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Sex Roles, Vol. 50, Nos. 7/8, April 2004 (°

C 2004)

Engaging in Self-Reflection Changes Self-Concept Clarity:

On Differences Between Women and Men, and Low- and
High-Clarity Individuals

Patricia A. R. Csank1 and Michael Conway1,2

Three studies addressed the gender difference in the tendency to reflect upon self-descriptive
traits and the consequences of engaging in such trait-reflection. In Study 1, women reported
engaging in trait-reflection more than men did. In the pilot Study 2, low and high self-clarity
women and men were randomly assigned either to reflect on self-descriptive traits or to a
distraction condition. The expected clarity × condition × time interaction was significant for
women, in the analyses that excluded individuals with extreme self-esteem scores. Reflecting
on their own traits led low-clarity women to increase in clarity and high-clarity women to
decrease in clarity. Men showed no change in self-clarity across condition. In Study 3, low-
and high-clarity individuals were initially matched on self-esteem. Results of Study 2 were
replicated. Findings are discussed in terms of gender differences in self-focused attention and
the nature of self-clarity.

KEY WORDS: self-reflection; self-clarity; gender differences.

In the present research, we were concerned with
gender differences in the extent to which people re-
flect upon their own personality characteristics, which
is a particular form of self-reflection, and the im-
pact of such reflection on self-representation. There
are different types of self-reflection, and these vary
in their functional or adaptive potential (Conway,
Giannopoulos, Csank, & Mendelson, 1993; Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999). Much of previous research has
focused on stable individual differences. Earlier re-
searchers drew a distinction between private and pub-
lic self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975). Private self-consciousness refers to a propen-
sity to attend to one’s own thoughts and feelings,
whereas public self-consciousness refers to being
aware of oneself as a social object. Examples of
items that assess private self-consciousness are “I’m
1 Psychology Department, Concordia University. Montreal,
Quebec, Canada.
2 To whom correspondence should be addressed at Psychology
constantly examining my motives” and “I’m alert
to changes in my mood.” One example of a public
self-consciousness item is “I’m usually aware of my
appearance.”
Research suggests that women may be higher
than men in private self-consciousness (Alanazi, 2001;
Franzoi & Davis, 1985; Lafrenaye, 1997; Scheier &
Carver, 1985; Teixeira & Gomes, 1995) or in pub-
lic self-consciousness (Gould, 1987; Lafrenaye, 1997;
Teixeira & Gomes, 1995). Only one study indi-
cates that men may be higher in self-consciousness
(Bendania & Abed, 1997). One should note, how-
ever, that gender differences did not emerge in ini-
tial research on private and public self-consciousness
(Fenigstein et al., 1975; Turner, Carver, Scheier, &
Ickes, 1978), and are absent in a number of later stud-
ies as well (Abrams, 1988; Chan, 1996; Heinemann,
1979; Vleeming & Engelese, 1981). In sum, the find-
ings are mixed, but there is a tendency for women
to report greater private self-consciousness. As well,

Department (PY-170), Concordia University, 7141 Sherbrooke

private self-consciousness may be a more significant
St. West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H4B 1R6; e-mail: psychological experience for women than for men.
michael.conway@concordia.ca. Women who are higher in self-consciousness, either

469 0360-0025/04/0400-0469/0 °
C 2004 Plenum Publishing Corporation
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470
private or public, experience affective states more
intensely (Flett, Boase, McAndrews, Blankstein, &
Pliner, 1986); these effects do not emerge for men.
In other research, private self-consciousness was reli-
ably related to greater loneliness for elderly women,
but not for younger male and female adults (Schmitt
& Kurdek, 1985).
In addition, women in Western cultures gener-
ally appear to have greater experience in discussing,
thinking about, and explaining their inner thoughts
and feelings (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule,
1986). Belenky and colleagues noted that women ac-
tively seek self-understanding and do so with “intense
self-reflection and self-analysis” (p. 135). This open-
ness to inner experience can mesh well with women’s
greater interpersonal and interdependent socializa-
tion experience (cf. Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich,
1984). Women can be open both to others’ and their
own experiences. Women can be both caring and sen-
sitive to the needs of others and address their own
needs and goals. In contrast, it seems unlikely that
highly agentic individuals, who are self-assertive and
instrumentally oriented, would exhibit a predilection
or sensitivity for self-reflecting upon their own traits
and characteristics. Agency is the key component of
masculinity, as it is assessed with standard measures
such as the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1981).
Men generally score higher than women on masculin-
ity (Twenge, 1997).
In other research, it has been found that women,
relative to men, respond with greater self-attention
given the same self-focus manipulation (Ingram,
Cruet, Johnson, & Wisnicki, 1988). In Ingram et al.’s
Study 1, women who were led to sit facing a mirror
(a standard self-focus manipulation) reported higher
scores on the private self-consciousness scale than did
women in the no-mirror control condition. Men were
not affected by the mirror manipulation. These find-
ings suggest that women react more strongly to situa-
tional factors that induce self-focus.
