『HE WA OF 川YANMAR

AND CHINA'S QUEST

FOR GLOBAL DOMINANCE

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＂ 和丰』 汪 L 十周春
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f \tyanrna r and China's Quest for Global Dominance
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 The Wa o f M y a n m a r and
China's Quest fo r Global
D o m in a n c e

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CONTENTS

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Notes 212
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Dramatis Personae 236 、
Bibliography 24S
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vii
 Introduction

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to attention. Then came an impressive and
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rocket launchers,
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l carriers, and even

- machine-guns, assault rifles, armored personne
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tly Wa tribesmen but

, a weaponized drone. Columns of civilians, mos
, made their way to
also people from other ethnic groups in the area
the sky after dark and
the main parade grounds. Fireworks lit up
t.
people cheered and danced through the nigh
d by the regular
This event, on April 17, 2019 , was not organize
crowds of people
army of any recognized country. Rather, huge
anniversary of events
had come together to celebrate the thirtieth
State Army (UWSA),
Flag of United Wa State Army that had led to the founding of the United Wa
Burma's northeastern
an ethnic force made up of tribesmen from
rank-and-file of the
border mountains. In April 19的， the hilltribe
) had risen in mutiny
insurgent Communist Party of Burma (CPB
Leninist leadership
against their mostly Burman, orthodox Marxist-
The UWSA was born
and had driven them into exile in China.
it is today: the largest
shortly thereafter, and grew to become what
non-state actor in the Asia-Pacific
and best-equipped military

viii
 飞古
,
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTI ON

to have at least 20 ,ooo so]d·iers war on its

region. The 叭VSA is believed do not want to see a new
ticated weaponry has been ,噙 China's security services , tired and
more in resenre. Their sophis 呤 lied by was established when the Wa
southwestern border. Peace
as the now defunct CPB Wasar加d , entered into a ceasefire ag
reement with
Chinas security services. Just and weary after years of fighting
is the UWSA. . It would have
equipped by the Chinese, so eks of setting up the UWSA
the government within we y had enjoyed
ina wanted to export revoJurIona to give up the foothold the
During the Maoist era, Ch ry been a mistake for China a trusted and
day , the ir aim is economic expansion, and B days. The UWSA could be
commu nism. To With inside Burma since the CP in Burma and
lue nce . It str en gth en Ch inas new role the quest for dominance
it, political inf wa s to as a useful geostrategic ally in aponry from
's Xi J 201 J to acquire sophisticated we
superp ow er tha t Ch ina pre sid ent , inp ing , in 3 au nche d an beyond. The UWSA began ped than the
llar J lt n stronger and better equip
ambitious mu ltitrillion do P an cal led the Be an d Ro ad [nitiative China, and soon became eve
(BRI). Its sh ort-term aim is to b ring Asia, Af ric a, an d E
urope into CPB ever was. Burma, the
are a. Th . gives Beijing leverage inside
a single mega-economi c and tra din g 1s may see Inn m · ocent Chinese support for the Wa st convenient
ina with the easiest and mo
enough, but th e ultimate goal of that new Ch ina-dominated neighbor that provides Ch nmar [Burma]
. The so-called China-Mya
partnership is to rival and eventuallY overshadow all those across access to the Indian Ocean of Bengal, has
the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans current/y dominated by the onom ic Co rri do r fro m Yunnan down to the Bay
Ec BRI.
United States, other Western powers, and Japan. Ch·ma will become be co me on e of the mo st important features of the
therefore rmese
the pe ace agreement with the Bu
th ew or ld sd om·mant superpower, not just what it appears to be today, Under the ter ms of
ol over most of
permitted to retain contr
a trad·mgnation, huge as it might b
e, expanding its political influence government, the Wa were
r. Consequently,
across the glo be wit h th esoleaim ofprotecting 1ts · economic·interests. CP B's for me r ba se are a along the Chinese borde
the te between
Incongruou s as i . the ir ow n sel f-administered buffer sta
t may seem, it IS in this grand scheme that the they est ab lis he d
ge in any kind
Wa, a little-kn th were also allowed to enga
own people liv ing in
e northeastern borderland
s of Burma an d China. They
ote mountains,
Burma, have come to play a pivotal e. With Ch · , bu sin ess to su sta in themselves. In these rem
rol mas own po rts of of opium
being too distant and a/read erl oad ed so urc e of inc om e us ed to be the cultivation
Y ov With export item from the the main
and its allies were
coastal provinces, the landlocked . and two decades, the UWSA
ml provinces needoth
er outlets poppies. For more than roin, though
to the sea. OnlY two neighborin
g countries can provide th ma in pro du ce rs of op ium and its derivative he
at: Pakistan Asia's
and Burma. But th e route th ines an d other
an d facturing methamphetam
rough p扣st own to th coast goes they later tur ne d to manu
from Xinjiang in Chinas sternmost . e
ars that the Wa earn mo
re from tin
we er th c dr ug s. To day , it ap pe
Mountains, reaching an elevation of reg ion ov e Karakora111 syntheti , heroin, and
n from the trade in opium
above sea]eve], a dangerous climb f
ne arl y fi ve th
ousand meters an d rare ea rth mi nin g tha t important
or any comm tam ine s, co mm od ities that may no t be tha
reaching the 1owlands. erciaJ vehicle, before methamp he

to the m anymore.
2 3
 I
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
-Kh
ey speak several Mon mer •
So ,rho Jre the Wa? Th d垃le ce m northeastern Burma was a
ma1or
relatives of the Kh me r
empire bUild 沌 The Kuomintang s presen CPB. Burmese
and are thus \"ery dis tant ers in cid ed to lend all-out support to the
ina de
M on , who once had their OWnk'ingdo rea son Ch early 1950s,
Cambod ia as we ll as the
吭 un ist s ha d be en liv ing in exile in China since the
a
and Thailand. But the W never had th comm
cade later that military
training camps
in Khat are today Burma eir it wa s no t un til a de
b but l years of
0\111 kingdoms an
d have never been ruled Yany central Bur Se the m in Yunnan. Following severa
吮 were est ab lis he d for
itish colon Yafter being con quered• mmunist
autho rity. Bu rm a be cam e a Br
1n , the y ma de the ir mo ve on January 1, 1968. Co
wever, governmental prese preparation intang bases
stages in the nin ete en th ce ntu ry. Ho
nce;0 ea me d ac ros s the bo rder and the old Kuom
fl forces str
y we re cal led lim ited to an nu al
ag march岱 targets.
the Wa Hills, as the , was
were some of their first t soldiers
up to the Ch inese bo rde r.
po litica l co mm iss ars were CPB cadres, the foo
While the when
still head h unters and feared b tee rs'from China. It was only
At that time, the Wa were Y the were almost ex clu siv ely 'vo lun
s that its'people's
ins , and th Br itish s tha t Wa Hills in the early 1970
people of the pla us the tro op carried the the CPB had captured the g, the bulk of the
r il local recruits. Before lon
Union Jack up to the borde were always heav Y armed · The Wa army' began to consist of poured in more
Hills were only nominally included m • predominantly Wa. China
the Shan States of Burma and CPB's fighting force was outside Indochina.
had th eJC· own chieftains who did not heed any central or regional to the CP B tha n to an y other communist force
aid ol over more than
authority, which was the reason th e Wa Hills were·m colonial records the mi d-1 97 0s, the CP B had established contr
By stern and eastern
, om ete rs of territory in northea
sometimes referred t0 as the Wa states.'But most of the Wa Hills 20 ,00 0 sq ua re kil
st of the Wa Hills .
remained marked' Un-administered' on colonial maps. Shan State, including mo the CPB had no
h the Ku om int an g threat was eliminated,
In the 1950s, Jarge tracts of the Wa Hills were occupied byrenegade Al tho ug
tains. Its goal
of rem ain ing in the se remote border moun
Nationalist Ch inese Kuomintang forces who had retreated across intentio n wer in the
sh do wn to the Bu rm a lowlands and seize po
the border into Burma foll owing their defeat bY Mao Zedongs was to pu , only
oo n (no w Ya ng on ). Th e Wa, on the other hand
communists·m the Ch me ' se civil war. The established bases in
Y
capital, Rang isingly, the plan
mes in the hills. Not surpr
the Wa Hi))sand other mountainous areas of the Shan States from wanted to defend their ho licy changed after
failed, and as China's po
where th ey tried to invade yunnan but were to conquer the lowlands
repeatedly driven back d with the rise of'the capit
alist roader' Deng
to the Burmese side of the border. The rts of th M ao 's de ath in 197 6 an
pa e Wa Hills where the Chinese.
the Kuomintang were not sent were pin g, the CP B ha d ou tlived its usefulness for
Xiao the hilltri be
, chieft
pre controlled by various local,
s cam e to a he ad in M arch and April 19的 ， when
mostly Wa ains-cum- warlords. The K mm . Thing the aging,
uo tang, as well as the CP B's arm y rose in mutiny and drove
regions warlords, fi nced their rank-and-f ile of the
ome . It may
ive d f the cu
na
lt 'r es p ec ti v e struggles with inc an lea de rsh ip of the party into exile in China
der rom mostly Bu rm
1vation and sale of opmm
· , the only cash go-ahead by the
crop tineers had been given the
viable in these remote mountains. be assumed that the mu
5
4
 IN TRODUCTION INTRODUCT ION
n Suu Ky,i,
ge r in ter es ted · pr om ot in g rev oJ th Bu rm a ha s no w fallen on Aung Sa
Chinese. No lon m ution ,
ey 、 decades of civil war in the country s
for tra de an d oit the na tu ra l be ca m e 'state counselor: or
to open the border ex pl resources in 心 2015 r from becoming
who after an election in , tit ut io n prev en ts he
frontier areas. / leader (Burmas co ns
party,
fro m th old no mina tw o so ns ar e no t Bu rmese citizens). Her
Thus, the UWSA was bo
rn e ashes of the t because her lide vic tory
th . CPB. Ot妃 presiden fo r De m oc ra cy , scored another lan ds
o fo rm ed
础 nic groups in the CPB als eir own armies Which llJade the National League
1 . n, ensuring that
there will be no
nt. What those groups earned f e ec t10
peace with the governme November 8, 20 20 med organizat10ns
ro m 陑 in the ies : the country's ethnic ar
tiv ities wa s us ed s, h in off ici al po lic ent before
\'arious commercial ac to build road 叩 ta/s,
change
re em ent with the governm
·n a ce as efi re ag
and schools in th e area, the development of which h ad been grossly are supposed to s1g many observers
ot iat io ns can take place. That,
and its ex-CPB allies g
neglected by the CPB. The UWSA also built any substantial ne no t work. Beijing,
. pl ac in g th e ca rt be fo re the horse an d will
th 1 argue, is n peacemakers who
casinos and hotels inside 切 respective areas to ure tourists from ve red a host of Wester
ha s ou tm an eu an d
China, who bega arriving by the busload not long after the 的
n on its part, Seins announcement
,
e process af ter Th ein
mutiny. became involved in th because of the
of a go ve rn m en t he aded by Suu Kyi, an d
In the process, the UW
SA has become exact]Y what th e Chinese the formation services an d
伍 p at ex ist s be tw een China's security
wanted: a useful bargainingch·ip when they want to pu t pressure close relations th
as th e sole
as its all ies , th e Ch inese have em er ged
the UWSA as we ll
on the Burma government not to stray too close to th e West. The no t necessarily intere
sted in a
. Ho we ve r, Ch in a is
UWSA is · also a useful
tool when th e Chinese want to protect their arbiter of the talks y which
n to Bu rm a's civ il wars. It wants stabilit
investment in Burma. This b 加 al, peaceful solu
tio
ame especially im . portant after Burmas ic goals, now un de r
sid
then pre ent, Thein S
ec
e to pr ot ec t an d en hance its geostra teg
ein, decided in September 20 11 to suspend a it can us
ing BRI.
US句. 6 bill ion Chinese h gis of th e m assive, all -encompass
ydroe /ec tric power o丿ect in the far north the ae areas w he n
ofth e country. Th e Chinese also h pr fo re ig n jo ur na lis t to visit these bo rd er
ave to deal With ongoing protests I was the only ro ug h th e
against a Ch ine . se by th e CP B. In 19 86 - 87, I trekked th
mine project in Letpad e they were controlled where the fabled
central ci tyofMand y. Most · aung, northwest of th fro m Panghsai in the no rth
a/a nt/
importa Y, China i entire CP B te rri to ry,
s engaged in, and g Ri ver an d
Wants to control, th
e construcrion of sse s th e Ch in es e border, to the Mekon
inB urmas Ra妎me State a deep -sea rt at Kyaukphyu Burma Road cro B's (n ow
, an d to build hi -speedpo . I als o sp en t th re e m on th s at th e CP
connect th eportwith K gh railwars that will the border with Laos terviewed a11 th e
these un mi ng , th
pit al of y '.s) he ad qu ar te rs at Panghsang where I in
Fo r provincial ca th e UWSA
reasons, China has alseo b ome . unnan. er gr an te d to a
so-called ec rty . Th es e we re th e only in te rviews ev
peace process r talks be 彻 involved m • Burmas leaders of the pa a troops of
加litary, and t eh 'o , een the I sp en t m on th s in the field with th e W
countrys man central
government, the foreign journalist. rise. I kn ow ho w
加n S .
em after he assum ed th y eth nic armed
gro up s. ti d th us th e 19 的 mu tiny came as no surp
e presidency in lni ated by the CPB, an ou t that, an d
2ou, th e task of te d th ei r Bu rm an leadership. I wrote ab
much the Wa ha
7

' ~
 INTROD UCTION

INTRO DUCTION

predicted the mutmy, in a cover story for the Far Eastern E who they are, an
d how China's leaders are
con . fthe Wa,
oni
Reviewin May 哄7, two years before the collapse of th eCPB. r 4 understanding o · interests.
d strategic
their own economic an
broke the news about the mutiny in March 19的· That story a!So
romote
using them to P
, a!So 仆e Wa deser
ve a brighter future than that.
for the Far Eastern Economic Review, was the first to appear .
in the
international media as I was the on1y f · journalist informed b
ore1gn
the mutineers about the uprising. The message came tome via y
顷。
and telephone as I was then living in Bangkok.
Since then, I have maintained contacts with Wa and their allies.
The UWSA leadership has kept a hostile distance, though, because
of what I have written about their involvement m the drug trade
However, in August 2019 the UWSA leadership allowed me to visit
their area. Although I did not get to see Bao Youxiang, the top leader,
I met almost everybody else. The UWSA leaders wanted to present
their side of the story, which I appreciated, and my visit to their area
was even shown on their own television station: J\. friend of the Wa
people returns after 32 years.'
The Wa are a proud people and, as Bao said in his speech at the
April 2019 celebrations, "The Wa people are the masters of their own
destiny." That may not be entirely correct given their dependen ce
on China for almost everything, apart from trade and the supply
of weaponry. The Chinese yuan, not the Burmese kyat, is the only
currency that is used inside their area. Mobile phones and Internet
connections are provided by Ch.
mese servers. The Chinese language
is more widely spoken than B
urmese. Having had many meetings
with Wa from all walks oflife
from
the 1980s to today, it is also my
impression that the
Ymay be puppets of the Ch inese.
Ch·mese stoo But they are not
ges. The Wa are aware that the Chinese fee] superior to
them and in man .
Ymstances refer to th
they despise that. It em as'uncivilized savages; and
is my hope that this book will
present a better
8
9

~
 I
The Wa: Wild Men of the
Mountains

As Burma, as it was then called, was heading for independence in the

years after World War II, representatives of its many ethnic minorities
were summoned by the British colonial power for talks at Maymyo,
a picturesque hill station in the highlands east of Mandalay, now
called Pyin Oo Lwin.1 The hearings were called the Frontier Areas
Committee of Enquiry, and leaders of the non-Burmese peoples who
lived in territories far away from the country's heartland on the plains
of the Irrawaddy River were invited to present what they expected
from the proposed Union of Burma. Did they want autonomy for
their respective areas? A federation of equal states? Or even their
own independent nations, separate from Burma? Under British rule,
central Burma had been ruled as a colony while the more than forty
Shan principalities, or the Federated Shan States, were protectorates.
Other areas were called'designated'or'un-administered: It was a
patchwork of different jurisdictions, which now had to he brought
under some kind of unified, central administration.
Talks with major non-Burmese ethnic groups — the Shan, Kachin,
Chin, and Karenni (or Kayah) — went .· relatively smoothly. They
came prepared and asked for autonomy within a proposed federal
structure. The Karen, who had been fiercely loyal to the British

11
 CHAPTER 1

colonial power and even fought with them against the THE WA: WILD MEN OF THE MOUNTAINS
Japane
. th 沁
allied Burmese during World War II, did not participate in
Don't you want education, clothing, good food, good houses,
Instead, they sent a letter stating that they wished "to be in e talks
a disr hospitals?
territory under the direct control of the Governor," or ad 吭
OllJin.ion Sao Maha: We are very wild people and don't appreciate all these
that would be self-governing but remain under British
soverei things.
The Wa sent four delegates. Two of them gn炉
represented
Lun and Hsawnglong, relatively developed Wa M。11g
principalities . Have you got any ideas as to how you would like the Wa states
southern hills, while the other two came from th in 朊 to be administered in future?
e wilder and
remote northern states of Mong Kong and M 朊re Sao Maha: No.5
ong Mon. The h
were headed by U Nu, who later became inde earings
pendent Burma's first
prime minister. The southern Wa did not have an This exchange of views may appear farcical, but in retrospect it
Yspecific request,
Naw Hkam U from Mong Lun stated only that " shows that the Was did not think of themselves as citizens of Burma,
we are
educated in politics but not Wei] and that was not going change after independence in 1948 or when the
we are willing to abide b
Y the decision of
the Federated Shan States CounciJ;'3 while Sao name of the country was changed to Myanmar in 19的 TheWadid
Naw Hseng from
Hsawnglong stated that "Was are Was and Sh not have any concept of nations or states, nor were they ever ruled by
ans are Shans. wewould
not like to go into the Federated Shan States."4 any outside power. The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry's report
If that were not puzzling enough, the talks even stated that "there are no post offices but mails are accepted and
with th e northern Wa
revealed a wid e gap between the Wa distributed if addressed care of the Administrative Officers"6 which,
way of looking at life and the
committee's perception of it: in any case, would not have been relevant to them. Wa literacy in
any language was extremely limited so they would hardly have been
Do you want an any avid letter-writers among them. The report went on to mention
y association with other people?
Hkun Sai (for th eWa):Wed that "the only medical facilities are those provided by the Frontier
o not want to 丿·oin anybody because
in the past we have been ver Constabulary outpost Medical Officers and by itinerant Chinese
yindependent.
practitioners (non-certificated) … there is no organized education
Whatd 0 you want the futu service in the Wa states:'7
re to be in the Wa states?
Sao Maha (for th The early history of this idiosyncratic and isolated people is
eWa):Wehave not thought about that b
we are very wild people. W ecause shrouded in mystery. There is no doubt that they are related to the
e never thought of the administrative
future. We think Palaung, tea growers in northern Shan State, and the Lawa in the hills
only about ourselves.
of northern Thailand. The Mon and the Khmer may speak related
languages, but that is the only similarity between them and the Wa.
12
13
 .
CHAPTER I

THE WA : W ILD MEN OF TH E MOUNTAINS

The Mons in Burma and Thailand and the Khmer of Camb

咦 nineteenth century, claims that the Wa believe they
not only established their own 如ngdoms but also have their the end of the
own d from tadpoles and "spent their earlier years on the lake
literature and are Buddhists. Even the Palaung have converted t。 originate uninviting-loo如ng oval lake at the top of a
Buddhism. But most Wa have remained faithful to their animistic at Nawnghkeo, an d feet high ... the lake is about half a mile
beliefs throughout history, and it is only in recent years that some of mountain seven thousan
hundred yards w1•de. It is said to be enormously deep,
them have become Buddhists or Christians. What we know for certain long and two · "11 When they "became frogs
fish can live in it.
is that the Wa and their Lawa relatives have inhabited northeastern and so cold that no called Nam Tao where, in the progress of
they moved to a place »12 and eventually morphed into human
Shan State, southern Yunnan, and northern Thailand for centuries,
time, they grew to be ogres,
They may even be the original inhabitants of those areas as the old were head hunters, but definitely not
According to Scott, they
beings. the Shan who lived nearby and feared
Lanna 如ngs of northern Thailand and the Shan saohpa, or princes,
cannibals, as rumored among
in the eastern state of Kengtung paid a token yearly tribute to the these ferocious tribesmen. c. Pitchford in a 1937 essay,
Lawa and the Wa respectively as the "original owners of the land:'8 A second version, put forth by V.
11 The name Nawnghkeo is Shan for'green
When a Kengtung prince was crowned, two Wa always took part mentione d that lake as we . Pitchford's essay has no
in the ceremony and the Shan chief would consider his coronation Wa call it Kaing Kret. But
lake'while the
instead recounting that "from its primaeval
incomplete without them.9 The Wa may have been despised as reference to tadpoles,
f the Wa race and when they became
'savages,'but the Shan had to recognize their special status as a truly waters sprang the forebears o
f Pakkatei and there they learned
indigenous people. In Lanna, Thai historian Sarassawadee Ongsakul men, they lived in the cavern o
whereby they waxed fruitful and
noted "that the Lua [Lawal were accepted as the original owners of the mystery of head hunting, -Andre Prestre,
»13 On the other hand, Willy
the land can be seen in the coronation procession, in which a Lua multiplied exceedingly.
while smoking opium with some
walks with a dog ahead of the king into the city;'10 which was present- a French researcher, was told a story recorded
descendants of frogs. He also
day Chiang Mai. The Wa and the Lawa may not have lived in the tribesmen that they were n resulted in
kind of evolution that eventua Y
fertile valleys where the Shan and Thai settled, but they were certainly references to some "mankind
According to a fourth, Chinese version,
the first to form commumttes m that part of Southeast Asia. human beings.
»14 Toat version of the origin of the
Chronicles compiled by the Shan rulers, and research done by came from a cave caUed Yang-ho. head-hunting.
f tadpoles, frogs or
British colonial administrators and Chinese officials, Wa makes no mention o art of local mythology
provide some all those versions are p
dues, but it is far from certain that those account Needless to say, "a jumble of
5 are accurate. Based belief systems are
remarked, Wa
on interviews and oral history, they also contain wide!
Y differing
and, as Scott once »is Buddhism entered their
and simple fantasy.
accounts of the origin of the Wa. The intrepid British colonial officer Buddhism, totemism, called Dai in China,
contacts with the Shan,
James George Scott, who traveled extensively in upper Burma at belief systems through

15
14
 UNTAINS

,
CHAPTER 1 MEN OF THE MO
THE WA : WILD
a Wa lege nd
western si de o f th in ni ng to n re tells
ew W

1
a.
g mostly on the e W

忙酝 ”:1
t of th
lowlanders li"in a HiJJs unique ac co un ed on them
where th ey Jived to ge th er w ith C b · 如 in cl ud es a pi ta tio n be ga n with a trick play
also in the east
H an The which deca e of the Three
.
e Wa in to ' in ese.
according to hi ne se w ar ri or at the tim
an d the Ch inese divided th tame' Or'bi ' the fa m ou s C ot he r
Shan, the British, th em fight each
C h • · ation g by Zhuge Liang, D 22 0- 28 0. In or de r to make
d lived close to Shan or in es e civiliz A
id to have given
the
Wa, those who ha and Kingdoms, or C hi ne se ne ig hb or s, Z hu ge is sa
eir respective customs, in cl ud m · gB ud dh ·
m e of th ism f their ow. H e th en told
adop te d so , d
an
instead o t, w hi ch , na tu rally, di d no t gr
m en w h e st ill is ts w ith rice to plan ificed hu m an
'th e,叫d Wa,'trib
es ow er an im
I . so m e elements Wa boiled w ou ld gr ow on ly if th ey sacr
er s. th ei r ric e
d also he ad hu nt
t 1s he ad -h un ti n
g and 朊 en he ed ed this
of Buddhism, an the Wa that th ei r he ad s. A fter th e tr ib es m
W a th at h th of f gr ew.17 Chinese
ss of the as ca ug ht e im ag m arIO I] Of beings an d cu t rice seeds, w hi ch
presumed wildne d . av e th em pr op er
tside w or ld an
instilled fear am on g th e neighb 。rs advice, Zhuge g he ad -h un tin g,
people in the ou m il ar ac co un t of th e or ig in of
nt tribesmen . e a si
d
of these fiercely in ep en de chronicles provid hinese.18
a Shan, no t a C
s book Bur m a an d Beyond th at "the fact 1s · there th e evil tr ic ks te r is —
1948 colonial
Scott noted in hi but there
一 an d be fo re in de pe nd en ce in
side ad ve nt ur er s
f e
the Wa. Th were first h eard of On the Burmese casi on al visits by
has always been a ascination ab ou t y as lim ite d to oc
the d ays of Vasco d Gama. A t least, th er e seems no ·t h e ar ea w tis h perceived
by Europeans in a presence m
g m ar ch es up to w ha t th e B ri
nu al fla g Mangrai,
th t h· ad e in C amoens ' like Scott an d an ri te r Sa o Sa im on
reas on to do ub t e as se rtion ab ou is experiences m . T he Sh an w
it h C hi na his bo ok, The
Lusiads th at among the 'th ousand unkn own na ti ve s' h e ca m e across as the bo rd er w ly fa mily, relates in
g pr in ce
e K en gt un e Wa Hills
the Wa. He calls them Gueos, an d said the s, an d that a m em be r of th th at "d ur ing th
y were ca nn ib al the British A nn ex at io n,
ou t of
certainly was the
be lie f eir rs, the Shan States an d ha d to be ru sh ed
even amongst th ne ar es t ne ig hb ou , a Si kh do ct or
officer in 1939 w he n
Shans an d the B urmese, until 1893, when a British pa rt y w en t across tour of a British co rt of a pl at oo n o f tr oo ps
ar ea un de r an es
th e centre of their country,"16 and, presumablY, discovered th at th ey the he ad -h un ti ng d of fe re d 30 0 si
lver ru pe es to
a ha d co m e an
at th e W m ag ni fice nt
did not eat h uman flesh b ut were no t averse to th e ha bi t of ch op pi ng it was le ar ne d th ad , w hi ch , w it h its
s fo r hi s he
p follower pe ri ty to
off peoples heads. some of th e ca m ld br in g en du ri ng pr os
id w ou
ac he , th ey sa
The origin of the Wa h ead-huntin g tradition is ob sc ur e an d will beard an d m ou st
probably never b e fully fathomed . o ne theorYWas pr od uc ed byA la n their village:'19
as W es te rn an d C hi ne
se ac co un ts
B ai 's tale , as w el l
Winnington, the eijing correspo nd en t f or the British Sa im on g M an gr sc ri be it in th e
co nt ex t
co m m un is t a, te nd to de
D ai l am on g th e W s Fiskesjo, a
pa pe r 1h e Y Wor ker in th
e 1950s. Armed With h is ' co m m un is t of he ad -h un ti ng ha rv es ts. M ag nu
s fo r go od
credentials, h e was the only Westerner at that of fertility ri te s
an d w is he
th at it ha d
time who Was allowed is th eo ry an d ar gu es
sp ut es th
to trave l exte ns ive} · ot e po lo gi st , di ges.
Y m rem pa rt s of Yunnan. He later Wrote a Swedish an th ro hi es in w ar w it h rival villa
e SIaves o fth tr op
bo ok calle d 7h
eC oo /Mountains, an d alth ough th th e co ll ec ti on of
e title m or e to do w it h fi gu re d in th e he
ad -h un ti ng
fe rs tri b . no rt h or de it y th at
actually re to th e N or su tern y rt ili ty go d
e In Wes · also
unnan, It There was no fe

16 17
 CHAPTER I
NS
N OF THE MOUNTAI
THE WA : WILD ME
on of
sjo writes, "the panthe spirits ads by tens or
rituals because. as Fiske d sk · 归 rding to Sc ott , "M os t villages count their he
f em y he ad s an Acco according to
t part rn th e arr an gements o en uus. \v1 the y run into many more,
no direc with in• e twenties bu t in so m e ca ses
un de rstoo d ms to be the
｀｀可fare practices of the
past mu st be th social the vil lag e, an d wh ether, as sometimes see
d no t , and the age of one village
咚 ionaJ con text of co
nflict ov er land an re sour ces, cust0 呱:·切 ies or, as on e m igh t say, the guarantees, of
case, the troph ott noted,
Whatever the case, wa
rfare between different Wa Vill ages
co m bin e wi th an oth er."23 The Chinese, Sc
Was run into and opium
t, and given the tri bal nature of Wa society it would noth st "si nc e the y ha ve dealings with them in
preva len knew the Wa be such
one like Zh uge or anybody else to
a\re
ma 丿or ca sh crop in the hills and as
been necessary for some play ks
tric and salt心 Opiu m wa s a
wide in
ile d rice to pit on e communitYagam .
st erc ha nts an d the ir contacts spread far and
on them with bo another.As sold to Chinese m
lonial officer who wrote
·
"the Wa people live on th勺 ungle hilltops in on, another British co
Winnington describes, the region. G. F. Huds fies the Panthay一
uses built on stilts."21 g the early colonial era, identi
fortified villages of bamb oo, thatched ho A Wa ab ou t the W a du rin
Burma after rising
in Ch ina in the mid 炒5oswasno s fro m Yu nnan who had fled into
咄 age called Ur nu he saw different Chine se M us lim
1873- as the ma in
rd at th es am e time and earlier: pe ro r, wh ich lasted from 1855 to
from those across the bo er in Burma up again st the em
cellent muleteers
W a op ium . Hi sto ric ally, they have been ex
buyers of not only the
h of the ca rav an trade in the region,
surrounded bYa high growth of dense and controll ed m uc
凇 all villages, Urnu is y transported as far so
uth as Chiang
d ad and Iiving es s. Ot he r go od s the
thornwood behveen 15 an 20 yards thick, with de opium busin precious
er n Th ail an d inc lud ed salt, tea, minerals,
thom intertwined to form an impenetrabl e natural barbed -wire Mai in north , and
er go od s. Bu t op ium was a major commodity
stones, and cons um
barrier. At opposite ends of th e village two tu nnels are cut through trade rs, were "financed
co rdi ng to Hu ds on , the Panthay, the opium
the barrier, closed on the inside bYmassive doors hacked out of ac ser rifles with 巧 00
ng ap or ea n Ch ine se and they had 130 Mau
large trees-h inges, door and bolt slots all cut from a single piece by Si o French, Siamese
po rting op ium by the hundredweight int
of hardwood — giving the village the ad vantage over attackers in mules, ex
o riflemen:'25 For
h ter rit or y, ea ch m uleload escorted by tw
the tunnel. 22 and Britis g their crop,
on ey the W a op ium farmers got from sellin
the little m s from the
to bu y sa lt, ric e, an d a few other necessitie
Skulls of decapitated enemies were t on display outside the they were able
pu nts.
•
village to warn off int rude rs. Ea ch village would have a drum house,
. same Chinese mercha and again the buyers
ve r m in in g wa s an ot her source of income,
and th esoundof drums would he h Sil Yunnan. Large-
eard when there was a festival, or Pa nth ay an d other Chinese from
peop le f os tly th e
if rom a hostile viii age were spotted in the vicini ty. The Wa were m , and even
in in g wa s ca rri ed ou t between 1650 and 1800
also displayed heads of buffaloes, complete with impressive horns, as scale silver m un, Shan
wh at no w is a tow n in the Wa Hills: Vingng
troph·ies suggestin gwealth and ccessful hunting trips. Theh gave name to Wa
su orned
It is no t un us ua l that towns and areas in the
bu ffalo has ·
,m mo de rn tim es, becom e the symbol of the W for 'silver town:
a nation.

_
19
18

一C
 ~, 一

CH AP TER I THE WI\: WILD MEN OF THE

MO UN r I\INS

er sio n to Buddhis.rn calJ

an d th e pa rti al co nv centre, which was politi y and eco nornicaJJ Yind
s, m s. ependent. Th 』S
Hills have Shan name to th e ad op tio n of Sh an po lit ic al sy ste de d b
f them Jed centre was surroun ya Wa periph , in
we rfu l Sh 知 ery Which people lived
am ong some o y tri bu te to m or e po under the tenuous rule of state societies
\Va chieftains di d pa yet farther beyond. The
Whi le some do m in an ce
jo als o no tes th at "th es e Wa de fle ct ed Sh an Wa peop le Jiving in th al
e centr Wa lands t
saohpa, Fiskes em se lv es up as ake it for granted that
如 r ge og ra ph ic
al pos1t1on to se t th they live at the or igi n of th
e World , at Which they themsel
br seizing on m e th re at en in g Sh 叩 Yes have
th e m od el of th os e sa remained. 28
Shan 双yle prin
ces, on om e s
th them:'26 Th e ou tc Wa
be able to co m pe te wi so m er
States, so as to n as th e W a sta te s, 1.llles
f wh at be ca m e kn ow h
Ot he r se ct io ns of th e um an race, th eW a believe, have
th e emergence o · th e W emerged
pital's'. later ou t of holes m a m ou nt ain s "from which all humani
even spelled with a ca on g Lu n in th e so ut h ern
or ga ni ze d of th os e W a sta te s wa s M. come fo rth [an d th e Yl have pr oc ee de d farther
ty
The best proclai.rned aw ay -b ec au se the
Ta Aw ng as he 1s so m et im es ca lle d, lan d was al re ad y oc cu pi ed . Th• applies to such
hills. Tawang, or in 1822 , and is o n -Wa others as
th e ea rly ni ne te en th ce nt ur y. H e di ed the Shan an d th e Lah u, th e C han·d n th
hi m se lf sa oh pa in o had inese e Burmese, as well as any
ee de d by hi s ne ph ew H ku n H se ng wh others still."29 Ac co rd m · g to Fiskesjo, "th ew
cc
ha vi ng no so ns was su e th e village of a also see th emselves as
ho be ca m e a Bu dd hi st an d m ad living at th e to p of th e world , sm . ce it is
a Shan na m e, an d w
n of the where the high est and most
of hi s sta te . A fte r th e Br iti sh an ne xa tio im po sin g m ou nt ai ns are ."Jo
The Lahu, wh o speak a Tibeto- Burman
Pa ng ya ng th e capital m ai nt ai ne d cordial eth ni ca ll
in th e 18 80 s an d 1的 os, M on g Lu n language, ar e no t
Yor linguisticaU Yrelated to th eWa, but the
Shan States ni al power.
rio us Sh an sa oh pa s as w el l as th e co lo ll
two hi pe op les ha ve al ways been close an d are in some mytholo
re lat io ns wi th th e va nt to schools in br ot he rs.
th e ru lin g fa m ily w er e se regarded as gy
e ch ild re n in
Several of th t from their sta tu s th e Wa
d it wa s no t un us ua l th at th ey , ap ar The sp ec ial
enjoyed am on g the
Shan an d the
th e Sh an States, an d ev en English.» no rth er n Thai is we
ll do c d
an , Ch in es e, B ur m es e, an um en te d an may have en h anced that
ul d sp ea k Sh
na tiv e Wa, co backward worldview. Th ei r relat io ns with the Ch me .
ir to th e W a to sa y th at th ey w er e a se are also well -established,
be fa .
Thus, it wo ul d no t an d Chin改 bu t m od er n Ch
m es e so ur ce s exaggerate th at relationship in order
m so m e m te ra ct 10 n w ith th ei r Sh an
tri be wh o, ap ar t f ro
ns w ith little orno to fit it in to th e no tio n of a unified nation-state th at encompassed
ta l is ol at io n in th ei r m ou nt ai all th e pe op le s 1 icial
ne ig hb or s, liv ed in to
than that iv in g wi th in Ch in a's present boundaries. If off
e w or ld . Th e W a w er e sm ar te r
un de rs ta nd in g of th
e ou ts id Ch in es e so ur ce s ar e to be b elieved, th e Wa "came un de r the rule of
people at 曲
ha d a no tio n of be in g a th e Ha n Dy na sty "31 m . : "Th ereafter, through
an d, in fact, ev en th e' w ild 'o ne s th e se co nd ce nt ur y AD
no te d: ople
iv er se . In hi s Ph .D th es is , Fi sk es jo th e Tang, s on g, Yuan, M in g an d Qi ng d ynasties, the Va (Wa) pe
ce nt er of th e un
ha ve ha d in · se pa ra bl e ties with ot he r peoples in the hinterland."32
n of th e Wa during under direct
of th e ge ne ra l si tu at io That, of co ur se , is pu re fantasy as no t even Yunnan came
t sa lie nt fe at ur e Wa
The m os no m ous
nc e of an au to
s is th e pe rs is te
th e la st few ce nt ur ie 21

20
 Ch ·ine se
aW a pe
rul e un
op le wa s
til the fou
CH APTER 1

rte ent h century, and the ver

y existen
. THE WA : WIL D MEN OF
THE MO UNT AINS

the Iate vir tua lly un kn ow n to the em per ors in ce 。f

eig hte ent h no t colonies, the Shan States had the ir own admini
century.33 Be ijin g unt il stration, police
C forces, civil servants, magistra
olo nia l Br ita in, rat he r tha tes, an d judges.35
to cla im the n Ch . Hu dso n wrote tha t "th e ann
ma , was the first ou tsid e exa tio n of Up per Burma in
Wa Hil ls. Af ter d power 1885,
In 188 epo sin g Thibaw, the last ki gave us a fro nti er wit h Ch ina , mu ch of it so und efi
5 an d sen din g h· ngofBur阳 ned that we had
co nq ue r the Sh 1m int o exile in Ind ia, the to arr ang e for its del im ita tio n by joi nt com mi ssi
British we nt ons of British and
of an un an States. Th ey wa nte d ma inl on to Chinese officers. Ne ith er sid
con tro lla ble bu ff y to avo id th e wa nte d the Wa States, a
er are a bet we en the m an d the e em erg ence singularly
ab ou t the sam e t· unattractive area, a liability,
Fren ch, no t an asset, an d the Chine
im e we re est abl ish ing the ir who at discussing the map, agr eed to se, wh en
wh ich inc lud ed col oni al leave the m on ou r side of the
pre sen t-d ay Laos. Sir Ch arl rul e in Ind och ina, frontier.'.'36
Ch ief C es C ros The British, Hu dso n said, we
om mi ssi on er of B thwaite, British re "left wi th the bu rde n of pol
and pre ven tin g the ir ann ual icing the m
in thi s wa y: urm a m 1887一90, des cri bed rai ds int o civilised ter rito ry:
the situatio '37 Scott
n had already con clu ded tha t
"th e Wa nev er sto od agains
the ir per ma nen tly fortified t us, even in
Lo ok ing at the ch villages. Th eir sho oti ng wa s
puerile, and
ara cte r of the cou ntr y lying bet ou r casualties were a me re
an d the Me k ween the Salween han dfu l, bu t the ir con sta nt
sni pin g and
ong , it was cer tai n to be the ref am bus hes were dis tra cti ng
uge of all the discontent . . . [but] sin ce the y will nev
an d ou tla wr y of Bu rm a. Un er sta nd, it is
less it was ruled by a govern impossible to pu nis h the m
ment not save by bu rni ng the ir village
on ly loyal an d frie nd ly to us, s:'38
bu t thoroughly strong and effi But Hu dso n als o co nc lud ed
cient, -an d tha t wa s as late as the
this reg ion wo uld bec om e a 1930s一
bas e for the operations of eve tha t "th rou gh ou t history, the
ry brigand on ly adm ini ste red are a on
lea der ... or pre ten de r … wh of the Bu rm a-C hin a fro nti er eit her sid e
ere the y mi gh t mu ste r their we re the valleys an d a few ma
followers in rou tes .
an d hat ch the ir plo ts to rai The hills we re No Man's La
d British ter rito ry wh en opp nd , eve n for the Ch ine se,
ortunity an d the Wa
offered. To tho se res po nsi ma ssi f wa s especially ter ra
ble for the pea ce of Burm inc ogn ita . No bo dy eve r we
a, such a nt the re an d
pro spe ct wa s no t ple asa nt. eve n the app roa che s we re dre
34 ade d, the Salween an d Me ko
bei ng ma lar ia- rid de n-C hin ng valleys
ese officers reg ard ed the wh
a pen al station:'39 ole are a as
Co ns eq ue ntl y, the Sh an
Sta tes we re' pa cif ied 'ov er
the years 1885 Th e pre sen ce of the Wa , an
to 18 90 , an d tho se are d pre vai lin g my ths ab ou t
as ac hie ve d a sta tus dif the m, wa s
fer en t fro m that of ano the r rea son wh y Ch ine
Bu rm a pro pe r. W hil e Th se adm ini str ato rs did no t
iba w wa s de po sed , the Sh ven tur e int o
an pri nce s were the se rem ote mo un tai ns. Do
pe rm itt ed to ret ain the rot hy J. So lin ger wr ote in
ir titl es an d rul e the ir res he r stu dy of
pec tiv e states in a eth nic mi no riti es in Yu nn an:
ma nn er sim ila r to tha t of
the In dia n ma ha raj as. As
pro tec tor ate s an d

