Legal Prof

'Legal Prof.
Nature of Legal profession - the nature of the legal profession as a noble calling intrinsically linked to public
trust.
Legal profession is a duty of public service of which emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money; a relation as officer of the court to the administration of
justice involving through sincerity, integrity, and reliability; a relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;
a relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients—
these distinguish the legal profession from business.
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Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc. v Espiritu
FACTS: Herein petitioner Dayan Association filed an instant disbarment case against respondent Atty.
Napoleon Espiritu charged him with deceitful conduct, malpractice, gross misconduct in office and/or
violation of oath of office.
• Herein respondent Atty. Espiritu assisted the complainants in an ejectment case in which they are being sued
in their respective capacities as officers and members of the association. In the said case, the complainants
lost. However, Atty. Espiritu advised them to file a supersedeas bond to stay their eviction.
• Complainants entrusted the huge amounts of money to cover the required to Atty. Espiritu however, Atty.
Espiritu failed to transmit the entire amounts which he received to the court but instead misappropriated and
converted it for his personal use. At first, he erroneously received the sum of money that was given to him
which was in the amount of P116,605; he said it was only 86,666.72 but was corrected by one of the
members.
The complainants claim that the respondent deposited just P48,000.00 with the clerk of court, as shown by
receipts that the respondent provided. After verbally demanding that the respondent repay the remaining sum,
Association President Minerva Genato delivered a personal cheque for P141,904.00 in the name of Atty.
Ocampo Leonardo. Because there wasn't enough cash, the check bounced. As a result, Atty. Ocampo
demanded payment of the cheque from Genato in a letter mailed to him. To no purpose, Genato persisted in
making verbal demands until sending a letter dated May 25, 2000, requesting payment of the check's amount.
The Association was thus constrained to seek the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Through
Atty. Helengrace G. Cabasal, another demand letter dated July 17, 2000 was sent for respondent to return the
"remaining balance" of P206,497.00. An Information charging respondent with estafa was likewise filed
before the RTC of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Espiritu violated his fiduciary duty with the complainants.
RULING: Yes. A lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his or her client’s money.

Canon 16 of Code Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to him in his personal capacity, because of a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part.

By receiving the amount of money entrusted to him, failing to transmit it to the court in its entirety and
subsequently misappropriating and converting it for personal gain, Atty. Espiritu clearly committed a breach
of his fiduciary duty with his clients.

The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and
confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of
the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end,
all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he
shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. Law is
a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically, and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and
the public at large, with honesty and integrity in manner beyond reproach.
Atty. Espiritu is suspended from the practice of law for one year. He is DIRECTED to return the funds
entrusted to him by complainants, and to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision.
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Jerry F. Villa v Atty. Paula Dimpa Beatriz Defensor-Velez
FACTS
• Both complainant and respondent are engaged in the business of providing security services. Desperate to
meet the payroll of her security guards, herein respondent Atty. Velez obtained a loan in the amount of
200,000 from complainant Villa.
• They executed a Memorandum of Agreement detailing the loan amount and interest and respondent issued a
post-dated check as payment for the loan.
• Villa claimed that Atty. Velez just vanished in thin air and when he deposited the said check on its due date,
it was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. He sent a demand letter to the respondent, but
she ignored them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Velez violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Respondent violated Code 1.01 of the CPR, which states that a lawyer shall not engage in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. The Court has emphasized time and again that any
wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, respondent may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt
validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s
professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Respondent’s failure to pay her just loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere
error in judgment. She undeniably engaged in improper or wrongful conduct and violated the mandate that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As a member of the Bar, respondent’s act equates to such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to
undermine the public confidence in the legal profession which cannot be justified.
Atty. Velez was suspended one year from the practice of law, and was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.
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History of the legal profession -
Distinction between legal profession and business - In this day and age, members of the bar often forget
that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
is not a profession but a secondary consideration. Duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest
eminence may be attained without making much money.
Dominador P. Burbe v Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
FACTS:
• Herein complainant Burbe filed a case for disbarment or suspension or any disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Magulta with the Commission on Bar Discipline.
• Complainant alleged that Atty. Magulta received an amount of 25,000 as filing fee for complainant’s money
claim for breach of contract. Respondent admitted that he had not at all filed the complaint because he had
spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose.
• Respondent, in his answer, claimed that he never inconvenienced, mistreated, or deceived the complainant,
and that if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was him. He claimed that the
complainant availed of his services without paying, that the amount deposited to him as filing fee was
subsequently reimbursed using his own personal checks, and that said checks were accepted and encashed by
the complainant.
the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magulta is right that no client-lawyer relationship existed between him and the
complainant since he was not paid for the services he rendered.
RULING: The Court disagreed.
To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that a retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employment is established.
The practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
is not a profession but a secondary consideration. Duty to the public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a by-product, and the
highest eminence may be attained without making much money.