In the present research we were concerned with
both stable individual differences in, and the acute
effects of a particular form of self-reflection, that is,
reflecting on the nature of one’s own enduring charac-
teristics or traits. People may reflect on how their own
characteristics or traits are expressed in their behav-
ior, how the characteristics relate to each other, and on
the personal significance of these characteristics. This
form of reflection is hereafter referred to as trait reflec-
tion. Trait reflection can be construed as a particular
form of the reflective mode identified by Trapnell and
Campbell (1999). These researchers identified and
Csank and Conway
proposed measures for individual differences in two
modes of self-focused attention: a more philosophical
reflective style and a more negative ruminative style.
A reflection item is “I often love to look at my life in
philosophical ways.” A rumination item is “I tend to
‘ruminate’ or dwell on things that happen to me for a
really long time afterward.” This distinction between
reflection and rumination is based in part on the find-
ing that the private self-consciousness scale actually
consists of two components: self-reflectiveness and in-
ternal state awareness (Conway et al., 1993; Conway
& Giannopoulos, 1993; Mittal & Balasubramanian,
1987). The distinction made by Trapnell and Campbell
between reflective and ruminative styles is important:
reflection has been associated with openness to expe-
rience and propensity for complex thought, whereas
rumination is associated with various indices of dis-
tress, such as neuroticism and dysphoria (Trapnell &
Campbell, 1999). To our knowledge, researchers have
not addressed gender differences on the Trapnell and
Campbell measures.
Prior research on private self-consciousness and
on women’s orientation toward their own thoughts
and feelings (Belenky et al., 1986) led to the first
hypothesis that women are more likely than men to
engage in trait reflection. The first hypothesis was ad-
dressed in a correlational study (Study 1). The sec-
ond hypothesis, which followed from the first one and
from the findings of Ingram et al. (1988), was that
women would react more strongly than men to an
experimental trait reflection task. As such, reflection
upon one’s own traits was expected to be more rele-
vant and significant for women than for men. The sec-
ond hypothesis was addressed by having participants
in experimental studies engage in trait reflection (the
pilot Study 2 and Study 3).
The second hypothesis was articulated in terms of
individual differences in self-clarity. Self-clarity refers
to the extent to which an individual’s self-beliefs are
clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent,
and stable. Individual differences in self-clarity have
been identified with the Self-Concept Clarity scale
(SCCS; Campbell et al. 1996). Example SCCS items
are: “My beliefs about myself seem to change very fre-
quently” and “Sometimes I think I know other peo-
ple better than I know myself.” The SCCS is scored
so that higher values reflect greater self-clarity. Indi-
viduals with clearer self-beliefs are less likely to en-
dorse as self-descriptive traits that are mutually exclu-
sive (such as careless and careful) or to change their
self-descriptions over time (Campbell et al., 1996).
Greater self-concept clarity seems desirable, in that
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Self-Reflection and Self-Clarity
it has been associated with higher self-esteem, lower
neuroticism, less negative affect, and less distress
(Bigler, Neimeyer, & Brown, 2001; Campbell et al.,
1996; Chang, 2001). There are, however, some indica-
tions that high self-concept clarity may reflect poor ad-
justment as well. Campbell and DiPaula (2002) found
that individuals high in self-concept clarity are more
perfectionistic, in that they “set rigid, exacting stan-
dards for themselves” (p. 183). Such perfectionism is
a risk factor for depression when people face achieve-
ment stressors (Hewitt & Flett, 1993; Hewitt, Flett, &
Ediger, 1996). We have also found that high-clarity
individuals may be defensive (i.e., they are generally
unwilling to acknowledge negative experience and
adopt a protective stance regarding the self). In a large
sample of university students, high self-clarity women
and men had elevated scores on the K-scale of the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Csank
& Conway, 2000).
The second hypothesis, as stated above, was that
women will react more strongly than men to an exper-
imental trait reflection task. In terms of self-clarity, it
was hypothesized that women, and to a lesser extent
men, will evidence moderation in existing levels of
self-clarity as a consequence of engaging in an ex-
perimental trait-reflection task. The moderation hy-
pothesis is based on the particular orientations of low-
and high-clarity individuals. Low-clarity women and
men seem motivated to seek out and attain greater
self-clarity (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). This moti-
vation may influence what information individuals ac-
cess and may guide their hypothesis-testing regarding
the self (Kunda, 1990). This selective focus may be
facilitated by a directed self-reflection task. The self-
reflection task adopted in the present research was to
reflect on a few of one’s own self-ascribed personality
traits, both in terms of their expression and meaning.
Participants were provided with specific questions,
and they wrote their responses. As a consequence, a
low-clarity individual’s attention is focused on only a
few attributes, rather than on a wide range of different
characteristics. A written (as opposed to oral) account
may encourage a more coherent, structured response
that focuses on specific thoughts, feelings, and memo-
ries that can enhance low-clarity individuals’ sense of
clarity regarding the self.
High-clarity individuals may also show mod-
eration in self-clarity, but for a different reason.
Although high-clarity individuals are motivated
to maintain their sense of clarity, they may have
difficulty justifying their strong self-beliefs during
self-reflection that focuses on specific characteristics.
471
They may be constrained to confront information
about the self that could suggest ambiguity or in-
consistency regarding the sense of self. In their daily
lives, high-clarity individuals may generally disregard
information that implies ambiguity regarding the
self. As noted above, high-clarity individuals may be
defensive and tend to be perfectionistic.