22 23

....
 ~二7
CHA PTE R 1 THE WA: WILD MEN OF THE MOUNTAINS

the Salween and the

The wild l(awa !i.e. Wa], living between scene. Oneof the first was the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
head-hunters. Their fondness for warfare,
Mekong Rivers, were (VOC), or the Dutch East India Company. Having lost Formosa,
belief that Chinese heads were the most
and their superstitious or Taiwan, to rebellious Chinese forces from the mairtland in 1662,
沛cacious
for their sacrifices, had historically kept the Han out of
and then been excluded from Chinese ports as well, the Dutch went
these Kawa hated the Han and never
their hills quite e伯ctively ... looking for alternative trade routes to China. Burma seemed an
a few scattered Shan settlements
came under their influence. Only obvious route from the Bay of Bengal to the vast Chinese market, and
isolated and mountainous 陌 Id
dotted the ot herwise homogcnous, that was why the Dutch maintained a significant presence in Burma
40
Kawa homeland on the Burma border.
for nearly half a century. Their eye was on the northern Irrawaddy
比ver port of Bhamo at the beginning of an old trade route called the
There is, in fact, no historical evidence to suggest that thew囡
'ambassadors'road; which ended in Yunnanfu, today's Kunming.
Chinese heads as especially preferable, or that heads were used~
Bhamo, in today's Kachin State, was as far north as the influence of
religious rites, but just the notion that it could be true was enou创
t some brave and locally connected the Burmese kings stretched in those days.
to keep aII Chinese excep stlvQ
However, the VOC did not succeed. "Time and again;• Dutch
and opium traders out of the Wa Hills. Interaction with the Shan w~
historian Wil 0 . Dijk wrote, "the Company's factors in Burma
mostly in the valleys, an d then when Wa came down from their h心
pleaded with the King to allow the VOC a trading post on the Sino-
to buy or barter certain necessities.
Burmese border, but to no avail. Eventually this ban became a major
Britain, however, had a fundamental strategic interest in cont roll四
factor contributing to the Dutch decision to abandon Burma:'41 That
the Chinese frontier. That meant establishing a semblance of stabi伽
was a major setback for the Dutch because, as Dijk writes, "there is
along the border, and leaving the Wa to run their own affairs as lo贝
perhaps no route by which overland traffic between southwestern
as they did not ra1·d the lowlands. There was also nothing there a
China and any point on the Bay of Bengal can so readily be carried
any commercial interest. By the end of the nineteenth century, 旧
than the Bhamo route:'42
silver deposits had been depleted, and the opium that was grownil
Nevertheless, Dutch merchants stayed on in Burma even after the
the Wa Hills was of poor quality and most of it was consumed 1吐
British conquest in the nineteenth century, and the colony attracted
The British policy towards the Wa was to contain them ra临
a wide range of other merchants from all over the world. Rangoon,
than try to administer their hills. Peace in the frontier areas ~11 the capital of British
Burma since 1853, became one of the most
important because Britain's interest in Burma as a whole was a11 cosmopolitan cities in Asia, with significant foreig
n communities
backdoor to China for trade and commerce. The strategic import邸 of Indians, Chinese, A
rmenians, Jews, Persians, Europeans, .and
of Burma was recognized by other colonial powers as we11, and so似 Eurasians. It was, of
course, not because of trade with China, but
of them had been in the region even before the British arrivedon tlt

24 25
 可- 三
CHAPTER l
THE WA : WIL D MEN
OF THE MO UNTAIN S

from Burma to China. From 1的 4 to 1900, Major Davis, a Br

itish
official, made a remarkable series of surveys of the
no rth ern Shan
States an d Yunnan for possible railway routes. He found
that the most
convenient route would be from Mandalay ov
er the hills to Lashio
and the n on to Kunlong on the Salween River. Fro
m there, along the
Nam Tin g River, a Salween tributary, the ter
rai n was relatively flat
all the way into Yunnan, wh
ere mo un tai ns once again
\andscape.45 Davis arg ue do mi na ted the
d tha t the railway sho uld
be bu ilt on bo th
commerc1·\ a - to facilitate cross-bo rde r trade一and
political gro un ds:
to control the ba ck do or to
Ch ina in ord er to secure
British influence
over Yunnan an d oth er res
tive provinces.
Unfortunately for Davis,
his final sur ve ys of the pro
jec ted railway
across Yunnan were los
t wh en his colleague, Ca
pta in W. A. Watt-
Jones, was 回led du rin
g the Boxer Rebellion
in Beijing in 1900.
If the plan ha d materialize
d, the railway wo uld hav
no rth ern mo st fringes of e ski rte d the
the Wa Hi lls. Th e co st
of suc h a railway
would also have be en pro
hibitive. Da vis est im ate
d tha t a meter-gauge
line would co st 20 mi llio
n po un ds an d tha t the co
which, in mo de rn Ch ina ha s be en int erp ret e ns tru cti on wo uld
emperor, take at least ten years心 A
railway was bu ilt fro m Ma
of recognition of Ch ine se sov ere ign ty ov tho se regions. But this nd ala y to Lashio,
as 心 rather
an d tha t inc lud ed the spe
sho uld be see n cta cu lar Go kte ik via du ct,
wh ich was bu ilt
`- -- tribute payment tha n a sign of in l的 9 an d op en ed in
1900. Co mp on en ts for

a已立三;he
tak the 689-m ete r-l on g
acceptance of the authority 。 fa hig he r po we r: e thi s an d leave us bridge were ma de by the
Pe nn syl va nia Steel Co mp
an y an d shi pp ed to
., Burma. The he igh t of the
bri dg e is 102 me ter s, the
hig he st in Bu rm a
same and, at the tim e, the lar ge
st railway tre stl e in the
world.

二三二三霆三二二。
But after tha t, no thi ng
mo re ha pp en ed on the
nd the Sh an States 一was railway front.
me an t to chan陨
Ch ina an d the Un ite d Ki ng do m s1g · neda
convention tha t was me stimulate, t迎竺巴竺竺些旦oh
an t to reg ula te, an d pe rha ps even n LeRoy Ch ris tia n, a US arm y ma
raUwar in 1940 tha t ev en jad e jor, wr ote
cro ss- bo rde r tra de . Th ere
wa s ev en talk ab ou t bu ild ing a fro m the mi ne s aro un
d Hp ak an in Ka ch in

26 27
 State was no longer sent along
CHA PTE R 1
~
the ancient routes through Gua
from Rangoon to Guangzhou and
n邸
THE WA: W I LD MEN OF THE M OU NTA IN S

argued that it would be possible

in sou the rn China, but went by sea
"Britain and France forgot Yunna
i l t was no t until 受~at Ch
·po rta nc e of the Yu ~ nnan gat _
Shanghai was attacked, and Ch
夕
by the Japanese na Work the
hw ay fro m Bu rm a to
hig
we re res isti ng the Japanese adv
~m att er of cut tin g a roa d ove r
an d the Me kon g, two gre at riv
ste el- cab le sus pen sio n bridge
me n usi ng the mo st pri mi tiv
wo rk, an d as soo n as it wa s op
off on the 1,145-kilometer run
its com ple tio n, no few er tha
wo rk on ma int ena nce an d im
fic. 48 Th at wa s, of cou
co uld car ry hea vy traf
B urm a Ro ad tha t wo un d its wa y m
the mo un tai ns.
Jap ane se inv
Th en, the
Ro ad wa s cu t an d the all
—
the Un ite d Sta tes ha d to
sup pli es to the Ku om int an g
co mm an de r, Ge ne ral Jos eph
'V ine ga r Joe 'fo r his sho rt tem
a bo ld sol uti on : to cu t an en
Le do in As sam in no rth eas
int o Ch ina , wh ere it wo uld
勺 in the nor th were never fully con
n and the ir rivalry for its trade:'
ina and Britain awakened to
- h
eway. Ch ina was at wa r wit Japan,
-- the
ina's ma riti me por ts were blockaded
n began on bui ldi ng an all -weather
that
Yu nna n to sup ply the Ch ine se forces
anc e in the east. It was not only a
s ·
the mo un tai ns of Yunnan. The alween
ers, als o had to be spa nn ed bYmodern
s. An yw her e fro m 150,000 to 300,000
e of eng ine eri ng equ ipm ent Went to
sped
ene d in 1939 hu nd red s of trucks
n aft钉
fro m La shi o to Ku nm ing . Eve
stant!y at
n 30 ,00 0 me n we re kep t con
pro vem ent of the sur fac e to ma
ke sure it
rse , the fam ous and fabled
nu me rou s sw itc hba ck curves over
Burma
ad ed Bu rm a in Jan uar y 1942. The
—
ied for ces the Un ite d Kin
gdom and
te to send
loo k for an alt ern ati ve rou
American
for ces in Ch ina 's int eri or. The
kn挪
W. Sti lwe ll, wh o ear ned the nic
e upwi仙
pe r an d abr asi ve ma nn er, cam
all town ri
tir ely ne w roa d fro m the sm
st Bur皿
ter n Ind ia acr oss no rth ern mo
a Road廿
lin k up wi th the old er Bu rm
28
because the Na ga and Kachin hills
que red by the Japanese. There, local
Kachin guerrillas, sup por ted by
the United Ki ngd om and the United
States, were constantly harassing
the Japanese, and with some more
Allied sup por t the y sho uld b e able to ma int ain reasonable safe ty for
the road con str uct ion crews. Stil
well wh o had ser ved as a military
,
adviser to the nationalis t Ch ine se lea der Ch g Kai-shek, did not
ian
and h· ir fi
want to abandon him is forces in the gh t against the Japanese.
He had also bro ugh t wit h him Ch me se soldiers to Ind ·1a, wh ere the y
were being tra ine d and equ ipp ed to assist the Allied forces. Fo r the
British, it was also the b egi nni ng of th e cam pai gn to reestablish the ir
rule over Bu rm a.
First we nt Stilwell's A me ric an- tra ine d Ch me · se d1v1s1ons , dnVIn g
the Japanese before the m. On eit her side, in flan ki ng mo vem ent s,
Chinese and Am eri can pat rol s pro vid ed sec uri ty for the roa d
con stru ctio n teams. 0 n the heels of the Ch .
r如 ng me se div isio ns cam e the
trai lbla zer s, ma ou t the 1·
me wit h axes for th e arm ore d bul ldoze rs
Las t
that followed. cam e the ma in lab or force, wh o bla ste d the roa d,
paved it, and con str uct ed steel bri d ges acr oss the ·
inn um era ble
streams and rivers alo ng the way.
While the Burm a Ro ad wa s bui lt b Y Ch ine se lab
or, Stilwell's roa d
con str uct ion eff ort wa s on e of th e mo st mi xed anyw her e in the wo rld .
0
Lieut-Col. Fra nk wen, a British offi
the laborers: "C h.me se, Ch ·
cer in on e of the tea ms , des cri bed
ms, Kachi Ind ·tans, Nagas, G aro s sla she d,
ns,
hau led and piled, N egr oes d
rove ma chi nes . Bla ck, bro wn , yel low an d
wh ite me n toi led sh lde r-d eep in th
ou e str eam s, bel t-deep in red mu d.
On on e cam p, 2,0 00 labou rer s spo k
e 20 0 dif fere nt dialects."49
B
It Was the riti sh E mp ire , wi th
. an sup po rt,
con sid era ble A me nc
tha t str uck bac k aga.ins t th
e Jap ane se. So on we apo ns car ner s, gu ns,
29
 、 ~

CH AP TE R 1
TH EWA: WI LDMEN OF THE MOUNTAINS
d meter-wid e
nt ry co lu m ns flowed own the ten- nds o f Lah flocked t
tanks, an d in fa
ged road wh ·Ich Similarly, thousa u e n g t u n g tOsee and J
et al ed , tr en ch ed , banked, an d brid te A ° K ore IS!en
do ub le -t ra ck ed , m en th e to Young, a whi merican who w a White tropical suit and, like
d. T ow n af te r town was conquered, an d ev ied h Bible wherever h
Stilwell ha d in
it ia te ll on Augus1 the Judsons, carr is e Went. He ca pita/ized on the
er o f th e K ac hin Hills , Myitkyina , fe and h.
ve ce nt fact that the L吐 u had a similar belie
f,
ad 而nistralJ siege by th e Alli
es. The road , w闷 1s con sion rate Was so
y- ei gh t- da y ga tion un g to . Ver
3, 1944 af te r
a se ve nt d, 'b ec am e a ne 1y high th at a dele was sent to Ken gt
investigate. According
w el l R o ad 'o r' th e L ed o R oa
'th e Stil 6 kilornet s. to US researcher
A lf McCoy:
was kn ow n as ed o to K un m ing, a total o f1,72 er red
hi ng fr om L I
hi gh w ay st re tc e bu il t by A ll ie d en gi ne er s an d
oca/
th er ro ad s w er
O th er d ry -w ea M th e C h·
in Hills, fr om an ip u r to 1ndw·in
b o r fr om In d ia in to th e C h er f t B
la ac ro ss th e bo rd ro m Eas eng乱
an d to th e A ra k an re gi on
River , M aY1945, an d on A亵
e fo rc ed o u t o f R an go on in
er
T he Ja pa ne se w to th e A ll ie d f or ce s at th e
south eastern
it s su rr en d er ed
15 th ei r la st u n ri st ia
1
n re m ar k ed in 945, Altoge朊
"
oy C h
in. A s L eR
cityofM叫me b y th e cu rr en t war为
u rm a h ad b ee n de st ro ye d
· 01at io n o f B
th e 1s r contacts With the
so in th e W a Hills. B u t th ei
tr u e al
T h e sa m e h el d y en te re d a n ew st ag
e w h en the first
al re ad
h ad ac tu al ly ．一
o u ts id e w o rl d er e in th e 19 30_s. T he trailblazerwai
ar ri v ed th -
wes te rn m is si o n ar ie s _ _ er ic an B ap ti st , w ho se father w归
Am
n t Y ou ng , a n sp re ad ing th e gospd
M ar cu s V in ce 2 an d b eg an
rm a in 1的
m e to B u t Shan心
Y o u n g h a d co to co n v er t an y Buddhis
il in g
1901. A ft er fa lls surroun血
in K en g tu n g in n g th e L ah u in th e hi
o
tu rn e d to m is
si o n ar y w o rk
, li
am
k e so m e o th er S ou th ea
st Asian peo购 --- -~ a …
ur cn an da m 1 ssionary school in M englian in the Wa area
Th
. T h e L ah u Jee啪 o fsouthern Yun
nan. ed h un dr ed so fWa and Lahu
K en g tu n g city e so u th in B u rm a, held a e school educat
to th students, m an yo fw h om became pastors o f Christian congregations
K ar en fu rt h er e dayarrin
su ch as th e g a b ig b o o k w ou ld on
a t a w h it e m a
nh o ld in in M englian itself an d in G engma, cangyuan, Shuan gJ..iang, and
p re d ic ti n g th d write.
p le w h o co u ld n o t re ad an Lancang, all counties no w on the C h'mese side o f the Sino-Burmese
p eo
at io n am o n g st missionari6
to b ri n g sa lv er ic an B ap ti
d so n , A m border. S◄
n d A n n Ju heastern B听
A d o n ir a m a ar ri v ed in sout lem fo r the British nominal overlords was to
w h en th ey
doW!l ; A constant prob
e o f th at ta le
b e c a m e aw ar h m en t K ar en came determine th ee xa ct l ocation o fthat border which led to confrontat
ions
ia l as to n is
in 18 乃， and
to th e ir in it te foreig邮
h il ls to w el co m e th e whi
ir
d s fr o m th e
31
th e th o u sa n
30
 ~二二艺7
TH E WA: WIL D MEN
O F THE MO UNT A IN
CH APT ER 1 S

began to dissolved on ly wh en the British ret urn ed . It was

with the Chinese when they, in the nineteen th cen turY, war an d was the
the sou the rn fringes o f Yu血an . 如 B riti sh al Jap ane Ar my tha t rem ain e d the mo st po we rfu
claim the mountains on Jrnperi se l ins titu tio n
enetrate the area already before World in Burma thr ou gh ou t the oc cu pa tio n.
had made some attemp ts top
Co mm iss ion was app oin ted to more
cal
War II. A body led the Inselin Kengtung an d Mo ng Pa n we re giv en to Th ail an d, a Japanese ally,
between Burma an d ch ina, an d in 1935-
firmly demarcate the border whose sup p ort was necessar y to sec ure the bo rde rs of the oc cu pie d
the first tim e to sur ve y the Wa Hills. The
made
36 attemp ts were d twfor territories. As the British ha d eva cu ate d Bu rm a an d the Sh an Sta tes
o officers in the V\'a Hills to "in tro du ce light
British also statione in 1942, the y sou g ht he lp fro m Ch ian g Ka i-s he k wh o sen
t the 93 rd
administration.»55 Division int o Ke ng tun g wh ile the 24 9th an d 55th Di
the no rth ern Wa Hills in 寸sion s mo ve d
加 road tha t was bu ilt int o 1941 w赵 into the Ka ren ni States an d the so uth ern Sh an Sta
lar ge tra f the Wa Hi lls rem tes . Acco rdi ng to
pa rt o f those efforts. Ho wever, cts o ained Shan his tor ian Sai Au ng
da Tu n, "th e Ch ine se sol die rs we re ge ne ral ly
ng ero us for an y ou tsi de r to ventur
inaccessible. It was sim ply too e not well tra ine d or we ll- eq
uip pe d lik e the Jap an ese.
wh ere he ad -hu still rife. Finally, in 1941, the Th e Ch ine se we re
into the areas nti ng wa s badly defeated by su pe rio
r nu mb ers an d me ch an
British an d the Ch ine se ag ree do n wh ere the bo rde r sho uld be. But including air pla ne s, ag ain ise d eq uip me nt,
we re for ced to leave Burm st wh ich the y ha d no d efe
nc e '.'58
the n the wa r bro ke ou t an d the Br itis h a On May 3, 1942, tw en ty- sev
2 an en Th ai air pla ne s flew ov
Ra ng oo n fell to the Jap an ese on Ma rch 8,1 94 d the rest of the where the Ch ine se tro op er Ke ng tun g
s we re sta tio ne d an d bo
we ll. It wa s on the far no rth that mb ed the tow n's
colony was so on ov err un as ly in market. Th e bo mb ard me nt
inf lic ted he av y ca su alt ies
bli sh co ntr o ,1 an d in so me pa rts of the Shan on the Ch ine se,
the Japanese did no t est a who wi thd raw to the no rth
, clo se to the Ch ine se bo
rde r. A few we ek s
States . later, Th ai tro op s led by Fie
de ld Ma rsh al Pi n Ch oo nh av
The Bu rm a Ind ep en nc e Ar my (B IA ), led by Bu rm ese nation迦 Chatichai Ch oo nh av an, an an d his so n,
ma rch ed int o Ke ng tun g
an d the Th ai fla g
he ro Au ng Sa n, ha d ass ist ed the Jap an ese wh en the y ma rch ed across flew ov er the town.59 Ke
ng tun g, wi th 31 ,00 0 sq ua
. d Bu rm a. Bu t wa ry of re kil om ete rs, the
the bo rde r fro m Th ail an d an d occup比 loc忒 biggest of the Sh an Sta tes
, an d the mu ch sm all er
na
f the no n- Bu rm es e tio na liti es tended M on g Pa n Sta te
eth nic se nti me nts -m an across Th ail an d's no rth we
yO ste rn bo rde r, we re bo th
pla ce d un de r Th ai
to be an ti- Bu rm ese as we 一 the Jap an ese ke pt t he BIA out of the ad mi nis tra tio n, wh ich the
ll Jap an ese rec og niz ed the
fol low ing ye ar.
Sh an Sta tes wh en the y tri ed to en ter the are a in 1942· s6 It was nO! Th ail an d wa s als o giv en
are as in no rth ern Ma lay
a an d we ste rn La os
un til Se pte mb er 22, 1943 tha t Jap an de cid ed to tra ns fer "the Karenni as pa rt of the J血型迳
竺heme to est ab lis h wh
at they 叫~ ' The
sta tes , W a sta tes , an d the wh ole o f th e Sh an sta tes wi th the excepti优 竺 芒A畛肛型妇肝虹
乓 ：60
of Ke ng tun g an d M on g »s1 to a Bu rm es e puppe t re伊 Fie rce fig hti ng rag ed for
mo nth s in the no rth .
Pa n sta tes As the Br iti sh
wh ich the Jap an ese ha May Bof tht an d the ir mo stl y In dia
d est ab lis he d in Ra ng oo n tro op s ret rea ted eit he
n on r tow ard s In dia or
d of !bl Ch ina , the y we re bo mb
ye ar. Th at reg im e co nti. d to 'go ve rn 'B un til the en ed by the Jap an ese . Ac
nu e ur ma co rd ing to Sa i Au ng

33
32
 飞 ＼＼ CHAPTER 1
\ Tun, "corpse after corpse lay scatte
red in towns, espe
THE WA : WILD ME
N OF THE MOUN
TAINS
Hsen面，:•61 an d cially Lash风 伽 Shan saohpa
along th e B ur m a also asked for, an
R oa d, "which cam to be known ~ d were granted, th
the Road ofDeath:
'62 匹血型主竺＝ e secede from th e pr
opos
e right to
立竺主竺乏 ed U ni on of Burm

三气
erious warfare. The Japanese were pr of independence, a after a ten-year
period
~~ ~—一一 obably as afraid as th at is, in 1958 , sh
anyb 咘 ould they be diss
else to enter the area. The o y re co rd ed
一------­ the new federation. This right w atisfied with
exception oc cu rr as ensured under
ed in tht Constitution, Cha th e fi.rst Burmese
pter X, bu t applie
contingent of Japa d only to the Sh an
states. Toe 1947 C
nese troops, es co rt ed by a Shan fr om w onstitution stipul and Karenni
est of 如 ated th at other stat
Salween River, attacked a W a se tt le m en beforme d , th e first would be es could also
t ne ar M on g M au for th e Kachin an
an d kil屈 d th e Karen, bu t th

~ ~三~
twenty-one village ho
rs w , presumably, were ar m ed as well states would no t have th e righ
t to secede from th
ose
.63 e U ni
T坐二三 W on .66
a did 吧卫生
妇 ny—tanv.ible 甲屯
已 打
Hills. There, th e recommendations 严
lo ca1 C hi ne se po pu la ti on resist . Based on th e Pa
Japanese w he n th tr ie d to en te r th e area
ey
ed t~
at K un lo ng on th
三ma became nglong Agreemen
t an d the 1947

Chinese已3
e Salwe句 an in de pe nd en t
January 4, 1948,百 fe deral republic on
River. The local ru
le r o f ok an g, ng W en -p 芯蒜邓ljuriscllction ~

饮
in , allied himself
th e nationalist wi心 the last years of co of th e W a Hills. During '1
he lonial rule, th e Bri
畜 an d hi s th en twenty-th, tish ha d attempted
year- ~-sein, or Ji m m y some ki nd of in di
re ct rule by appo
to establish ~
Yang, w er e invite inting Harold You
d to Vist Young's so n an d ng, William
C hi an g Kai-she k at hi s w ar ti m e
ca p ital of Chungqing.64 Jimmy Y叫 Vincent's brother,
as assistant supe
la te r be ca m e a pr Mong Lun an d ad rintendent of
om in en t bu si ne ss m an an d po li ti ci an in尸
—
--------~声--三---竺
in~
---竺
----二
Kengtung an d M on ---三
--~~- 堕
urma, 叫 been given th e ra
command of two
jacent areas. Alth
nk of captain in th
battalions of mos
ough he was Am
e British Army an
erican, he ha d ~
d was pu t in -t
g Pa n w er e re tu rn ed to th e Sh an States tly Shan soldiers
when 版 against th e Japane w ho fought
., British re tu rn ed in 1945, no t to re es ta bl is h co lo ni se w he n they oc
cupied most of B
al ru le bu t to prep机 World War II . H ur m a during
for Burma's in de pe f w hi ch th ar ol d Young's kn
nd en ce o e F ro nt ie r Areas C owledge of th e ar
ommitteed languages were in ea an d of local
E nq ui ry was an im valuable assets to
po rt an t pa rt . T he K ar en ne ve r jo in ed th e British. H e al
th e tal归 together w it h th e so saw action
di d no t, in 1947, o to th e sm al l m ar ke Americans an d th
g t to w n of Panglo e British against
ng, north d in th e Kachin Hill th e Japanese
th e Sh an States ca s in th e far no rt h
pi ta l T au ng gy i, to si gn an ag re em en of th e country, an
t which p矗 recruited by th e U
S Office of Strate
d was there
th e way for B ur m gic Services, a fore
a to be co m e a de m oc ra ti c fe de ra Central Intelligenc runner to the
l re public with \oca e Agency (CIA).6
au to no m y fo r th e 7
fr on ti er areas. T he da y re pr es en
ta ti ve s of theSh仙 After th e war, H
ar ol d Young tr ie
th e Kachin, an d th d an d convicted
e C hi n si gn ed th ·th 局 warlords w ho w several local
e P an gl on g A gr ee ere su sp ec te d of
\ Sa n. Fe br ua ry m en t W1 having collabora
12 is st il l ce le br at
ed as U ni on D ay l ho
, a na ti on • lida~ ' Japanese. A m on g
became a pr om in
th em was K hu n
Ja, th e uncle of K
ted w it h th e
hu n Sa, who
en t dr ug traffick
er in th e 1960s an
d ra n his own

34 35
 畸

CHAPTER 1 THE WA : WIL D MEN OF THE

MOU NTA INS

private army
in the Golden Triangle, the notorious drug-producing Kuomintang force. The effort wa
加 iland, Burma, and Lao and his rnam s supported by the
area where s meet, until he eve ntu a\\) d States and its Central Intelligen
Unite ce Agency (CIA), and the plan
surrendered to the Burmese government in January 1996. Khun ll. eco nqu er the mainland from those bases in the
a gunshot to his head on the banks was tor northeastern
｀心s executed by of the Irrawad由 f
rnountains o the Shan States. It was, in a sense, the Cl.A'.s first sec
River.68 ret
war, and General Li Mi, the Ku
British, and after 1948 the gov omintang officer in charge of the
Whatever control the ern 、
hav e had operation, was proclaimed commander of the 'Yunnan
in som Province

二三:
of independent Bu rma ma y e outlyi ng areas, w奴
abandoned when, 呾坠纽胆骂 Anti-Comm unist National Salvation Army, 69
立竺贮巴 竺呾鲤玉迦忠 This was at a time when the United States and its
allies were
fighting under the United Nations
banner against North Korean and
Chinese forces on the Korean pen
civil war, they had been unable to J insula. Claire Chennault, a hard-
line former US general and World
along with Chiang Kai-shek, to Taiwan, and the only alternauv, War II hero who had served as an
adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, 1坐鸟
to surrender was to regroup in the mountains across Chin众 侐血4-flublid)'t归
t二二三三玉二卢
southwestern border. 心三竺 灶
\.~ Kuomintang solders first entered the no rth ern Wa Hills an~
It is reported一 and I have rea

: : : 三: 兰::: :~:=~三三三~:::。三:赁
I then marched through Mong Lun, where the local ruler, howevei son to believe it is true一that the
Nationalist [KMT) Government off
managed top rotect his people and their area. The nationalist Chin牧 ered three full divisions … of
pushed on to the mountains no rth of Kengtung, the home of Akh~
Palaung, and other hill peoples. That area was easier to control th汕
I
}}the wild Wa Hills 主丘竺
江匹过~ce 仙 兰 甡些竺些生 Chinese in southern areas ... the
巴aHi Communists would be caught
lls..pa声竺三王inesi in a giant pincer … this was a gre
at opportunity— not to put the
of...Yi皿皿竺严旦~ep 1·f the Kuomintang presence in the W1
即二三二三二三 spa!O
Nationalist Chinese in Korea, but to
let them fight in the south.70

产c沁
-----
the devastation ofWor d War II,
intricacies of world politics.
一、
The Kuomintang built an air bas
fo必止-胆 s caught up in 曲

e at Mo ng Hsat near the Thi

Between 1950 and 1952, the uo
States tried no fewer than seven
-
repeatedly driven back across the
mintang army in Burma's Shan
times to invade Yunnan but wa
..
s
border. 匹~urmese 竺 the
border and soon supply flights n
began to arrive from Bangkok a仙 entered the二竺二竺
( Taiwan, where the Republic of ＝竺二二三 and
China, defeated by the commu that in turn to _an un~recedented m血呾竺
nisU 血过the Shan S咄
on the mainland, lived on un de But the •r fast of the Salween
r the leadership of Chiang Kai-sht1 River were too remote to be affect
ed
 三
b 三三三~
TH E WA: WILD ME
CHAP TER 1 N OF THE MOU NT
AINS
d sup reme through
more like Lahus or Shans. Although other ob
servers ridiculed those
accusations, the Burmese were correct
. Among them there
were
large number of boys, Shans and Lahus . Ev
en by 1971 there were an
estimated 300 Lahu tribesmen still liv
ing in Taiwan who ha
evacuated during this period.73 d been
April 23, 1953 tbe
却don "these foreign forces [i.e.
the I(uom1
stating that to r }eave th e U ni on
·th er to internmen of Bur陨 Toe Y un na n Pr ov in
da nde1 agree ce A nt i- C om m un is
di笠rme
叩 resolution se em ed to ha ve ha d solll.e t N at io na l Salvation
forthwith -»11 At first the was officially di sb an Army
a jo in t US-Thai-Tai de d, bu t th ou sa nd s
situation. O n October 29, wan remained in th e Sh of na tio na lis t C hi ne se soldiers
叩act on the th at 2, 00 0 nationalist an St at es an d in se
communique was issue d in Bangkok stating Thailand. Th e hi ll ttl em en ts on th e bo rd er w ith
would be w ith dr aw pe op le s liv in g in th
soldiers, including their families, n. Taiwan also e ar ea s w he re th ey
were th e m os t tr ag op er at ed
th e tro op s in B ur m a w it h weap ic vi ct im s of th e w
pledged it wo uld no longer supply ons, ar , w hi ch co nt in ue
dn after th e so -c al le d d for years
d ld be di so re pa tr ia tio n in 1954
th er ew ou w ne • . El ai
and those who remaine Baptist m is si on ar y
w or ki ng fi rs t in K
ne Le w is, an A m er ic an
in Fe an
br ua ry 1954 d la st ed fo r a month. en gt un g an d th en
1he evacuation began Thailand, w ro te in in no rt he rn
tr uc k fr om th e bo 1957 th at "a t th e ti
Kuomintang soldiers were br ou gh t by rder to ~ccup~ed \7~11nan P m e th ~玉迦竺＂沁m巴亚
fo ~哑cetothe b呼 些
Chiang Mai in northern Thailand where, r th e be ne fi t of th e medi~ great fl oo d of hi ll pe ro fK en 茫 皿鸟te in 1950,
op le s ca m e do w n to a
theywerep araded through the streets dr es se d fo sm ar t un if or m s and to Lewis, th e K uo m
K en gt un g State:'14 A
ccording
newly issued tennis s hoes before th ey bo ar de d U S ai rc ra ft destined in ta ng in va si on fo rc
ed m an y of th em to
flee ag吐飞
for Taiwan. Other units left via C hi an g R ai no rt h of C hi an g Mai
and For many years th
Lampang to the south. er e have be en larg
e numbers of Chin
Nationalist tr oo ps in ese
The evacuation no do ub t w ea ke ne d th e K uo m in ta ng th e area de m an di ng
, bu t several food an d money fro
the people. The area m
thousand of its troop s still re m ai ne d in th e s in which these tro
hi ll s of th e eastern 啦 ops operate are getti
poorer an d po or er ng
southern Shan States an d so m e villagers
. It w as al so be co m are finding it necess
in g in cr ea si ng ly clear thi flee ... m an y hill pe
ople from th e area ha
ary to
not all the troops that ve found their way in
were se nt to T ai w an
w er e ge nu in e Kuomintant the hills of no rt he rn
Thailand, so th at no
to
soldiers. The US rese w one may find substa
archer A lf re d M cC nu m be rs of Lahus, ntial
oy no te d: Akhas, Meau (Hmon
g1, Was, an d other
tribes originally from hill
"Many of the troops Kengtung in th e hills
carried ru st in g m us of no rt he rn Thailand
.75
eu m Pieces as their
arms. The Burmese ob
servers, no w al lo w ed Ev en if so m e vi lla ge
in to th e staging area, rs fl ed ac ro ss th e bo
frequently protested rd er w he n so ld ie rs
th at m an y of th e su C hi ne se Pe op le 's L fr om th e
pp os e d C hi ne se looked ib er at io n A rm y (P
LA ) en te re d so ut he
rn Y un na n
/-11 1..
 CHAPT印， INS
OF THE MO UNTA

几n儒early－1950s, t『eywere at
MEN
THE WA : WILD

h lirst 911ite I句ie

nr . forms."18 Primarily
, it included

re d econom ic re
• Ian
the hill people s. Hardly any C 1n its t had been none be
fore,
inese had b n th
三
t h :,
灼

: l a n g
e呤。re 旬＼，
ee ei, ,
unists labeled canj

二
ason Th m

1 。
was the re some fled. ePLA Was seen Chine se com
what the

三
沪sta
as a f
1;~

：三
crushing
people did not kn ow what to ex r,;:Teig,,
e PLA h ad pect and \Vere af
th Of th ~
the main reason entered th e area an entirely
afeWY th orities introduced
飞uomintang from crossing the bord d th e C hi ne se au
屈r ofWa tribesmen,
s
加多 阶apon
in the possession
ing,
ca us e th ey depended on hunt
W 咘。fh " ,,,~ to being armed
be
砂 ernalia
innington met a a leader F is kesjo all paraph
呻o w ere us ed and ac co rd in g to
g with
who toldh·1m that the PLA Iirst came into th iscated, gh ly destroyed, alon

other 咄age
co nf ng w as th or ou
ting: area ~
::~ 诉re 'th head-hunti society:
he admen to a mee ted 叨 th at su st ai ne d independent Wa
him and associa
1institutions
伽 50c1a [a
They said th ey were against the K w n, al on g w ith an y njouh head-poles
uomintang and so we listene小。 were torn do ums
them , al thou gh th e
y were H ans {C h
ey D ru m -h ou se s an te d ne ar them; the log dr
inese]. 乃 told
us that once , head-con ta in er ] pl
way
Ku o呻 ta n un te rs iving in a few fara
the b
gwasdriven out, there would eno more 0ppression be ad -h
or burned (only surv
rown out, e Yunnan
of the minori ty peoples by the Hans. We should be asters ofour were th th e di sp la y at the museum of th
m such as
响 lives and th eywould co-operate 听th theh m useums, un m in g, the prov incial capital). The
eadmen and bringa rsity in K
Nationalities Unive ted along the approa
ch to
be廿er life to al l th e W
apeople. In stea d of op le head-c on ta in er po sts pl an
stealing from our pe side a nog [ otecting
they Would b响 · gifts and
that 也 I
ro ad
an do ne d; the fort沂cations pr
wouJ包坐止
new do ctrin es I ye d or ab
avillage] were destro tuals of the
to grow rich like the Hans.76
en up an d de m ol ished. The major ri
villages were brok d other leaders of
were
~ al is ts an

v
C hi ef ri tu
In order to spread literac ast were abandoned.