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Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. v Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
FACTS:
• There was a paid advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer which reads, “ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist”
• Atty. Simbillo claims that he was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within 4-6 months provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Similar
advertisements were in Manila Bulletin and The Philippine Star.
• Atty. Khan, in his capacity as Assistant Court Ad, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo
for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services.
• Atty. Simbillo argued that advertising and solicitation are not prohibited acts and prayed that he be
exonerated from all charges against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Rule 2.03 provides that “a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business. Rule 3.01 provides that “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualification or legal services.
It has been repeatedly said that law is not a business. There is no question that the respondent committed the
acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that advertising himself as self-styled “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist”, he wittingly or unwillingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of
this Resolution.
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Pedro LINSANGAN (Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office) vs. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the
help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations,
complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him
to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for
a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached the “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his defense,
denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
Issue: Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held: Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a
ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that
lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove
that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not
do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year.
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Supervision and control - establishing the nature of, directing and guiding the prepa- ration of, and
approving the work product and accepting responsibility that the work product is in conformance with
standards of professional practice.
Art VIII Sec 5 of the Consti - The sc shall have the following powers;
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporary judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
 (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Art. XII of the Consti, Sec 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of
Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled
workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate
technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit.
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In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil 554 (1954)
FACTS: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al, petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a
general average of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams
the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations.
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and
feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12,
but was vetoed by the president after he was given advice adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate
then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then
became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to
public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law
profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
ISSUE: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
RULING: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of
the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section
2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted
to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of a petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
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-In Re of the IBP, (1973)
FACTS: The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to
order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. Arguments in favor of as well as in
opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. The Court has closely observed and
opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. The Court has closely observed and
followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar.
(2) Whether or not the integration of the Bar be constituted.
(3) Whether or not the Court ordained the integration of the Bar at this time.
HELD:
(1) YES. The Court may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13
of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's
inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest
or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
(2) YES. The Court quotes discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration. To compel a lawyer to be
a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right
not to associate). For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views are opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. Bar integration is not unfair to
lawyers already practicing because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will
give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities
in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
(3) YES. In the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will
be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. The national poll conducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar shows that 96.45% voted in favor of Bar
integration, while only 2.51% against it. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached
COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
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In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue the Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, Etc. 92
SCRA 1.
FACTS: Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court. On May 5, 1975 Atty Alexander Sycip died.
While, Atty. Herminio Ozaeta died on February 14, 1976. The surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta
filed a petition praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of their firm, the names of their
partner who passed away. One of the petitioners’ arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name in so far as Greater Manila Area is
concerned. No custom exists which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the
individual members of the firm. They also stated that the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the
firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the
legal profession of most countries in the world.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law firm is allowed to sustain the name of their deceased partner in the name of
their firm.
HELD: NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association stated
the following: “The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use.” No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm
names of law partnerships. Firm names, under Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior partners
in a firm. Firm names in the Philippines change and evolve when partners die, leave or a new one is added. It
is questionable to add the new name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased one since they have
never been, technically, partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments of the petitioners stating
that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partner’s name, this is so because in the U.S., it is a
sanctioned custom as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S 2d
733). This does not apply in the Philippines. The petition filed herein is denied and petitioner is advised to
drop the name “SYCIP” as well as “OZAETA” from the firm name.
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In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978
FACTS: The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-
A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that
he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar in which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished bar association in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject
to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in
violation of his constitutional right to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-Laws of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional or illegal.
The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.
G.R. No. 165922

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE

(BAMARVEMPCO), vs. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES

FACTS: Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative
organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6)
of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives:

from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection
with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
(trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c)
of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of
the mortgagee’s claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the
fees.
ISSUE: W/N the power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure is with the Judiciary alone.
RULING: YES, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.
The SC reiterated their ruling in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees on the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. Until
the 1987 Constitution took effect, the SC’s two previous constitutions textualized a power
sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules. The1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.

This omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice That the Court's power to
promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by the SC with Congress. (See doctrine) The SC noted that any
doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with the SC’sEn Banc ruling
denying a request by the GSIS for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of itsCharter,
Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.

Reaffirming Echegaray construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence:
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
safeguards of this Court's institutional independence,the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive domain.

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Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo
FACTS: Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues from
1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil
Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
employment with the CSC prohibits him from practicing his law profession and he did not practice the same
while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an
inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes
the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he
was inactive in the practice of law.

RULING: The supreme court held that the payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the
IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to
stay abroad before he left. In such a case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF
LEGAL FEES.
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0 February 11, 2010
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from legal fees imposed in GOCCs under Sec. 22, Rule 141 of the ROC
which contradicts Sec. 39 of RA 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997. The petitioner avers that the courts still assess
and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding the exemption
provided in RA 8291 which exempts GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.
According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its
funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided by RA 8291 as low as
possible.
The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is superior
to the Rules of Court.The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption
of the GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS
wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure
promulgated by the Court.
The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of social
justice.
The Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to promulgate such
rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the exercise of the right of the GSIS “to
seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and
local government units.
RULING: NO. There is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed by the
Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS from “taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds” is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and
procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress.
The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially
procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule
141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to
implement an existing right. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by
this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by
this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive. The 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
The petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed under Sec
22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is hereby DENIED .
-
III. PRACTICE OF LAW - any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession.
QUALIFICATIONS -
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Legal Education, Bar examination
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show
that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the
candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such
facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following
courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Lawyer’s Oath
Lawyer’s Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
RULE 138, 138-A RULES OF COURT

*Rule 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Rule 138-A Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1.

fi
fi
Conditions for student practice.

A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum
and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Lawyers Authorized to represent the Government

Section 2.
the Of ce of the Solicitor General, as law of ce of the
Appearance. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, performs a vital
role in the program of the administration, particularly in the
handling of constitutional and other important litigations before
— the Supreme Court and other courts or tribunals;

The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and on
behalf of the legal clinic.

Non-lawyers who may be authorized to appear in court:

1. Cases before the MTC: Party to the litigation, in person OR through an agent or friend or
appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC)
2. Before any other court: Party to the litigation, in person (Ibid.)
3. Criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not
available: the judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is:
1. resident of the province
2. of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Rule 116,
Sec. 7, RRC).
4. Legal Aid Program – A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law school’s
 4. Legal Aid Program – A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law school’s
clinical education program approved by the supreme Court may appear before any court without
compensation, to represent indigent clients, accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school. The
student shall be under the direct supervision and control of an IBP member duly accredited by
the law school.
5. Under the Labor code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if
1. they represent themselves, or if
2. they represent their organization or members thereof (Art 222, PO 442, as
amended).
6. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court
(Act no. 2259, Sec. 9).
Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of Law in the Philippines:
1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).
2. Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid.)
3. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109).
4. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Art. VIII Sec.
15, 1987 Constitution).
5. Members of the Constitutional Commission (Art IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)
6. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2nd par), 1987 Constitution)
7. All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90).
8. Those prohibited by special law
Public Officials with Restrictions in the Practice of Law:
1. 1. No Senator as member of the House of Representative may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice as before the Electoral Tribunals, as quasi-judicial and other
administration bodies (Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution).
2. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160, Sec. 91)Sanggunian members may practice their
professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not:
1. appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
2. appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;
3. collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official;
4. use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
3. Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the
government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the Government, or any of its
subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in a criminal case wherein an officer or employee
of the Government is accused of an offense in relation to his office.
Beltran Jr v Abad
Respondent was charged of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent Abad’s explanation was that he paid his Bar admission fee in the amount of 175 pesos, paid his
certification fee in the amount of 5 pesos and also paid his membership dues for the year 1979-80 to the IBP.
Atty. Mendoza, then clerk of court, included respondent’s name among those taking the oath of office. After
signing, he was then informed by Atty. Mendoza that CJ Fernando wants to talk to him regarding his answer
to the reply of Mr. Jorge Uy. His lawyer’s oath was further suspended. He then filed his reply with a prayer to
the SC that they would determine his fitness to the bar. While waiting, he received a letter from the IBP
informing him of an annual general meeting together with his statement of account. He then assumed that the
SC did not order the striking of his name in the roll of attorneys. He then paid his membership due and other
assessments.
ISSUE: WON Abad is admitted to the practice of law without the lawyer’s oath and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys
RULING: Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The proven
charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within
ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
-

