1) Guevara vs Eala (A.C. No.

7136)

JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA

August 1, 2007

FACTS: On March 4, 2002, a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct
and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January
2000 when his then-fiancée Irene Moje introduced the respondent to him as her friend who was married to
Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read “I love you,” “I
miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or
early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her
work.

In February or March 2001, the complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001,
the complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger, and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings. The complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to
Irene, Complainant soon saw the respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street,
New Manila whereas he later learned sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002, together with the respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.

ISSUE: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Whether a lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman, not his wife, or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as ‘grossly immoral conduct’ depending on the
surrounding circumstances.’ The case at the bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Sexual
relations outside marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v.
Rongcal)

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct, and indicative
of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
(Tucay v. Atty. Tucay)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer’s oath he took before admission to practice law. Respondent
admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this
connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates
the husband and the wife “to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.

Furthermore, the respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,” and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any “conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala was disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2) Wassmer vs Velez (GR No. L-20089)

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

December 26, 1964

FACTS: Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez had decided to get married and set the date for
September 4, 1954. Various preparations were made, including obtaining a marriage license, printing and
distributing invitations to relatives, friends, and acquaintances, purchasing the bride-to-be's trousseau,
preparing the dresses of the entourage members, and buying a matrimonial bed and its accessories,
among other things. Bridal showers were held, and gifts were received.

On September 2, two days before the wedding, Velez went to his hometown in Mindanao and left a note
for Wassmer, postponing the wedding and citing his mother's opposition. The next day, September 3, he
sent her a telegram assuring her of his return soon but stating that nothing had changed. Afterward, Velez
was never heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and won the lawsuit by default. Almost two months later, Velez filed a
petition for relief from orders, judgment, and proceedings, as well as a motion for a new trial and
reconsideration. Velez's petition was unsuccessful, so he appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
He argues that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE: May a person be held liable even in the absence of a provision authorizing an action for breach of
promise to marry?

RULING: Although a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, it must not be
overlooked that the extent to which acts not contrary to the law may be perpetrated with impunity is not
limitless. Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." In
this case, to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs, for which the defendant must be held accountable in damages in accordance
with Article 21.

Under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages,
as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Furthermore, the award of exemplary damages is
also appropriate. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in a wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner. This warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him. Therefore, Velez should be held liable.
3) Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA (GR No. 119190)

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

January 16, 1997

FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988, at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros,
Manila. After the celebration and wedding reception, the newlyweds went to the house of the husband-defendant's
mother. Contrary to her expectations, instead of consummating their marriage, the husband-defendant simply went to
bed, slept on one side, and then turned his back to sleep. Even in the following nights, the couple failed to
consummate their marriage. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed for almost ten (10) months,
but there was no attempt at sexual intercourse. The wife claims that she did not even see her husband's private parts,
nor did he see hers.

On January 20, 1989, they underwent medical examinations conducted by Dr. Eufamio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital. The results of the physical examination showed that she was healthy, normal, and still a
virgin, while the results of her husband's examination were kept confidential. Medications were only prescribed for her
husband, but the details were also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her, but her husband was asked to
return for further evaluation, which he failed to do.

Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to annul their marriage.

The husband-defendant does not want their marriage annulled because he loves his wife very much, believes there is
no defect on his part, and sees a chance for reconciliation. However, the husband-defendant claims that if their
marriage is to be annulled due to psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them.
According to the defendant, this was because every time he attempted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
avoided him, and whenever he touched her private parts, she would remove his hands. The defendant claims that he
forced his wife to have sex with him once, but he stopped because she was shaking and did not appear to enjoy it.
Another physical examination conducted by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., as documented in a Medical Report, showed no
evidence of impotence on the part of the husband-defendant.

The trial court rendered a judgment declaring the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity.
2. Whether or not there is a necessity to determine who between the couple are psychologically incapacitated.

RULING: Yes, the refusal of a couple to engage in sexual intercourse with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity. The Court asserts that one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of a
marriage." Continuous failure to fulfill this obligation will ultimately destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In this case, the Court ruled that the senseless and prolonged refusal of one party to fulfill this marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The Court further quotes, "If a spouse, although physically capable, simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and continuous, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity rather than stubborn refusal. Senseless and prolonged refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the extended refusal of a spouse to engage in sexual intercourse with his or her partner is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity."

While the law stipulates that the husband and wife are obligated to live together and observe mutual love, respect,
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the actual sanction lies in the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not in any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is meaningless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no person exists in isolation, and the cruelest act of a spouse in marriage is
to say, "I could not have cared less."
4) Citizenship (Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

● Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
● Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
● Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
● Those who are naturalized in accordance with law (Section 1, Article IV).

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 of Section 1 shall be deemed natural-born citizens (Section 2, Article IV).

Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law (Section 3, Article IV).

Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission,
they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it (Section 4, Article IV).

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law (Section 5,
Article IV).

5) The Judicial Department (Article VIII, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of
age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines.

1. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine
Bar.
2. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence (Section 7, Article VIII).

6) Void and Voidable Marriages (Chapter 3, Family Code)

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

1. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s
spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As
amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase “However, in case of marriage
celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall
prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect” has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533
[Approved February 23, 1998]).

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:

1. The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered
legitimate;
2. The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by
a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
3. Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
4. The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
5. The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio
and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law. (n)

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of
age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
2. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
3. That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
4. That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
5. That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
6. That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:

1. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
3. Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the
time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the
periods indicated herein:

1. For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not
give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached
the age of twenty-one;
2. For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of
the other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at
any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;
3. For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;
4. For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the
time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
5. For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after
the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment. (88a)

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody
and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and
material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided
to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n)

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of
the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered
as advances on their legitime. (n)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.
(n)

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or
born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
8) Requirements for being a lawyer and Supreme Court Judge Qualification for Admission to the Practice of
Law

REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING A LAWYER

First Requirement (Before admission to the Bar)

1. Filipino Citizen
2. At least 21 years old
3. A resident of the Philippines
4. College graduate with a Bachelor's Degree
5. Law graduate with a Juris Doctor degree or its equivalent
6. Must be of good moral character, and no charges against him, involving moral turpitude have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines
7. Must pass the Bar Examinations
8. Must take the lawyer's oath before the Supreme Court itself
9. Must sign the Rolls of Attorney and receive from the Clerk of Court a certificate of the license to practice.

Second Requirement (After admission to the Bar) -

1. Must be a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

2. Must regularly pay all IBP membership dues and other lawful assessment
3. Must observe faithfully the rules and ethics of the profession
4. Should be subject to judicial disciplinary control

Purpose of Imposing the requirements - the said requirements are imposed to see to it that those who are
admitted to the practice of law are mentally and morally fit to discharge their duties to their clients, to the courts, and
to the public in general (Rolando A. Suarez, Introduction to Law, pp. 27-29).

REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING A SUPREME COURT JUDGE

SECTION 7: No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless

1. He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least 40 years of
age and must have been for 15 years or a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed
judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its
proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.