~三and
W p ecuted.80
m unis t y among the
de m oted , m ar gi na lized, or even pers
com authorities ·

三
ed
re ga rd ed 19 58 as the key watersh
spoke to
Wa elders Fiskesjo cy from reconcili
ation to

心 二 ：S
al li
:
e ro m an if te d po
:
on th e Chine se sh
:
oser to the th "since in that year th
三二。:
mmunists
s. n ' to be come Chinese co
史 enforcement."81 Eve
n th e W a ha d
Chinas own way of munes.
roma如ng the Wa J rd ed into peoples com e
t
points ou , Part of der
e W as
anguag ' a s Fiskesjo an d w ere he
di sc on te nt w as simmering. As th
a br oa scheme " tsuo of Burma,
and Inilitary conso]id C h pport the al In the Shan States th e Union was com
mg
ation of inese r~飞 t
l righ to se ce de fr om
over the area, and tb_e Shan's constitutiona
\
40

- 41
 CHAPTER! ~己动网勹叮 飞年
贷
de、 八 J I
THE WA: WILD MEN OF THE M OUNTAINS
·
into force in 1958, meetings were held m many towns
as the commander of the Bmmese A,my, Gene,al Ne Win,

二三三三三产~; ;:。三；::~:二o. ;: :~t:~:.~:~t:~:~:。~;: .~二二·:;,:

Sh二二~ /
were raised for independence. The Burmese ArmyS w:;d
. tang meant that the
Kuomm as we heading a caretaker government. The duties of the

rnov of the nationalists. It did not. In April 1960, a new,

ellJ哥 the aspirationsd rebel force, the Shan State Independence Army, was
by using the army and its dreaded intelligence service －－

students who, dissatisfied with the authoritari和 rule

｀＿、

, in. organize
effect, functioned as a secret police force. But th e outcoWhich
me better
dbyShan
counterproductive. Groups of young people move d·mto th 咙 forme had broken away from his Noom Suk Harn.82
where they organized armed guerrilla units. 0ne such 叮ungJ
e, of Sao Noi, the Kachin in the far north were also getting
group Was In the early 1960s,
called Noom Suk Harn, or'The y
oung and Brave Warriors , d to rebel. General Ne Win had_allowed elections to take place
prepare
led by a man called Saw Yan Da. His oth er name was Sao Noi' and
Was and .u Nu was returned to power. But one of his election
, and he in 196o,
was a Shan from yunnan. He was joined b some universi had been to make Buddhism the state religion of Burma,
Y promises
ty students the predominantly Christian Kachin as an open

三 ~: ~三~: :~三三; 三:~

who had fled the towns when the Burmese Army b by

三三:~二二:a: ,:iTan;~::h:~:
egan campaign
its a move seen
to suppress the Shan nationalist movement. ation.
Provoc _
In 1959, a well-kn own Union Militar ___________ the Burmese and Chinese governments had at last

三石 managed
Y Police officer named Bo In 1960,
Mong joined the rebellion. H to demarcate

garrison town of Tan

another group tried
1 ed ands y,
It was not a well-Pann
to attack Lashio in the north .
::b::~::.~g:::
sovereign~ 盒子革芦石忑盂石忑芯芦盂忑
:~::::
h
ynchronized militarY campaign and
the Burmese Army eventuall
Y managed to recapture T act 1easea rrom \..,nma m 1i:s97. 1ne VI11age uact:s in Kachin
the authorities·mRangoon ang-yan. But
ory that
were taken aback b
Ythe sudden outburst State encompassed 巧2 square kilometers and the Wa territ
of violence in the Shan States. The 赵旦
battle of T
ang-yan marked the was ceded to China was 189 square kilometers in area.巴块竺坦
s芦~..
beginning ofa Jong war between the U
no~ 气罗变竺竺史些些竺呾芝竺竺芝
竺?ss
been
In 1959, the Sh an saohpa-wh ose attitude Kachin.S tate to the effect t沺乒3过扛acts of Kachin territory had
.
to the rebeIJ10nha
ambivalent一some supported it whil d been
the Union 寸ormally renounced all their
e others wanted t 夕 ng
o remain Within
powers at a grand On February 5, 1961, in response to the question of maki
1eld at th e state capital of T p of
aunggyi and attended b ceremony Buddhism the state religion and the bord er issue, a grou
Yall the saohpa

乙 。
Kachin
Kachin led by World War II veter an Zau Seng formed the
42
．圈嗣圈

CHAPTER 1
盲
ge tracts

一
Independence 矗
正
Kachin State as
如y (KIA). It soon took over lar
而 益 n-i nha
.
bit ed areas of
O[J
吩·
north ernsn 柯
a~
2
The Plan that Failed
State. el
and Mon reb ar.rni
On the Thai border, Karen, Karenm, .
turmoil, and on March ies had
been active for years. Burma was m
the elected govern.rn 句; 19岛
General Ne Win stepped in, overthrew
ernment, as in the late 1 of U
Nu and introduced not a caretaker gov 9Sos,
a straightforw ard mil itar y dic tato rship. While it Was lllea
but lit to
sh the eth nic ins urg encies, th e outco
cont皿 and eve ntually cru 吮
that would much later
was just the opposite. Those rebellions
flared anew as 0PPositi as it may seem, an event
on Incongruous August 15, 1939 in a
grew against the new mil itar y gov err unent, which ha d ab olished he Wa's place in history began on ＿ 一
determine t Th akin Ko daw Hmaing, a writer
had enjoyed under on's Ba rr Str eet
the limited autonomy the ethnic areas 如 1947 small flat in Rango there,
nationalist movement lived
Constitution and repl aced it wit h strict cen tralize d rul e. Th
e 1962 and a major figure in Burmas
ts gathered in his
reb irth of th Co mm un ist hat day a small group of young nationalis
coup also led to the e insurg ent Party 。f 扭don t rmese
g. They wanted to form a Bu
Burma, which from pow erfu l beginnings in the early 1950s had home for an important meetin from
rr Street is just around the corner
dwindled into a rag-tag army holding out in isolate d
pockets in communist party. But since Ba ved
their spies, the nationalists mo
central Burma. where the British authorities had oden
ay Nu Street. It was a small wo
to a more discreet location in My h his
them, Thakin Ba Hein, lived wit
house, long gone, where one of med,
ily. There , the Co mm un ist Party of Burma (CPB) was for
fam first
in Rangoon is called the CPB's
and this unpretentious meeting ty.
first general secretary of the par
congress.1 Aung San became the nown
a young, talented, and well-k
Apart from Thakin Ba Hein, the
members of what was called
leftist intellectual, three other Pe
aki n Pa rty ' we re also pre sen t-T ha kin Aung San, Thakin Hla
'Th Naag,
— as well as two ethnic Indians,
(Bo Let Ya) and Thakin Bo oshaJ.
oretician Hamendranath Gh
a medical doctor, and the the was
equivalent of sahib in Hindi,
Thakin, or 'master,'the Burmese alists
in Burma, but the young nation
a title reserved for the British
付
45

呱
 THAT FAILED
rHE pLAN
links were with the
CHAPTER 2

instea ,d their
used it show that they; and not th vernent; ,Malaya an d Singapore.
e colonial ad ust rno vernentin the late 193os,
minist tiO证 unist mo
the real masters of their country. Ghoshal and Dr.
Naa rators•lveri
泸e na·nated cornrn blished contact in different course.
卯r do仰 esta
members of the Thakin Party or the Dohbama A g Were Chillese· 仅o groups dh妞 taken a very in India, of
siayone Co nei,er the coul movement
Assoc1at1on
. . ' ), an orgamzatron consisting solel UrBUr 犯 in Burma cornrnunist
yo£eth nic Bu 旬a radicals also
The leftists were staunch nationalists as well rmans.1 cof11J11un:::g inspired by th:ntil 1937, the Burmesethe British on
and had Iittlere d a part le against
for members of other ethnic communities. When 8ard pespite forrne their strugg they had
Thakm K。如 即ma for helP in China. However,
Hmaing, the learned Grand Old Man of Burmese nati which popes unist arrnY in which Wu
onalism 砂eir co叩 something
归
offered the position of chief minister of the Shan State of 飞
p zedongand his ,Mao's communists,
theless,
the thakin met
Yawngh阱 妒砰 of contacting d with. Never they
in the 1920s, he refused to accept the post, saying he had no Jll could have helpe f 1bakin Kodaw Bmaing,
no Wish to
serve under "a foreign _ruler"3 and, as a nationalist "to kneel down d his group ;\t the advice o San and 1hakin Bla
all in 1940. 1secretary ;\ung the Chinese
before a Shan saohpa."4 即goon cPB genera they knew
ill . send hai, where
Quite independently from the radical student movement among 如
ded to ;\ung) to
Shang
(BO Yan d themselves
妒ng
the Burmese intellectuals, communist ideas also penetrated Rangoons were strong. the duo disguise
unists British police, China they
Chinese community in the late 1920s.'Chinese communism'was comrn elude the the first ship to
Eager to and took d for ;\rnoy,
assengers
first introduced into Burma by a man caIIed Wu Wei Sai (alias Wu deck P It was, however, destine
Ching Sin) and his wife, who arrived in Rangoon in May 1沪9 from as Chinese 0on's port. Province, which was
could find in Rang 1 city in China's Fujian ;\ung San
Shanghai. Wu became the editor-in-chiefofBurma News, a Chinese- or){iarnen, a coasta 1he two young Burmese一
language newspaper, and his wife, who is not named in British police . d by the Japanese. thirty-two一found jobs as
documents, found work as teachers at the Chinese-medium Peng then occupte d 1h心n Bia Myaing but historically
was twenty .five an fXiamen
Island, part 0
Min School in Rangoon. The couple distributed communist leaflets hers on Gulangyu that in Shanghai.
English teac similar to
in Rangoon's Chinatown and built up a small circle of followers. ttlement was intercepted
叨th an international se rades in Burma
This clandestine group of ethnic Chinese members was discovered back to their corn d down to the
A Jetter they sent
when, in December 1沪9, the Special Branch of the British police and they were tracke
by Japanese agents in Rangoon, Japaneseagents based in Xiarnen
intercepted a letter Wu Wei Sai had written in invisible ink to the don Gulangyu-
regional communist headquarters in Singapore.5 room they had rente to what they had to say. Aung
d listened carefully CO血nunists.
Wu left Burma in 1930 and was never heard of again. Only half a visited them an the Chinese
dozen followers remained in the cell he San and Hla Myaing were told to forget with arms
had established. A Chinese and their comrades
cell was also established in th The Japanese would P rovide them
e central town ofPyinmana, but neither
this group nor the one in Rangoon had
any contact with the radical
46

L
47

_
 CHAPTER 2

and military training, and they were b

Tokyo.6 rought on a
Ja
沁e S加
The Japanese took them to Thailand
, and while P4,
remained behind in Thailand Thakin
n ind· 池气
, AungSan, agai
to Burma in February 1941. The followin isguise I
gmonth, heleft
freighter with four of his comrades. In April, anot
her 0''~
of seven young thak'in were smuggled out of B batch
consistin
urma. M
in June and July, helped out ofBurma b ore folio t
伽ovr,·d deSP怀 .,.'s independence.
YJapan's intelli
ABurmese drama student in Tokyo, Ko Saung, 耍ncese~：对 玄, an colln盯 twen
-eight of
砂e ty
meeting but never took part in the militar
had·
丿0inedthe 咖j · ·~ 彩s伲泌 er 1941,
the rernaining kok where the Burma
y training that foll ferred to Bang on the i6th,'Ibey
(BIJ\l 已了了~:.二
arrival of the others. OWedthe 111 were trans forrnallY set up
des
corn 作
In July, an unexpected batch of eleven arrived, dence MrnY rorn
::
each
and that
group ising f illness in 伽Uand,
included several members of a right·wing min
ority faction of the ~• bl :;: :/one "':~~:~:together with the
Dohbama. It was clear that the Japanese did not Jap•••::~:
fully trust Aun dofll' of thern entere or as
g free .seten d on the bord er
San and his left-leaning comrades. The July batc Burrnese joine had swelled to
祀ntY 归 rn~re
Shu Maung, who would later be known as Ne Win
h included Thakin
戒泸.
n叩 ber of BIA fig::~IA itself did not
. Not surprisingly, 沁 ,rossed 1t. 你 Mar ch 7·
friction soon arose between the original group and fell on f the Irnperial
the latecomers. as theY d when Rangoon
they followed on the heels o
Thakin Shwe, who later became Kyaw Zaw, remembe
rs that Aung San
归 thousan h fighting;
dorn匹 the British out. , _一心'to Burma
and Shu Maung (Ne Win) quarreled quite often whe actuallY 心rh drove
n they were at a , ArfllY,
training camp on the Chinese island ofHainan, whic apane~e．过 1,
h was occupied ' -,~ - -心 ,,,...~--~
by the Japanese. Thakin Shwe, or Kyaw Zaw, remembe
rs that Aung replaced Br
San objected to what he saw as Shu Maung's immoral
character:"He San an dhiscomrades.
was agambler and awomaniser, which the strict mor obvious to Aung
alist Aung San, becarne
伽k
Pe, was sent secretly to
and the rest of us as well, despised. But for the sake of unist in'l bein
unity, we kept 知 emissary,
the comm a front organization called
together as much as we could~7 They thought they wou h and in 1944
ld be fighting t the Britis , (AFPFL), was set up to
for independence from the United 灼ngdom, but the ea1cutta to contac , Free dom Leag ue
on March 27,
Japanese had • t peoples
other plans. They wanted to occupy and control Burm the知ti-fasC15 ainst he Japanese.
t
a in order d uprising ag d their guns against
to cut American and British support for the Chinese coordinate the planne l'sts eventually turne
nationalists nationa t
1945, the Burmese
2
_
49
48
 心
--
,

- THE p.LA N THAT FA LED

_
became an
e B ri ti sh le ft Burma, which _-
194s, th Communist
anuary 4, ts id e th e C ommonwealth.
on J ou
pendence' was
严 dent republic n o t to accept an y 's h am inde
indepen the AFPFL lonies that had
on d n o t, li ke o th er former co
re di ritish
pressu Burma n where the B
reason be co me a do m in io
a major independence,
d .
d H ea d o f State nThan
achieve
re m ai ne , C P B ge ne ra l secretary Tha如
monarch h after independence cutta to
t ki n B a T he in T in went to Cal
A m on itburo m em b er Tha a (CPI).
ol
th e C o m m u n is t Party o f Indi
ru n an d p d congress o f a at that
d the secon ra di ca ls w er e also in Calcutt
e
atten o f four Burmes organized by
Another gr ou p
an A si an yo ut h conference e
t in ra ti c Youth. Som
but to take p ar io n o f D em oc
er at
-··'"ts in 心 time, lied World F ed conference
U1ess p ea sa n ts . ro an d th e yo ut h
in th众ount咦
- -. .
the Sov ie t- cont co ng re ss
O
e C P I
s n o t en o u h da血 that th rm , a n ew inte
rnational
r co m m u n is t fo
ard- ner 乃气
g h fo Ji 伍 st or ia ns on an d C o m in
th e the Soviet U ni
w h o ac cu se d ad er sh i d ra w up a m as
te r plan
n g guilty 。f ad
p a rt y le p of b e us ed by M os co w , to
vocatin w er by
,'o r th e ki ei g anization se t up
B'B ro w de ri sm f
n d o p ea ce fu l 血 is to rg ou th ea st Asia.
tr an si ti on to socialism thatEarJ c o m m
t re be ll ions all o v er S
er
ro w d , g en er a] se cr et ar d co m m un is claim. The
y o f th e C 0 m m u n is t · [orarme ce to back u p this
P ar ty o f the u蛔 ic al ev id en
h ad 加re is, howev
er, n o histor etary P.
States, c o m e to b elieve in . s his le d t sp li t I's m od er at e secr
in the CPB in 妞 sm is sa l o f C P
T 0a result in th e di
an d Th 啦n S oe CPI congress di d radical leader,
se t u p h is o w n o u tf it di ve , a m u ch m o re
(Red F la ) g e an d h is foll ca ll ed th e C 0mmunist Party election o fB . T. R an a
erence. But
g. H Owers w en t u n d er ro u n d in the Jrrawaddy C. Joshi and the h ea rd at th e y o u th conf
er e
delta to Wage a guerri]J g ed uprisings w re region. The
ag ai ns t t and calls for ar m ra te g y fo r th e en ti
_ a w ar h e British colnn 闪 飞ower. rt o f a co m m u n is t st
HowPtro~L1 that falls far sh o in B ur m a,
m m u n is t uprisings
址t~at ous o u tb re ak
o f co
th er
almost simultane th e 1940s h ad o

言
es in

三
d th e P hi li pp in

三
if;~三1:~ \{j
In do ch in a, an ad played
Malaya, French s. C o m m u n is t forces h
tr ie
to th o se co u n on o f
causes, specific n st th e Ja pa ne se oc cu pa ti
ag ai
in th e st ru g g le n o t th in k
important roles w ea po ns , an d th ey d id
h ad
co un tr ie s. T h ey u n is m sh o u ld
their respective al is m , an d co m m
al s, so ci
fo r th ei r go in g o u t
an d y eb aw ( comrade) that the struggle b ee n in st ru m en ta l in d ri v
ad
be ca us e th ey h
阳'rtry e
cadr e
p r e sen te d th e CPB at the be forgotten ju st
加 Co mnim
st c
U onferen ce in Lo n d o n.'o A few
m on th s the Japanese.

so 51
 ....f.·;_-;;~:~• 心~-- ·····~
....;.
.\
,

CHAPTER 2 ` THAT FAILED

THE PLAN
The CPB had nevertheless becom
e he lead had notyet arrived. At 11.30
radicalized so t ers cadres to
what they called'Burma'.s sham ind
ependence, , and 碱 the mor ning, d ins tructions to all leading
in
战。}itburo issue
, Which led t °\\ to rura1 areas, where
conflict with the AFPFL and, esp '"as artY's p as possible an dmove
ecially, th Oa .
抑, the p oon as soon undergroun d
art~
e socialist 归 d
Nyein, who served as home mi
nis ter · · stalw be organize . 1his decisio n to go
1h心n Soe two yea rs
m mdependent Bur k沁 1eave d struggle w::;~ous than that tak
cabinet. But the radicalization wa 咙 en~ :es with the police. 1he
than by attending meetings in Cal
s caused more b
Ydomestic ~
闷 气uch 产。nlY a fews伈rm1s
cutta. On July d led to I organizations in the
19, 1947, halfa~ 护 which 阰 0werful P olitica
~~ ·:氐°忙 of th• '"0
before independence, Aung San
had be ;-;二百~ted b l1ct 't p
--
led by the rightist politic -- --
ian U Saw. -Thakin---Tha
- --玉 N沪·twas
civil war. 1h心n1han Tun went in

二~:I~:
n Tun, t car s wh ile Hundreds
cou nt rY ·Je ft in differen bus to Toungoo.
e阳 ders al simply cau ght a
50Jll 。 诈ey were
w玉五五卧一 邧茹而丁石石忘 Ghosh
left by whatever rneans Pd mount
ssible.
而Mi~咖如nether闷 by train,
1a盂a函~石石平芍声~气 归se arty workers ain range
tI1TI
densely foreste
Independent Burma's first prime
1NI down.II of other p the pegu Yorna, a village near the
town
of Pegu, the
minister, U Nu, was a1a all headed for on April 2, in a overnrnent forces and
intellectual but hardly the strong lea fRang 0on. between g
der the country needed during 旧 north 。 were fired in a civi l wa r
I decades.
troubled first years ofindependence shots to last for severa
. In an attempt to placate Burma\ 即 hat was activists
restless ethnic minorities, Sao Shw coinmunist rebels t underground party
e Thaike, the Shan saohpa of only a few d ears: while in
Yawnghwe, had been appointed pre the end of April, the party's'eyes an
sident of the new Union ofBurma 即 to act as ArmY of
d . .Rangoon
1n 'Pe , Liberation
But that was a ceremonial title with
limited political significance. The rernaine CPB forrne ditsown oples
Karen, the Karenni, and the Mon the pegu Yom a the the country, and within a
were ready to rebel against the read quickly across artisans.
rising sp f 15,00° arrnedp
government, which they did not lon
g after Burma's independence Burrna.叮he UP d to rais e a for ceo
In mainstream politics, the situatio yearthe CPB had manage olice and outposts or came from
n was becoming more tenseas hed from p arm y
Kyaw Nyein's socialists rallied in the Guns were snatc had hid den in foreste d areas
park outside the city hall 3nd ant forces
attacked the editorial offices of left caches various i-Japaneseand the turned to Burma.
-wing publications. At first, the II was over Britishh adr e
CPB had no guns at its office in Bag when World War Yorna but also in the
ayar Street, but as the situation acti ve not only in the Peg u
CPB units were now in the Arakan

Th竺 U Nu
deteriorated they began to stock rifle the southeast,
s and pistols on the premises. . Ten ass erim in
Irrawaddy delta reg ion,in in parts
the rn Sag Division, and even
ersonally, branding him a'fascist.' The Yoma in the west, in nor ain g
1948, U Nu n, on arch 25,
运Tun . In~ of central Shan State. thern the
Tha
石 二 akin Several Western writers on Burmese
history, among
n Tun addressed a crowd of three tho
usand people in downtown
and British author, Martin
Rangoon. Three days later, the police raid German scholar Klaus Fle isch ma nn a
ed the CPB headquarters. It

乙
52 53
m
』
] /
\
Dmt I,

\\ ... . . ., • _,. ,ch nlo etC al ~

_ - • '• ,he n

55
 THE PLAN THAT FAILED
CHAPTER 2
f hard-liners began to leave
line, groups o
hard-line interior minister Kyaw Nyein, who led th ecampai their new for the continuation of their
gn 炽 ·ded on to seek support
the communists. Whatever the case, Ghoshal did deCI for China f thirty Burmese communists led
..______ ~ 钳 secretlY The first batch o d to cross the border
it is not a genuine CPB document. But it shows how sophistica屈 d struggJe. . traveled northand manage
arme
Aung Gyt 1hakin Ba'Jhein Tin, then vice
Burma's security services already were at that time. 如W
by Y Early the following year, be an arduous
, Despite its initial successes on the battlefield, the CPB made so脏 Yunnan. hat was going to
into set out on w
ds Yunnan. His party
乏s. In late 1951, at the he塔二
of the party,
by elephant an d
,hairJTI却 on foot towar
.Jongjourney . Kachin State, then a small border
its central committee decided to launch an entirely new policy心 year China near Laiza in ds to the town
crossed into Chinese border guar
Chinese revolution had succeeded because the communists h孙 escorted b y · a n d , later,
伽y were for Kunming
joined hands with the Kuomintang against the Japanese, and then, village. boarded a plane
where they I afterwards, bringing the
of Baoshan, followed short Y
when the foreign invader had been defeated, they turned against one more group Juded Bo Zeya,
Beijing. . China to 143. 1he group also inc
their erstwhile Kuomintang allies and drove them into exile on f CPB cadres m f staff of the CPB's army,
1otalo d the chief o
the island of Taiwan. 丛止比上uwber~钮s a strimg belie迪生 Comrades an
f the 1hirty 1hakin 1han Myaing, and 1hakin Baw, a senior
TI 0ne o
s i ~三乏二二二二二畦;_CPB 0]itburo member 1committee. 19
lea ers suggested that their orces should forge a united front with P f the centra
-- 盲

t罔竺覂勺痴 nmrr、sarmy 呾呾业坠迎叩卯四 ders in " ' ~ c e, where they

~ -~
the northeastern and eastern Shan States. If successful, the Burmese
communists would attain a stronger position and be able to turn
allowed to But no mHitary a10 was
皿王座兰竺严tin Beijing was not willing to sacrifice
forthcoming

against the government.

at this time; the governmen ~ 一
In line with this new policy, called'PCG'(Peace and Coalition with the U Nu govern
---
- -~ the CPB as a conciliatory gesture began to return to
Government), - itsjzjendly relations
nts

the landlords the land they once had confiscated from them and d CPB cadres
arrive
given to the cultivators. The ine!itable outcome was that many however, the newly almost
- - -- Much to their surprise, had disappeared
- ____g .. '立竺竺巴炉竺吨严呾些胆皿~and
CPB fi hters wh Id comrade who
were introduced to an° member an d
- (竺皿皿尘竺兰巴迦严芒印t竺竺空ed,the a Sino-Burman party

h已~二;:c:;:~
PB's offer of a united front and a decade earlier-Aye Ngwe, clear that
When it became
former student at Rangoon University. · China
lied areas in
h communis t-contro
had failed. Aung San had failed to reac a safer bet
C --' d to Yunnan,
Moreover, not everyone in the party agreed with the new policies. A e Ngwe overlan
in 1941, the CPB had sent Y Chinese port.
Shortly after the meeting in late 1951 at which the leadership had than going by ship to some little-known
56 57
 In september 41, Aye N
CHAPTER 2
~ THE PLAN THAI下AIL
ED

19
bridge at KYllhkok-W
gwe had iy r A.I 加
Army had fought valiantl
y against the Kuomintang,
which
I~ tin g, wh er e th e: :~ :: aero,, th, b Burmese reciated . On April 22, 1954, Ch- ina and Burma- for the
e ars to Road cro5s 咦
international fro nt ier .
-- -
to ok hi m fiv ~ 竺 竺 吐 耻 llJlll..I!we盛29,
·-- ed a bilateral~d~ag
communists, bYWhich 欢 Beijing app
tim e he ha d lo st touch contact the Ch~I~ at th 已正如 tion of the
he became a With th Cp们 冤 :urmese
m em be r of the C ommunist e
1earned t speak standard Ch . Party of Ch . (Cp. n 炖 gthe
o mese. In Burma, h ma 归
ct for each
o孜顽ence~而平espe
one of th e southern d·1alects. Wh e had sPok
en the CPB cadres began 切。n~
th
~ 一 - - -- - non-aggression, non-
-rei-gn-ty,
in Chin a in e early 19508 A Ngwe
e as called upon t
arriVing 少 -- ·r
F.i芝, territor ial integ rit y an d so ve
,
interpreter.2 0 ' y W
°act as others oth er's in terna l aff air s, equal and mutual benefits
·n each

二三~ which
Unbekn n to the CPB interference I 21
.
伽 next
ow cadres in Sich uan at that tim · e re was and pe ac efu l co ex isten ce U Nu
o an ot he r , the
als
group of form er fi
ghters from Burma in Ch ina issue was to settle the~
· .N彻 r 1956 visit to China. Th
Seng, a Kachin World ar II h · de tail during a Septembe
W ero who had fought with th e British discussed in led to more turmoil along
it
ag ain st th e in 19 60 , bu t th at on ly
Japanesed uring the war, h at first been a B 泸 border was settled
咘cer leading several campaigns a
the n t
ad
gainst the CPB in the
如nesearmy
Irrawaddy -••ho$匠 Bu rm es e bo rd er 扭室皿气~ one of
Whether Naw Seng was 升
the factors which

delta but urnedh·IS guns ag砌st th at they did

of Kachm . e government. Heled a band ,v nu , v ~• 尾 `矗9 尸＂
已V 丛 V矗e to assume th
and Karen warriors wh aware 01 uu :, J:> uu iu g
O captured one town after another
m ho m e as he an d his followers were toilin
m northern Burmaand th eShanS not receive any ne ws fro
tates. His goal was an independent rest of the
th un e in Gu izhou, cut off from the

A
coun try for e Kach In· , Which he called in their peop le' s co m m
t after Jinghpaw Pawngyawng.
Bu seve ral initial world.
successes, his group, the Pawngyawng nnected
National Defence Force ese co m m un ists, thou gh, were much more co
, Was eventual]Ycornered at Mong Ko in the The Burm ger cadres were
north easternmost ou tside wo rld . In 19 57, three promising youn
corner of the Sh w Seng with the joined
and ab ou t th ree hundred ofh is follow an States. In April 1950, Na er th eir stu di es in M oscow. There they were
ers retreated across the border selected to furth the Soviet
into yunnan. The
Y Were allowed to er Bu rm es e co m m un ists who had made it to
remain in China, but while the by two oth anding of the
CPB exiles in Sichuan th e ea rly 1950s. The most outst
:n Chengdu and Were allowed to study at various in stitutions Union fro m Bu rm a in
a party
some Were even sent to th un g in tel lec tu al Kh in Maung Gyi and San Thu,
3 ... , Naw S
e11mg e central party school in five were the yo Gyi attended
engand h·is men ended Py aw bw e in ce ntral Burma. Khin Maung
ural Guizhou , one ofCh s up in a peoples commune in worker from on
ina Poorest and most cia l Sc ien ce s in Moscow and wrote a thesis
Back in Burma, th e CPB neglected provinces. the Academy of So
Wa s, at las t, outlawed in rma.'22
ame time, relafzons be勋een ina and B 1953. At the '.l\grarian Problems in Bu
Ch urma were excellent. The
58 _
 The Bur mes e com mum
CHAPTER 2
~~
. THE PLAN THAT FAILED
sts wer e
active in their
they wer e doi ng had no imp act on th Soe probably attracted the most attention
. eX1Je, b
general Ne Win seized pow er on Ma rch
e situation•

bee n war y ofthe ambitious and som etim2, 1962. Jhe Ch·
es
`
Inside B 补q~
urrna u
． ｀ ，明
你
colorfu

when arr
he
1'fh akin
jved accornp
anied by a team of attractive young girls in
He placed a portrait· of Josef Stalin in front of him
Inese h ·forms.
som e imp orta nt events, whi ch reflecte
unpredictable a小。肘 即ki uni table an
d then began attacking the ,rev1s
..
1omsm
,
d th gener al the nego tiating
e fact that a Khrushchev and the opportunism of Mao
Chi na- Bur ma relations had b new cha 例 on
leader Nikita
egun, too k place short! pt归
Yafter h'1s cou
of soviet Not surprisingly, 加kin Soe was soon excluded
The first rater
h·mno cuo us step was , China.
take n when p 如o ngs
, on August 1, the talks-
CPB exiles pub lish ed a doc ume nt in Eng 196湛 CPB members arrived by air from China,
lish titled s fro!ll -nine
Ne Wins Mil itary Government, omeFacts ab叩 J-lowever, twen ty talks. Among the 'Beijing
d eno unc mg the new · · ate in the peace
artic1p
then, they had not bee n allowed to regime. Unu ostensibly to p to be known, were yebaw Aung Gyi, Thakin
prin t any propaganda material in 'as they cam e cadre called Sein Win, and
China. Now they were, and it wou ld soo retur nees, de'Bo Zeya, a woman
n become even clearer that com ra
p 仰i u rty ,'f did not actually Participate in the tali<s
China's policy towards Bur ma was und
ergoing some fundamental 'Ihakin Ba Theiinn , who k out of Rangoon and visit the
to
changes. d the opp ortunity snea
but seize
in the Pegu Yoma. He had brought with him
The most urgent task was to find a way to CPB's headq u a r t e r s · f i g h t e r s in
contact the CPB units that and the commumst the
were still holding out in the Pegu Yoma ·tters from China,
and other places in central radio transrn1 them so they could co血nunicate
Burma. There had been no links between Yorna were shown how to use
them and the exiles since pegu . Sichuan. They were also told to be patient. Big plans
the latter had trekked to China in the earl with the exiles in . 23
y 1950s. By a strange twist and help would soon be forthcoming.
of fate, it was the new military regime in hatched in China, demanded that the
were being
Rangoon that unwittingly CPB documents, the gover血ent
provided an opportunity for the Burmes According to d party members
e communists in China to hould concentrate a11 their troops an
reestablish contact with the forces at home.
Probably hoping that the
communists s thorities, inform the governrnent if
in an·area stip ulat ed by the au
country's many communist as well as ethnic
insurgents would give up cadres elsewhere, stop all
rem aini ng g uerr illas or . 24 The
when faced with the massive force of the there were any and cease fund-raising.
new military government, f the part y,
Ne Win called for peace talks after about organizationa1 activities o . ·dis guis e for
was a blessing
a year in power. In July f the mili 1n
19 句， the CPB, Thakin Soe's much intransigence 0 tary regi me and the various
smaller Red Flag communist party, on November 14,
the Karen, Mon, Shan, and Kachin rebel arm the CPB. The talks broke down jungle camps. 伽kin Ba
ies, and some smaller d to thei
groups attended the negotiations in Rangoon insurgents returne r resp ectiv e while the
, with guarantees of
CPB cadr e flew back to China,
free and safe passage to and from the peace Thein Tin and another
parley, regardless of the retu rnee , went to the Pegu Yorna
s
outcome. remaining twenty-seven 'Beijing . of the party at home.
where they assume d de facto lead ersh ip

60 61
 THAT FAILED
THE PLAN
CHAPTER 2 of the
in a new era in the history
woul d usher
Following the split in the international which
communist
about the same time, Khin Maung Gyi, San Th move吮nt 即J1l3,
. China, with the exception
u,and a third 礼 joto iosurgencY• hat the CPB cadres tn . tellectuals
member called Thein Aung were forced to Ieave cPB 衄 11-rea
d Marxist tn
Moscow. }h 归 oblel11 others, were we hand, Naw Seng's
eeps 你 pr dafew
had sided with China in the split and were no I 沪叩
On the other
ongerwelcome in 朊 erience.
严 •marY eJCP even before the peace
Soviet Union. The other two Burmese communists in M little or
.no 1111 In early 19句，
oscow,Aung fighters. Chengdu to meet
凇 e,ccellent brought to
Win and Kyaw Zaw (not the same Aung Zaw as th were NaW Seng was or the Sichuan
e one fromthe I(achi11 . R a n g o o n ,'
/aobing,
Thirty Comrades), who had married Russian women an in 'the Sichuan Jd that the
, were allowed talkS beg 即own as Tin and to
to remain in the Soviet Union. They later became BurmeseJ had become Thakin Ba Thein to leave
anguage ,~hat f-ie was introduced to d fight. Naw Seng, eager
teachers at a school in Moscow where the Soviets trained diploma~ veterans, o back to Burma an d He assembled his
dcorne tog Guizhou, readily agree .
and intelligence agents. tirneha rnune in , or the Guizhou veterans,
!e's corn
A 'leading group of five'to direct the work in China was set up his peop't he Guizhou Jaobing, camp in Yunnan.
rneo, 即wn now as e enhanced at a training
in Beijing shortly after Thakin Ba Thein Tin's return from the peace
·maryskills wer ·Marxism-Leninism.
talks in Rangoon. This group, which became the nucleus of the new and their rn1 olitica I lectures 1.11
them P the small cells
leadership of the CPB that emerged in the 1960s, consisted ofThakin Aye Ngwe gave were forged in the early 196os as . touch
alliances the first time put 10
Ba Thein Tin as'leader: Khin Maung Gyi as his personal secretary, More . ts were for
Chinese commun1s but the Chinese embassy
and Thakin Than Myaing, Than Shwe, and Tin Yee as members of ethnic few in number,
伽y were ·ta! and some
with the CPB. Chinese from the cap1
Than Shwe was a World War II veteran who had been educated at d for ethnic
in Rangoon arrange ddy delta tog
o to the CPB's then base area
an officers'training school in Rangoon during the initial stages of the • the Irrawa d wait for further
smaller towns m Shan State an
Japanese occupation. Tin Yee was a CPB cadre from Pegu, who had . River in northern
joined the party in 1943 when some of the communists had begun along the Shweh
instructions. 26 that were being PJanned
guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. Both had gone to China in mentous events
In preparation for the mo hakeup of the party at
the early 1950s. also ripe for a major s
in Beijing, the time was that the party was
In late 19句， San Thu, one of the Moscow returnees, was put in China declared in 1964
home. 1he CPB exiles in the
charge of a team that began surveying possible infiltration routes
revisionism or · ht-wing opportunism as
ng
from Yunnan into northeastern Burma.25 The Chinese also built a "struggling against d inside
• the international communist movement an
network ofnew asphalted highways leading from Kunming to various main danger m
connections with the Communist
points along the borders with Burma. Warehouses were stocked with our party:•21There were no more ears after
when the CPB in the y
arms and ammunition in preparation fo_r a China-supported thrust Party oflndia, which had been close
d elsewhere. Now, the
World War II operated openly in Rangoon an

』）
62 63
 CPB Was fir叫 CHAp 'Tf:R 2
Yo n th
co llll llu nis t lllo v e Ch ine THE PLAN THAT FAILED
窃 s'elll en t se Side .
Ionists.'2s an d condelll in t如叩lit· d. The veteran Ghoshal was
denounced
ned l<h in th e .
In 196 九shch in屈 and execute sident, and also
5, a pro lll· ev an<! na、
cPC, ·• after China's disgraced pre
ill the , Liu Shaoq1
气。沁
irty
ine nt central Hla Myaing), one of the Th
Yi如nan com如tte五e
Was sen over1
t
as'即mas Yan Aung (Thakin
to 0, was
Pe gu Yoma an d to i2 Bo h Aung San to Xiamen in 194
叩 d elsewhere In . ce加nt hes .
b叩 沁kin p叮·
lllber, l<lUed- had gon e wit
th by
Ch · B des who ich meant bludgeoned to dea
Ina. Not} on g after, A urm a an d the 'l een the 叽 comra those executed,
wh
ha d b in ead i Units in 1he among
een a so 1er ld··u n g Se 'a Youn ng grou also
colll Pof伽｀
; lunge. the wake
. rm ese the tat n f the intellectuals who had joined the CPB in
RIn to China in I In the gro up that hadg Bu
ll. The policy was
953 , Wa s sen t b escorted'Ihakilllunist Iv Many o were purged and killed as we
Us ing old ack along the same n Ba 1hein 62. coup Three
ne加orks of local
ho 。f the 19 ouk -touk-hta, or, in English,'the
ove rJ referred to as PY
to the pegu yoma. H的d roure,
Withh· contacts, unofficially d from office, dispelled from the party, and disposed of
．如 a letter in Which Thaki
in Ch .
ma outlined th e'.Invasionn
Ba 1hem . T· e carried Ds':dismisse ed Thakin Ba Thein Tin about
, . In and th
e oth er I . executed.) In 1986, when I ask
-b
Yoma ase dh ea d Pla ns 10 d (that IS, ed to them as a "revolution
quarters h ad b e e n · 1
In
etail. 6 eaders he was unrepentant and referr
of What 9 3 , th e Pegu the purges, n fifty-three people
Was going to h 呤rmed only in " and claimed that no more tha
app en. 29 general terms within the party,
InternaU d 33
Y, China were execute .
Was about t0 embark Beijing returnees was Taik Au
ng.
de str uc rion. In Ma One of the most hard-line of the
y 1966, Mao called on on a decade of chaos and joined the
against What h you n people to · eas ant fam ily in Waw near Pegu, he had
e termed , nter- g nse up Born into a P led
cou revoiur sidered a ruthless fanatic. He
leadershi .lo Then
P st n th
ionaries'Withi e Chinese party as a young man and was con ing
pu bl is he d' on Augu 12, the official Weekl seemed to take a delight in hav
a s坟 teen- yB吻ng Review the pyouk-touk-hta purges and
I
of the c munist p P0int dec aration that the killed by the tat ni lunge. 34
om Central committee veterans as well as younger cadres
la如ching what arty of China (CPC Zeya was killed in action in 19句
) had passed on August 8, Of the other Beijing returnees, Bo
The B叩 ... Was called the G reat Prolet .anew Gyi fell in battle in 1968, Thaki
n Pu
n 如 near Tharrawaddy, yebaw Aung
and assigned gtreth urnees . tural Rev0Jution_J1 ong
• inspired b Sein Win, the only woman am
. y Maos Cultural Revolution succumbed to illness in 19的， and
deviarIOnists, e task of Sll llilar} ' an sin ' delta. Among the exiles in China
,
, staged Y de
g the CPB of 'rightist them, died fighting in the Irrawaddy shed
po rt of gri sly tria ls in th mi ssed from the party and langui
the sup
militant tat e Pegu Yoma. They enlisted Tha kin Tha n My ain g wa s dis
' i!1
Were orphans raised b ni lunge, or d Youth G
.Re was released and 'rehabilitated
led uards, who often in a Chinese labor camp until he B at
__ , Hence, they Were . y the Party and it their'parent.' survived his ordeal, but the CP
immense!
to reg ard as 1973.35 He was fortunate to have the
who had headed th y loyal to their extremely bloody purges before
egation to th new masters. Yebaw Htay, home experienced five years of
branded'Burma's De CPBs del e 1963 peace talks, wa s up in Beijing was put into practic
e.
eng Xiaoping' after Mao's master plan that had been drawn ency.
ma in'rightist'rival ond revitalizing the CPB insurg
Moreover, that plan went far bey
" 9
.._ __ ,, 一 ) 65
 CH AP TER 2
LED
THE PLA N TH AT FAI

Kang Sheng, at the time Chinas ies,

. intelJ · nce disas trous economic polic
mastermind behind the formation ofa 'new' cPige in mid班7.37 Ne Win's
C如
乡
ich , in
B,
归衵 ese Way to Socialism;' wh
During the Vietnam War in th e I96os and &rand ~ what he called "the Bu rm d handed
7o s, th erPla don ant that everyt伍 ng in sight was nationalized an
19 base me e and basic
talked about what th ey called 'the d ed in acute shortages of ric
omino theo 功；' if e I\ 吮n ~
\ d result
· effecl, the mi litary, ha
was not sto pped in y
ietnam, it would spread to th se community
。
coni
rs Ill、 the same time, the Chine
yo nd. Th 国 o咄
r 10
ove tfs 1n . Ra ng oo n. At
ltural Revolut ion,
Asia and perh aps ev en be r
at theo Ym ay h been 'asi foodstu ·tal had also been influenced by the Cu
e This
but for Maos ch1e · fstrategist K av the cap1 gan wearing Mao badges.
an g, the North v·Ietnamese I cor奴 仇 young Sino-Burmese be
and the National Liberation F eade . the young'Red Guards'
ront in the south Were too cl 对，P and rnanY fficial Burmese regulation, and of
violated an o re ordered to remove their badges. When some

诅
Soviet Union to be trusted. K叩 plan w as t revo:se to the we
the region 出 rough the CPB and t o sprea
wn to Thailand,
d Ufion1
。 I
.川 R鸣oon
refused, anti-Chinese rio -
ts swept the capital in Ju
-
ne and July.
- ny Sino-

-
n do
and Indonesia, wh ere Maoist-leanin
he thern ed and looted, and ma
communist Parties WeMa
lay ,
sia -run stores were ransack ervene
The plan, absu rd g
.
re active. Ch扣ese
即 ed in their homes
. The authorities did not int
as it may seem, also m duded th e Com

夕
surrnese were

!
-
munist Pa
ofAustralia (Marxist-Leninist), a tin
radicals. one ofThakin Ba Thein r·
ygroup ofpro-Beiji Australian
ng rty
皿三皿竺we竺 空
吨
its chairman, a Melb ourne la 叩r called Ed
Ba Th ein r·
m told me: "Ted Hill and I
ms closest£oreign asso .
wa rd Fo
ere together m
wler
•
Hi
ciates Was
ll
. Th知
竺
~ -----
food crisis, and the Si
attention
吧竺覂
from the
竺 逗 竺
no-Bur

竺
mans

~
re easy

~hants叩竺亟
屾rge
竖竺up. But
that had e呻忍 竺迦
W Be g. We
ijin
wrote appeals against the s 竺 吐 et
d f
oviet Union an or world revolution. He d had
was a fine, cul tured 枷 d embassy , mob violence had got qut of hand an

19
Th
68 .
e pla
Na w
n
S
was
of man."沾
put into action early in th
eng and h'15 Kach · fighters
e morning of Janua ry 1,
by attacking the
to becurtailed.
Ne Win's military
l__
goverrunent 玉宝艺竺吓 -counter- and ~
t
Burma at Mong Ko, th
m crossed the b der into
or cist and re ac tionary"38 over Radio Beijing,
pla ce he had revolutionary, fas
eC~石Ire.
1950, But this t e very same treated from in
ime, his men were heavi}
re
乏 二已 少 速
Bu
overran the meseA r Yarmed, and within hours ～之竺 Rangoon and elsewhere
we
ese from
in surround·mg areas rm
ygarrison there. Hea Secre y, more Sino-Burm
, an for the first
d 叩ighting continued em ba ssy to reach the CPB's base
area along the
helped by the Ch ine se
countrys civil war, the Bur time in th e history of the fore.
Ar my f in th eir co m ra de s wh o had fled some years be
mese ound itself outgunned, and in Shweli River, to jo
some cases even outnumb dio Beijing
ere d as th sands
nth s aft er the Ch in ato wn riots in Rangoon, Ra
streamed across the bord ou of Chinese,volunteers' Afew mo
ions;' saying that
Most Western h istorians haveer to fight alo n
g the Bu rm es e Army of "border violat '

~三三辜三ion
gside theCPB, beg an accu sin - aircraft
ass um ed t
d in tru de d in to Yu nnan and that Burmese
lend all -out su to Burmese forces ha
somewhat
~ 一C hi ne se r sp ace. ~oreign observers were
in R 已1 ai
-- -- -- - angoons
66
67
 '""'"'"'"""" ~ 气
rerrun in 19的 . Th
1ed to be nothing 1
1, communist trooi
Ko. Then, on Mar
rifles, and machir
garrison town ne
China. It took the i
ed territories stre
contiguous area. arc-
19

d to es-tablish a bas
\_ __一、、－－ 矶 ndependence
19 67, tw o loc al co mmanders in the Kach
:.:.:乏1 Nove mb er broken away and
- -·HVuid most------.. on Ti ng Ying and Zalum, had
certainlYb欢o脏 ArmY (K IA ), Sa kh
A leadership was
The dispute with the KI

~ ' .三 ：
c

:
allies ifthey were offered new automati weapons[ B.