PH Lawyer’s Association V Agrava

FACTS: Petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer’s Association for prohibition and injunction against
FACTS: Petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer’s Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as the Director of Patent Office.
Respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys. According to the circular, persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination.
Petitioner is a bar passer and is licensed by the Supreme Court is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office. But was still required by the Director to take and pass the exam. The respondent
answer to Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by
lawyers but also professionals such as engineers, and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical
training who passed the prescribed examination.
‘
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with
the law of evidence and procedure.
The Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal
effects of fact and conditions.
Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or
mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be
taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.
—--
Cayetano v Monsod
FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on
April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the
requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
RULING: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to
be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
—--
Diao v Martinez
Telesforo Diao passed the bar examinations. He was then admitted to the bar. He was then charged by
Severino Martinez 2 years later; that he falsely represented his application, and that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. Solicitor General then started the investigation against Diao. The findings were;
- Diao did not finish high school
- Diao never attended college and never acquired his A.A Diploma, which contradicts the credentials
in support of his application and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the required pre-
legal education.
In his answer, Diao admitted the first charge, saying he had left high school in his third year but he entered the
service of the US Armt and passed the general classification test which is equivalent to a HS diploma. Upon
his return, educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd-4th yr hs.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented
him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
ISSUE: Diao is qualified to practice law
Ruling: This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of
1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must
affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on
"previous").
Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been
obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations
is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the
latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days.
-
In Re: Argosino
Petitioner passed the bar, however the court deferred his oath-taking due to his conviction for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The conviction arose from the death of a neophyte, Raul Camaligan,
during a fraternity initiation rites. The court granted the petitioner's application for probation after being found
guilty. When he was discharged from probation, he filed a petition to the court that he may be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath. The court asked for evidence that he is complying with the requirement of good moral
character.
Petitioner submitted 15 certifications and letters among others two senators, 5 trial court judges and six
members of religious orders. He also submitted evidence that a scholarship fund was established in honor of
the hazing victim, Raul.
The court then asked for an answer from the father of the victim, Atty. Camaligan. He stated that the infliction
of the injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate and not accidental.The offense is not homicide
but murder, since the accused took advantage of the neophyte’s helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superiority, and treachery.
He consented to the accused plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house. He said as a
christian himself, he forgives the petitioner for the death of his son. However, as a father, he still grieves the
death of Raul, whom he wanted to be admitted to the practice. He said that he is not in the position to say
whether the petitioner is morally fit to be admitted to the bar, and left the court to decide.
ISSUE: WON Argosino should be admitted to the bar, despite of his conviction
RULING: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the
noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath,
thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less
than irreproachable.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We
are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be
rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier
for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
—
AGUIRRE VS RANA, BAR MATTER No. 1036 (2003)
FACTS: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees, Aguirre filed against Rana a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar charging him with unauthorized practice of law among others. Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Aguirre further alleges that Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading
wherein Rana represented himself as counsel.
Rana was allowed to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against
him. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that the respondent
actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rana should be admitted to the bar.
RULING: No. The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan before he took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar which
means that he was not yet licensed to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. The right to
practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
—
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN DACANAY, 540 SCRA 424
(2007)
FACTS:   Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship.
RULING: No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2.
Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in
the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities
as a member of the Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception
is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."