The moderation hypothesis was addressed in the
pilot Study 2, conducted with a small sample, and in
Study 3, which focused on the impact of a period of
trait reflection. A similar form of self-reflection has
been considered by Hixon and Swann (1993). They
examined how reflecting about one’s personality (i.e.,
sociability) influenced people’s reactions to others’
ratings of their personalities. These researchers were
interested in the impact of the duration and type of
self-reflection on reactions to feedback. In contrast,
the focus in the present research was on subjective de-
gree of self-clarity, not on acceptance of feedback. The
present research also differs from research on other
forms of self-focus. Much research has addressed ob-
jective self-awareness, which is a state induced by ex-
periences such as sitting facing a mirror (Wicklund &
Frey, 1980). This state leads people to compare their
current selves against their personal standards, and
people typically find themselves falling short. In con-
trast, engaging in trait reflection does not necessarily
render personal standards salient.
A general assumption underlying the present re-
search is that self-reflection is beneficial. This is a
view that is commonly shared. Reflecting upon the
self is considered useful to self-understanding, both by
laypeople (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995) and devel-
opmental theorists (e.g., Erikson, 1980; Mead, 1934).
Psychological interventions aimed at promoting pos-
itive change in terms of well-being and function-
ing often focus on developing self-observation and
self-awareness, and such focus seems to be effective
(Mahoney, 1991; Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross,
1992). Another general assumption underlying the
present research is that people’s representation of the
self varies as a consequence of on-going experience.
This is a view that has been well-supported in social
psychology for some time. Consider the following ex-
amples. Morse and Gergen’s classic study (Morse &
Gergen, 1970) demonstrated that people’s acute self-
esteem varied as a function of which other individ-
ual was present for social comparison. The body of
research by Tesser (1986) and his colleagues on self-
evaluation maintenance indicates, amongst other pos-
sibilities, that people will disinvest from a certain do-
main of activity (i.e., consider it less relevant to their
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472
own sense of self) if they are threatened by the good
performance of another person in that domain. Gen-
erally speaking, people may exhibit transitory changes
in their self-representations, even as there is relative
stability on the long-term for constructs such as self-
esteem and self-concept. This is the case, regardless
of the favorability of the self-representations (i.e., of
whether self-esteem is negative). Of course, stable
change can be achieved, but it likely involves persis-
tent, long-term efforts (Smith & Glass, 1977).
STUDY 1
The hypothesis was that women would engage
in more trait reflection than would men. Participants
were administered a questionnaire, and they reported
the frequency with which they asked themselves self-
reflecting questions.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were undergraduate students who
approached a booth on the campus of Concordia
University. A sign announced that volunteers were
needed to complete questionnaires for a psychology
project. Volunteers were offered lottery prizes for
their participation. The questionnaires, which were
presented in counterbalanced order, were completed
immediately at the booth. The trait-reflection ques-
tionnaire was included in the packet of questionnaires
(other questionnaires were for other research). In to-
tal, 191 participants (117 women and 74 men) between
the ages of 18 and 30 (M = 22.90, SD = 3.20) par-
ticipated. There were no gender differences in age
or education. Although ethnicity and language infor-
mation were not collected from each participant in
the present studies, the booth procedure has recently
been shown to result in the following sample pro-
file. When asked “What cultural group, if any, do you
identify most with?,” participants’ responses could
be grouped into the following principal categories:
Canadian (24%), Middle East and South Asia (14%),
Chinese (10%), European (10%), French Canadian
(6%), White (5%), Latin American (3%), and Black
(2%); 23% left the item blank. When asked “What
languages do you speak most often at home?,” most
responded as follows: 51% indicated English alone,
18% indicated French alone, 7% indicated English or
Csank and Conway
French and some third language, and 19% indicated
a language other than English or French.
Measures
A trait-reflection frequency questionnaire was
constructed for the purposes of the present study. The
questionnaire was designed to assess the frequency
with which individuals ask themselves self-reflecting
questions. On the questionnaire, participants were
first instructed to think of one word that describes
their personality. Participants were then asked to in-
dicate how frequently they ask themselves each of
six questions in regard to their selected personality
characteristic. The questions were: “Why do I think I
have this characteristic?,” “In what ways is this char-
acteristic important or not important to me?,” “How
does this characteristic relate to others that I have?,”
“What does it mean to me to have this characteris-
tic?,” “In what ways might people notice this about
me?,” and “Why do I see myself this way?” Partici-
pants responded on 5-point scales with the following
endpoints: almost never ask myself (1) and almost al-
ways ask myself (5). Question order was counterbal-
anced.
Results and Discussion
An overall trait-reflection score was derived by
averaging participants’ responses. Scores were nor-
mally distributed. Mean score was 2.92 (SD = .85);
scores ranged from 1 to 4.83. Cronbach alpha for the
measure was .84, which indicates satisfactory relia-
bility. A principal components analysis of responses
to the six items revealed one factor with an eigen-
value of 3.43 that accounted for 56% of the variance.