三
CP

三 ；
the

三
by

~
d

;
cte

~
nta

,
co

:
been

~
which some Maru

三 ； 三
rom China, Which

三 ： 三 ：
A leaders were Jinghpaw,

：
· abundance. os t KI

:
the CPBhad m s. M

:~
ue

;i
iss

!
l

：
triba

If『 ;三
over
es
In July 1967, CPB cadr contacted p

厂：hluwnkThr t y d M / ：
\ : H
／ k / g m M N m t w / h k / B H d : g d m d f t h o m kh

69

_ J;
_
~ - ..,
. -,,._.___~
THE PLAN THAT FAI
LED
v--

~------ 7,so于
、
、
.... CHAPTER 2
family moved across
,, ' When he was sixteen, his

~臣d
win over local Warlords , \ inese border. area whic
· Yunnan, a town and an
biogra二
to
The CPB's tactics, which were
m
Ch

五
the cangyuan in
. According to his official
I( 囡 th• frond:;,'~• population o
er JUnct10n northeast of e before being recruited int
the Burma-Laos-China tribor en&tiin g, 泸 siza hile in a people's commun
ang in reaction to h a while with
the Ku om int dfora w t time, he also fought for
had risen up agains t
气 t~ y;orke During tha cross the
era l abu se. Le d by La o Er Ji p yao 知d oJice force. om intan g unit that had managed to
collection and gen Ku

｀尸
P
a Jocal eagainsta
ars, and knives, th eyamb a of the northeastern
with homemade flintlocks, spe the Chines 42 Back in the Saohpa are
咽
antly without anyoutsidesu into Yunnan. mrades organized a local
harassed the Kuomintang incess Zhao and some of his co
PPort』 border
nt-sponsored militia
1970, the CPB invited Lao Er
Ji Pyao and a few of h•is men t hi
°C na. Wa J-Iills in 1的 7, ht against local goverrune
tfoug
d tha t we wo uld i·ttha
According to him, "W e we re tol get mo de rn
arrns if guerrUJaun
we joined han ds wi th the CP B."40 They agreed, and .m Octob
commissar in th e area, proclaimed
er 19九 ,n ;~ m uc h yo un g( ;> ~ ho was bo rn in 1949,
came from
d ha d also spent some tim
e
Pe Thaung, the CPB's political the northern Wa Hills an t,
， Th
the formation of'War Zone 8巧， e term probably
had meaning 叩in Ma in the same official accoun
no his youth. Accord ing to
then
to the local Akha; it wa s na me d after th e fou nd· date of th e CPB, in Cangyuan in ol from 1959 to 1961, and
mg d a Chinese primary scho of
August 1幻939. Bao attende
his fam ily to Hk wi n M a. At only seventeen years
.. returned with against
\ In October 19的， the CPB made its first fora Yinto the Wa Hills. rmed a ba nd that fought
'.orth
、 h~至芦立芦=芦'tn-e-i
畸

d some other young Wa fo

The sen as age,Baoan
the government's militias.43 were
e was one of the few of the Sichuan laobing who had any military assu me th at Ch ina's intelligence services
ble to
,冷experience. He came from Bassein in th e Irrawaddy delta and was
It is plausi
ities ~ 哟呾
竺 已 严 至正 如rrent activ
trained by the British Army in Dehra D un in India after World 兰 d marched
th e bo rd er from China an
~ 。二二h
aun g be for e he cro sse d
War II. After returning to Burma, he had Mya Th
served with the Burmese
military and joined a unit that mutinied aft
er independence in 1948. 玉h()ut 产or 应业埜呾
翌
uicidal wit
at h th
Th unit merged wit e CPB, and Mya Th ng went to China in 三~
the early 19505_
He had never seen anYWa before h
au

to
-_ -
con itions and who to conta
In December 19的， Zhao
ct.
Yilai an d CPB commiss
ar Kyaw Htin,
e ventured into their hills lau nched their first attack.
The target
al
contact loc warlords. His assignment au ng's office rs,

：
one of My a Th
was to offer support to any a small garrison of govern
ment
Wa chieftain who was waging guerrilla d by

芒
ich wa s de fen de
war against government- was Saohpa, wh seven-year-
sponsored militia units.41
supp orted by a mi lit ia led by Saw Lu, a twenty-
troops
the Karen Baptist
old Wa who had been educated by missionaries at
much better
School in Myaungmya in the Irrawaddy delta. The

70 71
 y THE PLAN THAT FAILED

』b
CHAPTER 2

mind, in November 1 ' CP 1aunched

ar了~s
_

\ ., equipped CPB force overran Saohpa without much diffi叫 that in a surprise
CPB had gained its first foothold in the Wa Hills. ty, 沁 硐
on a Burmese
ase a few kil
east of the town of
attack the Salween River. The aim was to capture
However, the advance from Saohpa into other a1 Jong on a strategic
35 slow. Saw Lu was not the only Wa who resistt
萨 t connected Kokang with areas west of th
e tha e river. At that
iroughout history, these fierce and proud tribes1 咚 the I(unlong bridge was one of only two on the Salween River
tiJlle, The other was at Ta Kaw on the main hi h
resist any outsiders who had come to subdu . shaO State. g way from
:ween the CPB and local bands broke out acr, JJl i to Kengtung in the south. The one at Ta Kaw was old but,
-- • Ye(Hill. 揤nggY
. ally, the impressive suspension bridge at Kunlong was built b
ironic y
- -, 叩 ucadin
I the
Chinese
when U Nu was Burma's prime minister and relations
themselves inside a longhouse. We fired a B-40 rocket th g 00n and Beijing were good.
rlnnr "t thP Pnrl nf thP lnnohnn~P'T如 t hn 吐 oA+L. __ ,.
rough the I be沺
en Rang
army outpost was annihilated after a savage eight-
\A " 伽 Burmese
Within a year or so, local resistan battle. There were no survivors; all three commanders and their
hour
严旦
Many Wa were now recruited into tht
eighty
soldiers died in the fighting. The CPB pushed on and took up
on Shan Tele Mountain, overlooking the Salween River and
z、一 positions
。见义艾突婓趾逆竺. But most the bridge. There are very few places where it is possible to cross the
many of the officers were Kokang Chinese. Nearly all th fast-flowing Salween and, if the CPB managed to capture the bridge
1
, . commissars, though, were Burmese.
e political
and secure it, it would be an easy task to send thousands of troops
A clandestine radio station, the People's V to the west bank of the river. From Kunlong, it is only seventy-five
oice of Burma, was
officiallYinaugurated on March 28
, 1971, the 23rd anniversary of the kilometers to Hsenwi and another fifty to Lashio, the main town in
CPB uprising, and began transmitting from M
＿巴巴~tire
northern Shan State. ~ ictory at Kunlon~ would 压吐

二 ~i: ;:
angshi in Yunnan in
April Fighting bulletins were mixed with choirs sin·
、 songs and
gmg revolutionary
announcers extolling the virtues of M
Thebroadcasts were in B arxisrn-Leninism.
urmeseand a number ofminority languages,
including Wa, whose su com~兰二巴业皿血g-0ut.
in th 言 1e government was clearly aware of this and threw in all possible
、 一竺兰史-尸~ountai邓· resources to defend the bridgehead at Kunlong. "The whole area
Everything seemed to b
,_in northern, north e going to plan. But th ose remote areas
became a war zone:• remembers Aung Myint, a Burmese army officer
eastern, and eastern Shan
nothing more th State were seen as who took part in the campaign. "Convoys of trucks rumbled down the
an springboards fromwhich th
march down to Burma e communists would road to Hsenwi to the river carrying reinforcements and ammunition
proper and seize major
population centers.
72
73
~

涵画盲 _
 ~
心cal
CHAPTER 2

THE PLAN THAT FAILED

to the front. Command posts were established everywhere
weapons drills were conducted by the roadside."4s'a由 a11~ militia fo,ce, led by a Kokang wado,d called LJ ; ingha~, '~
The Burmese commander, Tun Yi, was nickn amed ' took part in the battle, but mostly as local guides to help direct
NapoJ a!s0 assaults an d artillery barrage
s rather than as conventional 1
because he was short and rotund. His first tactic Was to ch 匈 呻ntrY
knowledge of the terrain was far superior to the
Tele peak with infantry forces. With fixed bayone ts, th 打朕 Shan soldiers .
伽ir
e soldi manders'who all came from central Burma and did
uphill, shooting as they advanced through the forested slo e归 13urm
ese com
eak the local languages. In return, Luo was permitted to
沁。f

:。艺还ting
mountain. But the well-entrenched CPB troops on the to t址 not
even sp
--
vehicles to transport his opium -
out of the area. --
-Govern ment
mountain repelled more than forty such attacks , inflic p of the
ting hea
casualties. ~
~ \
mhSbasein
The firepower of the communists seemed inexhaustible as was
La竺 y that finally turned the
,
their logistical advantage. Shan Tele was close to the Ch·inese b tide at Kunlong. Howitzers
order nwas the artiller
d around Shan Tele, and as the CPB soldiers came
>

and fresh supplies of bullets and even rations for th e CPB ositione
solders were P
were sent in daily. Wounded CPB soldiers were treated 10 · Chinese down the mountain in human waves, air-burst shells were
chargin g
hospitals across the border. It also became obvious that d effective even against CPB troops inside bunkers.
fired. They prove
,· ·1s were actuall了百忑T际mthe可~ostof 伽 con
cussion when the shells exploded in the air caused bleeding

－ 二二玉三三三 三言二

：：三{;~~:,:~~~~::三王立。？。: ti~:.二
and mouth. Hundreds of CPB soldiers died, though
罕 ~- "We found tell-
from the nose
加mes_e邸111_rad_e也如怎宒竺
Jale bodies in the forest on the hillsides:' recalls Aung Myint. 46
When the communist forces resorted to Chinese-style 迦
Kunlong bridge was safe, and so was the road to Hsenwi and Lashio.

I
竺ctics, the situation at Kunlong became desperate. Some
It was the Burmese army's first major victory in the northeast and
defenders fled in disarray, while others deserted and were never
boosted tremendously.
seen again.'Napoleon'Tun Yi 0、rdered h.1s men to mine the bridge the morale of the troops was
with dynamite sticks and blow It· up if the outer defenses fell to the Despite the success al Kunlong, the Burmese military,ealized that
CPB. Each battalion commander was ordered to keep one bullet i竺业－ 坦竺竖竺旦业严止east and driv也-互
for himself t0 commit suicide rather than be captured alive by the the base areas.they had established along the Chinese border. But the
CPB or, alternatively, have to return in disgrace to Rangoon where CPB could be A I i outof面
- - · ·· 芯芦二二函 urma,
d
court-martial was awaiting everyone who deserted his post. It was a which had not benefited from the supplyofCh inese munitions, an
do-or-die battle, the b'
~三st and fiercest the Burmese army had ev,
- . I in that way the grand plan to link up the 'new'forces
with the'old'
九 ·

心屯
fought
---~ ~..... "'-
74
.r
勹尸

、-

｀一一
三/
． 一 _ ,.,_ ,_
_

m
- CHAPTER 2

~/M H EPLAN THAT FAILED 飞 ． 严一飞＇

八 ._~nrtheastern Shan State. Kyaw Mya told me千hat
』
』wl lesh authorities were very close to the Chinese
lthough I
didn't even have a passport.
ng bridge an
:al Burm~只多芝丈竺竺竺竺妇
寸 ct<: The govern
»49

d the ensuing eradication of the

ment's army had managed

1tains along the Chinese border,

妇ng and the 宁芝空运二三readr~二言二

such as
id not belong and had never

--
fN
｀ 炬乙

thTIlffth]th/HrnDm
言
i
Omn

77
76
,
3
The Wa and the Communist
Party of Burma

n th
Having failed to cross the Salween River at Kunlo g, e Communist
its attention to less
Party of Burma (CPB) realized that it had to turn
1971, a combined force
well-defended government positions. In April
s had attacked Mong
of Zhao Yilai's Wa troops and Chinese volunteer
May 1 (Labour Day),
Mau in the northern Wa Hills. It was captured on
political commissars.
a day especially chosen by the CPB's Burmese
e to the Wa troops
Presumably, though, that was of little significanc
it was a battle against
who marched into town on that day. For them,
the CPB had given
central authorities which most Wa despised, and
tory meant that the
them guns to fight with. Nevertheless, that vic
n of Panglong south
only motor road into the Wa Hills, from the tow
of Hopang to Mong Mau, had been cut.1
ed on, south from
After the battle at Kunlong, the CPB march
along the way. The
Mong Mau, encountering little or no resistance
blished War Zone
aim was to link up with Pe Thaung's newly esta
8巧， and thus wrest control over the ent
ire border from Panghsai on
.

kong River and the

the Burma Road in the north down to the Me ','
,lI

July 1972, the CPB ' '.

Laotian border. In rapid sequence in June and

1
1

Hpan, Man Hpang,

took over three townships east of the Salween: Na I

ns of Loi Leun and

an<l Pangyang. At the same time, the market tow
,'

,.

79
环沪歹~~
-- . ..., -. · ~又＇ ．
CHA PTER 3
on the Na m Hk a River, wh ich ma
rks the bor der bet wee n Bur
and Chi na. 陨
On ly one are a now sep ara ted the Wa
forces in the Wa Hills from'N
Zon e 815: the hill s sur rou ndi ng the Bu rme se gar riso n tow n of M ar
Yang. Tha t are a was con trol led by a Sha n arm y led by Kh ong
un MYint.
a war rior wh o had bee n figh ting aga ins t the Bu rme se gov
sinc e the ear ly 196os. He had bee
erntnent
n con tac ted by emissaries
by Pe Toa ung in 1971, and by No vem sent
ber 1973 mo st of the area Was ,
con trol led by the CP B. Bu t it wa s
not unt il 1975 tha t Kh un
gre ed to me rge his for ces wit h tho se Myint
of the CPB. After all, h
e and his
。三：~三:§~~t~ii~~言：;fglg:::::;~
,hte rs wer e Sha n nat ion alis ts, not com
mu nis ts. In April 1976, th
be am e the 768 Bri gad e of the CP B's ey
'Pe opl e's Ar mf The
commander
\
g their new
炉 ：二三三三: ;~i三三三;言；~:三三三
'-- con tigu ous se are a alo ng the Ch ine se bor der .
Altogether more than
on hea d-h unt ing . Off icia lly, tha t
wa s don e by' edu cat ing the masses;
bu t acc ord ing to the Wa lea der Zh
ao Yil ai, his me n simply shot those
see n car ryi ng sev ere d hea ds. 2 Jus
t as the Ch ine se communists had
don e in Wa are as on the ir sid e of
the bor der , the CPB also destroyed
hea d-p ole s, dru m hou ses , and
oth er par aph ern alia associated with
hea d-h unt ing . Bu t hea ds con tin
ued to pla y an imp orta nt role in w,
80
_
it a1sv v ...---· ·- -
, tillY• ----八"l''" 人uus ma aen
m
Jfl\l
villages, out of sig ht of the CPB's political commissars.4
their
诈e
cPB divided the Wa Hills into two districts
, a northern district
cen ter at Mo ng Ma u and a sou the rn
with itS
1he dis tric ts we re div ide d
dist rict headquartered at 2.
panghsang. into townships, which in turn
ma de up of vill age trac ts. On the dist
rict level, however, there ~
were the beg inn ing few Wa in lea
din g positions. The new rulers
were in
were the CPB's pol itic al com mis sar s.
Panghsang, loc ate d in a hor ses hoe
ben d of the Nam Hk a River
;:.:::三三:~:三三＼飞~:,。三~ :三三三；h。:三~三::
with Chi nes e terr itor y eve ryw her e exc ept to the west, was
an ideal
place for a ma jor bas e. In Ap ril 1973,
wh at was called the Northeastern
stayed in small ind ivid ual con cre te bui ldin gs beh ind a well-st
armory at the far end of the hor ses hoe ocked
. A prin ting press was also built
助咖ang. ~en tra l Bu rm a wa s los
t, and the CPB had to adjust to
having bas e are as in the se rem ote are
as alo ng the Chinese border.
Despite the set bac k at Ku nlo ng,
艺竺.§.llPpw:L竺三
二： 1968一1978,
una bat e ang She ng and the har d-li ner s had
not given up their
strategy for spr ead ing rev olu tion
to Sou the ast Asia and beyond.
dec ade the Chi nes e pou red more aid into
,'
/ I
~ -,r 7 { I. 81
 尸 沪二co""""'"""''o""""'I 1气
恤 一

CHAPTER 3 ~ 、

th'"向:w,; r.".: : \:。二言；二："'沁

、
the Pegu Yoma, the'new'party also collected
the cPB effort era in basic education in Burmese and
orphans who
unlike received some were told that the
Indochina. . (sarongs) and sandals and \\>如 their parent. The ability to read and write non-B
Burmese / o n g J ' W e r e was
妇ed in than oId World War II-era rifles and shotguns 、 ?art'f was kept alive only in Christian churches, Buddhist
urmese

~ =~三：:二二::~。二；~~ :;: :h7二:~~ :;hl: : ~ ;: is;: ;。二:':!二~:,二:::勹言:i•:.(:~

nrith Jittle more theast bad new Chinese uniforms'e th Janguages
in the nor teries, and small schools run by the villagers themselves.
硐as
p.lrnost all political posts in the CPB's leadership and top positions

aft guns, 6o, 82 and 120mm mortars, and

立7mm anti-airer 冻n
Radio equipment, jeeps, trucks and petrol d headquarters area at the end of the horseshoe bend in the
recoilless rifles. , as We]] arde
驴
foodstuffs, cooking oil, and kitchen utensils, were sent I:Ika River. Although Thakin Ba Thein Tin was the chairman
- as rice, other Nam

I
across the border into Panghsang,
Yoma in 1975 was design ated the
which after the loss of the p
official headquarters of the CPB
眼
Chinese even sent a truekload of detailed military maps , covering a]]
the border areas and parts of central Burma.
egu of the party, h琴 The
only times he
left Panghsang were when he traveled through China
to Mong Ko in the north, or went to visit Chinese communist leaders
andh1g• h-ranking cadres in Kunming and Beijing.
L
, On the other hand, the CPB did very little to develop theWaHills Many of the military officers in the CPB's army were Kokang
&
and other areas the party had captured. The Wa and other recruits Chinese. A few who had come with Naw Seng in 1968 and from
~ from the non-Burmese ethnic peoples in the new base areas were Ting Ying's and Zalum's CPB unit in Kachin State were Kachin. Then,
thus viewed as little more than cannon fodder for its army. As on March 沪972, Naw Seng, the ethnic Kachin military commander
T石芦~面言芦丽飞f tl比如 mo颈沺， when in the northeast, died under mysterious circumstances near Mong
the Chinese volunteers began to return to China in the mid-197081 1 Mau. The first internal announcement from the CPB claimed that

_
Wa troops in particular formed the bulk of the fighting force: "The he had died when falling off a horse "on the way to the frontline'.'6
organisation made modest attempts to bring health and education However, the official version of his death soon changed to a tale of
to the area, but for the CPB the Wa region was never a riority and how he had fallen off a cliff while hunting in the Wa Hills. Many
was always a ste·ppmg stone to reach the central plains:'5 Kachin, however, believe that he was murdered by the CPB because
荀d out propaganda he refused to fight against his kin in the Kachin Independence Army
leaflets and ideological studies in Burmese, which very few Wa were (KIA). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the two rebel forces were
able to read, if th engaged in heavy battles in the hills south of Mong Ko and in Kachin
ey could read at all. Textbooks used in the CPB's
village schools were also m • State itself.7 Nevertheless, on July 6, 1976, the Kachin rebels and the
Burmese. Conspicuously absent were
publications in waoranyoth
er minority languages. But like the'old'

82 83
,-- CHA PTE R 3 飞 THE WA
AND THE COM MUN IST PAR
TY OF BUR MA

r than Loi Tsang

de had bee n una ble to pus h fur the
wa r bet we en th etw。 .Briga
CPB signed an alliance end ing the grou the 6B.3 ,) in we ste rn Sha n State, overloo
king an old CPB
t lan gua ge: Ps.'1/ie 5sA , r,,1oun tain
agreement was written in pur e Ma ois han t of Mo ng Ku ng and Lai -Hk a.
('即 P 如 wwns d
peo ple s in the are a clearly favore
superpowers一 记 near and oth er mi nor ity
Today; throughout the world the two val of the CPB
the s Shan reb el gro ups and vie we d the arri
impe rial ists 一a re tr 0"旧 1he rnu nis t lf from
social-imperialists and Americ an 加gtod ·
咦
com
佃 non·As a res ult,
the SSA wa s for ced to dis tan ce itse
and rule the world between them ...
it is necessarYto d iciOil• l enjoying. This
ecisi1re)y 仇thsusp t to los e the sup por t it wa s stil
s headed by the soc · ord er no rea chi ng cen tral
stand on the side of the worlds people 1alist 伽
cP. Bin
t to pus h wes
twards wit h the aim of
... bot h par ties totall th d atte mP SSA wa s in jeopardy.
Peoples Republi c of China Y agre ed at the secon and thu s the alli anc e wit h the
all nati onal itie s一 th eNe W- failed, and wa s dep end ent on
common enemy ofthe peo ple of had a cam p on the Th ai bor der
I
in-San ~
_Burma
of th re not ple ase d
Yu military government一is the chi ef rep rese nta tive
e three 仆e
SSA also tha t sid e as well, and the Tha is we
l_
com ing fro m e.
main enemies: imperialism , feu dali sm- land lord ism and b ureaucrat supplies Sha n cou sin s lin kin g up wit h a pot ent com mu nis t forc
.
to see the ir h the CPB's lac k of
capitalism. 8 mu st hav e bee n fru stra ted wit
伽 Chi nes e
nal com mu nis t par ty,
CP B wa s rec ogn ize d as a fra ter
Had the ardent Christian Kachin bec
om e com mu nis ts? success. 1he alli es dea lt dir ect ly wit h Ka ng
ch .
Despite Jike the KIA , the SSA and oth er
itat ion s to all Ka n De par tme nt
the Maoist rhetoric, and des pite inv m rebel leaders andun ara tus and his Int ern ati ona l Lia iso
Sheng's sec uri ty app
to visi t Chi na, little had actually cha nge d ins ide the KIA -controlled ina (CP C). Th e ILD rep ort ed
f the Co mm un ist Pa rty of Ch
e and nor th t Ch (ILD)o Joh n
areas of Kachin Stat ern Sha n Sta te. Bu inese-made mi tte e, and as the res ear che rs
mac hine - ion b directly to the CP C's cen tra l com
assault rifles, guns, mo rtar s, and am mu nit egan flowing alm ost unl im ite d cha rte r
ilar alr and Ro ber t Pac k pu t it, it "ha d an
in. The CPB forged sim (SSA) Byron
iances with the Sha n Sta te Arm y 0s and 196 0s, wie ldi ng far gre
ate r /
and smaller bands of Pa-0, Padaun in external aff airs du rin g the 195
g (Kayan), and Ka ren ni (Kayah)
""
上ore1gn Mi nis try :·"
· the
I
~

ver nm ent· ,un

CC'' ter
· par t, ·'
rebe ls. Th ese groups also benefited f rom arm s sup plie s fro m the CPB influence tha n the go . y the f
pf ns, Pan ghs ang wa s no t onl
td pla
in return for all In line wit h Ka ng She ng' s gra nd
owing the communists t 0 ope rat e in the ir respective
hos--t勹 ~ --勹「_ --- i顽
~ct垒·垒
en-一--
如z-三垒 ---s
I
areas.
hea~-~
星星.,'s 凰·- dqu --·art ers bu t als o r·-
·-·- .,_. -·- .. _d &&~
p}a,ye_ -~--~

~二二 ush
CPB
nd mo re tha n twe nty cacti-es
。；而~mu而正面芯亘坚迦~a
, ·

i
A newCPB Brigade, 68J
, was set u f ia,
into western
an St吵· Militaril·
1?...._ 血心足尘rtaiKomu面可芯nes
fr呾止立皿munifit P:i rt)r of血
the firs an, D.
ter s of its on ce pow erf ul cha irm
CPB, and Li :h: f PK!), inc lud ing the tw o dau gh
lay a

-吐unteers
~ of Ma lay a's Su ara Rev olu si Ma
elonged to th N. Aidit. Th e Co mm un ist Pa rty

。
t三
who had come across t sou th
the Ma lay an Re vol uti on' ) bro adc ast fro m He ngy ang
60s and lat er dec ide d ('Vo ice of
more than a
year of figh tin g alo ngs ide the

凶
85
 CH AP TE R 3
~ AN D TH E CO MM
UN IST PART Y OF
BURM A

THE WA
d control of
munists ha d wreste
th e B ur m es e com duce high-land
after lped them to intro
罕盂二一
shortIY ex pe rt s he
s心
hi ne
下
se
芦 芦 言
the Wa I-fillch , and the CPB
whi th ey ho w to pr ep ar e the new crop
w he at, Wa kn ew t that bamboo
了 ut no t m an y
ad vi se rs ha d no t taken in to accoun
13 ·n hordes
d th at it attracts ra
乙江as
Chinese or so , an
必 jtS ye ar s
every fifty
二:~ultiply
an d de st ro y cr op s
w ha t ha pp en ed in th e W
an d food stocks.
a H ills. The wheat was
wiped out

---— <'§i匹沭~
p re cise ly
60 ,0 00
扑 II th er e w as in e vi ct imsb yc II sf rf fiuting
rva s
I 、..... a an d
CPB assisted th e fa m
兰竺竺吵ic
disaster. 陨 en ~ ,.rl , i ' ! h e th e m os t commonly
used hard
~二 tre kk t th at ti m e st ill
ilver ru pe es, a paper,
Indians th ey w er e m ad e of real silver, no t
in th e Wa Hills as d stockpiled at
currency am s of op iu m , w hi ch th e pa rt y ha
ki lo gr milies reverted
and 1, 60 0 on as th e cr is is was ov er, m os t fa
As so pests than
Panghsang.
pp ie s, w hi ch ar e less vulnerable to
po
to growing op iu m

飞勹~::;尽雪:产;;
ents th at ha d a
sa w so m e ot he r ev
Wa. A pa rt from
pa ct on ot h th e CPB an d the
tremendous im st ru m en ta l in
, K an g Sh en g ha d also be en in
supporting th e CPB in C am bo di a afte
r its he ad of
t's K hm er R ou ge
building up Pol Po st ed in a co up in M ar
ch 1970.
uk , ha d be en ou
state, Prince Si ha no R ou ge m ar ch in to Ph no m
Penh
to se e th e K hm er
Kang Sheng lived r 16 th at year.
ed of bl ad de r ca nc er on D ec em be
in April 1975, bu t di l le ad er s was gone. H
is death
of C hi na 's ra di ca
The m os t ex tr em e ru
ex is ti ng po w er st - rd-liners
th e C
-

hi ne se leadership~ . The ha
in s wife
- '
's cl os es t fo llo wers, in cl ud in g hi
nd M ao
were centered ar ou
g Sh en
仵
g ha d played a leading
role
on g w it h K an
Jiang Qing, w ho al
一c

,Jd W Pl l do without.

86
"'- --
 CHAPTER 3
盲 ......- J?-e1----
during the Cultural Revolution, while Deng)(· ' fHE WA ANO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA

prominent among the pragmatists. 吟in 尸

gwas th
e闷 Gboshal as'Burm
In April 1976, when the radical Left reasserted . Oii r-J. fell silent

p竺B
Deng, the CPB, unlike most other communist itself respectively,
Parti and 。闷
es in th 闷
spoke out loudly in favor of the hard-I'Iners. "1he ere创 state竺归声牢竺空竺hing about the'revolutionary
revis•
ionistcl尸
阮th which Deng was linked] headed b
Shaoqi has been defeated;'12 the CPB stated .
Y fforrner
Preside
in a con nt] lii
恨
，吐-
~----
rnu l-.~...l hoon mentioned for the last time in
en Thakin Ba Thein Tin and vice chairman Thakin
- - -
the CPC· gratu1 ad caued on Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, in Beijing.is
to the 55th anniversary of I
石ing to
message m June 1976. It ato~
"The movement to repulse the Right d eviationist
attempt at
0~
reversjng ` ordinary Wa, who could not care less about power struggles in distant (

--- ~
correct verdicts, and the decision of the Central c
CPC on measures taken against rightist chieftain D
0rnmittee Beijing. 竺~三~nt that Chinese世
he CPB was significantly reduce . It was not completely cut off,
in full accord with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zed eng Xiaop;::~ .....
Then, on September 9, Mao died. In a second messa
ong though1."1i but it was curtailed enough for the Wa to notice that something had ·
ge to the 氓 changed. They were told to economize with the ammunition they had
now mourning his death, the CPB stated:
been allotted, and food, medicines, and other supplies from China
did not come in the same quantities as before. \
Guided by Chairman Mao Zedong's proletarian revolutionary line, In January 1978, Deng Xiaoping, then vice premier, traveled to
the Chinese people seized great victories in th e socialist revolution Rangoon to improve relations with Ne Win's government which had
and socialist construction in the Great Proletarian Cultural shown its goodwill towards China. In late November 1977, Ne Win
Revolution, in criticising Liu Shaoqi's counter-revolutionary had become the first and only head of state of a non-communist
revisionist line, in criticising Lin Biao and Confucius and in country to visit China's diplomatically isolated ally Cambodia when
criticising Deng Xiaoping and repulsing the Right deviationist the Khmer Rouge was still in power. He spent several days in the
attempt at reversing correct
verdicts and consolidating the country, hosted by Khieu Samphan and other Khmer Rouge leaders,
d·1ctatorship of th
e proletariat, thus, consolidating the People's who took him to see Angkor Wat and other cultural landmarks.
Republic of Ch
ina一the reliable bulwark of the world proletarian 三一 ~owards
revolution.14
improved relations between e1Jmg an Rangoon. China's interests
PBWmgnee
ThefoUCh
rpo .th c
hady

Coo w竺上皿皿逆二旦竺亚竺纱ilateral trade子江吐竺＿迦ical.

tODed仆 r

the.

ew
asonhennde
ar郎
the占

re luasn
aber氐

of动

ateumcre
evarew iii.mye
eliwS atbThtay
tyBba uJe
wd
ng m C迦立皿址迦皿型业主坐迦旦竺虫皿m哑严~am.
k

s
.T ; go ~竺竺坐竺也吁竺竺三le down its supp-ort to

二:t评，切了
A
bra .Its g
v

-q
eI
寸 ea

an
。

| rJ
whi

l
一8
dS

l L l ?
U _ '
、

/[ 8
 左
7

飞
«人
t
CHAPTER 3 ~

l
l
ND THE c MMuN sT pAR

。
T
TY F BuRMA

。
f Deng's visit, the CPB had to vacate th ~
months o
响in Kunming and other towns in e 0!6ce8
it had m皿
. tained in 归an. 1h
without being specific, said that the CPB "had made man
Ymistakes"
which had been broadcastin history. In other announcements f
也。pies Voice ofBurma, g frorn M e during1·ts forty-year-long

--- -~
romthe
1, had to move to Panghsang, where a new an筑 "non-interferen
- ce was declared to be a
since 197 meeting, - major aspect of the
in Yunnan the radio station. The Chinese also recalled studio CPB's relations with fraternal communist parties:'19
, was built for
nlya few were 1~祁画in扣而血而玩~ir
rnost of th
in ue脰
·---
The Burmese government took full advantage of the situation. In
?'
竺 d its army. Those who stayed were skilled November, a major offensive code-named Min Yan Aung-I ('King
over the party an operatives
ending years in the CPB's base areas, had become fl囡 Conqueror-I') was launched with the aim of capturing Panghsang
who, after sp before Christmas. Thousands of troops, supported by heavy artillery
well as minority languages such as Shan and
in Burmese as Kachin. and air strikes, took up positions in the Mawhpa area southwest of
oken by them. When communicatingwiththe
Wa, though, was not sp Panghsang. Heavy fighting raged for more than a month.Jhe CPB
the Wa had to speak Chinese, Shan, or Burmese
volunteers, :e resistance and managed to defend Panghsang
沪~二皿s, and despite the strength of its 百nuary6函So the governme~t call二~ffensive.
army, the actual party organization remained weak. In the late 197051 Although the operation fell short of its objective, the Burmese army
~5~
there were o Y 面面嘉丽而如元邪句berated area'of managed to regain control over most of Mawhpa. A forward base was
whom, signific扭tly, only 888 came from the 23,000-strong army established at Loi Hsia-Kao Mountain, less than thirty kilometers
The party's youth organization claimed a membership of 2,3巧， and southwest of Panghsang. The CPB claims that the government's forces
various 'peasant unions'一the basis of the CPB's'people's power' suffered 2,085 dead and 3,537 wounded, and that the CPB captured
structure in the northeast一enlisted 87,608 members in 882 different 320 prisoners of war.20 Even if exaggerated, these figures show that
local organizations.17 But those'mass organizations'existed only
on paper. ~丘吵d皿~ffe吐型竺巴些ction as a properly
the Burmese military was willing to accept heavy casualties in order
to make territorial gains against the CPB. r
But the government in Rangoon was not averse to the thought
一把一 亚竺l
: .::~::,:;~::。二 ~e civil war by politic~,~飞二二）
一，
心 － ． 一 d
selves and began to spend less an
吓 time in theiro朊GS.!!._ -
~ -- 一一一一一 the insurgents were not particularly enthusiastic about the offer.
Faced with this new situation, the CPB's central committee met,
Officially, 450 rebels from the CPB surrendered along with 400 KIA
fir5t at Mong Ko and later at Panghsang, between November 1978
soldiers, 260 from the Karen rebel army, 160 from'Kokang; aotl
and June 1979-The mood was somber when the CPB celebrated its
a speech over 450 'expatriates'returned from the Thai border and abroad.
40th anniversary on August 15. Thakin Ba Thein Tin
in which he emphasized that the party had to be ,~ and,

91
90
 CHAPTER 3 _

Although this adds up to 1,720, the government dai med THE WA A ND THE COMMUNIST PARTY O F BU RMA

had surrendered.21 2,2归

~ Recognition of the CPB as a legal political party;
加re was no way to cross-check those contradic
tory fi
am aware ofsurrenders only among the'Kokang grou , 8Ures b
p, or foU ' 阳
the opium warlord Luo Xinghan, who had gone under 。气。f
groun虾
and then stayed in camps near the Thai border, and ,
expatri 沥 arently,
non-communist Burmese opposition led by former ates' (t忧
prime
Nu, who had also been encamped on the Thai b order), and吨ister lJ
re咘
of the CPB in the Pokaung range and Arakan (Ra妞 ants
1ne) state.1Ji
were no surrenders in Kachin State and certain!ynonef ere
rolllth
in the northeast. To whom would any Wa have surrendered? eCpB
them could not even speak Burmese. M。Sl of
Nonetheless, both the CPB and the KIA entered into
peace talks
with the government. The Kachin held several rounds of
negotiations
with the regime, in Rangoon as well as in Kachin State, b
etween
August 1980 and May 1981. While in Rangoon, the Kach
mrebel
leader Brang Seng declared that his troops were willing to laydo阶
arms only if the government granted autonomy to Kachin State,
stressing that secession from the Union of Burma was no longer an
issue. 22 The government's response was to offer rehabilitation for the
KIA's fighters. They would have to surrender their arms and return
to their home towns and villages where the government would give
them some assistance to start new lives. No political concessions were
forthcoming, and the talks eventually broke down.
In contrast, talks in May 19出 between government officials and the
CPB lasted only one day. A three-man delegation led by vice chairman
Thakin Pe T'mt, along with Ye Tun (a veteran from Pyinmana) and
Hpalang Garn Di (one of Naw Seng's men), went to Lashio and put
1,
Recognition of the CPB's base area as an `autonomous entity';
2,
Recognition o f the CPB's army.23
3·
finding no room to negotiate, the Burmese officials
A.PP lks without further .discussion.
ended the ta
A.s the years went by, some of the old leaders dropped out of the
Hard-liner Taik Aung, the butcher of the Pegu Yoma, suffered
picture.
d became paralyzed after drinking homemade moonshine
a stroke an
. He left Panghsang and was hospitalized in China. Thakin Pe
in 19幻
Tint go
t throat cancer and also had to leave for China to get medical
treatment. Hpalang Garn Di, because of old age and ill health, began
to spend more and more time in Chinese hospitals as well. Than
Shwe, the first political commissar of the northeastern base area, quit
the party and retired in China because of disagreements with the
party leadership. He had argued that the time was not ripe for armed
struggle and it would be better, at least for the time being, to work
within the political system in Burma, even if that meant accepting the
rule of the military-dominated government in Rangoon.24
竺应型~Burma and China contin玉
- ----
improve. In January 19趴， China's new premier, Zhao Ziyang, a
staunch supporter of Deng and an advocate for market economic
reforms, visited Burma. That paved the way for an agreement on
bilateral economic and technical cooperation, which was signed
in June屯 The following year, some more exchanges took
arch, Chinese president Li Xiannian, one of the most
import卢t architects of the economic reforms that followed the
us Cultural Revolution, traveled to Burma. In May, Ne Win
china wher e he hel d t a ks with Deng Dur.1ng ne f t h se
--
-

。
。

。
幻

forth three demands: went

,L` -

_ _,
92 93

_
 A
CHAPT ER 3 AND THE COMM UN IST PARTY OF BURM
T H E WA

Were . revo lutio n in Burm a is the peop le's demo crati c

meetings, Deng said that both Chin a and Burm a 呻 ators of the
Co-E xiste nce, whic h were first Of 巾e
natur e over throw ing impe rialis m, feudalism and
the Five Principles of used · aime d at for the prese nt
revotutio n capit alism.»21 Ther efore , "the tactic al line

~
between Chin a and India and then expa nded at a surnrnit of
nden t Asia and Afric an state s in Band ung in Indonesia .
`""'ly
Ill
bureau
stage o
crati c
f the revo lutio n
[is that] arme d strug gle is the main form of
[with the aim of] estab lishi ng base s in the rural
areas
f
1955. wo of the key princ iples were "mut ual respe ct or each other's struggIe· ·· »28
.
non -1nter the citie s.
territorial integrity and sove reign ty" and "mut ual ference ding
surro un cadr es argu ed that feud al lords and gree dy
in each other's inter nal affairs:'25 The youn ger that the old
lende rs had pass ed into histo ry long ago and
In order to restr uctur e the CPB, a party cong ress was convened at rnoney -five
desc ribin g a soci ety they had left more than thirty
Panghsang on September 沪9的 It was only the third tirne since the leaders were ed that the
was in befor e for the jung le, or for Chin a. They also argu
party was founded that a cong ress was held. The first August
Rango on to
years
ms now facin g the peas antry were how to meet often
youn g leftis t natio nalis ts met in roble
1939, when a group of rnain P
duct ion quot as set by the gove rnme nt, and how
to
anized after
set up the CPB, and the seco nd when the party was reorg unrealistic pro price s.
rice to the gove rnme nt at rates well belo w mark et
the fall of the Pegu Yoma in 1975. Som e call it the 3rd congress while avoid selling i-
critic s also ques tione d the use of the term 'sem
others do not consider the 1939 meet ing a real cong ress
and therefore The same youn ger
its xeno phob ic,
CPB:' colo nial' and' semi-feu dal't o desc ribe Burm a and
refer to the one in 19躬 as "the 2nd Cong ress of the and its desir e to
until October atavistic regim e. Rang oon's ques t for self- relia nce
Whatever the designation, the congress, whic h lasted abso lute mini mum
us parts of the keep outsi de influ ence , and outs ide trade , at an
2, was attended by more than 170 deleg ates from vario rket econ omie s on
the remnants had creat ed one of Asia 's mos t thriv ing blac k-ma
northeastern base areas as well as a repre senta tive from gove rrun ent officials
oon. A new which not only priva te merc hant s but also man y
in Tenasserim and two unde rgrou nd work ers from Rang to the youn ger
the integration and army officers had mad e fortu nes. Acco rding
central committee was elected and, officially, "taki ng thes e thing s than
of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedo ng thou ght with
the concrete cadres, it wou ld be mor e appr opri ate to expo se
the oppo sitio n .was
practice of Burma as guidance, the 24-d ay cong ress was a congress to talk abou t'col onia l expl oitat ion: How ever ,
even warn ed not to
of unity, a congress of victorY:'26 defeated and som e of the youn ger cadr es were
actio n.29
~ In reality, serious d ment s between~l赵卫竺型空 raise such issue s, or they wou ld face disci plina ry
~
ress, and ethn ic
and younger intell 70s, Ethnic issue s were not disc usse d duri ng the cong
ip rema ined smal l.
com mitte es repo rt stated repre senta tion in the new ly elec ted top lead ersh
that on independence on g with Saw Ba Moe , a
Janua ry 4, 1948 "Bur ma beca me a semi- Only two Wa, Zhao Yilai and Bao Youx iang, alon
I colonial and semi-feudal · polit ically indep ende nt but
state which 1s Karen who had )·oine d the CPB in 1973, were amo ng the eigh t alter nate
economicallY dependent u
·
pon various impe rialis t coun tries. Hence, members of th e cent ral com mitt ee. Of the twen ty-on e regu lar cent ral