—
IV. PRIVILEGES AND DUTIES OF A LAWYER
A. Privileges of an Attorney - The privilege is intended to promote freedom of consultation and
confidentiality between the attorney and the client, in view of its rationale:

“In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed.”
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as
a result of a consultation with an attorney.
Also, as a general rule, the privilege may not be invoked to refuse to divulge the identity of the client.
However, there are exceptions, which are: (a) when a strong probability exists that revealing the name
would implicate that person in the very same activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice; (b)
when disclosure would open the client to liability; and (c) when the name would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict.

The privilege does not prevent the attorney from discussing the confidential information with
members of his law office if it is for the purpose of finding solutions to the client’s concerns.
B. Four-Fold Duties of a Lawyer

1. DUTIES TO SOCIETY - Should not violate his responsibility to society, exemplar for
righteousness, ready to render legal aid, foster social reforms guardian of due process, aware of special
role in the solution of special problems
2. DUTIES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION - Candor, fairness, courtesy, and truthfulness, avoid
encroachment in the business of other lawyers, uphold the honor of the profession.
3. DUTIES OF THE COURT - Respect or defend against criticisms, uphold authority and dignity,
obey order and processes, assist in the administration of justice
4. DUTIES TO THE CLIENT - Entire devotion to client's interest.
C. Duties of Attorneys (Rules 138, sec 20)
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay
any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
D. Duty of Counsel de Officio - A counsel de officio is the counsel appointed by the court to
represent and defend the accused in case he cannot afford to employ one himself.
WHO CAN BE APPOINTED COUNSEL DE OFFICIO?
The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise
shall appoint as counsel de officio
1. A member of the bar in good standing
2. And such member, by reason of his/her experience and ability, can competently defend
 2. And such member, by reason of his/her experience and ability, can competently defend
the accused ONLY DURING TRIAL: But, in localities where such members of the bar are not
available, the court may appoint any person who is— (1)A resident of the province; (2)And of good
repute for probity and with ability to defend the accused.
E. Duty of a Private Prosecutor
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of
heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private
prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court.Once so authorized to prosecute
the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn. x x x ."
—
IN RE THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491; October 6, 1989
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines held on June 3, 1989
at the Philippine International Convention Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of
office on July 4, 1989 before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports
received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings
and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of
president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the
alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the
voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the
SupremeCourt en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
The Prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws
emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,Sec. 14. Prohibited
acts and practices relative to elections and Section 12[d] of the By-Lawsprescribes sanctions for violations
of the above rules: Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 (Prohibited Acts and Practices Relative to
Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his
removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member
pursuant to the By-laws of theIntegrated Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the candidates violated the IBP By-Laws.
RULING: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated theBy-Laws of the
IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to"promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of ProfessionalResponsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association
detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one
way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates,during the initial
hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and
seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or atleast withhold vital information from it to
conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
—
SANTOS VS LLAMAS , 322 SCRA 529 (2000)
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060”
but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he
has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUES: (1)Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.
(2)Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of
law and for being a senior citizen.
RULING: (1) Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.
(2)No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default
shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether
or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432,
grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of membership or
association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his
IBP dues, whichever is later.
—
TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA A.C. No. 9000, 5 October 2011
FACTS: Atty. Gumba obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and offered the parcel of land registered
in her father’s name as security. She even showed Special Power of Attorney that she was authorized to sell or
encumber the property. However, Atty. Gumba defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same
despite repeated demands. So, Mr. Tan went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that
the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage
the property solely to banks.
ISSUE: Whether or not a lawyer should be subject to disciplinary actions considering that the deception was
made in her private capacity.
RULING: Yes, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the case at the bar, Atty. Gumba’s actions clearly show that she deceived the complainant into lending
money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education
and complainants ignorance in legal matters.
However, suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
—-
LEDA VS TABANG, 206 SCRA 395 (1992)
FACTS: Complainant Evangeline Leda assails Atty. Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character. She filed
against him Bar Matter No. 78 and the present petition for disbarment, Administrative Case No. 2505. Leda
and Tabang contracted marriage performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character.
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Tabang had finished his law studies and
taken the Bar. He finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he
declared that he was “single." He then passed the examinations.
First Complaint: Leda blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that
Tabang had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath
for lack of good moral character. Tabang reconciled with Leda and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
Second Complaint: Leda filed a petition for the disbarment of Tabang. She alleges that he is not of good
moral character and he only reconciled with her in order to get the complaint dismissed. Tabang claims that he
had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Leda to keep the
marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning.
ISSUE: WON respondent Tabang lacks good moral character and violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES, respondent’s lack of good moral character was only too evident. Respondent's lack of good
moral character is only too evident. Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar
Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith,
and a violation of Rule 7.01, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar
Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in
order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 thereof
which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola). Tabang through his
actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an
officer of the Court.
—
FOODSPHERE, INC. v. ATTY. MAURICIO, JR.
(A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009)
FACTS: Foodsphere, a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture of canned
goods of ―CDO filed an administrative complaint against Atty.Melanio Mauricio, Jr. for violation of the
code of professional responsibility. The case at hand involved a certain Alberto Cordero who purportedly
found a colony of worms inside the can of liver spread by CDO and Foodsphere that he bought from the
grocery.
The Cordero family sued the company for P150,000 for damages, but the companies did not agree to the
demands. The Cordero’s thereafter threatened to resort to the media, if their demands are not met.
Consequently, Atty. Mauricio the counsel of the Cordero’s, was involved in various media productions such
as being a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and
HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a
radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB.
Atty. Mauricio, in many cases utilized these media outlets to place the said company in a bad light by
declaring to the masses the liver spread of worms; even after his receipt of the Order addressed to him to
desist from ―further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the
instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its productsǁ. Even after
the parties have performed an agreement, signed by the Cordero’s and Atty.Mauricio himself – resulting in the
dismissal of the Cordero case, Atty.Mauricio still inexplicably launched a media offensive to the companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Atty. Mauricio has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Mauricio has violated the code of professional responsibility. His recourse to the Media,
even after being told to desist from such was a clear violation of Rule 13.03 of Canon 13, ―A lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party. His action has put not only the company Foodsphere and CDO in a bad light, but has also
degraded the dignity and authority of the legal system. Besides the above, he has also violated Canon 1.01 by
engaging in deceitful conduct taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his own interests,
and Canon 8, when he used abusive and offensive language in his dealings.
—