All items had high factor loadings (>.72). The trait-
reflection frequency questionnaire thus appears to be
a unitary measure of the frequency with which in-
dividuals ask themselves questions about their own
personality characteristics. In support of the hypoth-
esis, women reported significantly greater frequency
(M = 3.02, SD = .88) of trait reflection than did men
(M = 2.74, SD = .88), t(189) = 2.18, p < .05.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was a pilot study, which was conducted
with a limited number of participants. It addressed
the impact of self-reflection, particularly in regard
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Self-Reflection and Self-Clarity
to the degree of clarity with which people represent
the self. The hypothesis was that women, and to a
lesser extent men, would evidence a moderation ef-
fect. High-clarity individuals would drop in clarity,
and low-clarity individuals would gain in clarity in
the reflection condition. No changes were expected
in the distraction control condition. Even though a
pilot, the method of Study 2 is described in detail
given that Study 3 was virtually identical in design.
In addition to assessing individual differences in self-
clarity, we also measured participants’ self-esteem.
Greater self-clarity is associated with higher self-
esteem (Campbell et al., 1996), and we considered
that self-esteem might play a role in reactions to trait
reflection. As well, measures of affect were adminis-
tered before and after the reflection induction (and at
corresponding times in the control condition) in or-
der to determine whether any observed shifts in self-
clarity were accompanied by shifts in acute affect. As
no significant effects emerged for affect, this measure
is not addressed further.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from a booth on the
campus of Concordia University. At time of recruit-
ment, they completed a packet of questionnaires that
included the SCCS (Campbell et al., 1996). They also
completed the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale
(SES). Questionnaires were presented in counterbal-
anced order. They were also invited to complete a
form that would enable us to contact them for partic-
ipation in a future study.
Participants were selected on the basis of their
self-clarity scores. Participants were considered low
in self-clarity if they scored at or below the 25th per-
centile (a sum score of 34) of the SCCS distribution.
High scores on the SCCS reflect greater self-clarity.
Participants were considered high in self-clarity if
they scored at or above the 75th percentile (a sum
score of 46) of the distribution. In total, 38 low self-
clarity (19 men and 19 women) and 36 high self-clarity
(18 men and 18 women) individuals between the ages
of 18 and 30 (M = 23.03) participated. Mean clar-
ity scores for the low and high self-clarity groups
were 26.85 (SD = 4.25) and 49.51 (SD = 3.75), re-
spectively. Approximately equal numbers of low and
high self-clarity men and women were randomly as-
signed to the reflection and distraction conditions.
473
One participant was present at each session. Partici-
pants were paid $12 Canadian.
Materials
Self-Clarity. The Self-Concept Clarity Scale
(SCCS; Campbell et al., 1996) was used to assess the
extent to which self-beliefs are clearly and confidently
defined. The SCCS is a 12-item self-report measure of
the temporal stability, consistency, and clarity of self-
beliefs; it has demonstrated reliability and validity.
Higher scores reflect greater self-clarity.
Self-Esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using the
Self-Esteem Scale (SES; Rosenberg, 1965). The SES
is a reliable and valid 10-item self-report measure of
the positivity of feelings about the self. Higher scores
reflect higher self-esteem.
Procedure
Participants were recruited from a booth on the
campus of Concordia University. At recruitment, they
completed the SCCS and the SES, in counterbalanced
order, other questionnaires unrelated to the present
study, as well as providing name and telephone num-
ber if they were interested in participating in other re-
search. Three to five weeks later, they were contacted.
The purpose of the study was disguised. There was
one participant at each session. The experimenter,
blind to clarity condition, informed participants that
they would take part in two studies: The first study
concerned age differences in individuals’ descriptions
of their thoughts and feelings, and the second study
served to develop instruments to assess various opin-
ions and views of Canadian university students. In
fact, participants were randomly assigned to the ex-
perimental reflection or control distraction condition.
The manipulation in the reflection condition was an-
swering questions regarding traits that they had iden-
tified as self-descriptive. Questions were those used in
Study 1. In the distraction condition, the exact same
procedure was followed, with the exception that a dis-
traction task (reading a magazine and listening to mu-
sic) was substituted for the self-reflection task. Under
the guise of a separate study, all participants later com-
pleted the SCCS.
Trait-Reflection Condition. For the purpose of
the self-reflection task that would follow, participants
first wrote words that describe their personalities.
Instructions read in part: “We are interested in the
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474
personality characteristics that you feel best describe
you. Please think about what kinds of words you
would use to describe yourself.” They were instructed
to write for 5 min as many words as they wished in
the order that the words came to mind. The provided
sheet had eight lines.
Under the rationale that we were interested in
“natural thought processes,” participants then com-
pleted a stream of consciousness writing task. As
per Ericsson and Simon (1984), participants were in-
structed to write all the thoughts that were going
through their mind as they sat alone. They were asked
to write continuously during the 5-min period. This
task prepared participants for the upcoming written
self-reflection task.
Following the stream of consciousness writing
task, participants were provided with their previously
generated list of personality characteristics. They
were asked to transcribe three consecutive character-
istics from the middle of the list (lists ranged in length
from 4 to 15, with a mean of 9.90; SD = 3.37) onto a
separate sheet. Participants were then provided two
questions for each of the three characteristics. The six
questions of Study 1 were used, with each question be-
ing asked of only one characteristic. A what question
was always paired with a why or the how question.