怜 94
95
 CHAP TER 3
~ THE WA AN D THE COM MUNI ST PART
Y OF BURM A
Sai A Ung\,y•
committee members there was one Sha n, in , and h when it
Guiz hou laobing: Hpa lang Gam n · z only pitz u, a brownish-yellowish powder, whic
came from the 1 and l"1。 heroin, a general
e Sich 吁 jJJlO d becomes pure white num ber 4 heroin. As
rest, and all five members of the poli tbur o,
wer 如/ ai, 沁 ther refin e anhydrite and other
蝠h is fur 则ograms of raw opiu m, plus acetic
d in the old base area s in cen tral Bur阳,30 g, 。r in. But raw
had a backgroun 呻， ten
are nee ded to prod uce one kilogram of hero
The loss of much of the 五nancial and
mat eria l SU ,
cheJJll·cals
was bulky to move, and tran spo rtati on of
the drugs down to
可~ 主 opi叩
. bord er was mad e a lot easier whe n only bags
ofpitzu had to
Chi~
一 小e
名玉户酝玉孟百盂 如加1
orte rs or by mules.
一unorthodox 玉玉石of三 ）
airnin
be carried by p
ther 血portant dev elop men t took plac
e shortly after the 19躬
g to be to
communists, but the CPB alre ady con trol led
mos t owing the failure of the peace talks from 1980
J\DO
Burma's ress. Foll
but wer e ove Pop协 party cong
con clud ed that only a broa der fron t of ethn
ic and
growing areas. Some part y mem bers obje cted rruJed b the Kachin
y's fi nanciaI Y 1981,
1 rebels wou ld be able to force the gov
ernm ent to concede
those who saw no othe r way out of the part probJe职，
wer e collected politica whi ch wou ld be replacing
Thousands of viss (1.6 kilo gram s) of opi um from their demands for con stitu tion al change,
after 1962,
the farmers and stockpiled at Pan ghs ang .
Fro m ther e, armed lize d system whi ch the mili tary had intr odu ced
Units the centra federal system
transported the drug s via Mo ng Paw k sou th of p ang hsan g to the difications wou ld sign al a retu rn to the
b初K and with mo
ntatives of the KIA, or
of the Nam Hka River, then on by bam boo raft d own to th ·
勺 unction
that had existed before the cou p. Represe
Organisation
whe re the olitical win g, the Kac hin Inde pen den ce
of the Salween and downriver to Ta-Kaw, Y were loaded rath er of its P
nor th in early 19的 and
Tha i bor der. Once there, (KIO), left thei r hea dqu arte rs in the far
onto mules and porters and carr ied to the Tha i bord er, where they
nts wh0 ran laboratories trekked thro ugh Sha n Stat e dow n to the
the raw opium was sold to local mer cha ies. The KIO rejo ined the
made contacts with oth er ethn ic rebe l arm
~ -- - b
where it was refined into heroin. Thus, the CPB eca me involved with ~ National Dem ocra tic Fro nt (ND F), a gath
erin g of then eight, mostly
~罕罕巴e~ants of the old Kuomin
opiumm tang, '
乙 Thai bord er-b ased rebe l outf its, and invi
ted them to sen d delegates
of the mo st noto riou s warlords
_ g 1 u, one
to KIA-controlled area s in the nor th.
ral hun dred Sha n and
rate labo rato ries .in the A twe nty- six- man team , esco rted by seve
The CPB also allowed mer cha nts to ope i bor der in Apr il 19的 The
Kachin guerrillas, set off from the Tha
northeastern base area. Th ose mer cha nts belo nge d to the same bloc k them , but they finally
, Burmese mil itar y trie d to inte rcep t and
syndicates as th e ones on the Tha i bor der, and they had to pay
sing wel com e of dan cing
. Suc h labo rato ries were reached Kac hin Stat e in Nov emb er to a rou
protection money' and 'tax es' to the CPB from 12.5 mm anti-aircraft
established at Pang Hpeu ng nea r Pan ghs ang, at Wa n Ho- tao east of villagers, Kac hin bag pipe rs, and salu tes
guns.
Panghsang, and area in the
near the Salween Riv er in the Kok ang
north. But th ose laboratories
were not cap able of refi ning raw opium
97
96
 CHAPTER 3

A conference was held at the KIO's Pa Jau head

~ THE WA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA

qu吐t the CPB. He liked to style himself'Kyi Myint; which is

lasted from December 16 , 19躬 to January 20, 1986, 如 to join
加＇沐 . When China had recalled
was that the NDF was a united front in name only. More conc1Usi ch 19605咖rning, would sound in Burmese
teers in 1978, he belonged to a small group that had been
of the activities of its various members was needed 碗呴 0~
how
voiun on the CPB for China's
the NDF delegation marched south into areas cont
CPB, and in March a second conference was held at p
In late
咦d b 杻
`
lanua~
y叶
归
Jeft
behind,
Jjigence
most probably to keep an eye
services.
angh e 疵 continued for several days. The outposts on the top of the
meeting took place in the premises of the broadcastin sang 沁 伽
battle
only to provoke a massive counteroffensive
吵
• wereoverrun,
concrete building overlooking the Nam Hka RiVer. ong11station,, 佃叩 ent's side. Airplanes were dispatched from Meiktila
overnm
the NDF and CPB agreed to coordinate their military 吼 i i froJll
theg
of Mandalay and howitzers and other heavy artillery
• base south
against the Burmese army. The purpose was not to escaJ 0Perati。沁 air d around Hsi-Hsinwan. On December 7, the CPB
ate the ositione
buno step up the pressure on the government lil · Ran w句 \,;ere P retreat from the mountain, and four weeks later
goon forced to
the next time peace ta监 were held, the government Wouldhso th叶 was forces pushed on and captured not only Mong Paw,
rnment
face a unified, militarily powerful opposition.3 ' a ~切
gove market village on the foot of Hsi-Hsinwan, but also the
3 bustling
.
After meeting the CPB, the NDF delegates made th e1r waYb奴K f Panghsai, which the CPB had captured in March
border town o
to the Thai border. However, the broader alliance th 叩th those territories gone, 1t was easy for the Burmese army

the~:;: :。 I
at had been
envisaged at Pa Jau and Panghsang never materialized. The Karen
leadership, headed by the staunchly anticommunist
Mya, denounced the alliance, causing a·split within
which the front never fully recovered. It was only in the north that,
common command consisting-of the KIA, the SSA, and the Palaung
State Liberation Army was set up and reached out-to the CPB.
That aIIiance was put to test ·on the battlefield in mid-November
哄6. On the 16th, hundreds of heavily armed CPB troops attacked
I devastating blow to the morale of the CPB's soldiers. Moreover, the
goverrunent positions on Hsi-Hsirtwan, a mountain west of Mong
Ko. Kachin, Shan, and Palaung rebels were enlisted to ambush
reinforcements that the government sent up north from Mandalay
I I
197o.
the Shweli and retake, without resistance, the small enclaves
to cross
of肚un Hai an
d Man Hio north of the river, or what the CPB used
to call its 'Namkham District.
In terms of territory those were not big losses. The areas which
the government retook in late 1986 and early 1987 totaled not more
than five hundred square kilometers out of the CPB's large twenty
thousand-square-kilometer base area in the northeast. But it was a
fall of Panghsai and the areas around it was more than just a question
of the loss of a few hundred square kilometers. With several thousand
inhabitants, Panghsai was the largest settlement within the CPB's
northern base areas and the party's main commercial center. Tax on

I
and Lashio. .
the cross-border trade with China had been one of the CPB's main
The attack on Hsi-Hsinwan was led by Zhang Zhiming, a Chinese
volunteer who had come across the border from Yunnan in the late sources of income, and now that now gone.

99
98
 言勹 the
rendtO
CHAPTER 3 coMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA
shankkVIcdeag
言 edes二

blthffelht
呻othlahslarmDFPepaethlsS
efoawneoakanfor
p.ND THE
bngdod 证 WA

卫
thesod fKaWhasad
HSthsrnqu198noarengraedrtyWhmof killed by the communists when

0:Othatereyltsb
ichenea
0er.wweaayas.lvhp33&Nue
.SIBhonrSThoanithd mbnareedhsr
but was

mteOurt7cak
training

咦凡啪
BrtreserleaJauby.maum
meTha leaurmldtedater for tire southern Wa Hills. Mahasang,
沪an

\z 』困 Paredreda畸
un and the en
ndeveyhMwetngnatth tlO yin仅 in the area, allied himself with
妙。ver II tribal force
at 矿ool< rJlanded a sma arne a home guard commander under a
凇硬 and bee I(we Ye (I<I<Y), or'defense: They
卢”而 !led Ka

e岫
n
omenhiponbdutokweaikfoW Nhoad ,
产。vernrnent ca to sustain themselves. Mahasang s

r二
i

e the g trade in 0piurn

妙忍 d to Xinghan, one of the most powerful
2nn
s

was Luo
meam.me 妒e aUoW:tie business and once dubbed'the 氐ng of Opium'by
m

rin
己

sethdthdrghomNr manders
Pa戒I(l<'l co!ll
妇J:
h

go
dommgst eOUSa5

34
Ye

es s 。成 bureau, owerful for their own good,

坛
rcotics rew too p
霆恨 the I<灯 rn业ias g
m
.n

a the government. Luo and

，e
an

ever, disbanded by
sgleabl

-w

rmymmthtreAlH-gwas
即W 3 they were forces with the SSA. Luo,
n 砌 197 d to join
配o

沁 in
ue

anende0

afialtahpowaermaofprogsebyesaIned went undergroun dited to Burma,

ttien Thai border and extra

le
Sf

妇sang don the

was arreste for opium trafficking, which
th
t
Nf

however, sentenced to death, not

f the Burmese army to engage m,
m
如ek
a

he was
dunalwaHfuh叩
队d

扣e 币cial permission o
ro

吵d the u n ° tagainst h e state" in reference to his

wa
s

"rebellion
础g

二p
nt
re

am

but for "treason" and

』d

二
·th the SSA.35
e

ler

s
Y
心p
＼怂
c

咖
ntO
C

the Thai border after Luo's arrest, and

s
wl

brief alliance w1
mn
oa
the

don
aP

邮w

remaine
h

y Otgg

Mahasang ted his former KKY force

os

f the SSA, conver

themfoeeateMm
hn

Vn
re

with the help o SSA and joined

e
to

aB ot e in 1974• Three years later, he broke with the

2 令： 各

s
et

ad
B
二

iawb into the WNA, the Shan United Revolutionary Army

n

Shan army,
m

二e

'th another
ln

.
d

forcesw1 h the remnants of the Kuomintang. The

ao

XlSaanunoldofsosthe
st
P
Ouadm[ 儿

which was allied wit

叩W
t
g

f the WNA, joined the NDF in 19扔. There

m

p (SURA),
e~
正

』,
th
te

吓O, the political wing o

lhh
oh

·t Wa movement,
e
m
ha

f the non-commurus
ft

如unistrative arm o
he
he

二s

uaseerenn was also an a

ye

· i t functioned as a
he

WNC) but, in reality,

be
a
tC

the wa National Council (

elroseled:
emedid
et

(Ai Xiao Sue), came

aA

二adoe

separate organization. Its leader, Ai Kyaw Hso

心

Aadn ete
n
y

at

Wa Hills and had, like Mahasang,

MA

gch
P

nc from Yawnghpre in the northern

呻s
二

gh

also once been a KKY commander. Like SURA, which, in effect,

g
of

fe
Ot

em

be r ec ul. t had become the Kuomintang's operative arm inside Shan State
u
W}

etb
g
NB

100 101
h
h
}

_
 CHAPTER 3

after most of the Chinese

nationalists had
border villages, the Wa outfi settled•
ts in th e so In
the drug trade, and most of uth We re h nort朊
refine:'.nv。l:e~
the opium that eavu .
originated in CPB-controlled Was
areas such as Kok
the mountains north of Kengtung. ang, th
into h
eWafiu1 咦
In line with the new polic S.a叶
y of becoming'self
official policy was to colle -relian
ct twenty percent of th t; 1
harvested in its base areas. he QB•s
This was kept not on! .e raw
but also at local district off yin p op呤
ices. The CPB's'trade and angh匈g
department' then sold the
opium to local traders from commerce
Lashio, and other opium-tr T
ading centers in governmen 吨·Yan,
t-held town
west of the Salween. In addit s
ion, there was a ten percent activities: 夕 ~··-
on opium that was sold in loc 'tra de tax' rnernber iv.... . - and anyo

,voul尸d~~::~:;;。inb•~芦三::~::.:.~~
al markets and a five percent stated that anY party punis即ent
quantity of opium leaving the tax on any cuted.3s
CPB's areas for other destina 1r,ding
The funds derived from these tions.36
sources were viewed as legitim
several local commanders be ate, but
came increasingly involved
trading activities as well as the in private
production ofpitzu heroin
That was when the CPB's once base.
rather efficient civil administra

:: : ::
•- began to break down. Scho - tion
ols and clinics had to close all
而 base areas because ofl
began to show almost no intere
· main preoccupation of the
st in their administrative du
civil administrators out in
over the Wa
ack offunds, and party official
ties. The
the districts
s ::: / : : : a:adn;en:alC:::/p::s\;;::000:a
b:anood0/::anrncoeap:
e /: g/ u: \:
e:; aw /d :p :li be

became tax collection for the

:~三三亏三：
party, and enriching thems
their families by trading in dru elves and
gs. Ironically, the area controll
orthodox Maoists of the CPB ed by the
be ~二百芯飞rfree tra
de in then
~选严-宁 stic, and
in sharp contrast to thg to implement a land reform in the northeast,
the party had carried ouetdra matic land-distributing schem
es which
to act as warlords 产竺竺三 /
久勺灼
in
central Burma in the late 1940
s and early \
102 互8
,__

CHAPTER 3

Then came the big prodemocr acy uprising in

俨．，

盲旷飞

-
THE WA
AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA
"'
central 8 ounger party members were encouraged by the
1988. Across the country, millions of people took to th Urllla in meof the Y
arid s0 wanted to link up with it. But after discussing
vent decades of pent-up frustrations with a militar
e St
乓知。 农fl rising 3ndthe movement' s demand for the formation of an
government that had turned what was once one 0:、d妇｀ jf) g
eneral terms
overnment in
Rangoon, one of the aging Maoist leaders
A.Sias
prosperous countnes mto an economic and social Wreck, 咦。st joteriJll g . "The No. 1 point I would like to say is not to let them
吓 Juded.
paid minimal interest to the movement. The 1985 e CpB co低 cadres] lose sight of the fact that we are fighting
congress the Younger
reiterated the Maoist doctrine ofcapturing the countrysidefi 闷 [j.e., It is impossible for us to make attacks in the towns
erJll war.
surrounding the cities and moving into urban areas later. A. rst•t朊 a Jongt hs and years. That is possible
only in rural areas:'41
mont
else was considered 'adventuris tic'and not in accord n呱
心ng numbers of students as well as other activists fled
When large
Marxism-Le ninism, Mao Zedong thought. ance Wit! ilitary stepped in to reassert power on September
after them
Rangoon
On May 19 and 20, 1988, the CPB's clandestine radio s thousands arrived in areas controlled by various ethnic
tation had 18, 1988,
carried a surprisingly detailed and accurate account the Thai border and in Kachin State. Significantly, only
of the first rebels along
CPB's territory.42 The CPB's failure to link
outbreak ofantigovernm ent demonstrat ions in March. 39 The sources
fifty 。r
sixty went to the
for that account were most probably Tin Aung and Thet Khaing, up with the biggest popular uprising in modern Burmese history
the two party members from Rangoon who had participated in the intellectua ls in the party and some of the
annoye d the younger
啖5 congress and afterwards returned to the capital. Thet Khaing
d Burmese-s peaking minority cadres who had heard
better-educate
Burmese-la nguage service. The vast
was married to Hla Kyaw Zaw, the daughter of Kyaw Zaw, one of about the uprising on the BBC's
majority of the CPB's hilltribe rank-and-f ile was, however, unaware
the Thirty Comrades and a legendary Burmese army officer who
had joined the CPB in 1976. Tin Aung was an undergroun d party
organizer who, in 1969, had been sent to the Coco Islands in the
of the fact that there was a mass uprising in central Burma in the
first place.
J
Andaman Sea where the governmen t had established a penal colony There were also other卫空旦浊癹W吐贮~叩巴巴史竺呼
。
for political prisoners. He and the other prisoners, most of them CPB As early as December 20, 1988, Zhao Yilai and Bao Youxiang met
members or sympathizers, were released in 1972. 40 Tin Aung and The! f?r_the first time to 竺spire a砰吐归立一上
Khainghad been active among students in Rangoon in 1988, but both 竺色竺_a political o呾血主皿止卢nuld be nrl n 叩ly
were arrested in July 19的 and severely tortured. 逆巴~nd not communist .43 Before they could make a move against
That was almost the extent of the CPB's involvemen t in the 1988 the CPB leadership, however, the unit in Kokang led by Peng Jiasheng

L
uprising. The
party's policy towards the prodemocr acy movement rebelled. On March 12, 19的， Peng announced that he and his troops
was discussed at a politb
uro meeting in Mong Ko on September 10. had broken away from the CPB, and two days later they took over
Thedemonstratio ns in R
angoon and elsewhere were at their height, the party's northern bureau headquarte rs at Mong Ko. 44

104 105

CHAPTER 3
On April 13, Zhao and Bao met again and decided
归 f the lives of people in the Wa region following the
seven hundred W
could not wa1•r any longer. Four days later,
marched into Panghsang and surrounded the headquar 叶。Ops
ters
where the top leaders were staying. The mutineers Went
the well-stocked armory, the broadcasting station, and
on t
Os硕
other
buildings. While Wa soldiers were smashing portraits of ce网
colllllJ.
icons Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao and b
urnin
literature in an outburst of antiparty feelings, the B g Par ty
urman
leaders escaped across the Nam Hka River into China. 如。ist
The Wa now had their own organization and called it
the B
National United Party (BNUP). On April 18, the mutineers b U项a
roadcast
the first denouncement of what they termed "the narrow
policies of the Communist Party of Burma:•4s An even racial
stronger
broadcast followed on April 28:
Conditions were good before 19的 But what has th e situation
come to now? No progress whatsoever is being made. Why? In
our opinion, it is because some leaders are dinging to power and
are obstinately pursuing an erroneous line. They are divorced from
reality, practising individualism and sectarianism, failing to study
and analyse local and foreign conditions, and ignoring actual
material conditions …. They have cheated the people of the Wa
region, and through lies and propaganda have dragged us into their
sham revolution. How can an enemy armed with modern weapons
be defeated b
Yempty ideology and through military methods that
do not integrate theory with practice? We, the people of the Wa
region, never-kowtow before
an aggressor army whether it be
local or foreign. Alth
ough we are poor and backward in terms of
culture and I•
iterature, we are very strong in our determination.
106
丛，
AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA
THE WA
What became o
小勺 f power by an evil-minded individual within the CPB
wrestling o
time in the past? It was a hard life for the people. The
芞 at a certain
thepeople became heavier with more taxes being levied.
burden on
hardships. Can the people avoid staging an uprising
We faced grave
condition ?46
.
Unist under such a
tain who that "evil-minded individual" could have been.
Itis uncer
11 of the most important CPB leaders escaped to China
But while a
ecially disliked figures were captured alive: Mya
unhanned , two esp
olitical commissar of the Northern Wa District, and
加ung, the P
the overall political commissar of the northeastern region.
Soe 伽in,
the ethnic minorities,
Both were notorious for having manipulated
A third high-ranking CPB leader who was earmarked for arrest, and
possible execution, was the chief of staff of the army, Tin Yee, who
had been resp onsible for sending many young Wa to die in human-
wave attacks on government positions. Tin Yee managed to cross the
Nam Hka before he could be captured, while Mya Thaung and Soe
Thein were kept in custody until the Chinese told the Wa to release
them.
The role China might have played behind the scenes is still a
matter of conjecture. By the time the mutiny broke out, the Chinese
had signed several trade agreements with the Burmese. authorities,
and Chinese pressure on the CPB to reconsider its old policies
had become more persistent. Already in 1981, as Deng Xiaoping
was beginning to put his first promarket reforms into practice, the
Chinese had offered asylum to party leaders and high-ranking cadres.
This offer included a modest government pension一250 renminbi a
month for a politburo member, 200 renminbi for a member of the
107
........

了＼＼
付
CHAPTER 3
180 renrnmbi for any other leading cadre
ioo renminbi for ordinaIY party members一and a house With 尸
central committee,
．
珈 l relatio ns with the ·ethnic Chinese in
ofland. However, this was on condition that the retired CPB cad氐
refrained frorn p
olitical activity of any kind in Ch
ina. The old gu吼
the Sichua n laobing w ho had lived in China d
especially uring the
Cultural Revolution an d been clo se to Mao, saw the offer as trea
che
ry,
although they, at first, did not criticize China's new policies
open\y.
伽 offer was repeated in 19s5and again in 1988. Some
of theyo
unger
low-ranking CPB cadres accepted the offer to give up and
retire in
China. The senior members simply
ignored it.
Then, in early 啖9, the Chinese
once agam approached the CPB
and tried to persuade the leader
ship to give up. A crisis me
eting
was convened at Panghsang on
February 20, and for the first
time Thakin Ba Thein Tin lashed
out against the Chinese. In
an
address to the secret meeting,
he referred to "misunderstandi
in our relations with a sister par ngs
ty. Even if there are difference
s Kunming several times after
between us, we have to coexis
t and adhere to the principle
non-interference in each other's s of
affairs. This is the same as
in
啖1, 1985 and 1988. We
have no desire to become rev
isionists:'47
The minutes of the secret meetin
g were leaked, and this may
encouraged disgruntled local com have
manders to rise up against the
old
leadership. A major reason it did
not happen earlier was that
ordinary soldiers and their office the
rs were uncertain of China's rea
ction
to such a move. After all, the CP
B leaders still went to China
now and then, and they were every
always picked up at the border
Chinese officials in limousines.48 by
After the February meeting, it
is plausible to assume that the
Chinese gave some local comma
nders the green light to rebel,
the reason th and
e mutiny broke out prematurely
in Kokang instead of
_ 108
.
THE WA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA
Wa mu s could well have been that the Chinese had
ill the closer
Kokang than with
fraterna
mo re un rul y Wa . Wh atever the case, the more tha
the Potentially n
hu nd red par ty me mb ers and their families were firs
three t trucked
no rth
h to Pa ng va in
throug China the area in Kachin State which
Ue
wascontro d by the CPB. Some remamed there while most of them
were later movedto Kunmmg.
Julia Lovell, a Professor of modern China at Birkbeck
College,
University 。f London, quoting a Chinese-language
Hong Kong
ubl ica tion , writes in he r bo ok Maoism: A Global History tha
p t the
CPB veterans m ·C hi na "were marginal, im
poverished figures, who
could occasionally be glimpsed
in the cities of south and west
China,
their Mao jackets tattered, the
ir toes poking through their old
cloth
shoes.»49
Nothing could be more wrong
. I visited the ex-CPB exiles
in
the mutiny, and they had bee
n given
the pensions and the housing
the Chinese had promised the
few had also settled in Ruili, Te m. A
ngchong, and other border tow
ns.
The only exceptions were the
party's two oldest members, Tha
kin
Ba Thein Tin and the Pyinmana
veteran Ye Tun, the CPB's delega
to the 19趴 peace • talks with te
the government, who were sen
t to
Changsha in Hunan Province
where they were kept in isolatio
they would not try to rebuild n so
the CPB. Mao had begun his pol
itical
career in Changsha in the 191
0s, and it was there that the Malayan
communists had had their bro
adcasting station, so the location was
deemed suitable for the two com
munist veterans from Burma. They
were treated well until they die
d there, fir5t 1hakin Ba Thein Tin in
1995 and then Ye Tun in 1998. The CPB
But one thing was certain.
insurrection was over forty-one shots were fired
years after the first
109
r
CHAPTER 3

in a small village near Pegu and twent)r-one years since

the border from y unnanand
and 比s men had come across
Naws
哼
captured
4
Mong Ko. Now, the Wa were masters of their own destin
the United Wa
,he Gro wth of
Y-0r, at
least, to some extent.
State Arm y

in the Wa Hills and other parts of the former

伽 turnU
1tuous events
f the Commu nist Party of Burma (CPB) in the late 1980s
base areas o
d dramatically the military map of Burma in a way that no
altere
b the government's army could ever have done. Many
offensive Y
d initially expecte d that the Wa and other CPB mutineers
outsiders ha
with Burma's other ethnic minorit y armies, and
would link up
the urban disside nts who had fled to rebel-controlled
perhaps even
he bloody crackdo wn on the prodem ocracy movement
areas after t
in September 19ss, but that did not happen .
1he National Democ ratic Front (NDF) did indeed send a
delegation to Panghs ang after the mutiny. Mahasa ng from the Wa
National Organisation (WNO ) led the group, and his ethnic allies
expected that he would be able to win the Wa and other former CPB
forces over to the NDF and thus forge a broad alliance against the
government. Sensing what was about to happen , the new military
junta acted faster and with much more to offer than the ethnic rebels.
The generals now in power in Rangoo n were determ ined to prevent
such a linkup that could have potenti ally disastro us consequences for

µ 110
the new regime, and the strateg y they employ ed was to neutralize the

. 111
 THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY
CHAPTER 4 GRO WTH OF
THE

I
the mutineers in Kokang was followed by a
ex-CPB forces with ceasefire deals and promises of lucrativ with
eb 1,uo's meeting .Aung Gyi, a Sino-Burm ese former brigadier
opportunities. 啖n
north by who became a politician during the
The first su.-pdse came mthin days of the m u t i n '• 呻 to
the Burmese army
y and b eneral in tbe and Olive Yang, a colorful and well-known Kokang
Mahasan·g had arrived in Panghsang. He was arrested b 辜 g
y h· ising, 2 She belonged to the old ruling family of Kokang,
brethren, but managed to escape and make it back to Thailand. 18 炳 19
88 upr
warlady. when she linked up with the Kuomintan g
had happened in the meantime was that General Kh1n ·
NYunt吼at Chillese famous
庄 d become 6os and became the first drug trafficker to
powerful chief of Burmas military intelligence service, had , I如 印 and early 19
an inter
caUed .n the 195°5 convoys down to the Thai horde记 AungGyiand
the old Kokang warlord Luo Xinghan to act as media ill in Jorry Burma's
the mutineers. Luos death sentence, passed in 1976 after a ?With send OPi叩 tthe Peng brothers under the watchful eye of
engthy '[angme
trial, had not been carried out. He had been released d uringth oiwe intelligence in the garrison town of Lashio.
e 198。 吵tarY shortly after the Wa had taken over Panghsang and
amnesty when most of his men also returned from the Th Io ]ate .April,
ai border. had visited the north, Khin Nyunt himself
Luo had also been given two million Burmese kyat by thegover . and Olive Yang
nment A啤卯 chief of the Burmese army's Lashio-
1 _Maung Tint, the
to build a military camp southeast of Lashio. Called'the Salween
Village: it became the base for a new home guard unit, th IS. t叩
I 扭d Colone

based nor
theastern comman'
d flew by helicopter to Kun.long on the
f the forty-two- day battle in 1971-72. They
under the governmen ts new pyi thu sit ('people's militia') program, 氏ver, the site o
Salween d on a temporary ceasefire. After this initial
which was launched after the disbandme nt of the old Ka Kwe Ye rnetPeng Jiafu and agree
Khin Nyunt paid several visits to Kokang, which
(KKY) seven years before. The new agreement was effectively the meeting in Kunlong,
S皿e as the former accord between Rangoon and the local militias:
d wide coverage in Burma's governme nt-control led media.4
fight the rebels and gain, in return, access to government-controlled I receive
1he time was rip e to invite Zhao Yilai and other
Wa leaders, who

roads and towns for smuggling.
However, it was not until the CPB mutiny that Luo was able to
regain 比s former strength and prominenc e. On March 20-21, only
a week after the first uprising in Kokang and Mong Ko, Luo was
dispatched to the area, and this time his former enemies Peng Jiasheng 1
and Peng Jiafu arranged a dinner party for him. Luo's message to the
northern mutineers was dear: the governmen t is willing to let you
keep your guns and control of your area in exchange for a ceasefire
and a pledge not to share your guns with other ethnic rebels or the
I schools, and hospitals were going to be built in the Wa Hills. Diesel,
urban dissidents. 1
controlled nearly eighty percent of the CPB's old army. A helicopter
was sent to the Wa Hills to pick them up, and meetings were held
in Lashio between them and Khin Nyunt, Maung Tint, and other
亟ers from Bµrma's regular army as well as its military intelligenc e
services. The jµnta in Rangoon pledged to spend seventy m~~lion
kyat on a'border developme nt program' under which roads,0bridges,
petrol, kerosene, and rice would also be distribute d in former CPB
areas.5

112 113

.......
 1
CHAPTER 4
Luos import
叩cegrew
the mutineers. ashe Was abJ THE UNITED W A ST ATE A RMY
TH E GROWTH OF
Inl<ok叩g. .A, e to strik
and within years of the company called ebUsj
the newly formed Burma National United
conglome lllUtiny bee Asia \,y 压ss d ber 30, 19砂
Orld ea凡． tJoveJU
rates. For
mer CPB ameone
lv酐。 llh
on VP) rnerged with, or rather absorbed, the much smaller
had been d of Bur
eno叩ced -
cornrn
anders, 吨o 心 Ill。st lJnde~ 归
咬
al CounCl
•1 (WNC), officially the administrative arm of
traffickers,', In the govern Only Po,...,e Nation a separate entity. The links between the two
dru心rds,', lllent- m。向 伯 in reality,
respectabl
e citizens, now d
Womanisers'controlled
, and'bandits, Illedi
nths b
沁 tli凇O but, d before 19的 were formalized and the new unified
"th e national escribed , sudd a as 'd that existe
Wa State Party (UWSP). Its
races.'6 I as'village eld 叩lyb 沌 grouP5 was named the United
of 1he Working p n what could h ave been ers'and'I 、 organization
far the largest non-g
overnmental army in Burma, became
eop/es D aily, its D anov 峓
a Vitriolic ersight b 呤 forces, by State Army (UWSA). Zhao Yilai headed the civilian
ecernber Yth
- attack on the f 5, 1989 . e 磷。r the Vnited Wa while Bao Youxiang was appointed chief of
(Kyi M Yint) ormer CPB issue rnovernent
, who Was d commander Publish side 0 f the
to female escribed as·a "bull Zhang Zh·ed Headquartered at Panghsang, which was renamed
matters.''? on heat 、
military.
On the day th e -artide a When it the the UWSA took over the CPB's old stocks of Chinese-
newspaper, Zhang Zh- PPeared · co吹 硒肚arn, which were kept in warehouses near the homes
血ing Was in R angoon - in the . d weapons,
ta胆 to h 0fficial supphe
ammer out the d ' e n g a g e d · leaders.
authorities. . etails of a ceasefire deal in unofficial 0fthe former party a ceasefire agreement with the MNDAA in
With th After concluding
e lllilitary
The£ormerCPB t offered the Wa and the other former CPB
army, meanwh de, · had split Kokang, the governmen
forces based alongethn- up into f deal. Western media and even academics usually state
1clines. Wh at used to be called th our different forces the same
in Kachin State, a s1·1ver of land along the Ch e 101 Warzone that the UWSA and the other groups signed ceasefire agreements
inese bord er stretchin with the government in 啖9旭 But, at that stage, nothing was signed.
from Chimeli pass to Kambaiti, b g
ecame the New D emocratic All agreements were mere verbal understandings. It was not until
sometimes with'Kachin'added after it Army,
, and so abbreviated to NDA- October 1, 2011 that the UWSA actually signed a document, followed
K. It was led b YSakhon Ting Ying and 1 z
a um who had defected from byanother agreement on December 26, 2012 and a third on July 丸
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)·
m 1968. The population there, 2013.9 Those agreements said little more than that the Wa h ad no
only a few thousand, was alm intention of breaking away from the union. The Wa area was also
ost exclusively-Kachin. In Kokang, the
Peng brothers sef up the M yanmar National Democratic Alliance designated 'Special Region (2)'because their organization was the
Army:(MNDAA), while Peng Jiasheng's son-in-law, Lin Mingxian, second to~nter into a pact with the central government. Kokang, the
or Sai Leun, iri Mong La and the former 815 War Zone became first ex-CPB force to enter into an agreement with the government,
the National D emocratic Alliance Army (Eastern Shan State), or became 'Special Region (1): while the NDAA (ESS)'s area was
NDAA(ESS). designated'Special Region (4)'. The Shan State Army (SSA), which
hadbeen a close CPB ally since the mid-197os, concluded a ceasefire

114 115
 STATE ARMY
THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED WA

sgnc erd nus anb

lte nD
dF m
99 1 ea
c3
nd gerIw
ae
da
no nn
ct
nb
fth
.llsh ru
khe0
's entire leadership was detained. Most of them ended up

ar灿
勺
the NLD er, Aung San's
, notorious Insein Jail while the main lead
inRangoons er house arrest in her
Aung San Suu Kyi, was placed undO Ncn

pdnc
daug hter, cr ta o
aa lv ao lrr

,tr心
ad beRislS ng .ICe
ah
fc m
hs
twe m
thP I& PekS
ry p.U
S rteluro ns
b

aneenihiryeee
en sn atiu home”1 n\ /e
in Ran goon .

顷 Unralo
tig ituga
clo n almost the entire population of Burma

atsuter.leenCKfo nnc
nreaor ab
ot

lmt
hn m
Imde pn
en a
卢 acssoadehe知 etnoor

de
wm eth ph
d0 -c ~o
KaIC
thh m intve kn
m ne lnc .Ipd
emfli iti
Ironi ia
cally , atip time
a .a git ta
whe
ngriealfceu

ea
F e d o
eol eT lau v
ne he
ce ne
kD
em
ce
S Th
dh
IAoo
ec uwr
tso
e om
en
e m
rtw ic
al ot ha ns
lmpehaw

S9a ah eb
Ly rrg
cn wtoe
ua
n
eh he
hathw
n
m2m
.nt tgolm
5n ncnth ndon
.nIno ex es td

ur3erow.JSt,Ner
eSta
nS h
dd nAta mt
sm tht
e0oe
4b onth.am
e. le an thousands of former insurgents who
seC0Be9kcd

eA
re hainm
toa d,rbIthe in ed against the regime,
em had turn n r
t r s c .lu f
lts tota u kd lig m n ce ty ue deals with

soateearcs
C ,s a ese u 9
nd
figh .ls
en
ting ry
Th
against c8d
the 8t
cent rald
sh o(
govL eD
ernm o m
ent mad
o . w fohhe D an Im
Athad hm been
og.mimnemealelta昢
taanen na
er areas was thwarted
砒 0theAteeriss
the ruling military. The threat from the bord
danp teo nces for the country and
. .
aJ eirysanyerly -rhse glthfich and the regime was safe, but the conseque
re
F0 rtrn
eh g mtesve re to engage in 'business'
9w
1a pw ee the outside world were disastrous. Freedom
ld stop the production
哗t
in the northeast meant that no authority wou
ram

, the US State Department

t of opium and its derivative heroin. In 1987
n in Burma was 9砃00
应t

estimated that the area under poppy cultivatio

rb

e sta ota lfym 11 12

. aio
spda he an ros rey
eu tm oc ere ahand tIn 19的， that rose to 142,742 hectares, and in 1991, 1矶0
如

PI, ap ae nid
r genptsrhect
gow

ca

ares.
认 etrgpnd0srn
o

neds metric tons of heroin, up

。

hectares with a potential production o璃

回

ta onde c .sn
m ea tati.Igb .a
acma

tyioi en
t
ha c
k olB for tyIty ey
.lgndthusn nwteen ende ent Administration
ny

ctaexgusosyswamodevmo from 53 tons~. in 啖7.10 The US Drug Enforcem

Sm m ly
ernga

tehh naha nnB (DEA) has slightly different figures, but

those also show a sharp
g

KaBooa Du c
l

纪 ephie

am du m on LtI 0·- ase in opium and heroin production after

the UWSA entered
epatka

0e fP e sh
t

zd .sl incre
t

rbbna ~aen8 government in Rangoon.

into a ceasefire agreement with the military
Kha
g

opium and 75
a

e 压 86, the DEA states, Burma produced 900 tons of

中 antONettpid

bl oiudt c ytr l a rs c
th an m c d 203 tons of heroin
.n s dw a19
esoyk

ie c er Th
vh

ia dda ?P e p og
a tons of heroin. It rose to 2,430 tons of opium an
。

ln

d 215 tons of heroin

ee

wger
vmotnOTh

eagnSted

titap(ei m an
in 19的 to reach a peak of 2,575 tons of opiu
oJ
e,

. liePybn
no

r$ror m 1993_11
ni
>nSNtn

rm bp de it possible for
ent ma
The ceasefire agreements with the governm
od

and thus to import acetic

ca

mut inee rs to trav el mor e freel y,

.lefoth the CPB d Thailand. For
t
et a, India, an
rhsartu

Chin
anhydrite and other chemicals from roduced in the former
sr , pure whi te num ber 4 hero in was P heroin
the first time t least seventeen
a efo were a
CPB areas. In the early 1990s, there Ko and Kokang in the
a from Mong
J tion s stretchin g
弘

laboratories at loca
6
11 7

今
 ~

STATE ARMY
CHAP TER 4 THE GRO W T H OF TH E UNIT ED WA

ist
nort h thro ugh the Wa Hills in th e mid dle; and to th ily had fled across the bord er after the commun
你ir farn e they
匈AA 硬. civil war and settled in Vingngun, wher
area in eastern Shan State. 12 (Ess.) S 依
Chinese Kuomintang
The Wa mut inee rs'm erge r with the WN c, and th 沁r沪11 the dwi th the local Wa saohpa as well as the
eW einvolve 1 Intelligence Agency (CIA).14
fled the Wa Hills in the earl Y1970s and then encam a Wh。 h 沪J1l vs cent ra
asang's Wa to the Thai border
Ped th 咐 d the . brothers with drew with Mah
f
on the Thai border, also mad e it possible or the UWSA t elllseJves afl Wei
伽 Wei take n over the Wa Hills. The middle brother,
an entirely new base area far from thei r traditional h o estab妯 cP.B had United
omel and 如r
the •oin ed opiu m warl ord Khu n Sa's Shanland
' e frontier. Beginning in the mid-199os
the Ch mes al。n first J During
well
, tens ofth
ousan ds
g ){oegang, and serv ed for seve ral years as its treasurer.
of Wa, and som e Lahu as h
from the nort , Were rel
p..rJl'lY
(SVA) d extensively to Taiwan, West Germany, and
the south. Entire new town s spru ng up just across the b 0cated to be travele ired Thai
Order f 呻
tirne,
ugh cont acts in Thai land , he had acqu
'Jhro
Thailand, and the inhabitants of th e area, mostl
driven out and became refugees in ·Thailand.
y ethnic Shan, 二 other
countries.
and used
Tha i pass port s whe n he traveled abroad. His
citizenship t nam e was Pras it Chiw initipanya, sometimes Charnchai
The Wa leadership motivated the Wa to move south b 伽ipasspor a Thai
Yclaiming whil e the elde r brot her, Wei Xuelong, also
that they wanted to get the peas ants in th e nort h awa Yfrom Chiwinitipanya, the youn ger brother,
growing bee血e Api char t Chiw inpr apas ri, and
poppies. The Wa also said that th ose areas alon g th e Thai border citizen, Pair ot Sam eur Jayneuk.15 The
was give n the Thai nam e
were theirs because the first inha bita nts th ere were the close) yrelated WeiXueyin , ng Qifu, had
d I(hu n Sa, who se Chin ese nam e was Zha
Lawa, to whom the rule rs of Chia ng Mai as well as Kengtung had
;r wily warl or akul , yet
Tuai citiz en with the nam e Cha n Cha ngtr
had to pay tribute as th e "original own ers of the land."13 The first also become a een
f the clos e rela tion ship that once exis ted betw
claim was not convincing, as drug prod ucti on flou rishe d·m the Thai another outc ome o
ices.
Burma's drug lord s and Tha ilan d's secu rity serv
_ border areas after the move. The seco nd argu men t may have been
historically corr ect, but th e Lawa pop ulat ion of nort hern Thailand is Wei Xuegang fell out with Khu n Sa after
embezzled a large sum of mon ey and was imp
allegedly havi ng
riso ned at the warl ord's
negligible and th ousa nds of Shan had lived th ere for centuries. But
ns nort hwe st of Chia ng
with thei r supe rior firepower, the UWSA wres ted control over a new headquarters at Ban Hin Tae k in the mou ntai
in 1982 and 19的 took
. area in the sout h almo st as 1arge as the nort hern Wa Hills. Rai. Wei man aged to esca pe, how ever , and
i-Bu rme se bord er areas
The lead er of th e now defu nct WN C, Ai Kyaw Hso (Ai Xiao Sue), refuge in Taiwan befo re retu rnin g to the Tha
Lack ing an arm y inside
a former KKY com man der f rom Yawnghpre in the nort hern Wa Hills where he buil t up his own dru g emp ire.
r old cont acts with the
and one- time ally of Mah asang, had open ed the sout hern areas for Burma, he and his brot hers mad e use of thei
O, WN A, and WN C.
the Wa, but he was far from th e mos t imp orta nt play er along the Wa and bank rolle d the buil dup of the WN
Wa and the UW SA was
"
Thai bord er. H is organization was, in effect, cont rolle d by the
Weis, When the WN C mer ged with the nort hern
acce ss to the vast pop py
thre e brothers of y unna nese extr actio n who had spen t years in the established in 19的， the Wei brot hers gain ed

