared of the enemy. This rapid success brought numerous
reinforcements from Siena, Perugia, Bologna, Agubbio, Grosseto,
Montepulciano, Chiusi, Colle, San Gimignano, Volterra, San Miniato,
Faenza, Imola, Count Battifolle, and the exiles from Lucca and Pistoia;
all eager to assist in overwhelming this formidable chieftain; so that the
army had already swelled to 3454 men-at-arms and a proportionate
number of infantry. With this immense force Cardona advanced, and on
the 3rd of August invested the strong fortress of Altopascio, which
crowns a hill rising from the marshes north of the Bientina Lake; the
place, although impregnable to an assault, was so damaged by the
battering engines and so poisoned by heat, sickness, and the horrid
stench of filthy matter which it was then usual to cast into besieged
towns, that on hearing of the discomfiture of a Lucchese detachment sent
from Pistoia to make a diversion towards Florence it immediately
surrendered.
The capture of this place was succeeded by doubts, discussion, and
delay; the troops had become sickly from heats and malaria, and the
army proportionably reduced; discontent and intrigues were plentiful,
and Castruccio, quick in the use of corruption, seized the favourable
moment to bribe two Frenchmen of high rank, but was detected and
baffled. Cardona himself, although proof against Castruccio’s
temptations, was false and ambitious; he had seen Florence in periods of
distress repeatedly surrender her liberties, and determined by getting her
into difficulties to try if he also could not become her master; the fall of
Altopascio elated him, his pockets were filled and his camp emptied by
the bribes of rich citizens who, tired of a long campaign and alarmed at
increasing sickness, cheerfully exchanged their money for leave of
absence and the pleasures of the capital. The cavalry, being generally
composed of these, was reduced along with the rest of the army to almost
half its original number, and Cardona wished this; for his thoughts ran
high, and hence his delays, discussions, and repeated demands to be
invested with the same power in the city that he already exercised in the
army; in order, as he said, to insure the necessary obedience. But finding
that the government would not listen to his request, he lay idle amongst
the Bientina marshes while Castruccio, with the eyes and activity of a
lynx, strained every nerve to catch him in his toils, and succeeded; so
that he who at first neglected the means of victory through bad faith, was
at last through incapacity unable to save himself from destruction.
Dissension arose both in the camp and city about the propriety of
withdrawing the army to a more healthy quarter or boldly pushing on to
Lucca; the most cautious advised the former course from a suspicion of
the general’s views and the state of the troops; but their opponents
prevailed both in camp and council, some of them even favouring
Cardona’s wildest speculations. It was therefore resolved to advance
towards Lucca; but instead of cutting through the enemy’s position while
he was weak, by a direct movement, as might have been effected, a bad
unhealthy post was occupied on the edge of the Sesto marsh, which
decimated the troops while it still more augmented the gains of the
general.

A BRILLIANT SKIRMISH

Castruccio did not fail to profit by this delay, although his army also
had decreased from want of funds and sickness, and therefore could not
long maintain its position without reinforcements, but he discovered in
that of the enemy the seeds of certain victory. By reason, money, and
promises he had already prevailed on Galeazzo Visconti to send his son
with eight hundred horse into Tuscany; and with two hundred more from
Passerino, lord of Mantua and Modena, he hoped soon to recover his
ascendency; in the meanwhile his situation was very precarious, for
Cardona by a vigorous effort might have cut his line of communication;
the latter, now sensible of his errors and probably urged by the general
discontent, had actually detached a hundred men-at-arms and a body of
pioneers to clear a passage over the mountain. Castruccio’s outposts soon
checked their progress and were followed by a stronger body then
descending the hill in order of battle; skirmishing began, and voluntary
reinforcements pushed out unordered from the Florentine camp below. It
was entirely an encounter of cavalry; the green slopes of the hills were
covered with armed and plumed knights, the whole scene resembled a
tournament rather than a real battle and the effect is described as
beautiful. Each party was broken four different times and each reuniting
in compact order returned unconquered to the charge; many lances were
shivered, many gentlemen unhorsed, and arms and wounded and
expiring men lay scattered on the mountain side. The Florentines with
only half its numbers for three hours sustained and repulsed the charges
of Castruccio’s chivalry, and might have finally prevailed if they had
been well supported; but Cardona in complete order of battle looked on
inactively, his troops cooped up in a narrow angle of the plain below
whence they could not move without incurring danger. This did not
escape Castruccio who therefore pushed boldly on with augmenting
numbers and, though unhorsed by a German knight, wounded, and some
of his bravest followers slain, by night-fall had succeeded in driving the
enemy back to their entrenchments in face of a much superior army.
Forty men-at-arms were either killed or taken on the side of Florence,
and many wounded, but all in front; for the Florentines did not turn, but
battled proudly and retreated sullenly, more angry with their own
commander than with the enemy; they made no prisoners but must have
smote well in the conflict, for no less than a hundred of their opponents’
horses had galloped to the plain with empty saddles from the field of
battle.