Pairings were counterbalanced. Participants were left
alone to complete the self-reflection task. Instructions
and questions were presented on audiotape. Partici-
pants were instructed to write their answer to each
question, to begin writing immediately after they had
heard the question, and to continue writing until they
were asked to stop. Participants were provided 2 or 3
min to respond to each question. Time varied to pre-
vent participants from anticipating duration; allotted
time was counterbalanced. Total duration was 20 min.
Participants were then led to another room to
participate in the supposed second study. This decep-
tion avoided sensitizing participants to the relation
between the earlier tasks and the postmeasure of self-
clarity. Participants were told that the researcher con-
ducting the second study was unexpectedly unavail-
able. They were provided with a written introduction
that stated that the study was being conducted to de-
velop research measures that could be used “to es-
tablish a better understanding of the attitudes, opin-
ions, and thoughts of Canadian university students.”
From a number of questionnaire packets on the table,
the experimenter provided participants with a packet
that included the postmeasure SCCS along with filler
questionnaires. When the participant had completed
the questionnaires, the experimenter and participant
Csank and Conway
returned to the first room. Participants were supplied
the list of three personality characteristics they had se-
lected earlier, and they rated each of them on a 9-point
scale with the following endpoints: very negative (−4)
and very positive (+4). This scale was transformed to
a 1–9 scale for data analyses. Participants were then
debriefed and paid.
Distraction Control Condition. The procedure in
the control condition matched that of the experi-
mental trait-reflection condition, except that the self-
reflection task was replaced by a distraction task of
same duration. As such, participants in the distrac-
tion control condition first wrote words that described
their personalities, engaged in a 5-min stream of con-
sciousness writing task, and transcribed three charac-
teristics from the middle of their lists onto separate
sheets. These tasks served to equate the control con-
dition as much as possible with the reflection condi-
tion, except for the actual trait reflection; these tasks
were justified in terms of the cover story. Participants
in the distraction control condition then went on to
a pause, rather than engage in trait reflection. They
were asked to remain alone in the room during the
pause. Participants were supplied the current issue of
a popular science magazine. As well, a tape recording
of music by the Beatles was played.
Results
The moderation hypothesis was that self-
reflection would increase the clarity of individuals low
in clarity and decrease the clarity of individuals high
in clarity, and that this moderation effect would be
more pronounced for women than for men. Thus, the
main analysis was a 2 (chronic clarity: high vs. low) × 2
(condition: reflection vs. distraction) × 2 (time: pre-vs.
post measure) × 2 (gender) between–within ANOVA
on self-concept clarity scores. A clarity × condition ×
time × gender interaction was the hypothesized ef-
fect, but it was not significant (F < 1).
Exploratory analyses were conducted with a sub-
set of the data selected to reduce the confusion be-
tween degree of self-clarity and self-esteem: clarity
and esteem are correlated (self-esteem did not dif-
fer by gender). The data of participants with extreme
self-esteem scores (either very high or very low) were
excluded. Analyses revealed similar results, whether
self-esteem cutoffs of 1.00, 1.25, or 1.50 standard de-
viations (SD) from the mean were used. With cut-
offs of 1.25 SDs, three or four participants were ex-
cluded from each of the four cells of the clarity (high
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Self-Reflection and Self-Clarity
Fig. 1. Mean changes in Study 2 in acute self-clarity as a function of condition for women and men. Positive values denote
increased self-clarity, and negative values denote decreased self-clarity. Cell sizes are n = 9 and 9 for low chronic clarity women
in the reflection and distraction conditions, respectively. The corresponding cell sizes for high clarity women (6 and 8), low-clarity
men (7 and 7), and high clarity men (7 and 7) are similar.
vs. low) × reflection (reflection vs. distraction) design.
The overall sample size of 74 was reduced by 19%, to
60 (32 women and 28 men).
A 2 (chronic clarity) × 2 (condition: reflection
vs. distraction) × 2 (time: pre vs. post) × 2 (gender)
between–within ANOVA was conducted on self-
concept clarity scores for the reduced sample. The
expected clarity × condition × time × gender inter-
action was significant, F(1, 52) = 4.33, p < .05. The
4-way interaction shows that women demonstrated
the hypothesized clarity × condition × time interac-
tion, F(1, 28) = 4.45, p < .05, whereas men did not,
F < 1.3 See Fig. 1 for self-clarity change for low- and
high-clarity women and men in the reflection and dis-
traction conditions. Self-clarity change was calculated
by subtracting SCCS scores obtained in the study from
those obtained at recruitment. Positive and negative
change scores indicate increased and decreased clar-
ity, respectively. The clarity × condition × time ×
3 Analyses
of the data of male participants alone failed to reveal
any significant effects for experimental condition (reflection vs.
distraction) or any significant interaction effects involving clarity.
The only significant effect in the analyses of male participants’ data
was that, in line with the participant selection criteria, high-clarity
men were higher in self-clarity than low-clarity men. Note as well
that premeasures of self-clarity for men were similar to those for
women. Means were 28.0 and 49.0 for low- and high-clarity men in
the reflection condition, respectively. Corresponding means were
28.3 and 48.0 for men in the distraction condition.