118 119

_
'
fields · CHAPTER 4
OF THE
UNITED WA STATE ARMY
in the Wa Hills rHE GROWTH
refined · as Well as areas Serk, who had refused to surrender,
into heroin. Where raw called Ya叽
The WNc leader Ai 0Piuni. 产°币cer t called the Restoration Council of Shan
the background Kyaw Bso
as the Wei b (Ai 沁ao Sue)
coUlct
be
叮；丿 3 neW rebel out:obably needed someone to counterbalance
仆aisp
of the 叩SA's rothers soon (Ress)
bll'.'fhe
RCSSwas able to obtain guns, uniforms, and
southern f assumed 沁d · 泸vwSA so that the
drug:
me如mph etamine. orces. lhe Weis alsoalrnost .int to1a1 吮。 the Thai s1·de of the border. Among the Shan,
produced after Unlike roduCed co听。1 the uipJJlent frorn
month s of lab heroin, Which other eq d to cause some confusion by naming his army the
then cumb orious Work . couJd 囡 J<Jllanage uish it from the old SSA, Yawt Serks army
仰vi ser To disting
be manufac:::;e refining procedures, In the PoppY fields only be 51ate A.rJJlY. -South: The real SSA and its political wing,
syntheticall metharnph 叩 沪 as'SSA
pills Were also 即wn Party (SSPP), was subsequently referred to
y. Bags with etarnine bee即e Progress
easier to smu small rneth could
Was right there, in Thailanlgle across the border. Thearnphetarn吮 产n State d literature as'SSA-North:
reports an
Heroin, on the other h and other Southeast lllain ll1如 in foreign · Washington published a booklet
and, had to b Asian In 2007,
the East- West Center m
countries, Which Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist
e smuggled to China countries
was far riskier and involved
. andw United Wa State Army:
called'[he d informative, but the mistake was to
middl emen who could a numb er ofestern 1It was well-written an
Khun not always b e trusted. local Party. rnark in the title. An ethnic or politically motivated
Sa, whose army put a question
(MTA), was the main
was now called the M
ong Tai Arrny nmental army can be both, like Fuerzas Armadas
rival in the trade, nongover
vying for control of! de Colombia, or Fare, the Revolutionary Armed
trading routes to Thailand and th ucrative Revofucionarias
e outside world. Th which used to trade in cocaine at the same
early 1990s, fierce battles roughout the forces of Colombia,
MTA. Following th
were fought between the UWSA time as adhering to Marxist ideologies and principles. Likewise, the
and the
e. 19的 ceasefire agreement with th UWS/\s political wing, .the UWSP, used income from the drug trade
e Burmese
government, the UWSA was able to send thousands of
troops down to promote Wa nationalism and develop the area under its control.
to the Thai border. Khun Sa was cornered, and in Januar Within years of the mutiny, Panghsang had been transformed
Y 1996
he decided, to the surprise of many, to surrender to the Burmese into a modern town with marketplaces, retail stores, workshops,
authorities. His once mighty MTA was disbanded, Khun Sa moved to multistory houses, and paved streets with streetlights powered by
Rangoon, and his top lieutenants established themselves as perfectly solar panels. During the CPB days, there were only some old Chinese
legitimate businessmen in the Burmese capital, in Mandalay and in army trucks and jeeps in Panghsang. Now, new cars, buses, and trucks
Lashio. began to ply the streets in town and the roads between the various
It was the deal of the century, but it also inadvertently meant that settlements. A new concrete bridge was built to connect Panghsang
the UWSA became the-strongest and most important player in the with the town of Meng A on the Chinese side of the Nam Hka River.
northern Thai-Burmese border areas. However, a few of Khun Sa's men

120 121
 CHAPTER 4

TH E GROWTH O F TH E UNITED
The diversity of the populatio n was reflected in the WA STATE ARMY
new reli 19的， there
buildings that were erected: a new Buddhist pagoda, Ch ·8iolls womens'affairs. Before were only twen

`
}
teachers ·m the Wa Hills.tyNschools with

III.
churches, and a big mosque with a dome. Restaurants ristian 480 pup1·Js and a hundred
servLn with more than 60,000 pupils and ow there are ,

j
气
Chinese and Shan food opened up, along with hotels, smaller g 409 2,400 teachers. Toda
village has its own primary school and th ere is a high Y, nearly I
houses, and a casino, which attracted high rollers frorn yunnangu颂 every

今
township. When the CPB ruled the area, th school in
elsewhere in China. Chinese companie s were hired to build 叩 every ere were only four
hospitals. In 2019, there were 26 better
poorly equipped
between villages that had previously been reachable only ro砓 d
equipped
on foot facilities, including smaller clinics with octorsand nurses who have
along slippery mountain paths. educated in China.16
been
Above all, the creation of an indigenou s authority saw the revival Where in the past mule tracks were the most advanced lines of
of Wa culture, something that the CPB had paid little or no interest in b
cornmunication, new roads have been built y Chinese contractors
preserving. The schools began to teach in Wa, Chinese, Sh an, Lahu, to connect major settlemen ts: The roads in the Wa Hills are even in a
and other local languages as well as, for good measure, Burmese. rnuch better condition than those in government-controlled areas.17
Chinese and Shan are most widely spoken as a second Ianguage 伽 initial capital to pay for all this may have come from the drug

). among the Wa while Burmese, despite the pacts with the central
government, is still considered an alien tongue to most inhabitants
of the border areas. Books and journals were printed in romanized
Wa, using the old system Vincent Young and the missionaries had
developed before World War II, not the one the Chinese introduced
in southern Yunnan in the 1950s. Statues of Wa heroes and the
national symbol, the buffalo, were placed at major intersections in
Panghsang to serve as reminders ofWa culture and heritage.
For the Wa, their mountain s are not, as they had been for the CPB,
trade, but in recent years the Wa economy has been diversified to
include income from tin mining and investments in Burma, China,
and 1hailand. Poppy fields have given way to rubber plantations
and tea gardens. But it is a capitalism with many distinct Chinese
characteristics, as researche r Hans Steinmuller points out in a study:
"The kind of authorita rian capitalism that has developed in the Wa
State has similar effects.as in China. Even though relative inequality
has risen exponentially, living standards are higher and absolute
poverty is lo~er than in the past:'18

a'springb oard'from where they were going to move somewhe re else. Large-scale construct ion projects are managed directly by the top
This is their homeland . In 1995, the governm ent referred to as'the authority but the payment of salaries has created a cash economy
Wa Central Authority '(WCA) was establishe d at Panghsan g, or where, in the past, barter was the norm, and the only hard currencies

Pangkham as they sometime s prefer to call it. It has twelve bureaus that people in the Wa Hills accepted were opium and old Indian silver

responsible for finance, political work, agricultu re and forestry, coins. But it is the Chinese yuan, not the Burmese kyat, that is used

public relations, law enforcem ent, logistics, health and education, for business and in markets and shops in Wa areas. Mobile phones

constructi on, military matters, foreign relations, and even a unit for and the Internet are also connecte d to Chinese, not Burmese, servers.

122 \23

......
I

1
. ?
CHAPTER 4 ~ ,.\

.、
r
THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED WA ST ATE ARMY

夕
－
刁
Moreover, as Steinmuller points out, many young wa go a yi}ai's authority as chairman of the government and secretary
cross 劝ao
border to find work, generally without permits or identity 小e f the party was formalized at the UWSP's first

cards,btit
they are taken to Chinese factories by Chinese and Wa llliddJ
e归，19
The Wa authority has its own set of laws, which Were
Passed
December 24, 2003 and printed in the Wa 1anguage as Well 师
Chinese and Burmese. A court system is in place, and While :s in
OcaJ
courts can sentence offenders to impriso nment and the payzne
nt of
fines, the death penalty, which is on the books, can be meted outonJ
y following
by the top leadership过 Administratively, the WCA, which Is headed
by a chairman, has a'politi cal advisor y commi ttee'that serves as an
unofficial parliament. The head of the UWSP is a secretarYgeneral,
and the UWSA is led by its comma nder-in -chief.
—
Each township and there are three in the north plus two'special
townsh ips'-has its own local governm ent, and a'local administrative
commit tee'is in charge of the souther n areas along the Thai border.
In addition, the WCA maintai ns liaison offices in the government-
controlled cities and towns of Rangoo n, Lashio, Mandalay, Tachilek,
and Kengtung.21
Despite its well-organized adminis trative structur e, new'Wa State;
as it became known althoug h it was recogni zed officially only as a
'special region' within the Union of Burma, is no democracy. It is a
one-par ty state under the UWSP, and the UWSP control s the'Wa
govern ment'as well as the UWSA. The basic setup that has emerged
since the mutiny is, in essence, Leninis t, and apart from the ideology
its organiz ational structu re is more or less the same as that of the
old CPB. The UWSP remain s a Leninis t-style vangua rd party with
only 10,000 ofthe approxi mately 500,00 0 inhabit ants in the area it
control s being membe rs. It is not a mass organiz ation.
5
cong ress in
general O But Zhao's health was fail·and in Februa可 1995 he
1992, mg,
January
d·a stroke and had to be hospitalized, first in Cangyuan across
孤ere
the borderin
Yunnan and later in Shanghai. He continued to attend
fter his return to Panghsang, often sittingm · a wheelchair.
meetings a
5000 hospital ized· again, this time in Lancang in Yunnan,
}-le was
another stroke. He died there on the morning of September
four days later, more than a thousan d people gathered for
8, 2,009·
lat Saohpa, a small town near ·the Chinese border where
his funera
born. Speakers at the ceremo ny pointed out that it was Zhao
he was
had unified the Wa people and lifted them out of poverty,
who
and oppress ion. Even today, Zhao Yilai, or Ta Lai as he
h叩iliation,
is called in his own language, is seen as the father of the modern Wa
the 啖9 mutiny, he convert ed to Christianity to honor
nation. After
his stepfather, a Wa Christi an who had taken care of the young boy
when his own poor parents had been unable .to do so.
While Zhao remain ed the father of the nation until his death, the
new leader, Bao-Youxiang, had actually been acting general secretary
of the UWSP since 2004, serving concurr ently as commander-in-
chief of the UWSA and chairm an of the Vfa administration, thus
holding all three key positio ns in the leaders hip of the unofficial
,Wa State: After the death of Zhao, Bao Youxiang and his brothers 一
the elder Bao Youri and the younge r Bao Youlian g-becam e .the
undisputed triumvi rate ruling the Wa region. A fourth brother, Bao
Youhua, died of a massiv e stroke in 2007. Bao Youri was put in charge
of managing the movem ent's finance s while Bao Youliang became the
head of Mong Mau, a district which include s a financially importa n·
tin mining area.

124 125

....
 ... ..
.`.`,.
\
r. ` ,

飞、
THE GROWTH OF TH E UNIT ED WA STATE ARMY

Manda lay, and using proxies the Weis even took over
I
CHAPTER 4

0on and
妇g a domes tic carrier .
The Bao brothers, and especially Bao Youxiang himself, made sure Airlines, >
炉gon second in comm and of civil admin istratio n and
they and trusted Wa associates controlled the UWSA. The n咘坛 !vfinliang,
)(ia0 • al and organi zation al work for the WCA, belong s
two in the militar y setup, Zhao Zhong dan, was one of them, and dwith clenc
of a China -born Wa. He hails from a small
when Bao's health began to fail in the zooos, he was entrusted to entruste廿1er catego ry, that
totheo Cangy uan in Yunna n and was educat ed there. At
run the day-to -day affairs of the army. Bao had contracted chronic near
d pickle d pork, called neu soni wa 叫Jage t to"join the CPB and later came to serve under Bao
trichin osis after eating poorly prepar e bewas 蠡sen
仅entY d Li Ziru in centra l Shan State. Li Ziru, an ethnic Chine se
in Shan and naem in Thai, and that illness makes any physical or ·ang 印
Y。心 Yunna n and one of the old Red Guard volunt eers,
menta l activit y extrem ely strenuous. Baosh an in
froJll to be deput y comm ander -in-ch ief of the UWSA after
The civil admin istratio n that emerg ed in the i99os and early rose
hesive pattern . Chin Ko-lin, actuallY ultane ously runni ng variou s kinds of busine sses from
2000s, though , shows a different, less co whiles im
Ameri can crimin ologis t, describes it 1989• t Nalaw t, a few kilom eters west of Pangh sang. Li suffere d a
a Burma -born ethnic Chinese- his base a and since then the only Chine se ex-vol unteer
d died in 2005
this way: stroke an in a high positi on within the Wa admin istrati on
remain ed
who has
Wa leaders are viewed as the Born in Nansa n near Yunna n's borde r with Kokan g,
Within the Wa administration, is Zhao Guoan .
the brains. Ethnic Wa are respected in ,harge .of foreig n affairs and has repres ented the UWSA at
muscle and the Chinese are he is
for their fighting skills and, because o
f their ethnicity, they are the talks with the Myan mar gover nmen t. Li Ziru's two sons, Li
peace
masters of the Wa area, despite the fact
that some of them were d Li Ching , have .taken over their father 's variou s busine ss
zuhua an
the Wa area only recently. Ethnic which , at least in the begin ning, includ ed invest ment in
born in China and came to enterprises,
le with good business and
Chinese are considered to be smart peop the drug trade.
. 1skills, but because they are not ethnic Wa, they can The other forme r CPB areas also saw rapid econo mic and social
organisat10na
only work for the wa people, even though some of the Chinese develo pment after the 19的 mutiny. The Kokan g Chine se
built a
As a result, many Wa government units who
were born in the Wa area. new fortun e based on drugs , but rival gangs soon fell out over
are headed by ethnic Wa, but day-to-day operations of these units out as
should be contro lling the trade. In 1992, open warfa re broke
are conducted by ethnic Chinese who are usually deputy chiefs.22 Jiashe ng
Yang Maoli an, a forme r CPB milita ry office r, drove Peng
s with
out of Kokan g. Yang becam e the new chieft ain, but his-re lation
That is where the Wei brothe rs come into the pictur e. As smart er, Yang
China suffer ed a severe blow in 1994 when his young er broth
business people, they took charge of Wa enterp rises; and not only
king,
in Maoxian,.was arrest ed by the Chine se, convi cted of drug traffic
the drug trade. Profits were reinve sted in hotels and real estate
and execut ed in K unmm g.

126 127

........
 CHAPTER 4
、 THE GROWTH OF THE
which had become the ND从 (Ess).
In the former 815 War Zone,
nsformed his Mong La headquart
Lin Mingxian, or Sai Leun, tra ers
ds of vice, including gambling, prostitution , and
int o a cen ter for all kin
ainment industry, rather unorth od0~
transvestite shows. This entert . I{e
com mu nis t stro ngh old , catered to a mainly Chinese
in a former
in M
ina became a common sight
clientele, and buses from Ch ong
inos, karaoke, bars and
La. New buildings, inc lud ing fan cy hotels, cas
around Mong La. A new hyd roelectric
nightclubs, sprung up in and
the Nam Loi -River to provid those
e 印 or
power station was built on
e-dock electricity.
establishment with round-th
as, income from the drug trade
As in other former CPB are
that development. Shortly afte
r the
provided the financial basis for
oratories were set up near Mong
La and in the
呤 mutiny, heroin lab
g River. Drug production acti
vities
mountains closer to the Mekon AA
by the top leadership of the ND
in those areas were controlled ing
mittee headed by Lin and includ
(ESS) as a highly centralized com rs were
. They decided which operato
twelve other focal functionaries
much they should pay in taxes
and
g~ing to operate where and how
The profits were then equally div
ided
duties to the center at Mong La.
olders in the enterprise.
between Lin and other shareh
was
when drugs are involved, all
However, as one would expect d out
ber 1993, three men were dragge
no t well in Mong La. In Novem ofa big
cuted by firing squad in front
into the central market and exe . The
having tried to assassinate Lin
audience. They were accused of in rival
masterminded by his then ma
plot, Lin suspected, had been
I
． quit
夕
in the drug trade, Khun Sa. 23
ops, a few thousand, were Sha
n,
Most of the NDAA (ESS)'s tro se or,
mariy of its officers were Chine
Akha, and eastern Palaung bur ng
. His second in command, Zha
as in the case of Lin, Sino-Shan
128
UNITED WA STATE ARMY
ood friend. Zh angwas born
or I<yi Myint, is an old childh
劝叩 ing,
the Chinese side of the border opposite Lin's native
1/{an din g on , Zh
jJl Like Li Ziru and Zhao Guoan ang also came as a
panghsai. the CPB in the 1ate 1960s and
pJace d volunteer to fight alongside
d Guar ·
the others were recalled to Ch ma in the late 1970s.
do n when
stare La grew to become one of the most prosperous towns on
!vfong
China frontier, and some of the
proceeds from there were
• Yunnan,
由eBurma- MandalaY, m
d in real estate in Rangoon and
reinveste. the
即 Hong Kong and Taiwan.24 As
thern Thailand, an d even in
lucrative casino business, drugs
industry grew, especially the
tourism AA (ESS), and today their
or income for Lin an d his ND
bee皿eamin ble. There may be private dealers
'bution is believed to be negligi
contn icial'government'business.
La, put it is no longer an off
in Mong alum's
trolled by Ting Ying's and _Z
In Kai::hin State, the area con itors.
t large numbers of Chinese vis
NDA-K was too remqte to att rac for the
tha t turned out to be a boon
However, it had one resource titute
ber. The World Resources Ins
former Kachin communists: tim w that
gh-resolution satellite.data sho
reported as early as 19.9.8 tha t "hi
en ed by logging. Evid~、nee. els
ewhere
伽s fr:o ntier.is no w bei ng thr eat
stages of
chin State may be in the early
in the region suggests tha t Ka
clearing
n tha t could culminate i~t he
aperiod ofintense deforestatio
jus t a patchwork ofseverely dam
aged
of all accessible timber, leaving
er 2005, Glpbal Witness pub
lished a
forest fragments:'25 In Oc tob
tion in no rth ern Burma, as
well_as
damaging report on deforesta
be r to China. 26 That report
caused
legal and illegal exports of tim
l circles in China, as it.reve
aled that
e an up roa r am on g off icia
er ha rdw oo d, an d assorted
forest ry
th0usands of tons of teak, oth
products were being transportec,l across the border to Yq.nnan.
The
Chinese f ign mi nis try claimed in a statement that the Global
ore
129
 CHAPTER 4

` THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED WAS

TAT[ ARMY
rn
`

，占
Wit ness repo rt .
cont aine d a lot of "untruthful information;'and , internal affairs, as Song Qingrun, an associate

口
on to say that 即mas professor at
Chin a does not allow its citizens "to cond ill\vent ,5 Institute of South Asia, wrote·in March

｀
...
defo rest ar activities and trade across the border:•27
Uct
您l China has never intervened in Myanmar's2015: "The truth

、
ion 加， of is that
Chin a internal affairs."2a
as convoys of heavily laden timber t ruckscour沌
.
was a ludi crou s claim has been repeated by a number of China-
b h nonsense as so ci at ed
could soc them Yun Sun at the S·hmson Center·mtheUS,who
e seen leaving the NDA-K area for Tengchong and other t 叩ong
scholars,
Yunn an everY day. But the exposure led to a partial
owns in tI refers to China's "principle of non-interference in other
clam pdow n frequ y
en
h mid
on , internal atfairs."29
the trad e, which , owever came too late. By the -2010s, m。st 硬ntries
th is that China has always interfered·mMyanma'rs internal
of the fores t was gone, leaving opium poppies to be planted 伽 tru
on the d done so blatantly, and that policy has not changed since
denu ded mountains. 卸rs an
_ But with the
aged to hard-line communism was abandoned in the 19g05
Whi le the UWSA and the NOAA (ESS) man survive f free trade, and with drug production across the border
of infighting and otion o
and prosper, the NDA-K soon fell apart because prom ities changed at
g to stage a coup, . Burma skyrocketing in the 1990s, China's prior
pers onal rivalries. Zalum was ousted after tryin in I
血e as it became a most impossible to curta
il corruption
military bYagreeing the same
and Ting Ying moved even closer to the ruling 们thin the Jess ideologically motivated post-Mao
administration.
e under Burmese
to be the leader of a so-called Border Guard Forc 。伍cially, many of the former CPB commanders
who had become
and Pangva on the
com man d. Other units r~mained at Kambaiti drug dealers, especially those from Mong Ko and
Kokang, were
in drug trafficking
Chinese border where they soon became engaged barred from entering China. The fact that all of
them had been
factories.
and the production of weapons in clandestine arms operating for years along the Sino-Burmese border
meant, however,
had been sent to
Some of the younger former CPB cadres who that they had long-standing working relationsh
ips with Chinese
19的 mutiny had
Pangva along with the party leadership after the security authorities. This personal relationship enab
led them to visit
their families were
decided to stay ori when the top leaders and China regularly and to own property, including hotel
s and private
some reason, Ting
transferred to retirement homes in Kunming. For houses, across the border. They were often also seen
being driven
members were
Yang and his men thought those younger former CPB around in cars owned by local Chinese security offici
als. 30
them arrested and
going to resurrect the party and had several of Before the communist takeover in 1949, China
had vast poppy
-K was almost
executed. By 2020, the fragmentation of the NDA was considere~one
n remained in the
,
fields and millions of opium smokers. Addiction
complete. Only small bands of armed militiame that was why the
of the country's most serious social problems and
area. were brutal, but
lopments did communists decided to put an end to it. The methods
In the beginning, China's reaction to all these deve they worked. Hundreds, if not thousands, of gangsters, dealers, and
seem to be any
not appear to be particularly clear, and there did not trials. Addicts
even addicts were rounded up and shot after summary
`「

nterference'in
kind of coordinated policy apart from denial of any'i
131
130
 gwemamlleeyhw归l
clehERnoo
4Sn pthd
eipc
toa dou
dte.
nbh ICuru erPVisanuafodnb

whan二
odtn
wft

onpoeccsesemebenCor几9r
lyenrc aanh wup,i
theto clCrd
cdoo
00thg
sbnm wba.l
pbfoi
yuccheeted . cdutto
uarmi opfer seato
.1000
foca snOFhphm

wh 矶 nrodthHy11eat2iidnens
SidPP
ereva
ctread
eyddldne
sweea
oloprd
efiew
ro,a
csw uthinc
mewa
b
nog
suu&
ra gerde
sVebo
nuno
C
nraa
b t,
Bes
ddd omrm
reor1
o rOlnya
cuse
a 9ptoa
e
ee.lc
w.It
n s
hsotJred6
runtnon
iendhe
dma
e e r g
t.lcdhwe
r ss
p.IS
g rtrtire
e hoke
t i
THE
y o
GROWTH
d a r 1
THE UNITED
i -y WA STl o b udow,es
o ravaM

ablly19obthdr
u r est c
i
tges
nrc
oo ie
en
rehnem a
mur
drg nh
h
grasu h
nd a,me
iew e ft.Irtra
de i kibee
ianffe anctle
thngtpd esfro ATE ARMY
lit.mB olee gabd ery me an

tisi.narsydiovsans
. asa
0cAd
sgst MP
ooea
yada u1c
aVBa
dyV
pbredulla tedeV
omn oSle Venw
tePH higs aayettanr oaom lhthnon

mmruroftwgyherednThsa.
e mecpan,ruse nhus
t ma ror.glctoila
caan h
(PLA). Hardly surprisingly, distrust of th
ih.m

低
a t
I p.rJllY rooted among the Hui in Pingyuan, and thee authorities was

ndaterser
deeply massacre·
was probably why the provincial government th in the
y酝
必-1970s
T
.ISteeeingn3,unneecrede see
.wdeIll aramilitary units rather than the regular m山tar 1s time
ees u 抑Joyed P
unihmo

e iua y.
h

eration began on August 31 and lasted f

et 伽 op or eighty days, first
d then as armed confrontation. Th e Hui in th
e

.mdRhn as a siege an etownhad

伽y
0ahi hesder ereventually surrendered to the superior
back, but
r

.mme.mhteeshnodgma srn.1
.lonVe fought
ealng

eegclaoleterndh 皿
blean
guns.
_
cnb from Kunming. When it was over, the Chinese commanders
p

anmehatrp force oandyth

d Juxury o villas, bars, and dance halls run by the traffickers.
.cK y p
n

y e u e
rptc h
mmoa the traffickers was Mae
u t o
msn 1 reer

成 ug
e s
iorn
na
nn e neda
ucn dee
ave founLhrro ha he ua ea
Siling, who was found 1iving in a
屈ong
e

fortified villa in Pingyuan despite having been sentenced to death

硒t气

dr
lerea ePint
no whater.UI~d
s

abe.m
no1 wrt a o·a Jcourt for drug trafficking. The net haul after the operation:

me
Pocaheto
co hefr.merh
. idIteI
orthn tm
ufraceuosthd.e byalocal
clrea
a

s54peopJe arrested and 吵1

kilograms of drugs seized along with 353

dktaannodymffisslidnb
u

.ltaur sgm gorth ektm ur

n

clanth fogem
assorted $Utg
weapons.
32
二

t e
lt

lTe A public trial attended by more than 8,000 people was held on
ladsusl
tw

. e October 14. Two traffickers who had been apprehended during the
tt
m

asls.Itaeu
odiv eths
.manceFLg bce
hmor w d to death and immediately executed, and
四

operation were sentence

n

ho

0 hafhun
tofopwc
5

2aO

twenty-two were given pnson sentences. At a second public trial on

T o

. hrptvewaanhab totyo eg
ht

O mibnt November 12, which was attended by 12,000 people, five were given
ml
h
呻
he

讥0

tenbpi Buo
aw

0 the death penalty. Among them were the vice director of Pingyuan
afa
础

nr

.
elu.Isfrcnad

Btha,tkiVIOu
egyush3ae

ursn
township and the general steward of the local mosque.33
rm

goruepet6
．

aotoddault,o
gp

. detheelkdopl

rkm Significantly, low-level officials in Yunnan were kept in the dark

cm
sP

when the operation was planned in Kunming. Now, as researcher

hg

ei
of

Zhou Yongming points out in his study of antidrug campaigns

司
hy

.I in China, the old power structure that had made Pingyuan

1p

(gulat

uncontrollable was dismantled and replaced by a new one: "The

au

0tC ,so
neS

r s e rb authority of the government and regaining control of the local

df

.
l

tii
ese
l1
vnu,n ce government materialized in the process of the drug crackdown.
ey

do

r The Resident committee, Village Council, Security Committee, and

.
1 ng
wua

cpam

132 133
 中＼沁
,.
~

＼＼仑
THE GROWTH O F THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY

人「
CHAPTER 4

7
即eW perfectly well that Burma was an im portant outlet
aJso
Women's Association一 organisations that had not been abJe 妇 south and Southeast Asia as well as the on!Y country
to be p揤 with
— de .

,
establi sh before were set up."34 for t::uld provide China with safe and relatively easy access to the
Seen in a broade r perspective, the Pingyuan operation shattereda 砚 ocea几
nenyo rk of contac ts that had been in charge of drug distriburion in !fldian had first been articul ated by Pan Qi in his article _in
olicY
伽tP Review of Septem ber 2, 19躬. 36 The first border trade
the entire region. It is always sensitive, and often misleading, to talk
如;ng
Burma and China was signed on August 6沔88,
about 'ethnic organized crime'b ecause such labels tend to d ernonize
an entire group of people rather than a few'ba d apples; but rnernb如 I 伽 between
,sr""''" ~he• Burma was io turmoi l md almost the entire border
归Jlle various rebel groups. The 19的 mutiny and the
of the Hui commu nity had long been some of the most important
players in cross-b order trade in the Golden Triangle. Called Panthay I ,,.,'°; ;::.,% re agreem ents had change d all that, and China
必eq enetrat e the Burme se marke t in a very systematic
in Burme se and Jin Haw in Thai, they see themselves as descendants 咚印
top
soon k of econom ic intelligence operatives collected
of Kublai Khan's horsem en. Many have the· family name Ma, or A networ
产er. the prices and availability of more than 2,000 locally
horse, and have for centuries been the region's best muleteers. In the about
吵 d as well as impor ted items- medic ines, beer, soft
past, they had not only been the main buyers of Wa opium but had {acture
叩U
orts shoes, rice cooker s, motorb ikes, cigarettes, crocke ry
also conduc ted mule caravans that carried all kinds of contraband 抑心， sp
-and then the same goods were produc ed much cheape r
betwee n the Wa Hills, northe rn Shan State, southe rn Yunnan, and and so on
even northe rn Laos and Vietnam.35 In more recent times, they have , own state-o wned or pnvate facton es.
in Chinas
of transpo rt, such as lorries and other businessmen moved down to Lashio and Manda lay to
turned to moder n means Chinese
he networ k of contac ts throug hout the region the trade, and some of them even manag ed to buy Burme se
motor vehicles. But t supervise s
has remain ed more or less intact. documents from corrup t local officials. As 'Burmes e citizen
identity
The Pingyuan operation became a turning-point in China's policies they could buy proper ty and engage in other activit ies that are barred
towards the ex-CPB forces in northe astern Burma: Bao Youxiang and and MNDA A soldie rs in full unifor m could
to foreigners. 31 UWSA
other UWSA , MNDAA, and NDAA (ESS) -leader s were summoned also be seen in Manda lay and other towns , loadin g their Chines e-
to Kunmi ng and read the riot act. No drugs were to enter China. The made army trucks with goods destin ed for the Chine se marke t, and
direct interest
·central authorities in Beijing also began to take a more paid for with launde red drug money . _
f the border. It was an
in the former CPB forces on the other side o Regardless of the financ ial basis for those transa ctions , their
·Yunn an's border
issue that could not be left to local author ities m involvement in 'norma l'comm ercial activit ies suited the Chines e.
It was not
counties or even the provincial govern ment in Kunmi ng.
f national They were also able to maint ain contac ts with the UWSA and
only because of the drug issue but was also a questio n o
other former CPB forces throug h China 's peculi ar foreig n policy
security. Chinas southe rn border had to be secured. Beijing's security

135
134
 署式实
CHAPTER 4
可
THE GRO WTH OF THE
of differentiatin g between'government- to- UNITED WA
STATE A~MY
govern lllenf
to-party'rela tions, an entirelY artificial
concept as th and .Patty. 叩SA
had had a ceasefire agreement With the
party is China's only legal political party and as e co average age of the soldier Was also government since
such
陨
11nis1 1989, the erstwhile army, which much h th
goverrunent. But it means that it b ecame possible f controls cPB's towards the end 1gher an in
or the 朊 the Was made up of
recruited teenagers because the majority
Beijin liw知。
acquire weapons from China at the same ttmeas · forcibly of able-b Odied
glll.ai were either cripples or dead. Most soldiers are
cordial relations with Burma's central government. ntain对 men · not universal and child ren of thoseconscripted, but
ractice 1s who have good
Over the years, transfers of Chinese weapons to th thatP
e lJWsA. h with the elite might avoid being recruited or end
relations altogether
included HN-5A Man-Portabl e Air Defencesystems ave comfortable positions in the army.4o
, or MAN · up in more
heavy machine-gun s, automatic rifles, mortars, artiller PA. 汰 has been divided into the northern forces一fourb ·
y, armored 伽 armY ngades
fighting vehicles, and other sophisticated military
equipment. and an
—
artillery regiment and those along the Th ai border in the
Among the most recent deliveries are FN-6 MANPADS south, which consist of five brigades. The total number of troops is
, 105illlll
but most outside observers put the fi gure at
recoilless guns, 122mm howitzers, 107mm surface-to-surface
free- a weJl-guarded secret,
flights missiles, Xinxing ('New Star') wheeled armored personnel 20,000 and 25,000, or possibly as manY as 30,000. Those
between
and local village militia forces. In
carriers, and weaponized .drones. 38 This is not the kind of kit that figures do not include reserves
force with 砃oo men which is · responsible
falls off the back of a truck or could be supplied by some local PLA addition, there is a police
for maintaining law and order in the Wa-administered area.41 There
unit in Yunnan. The deliveries were almost certainly directed from
are no Burmese government troops anywhere in territory that is
the highest level in Beijing, and to disguise the origin often shipped
governed by the WCA, and representative s of the central government
into the UWSA's area via Laos. 39
come only for special occasions, such as in April 2019 when the Wa
In 2007, advisers from the PLA provided training in the use of
celebrated the 30th anniversary of the 19的 uprising.
122mm howitzers and 130mm field guns in the Lu Fang mountain
The UWSA has become stronger and much better equipped that
range west of Panghsang. The UWSA's artillery regiment had been
the CPB ever was. When Aung Min, then a minister in the Burmese
equipped with those weapons along with 12.7mm and 14.5mm
president's office, visited Monywa, a town northwest of Mandalay,
anti-aircraft guns. Soldiers were mobilized to dig a complex of
in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial
underground command centers near Panghsang, clearly intended
Chinese-backed copper mining project in the area, he openly
for protection against aerial attacks by the. Burmese air force in the
admitted: "We are afraid of China ... we don't dare to have a row with
event hostilities were to break out.
[them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and
With new Chinese weapons came smart uniforms, not the
resume their support to the conimunists ;the economy in the border
baggy; old-fashione d clothes the fighters in the CPB had worn, aod
discipline within the UWSA was'improve d. Given the fact that the areas would backslide. So you'd better think seriouslY:'42

136 137
 CHAPTE R 4

THE GROWTH O F THE UNJTEo

WA ST ATE
By 't/1e comm unists 'he dearly mean t the lTWSA. and · ARMy

lls while, has grown also from a handful

And he was right. It may not be in China 's·Jnterest to 啡1es. 产
. of fighters
see fi among Rakhine migrant workers 1°Kac h· recruited
and unres t along its southwestern border, which couJd 心hting from
000 and 3,000 today. It has 1 in State to an army
of between z, aunched
massive infl呕 of refugees into China . That h appen ed·in 201 LO a entirely new front in Burma's civil War. a War in Rakhine --.
the MND AA broke its ceasefire agree ment With th e govern en
and attack ed Burm ese army positi ons in Kokang. It led to a 归t
` state, an d in any fighting with th
110t in
volve
rNLA, MNDAA, and AA
叽ile the U
e Burrnese arrny, it has WSA. is
with guns, either supplied
as gifts or sold at
f̀
4
,'

counteroffensive, and 40,000亏0,000 peopl e sough t refugemassive the , rices. 43

aero沁 ,frien dship P
the borde r in Yunnan. But a strong UWSA that some runes s uWSA also supplied the SSA with weapons, Which
仆1e
its Chine se-ma de arsenal, which it has acqui red th rough ,
hares defend its Wan Hai headq uarter s in central Shan enabled
it to State when
to-pa rty're lation s with China, with other ethnic armies serves
Party_ ese army attacked it in 2015. That help was strategic, as
as a the Burm
stick in Beijings relationship with Burm a. Diploma cy and promises ss.A's areas west of the Salween River is the UWS怂 buffer zone
the
of aid to Burm as central autho rities come under 'government-to- them and the Burm ese army. Were the SSA forced out of its
be罚een
holds, it would be easier for the Burmese army to attack the
gover nmen t relati ons.'T hat fictitious divisi on of duties came in strong
Wa areas east of the river, shoul d the gover nmen t decide to launch
handy -when China became involved in the Burm ese governments
as offensive.
peace process, which was initiat ed by then presid ent Th ein Sein in such
be able The attack on the SSA and renew ed fighting in Kokang are only
2012. The Chine se could show that the卢 and only they, would
ofhow the gover nmen t, and some of the ethnic armies
to help the Burmese gover nmen t solve its intern al ethnic proble
ms. rwoexampJes
consider the ceasefire agree ments that were reached in the
The Wa maint ain close links with the other forme r CPB forces as.well,
when
two late 19805 and early 1990s obsol ete. The first sign of that came
in Koka ng and Mong La as well as with the KIA, the SSA, and
), a the Burmese army launc hed an all-ou t attack on the KIA•mJun e2ou,
new ethnic armies, the Ta'ang Natio nal Liber ation Army (TNLA s
d after just as the Thein Sein gover nmen t began talkin g about negotiation
Palau ng group, and the Araka n Army (AA), which were forme to the
as well with the ethnic armie s m order to find a peace ful soluti on
the central gover nmen t launc hed its peace proce ss. The TNLA l
to other country's decades-long civil war. Fierc e fighti ng raged for severa
as the AA were initially traine d by the KIA, and later move d huge
Shan months in Kachin State. Altho ugh the Burm ese army suffered
areas -the TNLA into the Palau ng-in habite d hills of north ern se
Kokang casualties, it did mana ge to captu re some KIA bases near the Chine
State and the AA to Rakhi ne State. Both group s saw action in
st the border, in western Kach in State, and in north ern Shan State.
in 2015 when the MND AA resort ed to arme d strug gle again
the
The KIA, however, has not benef ited as much as some of
Burmese army.
aliber
ago UWSA's other allies from Wa arms suppl ies. It got some 0.50-c
The TNLA has grown from a handf ul of soldie rs a few years
more
to the formi dable 5,000 -stron g fighti ng force it is today.
The AA, machine-guns, ammu nition , and two Humv ees, but little

138 139

_
 CHAPTER 4 ST
THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED WA ATE ARMY

than that. The reason could be that the

Chinese
remai n s0 to navigate different routes , markets and•investments
abilitr its self-reliance. Collaborations between w
suspicious of the Kachin, a pred omi nan t! YChristian Peopleni、 afl d a-owned
buttress
to anieS and other Myanmar (Burmese) conglomerates point to
:~~~~
cial! e U
the past have reached out to the West, espe Yth
arm ies in Bur ma. Mor e nited corllP business ties with elites in Yangon (Rangoon) and Mandala产
more than most other ethnic over, in th
eearl strong ed conflict with the Burmese militarywouldput
1990 s, before the KIA signed its failed ceas efire a
greement With y use any arm
. d India , and that the 13eca t in jeopardy, the UWSA is interested·in maintaining
goverrunent, 1t receive some support from . vestmen their fight
th
碱d
als。
soch ,n rather than actively joining its allies in
help explain Chinese attitudes towards e group. There is .
also n。 statu s quo ical situation, but
other the the central government. It is a paradox
way the UWSA can share its weaponry with groups with against Wa point of view perhaps the best solution, at least for the
of Chi na's secu rity serv ices . out at
least the tacit app rova l running their affairs.
frorll a 伽y have their own government
at strange! nsid
Relations with the NDAA (ESS), somewh Yco tirne
being.
is strong and their army sufficiently well
-equipped
tens e in 2016 . The UW SA ering econ omy
their shared past, became even sent in 伽ir n against them.
(ESS)'s positions alon de the Burmese army from taking actio
troops to take over some of the NDAA gwhat to dissua on other fronts also keeps the Burmese army from even
der. The prob lem s aros e afte r fighting
had been a com mon bor NDAA(ESS) first time in history,
ent in A lating attacking Wa areas. The Wa, for the
ernm
leaders attended peace talks with the gov ugust of that contetnP nation with their own de facto state. Tha
t is
r allies were on the verge beco me a um·fied
year, and the Wa leaders feared that thei have
achievement by a people who until only
a few decades ago
tral authorities that would no mean
of reaching an agreement with the cen head-hunters, and then used as little mor
e than cannon fodder
a peace deal had been struck, were
adversely affect the UWSA's interests. If for fulfilling the dream of a group of Bur
mese communists whose
roads leading through the
the UWSA would have been cut off from they do not even speak.
r, which forms the border language
NDAA (ESS)'s area to the Mekong Rive
plies of Chinese weapons
between Burma and Laos. Since the sup
have been disastrous for the
usually transit through Laos, that would
formed a defensive string
Wa. Since then, UWSA troops have also
to make sure the group does
of bases around the NDAA (ESS)'s area
not step out ofline.
their muscles in Burma's
The Wa have also continued to flex
her Andrew Ong of the
legitimate business environment. Researc
ts out in an August 2018
National University of Singapore poin
lings not only with Chinese
article that the UWSA has business dea
0s demonstrated a creativity
counterparts, but it has "since the 199