THE BATTLE OF ALTOPASCIO

The trumpets of either host answered each other in defiance until after
dark, and neither choosing to own a defeat both remained under arms
long after night set in; but the Florentines lost their spirit from that day’s
fight and no longer trusted either in the faith or talents of their general.
Castruccio, being anxious to keep the Spaniard in his difficult position,
directed the governors of several towns in the Val di Nievole to entangle
him in a fictitious intrigue with the expectation of their surrender, and
Cardona, thus duped, notwithstanding every warning, chose to continue
in this state of vain inactivity.
On hearing of Azzo Visconti’s arrival at Lucca with eight hundred
men-at-arms he took fright and hastily retreated to Altopascio, whilst
Castruccio, apprehensive of his escape, hurried back to the capital to
accelerate the march of the Lombards. Visconti was so unwilling to
proceed without repose or money that it required all the influence of
Castruccio’s wife, seconded by the blandishments of the most beautiful
women in Lucca and the payment of 6000 florins, to gain his promise of
marching on the following morning; Castruccio then departed, leaving to
the women the care of keeping the young Milanese chieftain to his
engagement. On the morning of the 23rd of November the allied army
paraded ostentatiously in front of Castruccio’s position, with flying
colours and sound of many trumpets, daring him as it were to battle, and
the latter fearful of losing such a moment sent out some troops to amuse
them with a prospect of victory while he kept his main body in hand
awaiting the junction of Visconti. This was completed at nine in the
morning, when Castruccio was seen once more descending from the hills
with three-and-twenty hundred men-at-arms in majestic movement
towards the plain, while the greater part of his infantry remained in the
mountain and took no part in the events of this day. An advanced
squadron of 150 French and Italian gentlemen began the fight by a bold
charge directly through Visconti’s line; but the second line or main body
of Feditori, consisting of seven hundred horsemen under Borneo of
Burgundy who had been corrupted by Azzo or Castruccio, turned when it
was time to charge and fled from the encounter. The whole army, whose
confidence was already shaken, were confounded and some others began
to fly; but had Raymond promptly moved forward to the support of his
first line which had charged so effectively, the battle might still have
been maintained on equal terms; instead of which he remained
motionless and added to the general consternation.
Presently the main body of cavalry, scarcely tarrying to exchange a
single lance-thrust, hurried off in universal confusion, leaving everything
to the infantry who still maintained their ground with undaunted courage;
but neither their arms nor discipline was calculated to stand alone against
such masses of man and steel as came successively upon them, and after
an obstinate resistance they also were discomfited. The battle lasted but a
short time, few were killed in the fight but many in the pursuit, for
 Castruccio instantly sent on a detachment to
Cappiano, took possession of the bridge
which had already been abandoned, and cut
off all direct means of escape. The slaughter
was therefore considerable but uncertain; the
prisoners, amongst whom were Raymond of
Cardona and his son, were numerous; the
carroccio, the martinella, with all the public
standards, banners, and baggage of the army,
were taken; Cappiano and Montefalcone soon
capitulated, and Altopascio not many days
after. Thus did the tide of fortune turn and
bear forward Castruccio to prouder hopes and
higher dignities. On the 27th of September
his whole army assembled at Pistoia and was
reinforced by that garrison, while Castruccio
in all the confidence of victory dismantled
the bridge and forts of Cappiano and
Montefalcone, and secure in the possession
I S
F C
of Pistoia left the rest of his frontier open to
the Florentines, whose territory he ravaged
for nearly seven weeks without interruption.
Policy and necessity dictated this course, for his funds were exhausted,
Azzo Visconti was still unsatisfied, and the army in arrears of pay; so
that nothing but the plunder of Florentine citizens could supply his
present necessities. Carmignano was his first conquest; he then marched
to Lecore, to Signa, Campi, Brozzi, and Guaracchi; all were captured or
fell a prey to flames and plunder; Peretola, within two miles of Florence,
became for a while his headquarters, while from the Arno to the
mountains he ravaged all the plain, a plain covered, then as now, but
more richly, with magnificent villas and beautiful gardens, the delight of
the citizens and the admiration of the world. All was destroyed. The
wealth was plundered, the monuments of then reviving art were carried
away and reserved for the conqueror’s triumph. Games were celebrated
and races run on the very spot time out of mind reserved by the
Florentines for their public spectacles. A course of horsemen began the
sports; that of footmen followed; and afterwards, to make the insult still
more disgusting, a bevy of common prostitutes ran together in mockery,
deriding the impotence of the Florentines, not one of whom had the
courage to come forth and check these insulting spectacles. Yet the city