475
gender interaction qualified a main effect for clar-
ity that confirmed the participant selection procedure
employed in the present study; F(1, 52) = 320.65,
p < .0001, and a significant clarity × time interac-
tion, F(1, 52) = 6.26, p < .05. Low-clarity individu-
als demonstrated a significant increase in self-clarity;
high-clarity individuals did not evidence a change in
clarity.
The significant interaction between clarity, con-
dition, and time for women was examined for simple
interaction effects. As expected, the clarity × time in-
teraction for women was significant in the reflection
condition, F(1, 13) = 8.08, p < .02, but not in the
distraction condition (F < 1). Low-clarity women
tended to evidence more clarity following reflection
than before, and high-clarity women tended to ev-
idence less clarity after reflection than before, but
these post hoc analyses were not significant. In con-
trast, both high- and low-clarity women in the dis-
traction condition evidenced an overall increase in
clarity.
Finally, across gender there was no difference
between high- and low-clarity participants in the num-
ber of words written during self-reflection (Fs < 1).
Analyses were also conducted on participants’ va-
lence ratings of their three selected personality traits.
The only significant effect was that low- relative
to high-clarity participants rated their traits as less
positive.
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476
Discussion
The results of the pilot Study 2 provide evi-
dence for the moderation effect for women, but not
men. Following self-reflection, women high in clar-
ity tended to experience decreased clarity whereas
women low in clarity tended to experience increased
clarity. The reflection induction did not influence the
degree of clarity of low and high-clarity men. The find-
ings suggest that the reflection induction employed in
Study 2 has a greater impact on women and is more
relevant for their sense of self. An attenuated moder-
ation effect was expected for men, but none emerged.
Sample size was small in Study 2, however, and con-
clusions must be tentative.
The expected results emerged for women only
when the data of participants with extreme self-
esteem scores were removed. In the analyses reported
above, 19% of the initial sample was excluded. It is un-
clear why individuals with extreme self-esteem scores
do not exhibit moderation as a consequence of reflect-
ing on self-ascribed personality characteristics. We re-
turn to this issue below.
There were increases in self-clarity for low-clarity
women in both reflection and distraction conditions.
One might argue that regression toward the mean oc-
curred across conditions for low-clarity women. It is
unclear, however, why this regression would have oc-
curred for women and not for men. The argument for
regression toward the mean is also undercut by the
fact that extreme scorers on self-esteem (and by im-
plication self-clarity) needed to be excluded in order
to observe the hypothesized results for women. Yet
regression toward the mean would presumably have
been greatest for these extreme scorers.
STUDY 3
The method of Study 2 was adopted for Study
3, with the exception that participants high and low
in clarity were selected so as to be matched on
self-esteem. This matching allowed for a stringent
examination of the influence of reflection on clarity
in high- and low-clarity individuals. A moderation ef-
fect of reflection was hypothesized for women. Self-
reflection was expected to augment self-clarity for
low-clarity women and to attenuate self-clarity for
high-clarity women. Such a moderation effect was not
expected to occur for women in the distraction con-
dition. In light of the results of Study 2, no significant
condition effect was expected for men.
Csank and Conway
Method
Participants
Low- and high-clarity participants were recruited
and identified as in Study 2. Low- and high-clarity
participants were matched on self-esteem by select-
ing participants who scored above the 25th percentile
of the self-esteem distribution (a score above 28)
or below the 75th percentile (a score below 34).
Forty low-clarity (20 men and 20 women) and 43
high-clarity (20 men and 23 women) individuals be-
tween the ages of 18 and 30 (M = 22.04, SD = 2.58)
participated. The low-clarity group had means of
29.85 for the SCCS (SD = 3.55) and 29.87 for the
SES (SD = 2.16). The corresponding means for the
high-clarity group were 47.45 (SD = 3.10) and 30.69
(SD = 3.26), respectively. Analyses of self-esteem
scores revealed that the high- and low-clarity groups
were similar on self-esteem (Fs < 1). Assignment
to condition, scheduling, and payment were as in
Study 2.
Procedure
All materials, measures, and procedures were
identical to those in Study 2. As in Study 2, af-
fect measures were administered but no effects
emerged.
Results
A 2 (chronic clarity) × 2 (condition) × 2 (time) ×
2 (gender) between–within ANOVA was conducted
on self-clarity scores. The expectation was a signif-
icant clarity × condition × time × gender interac-
tion. The analysis revealed a significant clarity ×
time interaction, F(1, 75) = 8.05, p < .01, indicating
that, across condition and gender, high-clarity partici-
pants tended to evidence decreased clarity (pre: M =
47.45, SD = 3.15 vs. post: M = 45.56, SD = 6.46),
t(42) = 2.04, p < .06, and low-clarity participants ev-
idenced increased clarity (pre: M = 29.84, SD = 3.54
vs. post: M = 32.54, SD = 8.15), t(39) = 2.19, p <
.05. This 2-way interaction was, however, qualified
by the expected clarity × condition × time × gen-
der interaction, F(1, 75) = 5.25, p < .03. This 4-way
interaction indicates that women demonstrated the
hypothesized clarity × condition × time interac-
tion, F(1, 39) = 5.68, p < .03, whereas men did not,
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Self-Reflection and Self-Clarity 477

Fig. 2. Mean changes in Study 3 in acute self-clarity as a function of condition for women and men. Positive values denote
increased self-clarity, and negative values denote decreased self-clarity. Cell sizes are n = 10 and 10 for low chronic clarity
women in the reflection and distraction conditions, respectively. The corresponding cell sizes for high clarity women (12 and
11), low clarity men (10 and 10), and high clarity men (10 and 10) are identical or similar.