_
141
140

霆
,,,,-
5
fhe United Wa State Army and
orugs: A Chinese Dilemma

岔Z
A major setback to
the United Wa State Army's efforts to become
卿ate, a goal the orgamzation had held since it entered into a
leg
fire agreement with the Burmese army in 19的， came on January
cease
2005. Roslynn R. Mauskopf, US attorney for the Eastern District
25,
of New York, and Anthony P. Placido, the special-agent-in-charge for
Drug Enforcement Administration
theNew York Field Division ofthe
(DEA), announced the unsealing of an indictment against eight high-
drug-trafficking related charges. The eight
ranking UWSA leaders on
on the list were the four Wa brothers, Bao Youxiang, Bao Youri, Ba·o
Bao Youliang, and Bao Youhua; the three Wa brothers, Wei Xuegang,
Wei Xuelong, and Wei Xueyin; and Bao Huachiang, an unrelated Wa
officer.1
Toe indictment, the US officials said, was the outcome of an
investigation code-named'Operation Warlord'which "focused on
stemming the flow of illegal drugs at their source, and is the latest
chapter in a long history of collaboration between the DEA and other
law enforcement agencies to combat heroin trafficking in Southeast
Asia卢 No specific case involving smuggling to the United States was

mentioned in the announcement, only vague references to trafficking

beyond the immediate region:

143
 CHAPTER 5 THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS : A CHINESE DILEMMA

伽is. The thirteenth name on that 1·tst is Li Ziru, the Red

The indictment alleges that through the UWSA, the defend叩ts 砰no·
an d voiunteer from China who joined the Communist Party of
control all decision making relative to the cultivation, collection
f . G1.1ar (CPB) in the late 196_0s.6
and transportation o opium m the territory under UWSA control,
即叩 呻eries in the Wa area were set up b
. h' nts and drug refi neries,
L

Y ethnic Chinese
This includes taxing of narcotics s 1pme . 你 whic h·
. and taxed by the UWS A , m return, provided
and the collection of Iucrative narcotics proceeds. In return dicates drugs to be smuggled out
s炉 and then arran ged for the
the defendants and the UWSA provide security for heroin 叩 tion
f protec mostly down •to Thailand but also acr~ss the border
methamphetamine laboratories in Wa territory, as well as ordrug 。｛由e : area, ,
Buyers would also send drugs to India and Bangladesh
caravans smuggling heroin and methamphetamine from Eastern China.
b to the uWSA was not present, so other armed factions, some
Burma to Thailand, China, and Laos where independent rokers where f
overnment-recognized militias, would have to take car~o
smuggle shipments to internat10nal distribution organizarions in 吵emg lJWSA's
ortation. That raises the question of how widely the
Asia, Europe and the United States.3 伲nsp tment
k of contacts actually reached. Although the US indic
n扣,;or
long list of Wei-associated companies in Burma, it seems
The announcement did not identify those "·International also gave a would
dru gs allegedly unlikely that he, the Bao brothers, or any other Wa,
distribution organizations;'so it is unclear how the highly y, Amsterdam,
s have contacts·in New York, or for that matter in Sydne
from UWSA-controlled areas ended up in the United tates. But the
largest heroin a nearby drug market such as Hong Kong.
DEA went on to state that the UWSA is "one of the or even
ne from the drug
伽re is no doubt that the UWSA made a fortu
producing and trafficking organizations in the world and was a spartan
c tons of op咖 trade, which ena.bled it to transform Panghsang fro.1!1
responsible for the production ofmore than 180 metri nistration,
designated communist headquarters into a modern city, run its admi
in 2004:'4 The UWSA as well as Wei Xuegang "have been ;
The new paved
and provide the villagers with basic social services.
'Drug Kingpins'by the United States government:'5 nt~controlled
included the roads in the Wa Hills are better than those in governme
There was, however, an additional sealed list which electricity and
who had also areas ofShan State, and even remote villages now have
names of thirteen people with UWSA connections corrugated
unsealed and piped water, and most houses have been provided with
been indicted一 and the names on the two lists, one
._

g the,CPB era
production iron roofs instead of thatch, all unknown luxuries durin
the other sealed, reveal an important feature in drug
brothers are and before. -The Wa ad· mm1strat10n now runs 409 sch(!ols compared
under the aegis of the UWSA. Although the three Bao
,
the time of the
hiang, who is with only 20 in 19的， and 26 hospitals, up from four at
on the unsealed list along with another Wa, Bao Huac ate and wo~e
All of them mutiny.7 Young Wa, whose parents were mostly illiter
not a relative, the rest are Sino-Burmese or Sino-Thai. le phones, are
d list, which baggy fatigues and caps with a red star, now have mobi
are connected with Wei Xuegang's network. The seale ork (VPN)
contains thirteen names, includes the names of twelve Sino-B
urmese on email, and surfthe Internet using Virtual Private Netw

144 145

合
 CHAPTERS
to get around Chinese restrictions. The ceasefi re agree
government has enabled them to travel to cities like ;ent Wit怕he
andaJa
Rangoon. Some have even been to Chiang Mai and B 飞 e price for
angkok.
While the UWSA and the people living under its
control h
benefited from the drug trade, a 1998 studY of drug . 张
Prices f
producer to consumer shows that the biggest profits Were not 噙
归e,
the mountains of northern Burma but where the d rugs were n I
actuauy
sold. At that time, a hilltribe poppy farmer in the Burmese s
ector of
the Golden Triangle could sell his raw opium to a local merch
anH句
20,000 Burmese kyat, then the equivalent of US$75, per viss
or·Joi,
the equivalent of 1.6 kilograms. The refinerY operators would
cook
the opium, and although ten kilograms·of it plus chemicals
such as
acetic ·anhydrite would make one kilogram of pure white number
4 heroin, the bricks that were produced would not be counted in
kilograms but in bricks; each weighing 700 grams. Toe wholesale
price for such a brick at the refineries in Burma also varied at that
time between US丸750 and US$4巧o. In other words , 700 grams of
I
heroin equaled US$330 worth of raw opium for the farmer.a
Once smuggled across the border into northern Thailand, a buyer
would pay up to US$4芯0-5,000 for the same 700-gram brick. Brought
from the border to the city of Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, the
price would have increased to US巧，625. Then, when the heroin had
been transported down to Bangkok, the price per brick would be
US$6, 巧0-乃oo. In Hong Kong, the sa·me brick would have fetched
US釭1,000, and in Taiwan as much as US$37,500. The wholesale
price in ·Sydney was AUS$75,ooo-85,ooo, or US江6,000-52,000 at
the time, ifsold from an Asian to an Asian. The importer would then
sell the same unit to a retailer for AUS$180,ooo, or US$no,ooo. In
Australia, the heroin would be broken up into 0.02-gram capsules,
146
.........
y;hiCh were so
p.tJSs1.05 m
ld in the streets for AUS
_
THE UNITED WA STATE ARM Y AN O DRUGS:
A CHINESE DILEMMA
勺o, or USs18.50 each-or
illion, or US$617,ooo for the equivalent of th
厂呀
brick in the Golden Triangle.
00.gram
a7
In New York, the wholesale price at the time was USsso ,ooo per
which would be adulterated and packed into bags containing
brick,
milligrams of heroin and 25 grams oflactose. Thus, 700 grams of
25 would make 28,000 such bags, which were sold to addicts
heroin
vssio each. The value of the same heroin that cost US丸750-
for
in Burma一and the opium equivalent of which
4,250 at the refinery
was priced at USs330 for the Golden Triangle poppy farmer— had
increased to gross sales of at least US釭80,000.
It is not hard to draw the conclusion that opium was not cultivated
b "hostile poppy farmers;• as the international press sometimes calls
y
them. That is a gross distortion of reality. The main profiteers were
not even refinery operators in the Golden Triangle, but rather the
importers and retailers in cities in the West. Few of them would have
even heard of the Wa and the UWSA. But when drug seizures are
made in countries such as Burma, the value of the catch is.always
counted as if New York street prices would be applicable even there.
The other mytl1 is the kingpin theory, which is little _more
than a Hollywood-like portrayal of Asia's drug trade. In reality,
the trade is, and has always been, run by loosely and informally
organized networks, and not by some overarching, all-powerful
,kingpins: Ko-lin Chin and Sheldon X. Zhang, two of America's
most accomplished criminologists, have shown in seminal books,
including The Chinese Heroin Trade and The Golden Triangle: Inside
Southeast Asias Drug Trade, as well as numerous papers and articles
that Chinese drug and crime networks "are horizontally structured,
归， and opportunistic:'9 They have also argued that, in private
147
 CHAPTER 5
~ '"'""'"'w, mu'""''""'""' ii匾丘兰刃
\

＼多
A CHINES
E DILEMMA
conversations, "even US drug enforcement officials in th

7/
were able to make ten drug-ru nning trips or

二
e field h
acknowledged that there are no kingpins, cir at Ieast the 痪 theY
other traders took over thedrugsand. rnore a year. In 6`

P3
Yhave 'fachilek, tt is doubtful whether
seen any in China and Southeast Asia:'10 呵
d Yang, or even Luo, knew much about those
Shi 扭
Chin and Zhang state categorically in their stud·ies th 妇, operated. networks and
at the
. Ivement in the d t 心
never encountered any significant mvo
bOW

rug rad
. LUO,
th e notorious, organized crime groups in Hong Kong, Taiw e of
an
mainland China that are known as·-Triads. Those gangs are 闷
often
depicted in the press as the main players but, as Chin and
Zh ang
argue, some Triad members may deal in drugs but their .
吮o吮
derives chiefly from enterprises such as const ruction, extort'
ion,
gambling, prostitution, and fraud.
Indeed, the use of the term'kingp in'is misleading when referring
to narcotics suppression in Southeast Asia. A'kingpin'bYdefinition
is the pin at the center in bowling and if toppled all the other pins
will fall·as well. But history has shown time and time again that this is
not how the Golden Triangle drug trade is structured: as one alleged
,kingpin'has fallen, others have been left standing, conveniently in
place to take on the misnomer mantle.
The notion of a drug'kingpin'is often produced as a diversionary
focal point while other actors, including supposedly legitimate
businessmen and even state officials, deal in narcotics under the radar.
But naming and shaming those individuals could have diplomatic as
·well as legal consequences.
In the early 1970s, as Kokang warlord Luo Xinghan was crowned
,king'of the Golden Triangle, two relatively unknown · opium
merchants in Kengtung, Shi Kya Chui and Yang Sang aka Yang Sh咄
were in fact trading in much larger quantities than Luo. Because they
were more conveniently located at Kengtung, only 168 kilometers
north of the border town ofTachilek, opposite Mae Sai in Thailand,
,I
who was based in Lashio·m northern Shan
State, could
only one trip to Tachilek a year. But he was a
organize convenient
because he had a formidable fighting force , which h
target e needed
t his convoys when they moved through almost the entire
to protec
of Shan State. It was also forgotten bYinternational
length narcotics
ression agencies that Luo began his career as a goverrunent-
supp
and was informally allowed to traffic
recognized militia commander
in opium in exchange for fighting ethnic and political insurgents in
Burma's Shan State. Moreover, most of the opium that Luo and his
army transported down to the Thai border did not actually belong to
him•Because he was a militia commander, he was also able to provide
protection for individual opium traders who lacked their own armed
forces. Even so, senior US narcotics adviser Nelson Gross at the
血e, said that Luo 1s an mternational bandit and responsible for .a
growing proportion of Asia's and America's drug-caused miseries:•11
Hardly surprisingly, Luo's arrest in Thailand in 1973 and his death
sentence for "rebellion against the state" did not have any impact on
drug production in the Golden Triangle. Another'kingpin'emerged
on the scene: Zhang Qifu alias Khun Sa who, like Luo before him,
had a huge army and was therefore highly visible in the area. Like
Luo, Khun Sa had started off as a government-recognized militia
commander and only later went underground. Meanwhile, the death
sentence against Luo was never carried out. He was pardoned during
the general amnesty in 1980 and he returned to his old home in Lashio.
There, he formed a new militia unit and built a base called the Salween

149
148
 寸
CHAPTER 5
village, south of the town. He also established Asia World
,a
company that became one of Burma's most powerful cong! Private
0吮r
ates
心勹'：
,vith interests in construction, trade, and ports. Lik
ewise, l<h
surrender in 1996 did not change anything. Although he
his life一he died in 2007-in quiet retirement in Rangoon, h·
, IS f allli]
and top officers became 'Ieg1timate
. businessmen' and ·
invested th
y
fortunes in construction, transport companies, a beer brewer eir
Y,and
similar businesses.
Next in the line-up of the region's alleged'kingpins'is not
only
Wei Xuegang but, as the 2005 US indictment shows, also
other top
leaders of the UWSA. Like Luo and Khun Sa before h·1m, Wei and his
UWSA associates have significant investments in different
types of
businesses, including jade mining, retail trade, and other enterprises
in Burma. How much, if at all, those businesses are used to launder
funds derived from drug dealing is unclear. Nor has it ever been clear
that he actually monopolized the Golden Triangle drug trade, as the
DEA indictment suggests.
Whatever the case, in late 2019 the Asia-Pacific drug trade had a
new kingpin according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) and some Western narcotics officials. Tse Chi Lop,
a Chinese-born Canadian, was supposedly the leader of a gang that
controlled most of the region's illegal trade in methamphetamine.
Jeremy Douglas, Southeast Asia and Pacific representative for
UNODC, told Reuters, "Tse Chi Lop is in the league of El Chapo
or maybe Pablo Escobar. The word kingpin often gets around, but
there is no doubt it applies here:'12 The Reuters report referred to Tse
ChiLop as "Asia's most wanted man" who "runs a vast multinational
drug trafficking syndicate" in alliance with "five of Asia's Triad
groups."13 Despite all those connections, his whereabouts seemed 10
，
150
一
THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS:
A CHINESE DILEMMA
be 叩即own. When and how that mysterious and elusive t:
'kingpin'took over the Golden T
Canadian Chinese-
riangle d
rug trade was
unclear. Sadly, it seemed to be just another Holl
a]sO rwoodesque
resentation of who is who in the d
misrep rug trade and how the
business works.
uWS/\s response to the January 2005 indict
仆1e ments in the US
a few months after the names of the alleged 'ki
carne ngpins' had been
made public. On June 24, 2005, the UWSA took the drastic
step of
banning all poppy cultivation within its area. There was some alarm
within the international donor community, which became involved
in developing the Wa area shortly after the 19的 CPB mutiny. The
丽ODC estimated in December that year that "350,000 households,
or about two million people in Shan State alone, will lose their
产ary income as a result of bans on cultivation opium:• (sic)14
"Two million people was, of course, a gross exaggeration as that
many people did not live in UWSA-controlled areas, but the fear that
poor farmers would lose their income was real. The Netherlands-
based Translational Institute warned in December 2005 .that the
proposed opium ban could spark a "h umamtarian crisis . . . the
implementation of these opium bans in one of the world's largest
opium-producing areas may sound promising to international anti-
narcotics officials, but for the opium farmers living there it could
spell disaster:'15
But within a couple of years, the slopes of the Wa Hills •were
covered in rubber and tea plantations, and that was the doing of
the Wa authorities, not because of any of the UNODC's programs,
咖ch could be described as general development schemes. rather
than drug-eradication efforts. Most of the produce was exported
ac『oss the border to China.
151
 飞闷诊
CHAPTER 5

It was also not the first time the Wain the post-CPB ` THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY ANO DRUGS: A
CHINESE DILEMMA

diately he escaped to the Wa Hills, where the UWSA

｀
erah

to rid their area of opium production. That began With th adtt'1对
Saw Lu, a prominent Wa community leader, in Lashio .e arre呤
In J
1992. He had never been in the underground. It was also a、
Well kn
that Saw Lu had been a m山tia commander whose f 0wn
Orce f
against Zhao Yilai when he and the CPB had entered th 、 bed after the 1吵9 ceasefire agreement, and a similar UNooc
eWafin1
December 哄9. He had also served loyally as an official ofth 钮 had not produced any tangible improvements m
eBurma
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the ruling party led b
Ygenera[
Ne Win after the 19釭 coup. After the 1988 prodemocracy
and the collapse of the BSPP, Saw Lu founded both the Wa~:;.气
ionat
Development Party and, together with his Lahu wife Mar
Y, the Lahu
National Development Party.
Unbeknown to most people, however, Saw Lu was also 知
important source for the DEA in Rangoon. His codename·In internal
DEA commumcattons was Superstar, mdicating his status as one of
the agency's best informants. His arrest was prompted by a detailed
report he had compiled about the involvement in the drug trade of
the local military intelligence chief in Lashio. Somehow, it is not
clear how, the report was intercepted as it was being sent down to
Rangoon. Saw Lu, Mary, their two sons as well as two adopted sons
were all thrown in jail in Lashio. Saw Lu himself was hung upside
down and given electric shock treatment in the presence of the local
intelligence chief. 16
On hearing about the arrest, Zhao and the UWSA issued an
ultimatum: ifSaw Lu were not released before March 26, the ceasefire
with Rangoon would be over. Zhao and Saw Lu might have fought
each other in the late 1960s, but for Zhao it meant more that he
was also a fellow Wa. On the 16th, Saw Lu was set free. Almost
－
叩me appointed
"official spokesman for mternational affairs:•11
hiJllsaw Lu's first initiative was to persuade th e Wa to acce
pt an opium
tion program that he had worked out while still .
eradica m Lashio. The
military's'Border Development Programme:
即mese which was
1aunc
.
scheme the Wa
伽 T]WSA now appealed to the international
I-!iilS, community for
t assistance.
direc
saw Lu an d his Lahu assistant Benjamin Min were escorted by
洲SA troops down to the Thai border. Once in Chiang Mai, they
who had
Jooked up William Young, the nephew of Vincent Young
romanized the Wa language m the 1930s. Young was also a former
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and had, as
agent of the US Central
such, played a crucial role in raising hilltribe armies to fight the
communists m Laos during the Indochina wars of the 196os. Now
living in semiretirement in Chiang Mai, Young served as a part-time
local analyst for the DEA.
Together, Saw Lu, Benjamin, and Young drafted a document titled
,The Bondage of Opium: The Agony of the Wa People, a Proposal and
a Plea:18 It stated that "like the heroin addicts that result from the
opium we grow, we, too, are in bondage. We are searching for help
to break that bondage … we want to free ourselves from the slavery
of an opium economy … [but] our people are already so poor that
to take away opium production without giving them food would
mean starvation:'It concluded that crop substitution has worked in
Thailand, and "it can work in the Wa area:'19

152 153
 CHAPTER 5
闷 of Bangkok, juvenile delinquents
1 \v ard
唤 it also
icalions
1in
&ton
v .. "'I the'Na
people to implement Saw Lu's proposal. But for reasons th
at re咀in
unclear, the Central Intelligence Agency and the State D
epart吮nt
had other ideas:'20
The Wa had prepared bamboo arches and signboards tO WeJc
。Ille
the foreign visitors. When no one came and th e proposal
响 in
effect, rejected, Saw Lu lost his credibility among the Wa. He retired
to his home in the Saohpa area, while Benjamin remained in Ch·
响
Mai, where he died in January 2000.
Despite possible goodwill, there was an important·ISSue that the
Wa-initiated crop substitution proposals and programs did not
address: methamphetamine. The production of that drug in UWSA-
controlled areas was initiated·by the Wei brothers in the 1990s, and
by the end of the decade it had become a more lucrative source of
income for the local gangs than opium and heroin had ever been
In Thailand the pills一the laboratories in Burma produced pills
rather than crystal methamphetamine which is more common in
other parts of the world-became known as ya ba,'madness drug'
or'madness medicine: The most famous ya ba brand was called WY,
and although it is not clear what it stands for, pills marked'WY'
have been found in Thailand, Burma, Laos, northeastern India, and
Bangladesh, but seldom outside the region.
The new drug soon became an even more serious threat to Thai
society than heroin had ever been because the consumers were
not only'traditional'drug users一young men and some women in
154
飞
八
THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS:
A CHINE
SE DILEMMA.
小 e slumshigh school and universi , and other
ty students, Workers · outcasts-
bttdon construction sites, long-distance bus and truck d1n factories
ar artygoers. Millions of people became regular rivers, and
nrdinar'f P orocc·as1onal
Unlike heroin, ya ba successfully transcended
users: socioecon omic
creating a new wave of drug add·1ctionon anun
barriers, precedented
scale in 1hailand, and before long also in neighboring Laosandasfar
fro!l1 the Wa Hills as northeastern India and Bangladesh.
marketed by the German pharma
While heroin was first ceutical
Bayer in 1的8 as a sedative for coughs21 and only later
company
d to have some undesirable side effects, amphetamine was sold
foun
讥 the 193os
as an over-the-counter inhaler to treat nasal congestion.
伽 chemical structure of methamphetamine is similar to that of
amphetamine, but it has. more pronounced effects on. the central
nervous system. These drugs became known collectively as ATS,
st皿ulants. In the beginning, they were
or amphetamine-type
synthesized from a senes of compounds related to the derivative of
the ephedra plant but were later produced chemically.
During World War II, ATS was widely used to keep fighting men
of various armies awake so they could endure prolonged combat
duties. Pilots in the German Luftwaffe were given chocolate dosed
with methamphetamine, which became known as fliegerschokolade,
or'flyer's chocolate: It was also rumored that Adolf Hitler himself
received daily doses of a mixture that contained certain essential
vitamins and amphetamine. Ordinary soldiers had to be content with
amore common variety of methamphetamine, dispensed under the
trade name Pervitin.
The use of this kind of drug was not confined to the German armed
forces, however. Methamphetamine was also used by the US and
155
.....
 CHAPTERS
fighting each other in rough and harsh Condit
Japanese forces . ions
in Asia's war zones.
was over, large quantities of amphetarn吮
When the war and
beta.mine, which the Japanese army had stockpiled f
methamp or its
vailable in Tokyo and other cities under the
troops, became a . colll 吭n
habu. It was banned m 1951, but the yakuza,
street name s Japan's
d infamous crime gangs, continued to prod
well-organized an uce 压
laboratories. Following crackdowns in Japan, the
clandestine Yakuza
moved their laboratories to South Korea and Taiwan, and Iater the
Philippines and mainland China.
The demand was high in Japan, as the country was being rebuilt
after the war. Construction workers took it to be able to work harder
and longer hours. For the same reason, methamphetamine use spread
to many other countries in the region which were going through
· developments. Use became widespread among
similar economic
factory workers even ·the
m Soviet Union. In the United states,
pharmaceutical companies urged doctors to prescribe the drug for
depressed housewives and people with weight problems.
In Thailand, the new'speed'drug was first marketed as an over-
the-counter stimulant. It was first broughtto the country by a South
Korean company and became very popular in the 1950s. At the
time, the tablets had a horse's head and the word'London'on them.
Consequently, they became known as ya ma, or 'horse drug: The
drug was used to treat narcolepsy and obesity, but was withdrawn
when it became obvious that it had serious side effects such as nausea,
hyperactivity, increased aggressiveness and, in some cases, total
mental breakdown.
That did not prevent long-distance bus and truck drivers as well
as unskilled laborers from using it. Crystal ya ma was produced
156
T THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND
DRUGS:
A CHINESE DILEMM A
destinely and sold through petrol stations
胪 and truck
a ma became ya ba, in th
when y e form of pills, that
恨s
confined to those categories of usage was
咚er people. Even teenagers began _
. It was cheaper than beer and easier to
osing it. conceal than other \
No syringes were necessary and it was easy to k
drogs.
eep a few pills ~~
, 0ckets.
伽 shift
in ones P 1
from opium and heroin to ya ba began shortly before \
J(hlln Sa's surrender in 1996, and then as an emergency solution to
cial troubles of his Mong Tai Army (MTA)
伽 Jinan ·The UWSA has
fought bitter battles against the MTA over control of trade routes to
伽Hand. Deprived of the supply of raw opium from the north, Khun
sasmen
found an alternative in easy-to-produce methamphetamine,
but that did not save his organization and he was left with no other
choice but to strike a deal with the Burmese military.
Around 1998, a Thai·drug lord called Bang Ron, or Surachai
Ngernthongfoo, arrived at the UWSA's new southern bases around
Mong Yawn on the Thai border. Before escaping justice in Thailand,
he had run one of that country's largest ya ba dealing networks and
brought with him the expertise that was needed to produce and
distribute methamphetamine: He and Wei Xtiegang, who was in
charge of the UWSA's new southern base area on the Thai border,
were a perfect match. The duo established new ya ba laboratories
around Mong Yawn and began flooding Thailand with pills. Seizures
on the Thai side were always in the thousands of pills, but no police
action seemed strong and effective enough to stem the tide. By
2011, the authorities estimated that nearly one in sixty Thais was a
methamphetamine user. 22 Like the German fliegerschokolade, some
pills were laced with chocolate to make them more appealing to
youngsters.
157
 寸
CHAPTER 5
In 2002, Time magazine published a cover story about the W
a and
the ya ba trade which had the rather provocative title'Speed'f
嗅 an
•
Inside the world of the Wa: Asia's deadliest drug cartel; and , Insidet
he
magazine,'Soldiers of fortune:23 It may have been an exaggerationto
brand the UWSA as a'drug cartel; but the article did contain a Wealth
of information about the Wa as well as eyewitness reports from the
area, which the authors had visited.
The portrayal of the UWSA as a'drug cartel'did not go down wen
with the UNODC, which had a number of projects in the Wa Hills
and other areas adjacent to the Chinese border. Jean-Luc Lemahieu,
the UNODC's Rangoon representative, authored an open letter
,. refuting Time's findings and defending his agency's work inside the
UWSA-controlled area.24 But the letter was riddled with so many
factual errors that he could not have done his homework before
writing it, or he was simply blissfully ignorant of the history of the
Golden Triangle drug trade. For instance, he writes this about Wei
Xuegang: "To refresh our memory, born in China, his family fled to
Shan State with the KMT (Kuomintang) but later joined Khun Sa's
organization:'Th us far, it is correct if ungrammatical, although he
refers to Khun Sa's group as "the Mong Tai Army:'When Wei joined
Khun Sa, the organization was called the Shanland United Army and
became the MTA only in 1987, after it had merged with another army
and long after Wei had left it.
Lemahieu then went on to say that Wei fell "in disgrace with Khun
Sa in 1974" and switched sides to the Communist Party of Burma,
and further, "when the CPB fell in 1996, he moved along with the
VWSA:'I t is unclear how Wei's falling out with Khun Sa could have
happened in 1974 as the old warlord was arrested in Burma in 19妙
released in 1974, and only in 1976 came down to the Thai border to
158
_
THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS:
A CHINE
SE DILEMMA
·Jd his organization. Then, of course, Wei never ·
rebut
d the party fell apart in 19的， not·tn 1996. LemahieuJoined the CPB
concludes, not
the irony of what he had to say b that the
realizing . , y Writing
rages as many Journalists as feasible to visit the WUNonc
"encou
Indeed, nothing beats a personal visit to th a and our
哗ctzone.
p to discover the discrepancy between th e project area
order e reality Within the
·飞
in
d the virtual reality of what is being said and
Wa an written outside
'(sic)
the country.
伽 ignorance and incompetence of international anti-drug
officials rnay be startling, but so is the overall hypocrisYof mostly
when it comes to global narcotics suppression.
western nations
In Asia, it is not
forgotten that opium brought by Western traders
enslaved millions of people in China and elsewhere during the
colonial era. Just in time -for Hong Kong's return to Ch'ma on July
I, 1997,
the Chinese movie industry released a mega production
called 1he Opium War, which depicted Lin Zexu, the emperor's
commissioner based in Guangdong and other southern provinces
in the 1凶os, as a national hero for trying to stop the importation
of opium that the British were bringing in from India. The British,
naturally, were brutal aggressors who defeated the Chinese, forced
China to open its ports for opium, and turned Hong Kong into a
British colony in 1842.
The origin of those wars can be traced back to the seventeenth
century when Britain's East India Company began to fight its way
into the highly lucrative and competitive markets of Asia. China,
with its teeming millions, held the greatest attraction as it had goods,
especially tea, that were becoming popular in Europe. But there was
little the Chinese wanted from Britain In fact, they showed interest
in only one item from Britain and British India: silver. By the early
· 159
 ~ TED WA STATE ARMY ANO DRUGS: A CHINES
THE UNI E DILEM MA
CHAPTER 5
aS
did not prevent the British from fighting econd op1um ·
e of silver and another
eighteenth century, India faced a shortag 伽t
856 to 1860. Its final phase saw British and F h forces
be found一and that was opium from the fields from 1 renc
commodity had to 仰 into Beijing, where they looted and burned the emperor's
currency of trade With 小 ,barging
of India. Opium replaced silver as the e surnrner palace. China had lost again,
and th
e Kowloon
and silver was not going back to Indi a to pay for th eopi(!rn. 卿o US
nlan d opposite Hong Kong island was ceded to
Chinese, uia on the mai
ially, to suPPress the
The Chinese authorities tried, at least offic penins 伽 enlarged colony of Hong Kong as
well Shanghai
as
population as millions of 归itish.
trade. Opium was devastating China's d as the most important transfer poin
ts for Indi an
opium
um smoking had actuauy emerge
people became addicted to the drug. Opi the vast Chinese market. By then, Indi a had
also begun its
ing and importingopiurn entering China. As the
been banned by China in 1729, and cultivat roduction, and the loser in the game was
e edicts were ignored byall own tea p
was specifically banned in 1799 尹 But thes trade continued unabated, It soon produced
more than one-
Dynasty was too weak to opi叩 ish Indian empire, and new
Western merchants, and the ruling Qing 劭 of government revenue in the Brit
were not the only traders
enforce its policies. Moreover, the British cities could be built. 28
kish opium to China and grandiose built on income from
marketing their opium. Americans sold Tur Panghsang and Mong La may have been
in a position to do so. The utta (Kolkata}, Madras
Persian opium was imported by any trader the drug trade, but so were Hong Kong, Calc
single phrase to describe bay (Mu ~ba i), and Saigon. It may be
rather far-
American merchant W. C. Hunter used one (Chenna1·), Bom
1944: "We were all equally UWSA's non-drug related
the Chinese opium trade between 1835 and fetched to expect the world to accept the
heson, other Hong Kong
implicated."26 commercial enterprises as it has Jardine-Mat
took decisive action and t India Company, for we
Then, in March 1839, Emperor Daoguang conglomerates, and Britain's erstwhile Eas
the opium business. The es, but it is certainly not
sent Lin Zexu to the south to stamp out are Jiving in different times with other valu
ts along China's southern e once heavily engaged in
British responded by bombarding the por without precedent for co~ pan ies that wer

;i
e, which was primarily
coast to open them to British merchandis the drug trade to turn to oth er more who
lesome activities. Western
ended with the Treaty of y people in Asia see their
opium from India. The First Opium War policymakers must understand that man
ated by Britain's superior
Nanjing in 心2. The Chinese, who were defe narcotics policies as deeply hypocritical.
firepower, had to open five ports, includin
g Shanghai, to foreign
British.
I Britain was not the only Western pow
er that used revenues
trade. And the island of Hong Kong became kings in India as well as
the British military had / from the opium trade to finance underta
Not everyone in London agreed with what In French Indochina, there
tician who later became colonies such as Singapore and Malaya.
done. William Gladstone, a young liberal poli the goverrunent-administered
m, a war were 扔oo licensed opium den s and
prime minister of Britain, said: "A war more unjust in ong all revenues in the
permanent disgrace, I do R炖ie de !'Opium collected mo re than half of
niore calculated to cover this country with the Dutch East Indies, now
colony. Similar arrangements existed in
not know and have not read of'27

160 161

_.,____
 \日
DRUGS:
THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND

I尸
CHAPTERS A CHINESE DILEMMA

，
,
ent authorities attempted to reinforce the prohibihons . against
Indonesia. Even there, opium was a governm monoPoly, and . ese
th
C!Jlll mid- and late nineteen century, «th e production
th
quantities of the drug were imported from e Middle East 19 "'ast in the
硬 in the mountains and in oth inaccessible
op d even further
so Were 沁

?
rants, and er
consumers were mostly ethnic Chinese mig 芝 areas such as the Wa Hills .
include

.\
Th· eJCP ,,32'Jhat would Similarly,
dealers who were referred to as'tax farmers.' IS did not indi the spre ad to Kok ang and the hill
Cate areas~tivation of popp ies s north of
they were agriculturalists but that- they had a gover nment 1· 如C ern Shan States.
II . ice唳 int he east
for payin
which enabled them to se opmm in return g taxes t the J(engtung
o first proposal for drastic action against the colonial opium
colonial authorities. 伽 seen how
T fro.Ill American m1ss1onaries in China, who had
But nothing could match China as a market. owards the end 1ra deca rne
smoking had been to large segments of society.
· of of
of mm ions tating opiu!ll
the nineteenth century, the country had tens opium devas ort from President Theodore Roosevelt, and m 1909
·
.
insuffi c1ent ot supp
addicts, and because supplies from India were to 伽y g for the first
吮et tatives of thirteen countries met in Shanghai
demand, large quantities of opium were soon produced in . repre sen It led to the
the I conference to discuss the opium problem.
e!
Chinese interior as well. Opium was not entir Ynew to the 如， 讥ternationa d with the
f the International Opium Commission taske
but it had never before been grown on such an industrial scale as formation o
no one was bound
to oversee the trade. But it was toothless as
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. duty g countries such
Chinese emperor in definite policy, and some key opium producin
- The Panthay, or Hui, rebellion against the byanY
and Persia did not take an active part in it.33
the fighting disrupted as Turkey
the mid- nineteenth century was crushed, but held in The Hague,
Nevertheless, another opium conference was
earlier trade flows, espe cially the export of minerals, and opi咘 dom agreed to halt all
I .
ity that could be bought the Netherlands, in 1911 一12. The United King
emerged as an a ternatJve lucrative commod and the Shanghai Municipal
opium may even have 血portation of Indian opium. by 1917,
and sold. By the end of the nineteenth century, rnational Settlement,
and there was a huge
.
Council closed down opium dens in the Inte
become the main crop of the Chinese interior, area of the city where
ent imports from Ind凡 which was not formally a colony but an
demand for the drug to supplement insuffici ial rights. It was not a
al opium production foreigners resided and enjoyed extraterritor
By the early twentieth century, China's annu had turned Shanghai
ies grown mainly 川 big loss, however. By then, opium revenues
had risen to over 20,000 metric tons, with popp e were plenty of other
and Shanxi provinces. l-0 into China's most industrialized city and ther
Yunnan, Sichuan, Shaa血， Gansu, Guizhou, consumption of opium
n was introduced to sources of income. Moreover, the sale and
It is unclear when large-scale poppy cultivatio re a corrupt Chinese
writer and adventurer continued in the' nati ve'p arts of the city whe
the Wa Hills, but Hideyuki Takano, a Japanese it. On the contrary, the
Wa people probably police force did little or nothing to stop
who lived there in the 1990s, believes that "the the criminal gangs which
of the 19th century."31 Shanghai police worked han d in hand with
began producing opium in the latter half titution.
esjo, as the imperial controlled the drug trade, gambling, and pros
According to anthropologist Magnus Fisk
163
162

- 5 如 一 ,, _.,
 L
CHAPTER 5

.
As Burma was conquered in stages by the British In
THE uN TE
D wA sTATE ARMY AND DRuGs. A cHIN
9 EsE DILEM~MA

not to attempt any restrictive measures in

(
,

、
then· nrnent

century through the three Anglo- Burme se wars of 1824_26 吨｀
.'18觅
and i885, new rules for opium production·were graduaij四trod
3•
An Opium Act was enacted in 1肋8, even before what is now 岭．
Burma was taken over by the British.34 Opium, imported f north匈
呤I
could be sold in government-licensed opium shops and theb 咦
u、
was taxed by the colonial authorities, but it was not a majors
problem in Burma proper or the adjacent Shan states, Which oc材l
ca吮
under British protection in the 1880s and 189os. In fact, th
e lllain
anthropological study of the Shan written ·during the colonial
Shans at Home by Leslie Milne, has only one reference toopium:"era,
N。
religious Shan takes opium, so it is not used openly as a med·icine, but
native doctors use it occasionally mixed with herbs."3s
· were ethnic Kachin in the far north of the colony. Those
The 呴8 Opium Act, which was amended m 1909, went into
1938 Opium Rules,
effect in 1910 and ·was supplem ented· by the
which outlined stiff penalties for illegal opium tradihg as "no person
may transport opium unless such person can. lawfullYpossess such
opium"36 and it could be sold only by "a licensed vendor:'37 But it was
aimost impossible to enforce those Jaws in Kokang and the Wa Hills,
where local farmers grew poppies and Panthay (Hui) merchants
bought the refined opium and sold·1t on to opium to buyers in China
or Southeast Asia, including Siam (Thailand), Malaya, and Singapore.
A special Shan State Opium Order was promulgated in 19丸
咖ch at least in theory banned poppy cultivation in the Shan
States. But, as researcher Robert Maule pointed out in his study
of the issue, "the trans-Salween areas;'that is, Kokang and the Wa
Hills, "were excluded from the
policy until more effective control
has been established:'38 B
urma was then a province of British India,
ar
and the "Secret Yof State for Ind·
1a specifically warned the Burma
r\
沪r Kokang if
Id create unrest:'39 The local Kokang Ch·inese, who lived at
叩U
由at de where not even dry paddy farming was practicable, were
ltilU
记 various cash crops, notably tea and opium, to buy
dent on
阅en
the rnore developed valleys. In years when theopiumcrop
frorn
招 f frost or other natural disasters, "most of the people
d because o
舵 depend on roots and shoots:'40 The situation was similar in
bad to but there the British had even less influence than in
Wa Hills,
如 lled Kokang.
. 1Ycontro
arual
p that the British, with varying degrees of success, had
伽: rules
d becarne totally irrelevant when the Japanese invaded the
扣troduce
during World War 11. The British and the Amencan · s raised
colony
forces to fight against the occupation, and most of the
guerrUla
fighters
ded goods and services, and the British paid for whatever
forces nee
they could obtain from local villagers in opium which they had
from India. But then came the Americans, and
brought with them
the us Air Force began to fly in much larger quantities of Indian
don, a British officer who served in the
opium. As Ian Fellowes-Gor
Kachin Hills during World War II, described in his excellent account
of the fighting, the Americans "were doing it with typical efficiency,
in ample, generous doses:'41 Whereas the British had paid for food
and other goods in opium, the Americans now paid a number of
the levies they had recruited in opium as well. As a result, Fellowes-
Gordon wrote, "it was starting to circulate as a currency and it
seemed as if, rather than being able to cut down the use of it, we
would have to step up ours:'42
The next Western involvement in the Southeast Asian drug trade
came when Kuomintang forces retreated into northeastern Burma

164 165
 ......
CHAPTER 5 THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS: A CHINESE DILEMMA

a viable alternative as the merchants came to the villages to

after their defeat in the Chinese civil war in 1949. American became
呤Ort roduce.
for the Kuomintang was substantial because it coincided With t bUY theP
he In the 1960s, when the civil war spread to other areas of what had
Korean War and, as such, became part of a larger geopolitical strate .
切． Shan State and involved the Shan, the Kokang Chinese, and
Claire Chennault's'pincer movement'which, the Americans hoPed, become
crop economY was in shambles,
, the traditional cash
would lead to the fall of communism in China. But, like the British the palaung
and the production of opium increased even further. The military
and the Americans during World War II, the Kuomintang also had
takeover in Rangoon in 1962, and the introduction of the so-called
to buy goods and services from the local people. The Kuo mintang
,Burmese Way to Socialism' led to the emergence of a black market
could not fly in opium from any neighboring country so they had to
the most valuable medium of exchange was opium. Chao
depend on local production in the areas of northeastern and eastern where
Tzang Yawnghwe, a promment Shan analyst and former rebel leader,
Shan states where they were ensconced. Income from the opium, sold
analyzed the phenomenon in a 19也 study:
to traders in Thailand, also paid for arms purchases from Burmas
eastern neighbor. The Kuomintang's involvement in the opium trade
All businesses and banks … were nationalised [and] in such an
was best described by one it its own generals, Duan Xiwen, in a 1967
economic vacuum there arose a black-market economy which
interview with a British journalist: "Necessity knows no law. That
for opium tra伍ckers was a boon…. Opium was bought by them
is why we deal with opium. We have to continue to fight the evil of
at very low prices from ragged cultivators, transported in armed
communism and to fight you must have an army, and an army must
caravans to the border and refined into heroin. And on the return
,__ have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains
trip to get more opium, Thai goods and commodities were taken
the only money is opium.43
back and sold in Shan State.... Rather than creating socialism, the
The Kuomintang introduced a hefty opium tax, to be paid in
Burmese Way to Socialism delivered the economy into the hands
kind, which forced the hill tribe farmers to·grow even more to make
of the opium traffickers …. Thus, cultivation of opium, limited to
ends meet. There were also other reasons for the opium boom of the
the east of the Salween prior to 19句， not only spread all over Shan
195os-Burma's annual production was estimated at a mere 30 metric
State, but to Kachin, Karenni and Chin states as well.44
tons at independence in 1948 and by the mid-195os had risen to
several hundred metric tons一such as the influx of hill tribe refugees
Opium politics even became part of the military government's
from Yunnan after the communist takeover in 1949. They were poor,
counterinsurgency program as the Ka Kwe Ye home guards were
arrived in a new country where they had to make a living, and there
d allowed to trade in opium to sustain their activities, privileges that
was a growing market for opium. When the Burmese army entere
the Shan states to repel the Kuomintang invaders, the fighting made also enabled traders like Luo Xinghan and Zhang Qifu, or Khun
it difficult to transport 'normal' cash crops to the markets, and opiurn Sa, to make fortunes for themselves and become immensely rich.