ADVINCULA VS MACABATA, A.C. No. 7204

FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Cynthia Advincula against herein Respondent, Atty.
Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality. It was alleged that sometime in December
2004, Advincula sought legal advice from Atty. Macabata about filing a complaint against Queensway Travel
and Tours for not settling their accounts as demanded.
Consequently, the two met on two separate occasions: the first was on February 10, 2005, where he
sent Advincula home and gave her a kiss on the cheek and embraced her very tightly, while the other
incident took place on March 6, 2005, where Atty. Macabata allegedly kissed Advincula forcefully
while his other hand was holding her breast.
In his answer, Respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that on
both times, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as
the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where
he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been
impossible to commit the acts imputed to him
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral, or which constitute serious
moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
RULING: NO. The Court held that the acts of Atty. Macabata would not suffice to warrant a disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Citing the case of Zaguirre v. Castillo, the SC reiterated the definition of
“immoral conduct”, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but “grossly immoral”: (1) It must be so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act, (2) or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or; (3) committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Guided by the definitions above, the Court perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as
mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
Respondent, though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such an act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.
In the case at bar, the complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her;
a mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Moreover, while Respondent admitted
having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. Be it noted also that the
incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt
Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If Respondent truly had malicious designs on
complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely
accomplish the same.
The complaint for disbarment against the Atty. Macabata for alleged gross immorality is therefore
dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his clients with
a stern warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future.
—

ZAGUIRRE VS. CASTILLO, 398 SCRA 659 (2003)

FACTS: Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita
Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the
release of its results. Zaguirre then allegedly got pregnant with Castillo’s daughter. The latter, who was
already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not
materialize after the birth of the child. The Court found him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct to which
Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.
The IBP commented that Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her. In his defense,
the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his good moral
character. His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amiability as a husband and father despite
the affair. More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court, Castillo reiterated his
willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-dated checks addressed to
Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of Php2,000.00 each.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be punished
with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.
RULING: YES. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03 of the same Code.
The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of
every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is
highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.
—-