F < 1.4 See Fig. 2 for self-clarity change across time
for low- and high-clarity women and men in the
reflection and distraction conditions. As in Study
2, self-clarity change was calculated by subtracting
SCCS scores obtained in the study from those ob-
tained at recruitment. Positive and negative change
scores indicate increased and decreased clarity, re-
spectively. No other significant interactions emerged
in the ANOVA (Fs < 1). The only other significant
effect that emerged was a main effect for clarity,
F(1, 75) = 252.03, p < .001, that confirmed the par-
ticipant selection procedure.
The significant interaction between clarity, con-
dition, and time for women was examined for sim-
ple interaction effects. On the basis of the hypoth-
esis, an interaction between clarity and time was
expected in the reflection condition but not in the
distraction condition. As expected, this interaction
4 As
in Study 2, analyses of the data of male participants alone
failed to reveal any significant effects for experimental condition
(reflection vs. distraction) and any significant interaction effects
involving clarity. The only significant effect in the analyses of male
participants’ data was that high-clarity men were higher in self-
clarity than low-clarity men. Note as well that pre-measures of self-
clarity for men were similar to those for women. Means were 30.6
and 47.0 for low- and high-clarity men in the reflection condition,
respectively. Corresponding means were 30.2 and 47.8 for men in
the distraction condition.
was significant for women in the reflection condi-
tion, F(1, 20) = 10.83, p < .01, and not in the dis-
traction condition, F < 1. Post hoc analyses revealed
that low-clarity women evidenced greater self-clarity
after reflection (M = 33.02, SD = 7.74) than before
(M = 27.88, SD = 3.35), t(9) = 2.51, p < .04. In ad-
dition, high-clarity women evidenced less clarity af-
ter reflection (M = 41.71, SD = 7.70) than before
(M = 47.01, SD = 3.03), t(11) = 2.35, p < .05. There
were no significant changes in self-clarity in the dis-
traction condition (Fs < 1).
Analyses examined possible group differ-
ences in the quantity of reflection that occurred
for participants in the reflection condition. High-
and low-clarity participants did not differ in the
number of words written during self-reflection, nor
did any gender difference emerge. On average,
participants wrote 364 (SD = 117) words. Analyses
conducted on participants’ valence ratings of their
three personality traits revealed only a significant
main effect for clarity, F(1, 75) = 4.07, p < .05.
Across condition and gender, low-clarity participants
(M = 4.53, SD = 5.18) rated their self-descriptive
traits less positively than did high-clarity participants
(M = 6.50, SD = 3.97). The mean rating for low-
clarity participants was not negative in an absolute
sense, but rather was near the neutral midpoint of the
scale.
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478
Discussion
Findings of Study 3 were clearly consistent with
expectations. As in the pilot Study 2, the moderation
hypothesis was supported for women. Low-clarity
women gained in clarity and high-clarity women de-
clined in clarity as a consequence of reflecting on their
own traits. In contrast, there was no significant change
in clarity for women in the distraction condition. The
reflection findings emerged even as there was no sig-
nificant difference between low- and high-clarity in-
dividuals in the extent to which they abided by the
reflection instructions, in that the number of words
written did not significantly differ across low- and
high-clarity participants.
There were no significant effects for men in Study
3 (see Footnote 4) as a function of experimental con-
dition. Men seem relatively impervious to the self-
reflection task. This is not because they did not en-
gage in the reflection task. There were no gender
differences in the number of words generated. At-
tempts to identify gender differences in the nature of
the content, in terms of the types of self-descriptions
written, were not successful. Nor were there gender
differences in the valence of the personality charac-
teristics that served as targets of self-reflection. Simi-
larly, there were no gender differences in acute affect,
either before or after the reflection period. Perhaps,
in-line with the findings of Study 1, men were not in-
fluenced by the trait-reflection task because they are
less prone to reflect inward on their own characteris-
tics. As suggested earlier, individuals who have a more
self-assertive, instrumental (i.e. agentic) orientation
may be averse to engaging in self-reflection. Such a
task may remain relatively unimportant to them and
may not be considered relevant to their self-views, re-
gardless of their level of self-clarity. Prior research has
shown that men respond with less self-attention than
women do, given the same self-focus manipulation
(Ingram et al., 1988).
High- and low-clarity participants in Study 3
were matched on self-esteem, and so the findings
are best understood as describing the impact of trait
reflection on individuals with moderate self-esteem
scores. By this account, the present results are
relevant to most individuals. Similarly, it is only when
individuals with extreme self-esteem scores were
excluded that significant results emerged in Study
2. Individuals with extreme self-esteem scores may
be relatively indifferent to self-reflection, at least as
operationalized in the present studies. Perhaps indi-
viduals with extreme self-esteem scores have more
Csank and Conway
stable views of the self, regardless of their level of
clarity.