166 167

......
 寸
THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS:
CHAPTER 5 A CHINES

`
E DILEMMA

、
r
man cut down, dealers and even users were arrested and
In Thailand, where most of the opium was sold and

、
、
.U`
护e
dealers were involved in the trade, drugs became part
0; t:iffi国
e IOca1 dllcation
camps, or simply executed. BYthe late sent to
1950s, there were
ree anY poppy fields left in China.
g Mai and other northern cities
economy, especially in Chian 如叽 tiardlY
July 1971 US Assistant Secretary of State Marshall
and villages. An anonymous'.American living in Thail
and'
'Wrote . 'Jhen, in Green
that opium was not actuallYgrown in Ch
"Profits f 1n 妇irted ma,aswash·mgton
a Jetter to US congressman Lester Wolff in July 1977;
•
rorn claimed. Instead, Green said·m an interview With the now
the sale of opium and heroin are generally reinvested In anoth er tiad once
b t Hong Kong weekly Far Eastern Economic Review, opium
illegal trade: basic dry goods and things like radios are roughtfrorn defu证
b in a 'golden triangle'stretching from northeastern Burma
northern Thailand merchants for shipment across the order 叩 was grown
northern Thailand and northwestern Laos.47 His somewhat
illegal sale in Burma. If the narcotics trade is forcibl y stopped, the to
be added rising admission of the fact, which was known to most people
economy in the area will be wrecked:'45 It could also that 叩
b the region, came at a time when Washington was t rying to win
money derived from the drug trade paid for legitimate usinesses in
s with Beijing. Indeed, in the same month as the articleappeared,
in northern Thailand like the construction of hotel , supermarkets, favor
it was announced that then US president Richard Nixon would visit
and housing estates.
had blamed China the following February.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, US policymakers used, became an
a communist 伽 new term, and 1t was the first time it was
China for the region's opium boom. It was all part of th
. The title of a immediate hit. The name captured the imagination of e public as it
plot to undermine the moral standards of the West · a few years; the
o-Chemical evoked the lawless nature of the opium trade. Withm
major work that appeared at that time, says it all: Psych
st the West.46 Golden Triangle一now with a capital'G' and 'T'一came to epitomize
Warfare: The Chinese Communist Drug Offensive Again
r produced, all ofSoutheast Asia's opium-related problems. The name also caught
But those arguments were not convincing. The autho kham), and it
of cardboard on in Chinese (Jin sanjiao) and Thai (samliam thong
for instance, 'photographic evidence; such as pictures ng borders
concealed is easy to understand why. In a place of constantly shifti
boxes with Chinese characters in which heroin had been
used by ethnic and upheaval, only two currencies remained constant: opium and
and confiscated, not forgetting that such characters are opium from
had writing gold. Heavily armed mule convoys would take the raw
Chinese all over the region. The boxes in question also
r, where it was
in Thai, saying'Boonrawd Brewery; one of the main
beer producers northern Burma down to Tachilek on the Thai borde
in Bangkok.
often sold in exchange for bars of pure gold.48
the years as
Whatever atrocities the communists had committed
after their Thailand's dependence on drugs diminished over
plot to flood other sectors of the economy, including tourism and manufacturing,
takeover of state power in China in 1949, there was no
production,
the world with drugs. On the contrary, in the 1950s Chin
a had with took off, especially in the 1990s. Thailand's own opium
n. Poppy fields which in th 切60s averaged 5o- 6o metn c tons a year and was never
brutal methods eradicated its own opium productio

168 169

......___
 CHAPTER 5
~ THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY AND DRUGS:
as massive as in Burma
or even Laos, also vanished complete!
the Thai king initiated a number of development programs .in the
Yas
north. ◄9 But as the ya ba abuse spread l,ike wildfire across lbaij
知din
the 1990s and early 2000s, the countrys drug problems WerefarfrOlll.
over, and it was not only Bang Ron and Wei Xuegang who benefited
from UWSA protection.
In February 1997, a drug dealer named Li Yun-chUng, 吨。
was wanted in the US in connection with a 486-kilogram heroin
shipment seized in California in 1991, jumped bail in Bangkok and
was spirited north by a relay of Mercedes cars. He spent a night in
hiding in Mae Sai, and disguised as a local trader was driven across
the border to Tachilek on the other side. From there he went on to
Panghsang and was sheltered by the UWSA. Somehow, the Burmese
military, under immense pressure from the Thais, managed to lure
him back to Tachilek, where he was arrested, flown to Rangoon, and
then handed over to the Thais.50 The judge who had granted bail
to Li was suspended and the fugitive himself was extradited to the
US. The UWSA-controlled area, and even more so Mong La with all
its casinos and other shady establishments like brothels, transvestite
shows, and stores selling tiger skins and other parts of endangered
species, were becoming criminal havens. That troubled not only the
Thais but also the Chinese, who had close relations with the Wa but
were, to say the least, wary of their involvement in the drug trade.
In 2018 and 2019, some unusual developments took place in
Burma's section of the Golden Triangle. The production of opium
was down, and so were the prices of raw opium and the more
f mid-201os to 600,000 (US$扔） in 2019. In Mong.Tun near the Thai
potent derivative heroin. Prices should go up when the supply 0
any commodity is down and demand remains the same, and drugs
are no exception to that rule. The answer was found in China. for
170
｀、
A CHINES
E DILEMMA
叩re
pro
than twenty years, China has been themain
duce
d in Burma, so the conclusion was th market for heroin
at Ch·inese
y·
to other drugs: the powerful syntherlCOpiatef users were
wrning entanyl, which
d in China, and cocaine·imported f
is P roduce rom the
Wa antiopium campaign had had.its effects Americas.
'!he on Burma's overall
ut of opium, but that declining demand for h
outp eroin was another
the area under poppy cultivation was shrink.in
reason g. According
妞9 survey done by the United Nations Office for Drugs and
to a
（丽ODC), it dropped to 37,300 hectares·m 2018, down from
crime
hectares in 2017, while the estimated total opium production
41,000
d from 550 to 510 metric tons.51 That meant a potential output
droppe
of about 50 tons of heroin, significantly down from the 1990s and
Burmas opium production was more than double.
early 2000s when
Price trends were also a clear indication of falling demand for
heroin. In 2019, an opium -farmer in Kayah (Karenni) State would
get 350,ooo Burmese kyat, or US$240, for a viss, significantly more
than in the 1990s, but almost the same in purchasing power parity.
More tellingly, US$240 was only half of what the farmers could have
fetched for a·vtss m 2013-o r 2014. In the past, the merchants always
came to the farmers to buy the crop; now farmers had to look up
the merchants, and they often offered the farmers half the price in
cash and the rest in methamphetamines.52 The buyers of opium from
Kayah State and southern Shan State were based in Namsang, a major
town on the east-west highway through Shan State.
In Lashio, another town where ·opium was bought, the price
dropped from a million kyat, or US$的 o, per viss in·the early-and
border, where farmers were paid in Thai currency, the price per viss
dropped from, 40,00 0-60, 000 baht, or US$1,255一1,885, to 20,000
171
 CHAPTER 5 ~ TH E UNITED WA STATE ARMY AN O DRUGS: A CHINESE DILEMMA
and it was hard to find any buyers. It·is clear th
bahtor USS 句o,
had declined considerably. at the
demand for heroin
attern of China's consumptio n of nar
1he changing P COtics
. 西＄
ther basic statistics. In 2010, China had 1,545,ooo register
clear in o
with 1,o6s,ooo of those addicted to heroin from B 对 Even
drug users, Utrna.si
drug addicts are not registered
1he actual figure, as most With the
uld have been as many as 5-6 million , accordin
authorities, co g to
other independent researchers.s4 The number of registered
气 an
addicts in China in 2016 was more at 2.5 million, of whom as
many
drugs, not heroin.ss
as 1.s million were addicted to synthetic
In the 1990s and early 2000s, heroin accounted for 6s- 75 Percent
of all seized narcotics in China, and the Chinese marked the lJnited
Nations Anti-Drugs Day, June 26, with mass executions of
气 rnent-reco gnized'Bor der Guard Force'in 2009. As such,
offenders, including addicts. The consumptio n shift is in line With
China's wider development into a more modern nation, where'old'
drugs like opium and heroin are no longer m vogue. As a result,
Chinese addicts turned towards drugs such as ice, cocaine, and the
locally made opiate fentanyl. Significant quantities of ice and fentanyl
are produced in China and cocaine comes from South America. 加
China Daily, an official newspaper, reported in September 2018 that
cocaine was being smuggled from South America to major ports on
China's east coast before being moved to Guangdong , Hong Kong,
and Macau.56 That year, the Chinese police seized more than 1.3
metric tons of cocaine in a raid in Shenzhen, opposite Hong Kong.s1
Despite those trends and falling prices, opium did not cease to
be an important cash crop in parts of northern Burma. It is correct
that apart from summoning Bao Youxiang and other Wa leaders
to Kunming to be read the riot act by Chinese officials, China
also supported the UWSA's crop substitution programs and this
172
ibuted to the decline in overall production, but it did not prevent
必r farrll ers in other parts of Burma, such as western Shan, Kayah,
。产 and Chin states, as well as the northern s againg Region from
岱cbifl,
wing
poppies, and the raw opium from there being refined into
妒 so, times had changed. In China, like in Thailand, other
peroin-had become more widely used.
drugs was one exception to the falling area under poppy cultivation
你re
heroin prices. Prices remained high, and even increased,
d 1ower
State, where a viss of opium fetched 1.7 million kyat in
J(achin
ill or apProxirnately USs1,300, and 2.5 million kyat, the equivalent
1,017, in 2018. Heroin addiction remains rampant in Kachin
f vss1,900,
0 and refineries are located in areas controlled by a remnant of
state
Ting Ying's New Democrati c Army-Kach in, which became
Sa吵on
0vern
aS
Id engage in any kind of business without interference from
theycou
, military authorities .
surmas
Although Burma's central authorities have always told the
international communit y that they are committed to drug
suppression, history indicates otherwise. From the days of the Ka
I(we Ye home guards to the situation today, drugs have been part of
counterins urgency strategies, not law enforcemen t.
the government's
Significantly, when then president Thein Sein initiated what he
called a'peace process: which included talks with a number of
Burma's ethnic armies, a main interlocuto r who was introduced
as'U Sein Win was identified by independe nt observers as none
other than Wei Xuegang.58 Wei also seemed to be the man not only
the Burmese military trusted the most in its dealings with the Wa.
As a local resident in Panghsang told US researcher Chin Ko-lin:
"Wei Xuegang's relationshi p with the Burmese authorities is an
173
 CHAPTER 5

if Bao attacks Wei, Wei might turn to the Bur

~ ~.;..:一. 一 }n

V,
`
n E

ous one;
6
,\
ambigu 吮Se J
“l
help and team up with the Burmese and turn a
authorities for gainst
the money from Wei is extremely important for B
Bao. Besides, »59 a吹
financia I well-being.
stronger and better organized , the
,he Plan that Might Succeed
As the UWSA grew 。沁
related druglord also emerged as China's favorite
Kuomintang- . · In
Kunming for private, and one would
early 2020, he went to . assull\e
Chinese security officials. It was obvious
secret, talks with that
had more faith in him than in the Wa , whose l
the Chinese 0Yalty
could not always take for granted. After all, Wei, a little most Chinese outside Yunnan kn
to China they 仰atever ow about the Wa
uld be expected to harbor some loyalty to his old mainly from a series of music videos where young girls,
fellow Chinese, co comes
thnic minority also in China, have not al anied by young men beating drums, shake their 1
homeland•1be Wa, an e ways accomP ong hair
had a trouble-free relationship · with the central authoritie s. back and forth. The girls are dressed in·red woven skirts. with some
即d of pattern which looks as if it could be of hilltribe origin and
the young men are bare-ches ted. The problem is that those skirts are
h shorter than the sarongs Wa girls would normally wear, and no
muc
female living in the hills where water is scarce would have hair that
long because it would be impossibl e to keep it clean. Besides, young

wamen these days would not go around dressed in little more than
a loincloth even when taking part in cultural events in their home
villages.
Tellingly, these dances are not performe d in a rural Wa setting
but in purpose-b uilt theaters in front of big audiences . The famous
'Wa hair dancers' are, in fact, the daughters of city cadres who are
of Wa, Chinese, or mixed Wa-Chin ese ancestry.1 According to
anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjo, the Chinese have created "an official
socialist-era image of the Wa as a member of the happy family of
nationalities within the Chinese nation: as exotic dancers full of

174 175
 . ~I
一 节

三：~t;~\ ,J
CHAPTER 6 TH E PL/\N T
H/\T MIGHT 二．
沁 cello

primitive energy, now sanitised and harnessed under c。m 、·

叽I)'1s1
Party guidance tlie sociali st-era versio n of Wa primitivity为
—
In line ,vith tl1is tl1inking, ethnic theme parks have been estabJ·ts
in several Chinese cities w
here one of the main attract'ions is to h对
and watch real Wa head-hunters perfor ming exotic dances . '{co"1e
Wa, because of their dark complexion, are hired to perform 吨
as wild Wa but also "as Africans, as-Maori, and as American Inct·
Those performers are Wa from Yunna n and Burma Wh。:~尸
、
only
佥1tY
l}fll
on
::::
~~~:f~[I: : : : : : :~
in Washi ngton, wrote an op-ed at G eor
published ·1n the Ngetown
octob er 1, 2019, in which h e argued th ewYork
俨es at Xi
find work in factories , and th ave in 2012, aband oned China's until recent\ , when he carne
migrated to Chinese cities to . ey take 0.,,.er
tO P ·ous traditi on of accept ing ethnic d'IVersity Yrelatively tolerant
part in those spectacles to earn some extra money. But it is eas , in Which
砂
p Ii的五ve nation alities were recogn辽ed in addirion to th no fewer
皿agine what the Wa dancers themselves think about their eth ni压 · 庐 6 Instea d, Xi's gover nment began prorno r
exploi ted in this way. Moreover, accordin 叩 ing a less
e majority
and culture · being g to 揤. tolerant
Chinese id,entity know n as zhonghua While th
Fiskesjo, "It is telling that Wa people use a Chine se loan Word ， 彻。lVti e Ban lan
严
('dance'), for all such Chinese-staged dances. They reserve their
reviously 即own as hanyu becam e guoyu, or the ,national\ guage,
。网 anguage:1
P target for those new police s was the restive T
indigenous word for'da nce'(n groh) for their own revived social
region , in the west with its traditional d吨c-Mus\im
f. J1lajor
dancing, such as the traditi onal'd ancmg m of a new house.)"4 炯iang nt With
1author ities. In July 2019, China's rul·mg State isconte
c ouncil ·issued
As China has aband oned its Marxi st-Len inist ideolo in favor gy ceotra
h a white paper entitle d'Hist orical Matte rs C oncerning Xin
of state and private capitalism, the conce pt of nation alism also as a jiang; in
it claime d that Xinjia ng has "long been an inseparable
new meani ng. It is no longer a socialist brothe rhood of nat ionalities which . part
of Chinese territo ry" and that the region's Uighu r "forrned th

I ~三了:i:. :~ 。三三:~'.三~::::三勹~g~: ~二o:h:

b
which it used to be in theory, thoug h not always in practice, Uta rough
China's a long proces s of migra tion and integr ation:•a The
pride in being Chinese and that China is really a nation-state.
sees
presid ent Xi Jinping is the torchb earer of that idea, and he clearly
. Mao
himse lf as the third great leader in mode rn Chinese history
the
Zedon g libera ted China from feudal ism and oppre ssion, created g urs are indeed
y. Deng a Turkic peopl e relate d to simila r ethnic
People's Republic, and manag ed to unify the divers e countr group s in Centra l Asia.
Xiaop ing moder nized China after Mao's death in 1976 and
created Control over the area where they live chang ed hand s several times
f .
a much more prosp erous societ y based on 'socia lism with
Chinese 呻istory betwe en ore1g n invad ers and local warlo rds until Chinas
oat Manchu-led Qing Dyna sty conqu ered it and, ·m l884, established a
charac teristi cs' which , in effect, mean t state- superv ised cut-thr
capita lism. Xi is going to turn China into the domin ant world
power province called Xinjia ng, or'Th e New Front ier' in Ch'mese.

176 177
圃卿•"

CHAPTER 6
T THE PLAN THAT MIGHT
SUCCEEO
.

｀尸
has been abolished not on) .

矗多
1education ·
Burma in a small but not Insignifi
仰 in cant tokenof
Today, bilinguathnic areas such as Tibet and parts of~in
but also in°~:: epeople speaking one language. And Ch.tna is•\
Chinese are
nation
which incJudes
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and all t
.
th China Sea. There 1s no room ford' a%
Xiniia~
unnan g

he isl e
o~
小e

Ilse
ese
ed
yincen t Youngs romaniz version of Wa
introduced in Yunnan in the 1950s. , not
Cll;illward's article was appropriately titled ,
from China's Emperors', and h
the

What Xi
resistance
system the

linping
`
the Sou' "e 闷 't Learnt e argues that x·•
and islets in for any part of the Great Chinese Nation. 权 。r 护11 oliticaI and cultural homogeneity runs contra is dream
real autonomy is that the unified nation state Xi wants of a P 1 approaches to diversity. However, thery to Chinese
to ditiona
Millward wrote, "Concentration earn c归
roblem ding the question of what kind of nation Ch· controversy
伽P and, as
tra
rot.1n ina should be is
心sted, Ps \\> to power in Beijing, as general
never d Kazakhs into faithful'zhonghua' Ch1nese 则 st.If
h older
than Xi's commg
.
顶ghurs an
not turn d disregard Ramadan. Violent policing Will not \\>h。 揤c cornrnunist party m 2012 and as president in .
2013.
secretary
吵e
eat pork an abandon calls for the autonomy promised . 咽e when Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his republican revolutionaries
in the It began
Hongkongers
. Constitution. Religious repression and dern 。n rebellion in 1911, overthrew the last Qing ruler .m 1912, and
扣
territory's mini- not endear Tibetans to the party. Milita !Sin
g
rose d an empire which consisted of man
y nationalities and had
will ry th 呻erite
the Dalai Lama 归 borders. Imperial rule was concentrated .m the court in
to the mainland:'10
alee Taiwanese feel closer no
缸ed
.
｀咄 notm
,the primitives'like the Wa with their drurns and the further away from that center the empue stretched,
Then there are Beijing,
叹 areas like Tibet may
For a proud people like the Wa with a long hi story of weaker the central power became. Certain
exotic dances. the have paid tribute to the emperor, but that did not
this is nothing short of humiliat'ion of the occas1·onally
de facto independence, Rather, it was a more like a
erformers and their families. Older Wa have not forgotten to recognition of sovereignty.
young p equate
arrived Ch· , that had to be paid in order to be left alone. The demand for
what happened in their hills in 1958, when newly . Inese 'bribe
utmost to eradica te old tradir demarcated borders came with the arrival of Western colonial
political commissars did their 1onsand clearly
'revival 'ofWa which in the nineteenth century were busy carving up Asia
beliefs, the very essence of their identity.吓e culture, powers,
ves: the Russians m the north and the west, the
which is now taking place in a grotesque form solely for the purpose between themsel
of entertainment, bears little resemblance to what it was in the past. British in India in the south, and the French in the southeast. That,
While the Wa in China are ruled by Beijing and those·in the in turn, led to a numbe r of border conflicts; that with India sparked
a war in 19釭 and remains unresolved even today.11
United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Burma are totally dependent on
China for trade and the acquisition of weaponry, there is a deep, China's new republican rulers, as the renowned sinologist Maria
historically motivated distrust of the Chinese. That has deepened in Adele Carrai has pointed out, "shifted the locus of authority from
more recent years with the promotion of ethnic theme parks, the hair- a sacred and moral Heaven to the people, identified China as one
throwing dance, and similar absurdities. It·is hardly surprising that nation among many, in equal relationship with the others, and began

178 179
 CHAPTER 6
~ ~
THE PLANT
HAT MIG HT
SUCCEEO
I law as the normal framework through
to use internationa relations:•12 However, what that'natio吵叽。
recent maps of the Republic of
Jllore . Ch·tna tend 1
conduct I
.nternational . n sh it ,ornes to the mamland boundaries. 0 be bl
urry When \.
Some republicans saw no reason to . oUld
. t o(\vas not clear.
cons1s incJude In the beginning, the Chinese commu
hile Sun Yat-sen sought to establish a , . n1stshada
non-Han areas w union the non-Han nationalities, which Was affi morel enient
, which he identified as the Hans, Manchus, M of of rmed in the view
nationalities, ong。K Constitution of 1931: Cornrnunist
13 state
Tibetans, and Uighurs.
0 Sun, interim president of the new republic
Accordingt ) th 伽 right of self-determination of th e national
was also a'Chinese nation: and that at als。 rninoriries in China,
meant that there conce their right to complete separation from China
Pt was , and tothef
the first time in a statement which he issued ofan independent state for each national rninori orrnation
used for on Janua ty, AIIM
沪912:
"Now we have staged an uprising and the general .
.
has been settled. The Chinese nation 1s so brave to overth
"
Siluation Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and oth ers living on th
China shall en丿oy the full right to self-deterrnination, •
ongolians,
e territoryof
row the 1.e. they may
autocratic government of the Qing dynasty and found the republic加 either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it
and form
Never before had any official Chinese document talked ab their own state as they may prefer.16
out the
existence of such a'Chinese nation. ·'Ch·ma was the Middle
Kingdom,
ruled by an emperor. This policy was abandoned as soon as th e communists seized
Mongolia, or'Outer Mongolia to distinguish it from ,
Inner power in Bei丿ing and the People's Republic of Ch·ma was proclaimed
Mongolia'where Beijing had firmer control, had taken advantageofthe on October 1, 1949. The independence of Mongolia, now a people's
upheaval and declared independence on December 1, 1911_Likewise, republic allied with the Soviet Union, was recognized so as not
the 13th Dalai Lama issued a similar declaration of independence create a rift in the communist camp. Diplomatic relations between
on February 13, 1913.15 Ch·mese armies tned on several occasions to Beijing and Ulan Bator were established as early as October 16, 1949.
invade Tibet, but with limited success. Although foreign countries However, Tibet, bordering In如， was a different matter. On October
never recognized Tibet's independence, it continued to function as 7, 1950, the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet, and
a de facto independent country throughout the republican period on May 23, 1951, a 17-point'Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation
The Chinese did not intervene militarily in Mongolia, but its of Tibet'was signed between The Chinese and a representative of
status as a separate nation was never recognized by the Republic the 14th Dalai Lama. Tibet was, in effect, occupied, which led to
of China. Maps produced in Taiwan, where the Republic lived on an uprising in 1959 and the Dalai Lama's subsequent flight to India,
after the communist victory on the mainland· in 1949, identified where he remains in exile.
Mongolia as a Chinese province until the island began to act more The PLA also marched into multiethnic Yunnan where some
as an independent entity in the early 2000s. It still officially is, but tribal people, among them the Wa, were largely unaware of what

180 181
.....
CHAPTER 6

country they did not even know th

~ THE PLAN THAT MIGHT
SUCCEED
in a ey he)
was happening Chinese the Wa had encount of his predecessors in attempts to rally th
Han ered b 、 剑
to. The only ionally ventured into th . et吭 dership and its policies. The same natie people behind the
who occas e1r h· 归 tea onalism and visions
merchants 11) tOPChina's greatness are
were ecially in view of Kuomintang forces s. 归 also the main d
security, esp e阳
of riving forces behind Xi's
border 'billion US dollar Belt and Road 1
Burma on the
other side, was of utmost·
畛rta'll闷 戒ti nitiative (BRI).
inside radually brought under central nee pespite the radical transformation that China h

) the Wa

Autonomous
Hills were g
leniently, andafter 195
county
control and
8 more brutally.'The Menglian-D . '闷
, was set up in 1954 in the area 0 ai-Lah叶
PPosit
d covering, as the name implies, tracts . ewhat ·
`
归ost-

a huge
Mao era, however, the old chairman
。伍cial politics. His picture can be seen on Ch
Mao portrait. h
angs over Tiananmen,'the
as undergone in
was never purged from
inese banknotes and
G
ate of Heavenly
now panghsang an inhabit ts
Lahu, and Wa. It was followed in 1955 by the c ed peace,, in Beijing even today. As British h'istorian and Ch'
by Dai, or Shan, ma expert
rear Julia Lovell concludes, the Soviet Union could d'
an Va Autonomous County'further to the north 10n iscard Stalin and still
of The cangyu Lenin as revolutionary founder; the Communist Pa
,The xuneng Va Autonomous County'between M 闷 have 19
rtyofChina
in 1964 by
17 响ian (CPC) has only Mao.
and cangyuan. 伽t kind of respect, however, does not extend to those who were
In the official version, this was done "in the course of
regional autonomy .. . many Va were tramed, paving the Wa 吨
Practi( close to Mao when he was at the apex of his political power during
Yfor the Cultural Revolution. The most notorious of them, Mao's dreaded
the Communist Party's united front polic
implemen血g y, for further intelligence chief Kang Sheng, is even considered a nonentity and his
winning over and uniting with the patriots from the uPPer s 叩e is rarely mentioned in official circles. Only Chinese intelligen~e
th·e Vas, and for carrying out soc1a ·1 re f ·m Va areas:•1a 四trata of
orm
esorne p
rofessionals recognize the crucial role he played in building the
Wa were recruited, put in schools where they had to learn Ch·
、

1nese country's internal and external intelligence services.20

and after that given some responsibilities in the local ad
ministration,
those'autonomous'counties were run by-communist party cadres,
and most of them were Han Chinese.
In Xi's China, with the introduction of zhonghua as the nationwide
concept, and with the culture of a few'primitive'peoples like the Wa
being degraded to entertainment status in what amounts to human
zoos, Han Chinese nationalism has been carried to the extreme. As
Marxism-Leninism was discarded sometime in the late 1980s at least
unofficially as the state ideology, nationalism replaced it. Under Xi,
nationalism has been promoted more vigorously than it was under
Kang Sheng was posthumously expelled from the CPC a few years
after his death in 1976, and then slipped into official oblivion. His
rule of terror was such that he was best forgotten. Massive Chinese
support for overseas Maoist parties and insurrections may also have
died with Kang, but some of the old comrades were not forgotten.
In her book about Maoist movements in various parts .of the
world, Julia Lovell suggested that after the leaders of the Communist
Party of Burma (CPB) had been driven into exile in China in 啖9,
where they supposedly became marginal, impoverished figures
"who could occasionally be glimpsed in the cities of south and west

182 183
 了
6
PTEwh
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Atssaxp
CHke21 cyunom
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snsoed wnrt
mate
erpaprh dlhsa
otidtaln ohooIllrwldefneoitan cyrn1 $hetheu 9eve
snlt co

uerhahemo池
and
_____

归dgg2as9b虹
ce1e ee0
a
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st teo
he hio.slt
fnntn e
inatrm
r h SKusq
thnwlo1
a gbies
o tondu
ou THE onres
PLAN THAT
m rdAuas rdsern
br s

lrghasstylo
Jaolpb sveg e n a
SUCCEEDsi

Mtir
aoshdtoeasreetnn nlheee mderp lyorAe psal.a MIGHT

s叭sya
ttblor
0 encfSRene
upileok i23
sote v . e
rlhndca mdngta d areas'during the civil war, and
ly .1 eme

刘 闷 atith
0 a twnd .
leekw l伲rate
nh wmeoeventual\
meinssovad owu eow
eyndn lll\lllll
swsh aeo he0fri
roclaitn 1a- Republic.rvuyAa
laetat
its People's take over Beijing

叩
Shortly after th

lro
n
3nd P

ie
new regime, the now ruling CPC

邓 theli
e proclamation

`｀叽洲 n肮r
of the established th . .
of public security, known as Gonganbu , Which e Mm1stry

ar
remained ·its main
Higence service until the M·mistry of State S
d in 19扔. The Cultural R

岭t忳
. inte ecurity (MSS) was

nagednSanm如
w
IVeon erwthntbnfSmok
___ establishe evolution was not

th
iu
eee.lloo a ho on\y over, it
Ii
uapper ealwad e
thenad led to nahg8cuee
complete lrof policies. D
nuwn
reversal

\o
Q
also
gh

eng proclaimed that

teakianedllnglslwmffichhrvfot
.1S0gdn _ is China's second

浊df
ererb antM revolution"
他

wea,
eolnan水

gk
mangt hsnhC ecana "refortn , and
as

aCThV eWOnw femanp theser onellityfil turned out to b

th仆

.
WIBathpo.mwe20 .lVVa duraffid
,ntuc ito.lilpze e exactly
Rom rfoas 'capitalistess
roader'he had been condemned

lfb

\i
tT

orn
elnl

佃 l as when he was
ee

heas d during the Cultural Revolution.2s As Ch·

fu

nn
tosc

fe
c taap purge ren
dt.lfo nag
em

. ma scholar David

I
o
ee

. nleesnesr
e叩

Chambers writes, the post-Mao shak

ygn
:He

ntende Jan htreoio eup even reached the

代n

e
vo

. .1eue [ghee ofrsile

f the intelligence
agna
.zservices:ld9ae
"As rehabilitation b
m

xlme mes eyhr

Cals

mh
d ranks o
tyuhlewe队

cd
egan to gather
ev
ls

no

) ie entum in the early 1980s, they culminated in th

iw

eeeno toUdn spdCe

eei tcemr \,',
mshiorw.tl5。

rnotn

ha
e reappearance
ge

r,Ahe rCeB Bord .lneec

adn

iuere intelligence cadres in their former units or alternative

6bn

of once-purged

En
\
eceatrymLieseneatpwedentr
ry
t

pre-retirement comfort posts. Countless solemn memorial meetings

tdntsooCearCrn
1

sa0rcmthC ~
.

yhopBluzdnrmythe
e
v
e thmm

tf

te honoured the dead~'26

c
l

.gwthe
t

伽 MSS consisted of a completely new breed of

e

WGet.Vleo
. r.n t
IS

1sL oeccdn younger, better

e
t

educated officers who were usually

2

m.rmm.unnrso recruited before or during their

sw
e

. mreaSThlilere
Pl

ean
4

university education. Many of them were graduates of the China

SmTheeess
a

.,
ebn

Institute of Contempor ary International Relations, the Beijing

m

dia1 fyv
lt
emermobrnlanT

snofs oa4n
o

Institute of Internation al Relations, the special training facility at

k

es

the Jiangnan Social University in Suzhou, and the Zhejiang Police

.

t
ISRedf

aan eynsp
dy
m

College, which drew students from across the country.27

10hiuaps

hm
o

.10ashn.10
aW
hnt

m
The transforma tion could be noticed also in the workings of the
n

oa

seedinm
g

powerful Internation al Liaison Department of the Central Committee

. mo

.
mr

lpa.aslm
pha eptoc n91d
a
te

of the Communis t Party of China (ILD/CPC). Originally established

9e
酝ld

.1
e

e, .
ltol
kar.m

el

in 1951, it was once tasked with overseeing relations with foreign

r
eeut

9n

og .
1t
setehvt

communist parties, those in power as well as fraternal movements

asd

k
0V

n r.lts all over the world, among them the CPB. Under Deng, it expanded
gla
le

184 185
Bd
C
S
.....
CHAPTER 6

communist parties, which

~ THE PLANT
HAT MIGHT
SUCCEED
dude non-
its mission
10 in
that was willing to meet with it."ie吮呵 ，Ian~ 5ofll
e started in China or Rorne, but sorneinC
entral Asia, northern
olitical party olicies have been refined. India or Africa一and rnanyother
foreign P 即 rope,

衍匈
new P places. Journe
by rivers and by land, and sorne b ys Wereby
under Xi, those like the wire service Xinhua, the~
1/Jq 产 5ea, Yall three.30
se而0伍cial organs ing Daily, have become·
eciallY the Guan炉血 Portant Qi/y,
and esp romote its views on the international st 知。ts Bowring also argues that the trade "was most!
·
Ymaritime, involved
, drive top a朕. c; mostly conducted by non-Chinese.~31
in Chinas correspondents who hardly ever social•!Zed 0ne China but was
lheearlytraders
taciturn ;.rabs and people from what is now the Ind
are the surly, The new ones tend to be youn 、 were onesian
. colleagues. d by the Portuguese in the fifteenth archipelago,
their foreign d are active in international press c~:~sspea~ 吵砒 and early sixteenth
English, an and later the Dutch, French, British
eXceUent romote 沁's BRL Originally known·One centuries, , and other E
uropeans.
tasks is to p as o奶 Chinese explorer Zheng He, a eunuch from y
of their d Economic Belt and the 21st Centu ~ 仆1e unnan whose fleets
silk Roa ryMariti d across the Indian Ocean in the fifteenth
short for the 吮 saile . century, was a rare
alled it "the greatest dream for the Chinese
Silk Road, Xi c nation Histoncally, the Chinese were not great seafarers
,,29 China's propaganda machinery began to 1n aception. , nor did
叩dern history. Prom。le Chinese merchants trudge th rough Central A·
val of ancient trade routes dating back to Marc0 p anY s1a with camels
it as a revi olo and laden with silk or anything else. It was not until Ch'ma turned into
d silk Road.
the fable
is that the existence of an anc·1ent Silk R. a major trading nation in the 1980s and 1990s that Ch·mese ships,
The problem, though, oad after being absent for half a millennium, could be seen on the world's
hich desert caravans crossed from China through C IV\
along w entral oceans.
European markets is a popular myth of relative! .
Asia and on to So where did the notion of an ancient'Silk Road' come from? It
(

y
No historians dispute the fact that there was subst antial
recent origin.
trade between Europe and China dating back to medieval times. But
whatever caravan trade there was through Central Asia, it did not
10 any large extent involve silk. According to British historian Susan
Whitfield:
There was no'Silk Road'. It is a modern label in widespread use
only since the late 20th century and used since to refer to trade
and interaction across Afro-Eurasia from roughly 200 BC to AD
1400. ln re汕ty, there were many trading networks over this period
Some of these dealt in silk, yarn and woven fabrics. Others did not.
was first used in German and then in the plural, Seidenstrassen ('s业
roads'), in an academic report published in Berlin in 1g77 by German
geographer Ferdinand von 比chtbofen, who had traveled extensively
in Central Asia. 32 However, the term did not gain mainstream usage
until one of von Richthofen's students, a Swede called Sven Hedin,
literally followed his teacher's footsteps and in 1936 published a book
called The Silk Road.33 That was the first time the term appeared in
English, and it caught on because it appealed to Western notions of
the exotic East. It was Eurocentric, and as Hedin points out in his
book, "The name'Silk Road'is not Chinese and has never been used
in China:'34 Indeed, it was likely first used officially in China in the

186 187
 CHAPTER 6
l"
THE PLAN
THAT MIGHT
SUCCEED
ublished a book titled The Silk~
ChelvfuqiP figures wheeling a circular object between th
when author Ellstrom, a prominent Swedish Sin。1:~d em, their d
19805 35 Lars 娴 ointing south. The Chinese ch
d present. f China from 2009 to 2011, sums it up: "W加 faces P aracters on the b etermined
past an 即e paths! Forge Ahead!'O r, in more ase say'Unite!
helengtho 7 It is good marketing for the nau
who tre归 t China today. on
mundane
here we c o m e ! ' e r m s , 'Southeast t
;.sia
is the term used toin»3 6
tourism- 伽 monument was placed there short!
and contributes meant
to be little more than a catchy b
new wide bridge across the river Y after th e Chinese had
o。K built a
What was originally it in 1936, assumed a life of its own and led , connecting th
e town of
Hedin wrote Ruili with Jiegao, which at that time consisted of littJ
title has, since and myths-about cultural and econo e more than
£theories 一 硕 b即boo huts and rice fields. OntYa few years later, th
to all)<lnds o and Europe, supposedly dating back e tiny enclave
between China was Packed with high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, st
环changes A recent BBC documentary even called it "the ores selling all
即ds of wares, and a huge jade market where b
to medieval times. where people with new ideas uyers from all over
bal superhighway , new China came to shop for the precious stone, which .
world's 忙st glo made exchanges that shaped humanity:•i, is found in its `
and new religions imperial green variety only in Hpakan in Burma's Kach. ..
cultures 'southern Silk Road'in his 1985 article for m State. Every I \

p\ ｀尸
pan Qi conJ·ured up a morning, caravans of trucks laden with Chinese
inventing an old trade route down to Southeast consumer goods left
R切iewby Jiegao for points beyond: Muse right across the border, the towns

4t.
theB叫ing
doubt that trade between China's southern of Lashio, Mandalay, and Rangoon, and even as far as Moreh on
沁ia包 Again, there is no ``
d Southeast Asia existed in ancient t皿es, but it involved

J
regions an the Indian border. The research that China's economic intelligence ,

not silk. In addition to that'Silk operatives had done was paying off.
．之

tea, jade, and Precious stones, \

osed'Maritime Silk Road'as well as a
Road: there is also the supp
'Pac泊c Silk Road; and even an 'Ice Silk Road'connecting China with
northern Russian ports in the Arctic Ocean all the way to Europe.
Von Richthofen and Hedin could hardly have imagined what they
would set in motion by using that term, which they probably did
only in order to captivate the attention of their Western audiences.
Whatever the case, the BRI is a reality today, and Burma's key role
in connecting China with the outside world actually predates Xi's
plans by several decades. In 1993, a curious monument was erected
叫iegao, a two-square-kilometer enclave of Chinese territory south
of the Ruili River, which otherwise forms parts of the border between
China's Yunnan Province and Burma's Shan State. It shows four
伽 next step for China was to construct pipelines through Burma,
from the coast to the border near Ruili, through which oil and gas
from fields in the Middle East were pumped into China. Then came
plans to build a high-speed railway from Yunnan down to the deep-
sea port of Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal where the pipelines
begin. That facility was also partly built by Chinese contractors, and
Kyaukphyu, in turn, was only one of several ports on the Indian
Ocean rim that China was involved in initiating and then taking part
in constructing. Others were Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota
in Sri Lanka. In August 2017, China opened its first overseas military
base in Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea and shipping lanes
through the Suez Canal.

188 189