Although there were significant shifts in self-
clarity in Study 3 (and a significant interaction in
Study 2), the relative standing of low- and high-
clarity women remained intact. Low-clarity women
remained lower in clarity than high-clarity women.
As such, the present trait-reflection manipulation was
probably less powerful than manipulations in some
other research. Baumgardner (1990) provided par-
ticipants with feedback that suggested either that
they had certain and well-defined self-knowledge
or that they had poorly defined and uncertain self-
knowledge. Participants who received self-certain
feedback evidenced increased positive affect relative
to those who received uncertain feedback. In con-
trast, there were no significant effects for affect in the
present experimental trait-reflection studies.
One might question whether self-reflection was
actually avoided in the distraction control condition
in Study 3 (and Study 2). To match conditions as much
as possible, participants in both reflection and dis-
traction conditions listed self-descriptive personality
characteristics, and then transcribed three of them.
As such, distraction participants were self-focused to
some degree early on during the study. Yet partici-
pants in the trait-reflection condition went on to spend
20 min thinking about the what, why, and how of self-
assigned characteristics. As such, there is a large dif-
ference in amount of self-focus between conditions.
Generally speaking, it is not necessary to argue for ab-
solute differences between conditions (complete self-
focus vs. complete external focus) to address issues
such as self-directed attention or reflection. Indeed, it
would be difficult in any particular study to substan-
tiate this extreme position on empirical grounds.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present findings support the view that
women are more likely than men to reflect upon their
own personality characteristics (Study 1) and that this
type of self-reflection more greatly affects women
than it does men (Study 3). A moderation effect in
women was observed as a consequence of a structured
self-reflection task in which participants answered in
writing what, why, and how questions regarding some
personality characteristics that they themselves con-
sidered self-descriptive.
The present findings converge with those of other
researchers that indicate that women may be higher in
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Self-Reflection and Self-Clarity
private self-consciousness. This general openness to
introspection could account for women being more
likely to become acutely self-conscious when faced
with a self-focusing situational cue such as a mirror
(Ingram et al., 1988). That women are more likely to
reflect on their own traits, and are more sensitive to
such trait reflection, is consistent with the general view
that women have substantial experience in discussing,
thinking about, and explaining their inner thoughts
and feelings (Belenky et al., 1986). This self-reflective
orientation can work well with women’s greater in-
terpersonal and interdependent socialization experi-
ence (cf. Spence et al., 1984). Women can be open
to both others’ and their own experience. In con-
trast, it seems unlikely that more agentic individu-
als, being more self-assertive and instrumentally ori-
ented, would be drawn to or sensitive to self-reflection
upon their own traits and characteristics. In support
of this view, Conway (2000) found that individuals
higher in masculinity (agency) represented their own
and others’ emotions in less complex ways. Although
agency was not assessed in the present studies, one
might argue that an incongruency of agency with self-
reflection may have contributed to men’s reported
lower trait reflection in Study 1 and to their being
relatively impervious to the effects of the reflection
period in the pilot Study 2 and Study 3.
The present research focused on trait reflection.
Other types of reflection or self-focus may have
different consequences. Consider, for example,
attitude polarization (Tesser, 1978). People with a
positive attitude toward some object who think about
the attitude object may exhibit more polarized (i.e.,
more positive) attitudes. The same holds true for
negative attitudes. This polarization seems to reflect
selective focus on material that supports the existing
attitude. Attitude polarization differs from the
moderation observed here in a number of respects.
Polarization concerns attitudinal valence, and it is
more likely to occur for well-defined (i.e., schematic)
attitudes. In contrast, the moderation observed here
was for degree of clarity, and high-clarity individuals
(i.e., with apparently well-defined self-concepts) ev-
idenced moderation, not polarization. Thus, valence
needs to be distinguished from degree of self-clarity.
Moderation in self-clarity for high- and low-
clarity women was observed as a consequence of a
self-reflection task. This moderation seems beneficial.
The research reviewed earlier suggests that extreme
scores on self-clarity are not beneficial, whether those
scores are very low or very high. In the present ex-
perimental studies, low-clarity women seem to have
479
gained by having greater self-clarity. This gain is pre-
sumably what they desired (cf. Campbell & Lavallee,
1993). High-clarity women may have (reluctantly)
gained by having a less constrained self-definition.
Yet clarity should not be taken to reflect greater self-
understanding. Degree of clarity, whether high or low,
has no implications in regard to the accuracy of self-
beliefs “in the sense of insight or awareness of one’s
behavioral potentials” (Campbell et al., 1996, p. 142).
As well, the shifts in self-clarity observed here do not
necessarily reflect a more benign view of self.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This article is based on Patricia Csank’s doc-
toral dissertation that was completed in partial ful-
fillment of the requirements of the PhD program in
Psychology at Concordia University, under the super-
vision of Michael Conway. The research was funded
by research grants from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, and from
the Fonds pour la Formation des Chercheurs et l’Aide
a la Recherche (FCAR) of Quebec. Patricia Csank
was supported by an FCAR doctoral fellowship.
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